

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 3/5/86

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THE ACTING SECRETARY

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NIACT/IMMEDIATE - JERUSALEM

IMMEDIATE - TEL AVIV, BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

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FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY

E.O. 12065: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, IS, LE, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: ISRAEL-LEBANON
NEGOTIATIONS

REF: TEL AVIV 05212

1. SECRET--ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE AGREE WITH THE BASIC COURSE OF ACTION YOU OUTLINED
IN YOUR MESSAGE (REFTEL) FOR THE NEXT STAGE IN THE
ISRAEL-LEBANON TALKS AND SUPPORT THE U.S. POSITIONS THAT
YOU HAVE PROPOSED. AN IMPASSE, FOLLOWED BY MORE
PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS, IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST, AND WE
SHOULD DO THE UTMOST TO AVOID THIS OUTCOME, WHILE
RECOGNIZING THAT THERE MAY WELL BE CONTINUED DIFFERENCES
WITH ISRAEL OVER SOME OF THE KEY PROBLEMS IN THE TALKS.

3. WE ARE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, OVER PLO AND BROADER ARAB
BACKING FOR THE RETENTION OF UNIFIL AS PART OF
ARRANGEMENTS WITH LEBANON TO ASSURE PROTECTION FOR THE
CAMPS IN THE SOUTH, IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL. ACCORDINGLY, YOU SHOULD HOLD ON TO THE

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LIMITED UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT ROLE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, AS WE
ASSUME YOU WOULD DO.

4. WITH REGARD TO A VISIT BY THE SECRETARY TO THE AREA
TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE
BETTER TO DECIDE THIS ONCE THE RESULTS OF OUR STRATEGY
ARE CLEAR AND IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSIDERING OTHER STEPS
TO ESCALATE THE LEVEL OF PERSUASION. A U.S.-BACKED
AGREEMENT WOULD THEN HAVE BEEN TABLED AND WE WOULD HAVE
THE FULL BENEFIT OF THE ISRAELI REACTION. YYY

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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E.O. 12065: GDS 2/25/87 (HILL, CHARLES) OR-M
TAGS: P8OR, IS, XF
SUBJECT: ALLEGED USG MAP OF WEST BANK-OWNED LAND IN
ISRAEL

1. (U) MILITARY CORRESPONDENT ZE'EV SCHIFF CLAIMS ON FRONT PAGE OF FEBRUARY 25 HAARETZ TO HAVE SEEN A MAP, ALLEGEDLY DRAWN UP BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT, DEPICTING, INTER ALIA, LANDS IN ISRAEL THAT BELONG TO ARAB RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK. SCHIFF SAYS THAT THE MAP SHOWS THAT MANY ISRAELI TOWNS, ESPECIALLY IN THE COASTAL PLAIN, ARE LOCATED ON SUCH LAND. HE CITES CONCENTRATION OF SUCH LAND ALONG THE GREEN LINE IN THE VICINITY OF RAANANA AND KEFAR SABA AS WELL AS FURTHER AFIELD NEAR ARAD.
2. (U) ACCORDING TO SCHIFF, THE PURPOSE OF THE MAP, WHICH WAS PREPARED UNDER THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, WAS TO COUNTER ISRAELI CLAIMS TO LAND IN THE WEST BANK BY DEMONSTRATING THAT "THERE IS FAR MORE ARAB LAND IN ISRAEL THAN JEWISH LAND IN THE WEST BANK, AND THIS LAND IS OWNED BY ARABS RESIDING IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA."

3. (C) WE HAVE SEEN A MAP WHICH DEPICTS THOSE ARAB VILLAGE LANDS THAT FORMERLY EXTENDED ON BOTH SIDES
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PAGE 02 TEL AV 03087 251057Z

OF THE GREEN LINE, PREPARED IN 1977, BUT NEITHER WE

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MOR CONGEN JERUSALEM ARE AWARE OF ANY USG MAP THAT
FITS THE ABOVE DESCRIPTION, I.E. ONE THAT FOCUSSES
ON LAND WITHIN ISRAEL PROPER OWNED BY WEST BANKERS.
WE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING IF ANY SUCH MAP EXISTS
AND, IF SO, HOW WE SHOULD RESPOND TO THE PRESS
QUERIES THAT WE HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO RECEIVE ON
THIS SUBJECT. IN THE INTERIM WE WILL SAY THAT WE
HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH A MAP AND WILL DIRECT
INQUIRIES TO WASHINGTON. BROWN

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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August 19, 1982

TO: The Secretary
FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis
SUBJECT: U.S. Reaction to Approval of Habib Plan

The Israeli Cabinet today approved the Habib Plan. Lebanon and the PLO had done so earlier. Israel, however, says the plan will not be implemented until the PLO turns over two Israeli soldiers and the bodies of nine others. There are other details yet to be worked out as well. The question now is: should you recommend to the President that we now issue his statement welcoming this success -- and which you would follow up with a press conference.

PRO

- Formal approval by all key parties is now in hand. A U.S. announcement will be expected.
- Although difficulties remain a Presidential statement could give important momentum to the effort to resolve them in time to meet Saturday's scheduled departure.
- To delay our response would in effect be bowing to the Palestinian radicals who kidnapped an Israeli soldier last night and who continue to violate the cease-fire on a small scale.

CON

- We have already issued a brief welcoming statement which can hold off the media until we are sure that implementation is possible.
- Too many things can go wrong following such a Presidential statement today. If the kidnapped and captured Israelis are not handed over, or PLO cease-fire violations continue, the President's statement could be followed within hours by a massive Israeli attack.
- There is much in the plan that is unspoken and tacitly agreed; to focus on it in a press conference could lead some of the parties to backtrack.

Sam Lewis thinks a U.S. public announcement at the Presidential/Secretary level is premature. Too many things can go wrong between today and Saturday.

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*R Phil agrees a 78
Presidential
announcement would
be premature and
dangerous -
This should
be held until about
7:00 pm our time
Tomorrow so there
would be an
incredible momentum
in press*

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ACTION: NEA

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PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

ON THE OCCASION OF AGREEMENT

ON PLAN FOR RESOLUTION OF WEST BEIRUT CRISIS

AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS INFORMED ME THAT A PLAN TO RESOLVE THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS HAS BEEN AGREED UPON BY ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED. AS PART OF THIS PLAN, THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON HAS REQUESTED, AND I HAVE APPROVED, THE DEPLOYMENT OF U. S. FORCES TO BEIRUT AS PART OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

THE NEGOTIATIONS TO DEVELOP THIS PLAN HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY COMPLEX AND HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED IN THE MOST ARDUOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. AT TIMES, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE HOW AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED, AND YET IT HAS BEEN REACHED.

THE STATESMANSHIP AND COURAGE OF PRESIDENT SARKIS AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DESERVE SPECIAL RECOGNITION, AS DOES THE MAGNIFICENT WORK OF AMBASSADOR HABIB. PHIL NEVER LOST HOPE, AND IN THE END HIS SPIRIT AND DETERMINATION CARRIED THE DAY. WE ALL OWE HIM A DEEP DEBT OF GRATITUDE.

THE PARTIES WHO MADE THIS PLAN POSSIBLE HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING ITS SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION. I EXPECT ITS TERMS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN GOOD FAITH AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREED TIMETABLE. THIS WILL REQUIRE METICULOUS ADHERENCE TO THE CEASEFIRE. VIOLATIONS BY ANY PARTY WOULD IMPERIL THE PLAN AND BRING RENEWED BLOODSHED AND TRAGEDY TO THE PEOPLE OF BEIRUT. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES MUST THAT BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN.

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Date: 3/5/86

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AS YOU KNOW, MY AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE U. S. FORCES IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WAS ESSENTIAL TO OUR SUCCESS. IN THE DAYS AHEAD, THEY AND FORCES FROM FRANCE AND ITALY WILL BE PLAYING AN IMPORTANT BUT CAREFULLY LIMITED NON-COMBATANT ROLE. THE PARTIES TO THE PLAN HAVE AGREED TO THIS ROLE AND HAVE PROVIDED ASSURANCES ON THE SAFETY OF OUR FORCES. OUR PURPOSE WILL BE TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN CARRYING OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THE DEPARTURES OF PLO LEADERS, OFFICES, AND COMBATANTS IN BEIRUT FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY UNDER SAFE AND ORDERLY CONDITIONS. THE PRESENCE OF U. S. FORCES ALSO WILL FACILITATE THE RESTORATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OVER THE BEIRUT AREA. IN NO CASE WILL OUR TROOPS STAY LONGER THAN 30 DAYS.

THE PARTICIPATION OF FRANCE AND ITALY IN THIS EFFORT IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THESE GOOD FRIENDS OF THE U. S.

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SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS BY RESPONSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN NOW AGREED WILL SET THE STAGE FOR THE URGENT INTERNATIONAL ACTION REQUIRED TO RESTORE LEBANON'S FULL SOVEREIGNTY, UNITY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, OBTAIN THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM THAT COUNTRY, AND HELP ENSURE THE SECURITY OF NORTHERN ISRAEL. WE MUST ALSO MOVE QUICKLY IN THE CONTEXT OF CAMP DAVID TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, AS WELL AS THE OTHER UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. ONLY WHEN ALL THESE STEPS ARE ACCOMPLISHED CAN TRUE AND LASTING PEACE AND SECURITY BE ACHIEVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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September 3, 1982

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Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Thank you very much for your message of August 21 with your very kind words on the successful resolution of the West Beirut crisis. We, too, are extremely pleased and proud that Ambassador Habib's skill and patience have resulted in a plan for the evacuation of the PLO from West Beirut, and we are heartened by the success of the plan's implementation.

With the completion of the evacuation of the PLO from West Beirut, we are turning our attention to negotiating arrangements for the withdrawal of Syrian, Israeli and remaining PLO forces from Lebanon. We will continue to work closely on such issues with the Lebanese government, as we encourage it to exert maximum effort to strengthen its institutions, expand its authority throughout its sovereign territory and promote a genuine reconciliation among Lebanon's many communities.

There is a strong possibility that certain international peacekeeping arrangements in an extensive area of southern Lebanon will have to become part of a general solution. In this context, there can be no return to the situation in which southern Lebanon can be used as a staging area for military attacks against Israel. We will, of course, be consulting very closely with the United Nations on this very important subject, particularly as it affects UNIFIL. We also plan to work closely with the Lebanese government on the question of arrangements for southern Lebanon as part of efforts to restore the government's control over all of its sovereign territory.

I look forward to consulting with you on these very important issues as we pursue efforts to bring peace and stability back to Lebanon.

Sincerely yours,

L. D. Long

George P. Shultz

His Excellency
Javier Perez de Cuellar,
Secretary General of the United Nations,
New York.

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PLANNING CHECKLIST

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D-6 (Aug. 10)*

- Agreement reached between GOL and PLO on withdrawal plan.
- Israelis accept agreement.
- Negotiations completed on texts of notes to be exchanged between GOL and respective MNF contributors.
- ICRC begins chartering ships.
- President informed by Secretary Shultz. (Action - NEA/PM)
- Sec-Pres memo transmitting agreements and seeking authority to sign them. (Action - L)
- Further consultation with Congress (including calls by Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger. (Action - PM/NEA/H)
- Final agreement of recipient countries (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan) confirming acceptance of PLO leadership and fighters.
- Notes exchanged between GOL and respective MNF contributors to confirm MNF mandate.
- Assurances concerning safety of MNF received from appropriate parties.
- Review/confirm ICRC arrangements. (Action - NEA/PM)
- Consider further consultations with Congress.
- Update press guidance. (Action - NEA/PM/PA)
- Presidential messages to French and Italian Chiefs of State expressing appreciation for their participation in MNF. (Action - NEA)
- Discuss Lebanon situation at previously scheduled luncheon with Senator Baker. (Action - NEA/PM/H/L) (Aug. 11 - real date)

- 5 (Aug. 11)

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*Tentative dates based on D-Day being August 16.

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- D-4 (Aug. 12)
- Secretary speaks to House Republican Conference (Action - PM/NEA/H) (Aug. 11 - real date).
 - PLO begins processing evacuees, identifying them by destination, and collecting all but personal weapons.
 - LAF continues detailed planning with PLO regarding evacuation (e.g., departure routes, times, evacuees per day).
 - Negotiations begin with Israel about implementation of agreement affecting MNF and UN observer deployments, and PLO departure.
 - ICRC charters completed for evacuation vessels; first ships underway to Beirut; ICRC provides information to shipowners concerning planned arrangements and options (e.g., disposition of PLO personal weapons, USN escorts, indemnification issues).
 - Begin daily meetings in Washington with French and Italians on U.S. diplomatic consultation and public affairs strategies. (Action - NEA/PM)
 - GOL informs UNSYG about formal agreements concerning MNF and PLO departure. (Action - IO/L).
 - U.S. informs UNSYG and briefs Secretariat. (Action - IO)
 - U.S. informs NATO allies, M.E. friends, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, PRC, USSR. Circular message for all diplomatic posts. (Action - NEA)
 - Cabinet briefed on MNF. (Action - PM/NEA)
 - President meets with Congressional leadership about Beirut, MNF, etc. (Action - PM/NEA/H)
 - On-the-record White House statement and White House press backgrounder. Follow-up press guidance prepared for use by White House, DOD, and State. (Action - PM/NEA/PA)
 - Amphibs underway from Naples.

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- D-3 (Aug. 13)
- Agreement among all parties on arrangements for participation of UN observers in PLO withdrawal operation.
 - Review funding issues (e.g., compensation to ICRC, peacekeeping expenses associated with U.S. contribution to MNF).
- D-2 (Aug. 14)
- First charter ship arrives in Beirut. (6th Fleet escorts available if needed.)
 - Representatives (if any) from receiving nation arrive in Beirut.
 - Secretary conducts possible background session with selected journalists. (Action - NEA/PM/PA)
- D-1 (Aug. 15)
- Final arrangements for French MNF deployment.
 - Check access to, and conditions at, port and airfield.
- D-Day (Aug. 16)
- LAF takes up positions.
 - French MNF elements (350 people) enter Beirut.
 - PLO begins departure. First ship for Jordan and Iraq is loaded. Wounded may also be transferred beginning on D-Day to specified country(ies).
 - UN observers in position.
 - On-camera White House statement issued. Follow-up backgrounder at White House. (Action - PM/NEA/H)
 - Special UNGA session on Palestine begins in New York (Aug. 16 - real date).
- D+1 (Aug. 17)
- Congressional briefings begin on MNF. (Action - PM/NEA/H)
- D+2 (Aug. 18)
- All evacuees for Jordan and Iraq will have departed.
- D+3 (Aug. 19)
- UNFII mandate expires. (Aug. 19 - real date).

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- D+4 (Aug. 20)
- Ships begin loading PLO for Egypt.
 - Congress goes into recess (Aug. 20 - real date).
 - Final preparations for U.S.-Italian MNF deployment.
- D+5 to D+6 (Aug. 21-22)
- U.S. and Italian MNF elements enter.
 - Remaining French elements also enter.
 - White House press announcement of U.S. entry, Qs and As to be used by State, DOD, White House.
- D+6 (Aug. 22)
- All evacuees for Egypt will have departed.
 - First convoys for Syria begin departure.
- D+7 (Aug. 23)
- Send War Powers notification to Hill (on day after U.S. military personnel enter Beirut).
- D+12 (Aug. 28)
- ADF units begin departure for Syria.
- D+14 (Aug. 30)
- Last PLO depart Beirut, turn over assembled crew-served and heavy weapons to LAF. ADF also completes withdrawal. The MNF assists the LAF and ISF in arrangements, as may be agreed by the governments concerned, to ensure good and lasting security throughout the area of operation.
- D+30 (Sept. 15)
- All elements of MNF depart, except by mutual consent of contributing governments and GOL. (The American force will depart Lebanon not later than thirty days after its arrival or sooner at the request of the GOL or at the direction of the USG.)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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August 9, 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *ups*

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SUBJECT: Status Report on Lebanon

Phil Habib has finished his "final package plan" and sent it to us for review. The plan looks good. Ambassador Lewis will forward it to Begin this evening and meet with him Tuesday morning. Begin continues to resist the idea that part of the multinational force will enter on the day the PLO will start to withdraw. This has, however, become a practical necessity. If we can firm up the final destinations of all of the PLO fighters and communicate this to Begin, it would greatly facilitate Israeli approval. We are trying to confirm PLO reports to Habib that Egypt has agreed to participate. This would be the breakthrough that we need. In any event, Phil may have to go to Jerusalem to talk to Begin and a letter from you to Begin may be needed in the next day or so.

We have strongly protested the Israeli harassment on Saturday and Sunday of our helicopters as they ferried our liaison officers in and out of Beirut for meetings with Phil. One was buzzed by an Israeli fighter plane coming dangerously close, passengers and crew were delayed in questioning, and an Israeli patrol boat trained its guns on another helicopter as it was coming in to land. In response to our tough protests, the Israelis assured us there was no malicious intent and Begin has sent his personal apologies. We have made it clear that there are to be no more such incidents.

Within Israel, Defense Minister Sharon has launched a media campaign aimed at discrediting Phil and undercutting his mission. Lewis has protested strongly to Foreign Minister Shamir and we see some signs of a press backlash against Sharon and his tactics. In our public statements here, we will make clear your absolute confidence in Habib, the accuracy of his reporting, and in his mission as a whole.

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-- THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 24 AND FOR YOUR CONGRATULATIONS ON MY NEW RESPONSIBILITIES. AS MY RECENT MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR GHORBAL INDICATED, I PLACE THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY AND WELL WITH YOU AS WE SEEK TO ACHIEVE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF A JUST AND STABLE PEACE THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. IN THAT SPIRIT, I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO OPEN WITH YOU WHAT I HOPE WILL BE A REGULAR AND FRANK DIALOGUE.

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-- THE SITUATION IN LEBANON IS THE MOST URGENT CHALLENGE FACING US. THANKS TO AMBASSADOR HABIB'S TRULY HEROIC EFFORTS, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FACILITATE PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AND THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES. THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOW REACHED A CRITICAL JUNCTURE. FOR THEM TO SUCCEED, THE ARAB NATIONS MUST AGREE TO ACCEPT THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND FORCES NOW IN WEST BEIRUT. AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS SAUD AND KHADDAM ON JULY 19 AND 20 TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE. I AM PLEASED TO REPORT THAT THESE MEETINGS WERE HELPFUL IN CONTRIBUTING TO THE MOMENTUM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN BEIRUT. WE NOW HAVE THE AGREEMENT OF SYRIA TO TAKE THE LEADERS AND OFFICES OF THE PLO FORCES IN WEST BEIRUT. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE RECEIVED A GENERAL COMMITMENT THAT OTHER ARAB STATES MAY BE READY TO RECEIVE CONTINGENTS OF THE REMAINING FORCES.

-- AMBASSADOR HABIB IS NOW FOLLOWING UP ON OUR MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS SAUD AND KHADDAM BY VISITING VARIOUS REGIONAL CAPITALS. HE WILL BE DISCUSSING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN BEIRUT AND THE URGENT NEED TO FIND

DESTINATIONS FOR THE REMAINING PLO FORCES. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED AMBASSADOR HABIB TO VISIT EGYPT AS PART OF THIS TRIP TO MEET WITH YOU AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK. I STRONGLY HOPE THAT EGYPT WILL JOIN WITH OTHER ARAB STATES IN A COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO RELOCATE THE PLO AND I BELIEVE WE HAVE GONE A LONG WAY TOWARDS MEETING THE CONDITIONS FOR EGYPT'S PARTICIPATION THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK OUTLINED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. I KNOW YOU SHARE OUR VIEW ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE LEBANON SITUATION. BY AGREEING TO COOPERATE WITH OTHER STATES IN RELOCATING THE PLO, EGYPT COULD PLAY A VITAL ROLE IN ACHIEVING THIS GOAL.

-- AS YOU NOTE IN YOUR LETTER, THE CRISIS IN LEBANON UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. WE WILL NEED TO WORK HARD WITHIN UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, OUR COMMON POLICY AND THE ONLY APPROACHES

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AGREED TO BY ISRAEL. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT I SHARE YOUR EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO BRING THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. WE WILL BE COMMUNICATING WITH EACH OTHER ON THIS SUBJECT OFTEN AND IN DETAIL IN THE PERIOD AHEAD.

-- I SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. OUR POSITION ON THE WAR ITSELF REMAINS CONSTANT: WE HAVE FROM THE BEGINNING SUPPORTED THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ AND OTHER STATES IN THE REGION AND HAVE MADE THIS ONCE AGAIN QUITE CLEAR PUBLICLY IN THE STATEMENT BY THE WHITE HOUSE ON JULY 12. IN THIS REGARD, WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT THE IRAQIS ARE MAKING AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE OF THEIR TERRITORY. WE CONTINUE IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO DO EVERYTHING WE CONSTRUCTIVELY CAN TO ENCOURAGE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. OF COURSE THE WAR HAS IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THE TWO COMBATANTS. AS YOU KNOW, A MAIN THRUST OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE WAR HAS BEEN TO SEEK TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES, WHO FEEL A SERIOUS THREAT TO THEIR OWN SECURITY BECAUSE OF THE INCREASED TENSIONS IN THE REGION. IN LIGHT OF THE IRANIAN INVASION ATTEMPT, WE HAVE INTENSIFIED OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES, REASSURING THEM OF OUR SUPPORT. IN ADDITION, WE ARE MAINTAINING A MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION TO ILLUSTRATE THE DEPTH OF OUR COMMITMENT TO OUR FRIENDS. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE KEEPING A VERY CLOSE WATCH ON THE SITUATION.

-- I RECOGNIZE THE SERIOUSNESS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO DEAL WITH THEM. ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT, WE HAVE SOUGHT THE SUPPORT OF OUR ALLIES IN AN EFFORT TO BRING HOME TO THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ITS ATTACK ON SOMALIA. I THINK THIS WILL HAVE SOME EFFECT. WE ARE SUPPLEMENTING OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS BY AIRLIFTING EMERGENCY MILITARY SUPPLIES TO THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT SO THAT IT MAY BETTER DEFEND ITSELF. WHILE THE SITUATION REMAINS WORRISOME, I BELIEVE THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT CAN DEAL SUCCESSFULLY WITH THE THREAT.

-- IN CLOSING, LET ME REITERATE THAT I PLACE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON STRENGTHENING THE ALREADY CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU TOWARDS THIS END.

SINCERELY,

END TEXT. STOESSEL

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IMMEDIATE

SECRETARY

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TS/PMC/SDR

Date: 3/5/90

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ED Citations

TS Authority

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 0723/02 (VELIOTES, N. A.)

TAGS: PEPR, EG, US

SUBJECT: LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER ALI

REF: CAIRO 17785

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1. [REDACTED]
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN ACTION MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY FROM NEA:VELIOTES.
3. ISSUE FOR DECISION
4. ESSENTIAL FACTORS

WHETHER TO SEND THE ATTACHED LETTER TO EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALI.

EGYPTIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HASSAN ALI RESPONDED TO WALT STOESEL'S JULY 15 LETTER ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR BY WRITING YOU JULY 20. ALI CONGRATULATED YOU ON YOUR NEW RESPONSIBILITIES AND DISCUSSED EGYPT'S VIEWS ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, THE LEBANESE SITUATION, THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND THE RECENT ETHIOPIAN ATTACK ON SOMALIA. SINCE THIS IS YOUR EGYPTIAN

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COLLEAGUE'S FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MESSAGE TO YOU I BELIEVE A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE IS APPROPRIATE. PHIL HABIB'S IMMINENT ARRIVAL IN CAIRO TO MEET WITH ALI AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK WOULD MAKE A RESPONSE FROM YOU NOW PARTICULARLY TIMELY, ESPECIALLY SINCE OUR PROPOSED DRAFT (PARA 6) URGES THE EGYPTIANS TO ACCEPT SOME OF THE WEST BEIRUT PLO FIGHTERS AND REITERATES OUR INTEREST IN INCLUDING PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

5. RECOMMENDATION:

-- THAT YOU SEND THE LETTER IN PARA 6 TO FOREIGN MINISTER ALI.

6. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MR. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER:

-- THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 20 AND FOR YOUR CONGRATULATIONS ON MY NEW RESPONSIBILITIES. AS MY RECENT MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR GHORBAL INDICATED, I PLACE THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY AND WELL WITH YOU AS WE SEEK TO ACHIEVE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF A JUST AND STABLE PEACE THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. IN THAT SPIRIT, I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO OPEN WITH YOU WHAT I HOPE WILL BE A REGULAR AND FRANK DIALOGUE.

-- THE SITUATION IN LEBANON IS THE MOST URGENT CHALLENGE FACING US. THANKS TO AMBASSADOR HABIB'S TRULY HEROIC EFFORTS, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FACILITATE PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AND THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES. THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOW REACHED A CRITICAL JUNCTURE. FOR THEM TO SUCCEED, THE ARAB NATIONS MUST AGREE TO ACCEPT THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND FORCES NOW IN WEST BEIRUT. AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS SAUD AND KHADDAM ON JULY 19 AND 20 TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE. I AM PLEASED TO REPORT THAT THESE MEETINGS WERE HELPFUL IN CONTRIBUTING TO THE MOMENTUM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN BEIRUT. WE NOW HAVE THE AGREEMENT OF SYRIA TO TAKE THE LEADERS AND OFFICES OF THE PLO FORCES IN WEST BEIRUT. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE RECEIVED A GENERAL COMMITMENT THAT OTHER ARAB STATES MAY BE READY TO RECEIVE CONTINGENTS OF THE REMAINING FORCES.

-- AMBASSADOR HABIB IS NOW FOLLOWING UP ON OUR MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS SAUD AND KHADDAM BY VISITING VARIOUS REGIONAL CAPITALS. HE WILL BE DISCUSSING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN BEIRUT AND THE URGENT NEED TO FIND

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DESTINATIONS FOR THE REMAINING PLO FORCES. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED AMBASSADOR HABIB TO VISIT EGYPT AS PART OF THIS TRIP TO MEET WITH YOU AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK. I STRONGLY HOPE THAT EGYPT WILL JOIN WITH OTHER ARAB STATES IN A COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO RELOCATE THE PLO AND I BELIEVE WE HAVE GONE A LONG WAY TOWARDS MEETING THE CONDITIONS FOR EGYPT'S PARTICIPATION THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK OUTLINED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. I KNOW YOU SHARE OUR VIEW ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE LEBANON SITUATION. BY AGREEING TO COOPERATE WITH OTHER STATES IN RELOCATING THE PLO, EGYPT COULD PLAY A VITAL ROLE IN ACHIEVING THIS GOAL.

-- AS YOU NOTE IN YOUR LETTER, THE CRISIS IN LEBANON UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. WE WILL NEED TO WORK HARD WITHIN UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, OUR COMMON POLICY AND THE ONLY APPROACHES AGREED TO BY ISRAEL. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT I SHARE YOUR EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO BRING THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. WE WILL BE COMMUNICATING WITH EACH OTHER ON THIS SUBJECT OFTEN AND IN DETAIL IN THE PERIOD AHEAD.

-- I SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. OUR POSITION ON THE WAR ITSELF REMAINS CONSTANT: WE HAVE FROM THE BEGINNING SUPPORTED THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ AND OTHER STATES IN THE REGION AND HAVE MADE THIS ONCE AGAIN QUITE CLEAR PUBLICLY IN THE STATEMENT BY THE WHITE HOUSE ON JULY 12. IN THIS REGARD, WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT THE IRAQIS ARE MAKING AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE OF THEIR TERRITORY. WE CONTINUE IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO DO EVERYTHING WE CONSTRUCTIVELY CAN TO ENCOURAGE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. OF COURSE THE WAR HAS IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THE TWO COMBATANTS. AS YOU KNOW, A MAIN THRUST OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE WAR HAS BEEN TO SEEK TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES, WHO FEEL A SERIOUS THREAT TO THEIR OWN SECURITY BECAUSE OF THE INCREASED TENSIONS IN THE REGION. IN LIGHT OF THE IRANIAN INVASION ATTEMPT, WE HAVE INTENSIFIED OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES, REASSURING THEM OF OUR SUPPORT. IN ADDITION, WE ARE MAINTAINING A MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION TO ILLUSTRATE THE DEPTH OF OUR COMMITMENT TO OUR FRIENDS. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE KEEPING A VERY CLOSE WATCH ON THE SITUATION.

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-- WE RECOGNIZE THE SERIOUSNESS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO DEAL WITH THEM. ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT, WE HAVE SOUGHT THE SUPPORT OF OUR ALLIES IN AN EFFORT TO BRING HOME TO THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ITS ATTACK ON SOMALIA. I THINK THIS WILL HAVE SOME EFFECT. WE ARE SUPPLEMENTING OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS BY AIRLIFTING EMERGENCY MILITARY SUPPLIES TO THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT SO THAT IT MAY BETTER DEFEND ITSELF. WHILE THE SITUATION REMAINS WORRISOME, I BELIEVE THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT CAN DEAL SUCCESSFULLY WITH THE THREAT.

-- IN CLOSING, LET ME REITERATE THAT I PLACE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON STRENGTHENING THE ALREADY CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU TOWARDS THIS END.

SINCERELY,

END TEXT. YYY

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July 13, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting

Subject: Habib Mission: Letter to King Fahd

If Syria holds fast to its refusal to accept PLO combatants, we could find ourselves with the elements of an agreement in place in Lebanon with no place for the PLO to go. We have probably done as much as we can do ourselves with the Syrians.

Our best hope of turning the Syrians around or of otherwise solving the problem of a destination for the PLO before those Israelis advocating a military solution in Beirut gain the upperhand is by acting through Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have an interest in helping us with this problem and the wherewithal to encourage other Arab states to cooperate. There is, of course, no guarantee that the Saudis will wish to become so actively involved, but at this point we have little recourse but to approach them once again.

The attached letter from you to King Fahd spells out very clearly the problem we are facing. It highlights the lengths to which we have gone in an effort to assure a peaceful resolution of the Beirut crisis and, in effect, attempts to challenge Fahd to be as concerned about the well-being of the PLO members as human beings as we are. The letter also underscores the time element, making clear our assessment that the hardliners in Israel are in a position to gain the upperhand should Phil Habib's effort remain stalled, which it will unless a recipient state or states is found quickly.

I recommend that you approve the cable at Tab A which contains your letter to Fahd, and the supplementary Talking Points for Ambassador Murphy at Tab B.

Attachments:

- Tab A - Proposed letter.
- Tab B - Talking Points.

Drafted: NEA/IAI:WAK:rbj
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TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH
FOREIGN MINISTERS SAUD AND KHADDAM

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-- Point out that U.S. has done its part. Habib Mission accomplished much. Now Arabs must find place for PLO to go. Until they do, it is Arabs who are delegitimizing the PLO.

-- We understand Arab concerns and believe they are being addressed.

- o Firm U.S. position that Israel must withdraw.
- o You have committed U.S. to international force to arrive during withdrawal.
- o We will work so that Israel and Lebanese factions do not endanger Palestinians who depart as well as those who stay.

-- Time is crucial.

--In view of today's discussion, we agree that Arabs should determine several countries to take PLO.

-- But before PLO leaves Beirut, we must know which countries and when. We only have a matter of days.

-- To stress importance and urgency, you will send Ambassador Habib as soon as tomorrow to Syria and Saudi Arabia to help fix schedule. Also can go to Egypt and Jordan. Of course must stop in Israel as well.

-- Reiterate that there are two phases. We work to end siege of Beirut now through departure of PLO. Next will be cooperative effort to get all foreign forces--Israeli, PLO, Syrian, out of Lebanon.

-- All this can launch intensified effort to solve underlying Palestinian problem. We are prepared to be creative.

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RDS-3, 7/20/02

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June 27, 1982

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MEMORANDUM TO: S/S - L. Paul Bremer III

FROM : NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis *upn*

SUBJECT : Radio Report from Beirut Political Section,
6/27/82, 12:45 p.m.: Visit to Salim Al-Hoss

_____xt.

On June 27, Political Officer drove to Doha, just south of Khaldah on the Beirut - Sidon highway, to see former Prime Minister Salim Al-Hoss. It was our first meeting with Al-Hoss since the Israeli invasion and one of his first contacts with the outside world since Israeli air strikes and artillery cut the road from Doha to Beirut on June 8.

The trip to Doha, about ten miles from Yarze as the crow flies, took three and a half hours. The main road through Kafr Shima and Shuwayfat was choked by south-bound refugees and north-bound Israeli convoys (there was an abundance of APC's, trucks, and jeeps, but only an occasional tank). In contrast to a trip in the same area on June 17 when there were hardly any Israeli checkpoints, IDF soldiers were stopping and searching vehicles at regular intervals. Many of those manning the checkpoints were Israeli Arabs. At the Shuwayfat - Khaldah intersection, we were told that the road south has been closed to everything except military traffic since June 25, and Lebanese residents in the area said that a steady stream of Israeli troops/equipment had been coming north during that period.

We reached Khaldah by a lengthy detour through the mountains. This was the scene of heavy fighting as the Israelis moved north toward the airport, and buildings ranged from totally destroyed to slightly damaged. Hardly any were untouched. An immigrant camp at Khaldah (populated by Shia from the south rather than Palestinians) was completely razed. The situation was the same in Al-Hoss's prosperous residential area of Doha. Al-Hoss himself was lucky; except for some machine gun bullets through his dining room walls, his house escaped unscathed. The homes of several of his neighbors were hit by artillery or tank fire. The Israelis have been in Doha since June 13, but are continuing to reinforce positions: in the last three days an artillery battery has been established below Al-Hoss's house. (Comment: Our own observations and those of others indicate that Israelis are continuing to beef up their strength in the Beirut area.)

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Al-Hoss, normally a vocal (although highly intelligent) opponent of U.S. policies in the Middle East, seemed remarkably relaxed over the developments of the past three weeks. After some criticism over lack of effective U.S. pressure on Israel and the American veto of the French Security Council resolution, Al-Hoss focused most of his comments on Lebanon's political future. On presidential elections, for example, he expressed opinion that the consequences of the Israeli invasion should favor the candidacy of Raymond Iddi, whose stated opposition to most principal players (Israel, Phalange, Syria) will protect him from charges of collaboration with the former while the diminished influence of Syria will reduce pressure from that quarter.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

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Subject: A Forward U.S. Strategy in Wake
of Israel's Offensive

With the Israeli invasion into Lebanon we need a dramatic new vision and a strategy to match. Old policies will not work and a return to the status quo ante on the ground is impossible and undesirable. A new conceptual framework is needed. We must seize the initiative quickly to achieve our goals in a manner which supports our overall policies in the area. In this respect, delay on our part will lead to the development of heavy pressure to press only for Israeli withdrawal, a situation which would threaten to isolate us with Israel and to create a policy vacuum to be exploited by the radical Arabs and the Soviets.

We are now at a unique moment when an important but so far formless convergence of interests exists: between the U.S. and Lebanon, the U.S. and Israel, and the U.S. and some Arab and European states. Among these converging aims are:

- Creating a strong government of Lebanon, with authority throughout its territory.
- Reducing the Syrian presence in Lebanon. (To do this we would support an effort by Israel to link their ultimate withdrawals to that of Syria's; we can expect others to press hard for Israel alone to withdraw.)
- An end to the PLO's position as a separate extraterritorial power in Lebanon. The Palestinians there should be absorbed into a framework responsive to central Lebanese authority. (This has existed in the past when PLO and Syrian military power in Lebanon was weak.)

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- An end to the role of Haddad's militia as an Israeli surrogate in South Lebanon. Haddad himself will have to retire; his personnel must be absorbed into Lebanon's army or citizenry without retribution.
- Strengthening peacekeeping operations in Lebanon to facilitate eventual Israeli pullback. This might best be accomplished by integrating an enhanced UNIFIL contingent with Lebanon's Army (perhaps enlarged and modified) and have Israel hand over to them as it withdraws. This would prevent a vacuum from developing which Syrians or Palestinians might fill. We must not, however, be compulsive about pressing Israel to move back to any line as it is even conceivable that the Lebanese government may want the Israeli presence in advanced positions -- at least for a short time -- as leverage for Syrian withdrawal.
- Dealing with the critical regional dimension. The new situation contains both grave risks to strategically important Arab relationships (with Egypt) and opportunities (with Jordan) to stake out important new ground. We will be considering some steps designed to reduce the risks and seize the opportunities. We will be doing a great deal for Israel in this venture; what we ask of them may come in the peace process negotiations. In this respect, despite the developments in Lebanon, the Palestinian problem remains a central issue. The degree of cooperation and support we can expect from Western Europe and the key Arabs probably will require some meaningful demonstration that early progress on this issue continues to be high on our agenda.

With these goals in mind, I propose the U.S. take charge of this situation by mobilizing a "contact group" of other concerned and influential nations, primarily France and Saudi Arabia. Lebanon's attitude toward this is key. If President Sarkis can be encouraged to issue a call for international support along the above lines, we would seek responsive public statements. Phil Habib could then move between the capitals to garner help for the cooperative steps needed. Other nations could participate as well in selected fields of their particular concern, e.g.,

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Humanitarian aid -- Scandinavia, the EC and Gulf Arabs;
Peacekeeping -- the UNIFIL contributors; strengthening
Lebanon's military forces -- Belgium, some Arabs perhaps.

Most vitally, we need immediate action to break through the current mood of pessimism and fear. If you agree with the above approach I will instruct Phil Habib to get to work with Begin Sunday morning and in Beirut as soon as safely possible, and I will prefigure our moves in general terms on the Brinkley program Sunday.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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AMMAN FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 1, 3 2/5/02 (HAIG, ALEXANDER H., JR)

TAGS: IS, JO, SY, UR, PLO, MILI

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER BEGIN

SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

1. PLEASE SEE BEGIN SATURDAY NIGHT OR PRIOR TO THE
CABINET MEETING TO DELIVER FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE
FROM THE SECRETARY:

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF FEBRUARY 5 MR. PRIME
MINISTER AND AM VERY GRATEFUL FOR IT.

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PAGE 02

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PLEASE ALLOW ME TO EXPLAIN, IN REACTION TO YOUR POSITION

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REGARDING A "CLEAR PROVOCATION", WHY I HAVE CONTINUALLY STRESSED AND MUST STRESS AGAIN THAT, IN THE CURRENT HIGHLY VOLATILE CLIMATE, ANY PRECIPITATE ACTION BY ISRAEL OF THE KIND DESCRIBED TO US RECENTLY BY MINISTER SHARON AND HSEN SAGI, IF NOT JUSTIFIABLE IN THE COURT OF WORLD OPINION, WILL CAUSE VERY GRAVE PROBLEMS.

I HAVE BEEN MOVING ON AN URGENT BASIS TO CONVEY THROUGH ALL APPROPRIATE CHANNELS THE VITAL NECESSITY FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES TO BE MAINTAINED. IF, EVEN THOUGH OUR MESSAGES ARE RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD, YOU

FIND YOURSELF FACED WITH A PROVOCATIVE ACT, IT IS OUR FIRM CONVICTION THAT IT WILL COME AS A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT BY SYRIA AND THE PLO, BACKED BY THE SOVIET UNION, TO STIMULATE THE VERY MILITARY OPERATION YOU HAVE CONTEMPLATED TAKING. THIS IS, MR. PRIME MINISTER, A SOVIET TRAP AND WE MUST NOT FALL INTO IT -- IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH TOGETHER SO THAT ISRAEL MAY KNOW TRUE SECURITY AND PEACE.

HAIG

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AN ACTION PLAN FOR THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI ARENA

The Conceptual Approach:

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Our objective will be to change basic conditions in the Lebanese-Israeli arena so as to forestall or minimize the chances of future major military confrontations. We want to set the stage for a more stable security situation within Lebanon which, among other things, would reduce the threats to Israel over time. The highest initial priority must go to reinforcing the ceasefire. There will be, however, other elements in our approach, including those with immediate, short-term, and medium-term target dates. All components will be complementary and will have to mesh with one another at various stages in the process.

Broadly outlined, our strategy would encompass the following:

Reinforcing the Ceasefire (immediate objectives):

The immediate short-term goal is to prevent or ameliorate:

- Palestinian or Lebanese leftist wildcat shelling or rocketing of either the Haddad area or northern Israel. (This will require continuing efforts with the Saudis and Syrians on our part, and UN and Saudi efforts vis-a-vis Arafat. The Israelis should be kept fully informed of what we are doing to provide reassurance.)
- Challenges and confrontations in the air stemming from Israeli aerial reconnaissance activities. (We are making continuing strong demarches to the Israelis to refrain from provocative and unnecessary flights, such as the daily schedule causing sonic booms over Beirut and the refugee camps.)
- Security Council actions criticizing Israeli actions or throwing roadblocks in the path of what we are trying to achieve. (This will require strong efforts to mobilize our supporters and potential supporters while seeking to neutralize negative voices, such as from Uganda and Mexico. The Lebanese must be encouraged to resist radical pressures. Waldheim and Urquhart should be fully consulted as our strategy unfolds.)

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Expanding the Role of UNIFIL:

- We should seek amendment of UNIFIL's basic mandate (Resolution 426, and associated administrative decisions by the UN Secretariat) in order to give UNIFIL more authority and flexibility. We should also seek some expansion of UNIFIL's manpower strength from its present figure of 6,000 men to 9,000 men.
- This change in the mandate would be intended to make it possible--if the opportunity presents itself--for UNIFIL to put a major presence into the city of Tyre, to take over control of the bridges across the Litani, and to occupy the Beaufort Castle area, replacing the Palestinians at this strategic location which dominates militarily much of Haddad's area and the northern Israeli panhandle. The occupation of these key areas (perhaps in conjunction with Lebanese army units) will require a major diplomatic effort, with a first step ensuring that UNIFIL will have the authority and manpower to do the job.
- UNIFIL (and UNTSO) already monitor and report ceasefire violations. Our objective, however, should aim at resolving--more quickly and efficiently than is presently the case--ceasefire violations, whether from Haddad or the Palestinians. Such UNIFIL (and UNTSO) functions must be made more acceptable to the Israelis and to Haddad so that they can operate more efficiently as an intermediary with the PLO and the Lebanese leftists. Formulations to take into account Israeli sensitivities could be advanced by the U.S. as well as the UN.
- The rules of engagement for all the national battalions in the UNIFIL area should be revised and strengthened to parallel those now followed by the Dutch and Fijian battalions. The purpose would be to make UNIFIL as a whole more effective in deterring and forestalling infiltration, whether from the Palestinians and Lebanese leftists or from Haddad's forces and the IDF.
- Support from the UN Secretariat and key countries, including the UNIFIL contributor states and the Europeans, should be mobilized to bring about

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the elimination or reduction of the Palestinian military presence within the UNIFIL area, such as in the "iron triangle." (This would be an objective whose handling would have to be meshed carefully with some Israeli concessions, such as those described below, as well as with longer range Lebanese government efforts. Through the Bayt-ad-Din process, the Lebanese want to introduce a stronger official Lebanese presence in southern Lebanon and supersede the so-called Cairo and other accords institutionalizing the Palestinian presence below the Litani River.)

- UNIFIL should be assisted to recover control over the territorial encroachments made by Haddad and to establish improved security around the UNIFIL headquarters. In addition, Haddad should be persuaded to allow UNTSO to perform its duties without harassment. These steps will improve UNIFIL's (UNTSO's) credibility with the Palestinians and allow trade-offs.

Actions Required of the Israelis (which, if the Israelis are cooperative, could be employed in other negotiations to gain parallel commitments and concessions from the Palestinian and Lebanese leftists):

- All Israeli military equipment in South Lebanon of U.S. origin subject to U.S. law or to the 1952 U.S.-Israeli agreement must be withdrawn. A second stage would see the total withdrawal of IDF combat personnel from South Lebanon, along with all Israeli military equipment used by those personnel, whether subject to U.S. law or not.
- Equally important, the Israelis must exert effective control over the activities of Haddad, to prevent the kind of reckless shelling which has led to wider and more serious exchanges of fire. It would be at least implicitly understood, however, that efforts to alter Haddad's status in southern Lebanon or his area of control would be held in abeyance for the indefinite future. The ultimate solution to this problem will require the long-range strengthening of the Lebanese army so that it could control a buffer zone in southern Lebanon which would satisfy most Israeli security concerns.
- Israel should do its part in persuading Haddad to cooperate with UNIFIL and UNTSO (see above).

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Strengthening the Lebanese Government's Military and Civil Role:

- The Bayt-ad-Din process has laid the "Arab" political framework for a restructuring and expansion of the Lebanese army. Putting a strengthened Lebanese army into "hot spots" in Beirut and elsewhere in central Lebanon (e.g., the Sannin ridgeline) may have to occupy a high priority from our perspective, since these units would be replacing Syrian forces and would thereby contribute to a broad easing of tensions.
- To the degree it can be done, however, additional Lebanese forces should be sent to southern Lebanon and the UNIFIL area to join the 1500 men already there. The present practice of incorporating engineering and construction troops to assist in civic programs should be encouraged. The basic objective of the additional Lebanese troops, supplemented by those already there, would be to join with UNIFIL in occupying the city of Tyre, the Litani bridges, and the Beaufort Castle, if the Palestinians can be persuaded to cooperate.

The Strategic "Gap" in Southern Lebanon:

Closing the so-called "gap" in the UNIFIL area--by placing UNIFIL troops there--might be one of the more attractive changes in the status quo from the perspective of the Syrians in particular. As it is, the Syrians are concerned that the Israelis could move forces rapidly through this gap to attack Syrian forces in the Bekaa Valley, without having to overrun UNIFIL forces. Occupying this gap should be sought in conjunction with parallel efforts to reduce the Palestinian military presence within the UNIFIL zone, in Tyre, at the Litani bridges, and at Beaufort Castle.

Reducing the Flow of Heavy Weaponry:

While we have already tried to enlist Crown Prince Fahd's support for stopping or at least reducing the flow of heavy weaponry for the Palestinian forces in Lebanon, ultimately the most promising means may be through the strengthening of the Bayt-ad-Din process, since this process calls for a strengthening of Lebanese authority and Lebanese institutions. For all practical purposes, the Libyans and Syrians are the principal suppliers. Those arms acquired by the Palestinians from Eastern Europe or the USSR usually are delivered via the Syrians.

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- In this case, direct approaches to the Syrians by the French, British, and others, as well as the U.S.-- supplementing the Saudi efforts--could be employed.
- The greater problem, however, could be Libya. While many Libyan armed shipments to the Palestinians go through Syria and require Syrian cooperation, a certain amount can get through directly to Palestinian forces through the port of Sidon, which the Palestinians control for the most part. If the French decide in the end to woo Qadhafi and release military shipment to him, we should urge the French to secure a quid pro quo in the form of a reduction in the flow of heavy Libyan military equipment to the Palestinians.

Moving Heavy Weaponry in Lebanon Further Away from the Israeli Border:

The Israelis would be far more comfortable if heavy weaponry (artillery and Katusha rockets) in the hands of the Palestinians and Lebanese leftists were emplaced further north, preferably out of range of Israeli territory. Given the smallness of Lebanon, and the range of present artillery (27 km) held by the Palestinians, this would be an extraordinarily difficult undertaking. Some amelioration of the threat, however, could be accomplished if the Beaufort Castle area were occupied by UNIFIL and the Lebanese army. Over the longer term, the only realistic possibility for Palestinian cooperation in withdrawing their heavy weaponry would lie in a tit-for-tat arrangement whereby Haddad would return his heavy weaponry to Israel. We should hold open this option for a propitious moment.

Withdrawing the Syrian Missiles from Lebanon:

Crown Prince Fahd has promised to continue working for the the withdrawal of Syrian missiles from the Bekaa at a propitious moment, ideally following a period of military quiet and an absence of public Israeli statements on the matter. We have explored with him and Lebanese leaders the idea of setting a time for the withdrawal of at least one of the three SAM batteries to begin with, in conjunction with an appropriate milestone in the Bayt-ad-Din process. This still seems the most promising avenue, and we would pursue it in appropriate ways and possibly in conjunction with Israeli restraint as regards highly provocative aerial reconnaissance activities.

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Movement on the missile question must go hand-in-hand with efforts to forestall Israeli-Syrian confrontations in the air over Lebanon. We should make efforts to reinforce Syria's present inclination not to fire--either missiles or antiaircraft artillery--at Israeli reconnaissance flights showing non-hostile intent. We would continue our urgings that Israel avoid highly provocative aerial reconnaissance activity and be prepared to return to the lowered scope and intensity of flights taking place before April 27, 1981.

Withdrawal of Syrian Forces from Lebanon:

Since it is also an objective of the Lebanese Government, we should coordinate our diplomatic efforts so as to encourage a major withdrawal of Syrian forces in Lebanon before August of 1982, at the time when the next Lebanese President is scheduled to be elected and inaugurated. Total Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon is probably unrealistic, since the Syrians consider defense of the Bekaa Valley as a strategic military necessity. Withdrawal of the Syrian forces elsewhere--particularly from Beirut, the Sannin ridge, and other locations--is, however, feasible, as long as the Bayt-ad-Din process continues with some vigor.

It will be our task--and that of like-minded governments--to encourage the Bayt-ad-Din process without destroying its basically "Arab" character, which has made possible the successes so far. At the same time, however, it will be necessary for us to conduct policy in such a way as to allow the Syrians to save face. It may be necessary, moreover, to make it clear that we would not tolerate Syria insisting on unacceptable political concessions from the Lebanese in return for withdrawal of their forces (e.g., a mutual security pact allowing Syrian forces to return at will to Lebanon).

Supporting the Bayt-ad-Din Process:

The key strategy will be to keep the Saudis and the Kuwaitis engaged. This must be done in a way that does not hurt the concept of "Arabization" that the Saudis brought to bear on the problems of Lebanon. This means inter alia that the U.S. must use its influence within Lebanon--particularly with the Phalange--in ways that will contribute to the on-going process.

Equally important, we--plus other governments such as France--should make it clear--publicly and privately--that we intend to stay actively engaged with the Lebanon problem

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for the long run. This will keep the Saudis engaged. This also means that the U.S. should be seen as moving forward on the general peace process in the Middle East, which is the only way the Palestinian dimension of the Lebanese problem will ever be dealt with effectively.

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FOR AMBASSADOR VIETS FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12065: RQS 1-2-3, 2/3/02 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR)

TAGS: NOPS, PEPR, XF, JO, SY, LE

SUBJECT: THREAT TO THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI CEASEFIRE: MESSAGE
TO KING FROM SECRETARY

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN THE AFTERMATH OF LAST WEEKEND'S FATAH INFILTRATION
ATTEMPT FROM JORDAN, THE ISRAELIS HAVE MOVED TO A NEW PEAK

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OF CONCERN OVER THE PALESTINIAN THREAT. THEY BELIEVE THAT

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ARAFAT IS COMMITTED ONLY TO GOING ALONG WITH THE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON BUT FEELS FREE TO CONDUCT TERRORIST OPERATIONS THROUGH SYRIA AND JORDAN IF HE CAN. THE ISRAELIS ARGUE, AS YOU ARE AWARE FROM THEIR PRESS, THAT LAUNCHING AN OPERATION FROM LEBANON THROUGH SYRIA AND JORDAN INTO ISRAEL OR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IS A VIOLATION OF THE JULY CEASEFIRE. WHATEVER THE MERITS OF THEIR ARGUMENT, THE FACT REMAINS THAT THERE IS FAR TOO MUCH DANGEROUS TENSION IN THE SITUATION AND HE MUST DO OUR BEST TO KEEP IT UNDER CONTROL.

3. PLEASE THEREFORE DELIVER TO KING HUSSEIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME (ADDING THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE WITH THE JORDANIANS WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING THE U.S. COULD DO TO ASSIST JORDAN IN ITS FUTURE EFFORTS TO CONTROL INFILTRATION):

QUOTE BEGIN TEXT:

YOUR MAJESTY:

I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY SERIOUS CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS SET IN MOTION BY THE ATTEMPT OF A FATAH GROUP TO INFILTRATE INTO THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND ISRAEL FROM JORDAN.

THE ISRAELIS CONSIDER THIS EFFORT TO BE A VIOLATION OF THE JULY 24 CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB, SINCE THEY ARE CONVINCED THE OPERATION WAS LAUNCHED FROM LEBANON, ALTHOUGH THE MEMBERS OF THIS GROUP WENT FROM THERE TO SYRIA AND FINALLY INTO JORDAN BEFORE GOING INTO THE WEST BANK. THEY CONSIDER IT OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFI-

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CANCE THAT THE GROUP BELONGS TO FATAH. THEY SAY THAT THIS PROVES THAT ARAFAT REMAINS READY TO CARRY OUT TERRORIST OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL FROM ANY QUARTER OTHER THAN SOUTH LEBANON, WHERE HE GENERALLY RESPECTS THE CEASEFIRE.

THE ISRAELIS FREELY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT JORDAN HAS BEEN DOING A GOOD JOB OF FORESTALLING AND STOPPING SUCH TERRORIST OPERATIONS. I, TOO, BELIEVE THAT JORDAN HAS DONE A GREAT SERVICE TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE BY

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CONTROLLING SUCH DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EFFECTIVE WAY IT HAS.

WHATEVER THE MERITS OF THE ISRAELI VIEW, IT IS A FACT THAT CONCERN AND TENSION IN ISRAEL HAVE RISEN TO A VERY HIGH LEVEL. WE ARE DOING OUR BEST TO URGE CAUTION AND RESTRAINT BUT, AS YOU KNOW, THE ISRAELIS ARE ALREADY IN A TENSE STATE AS THEY PREPARE TO COPE WITH WHAT SOME HAVE DESCRIBED AS A NATIONAL TRAUMA OVER THEIR FORTHCOMING FINAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI.

YOUR MAJESTY, I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE ON THE HIGH IMPORTANCE--IN THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD--OF NOT ALLOWING THE PALESTINIANS OR THE SYRIANS TO PROVOKE THE ISRAELIS INTO ACTIONS WHICH COULD UNDERCUT WHAT JORDAN AND THE U.S. HAVE BEEN TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH FOR MANY YEARS. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR JORDAN TO FORESTALL FURTHER TERRORIST OPERATIONS IF THEY ARE BEING ASSISTED BY THE SYRIANS, AS THE ISRAELIS STATE. HOWEVER, I KNOW THAT YOU WILL DO YOUR BEST. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL, I BELIEVE, IF YOU COULD GET THE WORD TO ARAFAT AND THE PLO LEADERSHIP THAT THEY ARE PLAYING WITH FIRE.

YOU CAN COUNT ON THE U.S., YOUR MAJESTY, TO DO ITS BEST TO CALM ISRAEL.

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WITH WARNEST REGARDS.

SINCERELY, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. END OF TEXT. HAIG

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FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12065: RDS 1-2-3, 2/3/02 (HAIG, ALEXANDER H., JR)

TAGS: NOPS, SA, XF, IS, SY, LE, JO, PLO

SUBJECT: LEBANESE-ISRAELI CEASEFIRE: MESSAGE TO CROWN
PRINCE FROM THE SECRETARY

1. ~~SECRET~~

2. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE RECENT FATAH INFILTRATION
EFFORT FROM JORDAN INTO THE WEST BANK AND ISRAEL, THE

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ISRAELIS HAVE BECOME DEEPLY CONCERNED. THEY VIEWED THIS

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EFFORT BY FATAH (AS OPPOSED TO PALESTINIAN FRINGE GROUPS) AS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT, IN THAT ARAFAT APPEARS PREPARED TO WAGE TERRORIST OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL FROM ANY QUARTER OTHER THAN SOUTH LEBANON, WHERE HE STILL RESPECTS CEASEFIRE. THE ISRAELIS REGARD THIS AS A SERIOUS PROVOCATION AND A VIOLATION OF THE JULY CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATED BY PHIL HADID- WHATEVER THE MERITS OF THE ISRAELI ARGUMENTS THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE SITUATION IS DANGEROUSLY TENSE. WE CANNOT RULE OUT A STRONG ISRAELI REACTION, DESPITE OUR STRONG URGINGS FOR CAUTION AND RESTRAINT WHILE THE U.S. TRIES TO REDRESS THE PROBLEM.

3. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO CROWN PRINCE FAHD. IF A QUICK APPOINTMENT IS NOT POSSIBLE, YOU SHOULD ENSURE THAT HE RECEIVES THE THRUST OF THIS MESSAGE THROUGH THE MOST APPROPRIATE SAUDI INTERMEDIARY. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR US TO SAY TO THE ISRAELIS THAT WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE SAUDIS (AND JORDANIANS).

4. BEGIN TEXT OF MESSAGE:

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS:

I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY DEEP CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS WHICH THREATEN TO JEOPARDIZE THE JULY CEASEFIRE IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI ARENA, IN WHICH YOU PLAYED AN INDISPENSABLE ROLE.

THE ISRAELIS ARE GRAVELY CONCERNED OVER THE RECENT EFFORT BY A FATAH GROUP TO INFILTRATE INTO THE WEST BANK AND ISRAEL FROM JORDAN. THE ISRAELIS ARGUE THAT

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THIS IS A MAJOR PROVOCATION AND A VIOLATION OF THE JULY CEASEFIRE, SINCE THE OPERATION WAS PLANNED AND ORGANIZED IN LEBANON, ALTHOUGH THE MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WENT FROM THERE TO SYRIA AND JORDAN BEFORE MOVING INTO THE WEST BANK. THE ISRAELIS SAY THAT THIS MEANS THAT ARAFAT IS PREPARED TO HONOR THE CEASEFIRE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON BUT NOWHERE ELSE, AND THAT FATAH IS FREE TO TRY TO STRIKE AT ISRAEL FROM JORDAN.

ISRAEL ALSO CLAIMS THAT SYRIA HAS BEEN ASSISTING

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FATAH TO CARRY OUT SUCH OPERATIONS.

WHATEVER THE MERITS OF THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE, I AM SURE YOU WOULD AGREE THAT THIS IS NO TIME FOR THE PLO OR THE SYRIANS TO PLAY WITH FIRE. THERE IS A TENSE AND PERHAPS UNPREDICTABLE ATMOSPHERE IN ISRAEL TODAY, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS ISRAEL IS FACING IN ITS FINAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI. WE ARE URGING RESTRAINT AND CAUTION ON THE ISRAELIS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO, BUT I HOPE YOU ALSO COULD USE YOUR INFLUENCE IN REDUCING THE RISKS.

SPECIFICALLY, IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF YOU COULD URGE ARAFAT AND THE FATAH LEADERSHIP TO REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS WHICH COULD PROVOKE THE ISRAELIS INTO GIVING UP THE CEASEFIRE, WITH ALL THE IMPLICATIONS THIS WOULD HAVE FOR WHAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN STRIVING TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IN THIS SAME VEIN, IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IF YOU COULD USE YOUR INFLUENCE WITH SYRIA TO CALM THE SITUATION.

I FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE CONCERNS ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION OVER ISRAELI INTENTIONS AND THE PRESENT DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OVER ISRAEL'S GOLAN ACTION DOES NOT MAKE MATTERS EASIER. NEVERTHELESS, WHAT IS NEEDED--ABOVE ALL--IS AN ABATEMENT OF THE

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TENSIONS AND AN END TO THE CAUSE OF TENSIONS.

WITH WARM REGARDS.

SINCERELY,

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. END OF TEXT. HAIG

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Despite the pessimism that we all feel because of the recent tragic events in the Middle East, this crisis also contains the seeds of great opportunity as well, opportunity to make a real breakthrough toward that goal of a just and lasting peace which is the true source of security for Israel and for all moderate Arabs as well. Now, as Anwar Sadat said in his historic speech to Israel's Knesset, is one of those "moments in the lives of nations and peoples, when it is incumbent upon those known for their wisdom and clarity of vision to survey the problem, to look beyond the past with all its complexities and residues, in a bold drive towards new horizons...to stand together with the courage of men and the boldness of heroes to erect a huge edifice of peace, an edifice that builds and does not destroy."

The war in Lebanon has added to the already enormous toll of bloodshed and dying and suffering in the Middle East. But it can also become one of those moments in history when men move decisively to build a better world. But much depends on us. American leadership and statesmanship, American will and political courage may decide whether today's tragedy can become the basis for a new beginning and a new opportunity for all the peoples of the region, Israelis and Arabs alike; or whether, alternatively, it marks the beginning of a new spiral of deepening violence.

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American leadership in the peace process during the last eighteen months -- including U.S. diplomatic success in creating an effective international force for Sinai and your decision to commit U.S. forces to it -- helped to secure the great achievement of Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai in April. We had, at the same time, strengthened our bilateral relations with both Israel and the moderate Arab states. Despite the impasse we were reaching in the autonomy negotiations as the result of Israeli policies of "creeping annexation" on the West Bank and Gaza and the weakness of Egypt's position in the wake of Sadat's death, we were poised to try to reinvigorate them after the Sinai withdrawal.

Israel's invasion of Lebanon, however, has made it vastly more difficult to bridge that impasse and has led many to conclude that Camp David is dead. Unless we can move boldly and rapidly to breathe new life into the peace process -- addressing not just the new problem of Lebanon but the continuing problem of the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza -- we will face growing dangers not only to U.S. national interests in the region but even more to the prospects for peace on which the future of all the people of the region depends.

Such a breakthrough must be achieved. And it can be. Your personal emissary, Ambassador Habib, is hopefully on the verge of a remarkable success, a success which will demonstrate American leadership in the region and gain us

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credit on both the Arab and Israeli sides. With the PLO threat on Israel's northern border eliminated -- and with the PLO perhaps ended as a military force forever -- there is no better time for Israel to take the short-term risks necessary to achieve the long-term security that only a genuine peace can provide and that virtually all Israelis yearn for. Above all, the present crisis confirms the wisdom of Sadat's statement that "there can be no peace without the Palestinians. It is a grave error of unpredictable consequences to overlook or brush aside this cause." Now is the time -- there will never be a better one -- for Israel to give an authentic and moderate Palestinian leadership a chance to emerge and to prove that Palestinian self-government is not only compatible with Israeli security but offers the greatest real security in the long run.

While we must be careful of direct linkage between Lebanon and the Palestinian problem there are, indeed, some connections that we must be aware of and that we should seek to exploit. On the negative side, we cannot let Lebanon deflect

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us from the Palestinian issue. Begin could get us bogged down in the intricacies of the Lebanon problem, negotiating assiduously each and every point, while he creates more facts on the West Bank and in Gaza. On the positive side, Begin will need our help if he is to avoid the kind of morass in Lebanon that would make it impossible to justify Israel's large losses in this war. And we will have a PLO leadership that has seen the futility and the cost of the "armed struggle" solution.

The key to success, however, will lie in bringing Jordan to join Egypt and Israel in the peace process.

Jordan has always been a key factor in the peace equation but opted out of the Camp David process because its initial inclusion was crudely handled and because its confidence in the U.S. had collapsed in the wake of our treatment of the Shah. Moreover, Jordan is precluded from negotiating on behalf of the Palestinians by the 1974 Rabat Summit decision that states that the PLO is the sole, legitimate spokesman for the Palestinian people. Arranging for Jordan's entry into the peace process will be an electrifying development -- not unlike Sadat's dramatic visit to Jerusalem -- that will permit us to seize the high ground early on and work from a

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strong basis of public support in Israel as well as in the United States, support that will be essential in confronting the many formidable problems that this course of action entails.

The key to bringing Hussein in will be first our ability to obtain support from the PLO and the moderate Arabs for Hussein's negotiating on behalf of the Palestinian, and that in turn will require convincing all of them that the United States will throw its full weight behind achieving an early outcome which -- while far short of their maximum demands -- is an enormous advance over the present deteriorating situation.

Such an outcome would consist of two time-phased components:

First, and most immediately, we must move rapidly to a substantially new transitional phase on the West Bank and Gaza, to last for a few years, during which the Israelis can see that Palestinians can direct their own affairs in a manner that does not threaten Israel's security -- and Palestinians see that they can run their own affairs without repeated intervention by Israeli authorities and without the continual absorption of West Bank and Gazan land for Jewish settlements.

The chief features of this transitional period would be the transfer of control over the main population centers and

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Palestinian lands of the West Bank and Gaza from Israel to the Arabs, with Palestinian control of land and water and some significant role by Jordan (perhaps in assuming administrative powers that Israel would not give directly to the Palestinians); a cap on Israeli settlement activity; some form of participation by East Jerusalem Arabs; and continuing Israeli control of critical security areas (which, fortunately, are principally in very sparsely-populated areas).

Second, there must be clear understanding that the transitional phase is not the end of the game. It must lead toward a final status which will be negotiated, not imposed by Israel or any other party. The final outcome would have to be based on Resolution 242, under which Israel withdraws from territory in exchange for conditions of true peace and security, including effective demilitarization of the territories returned (and ultimately bolstered by some form of U.S. security guarantee or treaty with Israel).

While the territory from which Israel withdraws would have to be wholly under Arab control, we would not support the creation of an independent Palestinian state. While we cannot prejudge the final outcome, we must recognize that the solution which would best satisfy the interests of the different parties (and of the U.S. as well) would be one and

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in which the Palestinians exercised broad powers of self-government under overall Jordanian sovereignty. This would grant the Palestinians significant control over their day-to-day lives within a larger, more viable Arab entity, while relieving Israeli anxieties that they were planting the seeds of a Palestinian state. The final outcome would include a negotiated permanent status for Jerusalem providing some Arab political role in a physically undivided city, and a definitive resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem.

As the above suggests, the Camp David Accords provide an effective avenue for progress. While we must face squarely the reality that the words "Camp David" have become unfairly discredited, there is an even greater reality that compels us to stick with it, since our reputation for reliability -- upon which the entire peace process rests -- is at stake. We must be extremely careful not to create the symbolism of a withdrawal from Camp David, thereby handing a potentially fatal point to those Israelis who may oppose what we are trying to do and creating a partisan issue in the U.S.

By basing ourselves squarely on Camp David we can put our case to the American people with confidence. By adhering to the letter and spirit of the Accords, Israel can have no grounds for complaint about our fidelity to our commitments.

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Yet at the same time, the language of Camp David gives us leeway for movement that we have not yet taken -- and which, if we do take it, could do much to help us overcome Arab rejection of the process. For example, we can appeal directly to the language of Camp David to:

- stress that the final status of the West Bank and Gaza must recognize "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements";
- stress that due consideration be given to "the principle of self-government"; and
- the negotiations on final status are to be based "on all the provisions and principles of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242," whose central principle is the return of territory in exchange for security and not, as we have so far suggested, a completely open-ended process without specific content.

Something fairly dramatic is needed to launch a new beginning for the peace negotiations, but this would be achieved if we are able to induce King Hussein of Jordan to join the negotiations. Only Jordan can play the role of effective negotiating partner with Israel, and unless Jordan participates the process will inevitably tend toward the creation of a separate Palestinian entity on the West Bank that Israel would never accept and that would not be in U.S. interests either.

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We would approach Hussein privately, to tell him what we have in mind, to find out what he needs politically to take such a bold step, and to warn of the dangers if the present opportunity for progress is lost. We would list for him the important new departures in the U.S. approach:

- using the flexible language of Camp David to move toward divesting the occupied territories from Israeli control;
- state publicly that 242 applies to the West Bank (Hussein believes we have evolved away from this original interpretation);
- give the representatives of the Palestinian people an assured role in the final status determination;
- strengthen our responsiveness to Jordan's security and political needs.

But we would also have to stress the dangers of rejecting the attainable progress of the transitional period in favor of the unattainable goal of immediately achieving a final peace.

We will not be able to move Hussein to join the process by such arguments alone. He will require fairly broad Arab support for his participation. We will need Egypt, Saudi Arabia and credible Palestinians behind our initiative. To do so, we will have to approach the critical issues with greater

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clarity in public as well as in private, so that Arab leaders will have concrete evidence to justify their actions to their people.

With the PLO, we would argue that the objective situation has changed; that the radical course only promises further disasters; that Jordan -- and only Jordan -- can recover the major populated areas of the West Bank and Gaza for the Arabs; and that they have no better alternative than to accept our conditions and pursue their cause by diplomatic and political means. Our aim would be to get a "green light" for Jordan's participation in the negotiations; in return they would gain our support for eventual Palestinian control in the West Bank and Gaza, including the prospect of some role for the PLO, albeit on Jordanian terms, within an autonomous region under Jordanian control.

Anything more than that would make it impossible for any Israeli government to make the enormous concessions required. Moreover, it is questionable whether a larger PLO role in the negotiations could produce an outcome that serves U.S. interests. Much more change in the basic structure of the organization and its perception of its interests is necessary before it can become a force for stability in the Arab world or a practical participant in a peace negotiation. The present predicament of

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the PLO may make such an evolution possible -- and its role in an expanded Jordan might provide the basis for such a process -- but it is far too early to tell what the results will be.

With Egypt, we would argue that Jordan's involvement in the process would end Egypt's isolation in the negotiations. We would also promise to ensure that Egypt gets due credit for its key role in peacemaking not only since the Sadat visit, but in future phases as well. We would, for example, make it clear that our efforts to improve conditions for West Bankers and Gazans stemmed in large part from Egyptian initiatives. We cannot take the U.S.-Egyptian relationship for granted. Our initiative must be based on a solid U.S.-Egyptian relationship; and we must see to it that the Egypt-Israel treaty relationship continues to grow.

Saudi Arabia's attitude and willingness to take risks will exert a crucial influence, as already noted, on the posture of Jordan and the PLO, and the Saudis' own interests will be at stake in whatever arrangements are made for the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem. In addition, some improvement, if only tacit, in Israeli-Saudi relations could be among the positive incentives that we could offer to Israel. Saudi cooperation will be essential in final arrangements for resettling Palestinian refugees.

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With the Saudis, we would stress the relief which our initiative could bring from the instability that the festering Palestinian problem now imposes on internal Arab affairs. In addition, the Saudis are deeply focused on the Jerusalem issue. While an early shift on this could be highly counter-productive, we would start with our undertaking to seek the right East Jerusalem Arabs to vote in West Bank elections and we could foreshadow for the Saudis our intention to support eventually an Arab political role in Jerusalem.

Securing Saudi cooperation will depend not only on their ability to see their own interests in the outcome, but also on our ability to convince them of the value of our help in meeting immediate threats to their security. This is an area where we have already demonstrated a capability to meet their needs, as in the deployment and sale of AWACS, and where we easily can and should do more, quite independently of the peace process. We need equally to demonstrate the subtlety of our understanding of their security problems and of our ability to avoid the traditional American compulsion for promoting reform in unstable societies that we understand poorly. The only way that all of this can be done, if at all, is through detailed discussions of the most sensitive and confidential character.

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At the same time that we make clear to all the moderate Arabs our determination to achieve rapid and substantial progress, we must also be firm with them. We must make clear that while we are prepared to do everything necessary to obtain substantial concessions from Israel, these will inevitably fall short of what they would like. Jordan in particular must understand that some compromise is necessary if the peace process is to go forward, and that it must not lose this opportunity for an early and substantial step toward removing Israeli rule over the Palestinian population of the West Bank merely because it cannot yet get the final outcome it desires. The other moderate Arabs must lend their support and put pressure on the PLO to acquiesce. They should all be reminded that Sadat is the only Arab leader to have gotten back his country's territories. While American leadership is essential, we must not allow any of the parties to think that our stake in a peaceful settlement exceeds their own and that we can accordingly be pressured into assuming burdens they are unwilling to assume. We will make no headway with Israel (or for that matter with the moderate Arabs themselves) if we leave the impression that we are seeking to impose the preferred Arab outcome on Israel, or that we have only incentives for the Arabs and sanctions for Israel.

In spite of the inevitable difficulties our approach will create with the Israeli government, its greatest appeal in many

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ways lies in the fact that it is the most protective of Israel's security needs of all the alternative approaches to peace. By putting forward Jordan as an interlocutor, we would be helping Israel to forestall its worst security nightmare -- the emergence of a separate Palestinian state on the West Bank -- while pushing Israel to the difficult but inevitable choice of divesting itself of the Arab populations in the territories or facing the permanent enmity of the entire Arab world.

In fact, the basic elements of our approach have already been advocated by broad and influential segments of the Israel polity and have been enthusiastically advocated by many of Israel's most serious military men and strategic thinkers. If skillfully handled -- and this means extreme care on the issues of Jerusalem, contacts with the PLO and support for Camp David -- our approach would allow us to present Israel with the clear choice of a favorable peace agreement that takes into account the security of all Israelis in return for abandoning the goal of annexing the West Bank that many Israelis oppose.

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- 15 -

If King Hussein will make the courageous move to join in this effort, people around the world, and not least in Israel, will recognize it for the statesmanlike decision it will be, and will urge efforts by governments -- including Israel's -- to be responsive. The urge for peace is a powerful political force in Israel, as Sadat's initiative demonstrated, and it is possible that even Begin himself would be moved to play a statesman's role if he saw the chance to be remembered as the man who brought true peace to Israel and if the ultimate question of sovereignty over Judea and Samaria could at least be postponed.

Nonetheless, you must be aware that undertaking this initiative will require willingness on your part to face strong Israeli opposition for a sustained period of time. We will be running a risk of an Israeli government decision to refuse to negotiate, or even a move in the Knesset to annex the West Bank,, should Israel feel under unbearable pressure. The initiative will require us to take public positions that we have avoided up to now and which directly challenge the intention of Begin and his Likud party to retain control over the territories which they call Judea and Samaria:

- to assert that an Israeli claim to sovereignty over the West Bank is not a viable basis for peace;
- on the settlements issue, you personally will have to note publicly that the question of illegality is not relevant; further settlements are unnecessary

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to Israeli security and must halt or the U.S. will impose a cost on Israel for continuing;

- take public positions critical of Israel's policies towards the West Bankers and Gazans, particularly regarding acts of political suppression;
- state very clearly our view that the tradeoff of territory for peace in 242 applies to the West Bank;
- support voting rights for East Jerusalem Arabs in elections for the transitional period;
- and generally adopt the position that the entire thrust of Camp David is toward Palestinian self-government and away from Israeli control.

While these steps will certainly bring strong opposition from the Israeli government, our position will be logically and morally sustainable. Nothing in our approach will deviate from the letter or spirit of Camp David. Our goal will be the achievement of a breakthrough toward real peace and security for Israel and an end to the succession of wars caused by the failure to address the Palestinian issue. There are many people among the Israelis who will recognize that we are engaged responsibly, with the highest purpose, and with the intent to strengthen Israel and American-Israeli relations.

The approach outlined above contains many risks and will demand of us great boldness, firmness, and discipline.

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- 17 -

It could quickly become an issue in American domestic politics. But we do not have the luxury of deferring new policies until after the November elections. Careful handling with Congress, and clear and forceful public articulation of our initiative will take a great deal of your time and will be hotly debated. I believe it would redound to your benefit for addressing squarely and fairly an intransigent problem which has been for too long the cause of too much tragedy.

One point is clear: we cannot afford a continuation of the present stalemate. And history will not forgive us if we miss the opportunity which now exists.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date: MAR 5 1996

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PA Exemptions

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TS Authority

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JERUSALEM

E.O. 11652: GDS 4/5/88

TAGS: PDIP, IS, U.S.

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON TUESDAY. COMMENCE TEXT.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I WAS DEEPLY SHOCKED AND ANGERED BY THE MURDER OF YACOV BAR SIMANTOV IN PARIS ON SATURDAY. HIS FAMILY AND THE JEWISH NATION HAVE SUFFERED A GRIEVOUS LOSS AND I HOPE YOU WILL ACCEPT MY SINCERE CONDOLENCES AND CONVEY THEM TO HIS FAMILY. HE EXEMPLIFIED THE HIGHEST TRADITION OF ISRAEL'S DIPLOMATS, WHO REPRESENT THEIR COUNTRY DESPITE A TERRORISM THAT RESPECTS NEITHER BOUNDARIES NOR INDIVIDUALS.

WE HAVE COMMON PROBLEMS AND COMMON CONCERNS. OUR RESPONSE TO THESE ACTS MUST BE DISCIPLINED AND EFFECTIVE. I STRONGLY BELIEVE OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER, USING OUR INTELLIGENCE AND OTHER INFORMATION

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RELATING TO TERRORISM. THE PEACE WE SEEK THROUGH CAMP
DAVID MUST INCLUDE AN END TO SUCH LAWLESSNESS AND BRUTALITY.

WITH MY WARM GOOD WISHES.

SINCERELY,

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

END TEXT. YY

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7 August 1982

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Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Ambassador Arens has conveyed to me your message of August 6 concerning Israel's fear that any presence of an International Force in Beirut prior to the PLO withdrawal would serve as a screen behind which the PLO could procrastinate and delay their departure. We of course have been aware that Israel and the United States held widely differing views on this question since Minister of Defense Sharon told Ambassador Habib on July 19 that he had eleven points of disagreement with our approach, one of which was his statement that the international force should not enter until the last PLO member had departed, a position which we have not considered to be realistic or desirable for the achievement of our common objective of a negotiated departure of the PLO from Beirut and Lebanon under safe and reasonable conditions.

Mr. Prime Minister, it is important I believe for us to focus on the fact that Ambassador Habib's mission is to produce a package agreement between the Government of Lebanon and the PLO. That package, Ambassador Habib tells me, will be complete and able to be transmitted to you no later than Monday, August 9. In it, I believe you will see that virtually all of your -- and our -- concerns will have been addressed satisfactorily; there will be one or two elements that will not meet all our desires, but when viewed against

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the very positive outcome as a whole, I believe it will be clear that the risks are minimal and the practical purposes are quite understandable.

Both in Beirut and here in Washington ~~ambassadors~~, we have I believe conveyed to Israel our basic understanding of your fear that the PLO might seek to use the international force as a protective screen between it and your forces. There is no doubt Mr. Prime Minister that the PLO, for several weeks during this negotiation, sought every means to delay the talks and to avoid a decision to depart. It is now clear, however, that they have made that decision. Ambassador Habib is at present engaged in most urgent and intensive discussions on the operational details of the time and modalities of departure. The period during which many of us shared an understandable concern that the PLO wished to delay and divert the negotiations now belongs to the past. We are in a new phase. The momentum is with our side. The PLO have crossed their Rubicon and have accepted the necessity of departure; they no longer have the strength, the will, or the support to do otherwise. Indeed, their primary consideration now is for safety -- both for the combatants who will depart and for those non-combatants who remain behind. The United States has pledged itself to do all it can to ensure that the PLO has a safe passage out of Beirut; the presence of the multinational force will be an important symbol of that assurance.

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I can assure you, Mr. Prime Minister, that no contingent of the Multinational Force -- French, Italian, or American -- would allow itself to be used by the PLO in the manner Israel has suggested. I have today spoken to Foreign Minister Cheysson on this matter and he is in full agreement as regards the French force, elements of which may be the first to arrive.

I therefore hope, Mr. Prime Minister, that you will not foreclose any possibility at this stage, but will await the package agreement, which will contain a specific date for the start of the PLO withdrawal, and cover all aspects of the process of departure.

Sincerely,

George P. Shultz

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Original letter given to NEA for
Ambassador Lewis to hand-carry
1227 hours, 5/28. jgm

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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May 28, 1982

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Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I had a very useful two and one-half hour meeting with
Defense Minister Sharon earlier this week. I'm sure he will
be reporting to you the wide range of issues we discussed.
During this meeting, Ambassador Arens also gave me your
letter to the President.

As I have reflected further on my conversation with
Minister Sharon, and your letter to the President, I hope
there is no ambiguity about the extent of our concern about
possible future Israeli military actions in Lebanon. The
President and I recognize and admire the very real restraint
Israel has shown in recent months in the face of repeated
pressures to respond to violations of the cessation of
hostilities by the other side. At the same time, we want to
make it very clear that we sincerely hope Israel will
continue to exercise complete restraint and refrain from any
action which would further damage the understanding
underlying the cessation of hostilities. Israeli military
actions, regardless of size, could lead to consequences none
of us can foresee at this time. We recognize, as I feel sure
you know, how deeply we understand the very real threat of
violence Israel faces. Minister Sharon said, no one has
the right to tell Israel what decision it should take in the
defense of its people. We are only expressing our belief
that nations facing threats, including the U.S. and Israel,
should carefully weigh the consequences of how such
challenges are handled.

On a related matter, Minister Sharon said in our meeting
on Tuesday Israel has "decided not to allow Syria to fly over
Lebanon." We, of course, have accepted the fact that Israel
will be flying reconnaissance over Lebanon. I assume that
Minister Sharon's remark does not mean that Israel intends to
initiate action against Syrian aircraft over Lebanon when
such flights do not threaten Israel's own air activity
there. Again, I raise this purely in the spirit of seeking
to avoid serious repercussions for our mutual interests in
the area.

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His Excellency
Menachem Begin,

Prime Minister of Israel

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date:

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5 1996

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As I informed Minister Sharon, the President has asked Phil Habib to return to the region in early June. He will be carrying new ideas aimed at developing a more lasting solution to the Lebanon problem. We hope to establish, over the long run, a new and promising avenue toward addressing Israel's concerns about terrorists' acts from Lebanon against its citizens. After getting an update on the situation in Lebanon from the leadership in Beirut, Ambassador Habib would like to visit Israel to exchange ideas with you before going to other countries in the region.

Mr. Prime Minister, I write this letter in the same spirit of candor and deep friendship which prompted you to inform us that you did not want to surprise the United States over Lebanon. The President joins me in expressing our joy at hearing Mrs. Begin is out of the hospital. We all look forward to seeing you in a few short weeks.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,



Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

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ACTION NEA-09

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 RSC-01 PRS-01

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INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE

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UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 1219

E.O. 11652 N/A

TAGS: PFOR, PK, US, IN

SUB: CURRENT REACTION REPORT FEB 8

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION USINFO, INFO SECSTATE, KARACHI, LAHORE,
NEW DELHI, KABUL AND DACCA DATED FEB 08, 1975
REPEATING FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

UNCLAS ISLAMABAD USIS

FOR IOP/M, IPS, IBS, INA STATE NEA/PAB

E.O. 11652 N/A

SUB: PAKISTAN MEDIA REACTION FEB 8

BHUTTO VISIT: U.S.-PAK JOINT COMMUNIQUE AND BHUTTO'S
REMARKS AT HIS DINNER RECEPTION DOMINATED LEADS WITH
MOST USING BANNER HEADS. OTHER ITEMS WHICH RECEIVED
PROMINENT FRONT PAGE TREATMENT INCLUDED BHUTTO'S
DEPARTURE FROM WASHINGTON AND ARRIVAL IN NEW YORK AND
BBC CORRESPONDENT'S REPORT SAYING "ARMS BAN TO END THIS
MONTH--BHUTTO ASSURED".

EXTENSIVE FRONT, BACK-PAGE PICTORIAL COVERAGE INCLUDING
FORD'S DINNER, BHUTTO DINNER FOR ROCKEFELLER, DEPARTURE
FROM WASHINGTON AND ARRIVAL IN NEW YORK AND BHUTTO
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PAGE 02 ISLAMA 01219 01 OF 02 081058Z

MEETINGS WITH KISSINGER, SCHLESINGER AND MORGAN. BIGGEST CIRCULATION JANG USED SEVEN PICTURES ON FRONT PAGE. LEAD STORIES IN NPT'S PAKTIMES AND MORNING NEWS ON JOINT COMMUNIQUE WERE CREDITED TO THEIR CORRESPONDENTS WHO ADDED THEIR COMMENTS, WHILE OTHERS USED APP VERSION. PAKTIMES H.K. BURKI WRITING ON COMMUNIQUE SAID QUOTE "PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO'S VISIT, WHICH CONCLUDED WITH A JOINT COMMUNIQUE THIS MORNING, HAS ACHIEVED ITS MAIN OBJECTIVES--THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH PRESIDENT GERALD FORD AND THE REAFFIRMATION OF WASHINGTON'S CONTINUED BACKING FOR PAKISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AS "AN ENDURING PRINCIPLE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY".

THERE IS A BRIEF REFERENCE IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO THE "MUTUAL SECURITY CONCERNS" IN THE CONTEXT OF COMMITMENT TO THE STRENGTHENING OF REGIONAL AND WORLD PEACE WHICH LEAVES THE QUESTION OF AMERICAN ARMS EMBARGO UNSETTLED, IN A FORMAL SENSE AT LEAST. HOWEVER, PRESIDENT FORD'S REITERATION OF POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY CARRIES WITH IT A GOOD DEAL OF WEIGHT. CERTAINLY ITS IMPORTANCE WILL NOT BE LOST ON PAKISTAN'S HOSTILE NEIGHBOURS.

IN CONCRETE TERMS, THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE MERELY FORMALISES THE ALREADY KNOWN AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO SUPPLY ANOTHER 300,000 TONS OF WHEAT TO PAKISTAN AND MR. FORD'S ASSURANCE ON ADDITIONAL ALLOCATIONS THIS YEAR AND THE NEXT. THE PRESIDENT HAS ALSO PLEDGED A PRIORITY ATTENTION TO PAKISTAN'S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS.

IT MAY BE TOO SOON OF COURSE TO MAKE A PROPER ASSESSMENT OF MR. BHUTTO'S INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO SOFTEN CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION TO THE LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO. A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION INDICATES THAT WHILE SOME OF THE LEADERS IN CONGRESS ARE NOW SYMPATHETIC TO PAKISTAN'S CASE OTHERS CONTINUE, FOR VARIOUS REASONS, TO MAINTAIN THEIR HOSTILITY. UNQUOTE

MORNING NEWS CORRESPONDENT SULTAN AHMED REPORTING
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COMMUNIQUE SAID QUOTE "FOR MORE WAS ACHIEVED DURING PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO'S TWO-DAY TALKS IN WASHINGTON THAN HAS BEEN MENTIONED IN THE BLAND JOINT COMMUNIQUE

ISSUED BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR NEW YORK THIS MORNING. WHILE THE COMMUNIQUE IS FIRM ON PRESIDENT FORD'S COMMITMENT TO GIVE FOUR LAKH TONS OF WHEAT TO PAKISTAN THIS YEAR, IT IS NON-COMMITTAL ON THE ISSUE OF LIFTING THE EMBARGO ON U.S. ARMS TO PAKISTAN BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS AND THE NEED TO OBTAIN CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL BEFORE THE EMBARGO CAN BE LIFTED. BUT ON THE POLITICAL PLANE, PRESIDENT FORD'S COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT THE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY OF PAKISTAN IS FORTHRIGHT AND IT HAS BEEN MENTIONED AS AN "ENDURING PRINCIPLE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY." INDEPENDENT NAWA-I-WAQT COUPLED ITS LEAD ON COMMUNIQUE WITH A COMMENT BY ITS CORRESPONDENT ARIF NIZAMI SAYING QUOTE "THOUGH NO DEFINITE ASSURANCE HAS BEEN GIVEN TO PAKISTAN ABOUT LIFTING OF ARMS EMBARGO, THERE IS GENERAL IMPRESSION THAT PREMIER BHUTTO HAS SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING U.S. GOVERNMENT AND AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS ABOUT REASONABLENESS OF PAKISTAN'S DEMAND." NIZAMI QUOTED FROM AMERICAN PRESS TO SUBSTANTIATE HIS CONTENTION. APP REPORTING OF COMMUNIQUE AND BHUTTO DINNER SPEECH WAS STRAIGHT.

FOLLOWING

ARE MAJOR HEADLINES:

NPT PAKTIMES: "BHUTTO'S VISIT ACHIEVES ITS MAIN OBJECTIVES: JOINT COMMUNIQUE--ENDURING SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN'S INTEGRITY REAFFIRMED BY AMERICA".

INDEPENDENT DAWN: "MUTUAL SECURITY AND REGIONAL PEACE DISCUSSED. JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON PM'S U.S. VISIT.--

FRIENDSHIP WITH INDIA ON EQUALITY BASIS, SAYS BHUTTO'S

NPT MORNING NEWS: "SUPPORT TO PAKISTAN INDEPENDENCE U.S. POLICY'S ENDING PRINCIPLE: SAYS FORD., BHUTTO ASSURED OF PRIORITY TO AID REQUIREMENTS.-- BHUTTO HAS GIVEN SENSE OF PURPOSE TO PAKISTAN, SAYS ROCKEFELLER."

INDEPENDENT JANG: "PM BHUTTO, PRESIDENT FORD DISCUSS MUTUAL SECURITY PROBLEMS. INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY OF PAKISTAN ARE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, SAYS FORD., AGREEMENT ON FURTHER STRENGTHENING CLOSE RELATIONS.-- PAKISTAN READY TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH

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INDIA ON EQUALITY, NON-INTERFERENCE BASIS, SAYS BHUTTO.

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PAGE 01 ISLAMA 01219 02 OF 02 081121Z

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8759

INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 1219

YOU HAVE MADE THE NATION REALISE ITS DESTINATION, OBJECT
TIVES, SAYS ROCKEFELLER."

INDEPENDENT NAWA-I-WAQT: "RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND
U.S. WILL BE FURTHER STRENGTHENED, JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT BY
PREMIER BHUTTO AND PRESIDENT FORD, PAKISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE
AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WILL REMAIN ENDURING PRINCIPLE
OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, PRESIDENT FORD AND PREMIER BHUTTO
HELD IMPORTANT TALKS ON MUTUAL SECURITY, U.S. WILL CONTINUE
TO GIVE ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN'S FOOD AND DEVELOPMENT
NEEDS, U.S. WILL FULFILL ITS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
STRENGTHENING OLD TIES--PRESIDENT FORD".

TV AND RADIO COVERAGE: KARACHI TV SATELLITED BHUTTO'S
DINNER SHOWING BHUTTO, ROCKEFELLER SPEECHES
(FILM TO BE SHOWN OTHER STATIONS SATURDAY NIGHT).
RADIO, TV NEWSCAST STRESSED BHUTTO DINNER REMARK
"MY WASHINGTON VISIT HAS BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL, USEFUL
AND CONSTRUCTIVE".

RADIO SATURDAY MORNING DEVOTED MOST OF ITS NATIONWIDE
NEWSCAST TO COMMUNIQUE WITH POSITIVE OVERTONES.
EDITORIAL COMMENTS: INDEPENDENT NAWA-I-WAQT, JANG AND
PEOPLES PARTY DAILY MUSAWAAT COMMENTED ON BHUTTO VISIT
FOCUSSING ON ARMS QUESTION.

NAWA-I-WAQT SAID QUOTE "PREMIER BHUTTO HAS APPRISED
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U.S. LEADERS OF PAKISTAN'S DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS. THOUGH NO DEFINITE PROMISE HAS BEEN GIVEN IN THIS REGARD, U.S. HAS ALSO NOT REPLIED IN NEGATIVE AND THIS QUESTION IS UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION. U.S. IS PAKISTAN'S ALLY IN BILATERAL AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY PACTS. PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN ARE JUSTIFIED IN COMPLAINING THAT U.S. BETRAYED IN TIME OF NEED. U.S. CAN WIN BACK FRIENDSHIP OF PAKISTANIS BY RESUMING ARMS AID. U.S. NEEDS THIS FRIENDSHIP BADLY FOR PROTECTING ITS INTERESTS IN MIDEAST AND GULF AREA (AND INDIAN OCEAN). IF U.S. CONSIDERS PAKISTAN CORNERSTONE IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY, IT IS DUE TO PAKISTAN'S GEOGRAPHICAL IMPORTANCE AND ITS PROXIMITY TO MIDEAST AND GULF AREA. KEEPING IN VIEW POLICY U.S. IS PURSUING TOWARD INDIA AND EFFORTS IT IS MAKING TO BRING INDIA OUT OF SOVIET SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, WE SHOULD NOT HOPE THAT PAKISTAN WILL GET AS MUCH MILITARY AID AS ISRAEL GETS." UNQUOTE.

JANG SAID QUOTE "U.S. COOPERATION FOR SOLVING PAKISTAN FOOD PROBLEM IS VERY VALUABLE. BUT MORE IMPORTANT THAN FOOD IS THE PROBLEM OF ARMS SUPPLIES TO ENABLE IT TO DEFEND ITS FRONTIERS AT TIMES OF NEED. PAK STAND ON ARMS HAS FROM THE START BEEN EXTREMELY JUST AND REASONABLE, AND ITS REASONABLENESS HAS BECOME MORE VIVID IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING IN THE SUBCONTINENT. CHANGED CONDITIONS IN THIS AREA LEAVE NO REASON FOR AMERICAN APPREHENSIONS REGARDING ARMS RACE. IF U.S. SUPPLIES ARMS TO PAKISTAN, PEACE IN NO WAY WILL BE HARMED. THERE IS ALSO NO REASON FOR ANY APPREHENSION REGARDING INDO-PAK RELATIONS. UNDER THE SIMLA AGREEMENT, MUCH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AND OTHER PROBLEMS INCLUDING KASHMIR CAN WELL BE DISCUSSED. IF PAKISTAN ACHIEVES DEFENDABLE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY, THE CONDITIONS FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS OF DISPUTES THROUGH TALKS WILL BECOME MORE FAVORABLE. A WEAKER PAKISTAN CAN WELL PROVIDE THE COURAGE TO INDIA OF VIOLATING AGREEMENTS. SO, U.S. SHOULD SUPPLY ITS DEFENSE NEEDS AND ENABLE IT TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST ANY POWERFUL COUNTRY'S AGGRESSION." UNQUOTE. MUSAWAAT: OBSERVED, QUOTE "PREMIER BHUTTO HAS APPRISED U.S. LEADERS OF PAKISTAN'S POINT OF VIEW ON VARIOUS PROBLEMS. AS FAR AS PAKISTAN'S DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS UNCLASSIFIED

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ARE CONCERNED, U.S. LEADERS ARE READY TO CONSIDER

LIFTING OF ARMS EMBARGO AND FOR PRESENT IT CAN BE
TERMED AS CLEAR STEP TOWARD MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. SINCE
U.S. CONSIDERS PAKISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE IMPORTANT PART OF
ITS FOREIGN POLICY, ONE SHOULD HOPE U.S. WILL REVISE ITS
POLICY ON ARMS SUPPLY. PREMIER BHUTTO HAS MADE CLEAR
THAT PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY DEPENDS ON U.S. REPLY.
IF PAKISTAN'S DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT MET WITH
MODERN U.S. ARMS, PAKISTAN WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE
BUT TO FORMULATE ITS ATOMIC PROGRAM KEEPING IN VIEW
ITS DEFENCE NEEDS. PREMIER BHUTTO'S U.S. VISIT HAS
MADE IT CLEAR U.S. LEADERS HAVE FULLY REALIZED THIS
SITUATION AND PROSPECTS OF U.S., AS FRIEND OF PAKISTAN,
SELLING ARMS TO PAKISTAN HAVE BRIGHTENED." UNQUOTE
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 01 STATE 025785

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INFO OCT-01 AF-06 NEA-09 ISO-00 /023 R

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APPROVED BY EB-MR. HAND

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P 042334Z FEB 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR/18 Date: 8/7/97
☒ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PART
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FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

UNCLAS STATE 025785

E.O. 11652: NA
TAGS: ENRG
SUBJ: SECRETARY KISSINGER'S SPEECH BEFORE THE NATIONAL
PRESS CLUB, FEB. 3, 175

FOLLOWING IS REPEAT USIA WIRELESS FILE NR. EUR 14, FEB 3
QUOTE:

WA-6

EUR-14

(HIGHLIGHTS) KISSINGER ANSWERS QUESTIONS AT PRESS CLUB (600)
WASHINGTON, FEB. 3-- THE U.S. ARMS SALES EMBARGO AGAINST
PAKISTAN IS BEING "SERIOUSLY" EXAMINED IN PREPARATION FOR THE
FEBRUARY 4 VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY PRIME MINISTER ZULFIKAR ALI
BHUTTO, BUT SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER DOUBTS THAT "ANY
FINAL DECISIONS" WILL BE MADE DURING MR. BHUTTO'S TRIP.

DR. KISSINGER MADE THE POINT IN A 30-MINUTE SESSION AT THE
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB IN WHICH HE ANSWERED QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM
AFTER HE DELIVERED A SPEECH ON THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
SITUATION.

"THE QUESTION OF ARMS TO PAKISTAN, AN ALLY WHICH IS IN THE
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CURIOUS POSITION OF BEING SUBJECT TO AN AMERICAN EMBARGO, IS ALWAYS BEFORE US-- ESPECIALLY AT A TIME WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN VISITS THE UNITED STATES," DR. KISSINGER SAID, ADDING:

"I DOUBT ANY FINAL DECISIONS WILL BE MADE WHILE HE IS HERE...OF OF COURSE (THE ARMS SALES EMBARGO) IS BEING SERIOUSLY EXAMINED IN PREPARATION FOR HIS VISIT....AND, OF COURSE, IT WILL BE DISCUSSED."

THE SECRETARY ALSO ANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS PLANNED TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST LATER THIS MONTH AS WELL AS ABOUT CHILE, CUBA, VIETNAM AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

MIDDLE EAST:

HE SAID HE WOULD NOT BE PLANNING A VISIT TO THE MIDEAST IF HE "DIDN'T BELIEVE THERE WAS SOME POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS IN FURTHER (ARAB-ISRAELI) NEGOTIATIONS."

ANY NEXT "STEP THAT IS TAKEN" IN NEGOTIATIONS "SHOULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS AN ENTRANCE STEP TOWARD A FINAL" PEACE SETTLEMENT. "ALL OTHER NATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL HAVE TO PARTICIPATE...IN A NEGOTIATION FOR A FINAL PEACE."

ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), HE SAID THE UNITED STATES HAS REPEATEDLY SAID THAT THERE IS "NO POSSIBILITY" OF RECOGNITION SO LONG AS THE PLO DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL.

CUBA:

TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE IS A POSSIBILITY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO REVERSE CURRENT POLICY IN ORDER TO SELL GOODS TO CUBA TO EASE U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS, HE SAID: "WHATEVER DECISION WILL BE MADE... WILL NOT BE DICTATED BY ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS."

ANY CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY TOWARDS CUBA "WILL GROW OUT OF OUR ASSESSMENT" OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND WESTERN HEMISPHERE SITUATIONS, HE EMPHASIZED.

CHILE:

A CHARGE-- PRINTED IN THE WASHINGTON POST FEBRUARY 3 -- BY FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR ORLANDO LETELIER THAT DR. KISSINGER PERSONALLY ASSURED HIM IN LATE 1971 OF NON-INTERVENTION BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN CHILE IS "TOTALLY UNSUPPORTED," ACCORDING TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

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DR. KISSINGER FOUND IT "AMAZING" THAT THE FRONT PAGE OF A "LEADING NEWSPAPER" WOULD PUBLISH A "TOTALLY UNSUPPORTED

STORY BY AN INDIVIDUAL (MR. LETELIER) ...WHO WASN'T EXACTLY
DISINTERESTED" IN EVENTS IN CHILE.

DR. KISSINGER SAID THAT NEITHER HE NOR COLUMNIST JOSEPH ALSOP,
AT WHOSE HOME MR. LETELIER CLAIMS HE MET THE SECRETARY OF STATE
TO RECEIVE THE ASSURANCE, "REMEMBER SUCH AN INCIDENT."

DR. KISSINGER FOUND THE LETELIER ALLEGATION "PARTICULARLY
PAINFUL BECAUSE I HAD NOT BEEN UNINVOLVED IN HIS RELEASE FROM
PRISON" IN CHILE.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

THE FORD ADMINISTRATION DOES "NOT HAVE THE IMPRESSION"
THAT CHINESE LEADERS "ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE STATE OF
CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS."

WASHINGTON IS COMMITTED UNDER THE 1972 SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE TO
MOVE TOWARD NORMAL RELATIONS WITH PEKING AND IS "DETERMINED TO
CARRY OUT" THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THAT DOCUMENT.

VIETNAM:

THE "ONLY SECURITY PROBLEM IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS THE
PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY FORCES." ITEM
2/3/75 AM

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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NACIONALES

NOTICIAS

Asunción, miércoles 10 de mayo de 1995 20

Informe de Interpol incrimina a Mario Gómez en bebetráfico

La paraguaya Noemí Recalde de Díaz y el uruguayo Francisco Díaz Barreto confesaron que Mario Gómez es el que obtiene las criaturas que serán comercializadas. La pareja hizo las declaraciones a la Justicia de Bélgica. También salpicaron a otros presuntos implicados. El documento fue arrojado al magistrado interviniente por el agente fiscal Nicasio Ortega Flecha.

El fiscal Nicasio Ortega Flecha remitió al juez Luis María Benítez Riera los informes que fueron enviados por la Interpol, en donde se especifican sobre los pasos que se dan para concretar el bebetráfico y en el cual tendría activa participación Mario Roberto Gómez,

quien recientemente abandonó el Penal de Tacumbú, mediante una resolución dictada por la Cámara de Apelación.

El informe recepcionado por la Fiscalía interviniente especifica que uno de los organizadores de las operaciones en Paraguay es el abogado Jorge Horvath, quien administra además un negocio de préstamos e hipotecarios en Asunción.

Horvath trabaja en las operaciones junto a Miriam Sela Salma, quienes fueron los que contrataron a Noemí Recalde de Díaz (paraguaya) y Francisco Díaz Barreto (uruguayo), quienes empezaron a realizar los viajes para transportar a los

chicos, en enero o febrero de 1994.

Los informes que fueron proveídos por esta pareja que se encuentra detenida en la capital belga reseñan que Roberto Gómez es el que se encarga de obtener las criaturas para que estas sean trasladadas al viejo mundo.

Este, siempre según las confesiones de los detenidos, se dedica a comprar las criaturas de las madres solteras y se responsabiliza de la obtención de los pasaportes necesarios para que los pequeños viajen.

El informe fue remitido a la Fiscalía interviniente por el comisario principal, Blacio Benítez López, jefe de Gabinete de la Interpol en nuestro país.

La pareja que actualmente se encuentra detenida en la ciudad belga había confesado en su anterior declaración ante la Justicia de ese país que los chicos son comercializados a precios realmente elevados que rondan los 30 a 40 mil dólares americanos y que los "mercados" más accesibles son países como Alemania, Israel y Francia, entre otros.

El magistrado Benítez Riera había ordenado la reclusión de Mario Roberto Gómez en el Penal de Tacumbú, en tanto se proseguía el proceso, sin embargo, esta medida fue revocada por la Cámara de Apelación, segunda sala.

ESPACIO RESERVADO

COMUNICADO DEL BANCO CENTRAL DEL PARAGUAY

Con relación a publicaciones sobre el manejo de las reservas internacionales, el Banco Central del Paraguay aclara:

Los activos externos a cargo del Banco Central del Paraguay son administrados por la Institución directa y únicamente a través de la Gerencia de Operaciones Internacionales. A efectos de asegurar la transparencia y seguridad en sus inversiones, el Banco

Nombraron reemplazante de Levv Acuña en Senad

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IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 11/15/97

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FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

TS authority to:
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02927 091456Z
ACTION SS-30INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
-----227535 091456Z /41

O 091414Z MAY 81

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1819

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/CR/TR

Date: 11/3/97

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IN PART

EO Citations

TS authority to

FOIA Exemptions

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PA Exemptions

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BEIRUT 2927

DECAPTIONED

9302566

DAMASCUS FOR HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12065 RDS 1,3,4 5/9/01 (DEAN, JOHN GUNTHER) OR-M

TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, SY, IS, XF

SUBJECT: (U) HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
AL-WAZZAN - MAY 8

1. [REDACTED]

2. IN THE COURSE OF HIS MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB, PRIME MINIISTER AL-WAZZAN EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT IF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN LEBANON IS NOT RESOLVED, IT COULD LEAD EVENTUALLY TO PARTITION. AL-WAZZAN SAID THAT AT PRESENT, THERE IS AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF MODERATE LEBANESE MUSLIMS OF U.S. MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY AND A REALIZATION THAT NOT EVERYTHING ISRAEL DOES IS WRONG. HOWEVER, IF LEBANON DISINTEGRATES, AL-WAZZAN SAID HE BELIVES THAT CONSERVATIVE AND MODERATE FIGURES IN THE MUSLIM AREAS OF LEBANON WOULD BE POWERLESS AGAINST EXTREMIST FORCES. THUS, THE END RESULT MIGHT BE NOT ONLY THE DISSOLUTION OF A STATE

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02927 091456Z

THAT IS ESSENTIALLY A MODERATE INFLUCENCE IN THE AREA BUT ALSO THE CREATION OF A RADICAL, ANTI-U.S. ENTITY THAT WOULD FURTHER CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESTABLIIZATION OF THE REGION.


3. ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LEBANESE ARMY TO DEFUSE THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE BIQA', AL-WAZZAN WAS NOT NEGATIVE. HE SAID THAT UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS AND DEPENDING ALSO ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE UNITS, THE


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LEBANESE ARMY COULD BE USED. HE SAID THAT HE WAS
AWARE OF THE OPPOSITION OF MANY OF HIS CO-RELIGIONISTS
TO THIS POSITION.

4. COMMENT: I FOUND PRIME MINISTER AL-WAZZAN, AS A
MUSLIM FACING THE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURES ENGENDERED
BY THIS CRISIS, TO BE MODERATE AND BALANCED IN HIS
VIEWS.

DEAN


NVVZCZ

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification *** 

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UNCLASSIFIEDPAGE 01 DAMASC 02877 01 OF 04 100856Z
ACTION SS-30INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 (ADS) W
-----233132 100942Z /21

O 100830Z MAY 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 216

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/CR/TR

Date: 11/3/77

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EO Citations

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TS authority:

FOIA Exemptions

☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.

PA Exemptions

☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 02877

EXCISE DECAPTIONED

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 5/10/01 (DRAPER, MORRIS) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, LE, SY, IS, US, XF

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: INITIAL MEETING WITH KHADDAM,
MAY 9

1. [REDACTED]

2. I MET FOR TWO HOURS AND FORTY MINUTES ON SATURDAY EVENING, MAY 9, WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM, WHO WAS JOINED BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER QADDOUR, SABAH QABBANI, HEAD OF THE MFA AMERICAN DIVISION, AND AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE TO THE U.S., RAFIQ JOUEJATI. AMBASSADOR SEELYE, DAS DRAPER AND POLOFF ABINGTON WERE ALSO PRESENT. A "GUARANTEED" MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD WILL TAKE PLACE AT 11 A.M. THIS MORNING.

3. IN A TALK FULL OF GIVE-AND-TAKE, I DEVELOPED--AMONG OTHERS--THE FOLLOWING THEMES, DESIGNED TO ENGAGE THE SYRIANS AND IN EXAMINING AND DEVISING PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS TO SPECIFIC AND DISCRETE ELEMENTS OF THE IMMEDIATE

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PROBLEM IN THE BEKAA AND SANNIN INSTEAD OF RESORTING
TO STANDARD RHETORIC ON GLOBAL PROBLEMS:

-- (A) PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD ENTRUSTED ME WITH THIS MISSION TO DEAL WITH THE SERIOUS AND URGENT PROBLEM OF CALMING THE SITUATION IN LEBANON WHICH HAD ARISEN OUT OF RECENT EVENTS IN AND AROUND ZAHLEH AND THE BEKAA PLAIN. WE DID NOT HAVE ANY FORMULA OR OVERALL PLAN FOR CALMING TENSIONS BUT WANTED TO LISTEN TO AND EXAMINE THE

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VIEWS OF THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS BEFORE ADVANCING SPECIFIC IDEAS AND CONCEPTS OF OUR OWN; HOWEVER, WE HAD SOME IDEAS.

-- (B) I HAD SPENT 36 HOURS IN LEBANON TALKING WITH A FULL CROSS-SECTION OF LEBANESE LEADERS--FROM THE GOVERNMENT AND AMONG THE INDEPENDENTS--AND HAD A GOOD GRASP OF WHAT THEY COULD SUPPORT AND ENDORSE.

-- (C) WE WERE IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO BE HELPFUL, HAVING ACCESS TO ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED, AND WE WERE DETERMINED TO FORESTALL A SITUATION WHICH WOULD HAVE DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY.

-- (D) WE INTENDED TO APPROACH THE ISSUES WITH A CONVICTION THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO BLAME FOR PAST ACTIONS; AND NO VICTOR OR VANQUISHED, NO WINNER OR LOSER. ANY FORMULATION WE WOULD OFFER WOULD BE DESIGNED TO AVOID HARMING THE VITAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF ANY PARTY, INCLUDING SYRIAS. WHATEVER THE ROOTS OF THE ISSUES, WE BELIEVED THAT IT COULD BE SOLVED LOGICALLY.

-- (E) CHANGES IN APRIL OF THE STATUS QUO HAD INEVITABLY PRODUCED SERIOUS REACTIONS; OUR MISSION WAS TO DETERMINE WHETHER WE COULD RETURN TO A PREVIOUS STATUS QUO, WITH

[REDACTED]

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CHANGES WHERE NECESSARY, WHICH WOULD NEUTRALIZE OR ELIMINATE THOSE THREATENING REACTIONS AND PERMIT THE RESOLUTION OF LONGER-RANGE CHALLENGES, SUCH AS A LEBANESE NATIONAL CONSENSUS, TO GO FORWARD.

-- (F) ISRAEL HAD LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON.

-- (G) SUMMING UP, WE WANTED TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN CREATING A SITUATION WHICH WOULD POSE NO SECURITY THREAT TO ANYONE, AND WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A SOLUTION TO THE POLITICALLY AND GEOGRAPHICALLY RELATED PROBLEMS OF THE SANNIN RIDGE, ZAHLEH, AND THE MISSILE BATTERIES IN THE BEKAA VALLEY.

4. KHADDAM RESPONDED WITH QUALIFIED INTEREST TO THESE THEMES. WHILE HE TOOK A HARD, CRITICAL LINE REGARDING ISRAELI ATTITUDES, HE BEGAN TO LISTEN CLOSELY TO OUR EFFORTS TO BREAK DOWN THE ISSUES INTO THEIR COMPONENT PARTS, AMONG WHICH ARE THE FOLLOWING:

-- (A) IN ANY NEW ARRANGEMENT, WHAT WOULD BE EXPECTED OF THE LEBANESE? THE SYRIANS? THE ISRAELIS? (WE CERTAINLY HAVE A DEBATE STARTED.)

-- (B) WHICH NON-SYRIAN MILITARY/POLICE FORCE COULD

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PROVIDE ORDER IN THE CITY OF ZAHLEH? (LEBANESE ARMY
OR ISF?)

-- (C) THE PHALANGE FIGHTING MEN NOT NATIVE TO ZAHLEH
WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE UNDER ANY ARRANGEMENT.

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PAGE 01 DAMASC 02877 02 OF 04 100905Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 (ADS) W
-----233137 100944Z /21

O 100830Z MAY 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2168

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

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-- (D) HOW CAN THE SANNIN RIDGELINE BE "NEUTRALIZED"?
(E.G. THROUGH THE ABSENCE OF ANY MILITARY PRESENCE,
THROUGH LEBANESE ARMY CONTROL, ETC.)

-- (E) TO WHAT DEGREE IS THE CHTAURA AGREEMENT BETWEEN
SYRIA AND LEBANON APPLICABLE TO A NEW AND PRAGMATIC
RESOLUTION OF THE ZAHLEH PROBLEM?

-- (F) WHAT ARE THE TRUE SECURITY CONCERNS OF ISRAEL AND
SYRIA RESPECTIVELY WITH REGARD TO THE SANNIN RIDGE AND
MISSILE BATTERY PROBLEMS?

-- (G) HOW COULD THE PROBLEM OF THE SYRIAN SAM BATTERIES
IN THE BEKAA BE WORKED OUT, WHICH TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE
SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SYRIA AND ISRAEL?

5. WHILE THE ABOVE THEMES WERE NOT DEVELOPED ALL AT
ONCE, KHADDAM SEEMED TO ACCEPT OUR APPROACH. HE

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REQUESTED MY IMPRESSIONS ON THE MEETINGS I HELD IN
LEBANON, PARTICULARLY WITH MARONITE LEADER BASHIR

[REDACTED]

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GEMAYEL AND NATIONAL MOVEMENT LEADER WALID JUMBLATT. I SAID THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE A CONSENSUS AMONG ALL THE PARTIES WITH WHOM I TALKED THAT THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF THE BEKAA SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THE LARGER ISSUE OF NATIONAL ENTENTE. THE CURRENT CRISIS DETRACTED FROM THE CAPABILITY OF THE LEBANESE TO DEAL WITH THEIR FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF REARRANGING THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH SYRIA AND OF ACHIEVING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. I SAID I HAD MADE CLEAR BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY IN LEBANON OUR BASIC POSITION VIS-A-VIS LEBANON, AS ENUNCIATED BY THE PRESIDENT TO ME: SUPPORT FOR ITS SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS. BASHIR GEMAYEL WAS MUCH MORE REASONABLE THAN EXPECTED AND DID NOT EXPLICITLY REJECT EFFORTS TOWARDS ENTENTE. IN MY DISCUSSIONS WITH LEBANESE LEADERS, I STRESSED THAT THE U.S. WOULD PROPOSE NOTHING TO THREATEN THE BASIC INTERESTS OF ANY OF THE PARTIES IN THE LONG TERM, INCLUDING SYRIA.

6. AT THE OUTSET, KHADDAM LAUNCHED INTO A LONG RECOUNTING--FROM THE SYRIAN VIEWPOINT--OF WHAT HAD LED UP TO THE CURRENT CRISIS, FOCUSSED ON THE BEGINNING OF THE ZAHLEH CRISIS LAST DECEMBER WHEN, HE SAID, THE PHALANGISTS BEGAN MILITARY OPERATIONS THERE AGAINST THE ADF, AND THE ADF WAS FORCED TO "RIPOSTE." DURING THIS PERIOD, AND UNTIL MID-APRIL, SYRIA HAD HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH SARKIS AND HIS EMISSARIES, REACHING SOME UNDERSTANDING ON POLITICAL AND SECURITY PROBLEMS. PROBES HAD ALSO BEEN INITIATED, AFTER URGING BY SARKIS, TO ENCOURAGE A SYRIAN-PHALANGE DIALOGUE. FIGHTING IN EARLY APRIL IN ZAHLEH HAD SCUTTLED THE AGREEMENTS REACHED DURING THE SARKIS VISIT TO DAMASCUS IN EARLY MARCH. HE THEN OUTLINED FOR ME THE AGREEMENT THAT HAD BEEN WORKED OUT IN CHTAURA.

[REDACTED]

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BEFORE APRIL 24 TO BRING AN END TO THE ZAHLEH FIGHTING. THERE WERE TWO BASIC ELEMENTS: WITHDRAWAL OF ARMED ELEMENTS FROM ZAHLEH WHO WERE NOT FROM THE CITY, AND BRINGING IN THE LEBANESE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES TO RESTORE ORDER. UNDER PROBING KHADDAM APPEARED TO AGREE THAT THE ISF WOULD BE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE GOL, NOT THE SYRIANS. FOUR DAYS LATER, ON APRIL 28, KHADDAM SAID HE WENT TO BEIRUT TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH SARKIS AND THE LEBANESE FACTIONS TOWARDS NATIONAL ENTENTE. THAT WAS THE SAME DAY THAT ISRAEL SHOT DOWN TWO SYRIAN HELICOPTERS.

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SYRIA INTERPRETED THIS MOVE AS AN ISRAELI ATTEMPT TO FRUSTRATE THE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. KHADDAM THEN REVIEWED THE THREE MEETINGS SYRIAN REPRESENTATIVE GENERAL KHOULY HAD WITH BASHIR GEMAYEL. AT THE SECOND MEETING BASHIR STATED HE WANTED AN AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA UNDER WHICH: SYRIA WOULD RECOGNIZE THE STATUS QUO ON THE GROUND; SYRIA WOULD WITHDRAW FROM ALL AREAS WHERE THERE WAS A CHRISTIAN PRESENCE (I.E., FROM ZGHORTA IN THE NORTH TO JAZZIIN IN THE SOUTH); THE LEBANESE STATE THAT WOULD EMERGE TO GOVERN THIS AREA WOULD ALLOW SYRIA TO ANNEX THE LEBANESE AREAS IT HAD LONG DESIRED (I.E., IN THE BEKAA, AKKAR, ETC.). KHADDAM SAID THAT SYRIA WAS SHOCKED; THIS POSITION AMOUNTED TO PARTITION, WHICH SYRIA COULD NOT ACCEPT.

8. KHADDAM SUMMARIZED SYRIAN POLICY TOWARDS LEBANON AS PRESERVING THE SOVEREIGNTY, UNITY AND INTEGRITY OF LEBANON. SYRIA COULD NOT NEGOTIATE WITH ANY SPECIFIC FACTION ON LEBANON'S INTERNAL SITUATION. SYRIA DESIRED A SITUATION IN WHICH NO FACTION BECAME VICTORIOUS OVER THE OTHER, SINCE ANY PARTY WHICH FELT THAT IT HAD BEEN DEFEATED WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS IN THE FUTURE.

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PAGE 01
ACTION SS-30

DAMASC 02877 03 OF 04 101056Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W

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O 100830Z MAY 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2169

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

██████████ SECTION 03 OF 04 DAMASCUS 02877

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 14 ADDING ONE LINE DROPPED)

FROM HABIB

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9. KHADDAM ARGUED THAT THE ISRAELI ATTACK OF APRIL 28 ON THE SYRIAN HELICOPTERS INVOLVED TWO "DEADLY" ERRORS: FIRST, IT WAS CLEARLY INTENDED TO INTERRUPT THE PROCESS OF LEBANESE POLITICAL RECONCILIATION SPONSORED BY SYRIA; AND, SECOND, IT HAD ATTACKED THE ADF FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER SINCE THE ADF HAD BEEN FORMED IN 1976. SYRIA DID NOT WANT A WAR WITH ISRAEL IN LEBANON, KHADDAM SAID. IF SYRIA WANTED A WAR, IT WOULD BE ON THE GOLAN. AND WAR WOULD MAKE MORE DIFFICULT THE ULTIMATE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST POLITICAL SOLUTION IN THE REGION.

10. BUILDING ON KHADDAMS EXPOSITION, I TRIED TO LEAD KHADDAM ON TO A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION BY DEFINING WHAT WE THOUGHT SYRIA WANTED (OR WOULD AGREE TO) IN THE ZAHLEH REGION: (1) ARMED FIGHTERS NOT NATIVE TO THE CITY SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN: (2) THE BLOCKADE SHOULD BE LIFTED, ALLOWING A RETURN TO NORMAL LIFE; (3) NO THREATS FROM THE ZAHLEH REGION AND CITY AGAINST THE ADF SHOULD

[REDACTED]

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MATERIALIZE. CONCERNING THE SANNIN HEIGHTS, I SAID I UNDERSTOOD THE SYRIAN POSITION TO BE THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE CONTROLLED BY THE PHALANGE.

11. KHADDAM SAID--AS REGARDS THE SANNIN HEIGHTS--THAT (A) SYRIA WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE ANY ADDITIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE REGION, (B) IT WOULD NOT ADVANCE BEYOND ITS CURRENT POSITIONS; AND (C) THE MILITARY ACTION SYRIA HAS TAKEN SO FAR DOT IMPLY A POLITICAL OBJECTIVE. I TOLD KHADDAM THAT, IF THE THREAT FROM THE SANNIN RIDGELINE TO THE ADF, ZAHLEH, AND THE BEKAA COULD BE REMOVED, THEN LOGICALLY THERE WAS NO REASON FOR SYRIA TO BE THERE. THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO FIND A WAY TO "NEUTRALIZE" THE RIDGE IN A FASHION THAT REMOVED THE DANGER TO THE ADF AND PROTECTED THE POPULATION OF THE BEKAA. THIS COULD NOT WAIT FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF ENTENTE, AS KHADDAM HAD PREVIOUSLY STATED. SYRIA SAID, I NOTED, THAT IT SUPPORTS THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE TO FIND A FORMULA WHEREBY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CAN ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY ON THE RIDGE-LINE IN SUCH A WAY THAT MEETS SYRIAS REQUIREMENTS. SYRIAS PRESENCE THERE IS A NEW SITUATION WHICH WE NEED TO DEFUSE.

12. AT ABOUT THIS POINT, KHADDAM SAID THAT NOTHING IN WHAT I HAD SAID WAS CONTRADICTORY TO SYRIAN POLICY. HE SPOKE OF SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF LEBANON AND FOR THE PRESENT LEGITIMATE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. I NOTED THE UNIQUE POTENTIAL ROLE OF THE U.S. IN RESOLVING ISSUES BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL. IN ASKING WHAT SYRIA WANTED FROM THE PRESENT SITUATION, I ADDED THAT I WOULD ALSO BE ASKING THE ISRAELIS THE SAME

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QUESTION.
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13. KHADDAM SAID THAT ONLY A DIALOGUE--NOT FORCE--WOULD RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS IN LEBANON. SYRIA WAS COMMITTED TO DEVELOPMENT OF A POLITICAL CONSENSUS. AS FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ISRAELI-SYRIAN WAR, HE STATED FLATLY THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT BE LEFT ALONE. THE OTHER ARABS WOULD RALLY TO SYRIAS SIDE. SYRIA DID NOT WANT WAR, HE SAID, AND OBSERVED THAT SYRIA HAD NOT ESCALATED PRESS PROPAGANDA AGAINST ISRAEL IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. HE VOICED A SUSPICION THAT BEGIN WAS PLAYING ELECTION POLITICS.

14. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION AS TO WHAT SYRIA WANTS FROM ISRAEL, KHADDAM URGED THE FOLLOWING ON THE ISRAELIS: (1) REFRAIN FROM DOING ANYTHING TO UNDERMINE THE LSE PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION; (2) REFRAIN FROM UPSETTING GOL-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENTS; (3) REFRAIN FROM ASSERTING THAT IT HAS SECURITY INTERESTS IN LEBANON AND HAS THE RIGHT TO RESORT TO ANY END TO PRESERVE ITS SECURITY; (4) REFRAIN FROM THE CONCEPT OF PROTECTING THE CHRISTIANS; (5) REFRAIN FROM ATTACKING THE ADF, SINCE THE ADF WILL NOT BE IDLE. I INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT IT IS INACCURATE TO PORTRAY THE ISRAELIS AS HAVING NO SECURITY INTERESTS IN LEBANON. CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS ARE ONLY ONE FACET OF ISRAELS SECURITY PROBLEM, AND I DESCRIBED BRIEFLY OUR 1979 EFFORTS TO DEFUSE TENSIONS THERE.

15. KHADDAM SAID THAT THE MISSILES IN THE BEKAA VALLEY WERE SIMPLY AIR DEFENSE. THEY DID NOT THREATEN ISRAELS SECURITY WITHIN ITS PRESENT BORDERS. ANY SOLDIER HAS THE RIGHT TO TRY TO DEFEND HIMSELF AND THE MISSILES REFLECTED THAT PHILOSOPHY.

16. I ARGUED STRONGLY THAT, IF THE NEED FOR THESE MISSILES WERE REMOVED, THEN THE POTENTIAL CAUSUS BELLI
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WOULD BE REMOVED. THIS ISSUE NEEDED TO BE ANALYZED

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 (ADS) W
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O 100830Z MAY 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2170
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INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

OBJECTIVELY, BUT WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY. IF WE COULD
DEFUSE THE POTENTIAL THREATS, FROM BOTH SIDES, THEN WE
WOULD HAVE A BASIS FOR A SOLUTION.

17. COMMENT: IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT, AT THE BEGINNING
OF OUR DISCUSSION, KHADDAM DEPLORED THE LACK OF CONTACT

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WITH THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY SYRIAS DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE SECRETARYS FAILURE TO VISIT HERE. I RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS A DESIRE FOR COMMUNICATION WITH SYRIA AND I SAW NO REASON WHY NORMAL CONTACTS AT A SENIOR LEVEL COULD NOT BE DEVELOPED. THE DISCUSSION WAS BUSINESS-LIKE AND POLEMIC-FREE, WHICH IS UNUSUAL FOR KHADDAM. WE ALSO WERE ABLE TO NARROW THE DISCUSSION TO SOME SPECIFICS RATHER THAN GENERALITIES. NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE MANY GAPS TO BE FILLED AND LOOSE ENDS TO BE NAILED DOWN. PENDING MY FORTHCOMING TALK WITH ASSAD, IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY WHETHER WE ARE MAKING SERIOUS HEADWAY WITH THE SYRIANS.

18. I WILL SUBMIT A WRAP-UP REPORT AFTER MEETING



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WITH ASSAD AND AM PLANNING TO GO TO ISRAEL ON THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 11 AS PROPOSED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS, ARRIVING IN TEL AVIV AT ABOUT 2:30 P.M. SEELYE

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02922 091400Z
ACTION SS-30

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031.W
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O 091232Z MAY 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1814
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/CR/IR

Date: 11/3/97

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☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
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9302566

E.O. 12065: RDS 1-3-4 5/9/01 (DRAPER, MORRIS)
TAGS: PEPR, XF, MOPS, LE, SY, IS
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: CONVERSATION WITH PIERRE AND AMIN
GEMAYEL

1. [REDACTED]
2. PIERRE GEMAYEL, JOINED BY HIS ELDEST SON, AMIN, ON MAY 8. GAVE AMBASSADOR HABIB A LENGTHY TOUR D'HORIZON OF THE PHALANGE VIEW OF THE BASIS FOR THE LEBANESE CRISIS. AMB. DEAN, DAS DRAPER, AND POLOFF PATTERSON WERE PRESENT. IN SUM, HE SAID THAT THE CRISIS WAS THE RESULT OF COMMUNIST EXPANSIONISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT SYRIA HAD BECOME AN AGENT OF THE COMMUNISTS.
3. FOLLOWING HABIB'S REQUEST FOR SPECIFIC WAYS IN WHICH THE CURRENT CRISIS COULD BE EASED AND THE CONFRONTATION ENDED, AMIN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

--THE PHALANGE ARE NOT INVOLVED IN THE ISSUE OF SYRIAN MISSILES IN THE BIQA'. THAT ISSUE IS BETWEEN SYRIA AND [REDACTED]

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ISRAEL.

--THE SYRIANS HAVE NOW BECOME PART OF THE LEBANESE FACTIONAL CONFLICT. THEY HAD ADMITTED THAT THEY WERE SUPPORTING THE SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONAL PARTY (COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE PPS) WHICH HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN FIGHTING IN THE MT. SANNIN AREA. THEREFORE, THE SYRIANS MUST WITHDRAW FROM CERTAIN AREAS AND BE REPLACED BY "LEGAL FORCES."

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Page 1

--THE PHALANGE HAVE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED AND ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT DEPLOYMENT OF LEBANESE ARMED FORCES UNITS COMMANDED BY MUSLIM OFFICERS AND WITH MUSLIM TROOPS IN CERTAIN AREAS, INCLUDING MT. SANNIN, ZAHLAH AND THE DEMARCATION LINE IN BEIRUT.

4. IN RESPONSE TO HABIB'S STATEMENT THAT THE SYRIANS HAD THEIR SUPPORTERS MAY WISH TO HAVE GUARANTEES THAT THE RIGHTIST LEBANESE FORCES WILL NOT UNDERMINE ANY AGREEMENT, AMIN SAID THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD ALSO HAVE TO INVOLVE GUARANTEES FOR THE CHRISTIANS. HE POINTEDLY REFERRED TO THE OPENING OF ROADS IN THE BEIRUT AREA AND GUARANTEES OF SECURITY FOR CHRISTIANS USING THE BEIRUT AIRPORT.

5. BOTH PIERRE AND AMIN ASSERTED THAT THEY WERE "WILLING TO GO FAR WITH THE SYRIANS" AND THAT THEY WERE FAVORABLE DISPOSED TO A DIALOGUE, PROVIDED THAT SUCH A DIALOGUE WAS UNDERTAKEN WITH SYRIAN "RESPECT" FOR THE PHALANGE.

6. AMIN SAID THAT THE PHALANGE WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE RECENTLY STATED USG POSITION ON LEBANON (SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO SARKIS) INCLUDING U.S. SUPPORT FOR EVENTUAL

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SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID THAT WE COULD INFORM SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD THAT THIS WAS THE PHALANGE POSITION. BOTH AMIN AND PIERRE SAID THAT A DIALOGUE WAS NEEDED BETWEEN THE PHALANGE AND THE SYRIANS, SPECIFICALLY FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM.

7. PIERRE SAID THAT HE INSISTED THAT SOME "FORCES" BE CREATED TO EXECUTE ANY PROMISES MADE. HE ONCE AGAIN AFFIRMED THE PHALANGE WOULD SUPPORT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF, UNDER THE COMMAND OF LEBANESE MUSLIM OFFICERS, TO ZAHLAH AND OTHER AREAS, AMIN ADDED THAT, "WE ARE FOR THE ARAB OPTION IN LEBANON, NOT FOR THE ISRAELI OPTION. HOWEVER, WE HAVE HAD NO CHOICE THUS FAR BUT ISRAEL BECAUSE OF AN ABSENCE OF U.S. AND WESTERN SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE CHRISITIANS AND THE FAILURE BY THE WEST TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE MODERATE ARABS." DEAN

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02925 091449Z
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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/3/97

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9302566

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 5/9/01 (DEAN, JOHN GUNTHER) OR-M

TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, SY, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH DELEGATION FROM SOUTH LEBANON

1.

2. ON MAY 9 AMBASSADOR HABIB MET WITH A SHI'A MUSLIM DELEGATION REPRESENTING THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE SOUTH. THOSE PRESENT INCLUDED DEPUTY FROM BA'LABAKK HUSAYN AL-HUSAYNI, DEPUTIES ABDUL-LATIF AL-ZEIN, RAFIC CHAHINE FROM NABATTIYAH. AND FORMER MINISTER MUHAMMAD SAFI-AL-DIN. AMBASSADOR DEAN, DAS DRAPER, AND POLOFF PATTERSON WERE ALSO PRESENT.

3. AMBASSADOR HABIB OUTLINED THE PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT AND EMPHASIZED THAT ANY U.S. EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE CURRENT SITUATION INVOLVING ZAHLAH, MT. SANNIN AND THE PRESENCE OF SYRIAN MISSILES IN LEBANON WOULD IN NO WAY NEGATIVELY AFFECT THE SEARCH FOR LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS TO THE LEBANESE CRISIS. DEPUTY CHAHINE SAID THAT THE U.S. MUST NOT FORGET THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02925 091449Z

IN LEBANON ORIGINATED IN THE SOUTH AND THAT IT CONTINUES THERE.

4. AMBASSADOR HABIB EXPLAINED AT LENGTH THE EFFORTS THE U.S. HAD MADE OVER THE YEARS, INCLUDING ONLY VERY RECENTLY, TO LOWER THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH. HE ALSO DISCUSSED THE MISSION HE UNDERTOOK IN 1979 TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO CROSS-BORDER SHELLING WHICH UNFORTUNATELY DID NOT LEAD TO A LASTING RESULT.

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5. AMBASSADOR HABIB ASKED WHETHER THE SHI'A SUPPORTED THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF IN ALL AREAS OF LEBANON, NOT ONLY IN THE SOUTH. ALL MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION AFFIRMED THAT THE SHI'A FULLY SUPPORTED THE LEGITIMATE AUTHORITIES IN LEBANON AND WOULD FULLY SUPPORT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF WHEREVER IT WOULD BE USEFUL IN LEBANON. DEPUTY AL-ZEIN ADDED THAT ANY LAF DEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE FULLY COORDINATED AND AGREED TO BY THE SYRIANS.

6. DEPUTY CHAHINE SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE SYRIANS NOT FEEL THAT THEY WERE BEING PUSHED TOO FAR. THERE WAS A DANGER THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD TURN TO THE SOVIETS FOR ASSISTANCE. MOREOVER, OTHER ARAB STATES WOULD BE FORCED TO SUPPORT SYRIA IN A CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL. AMBASSADOR HABIB SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT THESE DANGERS WERE INHERENT IN A SYRIAN/ISRAELI CONFRONTATION.

7. THE SHI'A DEPUTIES ASKED AMBASSADOR HABIB TO BRING THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH, WHERE THE ISRAELIS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS CONTINUE TO KILL INNOCENT CIVILIANS AND ATTACK POPULATION CENTERS, TO THE ATTENTION OF AMERICAN LEADERS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03

BEIRUT 02925 091449Z

8. AMBASSADOR HABIB AND DAS DRAPER HAVE NOT REVIEWED THIS MESSAGE.
DEAN

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02921 091320Z
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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

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BEIRUT 2921

EXCISE **DECAPTIONED**

E.O. 12065 RDS 1-3-4 5/9/01 (DRAPER, MORRIS)
TAGS: PEPR, XF, MOPS, LE, SY, IS
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: VIEWS OF SUNNI ISLAMIC GROUPING

1. [REDACTED]
2. HABIB MET ON MAY 8 WITH SUNNI MODERATES: FORMER PRIME MINISTERS SAEB SALAM, TAQI-AD-DIN AL-SULH, AND NASSIB BARBIR (ISLAMIC OFFICIAL). AMBASSADOR DEAN, DAS DRAPER, AND POLOFF PATTERSON WERE PRESENT.
3. SALAM SAID THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE BIQA' AND IN ZAHLE WAS THE RESULT OF PHALANGE AGGRESSION WITH ISRAELI SUPPORT AND ISRAELI ACTIONS IN SOUTH LEBANON. SALAM SAID THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT BEEN EVEN-HANDED BECAUSE IT HAD PLACED MORE EMPHASIS ON THE SITUATION IN ZAHLE THAN ON THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH. HABIB POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. HAD ARRANGED A MODUS VIVENDI IN THE SOUTH IN 1979 WHICH HAD INCLUDED A SUSPENSION OF THE ISRAELI POLICY OF PREEMPTIVE STRIKES FOR MONTHS. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE USG HAD STRONGLY REACTED TO THE RECENT SHELLING OF [REDACTED]

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SIDON BY SA'AD HADDAD.

4. TURNING TO THE CURRENT SITUATION, SALAM SAID THAT THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON HAD BEEN REQUESTED BY THE GOL AND THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO BLAME THE SYRIANS FOR TAKING ACTIONS TO PROTECT LEBANON AND ITS PEOPLE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELI ATTACKS ON SYRIAN HELICOPTERS HAD BEEN INTENDED TO UNDERCUT NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAD BEEN UNDERWAY BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND THE SYRIANS TO DEFUSE

Page 1
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THE SITUATION IN ZAHLE.

5. SALAM SAID THAT THE PHALANGE DID NOT REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF ALL LEBANESE CHRISITANS AND THAT, IN FACT, A MAJORITY OF THE CHRISTIANS WERE OPPOSED TO PHALANGE POLICIES. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT PIERRE GEMAYEL HAD RECENTLY TOLD HIM THAT "WE HAVE LEARNED OUR LESSONS," AND THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD RESUME THEIR DIALOGUE. SALAM SAID THAT A DIALOGUE AMONG THE LEBANESE COULD BE RESUMED IF A PROPER ATMOSPHERE WERE CREATED.

6. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF TO ZAHLE AND OTHER AREAS, SALAM AND FORMER PRIME MINISTER TAQI-AD-DIN AL-SULH SAID THAT THE MUSLIMS HAD LOST CONFIDENCE IN THE ARMY FOLLOWING THE PHALANGE TAKEOVER OF AYN AR-RUMMANAH IN OCTOBER 1980. AL-SULH ADDED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EASIER TO DEPLOY THE ARMY PRIOR TO ISRAELI INTERVENTION IN THE BIQA'. HE THEN SAID THAT WHETHER OR NOT THE LAF DEPLOYED DEPENDED ON THE SYRIAN POSITION.

7. BOTH SALAM AND AL-SULH SAID THAT A PHALANGE RENUNCIATION OF TIES WITH ISRAEL WOULD BE HELPFUL BUT HABIB SAID THIS WAS UNREALISTIC AND NOT WORTH TALKING ABOUT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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8. SALAM SAID THAT THE LEBANESE MUSLIM POSITION REGARDING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF DEPENDED ON THE SYRIANS. THE SYRIANS MUST NOT BE MADE TO FEEL THAT THEY HAVE BEEN LET DOWN BY THE LEBANESE MUSLIMS BECAUSE THE LEBANESE MUSLIMS DO NOT WANT TO BE LET DOWN BY THE SYRIANS, SALAM ADDED.

9. SALAM--WHEN PRESSED BY HABIB--WOULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF TO SUPPORTING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF TO ZAHLE, EVEN UNDER MUSLIM COMMAND, AS HAD BEEN PUBLICLY PROPOSED BY THE PHALANGE. HE MADE A CONCESSION TO HABIB, HOWEVER, WHEN HE PROMISED NOT TAKE A PUBLIC POSITION UNTIL HE HAD HEARD THE SYRIAN POSITION. HE NOTED THAT HIS RELATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS, AS WELL AS THOSE OF AL-SULH, WERE NOT GOOD. AL-SULH APPEARED WILLING TO ACCEPT SUCH A DEPLOYMENT ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY SAY SO.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02870 080646Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1779
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/3/97

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FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS FROM HABIB

9302566

E.O. 12056: RDS-3 5/7/01 (DRAPER, MORRIS)
TAGS: OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP, PEPR, LE, SY, IS, US
SUBJ: TRAVEL OF PRESIDENT'S SPEICAL EMISSARY TO ISRAEL

REF: TEL AVIV 7286✓

1. [REDACTED]
2. ON BASIS OF HABIB'S TALK WITH EVRON TWO DAYS AGO, PART OF WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN COMMUNICATED TO YOU IN DRAPER MESSAGE PASSED THROUGH LONDON POLITICAL OFFICER HOOPER VIA SECURE PHONE, EVRON SUGGESTED THAT HABIB TAKE BEGIN ASIDE AT THEIR FIRST MEETING AND ASK WHETHER HE SHOULD SEE PERES. EVRON SAID THIS WOULD BE BETTER THAN HAVING AMBASSADOR LEWIS SOUND OUT BEGIN IN THE MEANTIME.
3. IN LIGHT OF EXPLICIT REQUEST FROM PERES (REFTEL), HABIB BELIEVES AMBASSADOR LEWIS SHOULD INFORM BEGIN OF THE REQUEST AND SOUND HIM OUT.
4. PRESUME DEPARTMENT WOULD CONCURE.
DEAN

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Date Printed: 09/26/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 81BEIRUT02889

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02889 081157Z
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USINFO

USINFO FOR PGM/RC, PGM/P, PGM/FW, PGM/FN, VOA NEWS/CA

E.O. 12065: N/A

SUBJECT : PHILIP HABIB STATEMENT IN BEIRUT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT MADE BY AMBASSADOR
PHILIP HABIB AFTER MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS AT
BAABDA PALACE, FRIDAY-MAY 8:

2. BEGIN TEXT: I'VE HAD A VERY USEFUL DISCUSSION WITH
PRESIDENT SARKIS. PRESIDENT REAGAN ASKED ME TO COME TO THE
MIDDLE EAST IN VIEW OF THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA
WHICH HAD CREATED WHAT CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS A DANGEROUS
SITUATION. I HAVE DISCUSSED, OR I SHOULD SAY, I'VE HAD
THE OPPORTUNITY TO LISTEN TO PRESIDENT SARKIS' VIEWS WITH
RESPECT TO THE SITUATION. I WILL TAKE THOSE VIEWS WITH
ME AS I CONTINUE MY DISCUSSIONS. IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT
THE SITUATION CALLS FOR AN EXAMINATION OF THE VARIOUS
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ISSUES IN AN ATMOSPHERE WHICH WILL BE CONDUCIVE TO THE
PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS. IN MY CONVERSATIONS WITH
THE PRESIDENT, I GAVE HIM A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN
AND I ALSO HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW AND TO RESTATE,
AGAIN, THE SUPPORT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS FOR THE
INDEPENDENCE, THE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE INTEGRITY OF LEBANON
WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED FRONTIERS. I WILL
CONTINUE MY DISCUSSIONS IN LEBANON AND GO ON TO DAMASCUS
AND THEN ON TO ISRAEL LATER. AND AT THIS TIME THAT'S ALL

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I HAVE TO SAY. THERE'S NO QUESTION, THERE'S NO POINT
ASKING ME ANY OTHER QUESTIONS. THAT'S ALL I'M GOING TO
SAY. END TEXT.
MALIK

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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ACTION: NEA-07

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STATE FOR NEA; INR, SP, PM; FOR P/RC, P/P, P/FW, P/FH, NEA;
BEIRUT ROME AND JERUSALEM FOR VOA; VOA NEWS/CA, AMCONGEN
JERUSALEM FOR AMB. LEWIS, HABIB AND DRAPER, AMEMBASSY ROME
FOR MFO.

E.O. 12356 N/A

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION/PRESS REVIEW, DEC. 19, 1982

1. HIGHLIGHTS:

- ALL MEDIA BANNER AMB. HABIB'S TALKS TODAY IN JERUSALEM
ABOUT HIS PROPOSALS CONCERNING MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM
LEBANON AND DEFMIN SHARON'S "BREAKTHROUGH" AGREEMENT WITH
BEIRUT. ITV REPORTED LAST NIGHT THAT "BARRING UNFORESEEN
DELAYS, TWO PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS WILL START THIS WEEK."

- ALL MEDIA REPORT THAT ISRAELI CABINET MINISTERS ARE
IRRITATED WITH THE PUBLICITY SHARON GAVE TO HIS BEIRUT
TALKS. SOME JERUSALEM CIRCLES ARE SAID TO FEAR THAT THIS
WOULD FORCE LEBANON TO BACK OFF.

- POLITICAL CORRS. SPECULATE THAT SHARON WENT TO THE
PRESS WITH HIS "BREAKTHROUGH" TO PAY THE AMERICANS BACK
FOR THE FACT THAT THEY HAD IGNORED HIM WHEN HE WAS IN
U.S., AND ALSO "TO OFFSET POSSIBLE INCRIMINATING FINDINGS
BY THE U. BEIRUT MASSACRE INQUIRY."

- MAARIV REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WAS "STUNNED" BY
THE PUBLICITY IN ISRAEL REGARDING SHARON'S TALKS IN
BEIRUT. HOWEVER, "HE TOLD AMB. HABIB AND DRAPER THAT
PROGRESS HAD INDEED BEEN MADE IN THE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS
WITH ISRAEL." MAARIV FURTHER REPORTS THAT THE AMERICANS,
TOO, ARE "OPENLY DISPLEASED" WITH THE PUBLICITY. ACCORDING
TO MAARIV, ONE OF THE BONES OF CONTENTION BETWEEN BEIRUT
AND JERUSALEM IS THE ROLE THE U.S. SHOULD PLAY IN THE
UPCOMING NEGOTIATIONS.

- HA'ARETZ MILITARY CORR. ASSERTS THAT "IT WOULD BE WRONG
TO SAY THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED ANYTHING IN
LEBANON AGAINST THE AMERICAN WILL. GEMAYEL WOULD NOT DO
ANYTHING WITHOUT BEING ASSURED OF AMERICA'S PROTECTION,"
SAYS THE HA'ARETZ CORR.

- MAARIV EDITORIAL COMES OUT AGAINST "GIVING UP U.S.
MEDIATION" IN THE LEBANON CONFLICT. AN HA'ARETZ EDITORIAL
CRITICIZES SHARON'S "THEATRICALS" AND ADVISES "TO WAIT WITH
THE TOASTS UNTIL BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM START TELLING THE
SAME THINGS."

- HA'ARETZ AND DAVAR WASH. CORR. REPORT THAT THE STATE
DEPT. HAS DECIDED ON A "DIFFERENT" LINE REGARDING ISRAELI
ARMS DEALS IN SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA.

- MAARIV EDITOR CHARGES THAT THE REASON WHY THE U.S. IS
STALLING ON THE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL REGARDING THE
SHARING OF THE LEBANON WAR LESSONS IS BECAUSE WASH. IS
"PLAINLY SCARED" THAT AN ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT WOULD
GET IN THE WAY OF WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND FOR LEBANON.
END HIGHLIGHTS

2. SHARON'S "BREAKTHROUGH" IN LEBANON:

A) ISRAEL TV POLITICAL CORR. YORAM RONNEN SAID LAST NIGHT
THAT AMB. HABIB AND DRAPER WILL TODAY MEET TWICE WITH
PM BEGIN AND HIS AIDES. FIRST THEY WILL BRIEF THE ISRAELIS
ON THEIR TALKS IN BEIRUT. IN A SECOND MEETING, AFTER THE
CABINET'S SESSION, BEGIN WILL TELL THE AMERICAN ENVOYS
WHAT THE CABINET DECIDED REGARDING THEIR PROPOSALS AND
SHARON'S DISCUSSIONS LAST WEEK WITH BEIRUT OFFICIALS. CORR.
RONNEN WENT ON TO REPORT THAT "BARRING UNFORESEEN DELAYS,
TWO PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS WILL START THIS WEEK. AMB. HABIB
WILL SHUTTLE BETWEEN JERUSALEM BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS TO WORK
OUT A MILITARY WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT, AND DIRECT ISRAELI-
LEBANESE TALKS, PERHAPS UNDER AMERICAN SPONSORSHIP, ABOUT
AN END TO THE STATE OF WAR AGREEMENT. THOSE TALKS ARE
TO LEAD TO THE SIGNING OF A DE FACTO PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL
AND LEBANON." CORR. RONNEN ADDED THAT A NUMBER OF MINISTERS
HAVE BEEN "VERY CRITICAL" OF SHARON'S DECISION TO REVEAL
THE BASIC POINTS OF THE AGREEMENT WITH LEBANON. THE ITV
CORR. LINKS SHARON'S MOVE WITH HIS DESIRE "TO SURPRISE
THE U.S., FOLLOWING HIS NON-INVITATION TO WASHINGTON."
IN ANY CASE, SAID CORR. RONNEN (AND MOST OTHER POLITICAL
CORRS.), WHENEVER LEBANON IS INVOLVED, ANY OPTIMISTIC
FORECASTS SHOULD BE TREATED WITH GREAT CAUTION.

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B) ISRAEL RADIO POLITICAL CORR. SHIMON SHIFFER REPORTED THIS MORNING THAT "JERUSALEM, BEIRUT AND WASHINGTON ARE OPTIMISTIC THAT A LEBANESE SETTLEMENT IS IN THE OFFING. FOR ONE THING, SAID CORR. SHIFFER, "THE AMERICANS ARE KEEPING UP THEIR PRESSURE" ON ISRAEL, BECAUSE "THE U.S. WANTS TO HAVE SOMETHING TO SHOW ON THE EVE OF KING KUSSEIN VISIT TO WASHINGTON."

C) HA'ARETZ POLITICAL CORR. YEHUDA LITANI REPORTS THAT "RELIABLE SOURCES IN JERUSALEM SAID THAT ISRAELI CONTACTS IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS WITH LEBANESE ELEMENTS CLOSE TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAVE PRODUCED AN UNDERSTANDING, WHICH HAS BEEN PARTIALLY PUT IN WRITING, ABOUT THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, OPEN BORDERS, RELATIONS OF TRADE AND TOURISM AND NORMALIZATION ... AS WELL AS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTH LEBANON." ACCORDING TO CORR. LITANI, JERUSALEM SOURCES ARE "FURIOUS" ABOUT THE WAY DEFMIN SHARON TREATED THE ISSUE. THERE IS NOW SOME CONCERN IN JERUSALEM THAT THE LEBANESE MIGHT REACT TO THE WIDE PUBLICITY GIVEN BY SHARON TO THE AGREEMENT BY BACKING OFF FROM IT. SHARON, SAID CORR. LITANI'S SOURCES, "WANTS FRONT PAGE ATTENTION IN ORDER TO OFFSET THE FINDINGS OF THE W. BEIRUT MASSACRE INQUIRY, SHOULD THOSE IMPLICATE HIM IN THE TRAGEDY." CORR. LITANI FURTHER QUOTES POLITICAL SOURCES IN JERUSALEM TO THE EFFECT THAT "IN THE MEETING BEGIN HAD (LATE LAST WEEK) WITH THE AMERICAN ENVOYS, THE LATTER WERE NOT ONLY SURPRISED BY (SHARON'S REVELATIONS BUT ALSO ANGRY THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT LET THEM IN ON THE DETAILS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE AMERICANS MAY NOW TRY TO SPOIL THE NEGOTIATIONS," LITANI'S SOURCES SAID.

D) HA'ARETZ MILITARY CORR. ZEEV SCHIFF ASSERTS, ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN TAKEN "SOMEWHAT" BY SURPRISE, "IT WOULD BE WRONG TO SAY THAT (THE ISRAELIS) HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THINGS AGAINST THE AMERICAN WILL PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S MEN WOULD NOT HAVE DARED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO THE ISRAELIS AT THE RISK OF EXPOSING THEIR FLANK TO THE SYRIANS WITHOUT AMERICA'S COORDINATION AND PROTECTION." CORR. SCHIFF GOES ON TO EXPLAIN THAT BY MAKING THAT AGREEMENT WITH LEBANON "ISRAEL WANTED TO TELL WASHINGTON THAT THE PRESSURE REGARDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS FROM LEBANON SHOULD NOW BE APPLIED TO SYRIA AND THE PLO. ISRAEL HAS DONE ITS SHARE...."

E) MAARIV POLITICAL CORR. ILAN Kfir REPORTS THAT "PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WAS STUNNED BY THE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THE SECRET CONTACTS WITH SHARON. HOWEVER, HE TOLD AMB. HABIB AND DRAPER YESTERDAY THAT PROGRESS HAS INDEED BEEN MADE IN THE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND NORMALIZATION." CORR. Kfir FURTHER WRITES (NO SOURCE) THAT "AMB. HABIB AND DRAPER REPORTED YESTERDAY THAT THE LEBANESE PRESIDENT IS UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM

HIS PARTNERS IN THE GOV'T, WHO KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL." ACCORDING TO THE MAARIV CORR., "AMERICAN SOURCES HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF THEIR DISPLEASURE OVER THE PUBLICITY (GIVEN TO SHARON'S DIPLOMACY), EXPLAINING THAT ONLY LAST THURSDAY THEY HAD BEEN MADE TO PROMISE MINISTER BEGIN TO KEEP THE (ISRAELI-LEBANESE) UNDERSTANDING TO THEMSELVES AND NOT LET IT BE LEAKED IN WASHINGTON." CORR. Kfir ALSO REPORTS THAT AMONG THE STILL UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS BETWEEN JERUSALEM AND BEIRUT IS "AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. LEBANON WANTS THE U.S. TO PLAY THE ROLE OF AN ACTIVE PARTNER ... WHEREAS ISRAEL WISHES TO REDUCE U.S. INVOLVEMENT...."

3. SHARON'S "BREAKTHROUGH": EDITORIAL COMMENT:

A) MAARIV POINTS OUT THAT THE THREE-PAGE, UNSIGNED PAPER SHARON BROUGHT WITH HIM FROM BEIRUT "IS NOT AN AGREEMENT, BUT A PLATFORM." THAT, TOO, IS SOMETHING, SAYS PAPER, BUT "LET US NOT EXPECT TOO MUCH AND NOT DECIDE TO GIVE UP AMERICA'S MEDIATION."

B) YEDIOI COMMENTATOR BEN-PORAT INCLUDES THE U.S. AMONG THOSE WHO "COULD UNDERMINE, DISRUPT OR PREVENT" AN ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT. "IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE U.S. WANTS TO LINK THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE SETTLEMENT WITH THE REAGAN PLAN," WRITES THE MAARIV COMMENTATOR. "STILL, ONE WOULD LIKE TO HOPE THAT IN LIGHT OF THE BREAKTHROUGH ACHIEVED WITHOUT AMERICAN MEDIATION, THE U.S. WILL BE SENSIBLE AND REMOVE THE BARRIERS INSTEAD OF PUTTING THEM UP...."

C) AN HA'ARETZ EDITORIAL POINTS TO LEBANON'S EXTERNAL

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AND INTERNAL PROBLEMS AS FACTORS WHICH COULD STAND IN THE WAY OF AN AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. ANOTHER DISRUPTIVE ELEMENT CONTINUES HA'ARETZ, IS SHARON'S DECISION "TO STEAL THE SHOW AND TURN THE LIGHTS ON HIMSELF." SHARON'S "THEATRICS," SAYS PAPER, STEM FROM A VARIETY OF REASONS. IN ANY CASE, "LET'S WAIT WITH THE TOASTS UNTIL BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM BEGIN TELLING THE SAME THING."

4. THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON: ALL MEDIA FRONTPAGE STORIES BY WASH. CORRS. ON THE PRESIDENT'S INTVIEW TO THE WASHINGTON POST, AS WELL AS HIS WEEKEND RADIO REMARKS ON LEBANON AND KING HUSSEIN. WASH. CORRS. ALSO REPORT ON REMARKS MADE ABOUT THOSE ISSUES BY A "SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL" ON FRIDAY, WHO "DREW A CAUTIOUS LINE ABOUT HUSSEIN'S UPCOMING VISIT." HA'ARETZ CORR. GIDEON SAMET REPORTS THAT THE OFFICIAL "IMPLIED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION REGARDS A SETTLEMENT IN LEBANON AS A PRECONDITION FOR MOVING AHEAD WITH THE PEACE PROCESS." THE JERUSALEM POST WASH. CORR. WOLF BLITZER SUMS UP THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS BY OBSERVING THAT "THE WHITE HOUSE IS OPENLY STEPPING UP ITS PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS QUICKLY FROM LEBANON."

5. FOR THE RECORD:

A) "KING HUSSEIN DETERMINED TO MAKE PEACE WITH ISRAEL." YEDOT BANNERS WASH. CORR. WOLF BLITZER'S REPORT THAT NBC-TV SAID LAST NIGHT THAT "KING HUSSEIN HAS RESOLVED TO MAKE PEACE WITH ISRAEL." THE NBC-TV REPORT RELIED ON AMERICAN AND JORDANIAN SOURCES.

B) ISRAELI ARMS DEAL IN SOUTH AMERICA: DAVAR WASH. CORR. YOSEF PRIEL REPORTS THAT STATE DEPT SPOKESMAN SAID ON FRIDAY THAT HE HOPED THAT "ISRAELI ARMS SALES TO SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH AMERICAN INTERESTS." THE SPOKESMAN REPORTEDLY ADDED THAT "IN SOME AREAS THERE IS AN IDENTITY OF INTERESTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE U.S. IN S. AMERICA." CORR. PRIEL OBSERVES THAT "THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION USED TO SAY ABOUT ISRAEL'S COMPETITION WITH U.S. ARMS IN LATIN AMERICA." ACCORDING TO HA'ARETZ WASH. CORR. THE STATE DEPT SPOKESMAN SAID THAT "THE ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT OBJECT (TO ISRAELI ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES) WHEN THEY ARE IN LINE WITH THE AMERICAN INTEREST."

C) THE CASE OF THE LESSONS OF THE LEBANON WAR. FOR MAARIV EDITOR MOSHE ZAK IT IS "UNBELIEVABLE THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION IS STALLING ON THE AGREEMENT INITIALED WITH THE PENTAGON ON SHARING THE WAR LESSONS, BECAUSE IT DOES NOT LIKE THE TERM 'PEACE FOR GALILEE WAR.' THE ADMINISTRATION WANTS, INSTEAD, TO USE THE TERM 'THE LEBANON CONFLICT,'" WRITES EDITOR ZAK. THE REASON FOR

THE ADMINISTRATION'S OBJECTION, ARGUES THE MAARIV EDITOR, IS THAT WHILE "THE U.S. WISHES TO BENEFIT FROM THE WAR'S MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS, IT WANTS TO BLUR WHY ISRAEL HAD GONE TO THAT WAR, NAMELY TO RESTORE PEACE TO THE GALILEE." EDITOR ZAK EXPLAINS THAT THE AMERICANS ARE "PLAINLY SCARED," JUST AS THEY HAD BEEN WHEN PRESIDENT SADAT CAME UP WITH HIS PEACE INITIATIVE, THAT AN ARAB (IN THIS CASE LEBANESE) ISRAELI AGREEMENT WILL DISRUPT THEIR KIND OF ARRANGEMENT, WHICH IS NOTHING MORE THAN "AN EXTENSION OF THE 19-YEAR OLD ARMISTICE ACCORD WHICH HAD BEEN A NUI ANCE FOR IRRAEL FROM THE 1948 THE 1967 WAR. LEE

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH
ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON, NOVEMBER 25, 1982

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY: I MET WITH SHARON FOR ONE HOUR IMMEDIATELY
PRIOR TO MY MEETING WITH PM BEGIN. SHARON PUT FORWARD
CLEARLY HIS OWN VIEWS ON WHAT ISRAEL WANTS TO ACCOMPLISH
IN EXCHANGE FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND SAID THAT
ISRAEL WAS IN NO HURRY TO WITHDRAW. THROUGHOUT HIS
PRESENTATION OF THIS ISSUE AND OTHERS WAS A RECURRENT
THEME THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS WORKING AT CROSS-
PURPOSES WITH ISRAEL. HE ALLEGED THAT WE WERE HOLDING
GENAYEL BACK CONCERNING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND THAT
WE HAD NOT RESPONDED TO HIS REQUEST FOR A DIALOGUE ON
HOW TO PRESERVE THE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES PRESENTED
BY THE NEW SITUATION IN LEBANON. SHARON ALSO CRITICIZED
THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH EXILED PALESTINIAN MAYORS AS
AN EFFORT TO REVIVE THE PLO.

3. I OBJECTED TO SHARON'S CLAIM THAT WE WERE HOLDING
GENAYEL BACK, AND SAID THAT WE HAD HELPED PRODUCE
GENAYEL'S CURRENT WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS A WIDE RANGE
OF ISSUES WITH ISRAEL. I ARGUED WITH SHARON ON THE
NEED FOR PROMPT PROGRESS ON LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS, BUT
AS INDICATED BY THE POSITION HE TOOK IN OUR SESSION
WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, HE WAS NOT CONVINCED. AND
I POINTED OUT THAT OUR MEETINGS WITH WEST
BANK MAYORS WAS COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES
OF CAMP DAVID. END SUMMARY.

4. I MET WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON FOR ONE HOUR
MORNING OF NOVEMBER 24. SHARON WAS JOINED BY GENERAL
TAHIR AND SAGI, AND STAFF. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY
AMBASSADOR DRAPER, CHARGE FLATEN, AND STAFF. WE
AGREED NOT TO DISCUSS THE PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES TO
ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS, SINCE SHARON WOULD
ATTEND THE SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
BEGIN (SEPTEL).

5. AFTER DISCUSSING THE ISRAELI POW AND MIA ISSUE
(SEPTEL), SHARON GAVE A LENGTHY PRESENTATION OF
ISRAEL'S POSITION CONCERNING LEBANON. HE SAID THAT
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR ISRAEL WAS THE MAJOR

ISSUE, NOT WITHDRAWAL. HE DEFINED SECURITY ARRANGE-
MENTS TO INCLUDE GENERAL SECURITY UNDERTAKINGS (E.G.
NO FOREIGN FORCES IN LEBANON UNLESS MUTUALLY AGREED,
A TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, AN END TO THE
PLO MILITARY PRESENCE AND TO ITS POLITICAL HEADQUARTERS
THE CREATION OF A 45-50 KM. SECURITY ZONE, AND NORMAL-
IZATION, WHICH SHARON SAID COULD DEVELOP STEP-BY-
STEP). SHARON SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS "NOT IN A HURRY"
TO WITHDRAW, AND MADE A POINT OF SAYING THAT THERE
WAS NO DOMESTIC PRESSURE FOR WITHDRAWAL.

6. SHARON SAID THAT THE US AND ISRAEL SHARE CERTAIN
INTERESTS CONCERNING LEBANON. HE ASSERTED THAT
ISRAEL HAD CREATED STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE
UNITED STATES, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE US MILITARY
PRESENCE AT THE AIRPORT. HOWEVER, HE WARNED THAT IF
THE BEIRUT SITUATION CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE THROUGH
THE CONTINUED INFLOW OF PLO TERRORISTS, BLOODSHED
WOULD RESUME AND THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC OPINION
WOULD DEMAND US WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID THAT IT WAS
IMPORTANT THAT THE US AND ISRAEL BEGIN A DIALOGUE
ON THESE STRATEGIC ISSUES ON A CLOSE-HOLD BASIS,
AND MENTIONED THAT HE HAD RAISED THIS ISSUE PREVIOUSLY
WITH AMBASSADOR LEWIS, BUT HAD NOT RECEIVED AN ANSWER.

7. CITING LEBANESE SOURCES, SHARON ALLEGED THAT AMIN
HAD BEEN TOLD IN WASHINGTON TO GO SLOWLY WITH ISRAEL
BECAUSE THE US WAS GOING TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE
LEBANON CRISIS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL MIDDLE
EAST SOLUTION. SHARON SAID THIS WAS A FORMULA FOR
DISASTER, SINCE WE WOULD BE SACRIFICING PROGRESS
WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE IN PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVES WHICH
WERE GOING TO BE VERY DIFFICULT.

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8. SHARON ALSO SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS TRYING TO REVIVE THE PLO, AFTER ITS MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEFEAT IN LEBANON. HE REFERRED TO THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH EXILED MAYORS KAWASME AND MILHELM, WHO HE SAID WERE MORE THAN SUPPORTERS OF THE PLO AND "HAD BLOOD ON THEIR HANDS."

9. DRAPER AND I DENIED CATEGORICALLY SHARON'S CLAIM THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS URGING GEMAYEL TO GO SLOWLY WITH ISRAEL; ON THE CONTRARY, WE WERE URGING HIM TO SIT DOWN NOW WITH ISRAEL. DRAPER SAID THAT HE HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS, IN WHICH WE HAD URGED THE LEBANESE TO BEGIN TALKS NOT ONLY WITH ISRAEL, BUT ALSO WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO. I SAID THAT OUR EFFORTS HAD MADE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION IN INDUCING LEBANESE WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES, INCLUDING NORMALIZATION, AND TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION ON COMPOSITION OF DELEGATION. GEMAYEL ACCEPTED THAT THE TALKS WOULD PRODUCE A NEW ISRAEL/LEBANON RELATIONSHIP. DRAPER ADDED THAT OUR EFFORTS HAD ALSO HELPED BUILD THE INTERNAL CONSENSUS FOR GEMAYEL'S POSITIONS AND THE MODERATE ARAB ACQUIESCENCE IN DIRECT LEBANON/ISRAEL TALKS. I EMPHASIZED THAT WE WERE NOT INTERESTED IN LEAVING LEBANON UNRESOLVED UNTIL THE PEACE PROCESS MOVED FORWARD. (I USED SHARON'S EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO BE PRAGMATIC TO URGE SHARON TO OVERCOME PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES AND MOVE ON TO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE. SHARON SAID THAT I HAD TAKEN HIS LANGUAGE OUT OF CONTEXT AND THAT PROCEDURE WAS SUBSTANCE IN THE LEBANESE CONTEXT.)

10. I ALSO TOLD SHARON THAT CONTRARY TO HIS STATEMENTS, THE US AND ISRAEL SHARED MANY GOALS IN LEBANON. WE BOTH SUPPORTED A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON. WE BOTH WANTED THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, AND WE BOTH SUPPORTED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SO THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT BECOME AGAIN A BASE FOR TERRORISM. AND, WE BOTH SUPPORTED DEVELOPMENT OF ISRAEL/LEBANON RELATIONS, WITH A VIEW TO THE ULTIMATE ACHIEVEMENT

OF A PEACE TREATY. I STRESSED THAT DESPITE THIS AGREEMENT ON OBJECTIVES, I STRONGLY DISAGREED WITH SHARON'S CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS NO HURRY IN RESOLVING THE LEBANON SITUATION. WHILE ISRAEL WAS IN A STRONG POSITION MILITARILY IN LEBANON, TIME WOULD ERODE GEMAYEL'S INTERNAL CONSENSUS FOR, AND EXTERNAL ACQUIESCENCE IN, POSITIVE TALKS WITH ISRAEL. AND, I POINTED OUT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MOVEMENT FROM SYRIA AND THE PLO WITHOUT ISRAEL/LEBANON TALKS.

11. I ALSO SAID THAT THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH WEST BANK MAYORS WAS NOT AN EFFORT TO REVIVE THE PLO, BUT WAS IN COMPLETE ACCORD WITH CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, WHICH CONTEMPLATED THE PARTICIPATION OF JORDAN AND INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I SAID WE WOULD BE TALKING WITH A WIDE RANGE OF PALESTINIANS FROM THE WEST BANK IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS, AND SAID THAT THIS WOULD ALSO FACILITATE JORDAN'S ENTRY. I POINTED OUT THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAD SUGGESTED THAT WE TRY TO IDENTIFY INHABITANTS IN THE WEST BANK WHO MIGHT JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

12. FINALLY, I SAID THAT I AGREED THAT THE US AND ISRAEL SHOULD CONSULT CLOSELY ON A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES, INCLUDING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. I SAID THAT WE DID NOT AGREE HOWEVER THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION WAS DETERIORATING IN BEIRUT THROUGH THE RE-ENTRY OF PLO MILITARY. I SAID THAT THE SITUATION WAS PROGRESSIVELY BETTER, WITH GEMAYEL CONCENTRATING ON ASSERTING THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT THERE WAS NO THREAT FROM THE PLO WHICH THE LAF COULD NOT HANDLE, AND SUMMARIZED THE EFFORTS WHICH WE WERE MAKING TO STRENGTHEN THE LAF. GROVE

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date

1/31/91

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From:

George P. Shultz

Subject:

Stalemate Over Lebanon

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Phil Habib and Morris Draper have completed a round of talks in Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem. Prime Minister Begin was very negative about Phil's proposals for starting direct Lebanese-Israeli talks. He insists the negotiations be at ministerial level with alternate sessions in Jerusalem. Although Begin agreed to submit Phil's proposals to Sunday's cabinet meeting, the outlook is for continued stalemate.

In the course of wide-ranging discussions in Beirut, Phil found Lebanese leaders eager for discussions with Israel and ready for far-reaching compromises intended to satisfy Israel's interest in the security of its northern border. To get talks started, Gemayel would be willing to seek his government's approval for starting substantive negotiations on political and military matters with a delegation headed by a senior Lebanese civilian. The Lebanese feel unable to meet Israel's other procedural demands.

Phil also urged the Lebanese to accelerate their contacts with the PLO and Syria. Gemayel assured him that he would but stressed that it would greatly strengthen his hand if he could begin negotiations with Israel.

Phil's talks in Damascus were less encouraging. President Assad made himself unavailable, and Foreign Minister Khaddam did not reveal any new positions. Khaddam confirmed Syrian readiness to begin negotiations with Lebanon on Syrian withdrawal, making clear that Syria would only leave after Israel.

During his meeting with Foreign Minister Shamir, Phil advanced a compromise calling for an initial Lebanese-Israeli meeting at the sub-ministerial political level which would proceed right away to substance. The venue of the negotiations would alternate between Israel and Lebanon but would be outside the two capitals. Subsequently, Defense Minister Sharon alleged we were preventing Gemayel from improving relations with Israel and asserted that Israel had created strategic opportunities for the U.S. which we were neglecting.

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Sharon and Shamir were both present when Phil met with Begin, but Sharon seemed to have the upper hand. Sharon made the point that Israel was in no hurry to withdraw, stating, "If we wait, Lebanon will agree to our position." Habib urged the Israelis to enter negotiations and then raise their desires directly. He emphasized that the mood in Lebanon is now as favorable as possible but that the situation can only deteriorate in the absence of negotiations. The Israelis contended that procedure and substance cannot be divorced, and it appears they are trying to win substantial political concessions from the Lebanese as the price for talks. Although Begin agreed to present the issue to the Cabinet, Phil fears that Sharon's hard line view prevailed with the Prime Minister.

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Drafted: NEA/ARN:DLMack:pdw
11/26/82, x 22670, #2090C

Cleared: NEA:WKirby (draft)
NEA/IAI:EAbington (draft)

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R. (T8A)

Response to Phil Habib
12:00 June 24

The Problem: Even if the Salvation Council and PLO may meet today, every likelihood is that the outcome will be inadequate: either (1) the PLO will refuse to talk about anything but IDF disengagement or (2) the Salvation Council and PLO will agree on some terms which Israel cannot accept, and we will be put in the spot of either undermining the GOL or trying and failing to move the Israelis.

Plan of Approach for review with Habib:

- (A) Tell Phil he should get word to the Salvation Council in their discussions with the PLO that we will guarantee that some visible IDF adjustments on the line will be made, but that such movements will not be made until the PLO give specific responses to the GOL policy of

- full GOL authority
- no Palestinian military entity in Lebanon
- Palestinian inhabitants will submit to GOL authority; no extraterritoriality

With regard to the last point, Phil may make it clear that the U.S. will oppose the Israeli position that all Palestinian fighters (10,000 estimated) must depart Lebanon.

He should at the same time make clear however that we expect the practical outcome of the GOL policy stated above will include

- safe departure of PLO leadership from Lebanon
- Palestinian fighters lay down their weapons
- LAF enter and take control of West Beirut.

- (B) Phil should be authorized to keep in his pocket our willingness to consider some form of international observation at the points of adjustment of the IDF line (e.g. unarmed French observers). It should be made clear however, that no adjustments would be started until the PLO has satisfactorily addressed the above key questions.

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9/30/86

Date: 9/30/86

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- (C) We would discuss with Phil the question of his going to Israel prior to midday Friday (the start of the Sabbath) only after (A) and (B) are fully discussed and decided.

Any final travel plans will be subject to a further exchange between us.

- (D) If the above steps do not alter the present situation of stalemate and we are at the same position tomorrow as we are today, Phil will inform the parties that we will do our best to prevent an Israeli assault, but that the burden of this rests heavily on those who over the past week have refused to negotiate or respond to Lebanon's effort at self-strengthening.

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R (T2)

Response to Phil Habib
1000 June 24

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- (C) We would discuss with Phil the question of his going to Israel prior to midday Friday (the start of the Sabbath) only after (A) and (B) are fully discussed and decided.

Any final travel plans will be subject to a further exchange between us: for example, developments may make Phil's presence in Israel desirable in any case

- (D) If the above steps do not alter the present situation of stalemate and we are at the same position tomorrow as we are today, Phil will inform the parties that we will do our best to prevent an Israeli assault, but that the burden of this rests heavily on those who over the past week have refused to negotiate or respond to Lebanon's effort at self-strengthening.

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Date: 9/31/91

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From:

The Secretary

9302560

Subject:

Strategy for the Withdrawal of Foreign
Forces from Lebanon

Phil Habib's Approach

Ambassador Habib has shared with us his views on necessary next steps for "Phase II" in Lebanon. He believes circumstances are right to capitalize on the momentum of the Beirut withdrawal to try to get all Israeli, Syrian and Palestinian forces out of Lebanon. Delay risks further confrontation and violence in Lebanon and an impasse in our Middle East peace negotiations. Strong U.S. leadership would be required, including the following actions:

- press for the fastest possible withdrawal (six weeks maximum);
- withdrawal in two stages;
- deploy the Multinational Force along the Beirut-Damascus Road as part of stage one (consultations with Congress required to expand the MNF mandate);
- seek to strengthen UNIFIL as the main peace-keeping force in the south after Israel's total withdrawal. Our fallback position would be the MNF (any U.S. role -- direct or indirect -- would require Congressional support);

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- support a Lebanon-Israel "termination of belligerency" arrangement as a first step toward eventual normalization;
- provide major U.S. assistance to the Lebanese armed forces.

The following analysis addresses these points in order.

Analysis

In general, Israel, Syria and the PLO have already agreed to the principle of withdrawal, but all three have reasons to delay. While Begin will derive political benefit by bringing Israeli troops home, the Israeli public must perceive that near-term arrangements provide an adequate security alternative to the occupation. The Syrians insist they are prepared to leave only after the Israelis. Pressures which can move the Syrians include the vulnerability of their army in Lebanon and the political onus throughout the Arab world of contributing to a continuing Israeli occupation. The PLO faces similar pressures and would find its situation in Lebanon less tenable if Syria withdrew protection and support.

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They are reluctant, however, to leave the last Arab country where they enjoy freedom of movement, and they have legitimate concerns about the welfare of Palestinian civilians. We would encourage Lebanon to open direct talks on withdrawal with both the PLO and Syria, both of which will seek from Saudi Arabia political and financial compensation which might adversely affect the peace process. There are obvious difficulties in negotiating withdrawal, but we must maintain movement toward our policy goals in Lebanon. Stagnation risks Syrian-Israeli conflict, further Palestinian reinfiltration, and loss of momentum toward a sovereign Lebanon.

The two-step strategy involves: First, Israel and Syria disengage and move away from the Beirut-Damascus road by October 30; second, full withdrawal by November 30. The disengagement reduces the risk of renewed fighting while building confidence for further withdrawal. A successful first stage disengagement however might reduce pressures on both Syria and Israel to continue to stage two.

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It is clear, however, that no first stage withdrawal is conceivable without deploying the MNF along the Beirut-Damascus Road. This in turn requires expanding the size and mandate of the MNF now in Beirut. Conceivably, this force might not include the U.S. Marine contingent, but U.S. participation may be necessary to obtain the cooperation of the French, Italians, and Israelis. (JCS and USCINCEUR estimate that any movement of U.S. forces outside of Beirut would carry a greatly increased risk of U.S. casualties, and ^{there is a} ~~the~~ danger of becoming mired in a stalemated situation should withdrawals cease after stage one. Expansion of the U.S. role beyond Beirut for even a short period would necessitate advance consultations with Congress and probably a follow-up to the War Powers Report.)

Effective security in the South is crucial to achieving full Israeli withdrawal and preventing a security vacuum thereafter. Israel would prefer direct talks between the IDF and the LAF to institutionalize practical cooperation, including a major role for Israeli-controlled Lebanese militia units. While practical cooperation is desirable and will develop

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naturally with time, this Israeli strategy could impede the reconstruction of Lebanese central institutions and prevent national reconciliation. To avoid this, Phil Habib envisions an international force in southern Lebanon following full withdrawal. This would be combined with efforts to enable the Lebanese Armed Forces ~~(LAF)~~ to develop the ability to handle internal security without the help of peacekeeping forces anywhere in Lebanon. [Phil believes that] The UNIFIL contingent now in southern Lebanon provides the quickest mechanism to do the job. Israel, however, has no confidence in UNIFIL and is adamantly opposed to renewal of its mandate. Although it would be difficult to arrange without American troops, an enlarged MNF could be considered for use in the south. (U.S. participation for a period of any significant duration would require statutory authorization.) Another option would be to establish an MNF for an initial period, phasing it out in favor of an expanded UNIFIL at a later date.

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"Normalization" in some form between Lebanon and Israel will be important to reduce Israeli resistance to a rapid pullback; it can as well give legal sanction, and thus a degree of permanence, to Syrian and PLO withdrawal. It is politically vital for Begin to show concrete achievements -- his preference is a full peace treaty -- of the controversial "Peace for Galilee" operation. Any formal arrangement attained under Israeli duress, however, would be denounced by the Arabs, including moderates whose support is needed for our objectives and Lebanon's reconstruction. While we support a full peace treaty as a long-term goal, we oppose its imposition under circumstances which would undermine Lebanese national unity and economic prospects. A possible compromise may be a "termination of belligerency" between Lebanon and Israel, if it could be artfully constructed to avoid Arab criticism and estrangement from Lebanon. A key element from Israel's point of view, and one fully consistent with Lebanese sovereignty, would be Lebanon's undertaking to strengthen its forces and make its best efforts to prevent any use of its territory by elements hostile to its neighbors.

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Direct Israeli-Lebanese talks are now taking place which could, over time, lead to arrangements ending the state of belligerency and ensuring security cooperation in southern Lebanon.

Strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces will take time. This means that a rapid PLO-Syrian-Israeli withdrawal probably cannot be accomplished in the absence of international peacekeeping forces if a dangerous power vacuum is to be avoided -- at least in stage one. As for stage two, however, Ambassador Draper recommends we not rule out the possibility of an Israeli-Lebanese deal whereby Lebanese army and police forces could assume control of the southern Lebanon buffer zone as soon as Israel withdraws.

Units of the Lebanese Armed Forces ^(LAF) ~~(LAF)~~ and police must be associated with any international force. International forces should provide interim arrangements during which the Lebanese authorities will assume their full security responsibility. Our goal of a strong central government argues for a peacekeeping force which is a temporary, gradually diminishing supplement to the ~~the~~ ^{the LAF} ~~the~~ ~~LAF~~, rather than a substitute force. To reinforce this goal we will continue our support for the enlargement,

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training and modernization of the LAF. The Lebanese now plan to expand the LAF rapidly from approximately 20,000 to 42,000 troops. We estimate this could require as much as \$150-200 million in U.S. security assistance for FY 83 and a large U.S. Military Aid and Assistance Group (MAAG) of about 100 personnel in Lebanon for at least one year.

Conclusion: As the above analysis indicates, an effort to achieve the fastest possible withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon is important, but fraught with problems. At this point I believe we need to use the visits of Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir this week, and Lebanon's President Gemayel early next week to refine our thinking further. I will also take the opportunity of the Shamir visit to make it clear that we are consulting with Israel on this matter. Shamir will certainly explain Israel's positions in full, and we will make sure that he in turn is fully aware of the points on which we are likely to differ markedly from Israel when our strategy is developed.

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ACTION ACDA-12

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JCS WASHDC
DOE WASHDC
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 GENEVA 01179

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP, DARPA; JCS FOR J-5/DDIN; DOE FOR
ASDP/ISA

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): THE 192ND
- PLENARY SESSION, FEBRUARY 8, 1983

1. CD-017.

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 01179 01 OF 06 091903Z

2. SUMMARY: THE 192ND PLENARY SESSION OF THE CD
SPILLED OVER INTO THE AFTERNOON TO ACCOMMODATE SEVEN
SPEAKERS: BELGIUM, UK, GDR, AUSTRALIA, CHINA, CUBA
AND KENYA. THE WESTERN DELEGATES EMPHASIZED THE OPPORTUNI-
TY FOR PROGRESS ON A CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) CONVENTION
REPRESENTED IN VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S STATEMENT AND
DESCRIBED CONDITIONS AS FAVORABLE TO BEGIN DEVELOPING
A CONVENTION. HUNGARY, AS COULD BE EXPECTED, TOOK A
SWIPE AT THE U.S. FOR PURSUING CW MODERNIZATION WHILE

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PUTTING UP THE HOPE OF PROGRESS TOWARD A CW CONVENTION AS A SMOKE SCREEN. AUSTRALIA LABELED ACCUSATIONS REGARDING A SMOKE SCREEN AS NOTHING MORE THAN A SMOKE SCREEN ITSELF. THE GDR AND CUBA MADE RATHER STANDARD POLEMICAL ATTACKS ON THE U.S. AND TOUTED SOVIET INITIATIVES. KENYA INTRODUCED A WORKING PAPER ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. END SUMMARY.

3. AMB. ONKELINX OF BELGIUM SUGGESTED THAT THE DEBATE IN EUROPE ON THE DUAL TRACK INF ISSUE MIGHT HINDER THE POSSIBILITY FOR REAL PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE WARNED THAT THE DEBATES BE BALANCED AND ATTEMPT TO AVOID POLEMICS AND SHOULD AVOID ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION OVER THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. TURNING TO THE CD, ONKELINX URGED THAT THE CD ESCHUE WASTING TIME ON ISSUES WHICH ARE NOT RIPE FOR NEGOTIATION SUCH AS "CLASSICAL DISARMAMENT" AND GIVE PRIORITY TO ISSUES WHERE REAL PROGRESS APPEARS POSSIBLE. PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO A CW PROHIBITION WHICH MAY BE FAIRLY NEAR IF ALL SHOW SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY. IN THIS CONTEXT HE WELCOMED VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S STATEMENT. HE CALLED FOR AVOIDING TWO STUMBLING BLOCKS; GETTING BOGGED DOWN IN SEMANTICS, AND LOSING SIGHT THAT A CONVENTION COULD BE NO BETTER THAN ITS SEPARATE PARTS. UNCLASSIFIED

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AN ADEQUATE TREATY COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED IF IT DID NOT PROVIDE FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION. A RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (RW) CONVENTION IS NOT AS IMPORTANT BUT MAY BE CLOSER TO READINESS IF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAN BE DEFINED. HE SUGGESTED IT WILL BE FOUND BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF INSISTING THE TWO ISSUES ARE INTEGRAL AND THAT THEY ARE UNRELATED. ONKELINX SUPPORTED CONTINUATION OF THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN (NTB) WORKING GROUP (WG) WITH THE SAME MANDATE AS LAST YEAR. ANOTHER WG SHOULD BE SET UP ON OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL IF TERMS OF REFERENCE CAN BE AGREED. HE SUGGESTED IT SHOULD BEGIN STUDYING PRESENT CONVENTIONS TO DETERMINE WHERE GAPS EXIST. CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES ALSO HAVE ENORMOUS POTENTIAL. IN THIS REGARD HE CITED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENTS LAST YEAR AND THE PRAGUE DECLARATION THIS YEAR AS BOTH SHOWING WILLINGNESS TO WORK ON CONCRETE MEANS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WARFARE. ONKELINX CLOSED BY INDIRECTLY CHIDING THE USSR FOR INTERFERING WITH THE WORK OF THE GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS. HE URGED THAT ALL DELEGATIONS BE "NEGOTIATORS NOT TUB THUMPERS".

4. UK AMB CROMARTIE NOTED THE HEIGHTENED INTEREST IN THE CD AS MANIFESTED BY THE APPEARANCE OF THE CANADIAN DEPUTY PM AND MFA, THE FRG VICE CHANCELLOR

AND VP BUSH. HE REFERRED TO THE U.S. APPROACH TO
INF AS OFFERING THE PROSPECT OF "A SUBSTANTIAL
MEASURE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT" AND REPRESENTING
"THE TURNING-POINT FOR WHICH WE HAVE ALL BEEN WAITING."
CROMARTIE TOO CALLED FOR PRAGMATISM AND A FOCUS ON CW.
HE REGRETTED THAT THE CW EXPERTS HAD BEEN PREVENTED
(BY THE USSR) FROM PREPARING A REPORT WHICH WOULD
HAVE REFLECTED A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT EMERGING IN

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ACTION ACDA-12

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JCS WASHDC
DOE WASHDC
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 06 GENEVA 01179

SOME AREAS AND THAT THE WORK OF THE GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS HAS ALSO BEEN DELAYED (ALSO BY THE USSR). ON OTHER AREAS, THE UK URGED AN EARLY START TO THE NTB WG WITH THE SAME MANDATE AS LAST YEAR AND SUPPORTED THE FRG VIEW THAT THE LINKAGE OF ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR FACILITIES TO THE RW NEGOTIATION CREATES SO MANY LEGAL AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS THAT IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THEY SHOULD BE COMBINED. IN ANSWER TO MEXICO'S CRITICISM OF THE U.S. ON THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT (CPD), CROMARTIE SAID "WE SHOULD NOT... UNCLASSIFIED

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DELUDE OURSELVES THAT IT REQUIRES A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF ONLY ONE, OR A FEW, STATES TO MAKE A CPD POSSIBLE." HE NOTED THAT LESS THAN HALF THE CD MEMBERSHIP HAD RESPONDED TO THE SYG'S REQUEST FOR VIEWS ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. HE JUDGED NEGOTIATIONS TO BE PREMATURE, ESPECIALLY UNTIL THERE IS ANY COMMON GROUND ON HOW TO TACKLE THE PROBLEM.

5. AMB HERDER OF THE GDR MADE A HEAVILY PROPAGANDISTIC STATEMENT WHICH DESCRIBED THE TWO ALTERNATIVES FOR MANKIND TO BE STOPPING THE ARMS RACE OR NUCLEAR HOLOCAST. 1983 MUST NOT BE THE YEAR OF THE MISSILE, HE SAID. HE REFERRED TO THE PRAGUE DECLARATION AS A PROGRAM FOR TRUE PROGRESS TOWARD DISARMAMENT AND QUOTED GENERAL SECRETARY HONECKER TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WORLD IS AT A CROSSROADS AND THAT WE MUST CHOOSE "REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION." HE THEN INDIRECTLY CITED THE U.S. FOR PURSUING PLANS FOR A "PROTRACTED NUCLEAR WAR" AS REFLECTED IN A "DEFENSE GUIDELINES FOR 1984 TO 1988." THIS PLAN PROJECTS A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE AND THE FULL INTEGRATION OF OUTER SPACE IN THESE "WAR PLANS." HE IMPLIED THAT VP BUSH SAID IN 1981 "ONE HAS TO HAVE A WEAPONS POTENTIAL WHICH INFLECTS MORE DAMAGE ON THE OTHER SIDE THAN THEY CAN DO TO US. THAT EXACTLY IS THE WAY TO VICTORY IN A NUCLEAR WAR." HERDER SUPPORTED THE G-21 APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AND TOUTED THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSED TREATY ON RENUNCIATION OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS. HE SAID INF DEPLOYMENT WOULD CHANGE THE TACTICAL SITUATION AND WOULD REQUIRE A RESPONSE. HE CITED "OVER 6000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS DEPLOYED TO THE WEST OF OUR BORDERS" AT PRESENT AND ASKED WHAT IS THE REFERENCE TO A MONOPOLY? THE GDR HAS REPLIED TO SWEDEN THAT IT WILL MAKE ITS ENTIRE TERRITORY UNCLASSIFIED

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A NWFZ IF RECIPROCATED ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND
EQUAL SECURITY. A NUCLEAR TEST BAN (NTB) SHOULD BE
NEGOTIATED ON THE BASIS OF THE USSR DRAFT TREATY AND NOT
THE U.S. INSISTANCE ON DISCUSSIONS OF VERIFICATION
IN THE HOPES OF FINDING ONE SOME DAY "WHICH WOULD SUIT
THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES." HE CITED A 12/17/82
ARTICLE IN THE NYT BY FORMER ACDA DIRECTOR RALPH EARLE
THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION "HAS MADE CLEAR ITS INTENTION
THAT IT WANTS TO CONTINUE TESTING" AND "THAT ITS REAL CON-
CERN APPEARS TO BE THAT A CTB WOULD PREVENT THE DEVELOP-
MENT AND TESTING OF NEW WEAPONS..." HERDER SUPPORTED A
FREEZE TO LIMIT MODERNIZATION AND OPPOSED THE NEUTRON
BOMB ON THE BASIS THAT IT WOULD MAKE NUCLEAR WAR

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R 091838Z FEB 83
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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7565
 INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
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 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
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"WAGEABLE AND WINNABLE." HE WELCOMED STATEMENTS THAT INDICATED POSSIBLE PROGRESS ON CW NEGOTIATIONS BUT QUESTIONED THEIR SINCERITY IN LIGHT OF NEWS REPORTS OF AN "ADDITIONAL DOLS 150 MILLION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NEW CW IN THE U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET." ALSO "IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO BRING UP PERMANENTLY NEW VERIFICATION DEMANDS." THE GDR SUPPORTS A REALISTIC VERIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH INCLUDES NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION, HE SAID. LASTLY HE MENTIONED PROPOSALS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN CHEMICAL-
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WEAPON-FREE ZONE AND AGAIN CITED THE "DEFENSE GUIDELINES" DOCUMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT "OUTER SPACE OPERATIONS ADD A NEW DIMENSION TO OUR (U.S.) MILITARY CAPABILITIES. WE MUST MAKE SURE THAT TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS DO NOT BLOCK OPPORTUNITIES TO DEVELOP SUCH CAPABILITIES."

6. AUSTRALIA: AUSTRALIAN AMB SADLIER EXPRESSED HIS HOPES FOR SUCCESS IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH, ALTHOUGH THEIR RAISON D'ETRE IS IN EUROPE, HE NOTED, WILL HAVE A BEARING ON THE WHOLE DISARMAMENT AGENDA. NOTING VARIOUS FACTORS WHICH HAVE SET BACK THE CAUSE OF DISARMAMENT BY SHAKING INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE--ACTIONS WHICH HAVE CHALLENGED PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER, OF

HUMAN RIGHTS, OF THE RULE OF LAW AND OF INTERNATIONAL
TREATY COMMITMENTS, HE URGED THAT CONFIDENCE BE
ESTABLISHED. HE CALLED ON DELEGATIONS TO ADOPT
"DIFFERENT, MORE IMAGINATIVE ATTITUDES," AND TO GET
AWAY FROM RHETORICAL REFERENCES TO "LACK OF POLITICAL
WILL" OR THE DEPLOYMENT OF "SMOKESCREENS." THE CD HAS
"AT LAST," HE SAID, "BEGUN TO FACE UP TO THE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE CONCEPT OF VERIFICATION, WHICH IS CENTRAL TO DIS-
ARMAMENT" AND THERE CAN BE NO MORE DISARMAMENT TREATIES
WITHOUT IT. HE REITERATED AUSTRALIA'S LONG-STANDING
SUPPORT FOR A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY, AND
SUPPORTED THE CONTINUATION OF THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN
WORKING GROUP UNDER ITS OLD MANDATE, AS VERIFICATION
AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES REQUIRE MORE ATTENTION THAN HAS
SO FAR BEEN GIVEN TO THEM. PRAISING THE WORK OF THE
GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS (GSE), HE CALLED ON THE
CD TO ENCOURAGE RATHER THAN DISCOURAGE THEIR WORK, AND
NOTED THAT AUSTRALIA HAS OFFERED TO GIVE FAVORABLE
CONSIDERATION TO ANY PROPOSAL TO SITUATE AN INTER-
NATIONAL DATA CENTER ON ITS TERRITORY. ON CHEMICAL
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WEAPONS, HE WELCOMED THE DETAILED IDEAS TO BE SUBMITTED
BY THE U.S. AND URGED THAT THE CW WORKING GROUP
CONTINUE UNDER A NEW CHAIRMAN WITHOUT A HIATUS. KEY
PROBLEMS RELATED TO VERIFICATION AND TO SCOPE OF A CW
BAN REMAIN. SUCH A BAN SHOULD INCLUDE A BAN ON THE
USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, HE SAID, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE
AMBIGUITIES REMAIN AS TO THE EXISTING PROHIBITION ON
USE, AND "THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS REPORTEDLY
CONTINUES." AS TO VERIFICATION, WHILE NATIONAL ARRANGE-
MENTS CAN SIMPLIFY THE TASK, HE SAID, THEY CAN NOT SUB-
STITUTE FOR VERIFICATION MEASURES OF INTERNATIONAL
SCOPE. AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM MUST PROVIDE FOR A
MEASURE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL

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AMEMBASSY BEIJING
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AUSPICES. HE URGED "A NEW SPIRIT OF ACCOMMODATION"
IN THE CD LEST THE GOOD WORK ALREADY DONE BE FRUSTRATED
BY ACTIONS SUCH AS THOSE OF ONE DELEGATION (USSR)
WHO PREVENTED CONSENSUS ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS

EXPERTS REPORT, WITHOUT OFFERING AN EXPLANATION. THE WORK OF THE GSE ALSO, HE NOTED, HAS BEEN RECENTLY QUESTIONED (USSR). HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT CONSENSUS HAS NOT BEEN REACHED ON THE CHAIRMANSHIPS FOR SUBSIDIARY BODIES, DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF UNDERSTANDINGS, AND INSISTED THAT THE CD GET ON WITH ITS WORK.

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7. PRC: THE NEW PRC AMB LI NOTED THAT NO SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON ANY IMPORTANT ITEM HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE FOUR YEARS SINCE THE CD WAS ESTABLISHED. HE ATTRIBUTED THIS SITUATION TO SUPERPOWER RIVALRY, ASSERTING THAT THIS RIVALRY COUPLED WITH THE ECONOMIC RECESSION HAVE RESULTED IN THE INTENSIFICATION OF ALL THE BASIC CONTRADICTIONS IN THE WORLD. THE GRAVE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE, THE CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND KAMPUCHEA, THE TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE STORMY SITUATION IN AFRICA, HE ASSERTED, ARE RELATED TO THE "SUPERPOWER RIVALRY FOR WORLD DOMINATION." BOTH SIDES, HE SAID, "ARE ENGAGED IN A CONTEST FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY UNDER THE PRETEXT OF MAINTAINING A BALANCE." ONE SIDE HAS VASTLY INCREASED ITS DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, WHILE THE OTHER HAS STATED THAT IT WILL NEVER ALLOW THE OTHER SIDE TO GAIN SUPERIORITY, AND WILL TAKE STEPS TO ASSURE THAT IT DOES NOT. HE CALLED ON THESE COUNTRIES TO SHOULDER THEIR SPECIAL DISARMAMENT RESPONSIBILITIES BY TAKING THE LEAD IN SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCING THEIR WEAPONS. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN THE START AND INF TALKS WILL TAKE A SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE AND TAKE A STEP TOWARD CONVERTING "GUNS INTO BUTTER." IN AN INDIRECT REFERENCE HE CALLED INTO QUESTION THE POSITION OF THE USSR AT THE INF TALKS, BY NOTING THAT SUCH AGREEMENTS, SHOULD NOT PREJUDICE THE INTERESTS OF THIRD PARTIES, AND THE WEAPONS SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION SHOULD BE ELIMINATED, NOT JUST TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER REGION WHERE THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO BE HARMFUL TO WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY.

AMB LI SAID EVEN IF THE SUPERPOWERS REDUCED THEIR

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ARSENALS BY 50 PERCENT THEIR SECURITY WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED, AND THEY DON'T DENY THIS POINT. STATING THAT CALLS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND FOR A CUT-OFF IN THE PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERAILS WERE

JUSTIFIED, HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THEY (I.E. THE SUPER-
POWERS ONLY) WILL HEED THESE CALLS. "CHINA IS WILLING
TO COMMIT ITSELF TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT," HE SAID, NOTING
THAT CHINA HAS ONLY A SMALL ARSENAL FOR DEFENSIVE
PURPOSES, DESIGNED TO BREAK THE SUPERPOWER MONOPOLY AND
TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL. HE REITERATED CHINA'S
PEDGE NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST, AND NOT TO USE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, AND
RENEWED THE PROPOSAL MADE BY HIS COUNTRY AT SSOD II THAT

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INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
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IF THE SUPERPOWERS TAKE THE LEAD IN REDUCING THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS BY 50 PERCENT, "CHINA WOULD BE PREPARED TO ASSUME OBLIGATIONS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE THEIR OWN ARSENALS BY RATIONAL RATIOS TO THE POINT OF DESTRUCTION." CHINA SUPPORTS A ROLE FOR THE CD IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, HE SAID, AND TO THIS END, IT SUPPORTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE CD. ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, HE NOTED THAT THERE WERE STILL WIDE DIVERGENCIES RELATED TO VERIFICATION AND UNCLASSIFIED

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SCOPE OF A BAN. ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION AND ON-SITE INSPECTION, HE SAID, A MAJOR POWER WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS (USSR) REMAINS AT A STANDSTILL. THIS IS OF CONCERN TO CHINA, AND HE EXPRESSED HOPES THAT THE CD WILL SPEED UP ITS NEGOTIATIONS AND ELABORATIONS THIS SESSION WITH A VIEW TO ELIMINATING THESE SAVAGE AND DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS. HE SAID THAT CHINA WILL CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS GOAL.

THE SUPERPOWERS, AMB LI ASSERTED, HAVE EXTENDED THEIR ARMS RACE INTO OUTER SPACE -- ASAT WEAPONS ARE ALREADY BEING MANUFACTURED, RESEARCH ON PARTICLE BEAM AND LASER WEAPONS HAS INTENSIFIED, AND MILITARY ACTION IN OUTER SPACE HAS INTENSIFIED. "SPACE WARS," HE SAID, "ARE NO LONGER A FIGMENT OF SCIENCE FICTION." AMB LI REITERATED CHINA'S POSITION THAT OUTER SPACE SHOULD BE USED SOLELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. HE SUPPORTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CD WORKING GROUP TO DEVELOP AN

"INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENT" BUT NOTED IN THIS REGARD THAT THE ISSUE TRULY IS EXTREMELY COMPLICATED. HE SAID THAT CHINA SUPPORTS THE EFFORTS OF THE NON-ALIGNED TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT. FROM EXPERIENCE, HE NOTED, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE NON-ALIGNED DURING CPD NEGOTIATIONS HAD MADE A NUMBER OF CONCESSIONS, BUT THAT "COUNTRIES WITH THE LARGEST ARSENALS WERE TRYING BY EVERY MEANS TO OBSTRUCT AGREEMENT." HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT DURING THE BREAK SINCE SSOD II THESE COUNTRIES HAD ENGAGED IN REFLECTION, AND HAD COME BACK TO THE CD WITH NEW IDEAS TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK.

8. CUBA: AMB SOLA VILA OF CUBA IN CADENCE WITH AN EARLIER SPEECH BY GDR AMB HERDER, TOOK THE U.S. TO TASK

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FOR INTERNATIONAL ILLS RANGING FROM THE WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION TO THE MAINTENANCE OF ILLEGAL MILITARY BASES ON FOREIGN LANDS AND CONTINUED RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND ISRAEL.

IN HIS RATHER TYPICAL PARTY LINE ATTACK, HE DESCRIBED VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S EUROPEAN MISSION AS A PUBLICITY STUNT LIKELY TO IMPRESS MADISON AVE BUT OF LITTLE OR NO USE IN FORGING WORLD PEACE. HE FURTHER DESCRIBED IT AS SIMPLY A DEVICE TO RATIFY THE ZERO OPTION, WHICH WAS NEITHER AN OPTION NOR ZERO.

WITH REGARD TO THE INF AND START TALKS, AMB SOLA VILA

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MERELY INDICATED THAT 42 MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES PROVOKED
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, YET THE U.S. IS NOW WILLING
TO INTRODUCE OVER 600 INTO EUROPE.

ON MATTERS OF THE CD ITSELF SOLA VILA SAID THAT CUBA
SUPPORTED WORKING GROUPS ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR
WAR AND OUTER SPACE AND CALLED FOR NEW TERMS OF
REFERENCE ON THE NTB MANDATE.

9. KENYA: DR. DON NANJIRA, KENYAN REPRESENTATIVE TO
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THE CD, USED THE PLENARY SESSION AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO
INTRODUCE INTO THE RECORD THE G-21 WORKING PAPER ON THE
PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR (CD/341). IN A BRIEF SUMMARY
OF THE PAPER'S CONTENT DR. NANJIRA MADE A SOMEWHAT
EMOTIONAL APPEAL TO THE CD MEMBERS THAT UNLESS THE
NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES CEASED THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE,
MUTUAL ANNIHILATION WOULD RESULT. INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY, SAID DR. NANJIRA, IS ROOTED IN REFRAINING FROM
THE THREAT OF USE OF FORCE AND NOT FROM THE CONCEPT OF
DETERRENCE. SWAEBE

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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E.O. 12356: DECL:

TAGS: PEPR, PORG, CH,

SUBJ: PRE-UNGA CONSULTATIONS IN BEIJING

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY:

AMBASSADOR SHERMAN AND DAS STREEB MET AUGUST 31 AND

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SEPTEMBER 1 WITH XIE QIMEI, DIRECTOR OF MFA'S
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT, AND EXCHANGED
VIEWS IN A FRIENDLY AND DIRECT FASHION ON A WIDE NUMBER
OF SUBSTANTIVE AND TECHNICAL TOPICS.

3. THE VISIT AND THE CONSULTATIONS WERE PARTICULARLY
USEFUL TO THE EMBASSY, PROVIDING A BOOST TO OUR EFFORTS
TO IMPROVE CONTACT WITH THE MFA ON UN AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS MATTERS. ASIDE FROM A FEW NUANCES,

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THE CHINESE STATEMENTS DID NOT DEPART FROM STANDARD POSITIONS ESPOUSED IN THE PAST. THE CHINESE INDICATED SUPPORT FOR UN SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAELI CREDENTIALS IN THE UNGA AND IAEA. THEY SAID BEIJING WOULD SUPPORT THE MAJORITY VIEW ON THE QUESTION OF PUERTO RICO'S INSCRIPTION ON THE UN AGENDA. THE CHINESE ASKED FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE IN ENCOURAGING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE CGD.

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THEY CAUTIONED THE U.S. IN TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS OVER AFGHANISTAN, STATING THAT MOSCOW HAD NO INTENTION TO ENTER INTO A GENUINE DIALOGUE ON A POLITICAL SOLUTION BUT WAS USING THE TALKS WITH THE U.S. TO CREATE AN IMAGE OF PROGRESS ON AFGHANISTAN WHEN THERE IS NONE. SHARPLY ATTACKING THE U.S. OVER "CONNIVANCE" AT THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON, XIE CALLED FOR CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY, INCLUDING A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO. ON NAMIBIA, THE CHINESE CALLED FOR GRANTING INDEPENDENCE TO NAMIBIA PRIOR TO SECURING AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA. ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES, XIE BLAMED A U.S./USSR "FAILURE OF RESPONSIBILITY" FOR THE RESULTS OF SSOD II AND PRESENTED BEIJING'S OWN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS IN DETAIL, POINTING OUT THE "MANY DIFFERENCES" BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND SOVIET POSITIONS. XIE INDICATED CHINA WILL NOT SUPPORT A U.S. PROPOSAL

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FOR A CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS REPORTING OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES. THE CHINESE SAID U.S. REMARKS IN THE THIRD COMMITTEE AND AT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ON SOCIALISM, COMMUNISM, AND THE LIKE, WERE IMPLIED ATTACKS ON CHINA. THEY INDICATED THAT CHINA WOULD HAVE TO RESPOND TO THESE ATTACKS IF THEY CONTINUED.

4. ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, CHINA CALLED FOR FURTHER U.S. FLEXIBILITY ON GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS AND DID NOT RESPOND TO U.S. CRITICISM THAT A SMALL GROUP OF LDC'S HAD PREVENTED AGREEMENT ON THE VERSAILLES TEXT. CHINA SUPPORTS THE PRESENT AGENDA FOR UNCTAD VI. XIE SAID CHINA WAS STUDYING THE TEXT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT TO SIGN AND RATIFY. THE CHINESE GAVE SUPPORT TO UNIDO AS A SPECIALIZED AGENCY, WITH CERTAIN CONDITIONS, INCLUDING MAJORITY FUNDING BY DEVELOPED STATES. XIE ALSO SAID CHINA WOULD SUPPORT PRESENT UNIDO DIRECTOR KHANE CONTINUING IN OFFICE. END SUMMARY.

5. XIE'S REMARKS ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW ON THE TOPICS COVERED. AMBASSADOR SHERMAN'S OR DAS STREEB'S REMARKS ARE REPORTED AS NECESSARY ON POINTS OF REBUTTAL OR ADDITIONAL EXPLANATION.

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ISRAEL'S CREDENTIALS

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6. IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE AN ATTACK ON ISRAEL'S CREDENTIALS IN THE 37TH UNGA, PERHAPS A MOVE TO SUSPEND ITS CREDENTIALS. ONLY ISRAEL IS TO BLAME IF THIS HAPPENS. IF ISRAEL CONTINUES ITS AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS, CHINA WILL SUPPORT SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOI IN THE UN. ISRAEL SHOULD OBEY THE RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS, CEASE ITS AGGRESSION AND WITHDRAW FROM

[REDACTED]

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LEBANON COMPLETELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY. THE U.S. ATTITUDE IS CRUCIAL IN DETERMINING WHETHER ISRAEL MEETS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7002
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THIS REQUIREMENT.

PUERTO RICO

7. CHINA'S POLICY INCLUDES FOUR PRINCIPLES: (A) TO
SUPPORT FULLY PUERTO RICO'S NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
AND TO RESPECT THE WISHES OF THE MAJORITY OF PUERTO
RICO'S POPULATION, (B) TO OPPOSE ALL EXTERNAL INTERVEN-
TION IN PUERTO RICO'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, (C) TO RESPECT
THE VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY OF UN MEMBERS
ON THE QUESTION
OF WHETHER AND HOW TO PUT THE ISSUE OF PUERTO RICO TO

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A VOTE, AND (D) TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE PUERTO RICAN PEOPLE WILL BE ABLE TO SETTLE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS FREE OF ANY OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. AMBASSADOR SHERMAN RESPONDED BY WARMLY WELCOMING CHINA'S OPPOSITION TO EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN THE PUERTO RICO ISSUE.

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MIDDLE EAST

8. THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON TOOK PLACE WITH U.S. SUPPORT AND CONNIVANCE, IS A VIOLATION OF THE UN CHARTER AND BASIC INTERNATIONAL NORMS, A PROVOCATION TO THE ARABS, AND HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE STEADY DETERIORATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. CHINA STRONGLY CONDEMNS ISRAEL AND SUPPORTS THE PLO, THE LEBANESE PEOPLE, AND THE ARMY AND PEOPLE OF SYRIA. THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD RECOVER THEIR NATIONAL RIGHTS, RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND AND ENJOY THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THE PLO, AS THE JUST REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. U.S. FAVORI'

TOWARD ISRAEL HAS ISOLATED THE U.S. FROM THE UN MAJORITY. ARAFAT HAS MADE GREAT CONCESSIONS, YET THE U.S. STILL FAVORS ISRAEL. THIS CREATES GREATER RESENTMENT AMONG ARAB STATES AND GIVES THE USSR AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEDDLE. THE U.S. SHOULD PRESSURE ISRAEL TO IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON AND REFRAIN FROM NEW PROVOCATIONS. ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL DOES NOT MEAN AN END TO THE LEBANON CRISIS, HOWEVER, AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION MUST BE SOLVED. THE U.S. SHOULD HAVE DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO.

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AFGHANISTAN

9. THE SOVIETS HAVE NO INTENTION OF LEAVING AFGHANISTAN. WE FULLY AGREE WITH THE U.S. THAT THERE SHOULD BE NEW PRESSURE TO COMPEL THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW. WE HOPE THE UNGA WILL PASS GOOD RESOLUTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT ENCOMPASSING THE MAIN POINTS OF PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS: (1) IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS, (2) FREEDOM FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEM, (3) GUARANTEES FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, AND NATIONAL STATUS OF THE AFGHAN STATE, AND (4) CREATION OF CONDITIONS ENABLING AFGHAN REFUGEES TO RETURN HOME. WE HOPE CHINA AND THE U.S. CAN COORDINATE SUPPORT WITH PAKISTAN AND OTHERS IN ADOPTING THIS SORT OF RESOLUTION.

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--- A POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR AFGHANISTAN MUST BE BASED ON THE RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS AND MUST BE CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN. THE USSR IS TRYING TO USE OTHER MAJOR INCIDENTS TO DIVERT THE ATTENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND FORCE IT TO RECOGNIZE A SOVIET FAIT ACCOMPLI IN AFGHANISTAN. IN FACT, SOVIET WITHDRAWAL IS A PRECONDITION FOR RESOLVING THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM. WE APPRECIATE THE U.S. INFORMING US OF TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIETS HAVE NO INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING, HOWEVER, AND THE U.S. SHOULD NOT RELAX ITS PRESSURE AND SHOULD MAINTAIN HIGH VIGILANCE AS TO THE REAL INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIETS.

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IRAN-IRAQ WAR

10. CHINA IS FRIENDLY WITH BOTH COUNTRIES AS MEMBERS OF THE THIRD WORLD, HAS A NEUTRAL STANCE TOWARD THE CONFLICT, AND CALLS FOR A CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS TO SETTLE PEACEFULLY THE PROBLEM. GREAT POWERS MUST NOT

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MEDDLE IN THE WAR. CHINA APPRECIATES THE EFFORTS OF

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7003
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USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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TE NAM COUNTRIES AND THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO MEDIATE
A PROMPT AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

KAMPUCHEA

11. CHINA IS HAPPY WITH THE FORMATION OF THE COALITION,
FEELS IT ALREADY HAS BEEN VERY BENEFICIAL, AND HOPES
THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE U.S.,

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WILL GIVE THE CGDK FULL SUPPORT AND AID. WE AGREE THAT THE CGDK SHOULD ENCOUNTER NO PROBLEMS WITH CREDENTIALS. WE SHOULD USE THIS SESSION TO BROADEN SUPPORT ON MORE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, ESPECIALLY IN GAINING SUPPORT AMONG

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WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THE U.S. SHOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH FRANCE, AUSTRIA, HOLLAND, IRELAND, AND OTHERS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS OBJECTIVE.

-- THE CREDENTIALS QUESTION INVOLVES THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE WHICH SHOULD REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY OF STATES. CHINA PRESENTS THE FOLLOWING LIST OF POSSIBLE MEMBERS FOR REFERENCE: PERMANENT MEMBERS - U.S.,

)
AND CHINA; ASIA - PHILIPPINES OR BANGLADESH; AFRICA - TWO SEATS FROM LIBERIA, NIGERIA, OR ONE OTHER; SOUTH AMERICA - COLOMBIA, VENEZUELA, OR URUGUAY; WESTERN EUROPE AND OTHER - ONE SEAT FROM AMONG WEST GERMANY, YUGOSLAVIA, NEW ZEALAND OR CANADA.

-- ASEAN IS DRAFTING A RESOLUTION ON KAMPUCHEA WHICH CHINA CONSIDERS IS FAIRLY GOOD. IT ENCOMPASSES ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF PAST RESOLUTIONS: (1) FOREIGN TROOPS MUST WITHDRAW, (2) THE KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE MUST FREELY CHOOSE THEIR FUTURE, AND (3) THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST RESPECT THE NEUTRALITY, INDEPENDENCE, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF KAMPUCHEA. WE ARE STUDYING THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE OF THE ICK.

-- VIETNAM HAS SUBMITTED AN ITEM CONCERNING PEACE AND COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WHICH THEY WANT REGISTERED ON THE AGENDA WITHOUT A VOTE. IF ASEAN WANTS TO EXCLUDE THE ITEM, WE HOPE THE U.S. WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES.

-- VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL IS THE KEY TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN KAMPUCHEA. SINCE VIETNAM HAS NOT WITHDRAWN, THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS ARE NOT YET RIGHT FOR A

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SETTLEMENT. A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IS A FACADE FOR CONTINUED VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA, DESIGNED TO SOW DISSENSION IN ASEAN AND CONFUSE WORLD OPINION. THE VIETNAMESE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IS NO DIFFERENT FROM PREVIOUS PROPOSALS -- ALL ARE MEANT TO CIRCUMVENT UN RESOLUTIONS AND ESTABLISH THE

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VIETNAMESE AS RULERS OF INDOCHINA AND GIVE HENG SAMRIN
THE SEMBLANCE OF LEGITIMACY. IF VIETNAM ENDED ITS
AGGRESSION AND WITHDREW ITS TROOPS, CHINA COULD
IMMEDIATELY NORMALIZE RELATIONS.
NAMIBIA

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12. CHINA SUPPORTS THE NAMIBIAN STRUGGLE. IT ALSO
STANDS BY UN RESOLUTION 435 AND OTHER RELEVANT
RESOLUTIONS. WE BACK THE AFRICAN PROPOSALS FOR SANCTIONS
AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. SOUTH AFRICA IS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE FACT THAT NAMIBIA IS NOT INDEPENDENT. THE KEY
TO THE SOLUTION IS SOUTH AFRICAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL
FROM NAMIBIA.

-- U.S. FAVORITISM TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA HAS ENCOURAGED
THE SAG TO STIFFEN ITS RESISTANCE. LINKING A CUBAN
WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA WITH A NAMIBIAN SOLUTION HAS
COMPLICATED THE SITUATION. THE U.S. SHOULD CHANGE ITS
POLICY AND NOT LINK CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AND NAMIBIAN
INDEPENDENCE. ONCE NAMIBIA IS INDEPENDENT, AND THERE
IS NO THREAT TO ANGOLA FROM SOUTH AFRICA, THE CUBAN
TROOPS WILL HAVE NO EXCUSE TO STAY. INTERNATIONAL
PRESSURE WILL MOUNT FOR A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, MAKING IT
POSSIBLE FOR ANGOLA AND OTHERS TO CHALLENGE THE CUBAN
PRESENCE. NAMIBIA'S INDEPENDENCE WILL THUS FACILITATE
THE COMMON OBJECTIVE OF A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL.

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

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13. IN THE FOUR YEARS SINCE SSOD I, THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION HAS GROWN MORE TENSE. IN SSOD II THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT. THERE WAS NO CONSENSUS ON THE REVIEW OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF SSOD I. THE MAIN REASON FOR THE FAILURE OF SSOD II IS THAT THE USSR AND U.S. FAILED TO ACCEPT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO IMPLEMENT SERIOUSLY A DISARMAMENT PROCESS.

-- CHINA PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS AT SSOD II BASED ON TWO PRINCIPLES. FIRST, STATES SHOULD DISCUSS WAYS TO
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SAFEGUARD INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AS FOLLOWS:
(1) THE SUPERPOWERS SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN REDUCING ARMS, (2) NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE SAME TIME, (3) MEDIUM AND SMALL SIZE COUNTRIES ARE ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES, (4) THERE SHOULD BE STRICT AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF ARMS REDUCTION, AND (5) ALL STATES SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY.

-- SECONDLY, CHINA PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING MEASURES TO BRING AN IMMEDIATE HALT TO THE ARMS RACE: (1) ALL NUCLEAR STATES SHOULD AGREE ON THE NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, (2) PENDING SUCH AGREEMENT, NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD PLEDGE NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR STATES OR REGIONS, AND (3) NUCLEAR STATES SHOULD MAKE A NON-FIRST USE PLEDGE TO EACH OTHER.

-- CHINA MADE A PROPOSAL THAT NUCLEAR STATES SHOULD STOP

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EXPERIMENTING, PRODUCING, AND IMPROVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY VEHICLES AND SHOULD START REDUCING NUCLEAR ARSENALS UNDER MUTUALLY AGREED CONDITIONS. WHILE THE PROCESS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IS UNDERWAY, STATES SHOULD ALSO CARRY OUT A CONVENTIONAL ARMS DISARMAMENT PROGRAM. STATES SHOULD PLEDGE NOT TO USE CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND SHOULD PROHIBIT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

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-- CHINA NOTED THE SOVIET PLEDGE OF NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. CHINA MADE THIS PLEDGE 18 YEARS AGO AND HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WILL NOT USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR STATES OR NUCLEAR FREE ZONES. THE USSR ANNOUNCED ITS NO FIRST USE PLEDGE ONLY AFTER
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IT HAD AMASSED A NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND GAINED SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS. MOREOVER, THE USSR DID NOT PLEDGE NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR STATES OR NUCLEAR FREE ZONES. THUS, THERE ARE MANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND CHINESE POSITIONS. ONLY CHINA PROPOSED IMMEDIATE MEASURES TO HALT THE ARMS RACE -- MEASURES WHICH ARE PART OF AN INTEGRAL WHOLE TO ACHIEVE DISARMAMENT.

-- THERE IS NOW TO BE A WORKING GROUP CONCERNING THE TEST BAN TREATY, AND A U.S. CONCESSION MADE THIS POSSIBLE. BUT NOW THE U.S. IS OPPOSED TO DISCUSSING A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. IN OUR VIEW, ONLY WHEN A NUCLEAR TEST BAN IS LINKED TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT CAN SUCH A MEASURE CONTRIBUTE TO WORLD PEACE. WE DO NOT OBJECT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WORKING GROUP. WE WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE GROUP, HOWEVER.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

14. CHINESE OPPOSITION TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INCLUDES OPPOSITION TO CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT CB WEAPONS HAVE BEEN USED RECENTLY, AND CHINA SUPPORTS THE INVESTIGATION INTO THIS SUBJECT.

-- THE CONVENTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS NOW BEING NEGOTIATED SHOULD PROHIBIT THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING AS WELL AS THE USE OF SUCH WEAPONS. THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL - TO WHICH THE U.S. AND CHINA HAVE ADHERED - IS INSUFFICIENT. THE GENEVA PROTOCOL ONLY PROHIBITS USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN TIME OF WAR. THERE SHOULD BE A PROHIBITION OF USE DURING ANY SORT OF ARMED CONFLICT. THE GENEVA PROTOCOL DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A STRICT VERIFICATION MECHANISM. A NEW

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CONVENTION WILL NOT DIMINISH BUT WILL IMPROVE THE

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125 PROTOCOL. WE HOPE THE U.S. WILL CONSIDER THE
CHINE
SE VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE.

U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING TO DISCUSS MEASURES TO

REPORT MILITARY EXPENDITURES

15. WE UNDERSTAND THE ESSENCE OF THE PROPOSAL IS NOT
TO REDUCE MILITARY SPENDING BUT TO UNIFY REPORTING
SYSTEMS. A TRIAL REPORTING SYSTEM HAS BEEN IN EFFECT
FOR TWO YEARS. FEW COUNTRIES HAVE PARTICIPATED - IN
1980 THERE WERE NINETEEN, AND IN 1981 THERE WERE

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TWENTY-ONE. PEOPLE FEEL THE REPORTING IS VERY
COMPLICATED. THERE IS A LACK OF CONSENSUS CONCERNING
REPORTING. INDIA THINKS THAT ONLY THE FIVE OR SIX
COUNTRIES WITH THE LARGEST MILITARY BUDGETS SHOULD
REPORT. YUGOSLAVIA SAYS ALL COUNTRIES SHOULD PARTI-
CIPATE. IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE USSR WILL
REPORT ACCURATE FIGURES. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE IS
SOVIET AND AMERICAN REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES.

-- AMBASSADOR SHERMAN PROPOSED THAT THE U.S. AND

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CHINESE MISSIONS IN NEW YORK OR GENEVA HOLD MEETINGS OF EXPERTS FROM TIME TO TIME TO CARRY ON A TECHNICAL DIALOGUE ON THE VARIOUS SUBJECTS OF INTEREST IN THE DISARMAMENT FIELD. ON THE WORKING GROUP FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY, AMBASSADOR SHERMAN SAID THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE; BUT WITHOUT PROVISION FOR ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE, THE U.S. WILL NOT PROCEED TO A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY.

IDEOLOGY IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS

16. IN THE THIRD COMMITTEE AND BEFORE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE U.S. AND CHINA HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS. CHINA IS NOT INVOLVED IN THE U.S./USSR DEBATE. THE U.S. HAS INTRODUCED IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS IN THESE TWO FORA -- CRITICIZING SOCIALISM, COMMUNISM, THE COLLECTIVE ECONOMY, MARXISM, AND LENINISM. THIS IS VERY INAPPROPRIATE. CRITICIZING SUCH CONCEPTS IN INTERNATIONAL FORA IS AN IMPLIED ATTACK AGAINST CHINA. WE CALL ON THE U.S. SIDE TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT; OTHERWISE, CHINA WILL BE FORCED TO MAKE A PUBLIC RESPONSE.

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-- AMBASSADOR SHERMAN REITERATED THAT U.S. REMARKS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ARE NOT INTENDED AS INTERFERENCE IN AFFAIRS OF ANY STATE. THE U.S. DOES NOT CRITICIZE GOVERNMENTS WHICH ENJOY POPULAR SUPPORT, AND DOES NOT TAKE THE POSITION THAT BECAUSE A GOVERNMENT IS SOCIALIST, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT NECESSARILY DOES NOT ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF ITS PEOPLE OR THAT IT ABUSES ITS PEOPLE'S HUMAN RIGHTS. THE U.S. ALSO DOES NOT SUBSCRIBE TO THE VIEW THAT A COUNTRY'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD IS ABOVE CONSIDERATION MERELY BECAUSE ITS SOCIAL SYSTEM IS DIFFERENT.

IAEA (ISRAEL AND NAMIBIA SEATS)

17. THERE ARE OBSTACLES TO CHINA PARTICIPATING NOW IN THE IAEA. WE SUPPORT, HOWEVER, THE POSITION THAT UNLESS ISRAEL PLACES ITS NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER IAEA SUPERVISION BEFORE THE 26TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF IAEA IN SEPTEMBER 1982, THAT IAEA SHOULD CONSIDER SUSPENDING ISRAELI MEMBERSHIP. ON THE QUESTION OF THE NAMIBIA SEAT, THE QUESTION WILL ARISE AT THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE THIS YEAR. WE SUPPORT A NAMIBIA SEAT IN IAEA.

MICRONESIA TERRITORIES

18. CHINA SUPPORTS THE ASPIRATIONS OF PEOPLES IN

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COLONIAL AND TRUST TERRITORIES TO GAIN THEIR
INDEPENDENCE. THE U.S. SHOULD GIVE FULL CONSIDERATION
TO THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLES OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC
TERRITORIES AND COUNTRIES. THE PROCESS OF INDEPENDENCE
IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC IS NOT COMPLETE. THE U.S. FIRST
ANNOUNCED THAT THE TRUST TERRITORY STATES WOULD GAIN
INDEPENDENCE IN 1981, AND THIS HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO
1984. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW THE U.S. PLANS TO END

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TE TRUSTEESHIP.
-- AMBASSADOR SHERMAN BRIEFED THE CHINESE ON THE
PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING TERMINATION OF THE

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TRUST TERRITORIES SUPERVISION FOR T
E VARIOUS PACIFIC
ISLANDS.

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GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS. (GN)

19. WORLD ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE VERY SERIOUS. THE
U.S. HAS TRIED TO SHIFT ITS ECONOMIC BURDENS TO LDC'S,
A POLICY WHICH HAS ONLY SERVED TO WORSEN THEIR PLIGHT
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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WHILE CREATING NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET
XPANSION.
REVITALIZING THE WORLD ECONOMY REQUIRES SETTING UP NIEO,
BUT RIGID U.S. VIEWS HAVE OBSTRUCTED GN. CHINA IS
AWARE OF U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT EXISTING COMPETENT
ORGANIZATIONS. THE REAL KEY TO FUTURE PROGRESS,
HOWEVER, IS WHETHER THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE
INSTEAD OF ESTABLISHING STILL FURTHER PRECONDITIONS.

-- DAS STREEB RESPONDED THAT A SMALL GROUP OF LDC'S
HAD PREVENTED THE LARGE MAJORITY FROM ACCEPTING THE
SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS THAT
HAD EMERGED FROM VERSAILLES.

UNCTAD VI AGENDA

20. CHINA SUPPORTS THE AGENDA PUT FORWARD IN JUNE-JULY
BY THE TDB CHAIRMAN AND HOPES THAT THE U.S. WILL
LISTEN TO THE REASONABLE VIEW OF THE MAJORITY OF LDC'S.
CHINA FEELS REMOVING PROTECTIONIST BARRIERS SHOULD BE
A KEY AGENDA ITEM. IT OPPOSES PLAYING UP THE ROLE OF
GATT COMPARED TO UNCTAD. CHINA ALSO OPPOSES
INTRODUCING EAST WEST TRADE DISPUTES INTO UNCTAD VI.

LAW OF THE SEA (LOS)

21. IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT A SINGLE COUNTRY'S
VIEWS TO BE ENTIRELY INCORPORATED INTO A COMPLEX
AGREEMENT. WE HOPE THE U.S. WILL RECONSIDER ITS
POSITION. FOR OUR OWN PART, WE ARE STILL STUDYING
THE TREATY AND WILL NOT MAKE A DECISION ON SIGNING OR
RATIFYING THE TREATY UNTIL OUR STUDY IS COMPLETE.
UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
[REDACTED]
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22. AS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY READJUSTING ITS NATIONAL ECONOMY, CHINA WILL MAINTAIN ITS 1981 LEVEL OF CONTRIBUTION TO UNDP. THE LDC'S DEMAND THAT THE DC'S INCREASE THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNDP WILL SERVE TO IMPROVE NORTH/SOUTH RELATIONS AND HELP THE LDC'S FURTHER DEVELOP THEIR ECONOMIES.

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-- ON THE ISSUE OF DESERTIFICATION, CHINA URGES AID TO THE SAHEL AND TO SUDAN PURSUANT TO THE TWO RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED AT THE 36TH UNGA. WE SUPPORT THE CALL FOR INCREASING AID FOR DESERTIFICATION PROJECTS. WE NOTE THAT THE UN IS STUDYING FORMATION OF AN ORGANIZATION FOR THIS PURPOSE.

UNIDO

23. CONCERNING AN INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL BANK, CHINA SUPPORTS THE PROPOSAL PROVIDED THAT IT WILL (A) BE A GLOBAL ORGANIZATION, (B) BE DESIGNED TO MEET THE NEEDS OF LDC'S, AND (C) RECEIVE A MAJOR SHARE OF ITS FUNDING FROM DC'S WITH LDC'S CONTRIBUTING ACCORDING TO ABILITY. CHINA WELCOMES NEWS THAT THE NEW UNIDO CONSTITUTION ELEVATING UNIDO TO THE STATUS OF SPECIALIZED AGENCY APPEARS TO BE MOVING SMOOTHLY THROUGH THE U.S. SENATE AND THAT ACTION ON RATIFICATION MIGHT BE EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS. CHINA FAVORS AN EARLY CONFERENCE OF RATIFYING COUNTRIES. WE NOTE THAT UNIDO'S EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S TERM OF OFFICE EXPIRES AT THE END OF 1982. CHINA WOULD LIKE TO SEE SOMEONE FROM THE LDC ASSUME THE POST, BUT WILL AWAIT G-77 CONSIDERATION TO SEE IF A CONSENSUS EMERGES ON A CANDIDATE. CHINA BELIEVES DIRECTOR KHANE HAS DONE A GOOD JOB AND COULD SUPPORT HIS EXTENSION.

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ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET OF UN

24. CHINA HOPES THAT DIFFERENCES ON ZERO GROWTH CAN
BE RESOLVED THROUGH CONSULTATIONS. MORE RECENT
RESOLUTIONS HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT VIEWS OF THE CLEAR
MAJORITY REGARDING ASSISTANCE TO PEOPLES STRUGGLING
FOR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, SUCH AS SWAPO AND THE PLO.
WE LACK FAMILIARITY WITH SALARIES/SUBSIDIES AND MUST
FURTHER CONSIDER THIS ISSUE. ON A GENERAL NOTE, THE
U.S. SHOULD AVOID GENERATING TOO MANY CONFRONTATIONS
WITH LDC'S. THE MAIN REASON THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE ICSC LOST HER SEAT LAST YEAR WAS HER NEGATIVE

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ATTITUDE TOWARDS LDC'S.

PEREZ DE CUELLAR VISIT TO CHINA

25. THE SYG MET TWICE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA,
AND ONCE WITH DENG XIAOPING AND WITH ZHAO ZIYANG. IN
HIS TALKS WITH HUANG HUA, THE SYG EXCHANGED VIEWS ON
INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND ON RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA
AND THE UN. THE SYG WAS CONCERNED THAT THE INTER-
NATIONAL SITUATION IS UNSETTLED. THERE ARE MANY HOT
SPOTS, AND SOME GOVERNMENTS SATEDLY VIOLATE UN
RESOLUTIONS AND DO NOT USE THE UN TO SETTLE INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES. DENG AND ZHAO EXPLAINED CHINA'S BASIC FOREIGN
POLICY OF INDEPENDENCE. THIS POLICY INCLUDES THIRD
WORLD UNITY, OPPOSITION TO HEGEMONISM, AND SUPPORT FOR

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification ***

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Dear []

I am replying to your November 5 letter to President Reagan regarding the unsuccessful efforts of Albert Katz and his family to obtain permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

We, too, are concerned over the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to respect basic human rights, such as freedom of movement. We are particularly dismayed in light of its commitment in the Helsinki Final Act "to deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family."

The U.S. Government has consistently encouraged Soviet authorities to adopt a more favorable attitude toward Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not been responsive to our efforts, labelling them as "interference" in their internal affairs. They further reject U.S. attempts to represent individual Soviet citizens seeking to emigrate to a third country, such as Israel. In short, U.S. influence on Soviet emigration practices and decisions remains extremely limited.

We will continue to exercise what influence we have. In raising the subject of human rights at the Geneva meeting, President Reagan stressed to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev that respect for the individual and the rule of law is as fundamental to peace as arms control. In this regard, the President pressed for greater Soviet adherence to international agreements such as the Helsinki Accord. The Soviets agreed in the Joint Statement to the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in a cooperative spirit.

We have included the Iosif Katz family name on the Department of State's list of Soviet Jews who have been repeatedly denied permission to emigrate. We present this list periodically to high-level Soviet officials to emphasize the deeply felt belief of the American people and government that Soviet Jews should not be forced to stay in the Soviet Union against their will. The Katz family name will remain on this list until their case is resolved favorably.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Smalley
Robert M. Smalley
Acting Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the R
United States of America

OUTGOING

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Charge:

Classification

Control: 2200

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Date: May 24, 1968
1615Z

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ACTION: Secstate WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO : Amcongen MUNICH

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PRAGUE 2200

Critical Decisions

SUBJ: Internal Situation Heading for ~~showdown~~

1. Summary. Amidst rumors that Kosygin quietly re-
turned to Prague last night, political forces of varying
stripes seem to be girding for showdown at CC plenum
scheduled convene May 29. Svoboda preaching Czech-Slovak
unity and eternal friendship with Moscow, Smrkovsky
cautioning that struggle for democracy is not over,
Slovak Communists still warning against anti-Socialist
Presidium member
forces and Piller weakly echoing same line. Breakdown of
present coalition is distinct possibility, though not likely.
In any case coalition urgently needs to settle question of
CC composition either with definite decision on extraordinary
Party Congress or resignations of conservative CC members or
both. End Summary.

Drafted by: POLEC:MGarrison:ar

Approving Officer: DCM:EWBurgess

Concurrence:

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2200

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2. CC Presidium in May 21-22 meeting took up following:

A. CC plenum will convene May 29 to discuss political situation, rehabilitation, Sejna case and personnel changes.

B. Presidium members directed to discuss work of National Front with other political parties and social organizations.

C. Relations with foreign Communist parties discussed, with emphasis on bilateral contacts; CSCP will take "active part in clarifying basic questions" of world movement prior to Moscow world conference.

D. Presidium discussed establishment various new organizations, including "sparadic attempts" form new political parties, and particularly condemned attempts by small group to renew activities of Social Democratic party.

E. Presidium praised activity of youth in revitalization process and supported independence of youth movement but urged federation and came out against formation of youth organizations by political parties.

F. Presidium discussed Rude Pravo situation on basis report presented by Svestka and directed paper to express viewpoints

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reflecting Party policy. (Embassy learned today from Czech journalist source that Svestka's antagonist Jiri Hochman has been fired from Rude Pravo.)

3. Slovak CP CC plenum continued yesterday. Accents still on caution and conservatism, judging from press summaries of speeches, which condemned demagogic attacks on Party's leading role and alliance with USSR and urged that danger from activation of anti-Socialist forces should not be underestimated.

4. Leaders offering variety of viewpoints:

A. President Svoboda returned to Prague yesterday after barnstorming tour of Slovakia aimed at courting Slovaks and reassuring all sides that ties with USSR are unbreakable.

B. Smrkovsky, speaking to Scientific-Technical Society, warned that "everything is not yet decided and great struggle for a democratic, humanistic and socialist republic has not ended yet". At same meeting Cernik said "we understand that our friends are disturbed by anti-socialist phenomena which have doubtless been occurring, especially recently, but we are not dramatizing these phenomena and do not intend misuse them against democratization process".

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C. Presidium member Piller, who is generally regarded as leaning toward conservatives, warned Central Bohemian regional committee (of which he is leading Secretary) against "those who non-democratically speculate on reversion to capitalist system".

5. Press today shows some signs of being inhibited by Cisar warning yesterday (Prague 2191), but Prace nevertheless published demand by Charles University students that Czechoslovakia should restore diplomatic relations with Israel and students' suggestion that public send petitions to this effect to Foreign Ministry. Radio Prague official last night downplayed importance of Cisar warning which he implied did not go much further than similar effort May 13; he added however that if regime did go too far this direction it would lose one of its best allies.

6. Press yesterday reported that leaflets were released by slight explosion downtown Wednesday night ~~appears~~ appealing in "faulty Czech" to workers to oppose attempts to remove "experienced personnel" from CC and to revert to days of Masaryk and Hacha.

7. Western correspondents have passed on rumor that Kosygin

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returned to Prague last night from Karlony Vary, but we have no confirmation. could

8. Comment: May 29 plenum ~~promises to~~ be crucial turning point for this regime. If current Soviet pressures succeed in stiffening resistance conservative holdovers in CC and if Slovak Communists, who have been displaying conservative inclinations, were to defect from present progressive-moderate-Slovak coalition, progressives and moderates could well find ~~themselves~~ themselves in minority and thus forced into ~~in~~ extensive programmatic retreat if not turnaround. In any case, failure to move significantly ahead with plans to rejuvenate CC membership or at least to retire bulk of conservative holdovers would seriously hurt progressive wing. Media liberals seem cautiously optimistic and several suggest conservative resignations from CC still good possibility.

BEAM

2.3.

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ACTION ARA-01

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R 061611Z JUN 91
FM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9513
INFO DEPTJUSTICE WASHDC
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4466
USMISSION GENEVA 2148
AMCONSUL NAPLES
AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
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SECTION 01 OF 04 GUATEMALA 05579

NAPLES FOR ARNDT
DUBLIN FOR TREACY

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CINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
DOJ FOR ICITAP

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PINS, PGOV, GT
SUBJECT: GUATEMALA: MAY HUMAN RIGHTS SUMMARY

REF: (A) GT 4334, (B) GT 4336, (C) GT 4338, (D) GT 4365,
(E) GT 4367, (F) GT 4429, (G) GT 4488, (H) GT 4495,
(I) GT 4524, (J) GT 4628, (K) GT 4695, (L) GT 4772,

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(M) GT 4775, (N) GT 4794, (O) GT 4900, (P) GT 4955,
(Q) GT 5114, (R) GT 5156, (S) GT 5210, (T) GT 5252,
(U) GT 5278

1. SUMMARY: MAY BEGAN WITH LEFTIST POLITICIANS AND LABOR ORGANIZERS FLEEING ABROAD FEARING THE UNSOLVED MURDERS OF FORMER CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE DINORA PEREZ AND OF AIR FORCE GEN. ANACLETO MAZA SIGNALLED A RETURN OF WIDESPREAD POLITICAL VIOLENCE. FERNANDO HURTADO PREM, FORMER DEPUTY HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN, TOOK OVER THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ON MAY 2, REPLACING AILING MENDEZ RUIZ, AND ORDERED THE SUSPENSION OF TWO POLICE CHIEFS INVOLVED IN THE FINCA OLGA MARIA INCIDENT. PREM ALSO ANNOUNCED PLANS TO COMBINE THE TWO CIVILIAN POLICE FORCES UNDER HIS CONTROL INTO ONE UNIFIED FORCE. THE NEW MINISTER ALSO ANNOUNCED AN AGREEMENT WITH CHILE FOR THAT COUNTRY'S CARABINEROS TO PROVIDE TRAINING TO GUATEMALA'S POLICE FORCES. THE DEVINE CASE RESURFACED AND MADE SOME PROGRESS AS FIVE NEWLY-ACCUSED SOLDIERS WERE DETAINED AND QUESTIONED. THE MOD AND THE PRESIDENT

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COMMENTED THEY WOULD ALLOW THE COURTS TO PUNISH THE GUILTY, REGARDLESS OF THEIR RANK.

2. THE SECOND ROUND OF MEETINGS BETWEEN THE GOG AND THE URNG, ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR MAY 25, WERE POSTPONED TO ALLOW MONS. QUEZADA, MODERATOR OF THE TALKS, TIME TO RECOVER FROM A HERNIA OPERATION. THE URNG SUFFERED A SETBACK IN THE FIELD WHEN 2 GUERRILLAS AND 68 OF THEIR SUPPORTERS SURRENDERED TO THE ARMY IN CHIMALTENANGO. THE OMBUDSMAN'S OFFICE RELEASED A REPORT CRITICIZING THE GUERRILLAS FOR THE FEBRUARY 16 KILLING OF 10 CIVIL PATROLLERS NEAR PLAYA GRANDE (QUICHE). THE URNG, WHILE ADMITTING THEY KILLED THE 10, CLAIMED THE DEATHS WERE JUSTIFIED SINCE THE PATROLLERS WERE ARMED. THE MONTH CLOSED ON AN UPBEAT NOTE AS GUATEMALA'S JEWISH COMMUNITY PRESENTED PRES. SERRANO AN AWARD RECOGNIZING HIS EFFORTS TO SUPPORT ISRAEL DURING THE GULF WAR AND HIS EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA. END SUMMARY.

EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS

3. THE APRIL 29 MURDER OF FORMER CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE DINORA PEREZ REMAINED UNSOLVED. AUTHORITIES CONTINUED TO CLAIM PEREZ WAS THE VICTIM OF GUATEMALA'S

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RISING CRIME RATE, DESPITE THAT THE "THIEVES" APPARENTLY MADE NO EFFORT TO TAKE ANY OF HER BELONGINGS. THE POLICE WERE EQUALLY UNSUCCESSFUL IN SOLVING THE MURDER OF FORMER GUATEMALAN DEFENSE ATTACHE TO WASHINGTON, GEN. ANACLETO MAZA, KILLED BY TWO MEN ON MAY 2. THE POLICE, AGAIN, CLAIMED MAZA WAS THE VICTIM OF CAR THIEVES AND

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POINTED OUT THAT HIS CAR WAS STOLEN--IT WAS FOUND ABANDONED THE NEXT DAY. THERE IS SPECULATION THAT MAZA, WHO WAS THE NATIONAL AIRLINE'S CONTROLLER PRIOR TO HIS ASSIGNMENT IN WASHINGTON, WAS KILLED TO KEEP HIM FROM REVEALING DETAILS ABOUT CORRUPTION AND DRUG RUNNING IN THE AIRLINE AND THE AIR FORCE.

4. THE TWO MURDERS PROMPTED SOME OF PEREZ'S COLLEAGUES TO FLEE GUATEMALA. LUIS ZURITA, 1985 PSD VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND AN ALLY IN PEREZ'S EFFORTS TO REGISTER A NEW LEFTIST POLITICAL PARTY (GUATEMALA UNIDA) FLED FOR CANADA. ZURITA CLAIMED HE HAD BEEN WARNED BY FORMER DCG PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ALFONSO CABRERA THAT THE MOD VIEWED ZURITA AND HIS ORGANIZATION AS A GUERRILLA BEACHHEAD AND HE WAS NO LONGER SAFE IN

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ACTION ARA-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-13 ADS-00 AID-01 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 C-01
DODE-00 EB-01 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 INRE-00 INR-01
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R 061611Z JUN 91
FM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9514
INFO DEPTJUSTICE WASHDC
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4467
USMISSION GENEVA 2149
AMCONSUL NAPLES
AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
AMEMBASSY MADRID
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[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 04 GUATEMALA 05579

NAPLES FOR ARNDT
DUBLIN FOR TREACY
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CINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
DOJ FOR ICITAP

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PINS, PGOV, GT

SUBJECT: GUATEMALA: MAY HUMAN RIGHTS SUMMARY

GUATEMALA. ZURITA ASKED MIN. OF LABOR SOLORZANO TO GET HIM AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE MOD, BUT DECIDED TO LEAVE WHEN SOLORZANO DID NOT GET HIM THE APPOINTMENT. ZURITA'S DEPARTURE HAD THE EFFECT OF SPARKING THE DEPARTURE OF SEVERAL OTHER LEFTIST POLITICIANS AND LABOR ACTIVISTS.

5. FIVE OF SEVEN SOLDIERS ACCUSED, BY ANOTHER FIVE PREVIOUSLY DETAINED SOLDIERS, OF BEING THE ONES WHO CARRIED OUT THE KIDNAP/MURDER OF MICHAEL DEVINE WERE DETAINED AND QUESTIONED. A CAPTAIN, ACCUSED OF GIVING THE ORDERS TO CARRY OUT THE KIDNAPPING/MURDER WAS QUESTIONED, BUT NOT DETAINED. ALL SIX DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MURDER AND OFFERED ALIBIS. FACE-TO-FACE CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE

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ACCUSERS AND THE ACCUSED BEFORE THE JUDGE ADVOCATE FAILED TO SWAY EITHER SIDE TO CHANGE THEIR STORY. THE EMBASSY LEARNED THAT A COLONEL IMPLICATED IN THE KIDNAPPING/MURDER AND A LT. COLONEL WHO SHELTERED THE DEATH SQUAD AT HIS BASE IN POPTUN TWO DAYS PRIOR TO THE MURDER ARE READY TO MAKE SWORN DECLARATIONS, ALTHOUGH BOTH ALLEGEDLY HAVE BEEN OFFERED MONEY AND THREATS NOT TO DO SO. PRESIDENT SERRANO AND MOD MENDOZA PUBLICLY STATED LAST WEEK THAT NO GUILTY PARTY, INCLUDING

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OFFICERS, WOULD BE PROTECTED AND REITERATED THEIR RESOLVE TO LET THE COURTS BRING THE GUILTY TO JUSTICE.

DISAPPEARANCES

6. CERJ LEADER AMILCAR MENDEZ, CLAIMED MIGUEL SUCUQUI, A MEMBER OF CERJ, WAS ALMOST KIDNAPPED BY MEMBERS OF A LOCAL CIVIL PATROL. SUCUQUI ESCAPED AND SOUGHT REFUGE IN CERJ HQS IN SANTA CRUZ DEL QUICHE, WHERE HE REMAINS.

USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE AND VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN AN INTERNAL CONFLICT.

7. MEMBERS OF GAM AND OTHER GROUPS PROTESTING THE DRAFT, WHICH THEY CLAIM ONLY DRAWS ON INDIGENOUS YOUTHS AND THOSE UNABLE TO BRIBE MILITARY COMMISSIONERS, STAGED A PROTEST MARCH IN THE CAPITAL ON MAY 31. THE MARCHERS ATTEMPTED TO REACH THE CONGRESS WHERE CEREMONIES HONORING GUATEMALA'S CONSTITUTION WERE BEING HELD. POLICE AND OTHER SECURITY FORCES PREVENTED THE MARCHERS FROM REACHING THE CONGRESS BUILDING, BUT DID NOT DETAIN OR PREVENT THE MARCH FROM CONTINUING.

8. THE SECOND ROUND OF MEETINGS BETWEEN THE GOG AND THE URNG SCHEDULED FOR LATE MAY WERE POSTPONED TO ALLOW THE MODERATOR OF THE TALKS, MONS. RODOLFO QUEZADA, TO RECUPERATE FROM HIS HERNIA OPERATION. QUEZADA ANNOUNCED THE MEETINGS WOULD TAKE PLACE JUNE 17 - 22 IN MEXICO AND THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD DISCUSS DEMOCRATIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS. THE GOG IS CONSIDERING MAKING NEWLY APPOINTED

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PAGE 04 GUATEM 05579 02 OF 04 061612Z
MIN. OF INTERIOR AND FORMER DEPUTY HUMAN RIGHTS
OMBUDSMAN, FERNANDO HURTADO PREM, PART OF THE GOG
DELEGATION THAT WILL TRAVEL TO MEXICO.

9. SIXTY-EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE GUATEMALAN ARMY OF THE
POOR (EGP) SUPPORT NETWORK KNOWN AS THE "IRREGULAR LOCAL
FORCES" (FIL) AND 2 TEENAGE GUERRILLA FIGHTERS
SURRENDERED TO THE ARMY IN THE CHIMALTENANGO DEPT. THE
FIL MEMBERS, LARGELY INDIGENOUS SUBSISTENCE FARMERS,
DECIDED TO ACCEPT ARMY PROMISES OF SAFETY AND AMNESTY
AFTER AN ARMY COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATION DECIMATED
GUERRILLA FORCES IN THE AREA. TWO TEENAGE GUERRILLAS
SAID HUNGER AND DISILLUSIONMENT HELPED THEM DECIDE TO
SURRENDER. THE TWO CLAIMED THEY WERE THE ONLY SURVIVORS
OF A GUERRILLA PATROL WHICH CLASHED WITH AN ARMY PATROL
EARLIER IN THE WEEK.

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ACTION ARA-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-13 ADS-00 AID-01 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 C-01
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R 061611Z JUN 91
FM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9515
INFO DEPTJUSTICE WASHDC
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4468
USMISSION GENEVA 2150
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NAPLES FOR ARNDT
DUBLIN FOR TREACY
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CINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PINS, PGOV, GT

SUBJECT: GUATEMALA: MAY HUMAN RIGHTS SUMMARY

10. THE NEW GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (NMRG), A NEW ANTI-GOG ORGANIZATION OPPOSED TO THE ONGOING PEACE PROCESS, SURFACED IN MAY. THE NMRG, ALLEGEDLY BASED IN THE SAN MARCOS DEPT., CLAIMS TO HAVE CLASHED AND INFLECTED CASUALTIES ON THE ARMY. THE NMRG VOWED TO ASSASSINATE PRES. SERRANO, THE ENTIRE CONGRESS, AND FIVE OTHER FORMER HEADS OF STATE, INCLUDING RIOS MONT. THE NMRG ALSO VOWED TO KILL CORRUPT BUSINESSMEN, JOURNALISTS, AND LAND OWNERS. MOST POLITICAL OBSERVERS CONCLUDED THAT THE NMRG DOES NOT REALLY EXIST AND THAT IT IS A CREATION OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS.

11. THE OMBUDSMAN'S OFFICE RELEASED, ON MAY 20, THEIR REPORT ON THE FEB. 16 SLAYING OF 10 CIVIL PATROLLERS NEAR THE TOWN OF PLAYA GRANDE (QUICHE). ACCORDING TO THE OMBUDSMAN'S REPORT EYEWITNESSES CLAIM THAT AFTER THE INITIAL CONTACT THE GUERRILLAS EMERGED FROM THEIR POSITIONS AND KILLED THE WOUNDED CIVIL PATROLLERS WHO WERE UNABLE TO RETREAT BACK TO TOWN. THE OMBUDSMAN'S REPORT PLACES THE BLAME FOR THE DEATHS ON THE URNG AND CALLS ON THE URNG TO DEMONSTRATE ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS BY ABSTAINING FROM FUTURE ACTIONS SIMILAR TO THE PLAYA GRANDE MASSACRE. THE MEXICO-BASED URNG

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PAGE 03 GUATEM 05579 03 OF 04 061613Z
RESPONDED TO THE REPORT, BY ADMITTING TO KILLING THE 10
MEN, BUT CLAIMED SINCE THEY WERE ARMED THE KILLINGS WERE
JUSTIFIED.

GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

12. THE COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED HELD ITS FIRST
MEETING MAY 15. THE COMMISSION, SET UP AFTER SERRANO
RENEGED ON AN EARLIER PROMISE TO FORM A GOG COMMISSION
ON THE DISAPPEARED, IS LED BY HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN
RAMIRO DE LEON AND INCLUDES MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF, AND
THE UN ADVISOR TO THE OMBUDSMAN'S OFFICE. ADVISORY
STATUS HAS BEEN GIVEN TO REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE
STUDENT UNION (AEU), LABOR UNIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS,
AND THE ARCHBISHOP'S OFFICE ON HUMAN RIGHTS. NINETH DE
GARCIA, LEADER OF GAM, UPSET SHE WAS NOT NAMED TO LEAD
THE COMMISSION, ALTHOUGH SHE AND GAM DO HAVE A MINOR
ROLE IN IT, CRITICIZED THE COMMISSION AND AS THE MONTH
ENDED WAS SEEKING TO HAVE THE COMMISSION TAKEN AWAY FROM
THE OMBUDSMAN AND RUN BY THE CONGRESS.

13. EMBOFFS ACCOMPANIED DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN ALVAREZ
GUADAMUZ ON SEARCH FOR THE BODIES OF THE VICTIMS OF PAST
POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE QUICHE. THE SEARCH RECOVERED
THE REMAINS OF TWO VICTIMS. DESPITE HAVING AN ARREST
WARRANT FOR THE LEADER OF THE LOCAL CIVIL PATROL, WHO IS
ALLEGED TO HAVE ORDERED THE KILLINGS, A JUDGE AND TWO
NATIONAL POLICE OFFICERS DECLINED TO EXECUTE IT, FEARING
THEY WOULD SET OFF A CONFLICT WITH THE LOCAL CIVIL

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PATROL. ALVAREZ CONTINUED HIS VOCAL CRITICISM OF THE
GOG'S FAILURE TO PROSECUTE THOSE ACCUSED OF THESE AND
MANY OTHER KILLINGS.

14. FERNANDO HURTADO PREM, A FORMER DEPUTY HUMAN RIGHTS
OMBUDSMAN, TOOK OVER THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FROM
AILING AND RETIRED ARMY COLONEL MENDEZ RUIZ ON MAY 2.
AS ONE OF HIS FIRST ACTIONS HURTADO ORDERED THE
SUSPENSION OF TWO POLICE CHIEFS INVOLVED IN THE MARCH 11

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- 12 OLGA MARIA FINCA INCIDENT. THE TWO WILL REMAIN
SUSPENDED UNTIL CRIMINAL CHARGES, FILED BY THE OMBUDSMAN
OFFICE, OF EXCESSIVE FORCE HAVE BEEN RESOLVED IN THE
COURTS. ONE OF THE TWO REPORTED A BOMB ATTEMPT ON HIS
LIFE FOLLOWING THE SUSPENSION. HURTADO ALSO ORDERED
THEN POLICE SPOKESMAN VALVERDE TO APOLOGIZE FOR CALLING
THE OMBUDSMAN A "LIAR" AND A "BUFFOON." HURTADO ALSO
ANNOUNCED PLANS TO UNIFY THE TWO POLICE FORCES UNDER HIS

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ACTION ARA-01

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IO-19 LAB-04 L-03 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01
PA-01 PM-01 PRS-01 P-01 RP-10 SIL-01 SNP-01
SP-01 SR-01 SS-01 STR-18 TRSE-00 T-01 USIE-00
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R 061611Z JUN 91
FM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9516
INFO DEPTJUSTICE WASHDC
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4469
USMISSION GENEVA 2151
AMCONSUL NAPLES
AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

[REDACTED] SECTION 04 OF 04 GUATEMALA 05579

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NAPLES FOR ARNDT
DUBLIN FOR TREACY

[REDACTED]

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PAGE 02 GUATEM 05579 04 OF 04 061614Z

CINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
DOJ FOR ICITAP

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PINS, PGOV, GT

SUBJECT: GUATEMALA: MAY HUMAN RIGHTS SUMMARY

CONTROL INTO A SINGLE UNIFIED FORCE, BUT THE UNIFICATION
WILL REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, WHICH WILL PROBABLY
DELAY OR PREVENT THE TWO FORCES FROM BEING UNIFIED. THE
MINSTER ALSO ANNOUNCED A CONTROVERSIAL AGREEMENT WITH
THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE TO HAVE THAT NATION'S
CARABINEROS HELP TRAIN GUATEMALA'S POLICE FORCES.

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification ***

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PAGE 01 GUATEM 14753 01 OF 03 042337Z
ACTION ARA-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EB-01 EUR-01
HA-09 H-01 INRE-00 INR-05 IO-19 LAB-04 L-03
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 PA-01 PRS-01 P-02 RP-10
SCT-03 SIL-01 SP-01 SR-01 SS-01 STR-18 TRSE-00
USIE-00 /086W

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P 042338Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5572
INFO RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MADRID
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
USMISSION GENEVA 1944
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4301

SECTION 01 OF 03 GUATEMALA 14753

CINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PTER, PREL, PGOV, GT

SUBJECT: GUATEMALA: NOVEMBER HUMAN RIGHTS SUMMARY

REF: (A) GT 14681, (B) GT 14650, (C) GT 14634,
(D) GT 14542, (E) GT 14047, (F) GT 14040, (G) GT 14021,

PAGE 02 GUATEM 14753 01 OF 03 042337Z
(H) GT 14003, (I) GT 13934, (J) GT 13917, (K) GT 13876,
(L) GT 13838, (M) GT 13799, (N) GT 13796, (O) GT 13723,
(P) GT 13685, (Q) GT 13643, (R) GT 13581, (S) 13574

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1. AMIDST GROWING PUBLIC CONCERN OVER THE STATE OF THE
ECONOMY, THE POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS PICTURE IN
NOVEMBER WAS DOMINATED BY THE HOLDING OF THE FIRST ROUND
OF ELECTIONS ON THE 11TH. THE ELECTIONS WERE OBSERVED

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DATE: 2/10/95

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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BY SOME 750 JOURNALISTS AND OBSERVERS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD AND, DESPITE A FEW GLITCHES, WERE ACCLAIMED AS GENUINE, FREE, AND FAIR. WHILE DOING FAIRLY WELL IN CONGRESSIONAL AND OTHER LOCAL RACES, THE GOVERNING CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS SUFFERED DEFEAT IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST: DC SECGEN ALFONSO CABRERA CAME IN A DISTANT THIRD AND WAS ELIMINATED FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE JANUARY 6 RUN-OFF. SOME 56 PERCENT OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS PARTICIPATED. THE TOP TWO VOTE-GETTERS WERE JORGE CARPIO OF THE NATIONAL CENTRIST UNION (UCN) WITH UNDER 26 PERCENT OF THE VOTE AND JORGE SERRANO OF THE SOLIDARITY ACTION MOVEMENT (MAS) WITH JUST OVER 24 PERCENT. THE UCN GOT THE LARGEST BLOC OF CONGRESSIONAL DEPUTIES AND TOOK THE LARGEST NUMBER OF MUNICIPALITIES. GUERRILLA CALLS TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTIONS AND FORMER DICTATOR RIOS MONT'S CALL TO TURN IN NULL BALLOTS, LARGELY WENT UNHEEDED.

2. THE ELECTORAL RESULTS RAISED THE PROSPECT OF RELIGIOUS TENSIONS IN GUATEMALA. ROMAN CATHOLIC CARPIO IS PAIRED OFF AGAINST PROTESTANT SERRANO. THE CARPIO

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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CAMPAIGN RAISED THE RELIGIOUS ISSUE HOPING TO DRAW THE SUPPORT OF THE STILL LARGELY CATHOLIC ELECTORATE. IT IS UNCLEAR IF SUCH AN APPEAL WILL PROVE ATTRACTIVE TO GUATEMALA'S RELIGIOUSLY TOLERANT POPULATION.

3. WHILE FAILING TO HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE ELECTIONS, GUERRILLA ACTIVITY INCREASED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF GUERRILLAS COMMITTING SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (THESE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE 1990 COUNTRY REPORT). THE INFORMAL PEACE TALKS WENT ON HOLD; THE TALKS APPARENTLY WILL NOT PICK UP AGAIN UNTIL A NEW GOG TAKES OFFICE.

4. CERJ LEADER AMILCAR MENDEZ RECEIVED THE ROBERT F. KENNEDY MEMORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS AWARD IN WASHINGTON DC. HE REPORTED RECEIVING NUMEROUS THREATS ON HIS LIFE DURING THE MONTH. THERE WAS LITTLE IF ANY PROGRESS ON MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS CASES OF THE PAST. THE MURDER OF AMCIT MICHAEL DEVINE REMAINED UNSOLVED AS DID THE BRUTAL STABBING DEATH OF GUATEMALAN ANTHROPOLOGIST MYRNA MACK CHANG. THERE WAS SOME PROGRESS IN PROSECUTING POLICEMEN SUSPECTED OF MURDERING A STREET CHILD AND THE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR ANNOUNCED THAT SINCE HE TOOK OFFICE LAST JULY OVER 1000 POLICEMEN HAD BEEN CHARGED WITH A VARIETY

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OF CRIMES AND DISMISSED FROM THE FORCE.

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POLITICAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS

5. ON NOVEMBER 5, THE DC MAYOR OF JALAPA, ROBERTO ANTONIO BONILLA, WAS MURDERED BY GUNMEN. THE CAUSES OF THE KILLING REMAINED UNCLEAR ALTHOUGH MOST SPECULATION

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CENTERED ON PERSONAL REASONS FOR THE SHOOTING. THE JALAPA AREA IS ONE AFFLICTED BY A VERY HIGH LEVEL OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE AND GANGSTER-LIKE ACTIVITY. A SIMILAR KILLING OCCURRED ON NOVEMBER 29 IN CUILAPA (SANTA ROSA) WHEN 74-YEAR-OLD UCN ACTIVIST ISRAEL GARCIA ESCOBAR WAS GUNNED DOWN. THERE WERE NO CLUES AS TO THE IDENTITY OF HIS KILLERS OR THEIR MOTIVES.

6. GUERRILLAS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATHS OF CIVILIANS, INCLUDING A CHILD. ON THE 14TH, 40 ARMED PERSONS BELIEVED TO BE ORPA GUERRILLAS TOOK OVER THE SMALL VILLAGE OF LAS TROJES NEAR LAKE AMATITLAN. THEY MADE RESIDENTS ATTEND A PROPAGANDA RALLY. ACCORDING TO

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[REDACTED]

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ACTION ARA-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EB-01 EUR-01
HA-09 H-01 INRE-00 INR-05 IO-19 LAB-04 L-03
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 PA-01 PRS-01 P-02 RP-10
SCT-03 SIL-01 SP-01 SR-01 SS-01 STR-18 TRSE-00
USIE-00 /086W

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P 042338Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5573
INFO RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MADRID
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
USMISSION GENEVA 1945
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4302

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[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 GUATEMALA 14753

CINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PTER, PREL, PGOV, GT

SUBJECT: GUATEMALA: NOVEMBER HUMAN RIGHTS SUMMARY

WITNESSES, DURING THE MEETING 14-YEAR-OLD VICTOR DE
JESUS SANCHEZ HERNANDEZ BECAME FRIGHTENED AND TRIED TO

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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LEAVE FOR HIS HOME; A WOMAN GUERRILLA, WHOM VILLAGERS
IDENTIFIED AS A FOREIGNER, SHOT HIM. HE DIED A FEW
MINUTES LATER. ALSO ON NOVEMBER 14, NEAR SANTA CRUZ DEL
QUICHE, A CLAYMORE MINE KILLED JUAN LUIS DE LA CRUZ AND
SERIOUSLY INJURED HIS BROTHER ERNESTO LUIS. BOTH HAD
BEEN COLLECTING WOOD ALONG THE ROAD LEADING TO CHICHE
WHEN THEY ACTIVATED THE MINE. EGP GUERRILLAS HAVE
PREVIOUSLY CONDUCTED CLAYMORE AMBUSHES OF MILITARY
CONVOYS IN THAT AREA. ON THE 18TH, TWO OFF-DUTY AND
UNARMED MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL PATROL IN SANTA MARIA DE
JESUS (SACATEPEQUEZ), CRISTOBAL AND DAMIAN ORON CUC,
WERE KIDNAPPED FROM THEIR HOME BY ARMED MEN APPARENTLY
BELONGING TO ORPA. BOTH WERE LATER FOUND TORTURED,
APPARENTLY WITH ACID AND SHARP INSTRUMENTS, AND SHOT
DEAD. THE TOWN OF SANTA MARIA, 50 KMS FROM THE CAPITAL,
WAS ATTACKED BY ORPA LAST FEBRUARY; THREE CHILDREN DIED.

7. AS PER THE OCTOBER HUMAN RIGHTS SUMMARY (GT 13465),
ON OCTOBER 6, THE LARGELY INDIGENOUS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP
CERJ REPORTED THE KIDNAPPING IN QUICHE AND SUBSEQUENT
MURDER OF MEMBER SEBASTIAN VELASQUEZ MEJIA. ON NOVEMBER
17, HOWEVER, THE NATIONAL POLICE ISSUED A PRESS

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STATEMENT CLAIMING THAT FORENSIC ANALYSIS SHOWED HE DIED OF AN ALCOHOL OVERDOSE. FURTHERMORE, THE POLICE CLAIM, HE HAD NEVER BEEN KIDNAPPED AND HAD BEEN FOUND DEAD ON OCTOBER 8 IN ZONE 1 OF THE CAPITAL. LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS DISPUTED THE POLICE CLAIM. THE CASE OF SEBASTIAN VELASQUEZ MEJIA HAS DRAWN CONSIDERABLE INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION AND US CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES.

DISAPPEARANCES

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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8. A MAJOR NEWS STORY IN THE LOCAL PRESS WAS THE REAPPEARANCE OF "DISAPPEARED" RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST LEONEL SISNIEGA OTERO (REPORTED IN OUR 1989 REPORT ON GUATEMALA). SISNIEGA VANISHED IN SEPTEMBER 1989 AS AUTHORITIES WERE LOOKING FOR HIM FOR SUSPICION OF BEING INVOLVED WITH HIS SON, AN ARMY CAPTAIN, IN A SERIES OF GRENADE ATTACKS. THE GOG CLAIMED SISNIEGA FLED TO A NEIGHBORING COUNTRY AND DENIED HIS FAMILY'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS BEING HELD IN A SECRET PRISON. CHARGES AGAINST SISNIEGA WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DROPPED FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE. SISNIEGA CLAIMED THAT THE GOG HAD HELD HIM BECAUSE HE COULD HAVE BEEN A MAJOR PLAYER IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. WIDESPREAD SKEPTICISM GREETED HIS STORY OF BEING HELD CAPTIVE SINCE SEPTEMBER 1989.

INTERNAL CONFLICT

9. THE PEACE TALKS PROCESS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN PUT ON HOLD UNTIL A NEW GOG TAKES OFFICE. BOTH CARPIO AND SERRANO HAVE EXPRESSED RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE IN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE GUERRILLA COMMANDERS UNTIL THE AFTER THE NEW GOG TAKES OVER. THIS IS CLEARLY A DISAPPOINTMENT FOR LAME-DUCK PRESIDENT CEREZO WHO HAD HOPED TO LEAVE OFFICE AS THE "PEACE PRESIDENT." ACCORDING TO THE AGREEMENT SIGNED LAST MAY BETWEEN THE ESQUIPULAS-CREATED NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (CNR) AND THE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, THE URNG, THE NEXT SET OF TALKS IS TO INVOLVE THE GOG AND THE ARMY.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

[REDACTED]

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10. ON THE OCCASION OF "DAY OF THE JOURNALIST," NOVEMBER 30, THE GUATEMALAN PRESS ASSOCIATION (APG) ISSUED A STATEMENT CLAIMING THAT ITS MEMBERS CONTINUE TO FEEL THREATENED IN GUATEMALA. AS TO UNDERSCORE THIS SENSE OF THREAT, APG VICE PRESIDENT BYRON BARRERA, WHO SURVIVED AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON OCTOBER 26 (SEE OCTOBER WRAP-UP) WHICH COST HIS WIFE'S LIFE, LEFT GUATEMALA ON NOVEMBER 3 FOR MEXICO. BARRERA ISSUED AN OPEN LETTER, WHICH RAN IN ALL THE LOCAL PAPERS, SEVERELY CRITICAL OF THE GOG AND THE ARMY FOR FAILING TO PREVENT THE SORT OF VIOLENCE WHICH KILLED HIS WIFE AND ALMOST KILLED HIM.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

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PAGE 01 GUATEM 14753 03 OF 03 042338Z
ACTION ARA-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EB-01 EUR-01
HA-09 H-01 INRE-00 INR-05 IO-19 LAB-04 L-03
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 PA-01 PRS-01 P-02 RP-10
SCT-03 SIL-01 SP-01 SR-01 SS-01 STR-18 TRSE-00
USIE-00 /086W

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P 042338Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5574
INFO RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MADRID
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
USMISSION GENEVA 1946
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4303

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SECTION 03 OF 03 GUATEMALA 14753

CINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PHUM, PINS, PTER, PREL, PGOV, GT

SUBJECT: GUATEMALA: NOVEMBER HUMAN RIGHTS SUMMARY

11. THE RELIGIOUS ISSUE IN GUATEMALA TOOK ON NEW

PAGE 02 GUATEM 14753 03 OF 03 042338Z
IMPORTANCE IN THE WAKE OF PROTESTANT SERRANO'S STRONG
SHOWING IN THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS. SERRANO ENJOYED THE
BACKING OF GUATEMALA'S ACTIVE AND GROWING PROTESTANT
MOVEMENT. CARPIO PLAYED ON THE RELIGIOUS ISSUE HOPING
TO SCARE CATHOLIC VOTERS INTO SUPPORTING HIM. THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH INDIRECTLY FURTHER RAISED THE PROFILE OF
THE ISSUE BY ASKING THAT THE ISSUE NOT BECOME A CAMPAIGN
ISSUE. THE CATHOLIC HIERARCHY WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED
ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROTESTANT PRESIDENT.

RIGHT TO CHANGE GOVERNMENT

12. AS REPORTED EXTENSIVELY, GUATEMALA HELD ITS FIRST
ROUND OF PRESIDENTIAL VOTING ON NOVEMBER 11. FIFTY-SIX
PERCENT OF ELEGIBLE VOTERS CAST BALLOTS DESPITE
GUERRILLA CALLS FOR AN ELECTION BOYCOTT. THE GOG
CANDIDATE CAME IN A POOR THIRD IN A FIELD OF 12. THE
TOP TWO FINISHERS WERE JORGE CARPIO OF THE UCN AND JORGE
SERRANO OF THE MAS; THEY WILL COMPETE HEAD-TO-HEAD ON
JANUARY 6. THE NOVEMBER VOTING ALSO ELECTED MAYORS IN
300 MUNICIPALITIES, DEPUTIES FOR 116 CONGRESSIONAL
SEATS, AND 20 SEATS FOR THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PARLIAMENT
(PARALACEN). THE UCN TOOK THE SINGLE LARGEST CHUNKS OF
OF THE LOCAL RACES. NO PARTY WILL CONTROL CONGRESS.

ILLEGAL DETENTIONS

13. THE LOCAL PRESS OF NOVEMBER 8 REPORTED THAT THREE
CAMPEsinOS WERE ILLEGALLY DETAINED BY CIVIL PATROLMEN IN
HUEHUETENANGO DEPARTMENT. THE CAMPEsinOS WERE
REPORTEDLY BEATEN AND TURNED OVER TO THE MILITARY ZONE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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COMMAND. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, HOWEVER, THE MILITARY
TOOK THEM TO THE LOCAL HOSPITAL FOR TREATMENT AND
RELEASED THEM.

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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EXCISE

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PAGE 01
ACTION SS-30

TEL AV 06545 241118Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
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O 241114Z APR 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6727

TEL AVIV 06545

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/24/91 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M
TAGS: EAGR, UR, US, IS, SHUM
SUBJECT: LIFTING OF PARTIAL GRAIN EMBARGO: ISRAEL INFORMED

REF: STATE 105466

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE INFORMED MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL KIMCHE OF PLANNED U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT. KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD GET THE WORD IMMEDIATELY TO FONMIN SHAMIR. KIMCHE SAID THAT HE COULD UNDERSTAND WHY AMERICA FELT IT SHOULD TAKE THIS DECISION IN VIEW OF FAILURE OF OTHER GRAIN EXPORTING COUNTRIES TO FULLY COOPERATE WITH U.S. IN EMBARGO AND RESULTING FACT THAT EMBARGO PROBABLY IS NOW HURTING U.S. MORE THAN U.S.S.R.

3.

LEWIS

PAGE 02

TEL AV 06545 241118Z

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United States Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Intelligence Research Report

Diplomatic Relations of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan

IRR No. 214 - December 13, 1989

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/TR *RAM* Date: *12-2/97*
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FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
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Abbreviations**

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Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator

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United States Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Diplomatic Relations of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan¹

Intelligence Research Report No. 214
December 13, 1989

Summary

As of December 1, 1989, China recognized and maintained diplomatic relations with 134 nations and the self-declared "state" of Palestine.² Since April 1988 China has exchanged diplomatic recognition with Bahrain, Qatar, and the self-declared Palestinian "state" but has suspended relations with Grenada, Liberia, and Belize.

Taiwan currently is recognized by 26 nations, up from 22 in April 1988. Most of the nations recognizing Taiwan are in Central America and the Caribbean, although the Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa also recognize Taiwan. In 1989, Belize, Grenada, and Liberia switched diplomatic recognition from China to Taiwan; The Bahamas did so in 1988.

* * * * *

¹ This report is an update of IRR 161, "Diplomatic Relations of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan," April 25, 1988.

² The US does not recognize the self-declared "state" of Palestine.

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A. Nations having diplomatic relations with China (134) (dates of recognition/establishment of relations in parentheses)

Afghanistan (Jan. 1950/Jan. 1955)	Brazil (Aug. 1974/Dec. 1974)
Albania (Nov. 1949/Nov. 1949)	Bulgaria (Oct. 1949/Oct. 1949)
Algeria (Dec. 1958/July 1962) ³	Burkina (Sept. 1973/Oct. 1973)
Angola (Jan. 1983/Jan. 1983)	Burma (Dec. 1949/June 1950)
	Burundi (Dec. 1963/Oct. 1971) ⁵
Antigua and Barbuda (Jan. 1983/Jan. 1983)	
Argentina (Feb. 1972/Aug. 1972)	Cambodia (July 1958/May 1970) ⁶
Australia (Dec. 1972/Aug. 1973)	Cameroon (Mar. 1971/Mar. 1971)
Austria (May 1971/May 1971)	Canada (Oct. 1970/Oct. 1970)
	Cape Verde (Apr. 1976/Oct. 1976)
Bahrain (Apr. 1989/Apr. 1989)	Central African Republic (Sept. 1964/Aug. 1976) ⁷
Bangladesh (Oct. 1975/Jan. 1976)	
Barbados (May 1977/Apr. 1978)	Chad (Nov. 1972/Mar. 1973)
Belgium (Oct. 1971/Apr. 1971)	Chile (Dec. 1970/Jan. 1971)
	Colombia (Feb. 1980/June 1980)
Benin (Nov. 1964/Dec. 1972) ⁴	Comoros (Nov. 1975/Oct. 1976)
Bolivia (July 1985/July 1985)	Congo (Feb. 1964/Feb. 1964)
Botswana (Jan. 1975/Apr. 1975)	Côte d'Ivoire (Mar. 1983/Mar. 1983)

³ China recognized the Provisional Algerian Government in December 1958 and the Republic of Algeria in July 1962.

⁴ Formerly Dahomey. China recognized Dahomey in November 1964. Relations were severed in January 1966 and reestablished in December 1972.

⁵ Burundi was recognized initially in December 1963. Relations were suspended in January 1965 and reestablished in October 1971.

⁶ China recognizes the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), not the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).

⁷ Formerly Central African Empire. China recognized the CAE in September 1964. Relations were suspended in January 1966 and resumed in August 1976.

Cuba (Sept. 1960/Sept. 1960)
 Cyprus (Jan. 1972/June 1972)
 Czechoslovakia (Oct. 1949/Oct. 1949)

Denmark (Jan. 1950/May 1950)
 Djibouti (Jan. 1979/Mar. 1980)
 Ecuador (Jan. 1980/July 1980)
 Egypt (May 1956/May 1956)
 Equatorial Guinea (Oct. 1970/Dec. 1970)
 Ethiopia (Dec. 1970/Dec. 1970)

Fiji (Nov. 1975/Apr. 1976)
 Finland (Jan. 1950/Oct. 1950)
 France (Jan. 1964/Jan. 1964)
 Gabon (Apr. 1974/June 1974)
 Gambia, The (Dec. 1974/Jan. 1975)

Germany, East – German Democratic Republic
 (Oct. 1949/Oct. 1949)
 Germany, West – Federal Republic of Germany
 (Oct. 1972/Oct. 1972)
 Ghana (July 1960/Feb. 1972)⁸
 Greece (June 1972/Nov. 1972)

Guinea (Oct. 1959/Oct. 1959)
 Guinea-Bissau (Mar. 1974/Mar. 1975)
 Guyana (Feb. 1972/June 1975)
 Hungary (Oct. 1949/Oct. 1949)

Iceland (Dec. 1971/May 1972)
 India (Dec. 1949/Aug. 1950)
 Iran (Aug. 1971/Aug. 1971)
 Iraq (July 1958/Aug. 1958)
 Ireland (June 1979/Feb. 1980)
 Italy (Nov. 1970/Nov. 1970)

Jamaica (Nov. 1972/Mar. 1973)
 Japan (Sept. 1972/Sept. 1972)
 Jordan (Apr. 1977/June 1977)
 Kenya (Dec. 1963/Jan. 1964)
 Kiribati (June 1980/June 1980)

Korea, North – Democratic People's Republic
 of Korea (Oct. 1949/Oct. 1949)
 Kuwait (Mar. 1971/Oct. 1971)
 Laos (June 1962/Sept. 1962)
 Lebanon (Nov. 1971/Nov. 1971)
 Lesotho (Apr. 1983/Apr. 1983)

Libya (Apr. 1978/Aug. 1978)⁹
 Luxembourg (Nov. 1972/Dec. 1973)
 Madagascar (Nov. 1972/Jan. 1973)
 Malaysia (Nov. 1971/May 1974)
 Maldives (Oct. 1972/Oct. 1972)

Mali (Oct. 1960/Oct. 1960)
 Malta (Jan. 1972/June 1972)
 Mauritania (July 1965/July 1965)
 Mauritius (Apr. 1968/May 1972)
 Mexico (Feb. 1972/May 1972)

Mongolia (Oct. 1949/Oct. 1949)
 Morocco (Oct. 1958/Nov. 1958)
 Mozambique (June 1975/June 1975)
 Nepal (Aug. 1955/Aug. 1955)
 Netherlands (Mar. 1950/Nov. 1954)

New Zealand (Dec. 1972/Mar. 1973)
 Nicaragua (Dec. 1985/July 1986)
 Niger (July 1974/Aug. 1974)

⁸ Ghana was recognized in July 1960. Relations were suspended in November 1966 and resumed in February 1972.

⁹ Libya unilaterally announced recognition of China in 1971, but formal relations were not established until the representatives of Taiwan departed Tripoli in 1978.

Nigeria (Feb. 1971/Feb. 1971)

Norway (Jan. 1950/Oct. 1954)

Oman (Dec. 1978/Dec. 1978)

Pakistan (Jan. 1950/May 1951)

^{10/}

Papua New Guinea (Oct. 1976/Oct. 1980)

Peru (Aug. 1971/Nov. 1971)

Philippines (June 1975/Sept. 1975)

Poland (Oct. 1949/Oct. 1949)

Portugal (Feb. 1979/May 1979)

Qatar (July 1988/July 1988)

Romania (Oct. 1949/Oct. 1949)

Rwanda (Nov. 1971/May 1972)

San Marino (May 1971)¹¹

Sao Tome and Principe (July 1975/Apr. 1976)

Senegal (Dec. 1971/May 1972)

Seychelles (June 1976/Mar. 1977)

Sierra Leone (July 1971/July 1971)

Somalia (Dec. 1960/Dec. 1960)

Soviet Union (Oct. 1949/Oct. 1949)

Spain (Mar. 1973/June 1973)

Sri Lanka (Jan. 1950/Feb. 1957)

Sudan (Dec. 1958/Dec. 1958)

Suriname (May 1976/Jan. 1977)

Sweden (Jan. 1950/May 1950)

Switzerland (Jan. 1950/Sept. 1950)

Syria (Aug. 1956/Aug. 1956)

Tanzania (Oct. 1964/Oct. 1964)¹²

Thailand (July 1975/Sept. 1975)

Togo (Sept. 1972/Nov. 1972)

Trinidad and Tobago (June 1974/Apr. 1975)

Tunisia (Jan. 1964/Oct. 1971)¹³

Turkey (Aug. 1971/Aug. 1971)

Uganda (Oct. 1962/Oct. 1962)

United Arab Emirates (Nov. 1984/Nov. 1984)

United Kingdom (June 1950/June 1954)

United States (Jan. 1979/Mar. 1979)

Uruguay (Feb. 1988/Feb. 1988)

Vanuatu (Mar. 1982/Mar. 1982)

Venezuela (June 1974/Sept. 1974)

Vietnam (Jan. 1950/Jan. 1950)¹⁴

Western Samoa (Nov. 1976/Nov. 1976)

Yemen, North – Yemen Arab Republic
(Aug. 1956/Sept. 1956)

Yemen, South – People's Democratic Republic
of Yemen (Dec. 1967/Jan. 1968)

Yugoslavia (Oct. 1949/Jan. 1955)

Zaire (Nov. 1972/Jan. 1973)

Zambia (Oct. 1964/Oct. 1964)

Zimbabwe (Apr. 1980/June 1980)

¹⁰ China recognized the self-declared "state" of Palestine and established diplomatic relations with it upon its declaration of statehood in November 1988.

¹¹ San Marino has only consular-level relations with China.

¹² China recognized Tanganyika in December 1961, Zanzibar in January 1964, and Tanzania in October 1964.

¹³ Relations with Tunisia were suspended in 1967 and reestablished in October 1971.

¹⁴ Prior to the July 1976 formation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, China had separate relations with North Vietnam (January 1950) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (June 1969).

B. Nations that recognize but have no official relations with China (3)

- Bhutan (Oct. 1971): Recognition is based on vote in UN to admit China and expel representatives of Taipei.
- Indonesia (Apr. 1950): Diplomatic relations were frozen in 1965 following a coup attempt which Jakarta accused Beijing of supporting. Direct trade resumed in July 1985.
- Israel (Jan. 1950): Israel has not been recognized by China.

C. Nations maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan (26)

Bahamas, The	Nauru
Belize	Panama ¹⁷
Costa Rica ¹⁵	Paraguay
Dominica	Saint Kitts and Nevis
Dominican Republic	Saint Lucia
El Salvador	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Grenada	Saudi Arabia ¹⁸
Guatemala	Solomon Islands ¹⁹
Haiti	South Africa
Honduras	Swaziland
Korea, South -- Republic of Korea ¹⁶	Tonga
Liberia	Tuvalu
Malawi	Vatican City

D. Nations that neither recognize nor have official relations with China or Taiwan (2)

Brunei	Singapore ²⁰
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Prepared by INR/EAP, China Division
647-2265

Approved by Mary Ann Casey
647-2402

¹⁵ The official Chinese Xinhua News Agency has had an office in Costa Rica since April 1979.

¹⁶ The Republic of Korea announced the opening of a trade office in Shandong, China in September 1988.

¹⁷ China's Xinhua News Agency has had an office in Panama since May 1973.

¹⁸ Saudi Arabia and China in November 1988 announced the opening of trade offices.

¹⁹ Taiwan upgraded its mission in the Solomon Islands from Consulate General to Embassy on September 16, 1985.

²⁰ Singapore has permitted Taiwan to establish a trade mission which also handles consular matters. Singapore does not consider this as recognition and has no mission in Taiwan. Singapore has a trade mission in Beijing.

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() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, OVIP (KISSINGER)

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HEREWITH FULL TEXT JEREMIAH O'LEARY FRONT PAGE BYLINER WASHINGTON STAR WEDNESDAY DECEMBER 1 HEADED "NEW MEXICAN PRESIDENT EXPECTED TO STEER CLOSER TO CENTER, U.S."
2. MEXICO CITY - THE INAUGURATION TODAY OF JOSE LOPEZ PORTILLO AS MEXICO'S 60TH PRESIDENT SIGNALS A CLEAR RETURN TO THE POLITICAL CENTER AND IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES OVER THE NEXT SIX YEARS.
3. THE IMPORTANCE THAT WASHINGTON ATTACHES TO THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN MEXICO IS UNDERLINED BY THE PRESTIGIOUS AMERICAN OFFICIAL DELEGATION HEADED BY SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A- KISSINGER. THE DELEGATION ALSO INCLUDES MRS. KISSINGER; ROSALYNN CARTER, WIFE OF PRESIDENT-ELECT JIMMY CARTER; LADYBIRD JOHNSON, WIDOW OF PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON, WHO HAD ALWAYS BEEN POPULAR WITH THE MEXICANS, AND OTHER STATE DEPARTMENT AND CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVES.

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4. THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE MEXICAN CAPITAL IS ONE OF EAGERNESS FOR THE NEW LOPEZ PORTILLO ADMINISTRATION TO TAKE CHARGE AND GET MOVING TO DISPEL THE WIDESPREAD SENSE OF UNREST CREATED IN RECENT WEEKS BY OUTGOING PRESIDENT LUIS ECHEVERRIA.

5. MEXICO HAS BEEN IN DEEP ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TURMOIL SINCE ECHEVERRIA DEVALUED THE PESO FROM 8 CENTS TO SLIGHTLY LESS THAN A NICKEL AND THEN PERMITTED LANDLESS PEASANTS IN THE NORTH TO SEIZE LARGE TRACTS OF RICH FARMLAND FROM THEIR OWNERS. THIS UNREST WAS ACCENTUATED ON THE EVE OF THE INAUGURATION WHEN FIVE BOMB BLASTS SHOOK VARIOUS PARTS OF THE CAPITAL.

6. JUST AS THE CARTER TRANSITION PERIOD IN THE UNITED STATES IS ONE OF WILD GUESSING AND HIGH UNCERTAINTY, THE MEXICAN TRANSITION HAS BEEN THE SAME. MUCH OF THAT GUESSWORK ENDED LAST NIGHT WHEN LOPEZ PORTILLO'S CABINET CHOICES WERE MADE PUBLIC ON NATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION.

7. AS IN WASHINGTON ALSO, THERE WILL BE A HONEYMOON PERIOD OF UNDEFINED DURATION FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT.

8. THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN DISILLUSIONED BY ECHEVERRIA'S OPEN COURTSHIP OF THE THIRD WORLD AND THE POLITICAL LEFT, AS WELL AS THE SHOCK OF THE LAND SEIZURES AND THE DEVALUATION OF THE CURRENCY, ARE UNABASHEDLY HAILING LOPEZ PORTILLO AS A MAN WHO WILL RESTORE NORMALCY AND STABILITY.

9. THE DIFFERENCE MAY WELL BE AS MUCH A MATTER OF STYLE AS OF POLICY.

10. PERCEPTIVE MEXICANS READILY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE 56-YEAR OLD NEW PRESIDENT HAS INHERITED A MESS WHICH IS IMPOSSIBLE TO UNTANGLE OVERNIGHT.

11. ECHEVERRIA PROBABLY DID HIM A FAVOR BY DEVALUING THE PESO BUT ECHEVERRIA PROBABLY OPENED A PANDORA'S BOX FOR HIS SUCCESSOR BY SUPPORTING THE LAND SEIZURES IN SONORA AND SINALOA STATES. LOPEZ PORTILLO FROM NOW ON WILL BE A UNCLASSIFIED

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MAN ON A TIGHTROPE FACING THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF LAND IN A COUNTRY WITH AN EXPLODING POPULATION AND ALMOST NO AVAILABLE ARABLE LAND TO SATISFY A LAND HUNGER OF THE POOR FARMERS.

12. ECHEVERRIA'S ACTIONS WERE DESIGNED TO MAKE HIM A PLACE IN HISTORY JUST AS HIS PREDECESSOR, GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ, DID BY CONSTRUCTING THE EFFICIENT METRO SUBWAY SYSTEM. ECHEVERRIA ALSO WAS PLAYING UP TO THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES IN HOPES THAT HE WILL BE ELECTED SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

13. BUT LOPEZ PORTILLO IS ALREADY PROJECTING THE IMAGE OF A MAN WHO IS WELL AWARE OF WORLD ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REALITIES AND WHO WILL NOT INDULGE IN THE KIND OF GRAND-

STANDING WITH THE MEXICAN COMMON MAN THAT WAS ECHEVERRIA'S TRADEMARK.

14. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES BECAME CONSIDERABLY STRAINED IN THE SECOND HALF OF ECHEVERRIA'S TERM ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE AS WELL AS THE MATTER OF THE PRISONERS EACH COUNTRY HAS IN JAILS OF THE OTHER.

15. ECHEVERRIA INCREASINGLY IDENTIFIED HIMSELF WITH THE FAR LEFT IN CUBA AND MARXIST CHILE BEFORE THE 1973 COUP. BUT LOPEZ PORTILLO SHOWS EVERY SIGN OF WANTING CLOSER IDENTIFICATION WITH THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND THE UNITED STATES TO ATTRACT INVESTMENT AND TRADE IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF STABILITY AND GENERALLY TO OPERATE IN MUCH CLOSER COOPERATION WITH WASHINGTON.

16. BUSINESSMEN ALREADY ARE HAILING LOPEZ PORTILLO'S DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST "MORDIDA," LITERALLY "THE BITE." MORDIDA IS THE PERCENTAGE RAKEOFF FOR ACCOMPLISHING ALMOST ANY TYPE OF BUSINESS HERE AND HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE. LOPEZ PORTILLO SAID IN HIS CAMPAIGN THAT HE WOULD PUT AN END TO THE PRACTICE BECAUSE, IN EFFECT, MEXICANS WOULD BE DEVOURING THEMSELVES.

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17. NONE OF THIS MEANS THAT LOPEZ PORTILLO WILL BECOME A PATSY FOR U.S. INTERESTS. A MORE REALISTIC ASSESSMENT IS THAT HE WILL NOT MAKE UNNECESSARY WAVES IN THE COMPLEX RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO NEIGHBOR NATIONS. IT IS STILL A FACT OF LIFE THAT NO MEXICAN PRESIDENT CAN AFFORD TO SEEM TOO SNUG WITH THE AMERICANS BECAUSE NO ONE HERE HAS FORGOTTEN THE LOSS OF TEXAS AND WHAT IS NOW MOST OF THE AMERICAN WEST. THE LOST BATTLE BETWEEN THE U.S. MARINES AND THE BOY CADET HEROES OF CHAPULTEPEC ALSO IS ENGRAVED IN THE NATIONAL MEMORY.

18. AND THERE ARE STILL TWO PLACES NO MEXICAN PRESIDENT CAN EVER BE SEEN: THE AMERICAN EMBASSY OR A CATHOLIC CHURCH. THIS HAS GIVEN RISE TO THE SAYING, "PITY POOR MEXICO, SO FAR FROM GOD, SO CLOSE TO THE UNITED STATES."

19. BUT LOPEZ PORTILLO BY ALL ACCOUNTS IS A VERY PRACTICAL MAN. HE KNOWS THAT MEXICO'S \$2 BILLION NEGATIVE BALANCE OF TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES CAN ONLY BE OFFSET BY TOURISM AND INVESTMENT FROM THAT POWERFUL NEIGHBOR.

HE PROBABLY NEVER WOULD HAVE ANTAGONIZED AMERICAN JEWS, SO IMPORTANT TO TOURISM, BY VOTING AGAINST ISRAEL IN THE UNITED NATIONS AS ECHEVERRIA DID.

20. BUT LOPEZ PORTILLO'S PROBLEMS PRIMARILY WILL BE DOMESTIC ONES THAT CANNOT BE SOLVED BY QUIXOTIC FOREIGN POLICY.

21. HE FACES A SURGING POPULATION WITH A GROWTH RATE OF 3.2 PERCENT ANNUALLY. THIS MEANS THAT MEXICO'S 60 MILLION PEOPLE WILL BE DOUBLED BY THE YEAR 2000 AND THERE ARE ALREADY 11 MILLION PEOPLE TRYING TO MAKE A LIVING IN THE CAPITAL ALONE.

22. IN AN ARID COUNTRY THAT DEPENDS SO HEAVILY ON AGRICULTURE, THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO FIND NEW LAND RESOURCES THROUGH IRRIGATION, HYDROELECTRIC DAMS AND BY DIVERTING MORE AND MORE OF THE NATION'S ENERGY TO
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INDUSTRY.

23. WHETHER HE CAN OR WILL DO ANYTHING TO REDUCE THE POPULATION EXPANSION BEFORE IT REACHES A CRITICAL STAGE IS PROBLEMATIC. OFFICIALLY MEXICO IS A SECULAR STATE BUT MOST MEXICANS ARE DEVOUT CATHOLICS WHO RESIST FAMILY PLANNING SCHEMES OF ALL SORTS AND WHO PUT A PREMIUM ON LARGE FAMILIES.

24. MEXICO CITY IS ABLAZE WITH NEON SIGNS, BANNERS, FLAGS AND ALL THE OTHER TRAPPINGS OF A JOYOUS OCCASION ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE DECORATIONS ARE DESIGNED FOR THE INAUGURATION OR FOR THE CHRISTMAS SHOPPING SEASON. MEXICAN TROOPS MADE SOME APPEARANCE ON THE STREETS IN FRONT OF KEY GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS IN THE PAST 24 HOURS BUT THIS IS STANDARD AND THE MOOD IS JUBILANT BECAUSE OF THE CHANGE TAKING PLACE TODAY.

25. MRS. ROSALYNN CARTER MADE A BIG HIT AT A RECEPTION LAST NIGHT IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY BY UTTERING SEVERAL SENTENCES IN PAINFULLY MANGLED SPANISH, CLIMAXED BY HER DECLARATION THAT SHE WOULD DO SOMETHING ABOUT SPEAKING THE LANGUAGE BETTER WHEN SHE MOVES INTO THE WHITE HOUSE WITH HER SPANISH-SPEAKING HUSBAND NEXT MONTH. ROBINSON

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E.O. 12065 GDS 4/10/85 (KORN, DAVID)

TAGS: PEPR, XF, IS, EC

SUBJECT: INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S REMARKS ON
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY

REF: NEW DELHI 5960

1. WE FIND VAJPAYEE'S REMARKS ON THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI
PEACE TREATY DEEPLY DISAPPOINTING AND WOULD LIKE AMBASSA-
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PAGE 02 STATE 094509

DOR TO TAKE MATTER UP WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OR SUCH
OTHER GOI AS HE DEEMS APPROPRIATE.

2. FOLLOWING ARE POINTS TO MAKE.

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-- WE ARE DISTRESSED TO LEARN THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS CHARACTERIZED THE TREATY IN SUCH A NEGATIVE WAY. WE BELIEVE THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S REMARKS IN THE LOK SABHA REFLECT A BASIC MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION.

-- THE TREATY SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A CULMINATION BUT AS THE FIRST STEP IN A CONTINUING PROCESS. THE PREAMBLE OF THE TREATY STATES THAT THE GOAL OF THE PARTIES IS A COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND THAT THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL IS A STEP IN THAT DIRECTION.

-- E VIEW THE TREATY AS BEING ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, WHICH HAS BEEN THE BASIS FOR ALL PEACEMAKING EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1967, AND WITH RESOLUTION 338 WHICH SET THE STAGE FOR NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWING THE 1973 WAR. WE DO NOT CLAIM THAT THE TREATY CARRIES OUT RESOLUTION 242 IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, BUT IT IS THE FIRST SOLID BEGINNING THAT HAS BEEN MADE. NO WORKABLE ALTERNATIVE HAS BEEN PROPOSED BY THOSE WHO CRITICIZE IT.

-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE DRAWBACKS TO THE COURSE ON WHICH WE HAVE EMBARKED. WE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO PROCEED DIRECTLY TO BRING ABOUT A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. OUR EFFORTS IN 1977 TO RECONVENE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WERE AIMED IN THIS DIRECTION, BUT IN THE END IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE. WE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO HAVE

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PAGE 03 STATE 094509

HAD THE SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING OF ALL THE ARAB STATES FOR THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS. BUT ANY CHANGE AS IMPORTANT AS THE MAKING OF PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE LARGEST ARAB STATE IS BOUND TO BRING SOME DISLOCATION AND TO BE MET AT LEAST INITIALLY BY RESISTANCE. THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE COURSE THAT EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE PURSUED WOULD HAVE BEEN A RETURN TO THE INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY OF THE PAST WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT THE WARS OF 1967 AND 1973, POSED THREATS TO WORLD PEACE AND CAUSED SERIOUS WORLD-WIDE ECONOMIC DISRUPTIONS.

-- WE ARE WELL AWARE THAT THERE HAS BEEN STRONG OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY FROM SEVERAL ARAB STATES. SOME OBVIOUSLY SEE THEIR OWN NARROW INTERESTS AND WAYS OF THINKING THREATENED BY IT; OTHERS FEAR THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL HAVE MADE A SEPARATE PEACE AT THE EXPENSE OF

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JORDAN, SYRIA AND THE PALESTINIANS. IT WILL TAKE TIME TO OVERCOME THESE RESISTANCES AND DISPEL THESE MISPERCEPTIONS, BUT WE THINK THAT AS THE BENEFITS OF PEACE BECOME MANIFEST AND PROGRESS IS MADE TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND OTHER PROBLEMS THOSE WHO INITIALLY OPPOSED WILL JOIN IN.

— THE FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD BE AWARE THAT ONE OF THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE TREATY PACKAGE WAS A JOINT LETTER, SIGNED BY PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR CARRYING OUT THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK CONCERNING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THE PARTIES AGREED IN THIS LETTER, WHICH WE VIEW AS HAVING THE SAME BINDING FORCE AS THE TREATY ITSELF, THAT NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN INTERIM REGIME AND SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

WILL BEGIN WITHIN ONE MONTH AFTER THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY. JORDAN IS INVITED TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT IF IT DECIDES NOT TO
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PAGE 04 STATE 094509

PARTICIPATE THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE HELD BY ISRAEL AND EGYPT; THE DELEGATIONS OF EGYPT AND JORDAN MAY INCLUDE PALESTINIANS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OR OTHER PALESTINIANS AS MUTUALLY AGREED. ISRAEL AND EGYPT HAVE SET FOR THEMSELVES THE GOAL OF COMPLETING THE NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN ONE YEAR SO THAT ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED.

— THE UNITED STATES WILL PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE UPCOMING WEST BANK/GAZA NEGOTIATIONS AND IN THE FURTHER EFFORTS TOWARD ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE. PRESIDENT CARTER IS PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO THE SUCCESS OF THESE EFFORTS.

2. YOU SHOULD SAY WE BELIEVE THAT THE EFFORT THAT WE ARE MAKING IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS NO LESS IN THE INTEREST OF INDIA THAN OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS WHO SEEK PEACE. WE WOULD HOPE FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING FROM OUR INDIAN FRIENDS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR EXCHANGES WITH INDIANS ON THIS SUBJECT HAVE BEEN LIMITED. WE WOULD BE GLAD TO PROVIDE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION THE FOREIGN MINISTER MIGHT WANT ABOUT THE TREATY OR THE UPCOMING WEST BANK/GAZA NEGOTIATIONS, OR TO CONSULT FURTHER ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST IN ANY WAY HE MIGHT SUGGEST. CHRISTOPHER

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CONFIDENTIAL STATE 094509

E.O. 12065 GDS 4/10/85 (KORN, DAVID)

TAGS: PEPR, XF, IS, EC

SUBJECT: INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S REMARKS ON
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY

REF: NEW DELHI 5960

1. WE FIND VAJPAYEE'S REMARKS ON THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI
PEACE TREATY DEEPLY DISAPPOINTING AND WOULD LIKE AMBASSA-
DOR TO TAKE MATTER UP WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OR SUCH
OTHER GOI AS HE DEEMS APPROPRIATE.

2. FOLLOWING ARE POINTS TO MAKE:

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PAGE 02 STATE 094509

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-- THE TREATY SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A CULMINATION BUT AS THE FIRST STEP IN A CONTINUING PROCESS. THE PREAMBLE OF THE TREATY STATES THAT THE GOAL OF THE PARTIES IS A COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND THAT THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL IS A STEP IN THAT DIRECTION.

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-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE DRAWBACKS TO THE COURSE ON WHICH WE HAVE EMBARKED. WE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO PROCEED DIRECTLY TO BRING ABOUT A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. OUR EFFORTS IN 1977 TO RECONVENE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WERE AIMED IN THIS DIRECTION, BUT IN THE END IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE. WE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO HAVE HAD THE SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING OF ALL THE ARAB STATES FOR THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS. BUT ANY CHANGE AS IMPORTANT AS THE MAKING OF PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE LARGEST ARAB STATE IS BOUND TO BRING SOME DISLOCATION
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PAGE 04 STATE 094509

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NOTE BY OC/T: ORIGINAL DIST: NEA/ADS,SAA,POLI,IO,SES,SSM.

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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PA Exemptions ☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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PAGE 01 NEW DE 06327 141545Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 ACDA-12 CIAE-00 INR-10 IO-14 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-05 EB-08 NRC-02 OES-09 SOE-02 DODE-00
DOE-15 SS-15 SP-02 CEQ-01 PM-05 SAS-02 PA-01
ICA-11 AID-05 OMB-01 TRSE-00 COM-02 SAA-01 /138 W
-----070719 141719Z /42

R 121204Z APR 79
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8668
INFO AMCONSUL BOMBAY
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NEW DELHI 6327

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/12/85 (SCHAFFER, HOWARD B.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, MNUC, IN, PK, US
SUBJECT: INDIAN REACTION TO PAK NUCLEAR INTENTIONS

REF: NEW DELHI 6046

1. (U) IN A FRONT-PAGED ARTICLE IN THE APRIL 12 INDIAN EXPRESS, DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT SAEED NAQVI DEVELOPS THE THEME THAT PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PLANS ARE NOT PRIMARILY THE PRODUCT OF PERCEIVED INSECURITY VIS-A-VIS INDIA BUT SHOULD BE SEEN INSTEAD IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN "ISLAMIC BOMB" DESIGNED TO DETER A NUCLEAR-ARMED ISRAEL. THUS, THE ARGUMENT GOES, IT IS NOT INDIA WHICH HAS THE MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR MOVING PAKISTAN OFF ITS NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES COURSE (BY A MUTUAL SELF-ABNEGATION ARRANGEMENT WITH THE GOI, AS NAQVI IMPLIES THE US IS URGING) BUT RATHER THE US, WHICH ALLOWED NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE SHIPPED CLANDESTINELY TO ISRAEL.

2. (C) NAQVI'S THESIS WOULD BE LESS TROUBLING, AND MORE LAUGHABLE, IF IT WERE MERELY HIS OWN. HE TELLS US, HOWEVER, THAT HIS STORY IS BASED ON BRIEFINGS HE RECEIVED FROM RESPONSIBLE GOI OFFICIALS. HE SAID HE HAD WRITTEN HIS STORY AS A FOLLOW-UP TO G.K. REDDY'S ARTICLE IN THE HINDU (REFTEL),
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PAGE 02 NEW DE 06327 141545Z

WHICH SUGGESTED THAT THE US WAS USING THE PAK NUCLEAR ISSUE TO MOUSE-TRAP INDIA INTO ACCEPTANCE OF FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. ACCORDING TO NAQVI, THIS VIEW, WHICH HE ALSO SUGGESTS IN HIS OWN PIECE, IS BEING PUSHED BY SOME GOI NUCLEAR AUTHORITIES.

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HE IMPLIED (AND ANOTHER EMBASSY SOURCE HAS ALSO SUGGESTED THIS) THAT MEA SECRETARY VELLODI MAY HAVE INSPIRED THE REDDY STORY.

3. (C) NAQVI CONCLUDES IN HIS ARTICLE THAT THE ARGUMENT HE PRO-
POUNDS MAY BE USED BY VAJPAYEE WHEN HE VISITS WASHINGTON
LATER THIS MONTH. (HE IS NOT AWARE, OF COURSE, THAT THE INDIANS
HAVE ALREADY RAISED THE CLANDESTINE SHIPMENTS ISSUE WITH
US.) WHETHER THE GOI PEOPLE NAQVI IS GETTING HIS MATERIAL FROM
REALLY BELIEVE THE "ISLAMIC BOMB"
CONCOPON, OR TO WHAT EXTENT, IS UNCLEAR. BUT WE DO ACCEPT
NAQVI'S REPORT THAT THIS IS WHAT SOME OF HIS (GOOD) CONTACTS ARE
HANDING OUT, AND IT COULD BE ONE OF THE LINES THE INDIANS WILL
SEE FIT TO DEVELOP FURTHER WITH US
GOHEEN

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(29)

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LOCATOR=TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= n/a

TAGS= OVIP, (CARTER, JIMMY)

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PAGE 01 NEW DE 00039 01 OF 02 031036Z
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07
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USIA-15 AF-10 IO-14 ACDA-12 EA-12 EUR-12 NRC-07
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P 030921Z JAN 78
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8420
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DACCA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY
AMCONSUL BOMBAY PRIORITY
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MADRAS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
CINCPAC HAWAII PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 NEW DELHI 0039

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (CARTER, JIMMY)

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CLASSIFIED BY DATE 7/21/97
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SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO INDIA: BRIEFING MATERIAL

1. HERewith MATERIAL PREPARED FOR THE JANUARY 2 AFTERNOON BRIEFING FOR THE PRESS COVERING THE VISIT TO INDIA OF PRESIDENT CARTER. THE MATERIAL WAS PREPARED JOINTLY BY THE U.S. AND INDIAN SIDES.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE FIRST ROUND OF THE OFFICIAL TALKS BETWEEN
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THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA WAS HELD THIS MORNING FROM 9:00 A.M. TO 11:10 A.M. AT THE RASHTRAPATI BHAVAN. PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER AND PRIME MINISTER MORARJI DESAI WERE ALONE FOR 35 MINUTES AFTER WHICH THEY JOINED THE TWO DELEGATIONS WHICH HAD ALREADY ASSEMBLED IN THE PANEL ROOM OF RASHTRAPATI BHAVAN. THE PRESIDENT WAS ASSISTED BY SECRETARY VANCE, MR. BRZEZINSKI, AMBASSADOR GOHEEN, MR. THORNTON, MR. ATHERTON AND MR. ANTHONY LAKE. THE PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY INCLUDED THE HOME MINISTER, THE DEFENSE MINISTER, THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE FINANCE MINISTER, THE COMMERCE MINISTER, THE MINISTER OF INDUSTRIES AND THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO PM, FOREIGN SECRETARY, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS SECRETARY AND JOINT SECRETARY (AMS), MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

DURING THE SESSION THE TWO LEADERS HAD A WIDE RANGING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN AS WELL AS BILATERAL COOPERATION. THE TALKS WERE HELD IN A WARM AND CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE REFLECTING THE DEEP RAPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING THAT HAS COME TO BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

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MIDDLE EAST

PRESIDENT CARTER EXPRESSED HIS "GREAT ADMIRATION FOR THE COURAGE OF PRESIDENT SADAT". HE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD ALWAYS MADE EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE THE VARIOUS PARTIES CONCERNED TO NEGOTIATE. THAT IS WHY THE DRAMATIC VISIT OF PRESIDENT SADAT TO ISRAEL WAS SUCH WELCOME NEWS TO THE US GOVERNMENT. THE UNCLASSIFIED

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PRESIDENT CONFIRMED THAT HE WILL BE GOING TO ASWAN TO "REASSURE PRESIDENT SADAT OF OUR CONTINUING SUPPORT TO THESE EFFORTS" FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN THE REGION. PRIME MINISTER DESAI STRESSED THAT A LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS POSSIBLE ONLY ON THE BASIS OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE GREAT POWERS CONCERNED WOULD ALSO WORK TOWARDS IT.

HORN OF AFRICA

BOTH PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRIME MINISTER DESAI EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN AND REGRET AT THE CONTINUING CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA. THEY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE CONFLICT WILL SOON COME TO AN END AND WHATEVER THE PROBLEMS WOULD BE RESOLVED PEACEFULLY. IN THIS CONNECTION PRESIDENT CARTER EXPLAINED THE US GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF NOT SUPPLYING ARMS TO ANY OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT CONTRARY TO CERTAIN REPORTS THAT HAD APPEARED IN SOME SECTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS. THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA ALSO DENIED RUMORS OF INDIA HAVING SUPPLIED WEAPONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO EITHER OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED.

CHINA

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THE TWO LEADERS INFORMED EACH OTHER OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE RELATIONS OF THEIR TWO COUNTRIES WITH CHINA AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE OF THEIR IMPROVEMENT IN THE FUTURE WITHOUT AFFECTING THEIR RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

SALT, CTB AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

PRESIDENT CARTER INFORMED THE INDIAN PRIME
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MINISTER THAT HE WAS HOPEFUL OF AN AGREEMENT ON SALT-II TO BE CONCLUDED WITH USSR IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE ALSO SAID THAT UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN REACHED WITH USSR AND UK FOR THE PROHIBITION OF ALL NUCLEAR TESTS, INCLUDING PEACEFUL EXPLOSIONS AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT FRANCE AND CHINA WOULD BE ABLE TO JOIN IN THIS UNDERSTANDING EVENTUALLY.

PRIME MINISTER DESAI REMARKED THAT IF THE TWO GREAT POWERS, USA AND USSR, WERE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THESE VITAL QUESTIONS, THIS WOULD GO A LONG WAY IN POSITIVELY INFLUENCING AND PROMOTING THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT.

PRESIDENT CARTER EXPRESSED HIS GREAT CONCERN AT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING CONSISTENCE EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSION CAPACITY ROUND THE WORLD.

THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S "EARNESTNESS" IN THIS REGARD.

INDIAN OCEAN

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMED THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA OF THE EFFORTS HIS ADMINISTRATION

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WAS MAKING TO REACH AGREEMENT ON MAKING THE INDIAN OCEAN MORE PEACEFUL AND FREE OF TENSIONS. HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN "VERY GOOD PROGRESS AT THE 3 SESSIONS THAT HAD BEEN HELD BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET SIDES ON THIS QUESTION AND ALSO THAT HE WAS HOPEFUL OF FURTHER PROGRESS AT THE 4TH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS TO BE HELD NEXT MONTH. THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA WELCOMED THIS DEVELOPMENT

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AND SAID THAT INDI'S HELP IN PROMOTING THE PROCESS OF PEACE AND RELAXATION OF TENSIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WAS ALWAYS AVAILABLE. THE PRESIDENT REMARKED "YOUR INFLUENCE HAS BEEN VERY HELPFUL."

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-15 AF-10 IO-14 ACDA-12 EA-12 MCE-00 EUR-12
NRC-07 ARA-14 DOE-11 SOE-02 /162 W
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P 030921Z JAN 78
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHEC PRIORITY 8421
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY DACCA PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY
AMCONSUL BOMBAY PRIORITY
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MAERAS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
CINCPAC HAWAII PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 NEW DELH 0039

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE

PRESIDENT CARTER STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE IN ALL ITS ASPECTS AND SPECIFICALLY UNDERLINEE THE ROLE THAT INDIA HAE PLAYED IN IT. THE PRIME MINISTER REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT FOR THE VAST MAJORITY OF PEOPLE ON THIS PLANET. AT THE AAME TIME, HE STRESSED THAT IN THEIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE DEVELOPING
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COUNTRIES HAVE TO MAKE THEIR OWN EFFORTS FOR SELF-RELIANCE

AND FOR "MUTUALLY HELPING EACH OTHER". HE SAID THAT HE

WANTED THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION TO EXTEND TO BOTH THE DEVELOPED AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. BUT IN AN INTER-DEPENDENT WORLD, THE FEELING AMONG THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF BEING NEGLECTED SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ACCUMULATE.

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PRESIDENT CARTER ASSURED THAT HIS ADMINISTRATION
WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE EFFORTS

TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE VARIOUS PROBLEMS FACING THE
DEVELOPING WORLD. THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA WELCOMED
THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AND SAID THAT INDIA'S APPROACH

TO THE WHOLE QUESTION WAS BASED ON MODERATION, RESTRAINT
AND COOPERATION. HE PARTICULARLY EMPHASISED THAT INDIA
DID NOT BELIEVE IN CONFRONTATION ON THIS OR ANY OTHER
QUESTION. PM RECALLED THAT WE HAD EXTENDED OUR FULL
COOPERATION TO THE PARIS CONFERENCE. HE REMARKED THAT
IT WAS ONLY THROUGH DISARMAMENT THAT RESOURCES COULD BE
RELEASED FOR THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES.

THE FINANCE MINISTER OF INDIA REFERRED TO THE GROWTH
OF PROTECTIONISM IN THE WESTERN WORLD AND SAID THAT
THE PROTECTIONIST FORCES HAD TO BE CURBED. THE PRIME
MINISTER ADDED THAT THE PURPOSE OF PROMOTION OF TRADE
RELATIONS MUST BE THE ULTIMATE CESSATION OF AID. HE WAS
AGAINST A BLOCK APPROACH TO THIS QUESTION, BUT RECOGNIZED
THAT NO COUNTRY COULD REALLY AFFORD TO BE ALONE IN THIS.
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THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE STATED THAT THE GENERALISED
SCHEME OF PREFERENCES NEEDED TO BE EXTENDED TO COVER THE
WHOLE RANGE OF COTTAGE AND SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES WHICH

ALONE COULD PROMOTE THE RAPID GROWTH OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTU-
NITIES.

PRESIDENT CARTER SAID THAT THE ROLE OF US BUSINESS

AND INDUSTRIAL CIRCLES IN THIS RESPECT WAS IMPORTANT.

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HE RECOGNISED THAT THE PROBLEMS OF INVESTMENT ETC. IN INDIA HAVE BEEN EXAGGERATED IN THE US, BUT LOOKED FORWARD TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND INTER-CHANGE AMONG THE CONCERNED ORGANISATIONS IN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

THE FINANCE MINISTER EXPLAINED THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA'S POLICY ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT. HE SAID WE WELCOMED FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND INDEED WERE GOING OUT TO SEEK FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AREAS THAT FITTED INTO OUR PLAN PRIORITIES.

PANAMA CANAL

PRESIDENT CARTER EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT CONGRESS

APPROVAL OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES WILL BE FORTHCOMING SOON.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

REFERRING TO THE PROBLEMS OF ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA, PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRIME MINISTER EESAI AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO FIND A SOLUTION CONSISTENT WITH THE INDICATED ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE.

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SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

BOTH LEADERS RECOGNISED THE NEED FOR CONSULTATIONS IN ORDER THAT THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT SHOULD BE FRUITFUL.

BILATERAL

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THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA THAT HE HAD AUTHORISED THE RELEASE OF THE NEXT CONSIGNMENT OF ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL FOR TARAPUR.

SPACE

PRESIDENT CARTER INFORMED THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS WILLING TO EXPAND THE ALREADY EXISTING COOPERATION BETWEEN INDIA AND THE

USA IN SATELLITE PROGRAMMES FOR GEODESIC, GEOLOGICAL AND METEOROLOGICAL SURVEYS AS WELL AS IN PROVIDING GROUND

STATIONS AND FACILITIES. "WE RECOGNISE THE BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT" OF SUCH TECHNOLOGY AND THE US WAS WILLING TO ENGAGE IN FURTHER COLLABORATION WITH INDIA IN THIS FIELD.

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT WE HAD ALREADY BENEFITED FROM THE TREMENDOUS ADVANCES MADE BY THE UNITED STATES AND LOOKED FORWARD TO CONTINUING COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD.

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BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED SUPPORT TO THE INDO-US JOINT COMMISSION FOR IDENTIFYING AND ENLARGING THE AREAS OF COOPERATION IN DIVERSE SPHERES. THE TWO SIDES ALSO AGREED THAT BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WERE A HELPFUL INSTITUTION IN

PROMOTING UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND SHOULD BE HELD AT MORE FREQUENT INTERVALS IN THE FUTURE.

PRESIDENT CARTER EXTENDED A WARM AND CORDIAL INVITATION

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TO PRIME MINISTER MORARJI DESAI TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES.
THE INVITATION WAS GRATEFULLY ACCEPTED.

END TEXT.
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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ADP428

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 08528 01 OF 02 191248Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-15 CIAE-00 EA-10 H-01
NSC-05 NSAE-00 HA-06 TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-01 OMB-01
SMS-01 SAL-01 ACDA-12 SP-02 SPRS-02 /089 W
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P 191228Z JUN 81
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4046
DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
USICA WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMCONSUL MUNICH
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PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or	
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SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 08528

CINCEUR, SHAPE ALSO FOR POLAD/INTAFF

DIA FOR DC-1 (CCF), JSI-2, DB-1

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 6/19/91(DJEREJIAN, EDWARD P) OR-P

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 08528 01 OF 02 191248Z

TAGS: PEPR, SOPN, PL, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET MEDIA ON POLAND, JUNE 19

REF: A) MOSCOW 8508, B) PRAGUE 2440, C) MOSCOW 6847

1. SUMMARY: PRAVDA JUNE 19 PRINTS A LONGER VERSION
OF THE RUDE PRAVO ARTICLE CARRIED BY TASS ENGLISH LAST
NIGHT (REF A). THE SIX ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPHS CONTAIN
DIRECT REFERENCES TO THE CPSU CC LETTER AND TO INTER-

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PARTY RELATIONS; THE TASS VERSION CONTAINS ALL THE MAIN POINTS OF THE JUNE 13 RUDE PRAVO EDITORIAL REPORTED REF B. AS REF A NOTED, A COMMENTARY BY TASS ITSELF WOULD BE MORE AUTHORITATIVE, BUT WE WOULD ADD THAT PRAGUE IS NOT JUST ANY CAPITAL: IT BEARS A DEFINITE SYMBOLISM IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, FOR POLES, FOR SOVIETS, AND FOR ALL EUROPEANS; TO QUOTE THE PRAGUE COMMUNISTS IS, FOR MOSCOW, TO QUOTE THE VOICE OF EXPERIENCE. IN OTHER ITEMS:

--TRUD ACCUSES SOLIDARITY OF REVEALING ITS TRUE POLITICAL AMBITIONS BY ATTEMPTING TO ORGANIZE A "POLISH LABOR PARTY" AT A METALLURGICAL COMBINE IN KRAKOW;

--KRASNAYA ZVEZDA ATTACKS POLISH COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES WHO "SLANDER" THE USSR IN PORTRAYING THE 1939 HITLER-STALIN PACT AS THE FOURTH PARTITION OF POLAND; AND

--TASS ENGLISH CARRIES A COMMENTARY DENOUNCING THE HOUSE OF EUROPE AND MIDDLE EAST SUBCOMMITTEE FOR WARNING AGAINST "INTERNAL REPRISALS AGAINST THE POLISH PEOPLE," AND ALLEGING LINKS BETWEEN THE CIA AND THE DISSIDENT COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT POLAND.

END SUMMARY

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2. (C) THE SIX ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPHS PRINTED TODAY BY PRAVDA ARE INTENDED TO CONVEY TO SOVIET READERS, IN TERMS THEY ARE SENSITIVE TO, THE FULL GRAVITY OF THE POLISH CRISIS AS VIEWED FROM MOSCOW TEN DAYS AFTER THE PZPR CC PLENUM. POINTS THAT WILL NOT BE MISSED INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

-- THE THREAT TO THE CAUSE OF SOCIALISM IN POLAND
"THREATENS ALSO THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THE POLISH STATE."

-- THE PZPR HAS MADE "ENDLESS CONCESSIONS," AND HAS "RETREATED UNDER THE PRESSURE OF INTERNAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION, RELYING ON THE SUPPORT OF IMPERIALIST SVTRISVE CENTERS ABROAD."

-- RETREAT BEFORE COUNTER-REVOLUTION MEANS BETRAYAL OF SOCIALISM, BETRAYAL OF THE INTERESTS OF THE NATION."

-- A TURN IN THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN POLAND IS POSSIBLE ONLY ON THE CONDITION THAT "THE WORDS WHICH SOUNDED OUT AT THE NINTH PLENUM ARE FOLLOWED BY DEEDS, DECISIVE ACTIONS AGAINST COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY AND ANTI-SOCIALIST FORCES."

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- THE "HORIZONTAL STRUCTURES" IN THE PZPR ARE SPLITTING
- . THE UNITY OF THE PARTY.

- THERE IS A "REAL DANGER" THAT THERE WILL BE AN ATTEMPT
- . AT THE FORTHCOMING PZPR CONGRESS TO "LIQUIDATE THE
- . PARTY," AND TO TURN IT INTO "AN ORGANIZATION OF THE
- . SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC TYPE."


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ACTION EUR-12

INFO	OCT-01	ADS-00	INR-10	FS-15	CIAE-00	EA-10	H-01
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	SMS-01	SAL-01	ACDA-12	SP-02	SPRS-02	/089 W	

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P 191228Z JUN 81
 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4047
 DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
 USICA WASHDC PRIORITY
 INFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY BEIJING
 AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
 AMEMBASSY BERLIN
 AMEMBASSY BONN
 AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
 AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
 AMEMBASSY LONDON
 AMEMBASSY PARIS
 AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
 AMEMBASSY ROME
 AMEMBASSY SOFIA
 AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
 AMCONSUL MUNICH
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[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 08528

CINCEUR, SHAPE ALSO FOR POLAD/INTAFF

DIA FOR DC-1 (CCF), JSI-2, DB-1

3. (C) PRAVDA AND TASS REPRINT THE RUDE PRAVO ALLEGATION
[REDACTED]

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THAT "ANTI-SOCIALIST FORCES" HAVE BEEN "DESECRATING THE
 GRAVES OF SOVIET WARRIORS, AND SYMBOLS WHICH ARE HOLY TO
 US." A SOVIET CONTACT, GENERALLY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH
 POPULAR ATTITUDES HERE, TOLD US THAT NO CHARGES COULD BE
 BETTER CALCULATED TO AROUSE THE IRE OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE,
 AND IMPLIED THAT THE AUTHORITIES WERE DELIBERATELY
 REINFORCING MOST RUSSIAN'S ALREADY HOSTILE FEELINGS TOWARD
 THE POLES.

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4. [REDACTED] THE SHORT JUNE 19 TRUD ARTICLE, SIGNED BY COMMENTATOR YU. VASIL'KOV, CONSTITUTES ANOTHER STATEMENT BY SOVIET LABOR "EXPERTS" THAT SOLIDARITY HAS OVERSTEPPED ITS BOUNDS. SOLIDARITY'S INSISTENCE THAT IT WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY IS CALLED A "TACTICAL TRICK," AND TRUD ALLEGES THAT THE "POLISH LABOR PARTY" INTENDS TO TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS TO THE SEJM. TRUD REEMPHASIZES THE URGENT NEED FOR POLISH PATRIOTS TO FIGHT THE EVER MORE "IMPUDENT" THREAT OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION.

5. [REDACTED] THE JUNE 18 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA ARTICLE ON THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NAZI ATTACK ON THE USSR, IS WRITTEN BY S. KHROMOV OF THE INSTITUTE OF USSR HISTORY. IT REPEATS THE CHARGE FIRST MADE IN THE MAY ISSUE (NO 7) OF KOMMUNIST (REF C) THAT POLISH COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES, IN LEAGUE WITH "BOURGEOIS FALSIFIERS," ARE SLANDERING THE SOVIET STATE BY CLAIMING THAT THE HITLER-STALIN PACT CONSTITUTED A FOURTH PARTITION OF POLAND.

6. (LOU) TASS POLITICAL OBSERVER YURI KORNILOV, IN A DISPATCH NOT CARRIED IN THE DOMESTIC PRESS, DENOUNCES THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST FOR EXPRESSING "SERIOUS CONCERN OVER [REDACTED]"

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 08528 02 OF 02 191254Z

INTERNAL REPRISALS AGAINST THE POLISH PEOPLE" WHILE PASSING OVER IN SILENCE ISRAEL'S RAID ON IRAQ. HE GOES ON TO CHARGE THAT THE CONFEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT POLAND (KPN) HAS LINKS WITH THE CIA THCMUGH THE "ANTI-POLISH" CENTER "FREE POLAND." THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S RESOLUTION IS TERMED INTERFERENCE IN POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. ALLEGATIONS OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE ARE INCREASING IN FREQUENCY AND VOLUME, A TREND WE EXPECT WILL CONTINUE.
MATLOCK

UNCLASSIFIED

LA Exemptions B6 TS authority to
Exemptions () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

Dear []

I am replying to your November 5 letter to President Reagan regarding the unsuccessful efforts of Albert Katz and his family to obtain permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

We, too, are concerned over the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to respect basic human rights, such as freedom of movement. We are particularly dismayed in light of its commitment in the Helsinki Final Act "to deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family."

The U.S. Government has consistently encouraged Soviet authorities to adopt a more favorable attitude toward Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not been responsive to our efforts, labelling them as "interference" in their internal affairs. They further reject U.S. attempts to represent individual Soviet citizens seeking to emigrate to a third country, such as Israel. In short, U.S. influence on Soviet emigration practices and decisions remains extremely limited.

We will continue to exercise what influence we have. In raising the subject of human rights at the Geneva meeting, President Reagan stressed to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev that respect for the individual and the rule of law is as fundamental to peace as arms control. In this regard, the President pressed for greater Soviet adherence to international agreements such as the Helsinki Accord. The Soviets agreed in the Joint Statement to the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in a cooperative spirit.

We have included the Iosif Katz family name on the Department of State's list of Soviet Jews who have been repeatedly denied permission to emigrate. We present this list periodically to high-level Soviet officials to emphasize the deeply felt belief of the American people and government that Soviet Jews should not be forced to stay in the Soviet Union against their will. The Katz family name will remain on this list until their case is resolved favorably.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Smalley
Robert M. Smalley
Acting Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs

RICHARD A. GEPHARDT

24 D. 118 ST. MISSOURI

WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE

8535052
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

November 7, 1985

E227E

1832 L. CLARK ST. BALTIMORE, MD 21201
Phone (410) 637-2577

5 STREET CORNER
9999 TRAIL A
ST. LOUIS, MO 63123
Phone (314) 837-2259

ATTENTION COUNTY OFFICE
COURT HOUSE SQUARE
SECOND AND MAPLE STREETS
P.O. BOX 129
MILLSBORO, MD 21050
Phone (410) 788-2527

R

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

300717

Dear Mr. President:

I hope you will be able to convey to Secretary Gorbachev in your upcoming meeting the concern that all of us share regarding the refusal of the Soviet government to allow the refuseniks to emigrate.

In particular, I hope you will bring to Secretary Gorbachev's attention the case of one Leningrader, Nadezhda Fradkova, for whom my wife Jane -- a member of the Congressional spouse's Committee of 21 -- has great concern. Fradkova has endured two hunger strikes, job loss and incarceration in her attempt to emigrate legally to Israel.

Nadezhda first applied for the right to emigrate in 1977. Permission was refused, and she was dismissed from her job. In March, 1983, Nadezhda commenced a hunger strike in support of her application. Forty-five days later she was removed from her apartment, force-fed and kept in the "reanimation ward" of a hospital for three weeks.

That December, Nadezhda began a second hunger strike. In early January 1984, she was again placed in a reanimation ward, force-fed, injected with tranquilizers and subjected to anti-Semitic abuse. In February, her father visited her in a vain effort to dissuade her from attempting to emigrate. After an April release, she was taken back in July. In a note she managed to get to friends, she spoke of threats and intimidation by authorities trying to get her to renounce her application.

Nadezhda is currently serving a two year sentence in a labor camp because of her conviction on charges of "parasitism."

We all share abhorrence of the continuing harassment to which the refuseniks are subjected. I hope you will be able to raise this important issue with Secretary Gorbachev and impress upon him the seriousness with which we view these continued violations of human rights.

Yours very truly,

9305906
DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/OR/IR Date: 3/17/97
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() DENY IN PART

Richard A. Gephardt

TS authority to Richard A. Gephardt
FOIA Exemptions () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
PA Exemptions () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

RAYMOND J. McGRATH
5th DISTRICT, NEW YORK

MEMBER
COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
SELECT REVENUE
MEASURES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT

8533577

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

November 1, 1985

WASHINGTON OFFICE
ROOM 208
CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
(202) 225-8518

DISTRICT OFFICE
203 ROCKAWAY AVENUE
VALLEY STREAM, NY 11580
(516) 872-9560

E224D

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

9303906
DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/TR Date: 3/17/97
☒ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY
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FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C


Dear Mr. President:


Soviet refusenik Mark Terlitsky, a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Architecture, worked for 15 years as an architect with a leading design firm in Moscow. He held a responsible position and worked on a number of large projects including the historic restoration of ancient buildings in Kremlin. In 1974, because he was going to apply for permission to emigrate to Israel, Mark transferred to another job where he worked on small residential and commercial projects.

The entire Terlitsky family, Mark, his brother Leonard, wife Svetlana, their daughter Olga, and Mark and Leonard's mother, Fanya, applied to emigrate in 1976. Only Leonard was given an exit visa. The other members of the Terlitsky family were denied on the grounds of Mark's alleged "possession of secret information". In vain the family has re-applied to emigrate to Israel many times over the past nine years, and has continually been refused. In 1983, and again one month ago they were also refused permission to join relatives in the United States.

After their original application in 1976, Mark was first demoted to a draftsman, and shortly thereafter, lost his job. Svetlana, an economics analyst, also lost her job. Neither has been able to find permanent work since that time. Additionally, on several occasions Mark and Svetlana have been detained, harassed and beaten by the KGB. Despite this situation they remain active members of the Moscow refusenik community.

We, the undersigned Members of Congress, respectfully request you to raise the case of the Terlitsky family during your upcoming summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. Without the continuing efforts of our government, refuseniks such as the Terlitsky family are left with little hope for life in a free and religiously tolerant society.


Raymond J. McGrath


Sidney R. Yates

Bill Nelson

Peter H. Kostmayer

Barbara Boxer

Herbert H. Bateman

Dean A. Gailo

Howard L. Berman

Steve Barlett

Norman F. Lent

Robert J. Wrazek

Mikey Leland

Albert G. Bustamante

Richard T. Schulze

Barney Frank

Thomas R. Carper

Bernard J. Dwyer

Joseph J. DiGuarda

Bill

Bill

Robert A. Young
Robert A. Young

Frank R. Wolf
Frank R. Wolf

Robert J. Ligoarsino
Robert J. Ligoarsino

Martin Frost
Martin Frost

Robert K. Dornan
Robert K. Dornan

William J. Hughes
William J. Hughes

Harry M. Reid
Harry M. Reid

Les AuCoin
Les AuCoin

Marcy Kaptur
Marcy Kaptur

Tom Lantos
Tom Lantos

Benjamin A. Gilman
Benjamin A. Gilman

Sander M. Levin
Sander M. Levin

Dennis E. Eckart
Dennis E. Eckart


Michael D. Barnes
Michael D. Barnes


Henry A. Waxman
Henry A. Waxman


Hamilton Fish, Jr.
Hamilton Fish, Jr.

James A. Scheuer
James A. Scheuer

Lawrence J. Smith
Lawrence J. Smith


Jack F. Kemp


Silvio O. Conte


Barbara A. Mikulski

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

E227A

DEC 19

R

Dear Mr. Gephardt:

I am replying further to your November 7 letter to President Reagan requesting that he raise the case of Nadezhda Fradkova during his discussions with Soviet General Gorbachev.

We, too, are concerned over the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to respect basic human rights, such as freedom of movement. We are particularly dismayed in light of its commitment in the Helsinki Final Act "to deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family."

The U.S. Government has consistently encouraged Soviet authorities to adopt a more favorable attitude toward Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not been responsive to our efforts, labelling them as "interference" in their internal affairs. They further reject U.S. attempts to represent individual Soviet citizens seeking to emigrate to a third country, such as Israel. In short, U.S. influence on Soviet emigration practices and decisions remains extremely limited.

We will continue to exercise what influence we have. In raising the subject of human rights at the Geneva meeting, President Reagan stressed to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev that respect for the individual and the rule of law is as fundamental to peace as arms control. In this regard, the President pressed for greater Soviet adherence to international agreements such as the Helsinki Accord. The Soviets agreed in the Joint Statement to the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in a cooperative spirit.

The Honorable
Richard A. Gephardt,
House of Representatives.

9303906 #4 Date: 3/17/97
DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/TR
☒ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PART

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

We have included Nadezhda Fradkova's name on the Department of State's list of Soviet Jews who have been repeatedly denied permission to emigrate. We present this list periodically to high-level Soviet officials to emphasize the deeply felt belief of the American people and government that Soviet Jews should not be forced to stay in the Soviet Union against their will. Ms. Fradkova's name will remain on this list until her case is resolved favorably.

Sincerely,

W
William L. Ball, III
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

E226A

R

DEC 19 1981

Dear Mr. McGrath:

I am replying further to your November 1 letter to President Reagan, cosigned by 40 of your colleagues, requesting that he raise the case of the Mark Terlitsky family during his discussions with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev.

We, too, are concerned over the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to respect basic human rights, such as freedom of movement. We are particularly dismayed in light of its commitment in the Helsinki Final Act "to deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family."

The U.S. Government has consistently encouraged Soviet authorities to adopt a more favorable attitude toward Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not been responsive to our efforts, labelling them as "interference" in their internal affairs. They further reject U.S. attempts to represent individual Soviet citizens seeking to emigrate to a third country, such as Israel. In short, U.S. influence on Soviet emigration practices and decisions remains extremely limited.

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The Honorable
Raymond J. McGrath,
House of Representatives.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 3/17/97
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() DENY IN PART

FOIA Exemptions: _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions: _____ () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec. _____
() DOWNGRADE TO () S or () C

We have included the Mark Terlitsky family name on the Department of State's list of Soviet Jews who have been repeatedly denied permission to emigrate. We present this list periodically to high-level Soviet officials to emphasize the deeply felt belief of the American people and government that Soviet Jews should not be forced to stay in the Soviet Union against their will. The Terlitsky family name will remain on this list until their case is resolved favorably.

Sincerely,

WLB
William L. Ball, III
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs



P860050-0453

STATE OF ARKANSAS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
State Capitol
Little Rock 72201

8537164

Bill Clinton
Governor

October 22 1985

President Ronald Reagan
U.S. Mission to the United Nations
11, Rte. Pregny
Case Postale 1292
Chambesy/GE

Dear President Reagan:

On behalf of the people of the State of Arkansas, I want to wish you the very best for a successful and productive Summit meeting in Geneva.

As you work to establish better relationships and understanding between our country and the USSR, I want to make you aware of the many Arkansans who are concerned about the plight of thousands of Jews in the USSR who wish to go to their homeland, Israel, and be united with their families.

Last year was enormously difficult for all Soviet Jews. Less than 900 were allowed to leave, and this year seems no different. Almost a dozen young Soviet Jews were arrested for no other reason than a desire to speak and teach the Hebrew language.

I commend you for your commitment to the issue of Soviet Jewry and urge you to voice our concerns to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev regarding the curtailment of emigration and the treatment of Jews in the USSR.

Thank you so much for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 3/17/97
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PA exemptions ☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

E212A

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JEC 17

Dear Mr. Carney:

I am replying further to your November 12 letter to President Reagan requesting that he raise the case of the Mark Terlizsky family during his discussions with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev.

We, too, are concerned over the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to respect basic human rights, such as freedom of movement. We are particularly dismayed in light of its commitment in the Helsinki Final Act "to deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family."

The U.S. Government has consistently encouraged Soviet authorities to adopt a more favorable attitude toward Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not been responsive to our efforts, labelling them as "interference" in their internal affairs. They further reject U.S. attempts to represent individual Soviet citizens seeking to emigrate to a third country, such as Israel. In short, U.S. influence on Soviet emigration practices and decisions remains extremely limited.

We will continue to exercise what influence we have. In raising the subject of human rights at the Geneva meeting, President Reagan stressed to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev that respect for the individual and the rule of law is as fundamental to peace as arms control. In this regard, the President pressed for greater Soviet adherence to international agreements such as the Helsinki Accord. The Soviets agreed in the Joint Statement to the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in a cooperative spirit.

We have included the Mark Terlizsky family name on the Department of State's list of Soviet Jews who have been repeatedly denied permission to emigrate. We present this list periodically to high-level Soviet officials to emphasize the

The Honorable
William Carney,
House of Representatives.

9303906

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR #14 Date: 3/17/97
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FOIA Exemptions () CLASSIFY as () S or () C or () S or () C
PA Exemptions () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

2

...to the belief of the American people and government that
...should not be forced to stay in the Soviet Union
against their will. The Teitstky family name will remain on
...until their case is resolved favorably.

Sincerely,

WLB
William L. Ball, III
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

F238C
#354130

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IN/IPS/CR/IR

Date: 3/17/97

#354130

☒ RELEASE☐ DECLASSIFY☐ EXCISE☐ DECLASSIFY

EO Citations

☐ DENY

IN PART

8537329

FOIA Exemptions

TS authority to

PA Exemptions

☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C*Ron Almirante*

City of Pittsburgh
Richard S. Caliguiri, Mayor

November 15, 1985

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
of America
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As the mayors of cities from every section of the United States, we want to share with you the profound concern felt by men and women of conscience in our communities about a most oppressed minority, the Jews of the Soviet Union.

We know you share that concern.

The situation of the Soviet Jews has not eased under the new Soviet leadership. Quite the contrary. It has deteriorated.

Emigration remains tragically low. 51,000 were able to leave in 1979. This year just 820 through the end of October.

The authorities cracked down on any signs of organized Jewish life. Hebrew teachers are sent to prison: Edelshtein, Khomainsky, Volvovsky, Brodsky, Netomniashy, Leven, Zelichonok, and others within the past year.

But even in the face of this repression, Soviet Jews courageously demand the Soviet government grant the most elementary right: to permit them to live as Jews, to permit them to emigrate to Israel.

General Secretary Gorbachev must be held to his recent public statement that even Soviet citizens who know the "state secrets" have only to wait "five or ten years" to leave. Thousands of Soviet Jews have waited that requested time, and are still waiting. Prestin...Abramovich...Goldshtein...Lerner...Taratuta...and the list goes on and on.

Page two
November 15, 1985

The Soviet Union must be held to its international commitments on human rights, especially the Helsinki Final Act. How can Americans trust the word of the Soviet authorities on issues of war and peace, when they refuse to honor the solemn international obligations they have undertaken? This is the test of their credibility.

Mr. President, we, and our fellow Americans, look to you to carry the message of Soviet Jews to General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. We look to you to hold the Soviets to their commitments on the human rights on Soviet Jewry.

Our thoughts and prayers go with you to Geneva.

Respectfully,



RICHARD S. CALIGUIRI

/aml



PHILIP B. KRAVITZ
Mayor

5811 NORTHWEST 88th AVENUE • TAMARAC, FLORIDA 33321
TELEPHONE (305) 722-5900

November 8, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As the Mayor of cities from every section of the United States, we want to share with you the profound concern felt by men and women of conscience in our communities about the most oppressed minority, the Jews of the Soviet Union.

We know you share that concern.

The situation of Soviet Jews has not eased under the new Soviet leadership. Quite the contrary. It has deteriorated. Emigration remains tragically low. Fifty-one thousand were able to leave in 1979. This year -- just eight-hundred twenty, through the end of October. The authorities cracked down on any signs of organized Jewish life. Hebrew teachers are sent to prison.

But, even in the face of this repression, Soviet Jews courageously demand the Soviet Government grant the most elementary right; to permit them to live as Jews, to permit them to emigrate to Israel. General Secretary Gorbachev must be held to his recent published statement that even Soviet citizens "who know state secrets" have only to wait "5 or 10 years" to leave. Thousands of Soviet Jews have waited that requisite term, and are still waiting -- Prestin...Abramovich...Goldshtein...Lerner...Taratuta... and the list goes on and on.

The Soviet Union must be held to its international commitments on human rights, especially the Helsinki Final Act. How can Americans trust the word of the Soviet authorities on issues of war and peace, when they refuse to honor the solemn international obligations they have undertaken? This is the test of their credibility.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/PS/CR/IR/HA Date: 3/17/97
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() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY EO Citations
() DENY IN PART

FOIA Exemptions () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
PA Exemptions () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER
POLICY OF NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAPPED STATUS

- 2 -

Mr. President, we, and our fellow Americans, look to you to carry the message of Soviet Jews to General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. We look to you to hold the Soviets to their commitments on the human rights of Soviet Jewry.

Our thoughts and prayers go with you to Geneva.

Sincerely,

CITY OF TAMARAC

Philip B. Kravitz
Philip B. Kravitz
Mayor

PBK/ss

cc: Debra Roshfeld,
Jewish Federation of
Greater Ft. Lauderdale

#352153

EL91D

R

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

8534874

November 13, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/PS/CRAR #4 Date: 3/17/97
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() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY EO Citations
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9303904

Dear President Reagan,


FOIA Exemptions () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
PA Exemptions () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C


We are writing on behalf of Ida Nudel. We ask that during your discussions with Chairman Gorbachev at the summit meeting this month you bring up Ms. Nudel's case and urge Mr. Gorbachev to grant her an exit visa.


Ida Nudel has been trying to emigrate to Israel since 1971. She has already served four years in Siberia for her efforts to obtain an exit visa.

Ms. Nudel has been diagnosed as having cancer. Reports on her health are not good. It is especially urgent that she be allowed to reunite with her family in Israel.


Sincerely,


Patricia Schroeder, M.C.



Norman Lent, M.C.

✓ 
Tony Hall, M.C.


Philip Sharp, M.C.


✓ 
Joseph Addabbo, M.C.


Dante Fascell, M.C.

✓ 
William Lehman, M.C.


Joseph McDade, M.C.

✓ 
Hamilton Fish, M.C.


Thomas Downey, M.C.

✓ Sidney R. Yates
Sidney Yates, M.C.

✓ Claude Pepper
Claude Pepper, M.C.

✓ Walter Fauntroy
Walter Fauntroy, M.C.

✓ Bill Green
Bill Green, M.C.

✓ Howard Berman
Howard Berman, M.C.

✓ Chester J. Atkins
Chester Atkins, M.C.

✓ Stephen Solarz
Stephen Solarz, M.C.

✓ Gary Ackerman
Gary Ackerman, M.C.

✓ Major Owens
Major Owens, M.C.

✓ Peter Kostmayer
Peter Kostmayer, M.C.

✓ Dan Mica
Dan Mica, M.C.

Mickey Leland ✓
Mickey Leland, M.C.

Ed Markey ✓
Edward Markey, M.C.

Les AuCoin ✓
Les AuCoin, M.C.

John Porter ✓
John Porter, M.C.

Sam Gejdenson ✓
Sam Gejdenson, M.C.

Steny Hoyer ✓
Steny Hoyer, M.C.

Tommy Robinson ✓
Tommy Robinson, M.C.

Jim Moody ✓
Jim Moody, M.C.

Dan Burton ✓
Dan Burton, M.C.

Charles Schumer ✓
Charles Schumer, M.C.

Robert A. Mrazek ✓
Robert Mrazek, M.C.

✓ Bill Nelson
Bill Nelson, M.C.

✓ Barbara Boxer
Barbara Boxer, M.C.

✓ Bill Richardson
Bill Richardson, M.C.

✓ Thomas J. Manton
Thomas Manton, M.C.

✓ Bill Hughes
William Hughes, M.C.

✓ Bernard Dwyer
Bernard Dwyer, M.C.

✓ Gerry Sikorski
Gerry Sikorski, M.C.

✓ Richard Durbin
Richard Durbin, M.C.

✓ William J. Coyne
William Coyne, M.C.

✓ Matthew D. Martinez
Matthew Martinez, M.C.

✓ Ben Erdreich
Ben Erdreich, M.C.

✓ Tom Luken
Thomas Luken, M.C.

✓ Charles Wilson
Charles Wilson, M.C.

✓ Mario Biaggi
Mario Biaggi, M.C.

✓ Edward Feighan
Edward Feighan, M.C.

✓ Bruce A. Morrison
Bruce Morrison, M.C.

✓ Albert Bustamante
Albert Bustamante, M.C.

✓ Charles Rangel
Charles Rangel, M.C.



OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
CITY OF **CORAL SPRINGS** FLORIDA

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O B "BEN" GEIGER
Mayor

9551 WEST SAMPLE ROAD
P O BOX 754501
CORAL SPRINGS, FL 33075-4501
TELEPHONE (305) 752 3410

November 12, 1985

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
The White House
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Reagan:

As the mayors of cities from every section of the United States, we want to share with you the profound concern felt by men and women of conscience in our communities about a most oppressed minority, the Jews of the Soviet Union.

We know you share that concern.

The situation of Soviet Jews has not eased under the new Soviet leadership. Quite the contrary. It has deteriorated.

Emigration remains tragically low. 51,000 were able to leave in 1979. This year - just 820, through the end of October.

The authorities crack down on any signs of organized Jewish life. Hebrew teachers are sent to prison: Edelstein, Kholmiansky, Volvosky, Brodsky, Nepomniaschy, Levin, Zelichonok, and others - all within the past year.

But even in the face of this repression, Soviet Jews courageously demand the Soviet government grant the most elementary right: to permit them to live as Jews, to permit them to emigrate to Israel.

General Secretary Gorbachev must be held to his recent public statement that even Soviet citizens who know "state secrets" have only to wait "five or ten years" to leave. Thousands of Soviet Jews have waited that requisite term, and are still waiting. Prestin...Abramovich...Goldshtein...Lerner...Taratuta...and the list goes on and on.

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Letter to President Ronald Reagan
November 12, 1985

Page 2

The Soviet Union must be held to its international commitments on human rights, especially the Helsinki Final Act. How can Americans trust the word of the Soviet authorities on issues of war and peace, when they refuse to honor the solemn international obligations they have undertaken? This is the test of their credibility.

Mr. President, we, and our fellow Americans, look to you to carry the message of Soviet Jews to General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. We look to you to hold the Soviets to their commitments on the human rights of Soviet Jewry.

Our thoughts and prayers go with you to Geneva.

Respectfully,


O.B. "Ben" GELGER
Mayor

OBG:jr

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THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
REFERRAL

NOVEMBER 22, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ATTN: WILL BALL

ACTION REQUESTED:
DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 352153
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED NOVEMBER 13, 1985
TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM: THE HONORABLE PATRICIA SCHROEDER
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON DC 20515

SUBJECT: ASK THAT DURING YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH
MR. GORBACHEV YOU BRING UP THE CASE OF IDA
NUDEL, WHO HAS BEEN TRYING TO EMIGRATE TO
ISRAEL SINCE 1971.

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/GR/IR #44 Date: 3/17/97

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November 18, 1985

Dear Mrs. Schroeder:

The President has asked me to thank you for your November 13 letter, cosigned by 49 of your House colleagues, urging that the case of Ida Nudel, who has been refused permission to emigrate to Israel since 1971, be raised during talks with General Secretary Gorbachev at the meetings in Geneva.

Your comments are appreciated. You may be assured that President Reagan will bring up the important issue of human rights, and please know that your special interest in Ms. Nudel's case has been brought to the attention of the President's foreign policy advisers.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Patricia Schroeder
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

MBO:KRJ:MDB:jz (MBO3)

cc: w/copy of inc to Will Ball, Legis Affairs, Dept of
State - for DIRECT response

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC - FYI

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UNION OF COUNCILS FOR SOVIET JEWS

Statement of Policy

on

Emigration and the Treatment of Soviet Jews

The Union of Councils for Soviet Jews is the umbrella organization for 38 local Soviet Jewry organizations throughout the United States. We have over 50,000 members nationally, and have long been dedicated to furthering the rights and interests of Soviet Jews in two critical respects: first, for those Soviet Jews who desire to do so, to be able to emigrate from the Soviet Union to another country; and second, for those Soviet Jews who desire to remain in the Soviet Union, or who are awaiting permission to emigrate, to be able to study and express their religious and cultural heritage, free from persecution and intimidation.

The Union of Councils believes that official dealings between the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union provide an extremely important forum for expressing the strong concern of the American people over Soviet transgressions of fundamental human rights. We fully recognize the need on the part of the U. S. government to maintain a flexible approach in dealing and negotiating agreements with the Soviet Union. However, within this framework of "flexibility", we urge that the issues of emigration and fundamental human rights not be forgotten, diluted or bargained away. More specifically:

- I. We believe that continuing substantial performance by the Soviet Union in permitting Jewish emigration must be considered a prerequisite to the granting of waiver privileges under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, a law which proudly reflects the fundamental philosophy of the American people and its government to protect and foster respect for human rights and personal liberty throughout the world.

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act^{1,2} took effect on January 3, 1975. The Amendment assured "...the continued dedication of the United States to fundamental human rights..." and denied Most Favored Nation (MFN) status and the extension of credit guarantees by the Export-Import Bank to any country that:

- a) "denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate;
- b) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the visas or other documents required for emigration, for any purpose or cause whatsoever; or
- c) imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice..."

In addition, in an exchange of letters between Senator Henry M. Jackson, one of the principal authors of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and then



UNION OF COUNCILS FOR SOVIET JEWS

1411 F STREET NW • SUITE 402 • WASHINGTON, DC 20005 • (202) 791-1111

Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, dated October 18, 1974, further assurances were given that the USSR would not punish individuals seeking to emigrate.³ Among the abuses that were understood by the Soviets and Kissinger and Jackson to be abandoned were: (a) criminal prosecution, (b) punitive draft, (c) loss of job or demotion, (d) withholding of documents, and (e) requirement of parental permission for adult applicants. The punitive actions specified in this exchange of letters were not considered a complete listing, and additional actions taken by the Soviets were not to be condoned simply because they were absent from these letters. Hardship cases were to be processed sympathetically. Persons become eligible for emigration within three years of their exposure to such material. Prisoners, on their release, were to be given prompt consideration for emigration and might even be given an early release. The rate of emigration from the USSR would begin to rise promptly from the 1973 level to correspond to the number of applicants.

As Senator Jackson himself noted, a few years later in a speech delivered in Washington, D. C., June, 1979,⁴ "We have seen how cruel and capricious their (Soviet) emigration policies can be, sometimes permitting the numbers to rise, sometimes holding them down.... We have seen enough in short to know that without a firm commitment to a freer emigration from the Soviets themselves, any concessions on trade or credits would be leaping in the dark with consequences for the prisoners and refuseniks and all who desire to emigrate that cannot be foreseen."

In this connection, "substantial performance" on the part of the Soviet Union would be evidenced, we believe, by the following actions:

A. The prompt release and emigration of the Prisoners of Conscience listed on Appendix A.

A prisoner of Conscience is a person imprisoned for political and/or religious views. Many of these individuals have been tried under the pretext of economic crimes (bribery, dealing illegally on the black market), malicious hooliganism, parasitism (being without a job), anti-Soviet slander, drug abuse, and in the case of Anatoly Shcharansky, treason. In reality, the true reason for conviction was the individual's beliefs and not an illegal activity. These individuals are deliberately used as examples to others who may contemplate applying to emigrate, or merely consider gathering a few friends to celebrate the Sabbath.

Prisoners who protest the illegal, harsh treatment in the labor camps where they serve long terms on fabricated charges are further penalized by confinement in even more barbaric punishment cells within the camps, where food and warm clothing are withheld.⁵ Letters to and from prisoners are regularly intercepted and confiscated. The pitifully small, legally allowed packages of food, warm clothing or medicine are often confiscated. Permitted family visits are suddenly cancelled without

explanation. Several prisoners have resorted to protest by long hunger strikes, as have their spouses and children at home.

One of the more alarming aspects of the plight of Soviet Jews is the recent increase in arrests and trials on trumped up charges and the deliberate campaign of physical abuse against Jews who have tried to maintain a sense of community while waiting to emigrate. Hebrew teachers in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Odessa have been arrested, and some have been assaulted by persons who deliberately beat healthy men to the point of a nearly total loss of eyesight or hearing; two have been injured within hours of peaceful arrests, and their families told they resisted arrest or inflicted the wounds upon themselves. Their elderly parents have been threatened and beaten for daring to inquire about extensive, illegal searches of their apartments and unlawful confiscation of books and belongings.⁸ Several refuseniks have been imprisoned after Soviet authorities planted drugs or firearms in their apartments. Jews who refuse to testify as witnesses against friends under arrest on trumped up charges are themselves arrested and fined.¹⁰

Young men are punished by being drafted into the Soviet army,¹¹ often after being denied admission to the university or being expelled before graduating. Several have served prison terms for refusing to be drafted, and one young man is serving a second term in a labor camp for refusing to serve in the army.

Jews arrested with non-Jews for similar offenses notice that the non-Jews never come to trial, but the Jews receive stiff prison sentences.¹² Families are torn apart deliberately and cruelly by a regime that punishes Jews for wanting to emigrate to a country where Judaism is not a crime.

- B. The prompt release and emigration of the former Prisoners of Conscience listed on Appendix B.

Ex-prisoners, who in the early 1970s might have been allowed to emigrate after serving long and brutal prison terms, now are released from labor camps but are not permitted to return to their homes, and settle hundreds of miles from their family and friends.¹³

- C. The prompt emigration of all Refuseniks who have been waiting for visas for ten years or more.
- D. The expeditious emigration of all Refuseniks who have been waiting for visas for five years or more.
- E. The expeditious emigration of all Refuseniks who were refused permission to emigrate prior to April 1982.

The Soviet Jewish refusenik (a refusenik is a Soviet Jew who has applied to emigrate and been turned down) community has itself requested that the United States Congress remain firm on the emigration provisions as outlined in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.¹⁴ Speaking on behalf of refuseniks at their request, the UCSJ shares in their determination to urge the Soviet government to comply with established law as a prerequisite for increased trade benefits.

In testimony before House Subcommittees on International Trade in July, 1979,¹⁵ two past presidents of the UCSJ, Robert Gordon and Irene Manekosky stated:

"...The Union of Councils for Soviet Jews welcomes the search for understanding with Moscow, which would create more beneficial conditions for U. S.-Soviet cooperation, trade, and human rights. Our organization has sufficient flexibility in approaching this complex task. Nevertheless, it is our firm position that some form of linkage between trade benefits for the USSR and Soviet emigration policies should be preserved. The fate of courageous individuals fighting for free emigration should not be sacrificed to promote superpower accommodation." (Robert Gordon)

"...It is not the Union of Councils' position that the Soviets' treatment of emigration issues to date qualified them for a waiver, even if the requirement of assurances is removed and replaced with an emphasis on performance. While we are, of course, encouraged by the increase in the number of Soviet exit visas, as well as by the release of some prisoners of conscience, it is our firm belief that we are talking about only the first and most modest Soviet steps, which deserve recognition and encouragement, but surely not a waiver at this point. This is particularly true since the encouraging signs are mixed with some very disturbing signals, including an apparent growth in official Soviet anti-Semitism, restrictions on Jewish college enrollment, and limitations on professional employment, actually forcing many people to emigrate. We also have not yet forgotten the outrageous political trials of last summer (editor's note: the trials of Vladimir and Maria Slepak, Ida Nudel and Anatoly Shcharansky), which indicated to many Soviet Jews that they could not feel safe in Russia...." (Irene Manekosky)

According to statistics published in the Congressional Record,¹⁷ between 1968 and 1981, 630,414 first affidavits were sent from Israel to Jews in the Soviet Union. In other words, over 630,000 Jews in the USSR were sent invitations from Israel -- the first step in the application process to emigrate from the USSR. It is also known from published figures,^{18,19} that 250,187 Jews had left the USSR by 1981, and another 4,899 left between 1982 and 1984; a total of 255,086.

Thus, if the total number of those individuals who actually emigrated is subtracted from the number of Jews who received invitations from Israel, that would leave 374,328 Jews who are still in the USSR, the majority of whom have at least begun the emigration process.

Number of invitations from Israel, 1968-1981:	630,414
Number of emigres, 1968-1984:	<u>-255,086</u>

Approximate number of Jews who have applied to emigrate and are awaiting permission:	374,328
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The total number of Jews residing in the Soviet Union is estimated to be between two and three million.

In 1979, the high point of Soviet Jewish emigration, over 50,000 were allowed to leave. Since then the rate of emigration has dropped sharply. In 1984, only 896 Jews were permitted to leave and in the first five months of 1985, only 463 individuals emigrated. Thus, although thousands of Jews are known to have requested permission to leave the Soviet Union, relatively few have actually been granted permission to do so, despite the claim of an official of the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Union, Samuil L. Ziv, ²⁰ that all who wished to emigrate have already left.

In addition to those Jews who have already requested invitations from Israel, many more would probably apply to emigrate if they felt it possible to do so without risking years of unemployment, harassment and perhaps even arrest, with no assurance that permission to leave would ever be granted.

F. The emigration hereafter of substantial numbers of Soviet Jews who desire to emigrate, in accordance with procedures fairly and consistently applied irrespective of age, sex, family status or place of residence, including —

- (1) Applications for emigration shall be considered in order of receipt, including those previously filed. Applicants will be notified of decisions within three months of submission of documents. Applicants refused permission to leave due to security factors will be informed of the date on which they may expect to become eligible for emigration; the security period shall not exceed three years.
- (2) Applicants for emigration will not be subject to unreasonable or onerous procedural requirements or to other unlawful impediments for completion of the application process. Invitations from abroad will be requested and delivered without interference. Authorities will provide all required documentation. OVIR offices will be open to receive and process applications at reasonable times during normal working hours and on a regular schedule. Jews residing in areas where no OVIR office is located will be permitted to apply through the nearest OVIR office without impediment.

6

- (3) Parental permission to emigrate shall not be required for persons eighteen years of age and older.
- (4) Officially sanctioned punitive actions shall not be initiated against persons seeking to emigrate, including: dismissal from work; demotion in work; public incrimination; disconnection of telephone service or interception of mail; physical and psychiatric abuse; intimidation; military conscription of persons who have sought to emigrate or are beyond normal conscription age; and the bringing of baseless or trumped-up criminal charges.
- (5) Recognition shall be given to the distinct and separate rights of repatriation and family reunification (regardless of the country involved), either of which shall alone be sufficient grounds to emigrate. The repatriation of Soviet Jews to Israel shall be permitted regardless of whether the applicant has family in Israel.
- (6) The so-called "first-degree relative" requirement shall be abolished.
- (7) The practice of causing families to be separated by allowing some, but not all, individual members the right to emigrate shall cease.
- (8) Applications of separated families, Holocaust survivors, World War II veterans, and hardship cases (including, especially, people with special medical problems) shall be processed sympathetically and on a priority basis.
- (9) Collection of the so-called "education tax" shall remain suspended.

Constitution of the USSR²¹

Chapter 4, Article 29: "The USSR's relations with other states are based on observance of the following principles: ...respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; the equal rights of peoples and their right to decide their own destiny; cooperation among states; and fulfillment in good faith of obligations arising from the generally recognized principles and rules of international law, and from the international treaties signed by the USSR."* (editor's note: This includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords.)

Universal Declaration of Human Rights²²

- a) Article 13 (2): "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."**

*(emphasis added)

- b) Article 14 (1): "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."*

Helsinki Accords²³

- a) "Reunification of Families: The participating States will deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family," with special attention being given to requests of an urgent character such as requests submitted by persons who are ill or old.

They will deal with applications in this field as expeditiously as possible.

They will lower where necessary the fees charged in connection with these applications to ensure that they are at a moderate level.

Applications for the purpose of family reunification which are not granted may be renewed at the appropriate level and will be reconsidered at reasonable short intervals by the authorities of the country of residence or destination, whichever is concerned; under such circumstances fees will be charged only when applications are granted.

Until members of the same family are reunited, meetings and contacts between them may take place in accordance with the modalities for contacts on the basis of family ties.

The participating States will support the efforts of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies concerned with the problems of family reunification."

- b) "Marriage between Citizens of Different States: The participating States will examine favourably and on the basis of humanitarian considerations requests for exit or entry permits from persons who have decided to marry a citizen from another participating State.

The processing and issuing of the documents required for the above purposes and for the marriage will be in accordance with the provisions accepted for family reunification."

- II. In addition to the foregoing, in determining whether to cooperate with or grant benefits to the Soviet Union in connection with trade, scientific and cultural exchange, and other areas of mutual interest, the U. S. Government should consider as an important factor the continuing violation of fundamental human rights in the USSR. Specifically, assurances should be sought that, in compliance with its own Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords, the

*(emphasis added)

Soviet Union will promptly terminate, and take action to rectify, injustices suffered by Soviet Jews as a result of the following official policies and practices:

- A. The arrest and prosecution of law abiding Refuseniks and Hebrew teachers based on fabricated charges or "planted" evidence of criminal activity.

FREEDOM FROM UNFAIR ARREST, PROSECUTION AND SENTENCING

Constitution of USSR²¹

- a) Preamble: "...The Soviet Government carried through far-reaching social and economic transformations, and put an end once and for all to exploitation of man by man, antagonism between classes, and strife between nationalities."
- b) Chapter 7, Article 50: "...Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights²²

- a) Article 5: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
- b) Article 9: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile."
- c) Article 11 (1): "Everyone charged with a penal offense has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty; according to law in a public trial at which he has all the guarantees necessary for his defense."
- d) Article 13 (2): "Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state."

FREEDOM FROM ILLEGAL SEARCH OF HOME AND CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY

Constitution of USSR²¹

Chapter 7, Article 55: "Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed inviolability of the home. No one may, without lawful grounds, enter a home against the will of those residing in it."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights²²

Article 12: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation...."

B. The publication and distribution, or any other communication, of anti-Semitic propaganda.

Excerpts from a speech by U. S. Ambassador Max M. Kampelman at the Madrid review of the Helsinki Accords; December 1, 1981:

"It is with regret that our delegation has concluded that the Soviet Union is clearly identified with a pattern of anti-Semitic behaviour that could not function without government support and acquiescence.... During the past fifteen years, a total of at least 112 Soviet books and brochures with anti-Semitic overtones of various degrees have been identified, some of them printed and reprinted in editions of 150,000 -- 200,000 copies. Anti-Semitic propaganda is also carried out through lectures, stimulated by the Communist Party and the state.

Soviet anti-Semitism is not limited to domestic consumption. It is also widely exported to Arab, African and other Third World countries. The writings of outspoken Soviet anti-Semites -- Kichko, Begun, Korneyev and others -- have been featured prominently in publications of the PLO, for instance. In addition, their writings are often published in English and distributed throughout the English-speaking world.

...There are many other instances of blatant government-condoned anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. These are accompanied by harassment and imprisonment of Jewish leaders, discrimination against Jews in education and employment, active and frequently violent interference with the study of Hebrew and the possession of articles of prayer, and by a drastic reduction in the number of Jews being allowed to escape this pervasive anti-Semitism through emigration."

Antisemitica Sovietica: New Intensity in an Old Campaign: excerpts from an article by Betsy Gidwitz; Spring, 1982:

"The latest Soviet anti-Jewish campaign dates from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. ...As the propaganda campaign intensified, it soon became obvious that Soviet anger embraced more than 'international Zionism' and Israel. The term 'Zionist' being employed as a euphemism persists to this day, it has been joined since the mid 1970s by blatant racist attacks on Jews and Judaism without anti-Zionist camouflage.

The Soviet Union has mobilized mixed mass media and personnel to disseminate its anti-Semitic disinformation and propaganda to the far reaches of the USSR and even beyond its borders. Articles appear frequently in newspapers, including such national stalwarts as Pravda and Izvestia; republic and local newspapers; and special interest newspapers, ranging from the intellectual Literaturnaya Gazeta to the narrowly-focused Gudok (Whistle) newspaper for railroad workers....Of special note are the youth and military publications that carry either especially strong or exceptionally large numbers of anti-Semitic articles. The publishing house of the prestigious Academy of Sciences, Nauka (Science), has issued at least half a dozen anti-Semitic books, each in the style of a scientific treatise.

...In addition to conventional printed media attacks on Jews and Judaism, Soviet authorities also exploit television and film for propagation of anti-Semitism. A notorious television special called 'Traders of Souls' was shown twice during prime time in 1977. In this special, a number of Soviet Jewish activists, identified by name and address, were portrayed as currency speculators, hooligans, drunks, and CIA agents. Another anti-Semitic television special, 'Lies and Hatred,' was aired in 1980. A limited circulation film, 'Secret and Open Things,' has been shown in some public theatres, but its main audiences are closely-controlled groups, such as army units....

Disinformation and propaganda form only one component of the Soviet anti-Semitic assault. Intensified application of anti-Semitic quotas in educational institutions and in career selection is widespread. False charges, rigged judicial proceedings, and subsequent harsh prison sentences have claimed a number of Jewish victims, of whom Anatoly Shcharansky is the best known. Punitive military conscription has been applied much more frequently to would-be Jewish emigrants than to others desiring to leave, such as Volga Germans. Jews are subject to frequent anti-Semitic verbal attacks by passersby on the street and fellow employees at places of work. Physical assaults, especially on children, are not uncommon.

Although permission to travel abroad is tightly controlled for all citizens, opportunities to travel outside the Soviet Union are even more circumscribed for Soviet Jews. Jewish specialists invited to present papers or receive awards at various conferences abroad are frequently denied the right to attend these events.

Considered by official Soviet ideology to constitute both a religious group and a nationality, Jews are accorded the rights of neither. Unlike other religious groups in the Soviet Union, Jews have no national organization, no institution for the training of clergy, no relevant publications, and no contacts with co-religionists abroad. Unlike other groups regarded as nationalities in the Soviet Union, Jews alone lack an infrastructure that would facilitate and encourage the development of their national heritage.

...Related to the historical expression of anti-Semitism is a deep-rooted popular sense of Russian cultural identity -- a perception of homogeneity so strong that non-Russians are viewed not only as others, but also as aliens.

...The proclamation of Birobidzhan as an area of Jewish settlement in the Soviet Far East (1928) and the establishment of the Jewish anti-Fascist Committee (1942-1948) followed in the same path of centrally-operated (and manipulated) national Jewish associations. The latter organization was clearly designed to encourage domestic and foreign Jewish support for the Soviet armed forces during World War II. Both the organization and the Jewish intellectuals around

It were liquidated when their services were no longer required. Birobidzhan still exists in 1982 as the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, something of a farce as Jews constitute only 5.4 percent of its total population. Jewish ethnicity remains an official Soviet nationality and one's nationality is still inscribed in the fifth paragraph of the internal passports (identity cards) carried by Soviet citizens. Jews, however, are permitted none of the infrastructure promoting national identity (publications in a widely understood language, national organizations, etc.) which is provided other Soviet nationalities."

- C. The arbitrary denial or discontinuance of telephone service applied for or previously granted Soviet Jews; and the illegal interference with postal, telephone and telegraphic communications between Soviet Jews and persons in foreign countries.

FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATION

Constitution of USSR²¹

Chapter 7, Article 56: "The privacy of citizens and of their correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications is protected by law."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights²²

Article 12: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation...."

- D. Restrictions on the admission of Jews to Soviet universities and institutes; and the arbitrary removal of academic degrees, titles and honors held by Soviet Jews.

RIGHT TO EDUCATION

Constitution of USSR²¹

Chapter 7, Article 45: "Citizens of the USSR have the right to education... by the free issue of school textbooks, by the opportunity to attend a school where teaching is in the native language; and by the provision of facilities for self education."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights²²

Article 26 (1): "Everyone has the right to education. ...Higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit."

- E. Attempts to discourage or prohibit private visits to Soviet Jews by invited foreign citizens.

RIGHT TO VISIT CITIZENS OF ANOTHER STATE

Helsinki Accords;²³ "Contacts and Regular Meetings on the Basis of Family Ties: ...participating States will favourably consider applications for travel with the purpose of allowing persons to enter or leave their territory temporarily, and on a regular basis if desired, in order to visit members of their families."

Helsinki Accords;²³ "Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons: The participating States intend to facilitate wider travel by their citizens for personal or professional reasons...."

- F. Attempts to discourage or prohibit the unhindered and open practice of Judaism — including education in Judaism and Jewish culture and instruction in, and use of, the Hebrew language.

RIGHT TO PRACTICE THE JEWISH RELIGION AND CULTURE, INCLUDING THE STUDY OF HEBREW AND THE RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE PEACEFULLY FOR RELIGIOUS OR CULTURAL PURPOSES

Constitution of USSR²¹

- a) Chapter 7, Article 52: "Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of conscience, that is, the right to profess or not to profess any religion and to conduct religious worship....Incitement of hostility or hatred on religious grounds is prohibited."
- b) Chapter 7, Article 50: "...Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations."
- c) Chapter 3, Article 27: "The State concerns itself with protecting, augmenting and making extensive use of society's cultural wealth for the moral and aesthetic education of the Soviet people, for raising their cultural level. In the USSR, development of the professional, amateur and folk arts is encouraged in every way."
- d) Chapter 6, Article 34: "Citizens of the USSR are equal before the law, without distinction of origin, social or property status, race or nationality, sex, education, language, attitude to religion, type and nature of occupation, domicile, or other status."

The equal rights of citizens of the USSR are guaranteed in all fields of economic, political, social and cultural life."

- e) Chapter 6, Article 36: "Citizens of the USSR of different races and nationalities have equal rights."

Exercise of these rights is ensured ...by the possibility to use their native language and the languages of other peoples of the USSR.

Any direct or indirect limitation of the rights of citizens or establishment of direct or indirect privileges on grounds of race or nationality, and any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness, hostility or contempt, are punishable by law."

- f) Chapter 7, Article 46: "Citizens of the USSR have the right to enjoy cultural benefits.

This right is ensured by broad access to the cultural treasures of their own land and of the world that are preserved in state and other public collections; by the development and fair distribution of cultural and educational institutions throughout the country; by developing television and radio broadcasting and the publishing of books, newspapers and periodicals; and by extending the free library service; and by expanding cultural exchanges with other countries."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights²²

- a) Article 18: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom either alone or in community with others and in public or private to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."
- b) Article 20 (1): "Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association."

Helsinki Accords, I, a, VII:²³ "Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.

...The participating States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms....

...In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Declaration of Human Rights."

RIGHT TO WORK AT A DECENT JOB, INCLUDING RIGHT TO TEACH HEBREW AS A PROFESSION

Constitution of USSR²¹

- a) Chapter 7, Article 40: "Citizens of the USSR have the right to work.... including the right to choose their trade or profession, type of job and work in accordance with their inclinations, abilities, training and education, with due account of the needs of society."

- b) Chapter 2, Article 17: "In the USSR, the law permits individual labor in handicrafts, farming, the provision of services for the public and other forms of activity based exclusively on the personal work of individual citizens and members of their families."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights²²

Article 23 (1): "Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment."

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October 31, 1985

FOR YOUR INFORMATION



YMCA of the USA
191 North Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60601-1000
(312) 467-4000

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much for your encouragement for as many citizens as possible to participate in the very important preparation for the forthcoming summit meeting between yourself and Mr. Mikhail S. Gorbachev. We also very much appreciate your radio messages which give us, as responsible citizens, many new insights as well as information about major issues facing our country and the world.

A very outstanding republican from Texas, Karl Amelang, strongly suggested that I should communicate with your office and that of Secretary of State George P. Shultz, sharing some insights and experiences which might help towards a successful completion of this very important event on November 19 and 20. Karl Amelang, who is an outstanding builder from Houston, Texas, and a very active layman in his church and the YMCAs, also wrote letters to Congressman Bill Archer and Senator Lloyd Bentsen asking them to recommend my name to the Department of State.

Before writing this letter, we at the YMCA of the USA took the liberty of sending requests to numerous members of our national and local staff, including the Board of Directors, asking them as responsible citizens to share their thoughts and ideas with our office about the forthcoming summit meeting. The following questions were sent:

1. In your opinion, what do you think a summit meeting should accomplish?
2. Which major issues, in your opinion, should be discussed (political, social, economic, military, education, the arts, exchanges)?

James W. Ashby
Chairman, National Board

Simon R. Cousins
National Executive Director

The President
October 31, 1985
Page 2

3. How do you see the future developments of the relationship between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. as well as Eastern Europe?
4. What kind of specific suggestions would you offer Secretary of State George Shultz and President Ronald Reagan as concerns:
 - a. Negotiation technique
 - b. some of the major issues of foreign policy from your local or regional perspective
 - c. do you have any specific suggestions as far as future exchanges are concerned (high school youth students, young adults, etc.)
 - d. what suggestions do you have about how to secure peace with understanding and mutual respect and avoid appeasement
 - e. your specific suggestions in the field of human rights

We have received overwhelming support and response, truly from the grass roots of our membership representing a difference in age, sex and race as well as position. These answers indicate most vigorous interest on behalf of average citizens. Enclosed in Appendix B are several samples of those letters. We also contacted YMCAs throughout Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East as well as Europe to ask their suggestions; realizing that the forthcoming summit meeting deals with the FUTURE DESTINY OF ALL MANKIND.

We are very happy at this time to share with you and the Secretary of State some of the pertinent thoughts and ideas directly related to the forthcoming summit meeting.

1. The YMCA of the USA at the present time represents about 15 million members and about 30 million volunteers from all segments of the population. The overwhelming majority of our members would like to see the summit meeting as a most serious attempt to begin a continuous, long range process of honest understanding between two superpowers--that the final goal of mankind should be preservation of the Human Race NOT nuclear race. Idealistic as it may sound, long range goals should be the abolition

The President
October 31, 1985
Page 3

of nuclear weapons in the East, West, North or South. People never started a single war, governments start wars. There is an awakening of a new consciousness in this country and throughout the world that well educated and knowledgeable citizens "the people of every nation" are capable of altering human destiny from possible destruction to very badly needed cooperation. The Soviet leaders are more and more aware of this newly emerging powerful reality.

2. From the voluminous correspondence and calls that we have received, it is obvious that the first priority for a summit meeting has to be arms control and slow but steady reduction of deadly arms by all countries who possess atomic weapons. Our members offer a specific suggestion: That after the summit meeting with Mr. Gorbachev you, Mr. President, might initiate small summit meetings with other nuclear powers such as the People's Republic of China, India or Pakistan involving our allies and friends Great Britain, France, Israel and all NATO partners.

Next to the arms control are, of course, regional problems and human rights. We deeply feel that regional problems and particularly human rights, need to be discussed in privacy so as not to create irritation or unnecessary stubbornness on behalf of the Soviets before we even begin to discuss those issues. Experiences of the past indicate that quiet diplomacy succeeds in negotiation with the Soviet Union and other dictatorships. There should not be any illusion that the Soviet government is capable of complete reinterpretation of a given ideology and misinformation. It is also true that the Soviet State represents an aggressive police state, waiting to be discovered. The Soviet system is organized to create illusions and the Soviets' continuous indoctrination depends on repetition, which creates a numbing effect on Soviet citizens as well as the foreign press and mass media. Negotiation with the Soviets has to be based on wisdom, strength and a desire for peace but not appeasement; singling out mutual interests like trade, intensified cultural exchanges on all levels, and possible mutual help from both superpowers to solve the problems of the Third World.

The President
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Page 4

On the other hand, we at the YMCA of the USA have numerous contacts and relationships within the Soviet Union with many honest citizens who speak the truth about their conditions and who are honest enough to share their opinions; and being honest in the Soviet Union means taking a great risk. Their advice to the United States Government is to temper our rhetoric and have a statesmanlike rather than a political approach during summit negotiations. Soviet citizens are accustomed to continuous negative rhetoric in their own country and believe therefore that strong rhetoric is absolutely useless.

3. A very important point to keep in mind, at least subconsciously, is to make a strong and principal difference between the government of the Soviet Union and the 114 distinctly different nationalities which inhabit the Soviet Union. In our most recent visit to the Soviet Union this summer, in the city of Leningrad, we had an opportunity to speak to a great variety of people; young and old, members of the Party, including Central Committee, and particularly average persons in churches, the streets, at the university, and many other places. The most frequent question asked of us was a great surprise.

- * Is the United States fighting Communism in Russia or Russia itself and the peoples of Russia? If the United States is fighting Communism, why is it so friendly with the People's Republic of China, which is the biggest communist, as well as atomic, power in the world?

- * We also heard from many people that they were very upset when their country was called "an evil empire".

In other words, negative rhetoric towards the Soviet Union is apparently very effectively used by the Soviet propaganda to point out that the United States is not against Communism in Russia, but against the competitive power of Russia. This is one of the most sensitive points needing to be taken into consideration in dealing with the Soviet Union.

The President
October 31, 1985
Page 5

Mr. Gorbachev knows very well that the average person in Russia is definitely against any global war and particularly nuclear war. Those feelings are most genuine among millions of people. They have lost more than 20 million people through death, and about 14 million are crippled. This was only 40 years ago and the memories are very strong yet. This mood should be taken into most serious consideration.

The right approach to the peoples of Russia will secure for us and the entire free world a most reliable ally in the moments of principal confrontation.

4. Regional problems are extremely important to discuss but at the same time we must understand that Russia, through centuries of being invaded from the East and West, created a concept to maintain "buffer states", and through the centuries Eastern European states were serving as "buffer states" as well as the Southern borders of Russia, including fighting in Afghanistan between Russian and British imperial forces. There is no justification for this kind of foreign policy and behavior but foreign policy of a given country is never objective in the sights of another country or neighbor. The Soviet Union is in Afghanistan not because it is a Communist power, but because it simply represents a continuation of the Russian imperial foreign policy to "safeguard the borders". While the Russian people with whom we spoke in the Soviet Union were vehemently opposed to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, they point out that the People's Republic of China was equally involved in similar situations; namely, occupying Tibet, fighting the United States in Viet Nam, and sending 2½ million volunteers to fight the United States and United Nations in Korea. We, in the free world, are definitely involved in ideological competition with various forms of communism. Unfortunately, it is not a new occurrence. Throughout history we have had crusaders fighting Islam or Islam fighting Christianity. For about 100 years, during the Middle Ages, we had Protestants fighting Catholics and Catholics fighting Protestants. As the present time, throughout Middle East we have similar situations among numerous splinter groups where one form of Islam is fighting another. When you read the rhetoric of the previous "enemies" they sound very similar to the present rhetoric of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The President
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Page 6

We believe deeply, Mr. President, that you are more than capable to appear at the summit meeting as an outstanding Statesman continuing the traditions of Jefferson, Lincoln and other great United States leaders in the last 200 years.

5. When we approached our YMCA leaders, laymen and professionals on other continents, they came up with a most burning major issue for the entire Third World. They have a great concern for the impact of the "debt bomb" versus the "atomic bomb". Our friends from Latin America and Africa deeply believe that they have a very uneasy choice between debt and democracy. The feeling of the Asian countries, where the majority of the population lives, in the words of the Foreign Minister of The Philippines, P. A. Castro "developing countries could be compared to the grass that gets trampled because of the proverbial quarrel between elephants, the two superpowers".

Maybe one of the most important issues which could be discussed with Mr. Gorbachev would be an open commitment on behalf of the Soviet Union, United States and other industrial nations to have a long range plan of at least 25 years duration to combat poverty, hunger, apartheid and other injustices throughout the entire Third World. Such a commitment should be announced loudly and clearly before all mankind to make it obligatory for all parties involved.

6. We are very grateful to you and Secretary of State George Shultz, that the interpretation of the ABM Treaty will be "restrictive". If at this time we begin to tamper with a variety of interpretations, the Soviet Union may repudiate this treaty altogether and in that case no one would win. Strategic defense initiatives "Starwars" represents a very sensitive issue, not so much to the Soviet leadership but to the millions of average citizens. in our continuous contacts with citizens of the Soviet Union we have never seen such frightened reactions from so many people. The reason that they are frightened of any kind of nuclear war is very simple; in case of such a war millions and millions of innocent people will die; the people who want liberty, freedom and dignity more than anything else.

The President
October 31, 1985
Page 7

They say that "the Soviet Government has already built necessary bunkers which would preserve the entire diabolic bureaucracy". Realizing the new nature of nuclear war, retaliation by another side is useless because of the nuclear winter. The old notion of an eye for an eye only creates mutual blindness.

Arms negotiations should proceed in the spirit of endless patience, statesmanlike arguments, and clearly verifiable methods to inspect and control each side's limited amount of weaponry system. Maybe two superpowers should invoke impartial help and judgment of the United Nations, a kind of world commission of arms reduction, which may consist of members from most respected representatives of the medium and small size states and nations of the globe. The world of the 1980's became interdependent and interconnected.

7. May we suggest a few exciting opportunities which might be big enough challenges for two superpowers to develop an unprecedented degree of cooperation in the coming years.

* Would it be possible to ask the U. S. Department of Defense and the equivalent department of the Soviet Union to set aside one billion dollars each year for the next 5 years for the beginning of an unprecedented massive exchange between the U. S. and Soviet Union and vice-versa. Such an exchange should include not only average families with children and grandchildren but professionals in every conceivable field to visit another country for a minimum of 3-6 weeks. Organized exchanges would be military to military, businessman to businessman, politician to politician, educators to educators, artists to artists, etc. Each group should have thorough preparation in the history of the country; culture, religion, habits and pattern of behavior. At least several persons in every group which visits Russia should speak Russian; while the rest of the group should speak at least 100 words in Russian. It might be possible that we might invite members of the Politbureau and their families as well as members of the entire Central Committee of the U.S.S.R. and their families or even Supreme Soviet (Soviet Parliament).

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They might invite the entire House of Representatives and the Senate or the judges of the Supreme Court and their families. Just imagine what would happen if all of those people would meet not only with the officials in another country but with families, seeing the beautiful sights and feeling the spirit of the people rather than only bureaucrats.

So far we have had only very limited exchanges but even those have created a very positive effect already. As we approach the 21st Century we are capable of having a new vision of massive unprecedented exchanges which might prove to be the best defense and therefore any money for such an understanding between nations should be directly related to Department of Defense expenditures.

- * Simultaneous and mutual announcements by you, Mr. President, and Mikhail Gorbachev of a long range program of mutual assistance without ideological competition to the Third World countries; keeping in mind it would be a plan for at least 5, 10 or 25 years.
- * It was the great Secretary of State Cordell Hull who said that if the borders are not opened by trade, armies will open the borders. our YMCA friends in Alaska, including former Secretary of the Interior, Walter Hinkle, Dr. Glen Olds, President of Alaska Pacific University and others suggest a superb innovation. Namely, to create a new global train network which would connect all of the continents of the globe except Australia. We have the know-how for example to build a bridge between Alaska and the Soviet Union and with the combined resources of all the industrial countries and the Soviet Union, to use the newest types of speed trains this would permit transportation of people and goods all over the world. Such a new rail system from Alaska to the U.S.S.R. and through the U.S.S.R. to Europe and down to Spain would present the opportunity to build a tunnel or a bridge to Gibraltar, connecting the entire African continent to trade and other exchanges and then further to build another tunnel or bridge either over the Suez Canal or other terrain connecting Africa with all of Asia. This

The President
October 31, 1985
Page 9

could be one of the first truly global projects of our interdependent world. We have already become a global economic system without complete realization of the consequences for all of us.

- * Through the combined resources of an industrial world and the Soviet Union we could build, for example, a kind of half way city right on the North Pole for the purpose of experimentation for the future space exploration programs.
- * We have many other very exciting suggestions and proposals from many of our members who include republicans, democrats, and independents throughout the United States. We would be very happy to share this information with you at a later date.
- * Mr. President, you have a most powerful card in your hand as far as negotiating with Mikhail S. Gorbachev is concerned. For the last 70 years beginning with Lenin, the Soviet Union has always told the Russian people and the world that they will create a "classless society with equal opportunities for all to be rich and prosperous". They also promised that the government will disappear and every worker would be capable of ruling the country, they promised lots of other nonsense. The Soviet leaders were very proud to announce that the Soviet Union is the first country of "workers and peasants"; the promises are still promises without fulfillment.
- * Having lived in the United States since 1952 and traveling around the country continuously, appearing on more than 600 college and university campuses, I wonder why we have not interpreted our country, The United States of America, as the one and only country in the world which truly represents the power and achievements of the "workers and farmers". After all, less than 300 years ago the emigrants who came to this country were truly workers and peasants who were persecuted for their politics, religion, and other reasons. An overwhelming majority of them came to the United States with nothing and in a period of one or two generations, these workers and

The President
October 31, 1985
Page 10

peasants from around the world created one of the most magnificent civilizations and way of life that mankind ever experienced on a massive scale. We have the most powerful middle class, which is the only guarantee for a sound democratic society.

In the year 1985, everyone who is anxious to work and is not lazy has a great opportunity to succeed in many different fields. Our country, the United States, is truly a country which is built on the foundation of workers and farmers. While Karl Marx and Lenin dreamed about this accomplishment, the United States has done it without their help or their false preachings. Maybe this is the time to reinterpret the United States as one of the most progressive and revolutionary societies of the world, where the so called "little man" has the best chance to succeed.

We deeply believe that this is a very strong card in your hands to approach Gorbachev and his group at the forthcoming summit meeting.

The Executive Director of the YMCA, Mr. Solon Cousins, and the National Board of the YMCA would like to take this opportunity to express to you personally, to your entire staff, your cabinet and the distinguished Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, our deepest respect, admiration and pride in your outstanding leadership and statesmanship.

Your presence at the United Nations was received with a degree of soberness and deep appreciation by the friends and foe. I⁺ was my privilege to serve as a permanent representative of the World Alliance of the YMCA to the United Nations for a period of 8 years.

Wishing you and the members of your staff who are going with you a bon voyage to Geneva and the best of success in the forthcoming negotiations. Our prayers and thoughts will be with you! May I quote Julius K. Nyerere, President of Tanzania,

The President
October 31, 1985
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with a profound suggestion from a very wise African leader to all of us in any human situation, but maybe particularly in the Geneva negotiation (from his address at the United Nations) "Let us act toward each other with humility, not arrogance, recognizing that none of us knows all the answers to the manifold problems facing us."

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Nicholas T. Goncharoff, Ph.D.
Director of Special Programs and
International and Cultural Affairs

NTG/js
enclosures:

APPENDIX A: Dr. Nicholas T. Goncharoff's biographical sketch

APPENDIX B: Selected letters and excerpts from selected letters of various YMCA representatives across the country.

cc: The Vice-President

Mr. Donald T. Regan
Chief of Staff

The Honorable Bill Archer
United States Congress

Mr. Karl Amelang
Amelang Partners

Mr. James W. Ashley
Chairman of the Board
YMCA of the USA

The Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Advisor

The Honorable Lloyd Bentsen
United States Senate

Mr. Solon B. Consins
Executive Director
YMCA of the USA



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Dear Senator Bingaman:

I am replying further to your October 30 letter to President Reagan requesting that he raise the cases of two Soviet prisoners, Vladimir Brodsky and Roald Zelichonok, during his discussions with Soviet Secretary Gorbachev.

We, too, are concerned over the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to respect basic human rights, such as freedom of movement. We are particularly dismayed in light of its commitment in the Helsinki Final Act "to deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family."

The U.S. Government has consistently encouraged Soviet authorities to adopt a more favorable attitude toward Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not been responsive to our efforts, labelling them as "interference" in their internal affairs. They further reject U.S. attempts to represent individual Soviet citizens seeking to emigrate to a third country, such as Israel. In short, U.S. influence on Soviet emigration practices and decisions remains extremely limited.

We will continue to exercise what influence we have. In raising the subject of human rights at the Geneva meeting, President Reagan stressed to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev that respect for the individual and the rule of law is as fundamental to peace as arms control. In this regard, the President pressed for greater Soviet adherence to international agreements such as the Helsinki Accord. The Soviets agreed in the Joint Statement to the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in a cooperative spirit.

The Honorable
Jeff Bingaman,
United States Senate.

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We have included the Vladimir Brodsky and Roald Zelichonok family names on the Department of State's list of Soviet Jews who have been repeatedly denied permission to emigrate. We present this list periodically to high-level Soviet officials to emphasize the deeply felt belief of the American people and government that Soviet Jews should not be forced to stay in the Soviet Union against their will. The Brodsky and Zelichonok family names will remain on this list until their cases are resolved favorably.


Sincerely,



William L. Ball, III
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

E481
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BARBAT MITZVAH



TWINNING

South Florida Conference on Soviet Jewry

a committee of the
Greater Miami Jewish Federation's Community Relations Committee

4200 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida 33137

Note: Be sure that your Rabbi has been consulted about incorporating the Twinning program within your congregation.

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HOW MANY JEWS HAVE LEFT?

Since 1970, two-hundred-fifty thousand (250,000) Jews have succeeded in emigrating from the USSR. Until 1979, more and more Jews were allowed out each year. Fifty thousand (50,000) Jews left in 1979. But each year since the numbers have gotten smaller. In 1980, twenty-one thousand (21,000) Jews got out, but by 1981 only nine thousand (9,000) were permitted to leave. The year of 1982 saw a drastic decline to 2,670. In 1983, it was an alarming 1,314. Through June 1984, only 484 Jews had emigrated from the USSR.

WHAT HAPPENS TO A JEW WHO WANTS TO LEAVE?

When a Jew decides to emigrate from the Soviet Union, he must apply for a visa. In order to apply, he must first present a letter from a relative already living in Israel who is willing to take care of the emigrant and his or her family when they first arrive. Many times the Soviet Government holds up the mail and the invitation from Israel never is delivered. Sometimes he must wait years before he gets the letter and can officially apply to leave.

When the application is submitted, the Jew is in danger of losing his or her job. When people find out that a family wants to leave, the husband or wife of the applicant is fired also. Sometimes they are forced to move out of their apartment.

In the Soviet Union, anyone who is not working can be charged with "parasitism," that is, not contributing to the Soviet state. Many Jews fired from their jobs have been sent to prisons and labor camps as "parasites." For those who are not arrested, it is impossible to find other jobs.

The children of applicants often are dismissed from schools and training programs. The entire family lives on the outer edges of society. Their friends avoid them, the KGB harasses them, they can no longer live as they did. They sit and wait for the Government to allow them to leave. Sometimes they wait months; many times they wait for years.

WHAT CAN WE DO TO HELP?

Twin your Bar or Bat Mitzvah. You help a young Soviet Jew to tell the world that he/she is part of the Jewish people. Your letters and the tape of the ceremony, if possible, will teach the family and friends of this young person all about this important event in the life cycle.

Writing to a Soviet Jewish family helps them to "keep up their spirits" during their long wait for exit permits. You can tell your Soviet twin about your life and share some of your religious learning experiences with him/her.

REMEMBER: EVERY LETTER WE WRITE, EVERY CONTACT SHOWS THE USSR THAT WE CARE AND WE ARE WATCHING OUT FOR OUR SOVIET JEWISH BROTHERS AND SISTERS. THE USSR WILL LISTEN TO OUR VOICES IF WE ARE LOUD ENOUGH. WE MUST CONTINUE TO HELP AS MUCH AS WE CAN UNTIL EVERY JEW WHO WANTS TO LEAVE IS PERMITTED TO EMIGRATE!

WRITING LETTERS TO YOUR "TWIN"

1. Your letter should be personal. Introduce and describe yourself. Write about your family, where you live, and your hobbies. Send photographs. (Make several copies of this letter.)
2. Explain about your Bar/Bat Mitzvah and that you would like to share this with him/her. You may want to explain what the "twinning" program is to your twin. **DON'T WRITE ANYTHING ANTI-SOVIET OR MENTION JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS.** It is OK to mention the synagogue.
3. Number your letters on the inside, which will enable your twin to know if he/she has received all your letters. Make copies of your letters.
4. Encourage them to write to you and indicate which number letters they have received. Let them (and the Soviet censors) know that you, your friends and your Congressmen have heard about them and are very concerned.
5. Take your first letter to the Post Office and mail it REGISTERED, RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED. It will cost \$4.25 and will give your letter a better chance of reaching its destination. Regular letters should be addressed to one of your twin's parents rather than to the twin himself/herself. This also gives you a better chance of having it delivered.
6. Write once a month. Mail some of your letters to your twin regular postage - air mail, especially until you have established contact and received an answer from your twin. Include a copy of the introductory first letter with a new, short note each month until you receive an answer.
7. In addition to your personal letter, send holiday cards and special greetings whenever you can - birthdays, Rosh Hashanah, Chanukah and Passover.
8. Be sure to answer all letters promptly! If no response is forthcoming, continue to write since some letters might not be delivered.
9. If information is included on relatives of your twin living in Israel or somewhere else outside the USSR, you can write to the relatives. You may want to send the relative a copy of your letter too.
10. If you receive any answers, please call the person in charge of twinning at your congregation. We would like to share them with the congregation. News needs to be shared.

GOOD LUCK! Remember you are their link. Your letters will let the Soviet KGB know that your Soviet Jewish family is known and supported in the West.

If you have any questions, please call me. I will be happy to help you in any way possible.

Shalom,

Congregational Twinning Chairman

Address: _____ Phone: _____

tn.

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SUBJECT: REPORT FOR PERIOD FEBRUARY 28-MARCH 5, 1980

-- ALL PAPERS SAID POLICE AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT
AUTHORITIES WERE DIRECTING EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT INTO
QUICKLY SOLVING THE BRUTAL MURDER OF THE SIX-YEAR OLD
TWIN DAUGHTERS AND AGED MOTHER OF LIN YI-HSIUNG, TAIWAN
PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY MEMBER AND ONE OF THE EIGHT MAJOR
KAOHSIUNG RIOT SUSPECTS AWAITING TRIAL ON SEDITION
CHARGES.

ACCORDING TO THE REPORTS LIN WAS RELEASED ON BAIL BY
ORDER OF PRESIDENT CHIANG CHING-KUO. THE TRIPLE MURDER
OCCURRED ABOUT NOON AT THE LIN FAMILY HOME IN TAIPEI ON
FEBRUARY 28. A NINE-YEAR OLD DAUGHTER WHO WAS STABBED
BY THE INTRUDER WAS REPORTED RECOVERING IN A HOSPITAL.
SHE IS DESCRIBED AS A KEY EYE WITNESS.

AUTHORITIES ASKED THE PUBLIC TO REFRAIN FROM SPECULATION
ABOUT THE IDENTITY AND MOTIVE OF THE MURDERER. HOWEVER,
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PAGE 02 AIT TA 01123 01 OF 03 091934Z

RUMORS WERE RAMPANT. ALL PAPERS REPORTED POLICE
QUESTIONING OF A "BEARDED ALIEN" DESCRIBED AS A LIN
FAMILY FRIEND. A CHINA NEWS STORY SAID THAT FOLLOWING
PUBLICITY ABOUT THE "BEARDED ALIEN" BARBERSHOPS WERE
BUSIER THAN USUAL SHAVING BEARDED FOREIGN CUSTOMERS WHO
WISHED TO AVOID EMBARRASSING STARES ON THE STREET.

AN NT DOLS 2 MILLION REWARD HAS BEEN POSTED FOR INFORM-
ATION LEADING TO THE ARREST OF THE MURDERER.

-- THE EXECUTIVE YUAN, RESPONDING TO AN INTERPELLATION BY OPPOSITIONIST LEGISLATOR KANG NING-HSIANG, DECLARED THAT PERPETRATORS OF THE KAOHSIUNG INCIDENT "USE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS AS A WINDOW DRESSING FOR THEIR SEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES."

THE EXECUTIVE YUAN'S WRITTEN REPLY, DISTRIBUTED FEBRUARY 28 BY THE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION OFFICE, STATED THAT THE INCIDENT, IN WHICH AUTHORITIES CLAIM MANY UNARMED MILITARY POLICE WERE INJURED, "VIOLATED THE PEACEFUL AND RATIONAL PROCEDURES OF DEMOCRACY AND INFRINGED ON THE FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS OF SOCIETY AND THE PEOPLE."

THE REPORT ADDED THE GOVERNMENT WILL SEE THERE IS "NO CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, TORTURE TO EXTRACT CONFESSIONS OR OTHER INHUMANE ACTS DURING THE PERIOD OF DETENTION FOR INVESTIGATION" AND THAT WHEN INVESTIGATIONS ARE FINISHED ALL DEFENDANTS WILL HAVE PUBLIC TRIALS BY MILITARY OR CIVILIAN COURTS.

"FROM THE BEGINNING THE GOVERNMENT HAS ASSUMED THE ATTITUDE OF BEING DISTRESSED, NOT DELIGHTED, AND HEALING, NOT HATING," THE REPORT SAID.

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THE REPORT EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR KANG'S VIEW THAT THE AUTHORITIES SHOULD PUSH POLITICAL IMPROVEMENT AS HARD AS THE 10 MAJOR CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS, BUT SAID THAT IN THE PAST 30 YEARS AUTHORITIES HAVE NEVER OVERLOOKED POLITICAL IMPROVEMENTS WHILE ENGAGING IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS.

THE REPORT SAID THAT THE KAOHSIUNG INCIDENT WAS INSTIGATED BY FORMOSA MAGAZINE STAFF MEMBERS WHO CARRIED OUT "ABOUT A DOZEN MASS ACTIVITIES INDICATING THAT THE KAOHSIUNG INCIDENT WAS PART OF AN OVERALL PLAN."

-- THE INDEPENDENCE EVENING POST SAID THE MANNER OF SIGNING THE NEW U.S.-TAIWAN AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT IS UNUSUAL IN THE HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE BECAUSE NORMALLY REPRESENTATIVES OF COUNTRIES WITH DIFFERENT LANGUAGES SIGN TWO EQUALLY BINDING LINGUISTIC VERSIONS.

IN THIS CASE, THE PAPER SAID, ONLY THE ENGLISH TEXT IS SIGNED, AND ALTHOUGH TAIWAN CAN USE THE CHINESE VERSION IT WILL NOT BE LEGALLY BINDING. THE U.S. INSISTED ON USING THE TERMINOLOGY "TO REPLACE" (THE OLD AGREEMENT) INSTEAD OF "TO SUCCEED", THE PAPER NOTED.

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-- SPEAKING AT THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN, LEGISLATOR WANG PAO-HSUAN COMPLAINED THAT THE TITLE OF THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT IS INAPPROPRIATE AND URGED AUTHORITIES TO TRY TO CHANGE THE NAME TO "ROC RELATIONS ACT."

FOREIGN MINISTER CHU FU-SUNG TOLD THE SAME LEGISLATIVE YUAN MEETING THAT U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS CHANGED BASICALLY AFTER THE DIPLOMATIC BREAK AND THAT NEW PROBLEMS HAVE APPEARED.

HE AFFIRMED THAT TAIWAN'S SUBSTANTIVE RELATIONS WITH UNCLASSIFIED

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THE U.S. WILL BE BASED ON AN ANTI-COMMUNIST POLICY,

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ICAE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 SP-02 SS-15 /084 W
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R 070622Z MAR 80
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO AIT WASHDC
INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

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PASS USICA WASHDC FOR EA, PGM/R
PASS SECSTATE WASHDC FOR EA
CINCPAC FOR USICA ADVISOR

MAINTAINING LEGAL RIGHTS AND UPHOLDING THE DIGNITY OF THE STATE.

-- PREMIER SUN TOLD ANOTHER LEGISLATIVE YUAN ASSEMBLY THAT THE TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, LIKE ANY ATTEMPT TO "SUBVERT OR CONSPIRE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT," IS ILLEGAL.

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THE UNITED DAILY NEWS, COMMENTING ON MASKED TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE DEMONSTRATORS BEFORE CCNAA WASHINGTON AND SEATTLE OFFICES, SAID THE ENTIRE INDEPENDENCE CONCEPT IS A "MASK."

THE PAPER SAID THE MOVEMENT ORIGINATED AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II WHEN THE JAPANESE MILITARY ATTEMPTED TO CREATE AN INDEPENDENT TAIWAN THAT WOULD BE SUBORDINATE TO JAPAN.

THIS PHASE, THE PAPER SAID, WAS FOLLOWED BY A "ONE CHINA, ONE TAIWAN" THEORY WHICH THE U.S. WAS INCLINED TO FAVOR.

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INDEPENDENCE ADVOCATES NOW ACTIVE IN THE U.S. WOULD LIKE TO TURN TAIWAN OVER TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AFTER A TRANSITORY PERIOD OF SOCIALISM, AND ARE SECRETLY PROVIDED WITH COMMUNIST FUNDS INTENDED TO SUPPORT A REVOLUTION IN TAIWAN, THE PAPER SAID. THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IS SYNONYMOUS WITH "TAIWAN TRAITORISM AND COMMUNISM," THE PAPER CONCLUDED.

-- PAPERS REPORTED THAT MOFA SPOKESMAN CHARLES KING TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT "THE DOMESTIC ADMINISTRATION IS SOMETHING WITHIN THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THERE IS NO NEED FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO CONSULT OTHER GOVERNMENTS OR MAKE ANY AGREEMENT CONCERNING ITS INTERNAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION."

-- IN A REPORT PREMIER SUN DENIED THE KAOHSIUNG RIOT WAS A CONFLICT BETWEEN AUTHORITIES AND THE PEOPLE. SUN SAID DEFENDANTS WILL BE FAIRLY TRIED BY LEGAL PROCEDURES IN MILITARY OR CIVILIAN COURTS.

-- ADDRESSING PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC CLERGYMEN IN KAOHSIUNG, INTERIOR MINISTER C. H. CHIU SAID AUTHORITIES HAVE NO DESIRE TO CONTROL RELIGION IN TAIWAN AND THAT CLERICS ARRESTED IN THE KAOHSIUNG INCIDENT BROKE THE LAW. HE SAID AUTHORITIES ARE STUDYING THE DRAFT OF A PROPOSED LAW ON RELIGIOUS PRACTICES THAT WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH RELIGIOUS BELIEFS.

-- COMMENTING ON A REPORT ABOUT PROPOSED U.S. ARMS SALES TO EGYPT, THE CHINA NEWS ASKED, "WHY? ARE WE LESS TRUSTWORTHY THAN THE EGYPTIANS WHO, AFTER ALL, HAVE FOUGHT SEVERAL WARS WITH ISRAEL WHICH QUALIFIES AS AN

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AMERICAN CLIENT STATE?"

THE PAPER ARGUED THAT ALTHOUGH TAIWAN IS A FAITHFUL ALLY, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAS "PLAYED THE RED CHINA CARD AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND AGAINST US" AND THAT WASHINGTON WOULDN'T CARE TOO MUCH IF THE COMMUNISTS ATTACKED TAIWAN, "ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD PREFER THAT WE LAY DOWN OUR ARMS AND GIVE UP."

"ABOVE ALL," THE PAPER SAID, "THE AMERICAN POWER HOLDERS WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT WE DO NOT ATTACK THE COMMUNISTS."

-- THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANNOUNCED PREMIER SUN WOULD VISIT SOUTH AFRICA, MALAWI, LESOTHO AND SWAZILAND BEGINNING MARCH 9.

SUN WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY VICE ECONOMICS MINISTER Y. T. WONG; K. T. LI, MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO; COMMUNICATIONS MINISTER C. S. LIN; GIO DIRECTOR JAMES SOONG; ADMIRAL SOONG CHANG-CHIH, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF; AND Y. T. MAO, DIRECTOR, CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION, PAPERS SAID.

-- CHINA PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND U.S. PACIFIC RESOURCES INCORPORATED WERE REPORTED PLANNING TO BUILD AN OIL REFINERY IN HAWAII WHICH WOULD PROVIDE TAIWAN WITH UP TO 20,000 BARRELS OF FUEL OIL DAILY. THE CHINA TIMES SAID THAT UNDER A NEW AGREEMENT KUWAIT WOULD INCREASE CRUDE OIL SUPPLIES TO TAIWAN BY 21,000 BARRELS DAILY. TAIWAN NOW RECEIVES 79,000 BARRELS DAILY, REPORTS SAID.

-- IN ANOTHER PROJECT, PAPERS SAID A SPANISH PETRO-CHEMICAL COMPANY AND CPC WILL COOPERATE IN BUILDING A PLANT IN INDONESIA TO REFINER 80,000 BARRELS OF OIL DAILY. ACCORDING TO THE CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY THE PROJECT WILL

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ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SY-05 AIT-02 HA-05 IO-15 JUSE-00
 ICAE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-10 L-03
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PASS USICA WASHDC FOR EA, PGM/R
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CINCPAC FOR USICA ADVISOR

COST ABOUT U.S. DOLS 800 MILLION.

-- THE UNITED DAILY NEWS SAID THE BOARD OF FOREIGN
TRADE HAS AUTHORIZED THE INDIRECT PURCHASE OF 10,000
BALES OF COTTON FROM THE USSR. THE TRANSACTION REPORTEDLY
IS TO BE HANDLED THROUGH SWITZERLAND.

-- TOURISM BUREAU DIRECTOR CHU KUO-HSUN SAID TOURISTS
SPENT MORE THAN U.S. DOLS 800 MILLION IN TAIWAN IN 1979.
HE PREDICTED APPROXIMATELY 1,400,000 TOURISTS IN 1980,
AS COMPARED WITH 1,340,000 IN 1979.

-- CUSTOMS OFFICIALS ANNOUNCED THAT ALL GOLD CARRIED BY
INCOMING PASSENGERS MUST BE DECLARED OR IT WILL BE
CONFISCATED. UP TO FIVE OUNCES CAN BE BROUGHT IN DUTY
FREE.

-- THE CHINA POST CARRIED A 17-COLUMN INCH COMPLIMENTARY
RESUME ON TAIWAN FROM THE FEBRUARY ISSUE OF "THE CITIZEN,"
PUBLISHED IN JACKSON, MISS.

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THE PAPER'S EDITOR, GEORGE SHANNON, A RECENT VISITOR TO
TAIPEI, WROTE THAT TAIWAN REMAINS A FRIEND OF THE UNITED
STATES DESPITE BEING BETRAYED BY THE NIXON AND CARTER
ADMINISTRATIONS.

SHANNON NOTED THAT UNEMPLOYMENT IS LESS THAN TWO PERCENT
IN TAIWAN AND THAT THERE ARE NO STRIKES.

"THE COUNTRY IS MILITARILY PREPARED TO DEFEND ITSELF,

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FIGHTING ALONE IF NECESSARY," HE SAID. "THE LIVING
STANDARD IS ONE OF THE HIGHEST IN ASIA."

-- THE EXECUTIVE YUAN APPROVED LT. GEN. KU CHUAN-HSIN
AS THE DEFENSE VICE MINISTER. HIS PREDECESSOR LT. GEN.
TIN EN-YUAN, IS TO RECEIVE A NEW APPOINTMENT.

KU, A GRADUATE OF THE CHINESE MILITARY ACADEMY AND THE
CHINESE ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, WAS
PREVIOUSLY DIRECTOR OF THE MND DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER.
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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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ACTION AIT-02

INFO OCT-01 EA-12 ADS-00 ICAE-00 EUR-12 SMS-01 ACDA-12
OES-09 NRC-02 HA-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 SP-02 SS-15
TRSE-00 OMB-01 IO-15 RP-10 SR-04 EB-08 COME-00
AID-07 AGRE-00 DOE-17 SSLG-02 SMI-01 /165 W
-----039451 021912Z /44

R 290740Z FEB 80
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO AIT WASHDC
INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 00995

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date 16 Apr 98
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☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
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CINCPAC FOR USICA ADVISOR

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E.O. 12065: N/A
SUBJECT: REPORT FOR PERIOD FEBRUARY 21-27, 1980

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-- PREMIER SUN TOLD THE 65TH SESSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE
YUAN THAT THE FREE AND COMMUNIST WORLDS CANNOT COEXIST
AND THAT U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PRC IS ENCOURAGING
SOVIET AGGRESSION. SUN DECLARED THAT SOVIET AGGRESSION
IN AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE CENSURED BUT THAT BY UNITING
WITH THE PRC IN AN EFFORT TO RESTRAIN SOVIET RUSSIA
THE U.S. IS INTENSIFYING THE CRISIS. HE ASSERTED THE
PRC LACKS THE INTENT OR STRENGTH TO CHECK THE USSR, BUT
TERMED A POWERFUL TAIWAN THE CORNERSTONE OF ASIAN
SECURITY AND WORLD PEACE. HE SAID TAIWAN WOULD REMAIN
IN THE DEMOCRATIC CAMP.

-- IN AN EDITORIAL, "DEFENSE AND THE BOMB," THE CHINA
NEWS SAID THAT JUST AS ISRAEL MAY HAVE DECIDED NUCLEAR
WEAPONS ARE ESSENTIAL IN VIEW OF MANPOWER INFERIORITY,
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TAIWAN "MAY BE FORCED TO CONCLUDE NUCLEAR FIRE HAS TO
BE OFFSET BY NUCLEAR FIRE."

THE PAPER SAID THAT THE PRC COULD "PULVERIZE" TAIWAN BY
NUCLEAR ATTACK AND QUESTIONED WHETHER TAIWAN SHOULD NOT
HAVE NUCLEAR DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

NOTING, "ISRAELI DENIALS OF MAKING AND TESTING THE BOMB
ARE BEING RECEIVED WITH CONSIDERABLE DISBELIEF," THE

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PAPER SAID TAIWAN'S POLICY HAS NOT CHANGED, BUT "THE ISRAELI VENTURE MIGHT GIVE US REASON FOR A THOUGHTFUL REAPPRAISAL."

NOT TO PREPARE FOR NUCLEAR RETALIATION IN CASE OF ATTACK COULD BE DANGEROUS, THE PAPER SAID.

THE EDITORIAL NOTED THAT ISRAEL'S POSSIBLE OPPONENTS HAVE NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NO PROSPECT OF ACQUIRING ANY, BUT THAT "TAIWAN'S ANTAGONIST HAS ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN BOMBS AND THE MEANS OF THEIR DELIVERY."

-- PAPERS REPORTED A SPECIAL TAIWAN GARRISON COMMAND MARTIAL COURT WOULD TRY EIGHT MAJOR KAOHSIUNG RIOT SUSPECTS FOR SEDITION, AND THAT LAWYERS FOR THE ACCUSED WERE INFORMED THEY COULD CONFER WITH THEIR DEFENDANTS FOR UP TO 40 MINUTES AND MAKE HAND WRITTEN, BUT NOT XEROX, COPIES OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PROVIDED THEM. RELATIVES OF THE ACCUSED REPORTEDLY WERE GIVEN PERMISSION TO VISIT THEM FOR THE FIRST TIME.

THE UNITED DAILY NEWS PRINTED A LIST OF DEFENSE LAWYERS FOR THE EIGHT SUSPECTS AND SAID EACH OF THE DEFENDANTS MAY RETAIN TWO ATTORNEYS.

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THE EIGHT DEFENDANTS WERE IDENTIFIED AS LEGISLATOR HUANG HSIN-CHIEH; SHIH MING-TE, ACCUSED OF MASTERMINDING THE DEMONSTRATION; YAO CHIA-WEN, A LAWYER; MISS LU HSIU-LIEN, A LAWYER DESCRIBED AS ONE OF THE PUBLISHERS OF FORMOSA MAGAZINE; MISS CHEN CHU, FORMOSA MAGAZINE STAFF MEMBER; LIN HUNG-HSUAN, ALSO OF FORMOSA MAGAZINE; CHANG CHUN-HUNG AND LIN YI-HSIUNG, BOTH MEMBERS OF THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY.

THE CASES OF 133 SUSPECTS WERE SENT TO THE KAOHSIUNG DISTRICT COURT FOR CIVIL LAW PROCEDURES.

ALL PAPERS REPORTED FAVORABLE PUBLIC REACTION TO THE DECISION TO TRY THE EIGHT MAJOR SUSPECTS FOR SEDITION AND TO TURN OTHER SUSPECTS OVER TO CIVILIAN COURTS FOR TRIAL ON LESSER CHARGES.

THE CHINA TIMES' WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT SAID THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE SEVERE PENALTIES FOR THE EIGHT CHIEF SUSPECTS BUT SAID THE GENERAL FEELING IN WASHINGTON IS THAT TAIWAN AUTHORITIES ARE BEING CONSIDERATE AND CAUTIOUS IN HANDLING THE CASE.

-- KAO YU-JEN, TAIWAN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT COMMISSIONER FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS, SAID FEBRUARY 25 THAT IF ELECTIONS

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ARE TO BE RESUMED BY THE END OF THIS YEAR, THE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO ANNOUNCE IT IN JUNE OR JULY. THE CODE FOR ELECTION AND RECALL MUST BE COMPLETED FIRST.

-- ALL PAPERS SAID HUANG SHAO-KU, JUDICIAL YUAN PRESIDENT, TOLD A SEMINAR ON LAW DEVELOPMENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN TAIWAN GIVES THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS, EVEN UNDER MARTIAL LAW. THE SEMINAR PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED 17 MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LED BY WILLIAM R. SMITH JR., ABA PRESIDENT ELECT.
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-- PAPERS SAID ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD HOLBROOKE

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ACTION AIT-02

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OES-09 NRC-02 HA-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 SP-02 SS-15
TRSE-00 OMB-01 IO-15 RP-10 SR-04 EB-08 COME-00
AID-07 AGRE-00 DOE-17 SSLG-02 SMI-01 /165 W
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R 290740Z FEB 80
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO AIT WASHDC
INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

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PASS USICA WASHDC FOR EA, PGM/R
PASS SECSTATE WASHDC FOR EA
CINCPAC FOR USICA ADVISOR

TOLD A HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HEARING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SELECTED WEAPONS TO TAIWAN AND HAS NO PLANS FOR JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS WITH THE PRC; ALSO THAT CCNAA OFFICES NOW ARE UNDER FEDERAL POLICE PROTECTION.

ACCORDING TO THE CENTRAL DAILY NEWS, LESTER WOLFF TOLD THE HOUSE COMMITTEE THAT CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT AND THAT CONGRESS IS CONFUSED BY REPORTS THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS TRYING TO CURB TAIWAN'S REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD.

-- MOST PAPERS STATED THAT POLITICAL CAMPAIGNERS PHILIP CRANE AND GEORGE BUSH CRITICIZED PRESIDENT CARTER FOR TERMINATING THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY AND THAT RONALD REAGAN CRITICIZED THE PRESIDENT FOR "DIPLOMATIC COMPROMISE WITH PEKING."
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-- SPEAKING BEFORE TAIWAN'S AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION, TU HENGTSSE, A SOOCHOW UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, SAID THAT TO SAVE TAIWAN FROM FUTURE DIFFICULTIES THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT SHOULD BE GIVEN THE STATUS OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW. TO DO THIS THE U.S. AND TAIWAN SHOULD SIGN AN AGREEMENT INCLUDING THE TRA AS AN ATTACHMENT. SUCH REVISION WOULD GIVE TAIWAN THE RIGHT TO EXPRESS OPINIONS ON THE TRA WHICH NOW IS ONLY A DOMESTIC LAW, TU SAID.

TU ALSO REFERRED TO AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE KAOHSIUNG INCIDENT AND THE PART OF THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT WHICH CONCERNS HUMAN RIGHTS. HE SAID BECAUSE THE LINE BETWEEN DOMESTIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IS NOT CLEARLY DRAWN, U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS PORTION OF THE ACT COULD EASILY LEAD TO INTERFERENCE IN TAIWAN'S INTERNAL BUSINESS. TU THEREFORE SUGGESTED THAT A CLAUSE SIMILAR TO ARTICLE TWO(SEVEN) OF THE UN CHARTER BE INSERTED IN THE ACT STATING THAT NOTHING IN THE ACT SHALL AUTHORIZE THE UNITED STATES TO INTERVENE IN MATTERS WHICH ARE ESSENTIALLY WITHIN THE DOMESTIC JURISDICTION OF TAIWAN.

-- ACCORDING TO THE UNITED DAILY NEWS THE STATE DEPARTMENT REQUESTED A DOLS 6.6 MILLION APPROPRIATION FOR AIT IN FY 1981. THE PAPER SAID DAVID DEAN TOLD THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS THAT A 10 PERCENT INCREASE IN THE BUDGET WAS MOSTLY FOR SALARIES AND OPERATION COSTS.

-- TAIWAN'S 25-MEMBER OLYMPIC TEAM RETURNED TO TAIPEI AFTER BEING BARRED FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE WINTER GAMES AS THE ROC OFFICIAL TEAM. THE OLYMPIC SOLUTION
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OF ALLOWING THE ATHLETES TO PARTICIPATE WITHOUT USING THE ROC FLAG AND ANTHEM WAS REJECTED BY THE TAIWAN TEAM.

ALL PAPERS NOTED THE TEAM'S STATEMENT IT WOULD CONTINUE FIGHTING FOR ITS "LEGAL POSITION."

CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY REPORTS SAID THE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH AND THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL WERE AMONG PUBLICATIONS CRITICAL OF THE IOC DECISION TO BAR THE TAIWAN TEAM. THE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER REPORTEDLY ALSO CRITICIZED THE STATE DEPARTMENT FOR ALLEGEDLY FAVORING PEKING OVER TAIPEI IN THE "TWO CHINA" OLYMPIC PROBLEM.

UPON RECEIVING TAIWAN'S OLYMPIC TEAM FEBRUARY 25, PREMIER SUN REPORTEDLY SAID, "THAT WE COULD NOT PARTICIPATE WAS A SHAME TO THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF THE US GOVERNMENT."

-- PREMIER SUN SAID TAIWAN'S NEW NT DOLS 500 AND NT DOLS 1,000 BILLS WILL MINIMIZE THE INCONVENIENCE OF HANDLING CURRENCY AND WILL NOT STIMULATE INFLATION. THE NT DOLS 100 BILL WAS THE LARGEST DENOMINATION PREVIOUSLY CIRCULATED. SUN AFFIRMED THE NEW CURRENCY WAS NOT DESIGNED TO MAKE UP FOR BUDGET DEFICITS.

-- ALL PAPERS SAID THE GOVERNMENT WILL SPEND NT DOLS 2 BILLION OF THE SINO-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL PROMOTION PROJECTS DURING 1980.

-- MINISTER OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS K. S. CHANG SAID THE 22 MILLION KILO LITERS OF CRUDE AND FUEL OIL TAIWAN MUST IMPORT IN 1980 WILL COST U.S. DOLS 4.6 BILLION, OR ONE FOURTH THE TOTAL VALUE OF PROJECTED EXPORTS FOR THE YEAR.

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-- HONG KONG REEXPORTED HONG KONG DOLS 898 MILLION WORTH OF GOODS ORIGINALLY IMPORTED FROM TAIWAN DURING 1979, THE CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY REPORTED. TEXTILES AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT ACCOUNTED FOR MUCH OF THE TRADE,

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ACTION AIT-02

INFO OCT-01 EA-12 ADS-00 ICAE-00 EUR-12 SMS-01 ACDA-12
OES-09 NRC-02 HA-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 SP-02 SS-15
TRSE-00 OMB-01 IO-15 RP-10 SR-04 EB-08 COME-00
AID-07 AGRE-00 DOE-17 SSLG-02 SMI-01 /165 W
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TO AIT WASHDC
INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

PASS USICA WASHDC FOR EA, PGM/R
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CINCPAC FOR USICA ADVISOR

IT WAS STATED.

-- ALL PAPERS NOTED THAT SIX ESCAPEES FROM THE PRC
INCLUDING SOLDIERS AND LABORERS AGED 20 TO 34, REACHED
TAIPEI AFTER FIRST FLEEING TO THE OFFSHORE ISLAND OF
MATSU ON FEBRUARY 18.

-- VISITORS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD INCLUDED
DR. HERBERT BROWN, 1979 NOBEL PRIZE WINNING CHEMIST;
IOWA TRADE MISSION HEADED BY DEAN ARBUCKLE; EIGHT
AMERICAN HANG GLIDERS ON A DEMONSTRATION VISIT; AND
TWO AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES.

-- TWO MOUNTAIN LIONS FROM THE KNOXVILLE CITY ZOO
WERE PRESENTED TO TAIPEI MUNICIPAL ZOO. CROSS

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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ACTION INR-05

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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, HA

SUBJECT: BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON PRESIDENTIAL
- CANDIDATE JEAN-BERTRAND ARISTIDE

9603383

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING BASIC CURRICULUM VITAE ON
JEAN-BERTRAND ARISTIDE WAS PROVIDED TO EMBASSY BY
ARISTIDE'S SECRETARIAT:

1953: BORN ON JULY 15 NEAR THE TOWN OF PORT-SALUT
- IN SOUTHERN HAITI

1959-68: PRIMARY EDUCATION AT SALESIAN CATHOLIC SCHOOL
- IN PORT-AU-PRINCE

1968-74: SECONDARY EDUCATION AT NOTRE-DAME COLLEGE IN
- CAP HAITIEN

1974-75: SERVED AS NOVICE WITH SALESIAN CONGREGATION IN


UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 PORT A 09061 061908Z
- LA VEGA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

1975-77: STUDIED PHILOSOPHY AT NOTRE-DAME SEMINARY,
- PORT-AU-PRINCE

1977-79: STUDIED PSYCHOLOGY AT UNIVERSITE DE L'ETAT
- D'HAITI, PORT-AU-PRINCE (RECEIVED DEGREE 7/79)

1979-82: STUDIED THEOLOGY IN ISRAEL (RECEIVED
- BACCALAUREAT DEGREE, 1982) AND TRAVELED IN
- EGYPT AND GREAT BRITAIN

1982: ORDAINED AS A PRIEST IN SALESIAN ORDER ON
- JULY 3 BY MONSIGNOR WILLY ROMELUS, BISHOP OF
- JEREMIE, AND ASSIGNMENT TO SAINT-JOSEPH PARISH
- IN PORT-AU-PRINCE SLUMS.

1982: SENT TO MONTREAL, CANADA, IN OCTOBER TO STUDY

UNCLASSIFIED

- BIBLICAL THEOLOGY AT SALESIAN PASTORAL
- INSTITUTE (MASTERS DEGREE RECEIVED, 1983)

1985: RETURNED TO HAITI IN JANUARY, APPOINTED BIBLE
- PROFESSOR AT GRAND SEMINARY OF PORT-AU-PRINCE
-

1987: ASSIGNED IN MAY TO CROIX-DES-MISSIONS PARISH
- NEAR PORT-AU-PRINCE

1987: ASSIGNED IN OCTOBER TO SAINT-JEAN BOSCO CHURCH
- IN PORT-AU-PRINCE

1988: REFUSED TO ACCEPT A DECISION BY CHURCH HIERARCHY
- [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

PAGE 03 PORT A 09061 061908Z
- IN APRIL TO SEND HIM TO CANADA

1988: SURVIVED AN ATTACK ON SAINT-JEAN BOSCO CHURCH
- ON SEPTEMBER 11 BY MACOUTES AND ARMY ELEMENTS

1988: REMOVED FROM SALESIAN ORDER BY THE VATICAN ON
- NOVEMBER 8 FOR REFUSING TO LEAVE HAITI
- AS ORDERED

1990: DECLARED CANDIDACY IN LATE OCTOBER FOR
- PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

2. (C) COMMENT: SINCE HIS RETURN TO HAITI IN 1985, ARISTIDE HAS SOUGHT TO PRESENT HIMSELF AS A DEFENDER OF THE HAITIAN POOR AND DISENFRANCHISED MASSES AGAINST THE ARMY, THE MACOUTES, FORMER DUVALIERIST OFFICIALS, AND THE BUSINESS CLASS. HE HAS ALSO BEEN A HARSH CRITIC OF U.S. POLICY IN HAITI. ARISTIDE'S PROBLEMS WITH THE CHURCH HIERARCHY BEGAN WITH HIS POLITICAL OUTSPOKENNESS IN 1985 AND 1986 AND INTENSIFIED AFTER HIS 1987 APPOINTMENT TO SAINT-JEAN BOSCO, WHERE HE USED HIS PULPIT TO CASTIGATE THE HAITIAN ARMY AND THE POLITICAL RIGHT WING. ARISTIDE WAS WIDELY ACCUSED IN 1987 OF URGING MOBS TO IMPLEMENT "POPULAR JUSTICE"---LYNCHINGS BY IMMOLATION---AGAINST MACOUTES AND FORMER DUVALIERIST OFFICIALS. ALTHOUGH HE HAS ADOPTED MODERATE POSITIONS SINCE BECOMING A CANDIDATE, ARISTIDE HAD PREVIOUSLY ADVOCATED MILITANT, REVOLUTIONARY SOLUTIONS TO HAITI'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

3. (C) BIO NOTE: ARISTIDE IS A SHORT, SLIGHTLY-BUILT
[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

PAGE 04 PORT A 09061 061908Z
MAN WHO OFTEN DISARMS VISITORS WITH HIS SOFT-SPOKEN MANNER. HE IS REPUTED TO BE A PERSUASIVE ORATOR AND

SPEAKS FLUENT CREOLE, FRENCH, AND SPANISH AS WELL AS SOME
ENGLISH AND HEBREW.

WATSON

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification ***

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DO YOU BELIEVE IN MIRACLES ?

In this day and age, when one writes to the President of the United States with a Macintosh computer, MIRACLES only happen in stories we read and learn about, in school or in our House of Prayer.

Tonight at the dinner table, while my parents were discussing current events and your forthcoming meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, I realize that you Mr. President, could possibly make a MIRACLE happen, in this -----
-----The 20th Century !

This coming November 23rd, I will celebrate my 13th birthday like my ancestors have done for hundreds of years, through my BAR MITZVAH.

As many other boys and girls my age have done in this past years, I shall celebrate my Bar Mitzvah by "Twinning" with a boy my age in the Soviet Union who is not allowed to celebrate his Bar Mitzvah in his country.

During the next six months I have written letters to my "Twin" in Russia, and also sent him an invitation to my Bar Mitzvah where his name appears next to mine. Copies of those letters as well as an invitation were sent to grandparents living in Israel.

Enclosed Mr. President, is my Bar Mitzvah invitation where we describe in English and Hebrew this dual celebration with my Russian Twin, and PRAY and HOPE, a MIRACLE will happen.

Mr. President, your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev is just a couple days before my Bar Mitzvah.

Would you PLEASE PRAY with us, that my Russian Twin can Celebrate his Bar Mitzvah together with his family in FREEDOM ?

Do you, Mr. President, BELIEVE IN MIRACLES?

Mr. President. Thank for your time and understanding.

Sincerely,

11/5/94

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Rm Alameda

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City of Pittsburgh
Richard S. Caliguiri, Mayor

November 15, 1985

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
 President of the United States
 of America
 The White House
 Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As the mayors of cities from every section of the United States, we want to share with you the profound concern felt by men and women of conscience in our communities about a most oppressed minority, the Jews of the Soviet Union.

We know you share that concern.

The situation of the Soviet Jews has not eased under the new Soviet leadership. Quite the contrary. It has deteriorated.

Emigration remains tragically low. 51,000 were able to leave in 1979. This year just 820 through the end of October.

The authorities cracked down on any signs of organized Jewish life. Hebrew teachers are sent to prison: Edelshtein, Khomainsky, Volvovsky, Brodsky, Netomniashy, Leven, Selichonok, and others within the past year.

But even in the face of this repression, Soviet Jews courageously demand the Soviet government grant the most elementary right: to permit them to live as Jews, to permit them to emigrate to Israel.

General Secretary Gorbachev must be held to his recent public statement that even Soviet citizens who know the "state secrets" have only to wait "five or ten years" to leave. Thousands of Soviet Jews have waited that requested time, and are still waiting. Prestin...Abramovich...Goldshtein...Lerner...Taratuta...and the list goes on and on.

Page two
November 15, 1995

The Soviet Union must be held to its international commitments on human rights, especially the Helsinki Final Act. How can Americans trust the word of the Soviet authorities on issues of war and peace, when they refuse to honor the solemn international obligations they have undertaken? This is the test of their credibility.

Mr. President, we, and our fellow Americans, look to you to carry the message of Soviet Jews to General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. We look to you to hold the Soviets to their commitments on the human rights on Soviet Jewry.

Our thoughts and prayers go with you to Geneva.

Respectfully,



RICHARD S. CALIGUIRI

/aml



0060 050-0453

STATE OF ARKANSAS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
State Capitol
Little Rock 72201

8537164

Bill Clinton
Governor

October 22 1985

President Ronald Reagan
U.S. Mission to the United Nations
11, Rte. Pregny
Case Postale 1292
Chambesy/GE

Dear President Reagan:

On behalf of the people of the State of Arkansas, I want to wish you the very best for a successful and productive Summit meeting in Geneva.

As you work to establish better relationships and understanding between our country and the USSR, I want to make you aware of the many Arkansans who are concerned about the plight of thousands of Jews in the USSR who wish to go to their homeland, Israel, and be united with their families.

Last year was enormously difficult for all Soviet Jews. Less than 900 were allowed to leave, and this year seems no different. Almost a dozen young Soviet Jews were arrested for no other reason than a desire to speak and teach the Hebrew language.

I commend you for your commitment to the issue of Soviet Jewry and urge you to voice our concerns to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev regarding the curtailment of emigration and the treatment of Jews in the USSR.

Thank you so much for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton
Bill Clinton

BC:cf

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR *HA* Date: *3/17/97*

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*City of
North Charleston*

SOUTH CAROLINA

November 11, 1985

JOHN E. BOURNE, JR.
Mayor

CITY COUNCIL
Pete B. Adams
James V. Edwards
Richard Gansway
Don John Hays
Patsy W. Hughes
R. E. Zipperer

8535448 R

Box 10100
North Charleston SC 29411
Telephone 554 5700

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, DC 20500

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR *HM* Date: *3/17/97*
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Dear Mr. President:

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As the mayors of cities from every section of the United States, we want to share with you the profound concern felt by men and women of conscience in our communities about a most oppressed minority, the Jews of the Soviet Union. We know you share that concern. The situation of Soviet Jews has not eased under the new Soviet leadership. Quite the contrary. It has deteriorated. Emigration remains tragically low. 51,000 were able to leave in 1979. This year just 820, through the end of October.

The authorities crack down on any signs of organized Jewish life. Hebrew teachers are sent to prison: Edelshtein, Kholmiansky, Volvovsky, Brodsky, Nepomniashchy, Levin, Zelichonok, and others all within the past year. But even in the face of this repression, Soviet Jews courageously demand the Soviet government grant the most elementary right: to permit them to live as Jews, to permit them to emigrate to Israel.

General Secretary Gorbachev must be held to his recent public statement that even Soviet citizens who know "state secrets" have only to wait "five or ten years" to leave. Thousands of Soviet Jews have waited that requisite term, and are still waiting. Prestin... Abramovich... Goldshtein... Lerner... Taratuta... and the list goes on and on. The Soviet Union must be held to its international commitments on human rights, especially the Helsinki Final Act. How can Americans trust the word of the Soviet authorities on issues of war and peace, when they refuse to honor the solemn international obligations they have undertaken? This is the test of their credibility.

Mr. President, we, and our fellow Americans, look to you to carry the message of Soviet Jews to General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. We look to you to hold the Soviets to their commitments on the human rights of Soviet Jewry.

Our thoughts and prayers go with you to Geneva.

Sincerely,

John E. Bourne, Jr.
John E. Bourne, Jr.
Mayor

352156

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CITY OF ZANESVILLE

MAYOR-COUNCIL GOVERNMENT
Donald L. Mason, Mayor

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 7/17/97
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November 12, 1985

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The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of The United States
Statehouse
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

As mayor of the City of Zanesville, I wish to share my concern and the concerns of the Jewish community in Zanesville regarding the repressed Jews in the Soviet Union.

The new Soviet leadership has not eased up on Russian Jews. As an example of their toughened stand on Soviet Jews, only 820 have been able to emigrate in 1985, a new low as compared to 51,000 in 1979. The Soviet leadership still tries to destroy the Jewish-Russian culture by sending their teachers to prisons, such as, Edelshtein, Kholmiansky, Volvovsky, Brodsky, Neopomnianchy, Levin, Zelichonok, and others.

The Russian Jews' primary concern, which has been ignored by the Soviet leadership, is their right to emigrate to Israel. As you might be aware, General Secretary Gorbachev recently stated that all Russian Jews could leave and even those who knew state secrets would eventually be able to leave after five to ten years.

Mr. President, the Soviet Union has continually failed to comply with the Helsinki Final Act as well as other agreements with the West, so I realize that holding them to their word is not an easy task. You have the political strength to remind General Secretary Gorbachev that Americans will more easily be able to negotiate with them once we see them fulfilling previous promises.

We urge you not to forget to press to the Soviet leadership our concern that they stop oppressing the Russian Jews and allow them to return to their homeland in Israel.

Most respectfully,

Donald L. Mason
Donald L. Mason
Mayor

DLM:sim

Municipal Building, 401 Market Street, Zanesville, Ohio 43701
(614) 455-9813

RICHARD A. GEPHARDT

360 State St. Madison

WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE

8535052
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

November 7, 1985

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I hope you will be able to convey to Secretary Gorbachev in your upcoming meeting the concern that all of us share regarding the refusal of the Soviet government to allow the refuseniks to emigrate.

In particular, I hope you will bring to Secretary Gorbachev's attention the case of one Leningrader, Nadezhda Fradkova, for whom my wife Jane -- a member of the Congressional spouse's Committee of 21 -- has great concern. Fradkova has endured two hunger strikes, job loss and incarceration in her attempt to emigrate legally to Israel.

Nadezhda first applied for the right to emigrate in 1977. Permission was refused, and she was dismissed from her job. In March, 1983, Nadezhda commenced a hunger strike in support of her application. Forty-five days later she was removed from her apartment, force-fed and kept in the "reanimation ward" of a hospital for three weeks.

That December, Nadezhda began a second hunger strike. In early January 1984, she was again placed in a reanimation ward, force-fed, injected with tranquilizers and subjected to anti-Semitic abuse. In February, her father visited her in a vain effort to dissuade her from attempting to emigrate. After an April release, she was taken back in July. In a note she managed to get to friends, she spoke of threats and intimidation by authorities trying to get her to renounce her application.

Nadezhda is currently serving a two year sentence in a labor camp because of her conviction on charges of "parasitism."

We all share abhorrence of the continuing harassment to which the refuseniks are subjected. I hope you will be able to raise this important issue with Secretary Gorbachev and impress upon him the seriousness with which we view these continued violations of human rights.

Yours very truly,

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Richard A. Gephardt

RAYMOND J. McGRATH
9th District, New York

MEMBER
COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
SELECT REVENUE
MEASURES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT

8533577

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

November 1, 1985

WASHINGTON OFFICE
Room 206
CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
(202) 225-5516

DEPT. OF STATE
203 ROCKAWAY AVENUE
VALLEY STREAM, NY 11580
(516) 872-9550

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The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 3/17/97
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
Dear Mr. President:


Soviet refusenik Mark Terlitsky, a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Architecture, worked for 15 years as an architect with a leading design firm in Moscow. He held a responsible position and worked on a number of large projects including the historic restoration of ancient buildings in Kremlin. In 1974, because he was going to apply for permission to emigrate to Israel, Mark transferred to another job where he worked on small residential and commercial projects.

The entire Terlitsky family, Mark, his brother Leonard, wife Svetlana, their daughter Olga, and Mark and Leonard's mother, Fanya, applied to emigrate in 1976. Only Leonard was given an exit visa. The other members of the Terlitsky family were denied on the grounds of Mark's alleged "possession of secret information". In vain the family has re-applied to emigrate to Israel many times over the past nine years, and has continually been refused. In 1983, and again one month ago they were also refused permission to join relatives in the United States.

After their original application in 1976, Mark was first demoted to a draftsman, and shortly thereafter, lost his job. Svetlana, an economics analyst, also lost her job. Neither has been able to find permanent work since that time. Additionally, on several occasions Mark and Svetlana have been detained, harassed and beaten by the KGB. Despite this situation they remain active members of the Moscow refusenik community.

We, the undersigned Members of Congress, respectfully request you to raise the case of the Terlitsky family during your upcoming summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. Without the continuing efforts of our government, refuseniks such as the Terlitsky family are left with little hope for life in a free and religiously tolerant society.


Raymond J. McGrath


Sidney R. Yates

Bill Nelson

Bill Nelson

Peter H. Kostmayer

Peter H. Kostmayer

Barbara Boxer

Barbara Boxer

Herbert H. Bateman

Herbert H. Bateman

Dean A. Gallo

Dean A. Gallo

Howard L. Berman

Howard L. Berman

Steve Earlett

Steve Earlett

Norman F. Lent

Norman F. Lent

Robert J. Mrazek

Robert J. Mrazek

Mickey Leland

Mickey Leland

Albert G. Bustamante

Albert G. Bustamante

Richard T. Schulze

Richard T. Schulze

Barney Frank

Barney Frank

Thomas R. Carper

Thomas R. Carper

Bernard J. Dwyer

Bernard J. Dwyer

Joseph J. PicGuardo

Joseph J. PicGuardo

Robert A. Young
Robert A. Young

Frank R. Wolf
Frank R. Wolf

Robert J. Bogarsino
Robert J. Bogarsino

Martin Frost
Martin Frost

Robert K. Dornan
Robert K. Dornan

William J. Hughes
William J. Hughes

Harry M. Reid
Harry M. Reid

Les AuCoin
Les AuCoin

Marcy Kaptur
Marcy Kaptur

Tom Lantos
Tom Lantos

Benjamin A. Gilman
Benjamin A. Gilman

Sander M. Levin
Sander M. Levin

Dennis E. Eckart
Dennis E. Eckart

Michael B. Barnes
Michael B. Barnes

Henry A. Waxman
Henry A. Waxman

Hamilton Fish, Jr.
Hamilton Fish, Jr.

James A. Scheuer
James A. Scheuer

Lawrence J. Smith
Lawrence J. Smith

U O C
D D D D

Jack F. Kemp
Jack F. Kemp

Silvio O. Conte
Silvio O. Conte

Barbara A. Mikulski
Barbara A. Mikulski



U.S. DEPT. OF STATE

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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DEC 19 1981

Dear Mr. McGrath:

I am replying further to your November 1 letter to President Reagan, cosigned by 40 of your colleagues, requesting that he raise the case of the Mark Terlitsky family during his discussions with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev.

We, too, are concerned over the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to respect basic human rights, such as freedom of movement. We are particularly dismayed in light of its commitment in the Helsinki Final Act "to deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family."

The U.S. Government has consistently encouraged Soviet authorities to adopt a more favorable attitude toward Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not been responsive to our efforts, labelling them as "interference" in their internal affairs. They further reject U.S. attempts to represent individual Soviet citizens seeking to emigrate to a third country, such as Israel. In short, U.S. influence on Soviet emigration practices and decisions remains extremely limited.

We will continue to exercise what influence we have. In raising the subject of human rights at the Geneva meeting, President Reagan stressed to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev that respect for the individual and the rule of law is as fundamental to peace as arms control. In this regard, the President pressed for greater Soviet adherence to international agreements such as the Helsinki Accord. The Soviets agreed in the Joint Statement to the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in a cooperative spirit.

The Honorable
Raymond J. McGrath,
House of Representatives.

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We have included the Mark Terlitsky family name on the Department of State's list of Soviet Jews who have been repeatedly denied permission to emigrate. We present this list periodically to high-level Soviet officials to emphasize the deeply felt belief of the American people and government that Soviet Jews should not be forced to stay in the Soviet Union against their will. The Terlitsky family name will remain on this list until their case is resolved favorably.

Sincerely,

WLB
William L. Ball, III
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

OD515:STATE 105256022341 **DECLASSIFIED** U/S KIMMITT BRIEFS AMB. Z

1 SUBJECT: U/S KIMMITT BRIEFS AMB. ZHU MARCH 25 ON
IMPORTANCE OF CHINESE SUPPORT FOR NEXT UNSC GULF RESOLUTION

1. ~~REDACTED~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. U/S KIMMITT MET WITH AMB. ZHU ON MARCH 25 TO BRIEF HIM ON PROGRESS TOWARD SECURING A COMPREHENSIVE CEASE FIRE RESOLUTION IN THE GULF. KIMMITT NOTED THAT THE U.S. DECIDED NOT TO IMPOSE A CEASE FIRE ON THE BATTLEFIELD, BUT TO WORK WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE UNSC AS PART OF OUR COMMITMENT TO COLLECTIVE ACTION. HE SAID WE APPRECIATED AMB. LI DAOYU'S HELP IN THE RECENT PERM FIVE DISCUSSIONS AND HOPE HE WILL RECEIVE FORMAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM BEIJING SO THAT THE ISSUE CAN BE BROUGHT TO CLOSURE SOON. KIMMITT EXPRESSED THAT WE MUST MOVE THE DEBATE ON THE RESOLUTION QUICKLY FROM THE PERM FIVE TO THE FULL COUNCIL. THE SECRETARY ESPOUSED FOUR PRIORITY ISSUES DURING HIS RECENT TRIP: THE PEACE PROCESS. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, REGIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL. STATES IN THE REGION MUST TAKE THE LEAD; THE PERM FIVE CAN PLAY AN ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL.

3. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM AMB. ZHU, KIMMITT EXPLAINED OUR TWO-TRACK APPROACH TO SETTLING THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE: TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS AND TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES. THE U.S. WILL NOT RESUME ITS DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT RENOUNCED TERRORISM, AND THE ARAB STATES DO NOT WANT US TO RESUME THE DIALOGUE WITH ARAFAT BECAUSE THEY CONSIDER HIM TO BE DISCREDITED. ZHU ASKED IF ISRAEL HAD NOT REJECTED U.S. PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY LAND FOR PEACE. KIMMITT SAID WE HAD NOT MADE ANY SPECIFIC, DETAILED PROPOSALS YET. HE SAID IT IS DIFFICULT TO CRITICIZE ISRAEL WHEN IT HAD OFFERED TO MEET WITH THE LEADERS OF ANY OF THE ARAB STATES WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS.

5. ZHU ASKED ABOUT THE U.S. POSTURE TOWARD THE IRAQI REGIME AND ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. KIMMITT RESPONDED WE HAVE EXPRESSED OUR DISLIKE FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN, BUT IRAQIS MUST SETTLE THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS.. WE HAVE NOT MOVED OUR FORCES FURTHER INTO IRAQ, BUT HAVE ONLY SHIFTED UNITS AROUND. WE SHOULD BE HAPPY TO REMOVE THOSE UNITS ALTOGETHER AS SOON AS THE UNSC AGREES TO A CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION, AND IRAQ ACCEPTS IT. ZHU STRESSED CHINA'S BELIEF THAT A RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IS THE CORNERSTONE OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND CALLED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PERM FIVE PARTICIPATION. WE MUST NOT LOSE THIS HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY, SAID ZHU. KIMMITT REPLIED THAT THE U.S.

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Date 3/97

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CANNOT "DELIVER" ISRAEL, BUT STANDS READY TO FACILITATE DIALOGUE AMONG THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION. BEFORE CONCLUDING THEIR MEETING KIMMITT ASKED ZHU FOR AN INFORMAL REACTION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT TO BEIJING EITHER IMMEDIATELY BEFORE OR AFTER THE G-7 SUB-MINISTERIAL MEETING IN HONG KONG APRIL 27 TO MAY 4. ZHU AGREED HE WOULD GET BACK TO US ABOUT THESE DATES. END SUMMARY.

6. U/S KIMMITT WELCOMED AMB. ZHU TO HIS OFFICE MARCH 25 TO DISCUSS PROGRESS TOWARD A UNSC RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING CONDITIONS FOR A FORMAL CEASE FIRE CONCLUDING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN COALITION FORCES AND IRAQ. PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING WERE AMBASSADOR ZHU, SECOND SECRETARY LIU XIAOMING, FOR THE CHINESE SIDE AND U/S KIMMITT, EAP/CM DIRECTOR WIEDEMANN, P SPECIAL ASSISTANT KARTMAN, AND EAP/CM KEEGAN (NOTETAKER) FOR THE U.S. SIDE. KIMMITT SAID HE HAD HOPED TO MEET WITH ZHU LAST WEEK. BUT ZHU HAD BEEN OUT OF TOWN. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO KEEP THE MEETING SHORT BECAUSE OF THE PRESS OF ACTION SURROUNDING

THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. LATER THIS WEEK, KIMMITT ADDED, HE HOPED TO MEET AGAIN WITH ZHU TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA AND TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION ON THE GULF.

7. KIMMITT SAID THE PERM FIVE AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST NOW TAKE THE NEXT STEP AND PUT IN PLACE A FORMAL CEASE FIRE RESOLUTION. OUR HOPE IS TO END THE HOSTILITIES IN A WAY TO MAKE FUTURE WARS IN THE REGION LESS LIKELY. THIS CEASE FIRE WILL ALSO ENABLE US TO WITHDRAW OUR FORCES FROM THE REGION, SOMETHING WHICH, KIMMITT NOTED, HAS BEEN OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO CHINA.

8. SHARING A POINT OF PHILOSOPHY WITH ZHU, KIMMITT SAID THAT THE NEW WORLD ORDER UPON WHICH WE HAVE EMBARKED IS BASED ON A COMMITMENT TO COLLECTIVE ACTION TO PROTECT COMMON INTERESTS. THERE WERE SOME IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, KIMMITT SAID, WHO FELT WE SHOULD SETTLE THE CONFLICT WITH IRAQ ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND UNILATERALLY SET THE CONDITIONS FOR A CEASE FIRE. WE DECIDED FIRMLY AGAINST THAT COURSE. WE INSISTED WE WOULD GO BACK TO THE UN AND SEEK A COMPREHENSIVE RESOLUTION TO SET THE CONDITIONS FOR A CEASE FIRE. THE RESOLUTION WHICH WE HAVE PROPOSED, KIMMITT COMMENTED, IS COMPLEX AND UNPRECEDENTED. THAT IS NOT A CRITICISM OF THE RESOLUTION, BUT RATHER A SHOW OF RESPECT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

6. WE HAVE APPRECIATED THE HELP WHICH THE CHINESE PERMREP, AMB. LI DAOYU, HAS PROVIDED DURING THE COURSE OF PERM FIVE DISCUSSIONS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS. WE REMAIN CONCERNED HOWEVER THAT HE REMAINS UNINSTRUCTED, AND WE HOPE THAT HE WILL SOON RECEIVE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS

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FROM BEIJING SO THAT THE RESOLUTION CAN MOVE FORWARD QUICKLY.

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9. THE U.S. IS CONCERNED THAT THE PACE OF DISCUSSIONS IN NEW YORK HAS SLOWED OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS. WE HAVE INSTRUCTED AMB. PICKERING TO SHIFT THE DISCUSSION OF THE RESOLUTION FROM THE PERM FIVE TO THE COUNCIL LATE TODAY OR TOMORROW. WE BELIEVE IT IS DISRESPECTFUL TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO MAKE THEM WAIT SO THAT THE PERM FIVE CAN COMPLETE ITS WORK ON THE RESOLUTION. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT OTHER NATIONS WILL HAVE GOOD IDEAS WHICH WE WILL WANT TO CONSIDER.

10. DURING HIS RECENT TRAVEL THROUGH THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SECRETARY LAID OUT OUR FOUR PRIORITY ISSUES FOR A BETTER, MORE STABLE FUTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE PEACE PROCESS;

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; REGIONAL SECURITY; AND ARMS CONTROL. ON ALL OF THESE ISSUES, THE REGIONAL STATES SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD. WE WILL SUPPORT THEM, BUT THEY MUST BE PRIMARY. ON ARMS CONTROL' INCLUDING CONCERNING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, THERE ARE IMPORTANT STEPS WE CAN TAKE WITHIN THE PERM FIVE. ON THE PEACE PROCESS WE WILL WANT TO LOOK PRIMARILY TO THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION FOR INITIATIVE.

11. A KEY POINT, KIMMITT REITERATED, IS THAT IN THE WAKE OF THE COALITION VICTORY THE U.S. COULD HAVE ACTED UNILATERALLY TO IMPOSE CEASE FIRE CONDITIONS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. INSTEAD, WE WANTED TO WORK WITH OUR INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS IN THE U.N. WITH THAT THOUGHT, KIMMITT ASKED AMB. ZHU IF THERE WERE ANY QUESTIONS OR ISSUES HE WANTED TO RAISE.

ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

12. AMB. ZHU ASKED U/S KIMMITT WHAT PROSPECTS WE SAW FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, AND WHAT THE U.S. POSITION IS ON THE DISPUTE. KIMMITT RESPONDED THAT WE BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE A TWO-TRACK APPROACH: TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS; AND TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES. IT IS OUR FEELING THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED ON THESE TWO TRACKS SIMULTANEOUSLY AND THEN BRING THEM TOGETHER IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE. THE SECRETARY CONSULTED WITH ALL THE PARTIES DURING HIS RECENT TRIP ABOUT WHAT STEPS IN GENERAL THEY MIGHT ADDRESS.

13. THE SECRETARY FELT THAT HE HAD A FAIRLY GOOD EXCHANGE OF IDEAS THROUGHOUT HIS TRIP. WE HAVE ALLOWED SOME TIME FOR THESE IDEAS TO COALESCE. NOW THE SECRETARY IS READY

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TO BEGIN SEEKING RESPONSES FROM THE VARIOUS PARTIES ABOUT HOW THEY BELIEVE THE PEACE PROCESS CAN MOVE FORWARD. FOR THIS PROCESS TO WORK, EFFORTS MUST CONTINUE AT THE SAME TIME TO SECURE REGIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL.

14. WILL THE U.S., AMB. ZHU ASKED, RESUME ITS DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO? KIMMITT REPLIED NO. THE U.S. BROKE OFF THE DIALOGUE BECAUSE THE PLO WOULD NOT RENOUNCE ITS USE OF TERRORISM OR ITS SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM. THE ARAB STATES HAVE INDICATED THEY DO NOT WANT US TO RESUME THE DIALOGUE WITH ARAFAT, WHO IS DISCREDITED IN THEIR EYES. WHAT IS LACKING IS A STRONG ALTERNATIVE TO ARAFAT. SOME OF THE POTENTIALLY STRONGEST ALTERNATIVES ARE RESIDENTS OF THE

WEST BANK. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF ISRAELI TRAVEL CONTROLS THEY CANNOT PARTICIPATE IN REGIONAL MEETINGS. WE HAVE URGED ISRAEL TO LIFT THE RESTRICTIONS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM TRAVELLING BACK AND FORTH.

15. ZHU ASKED WHETHER ISRAEL HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE SECRETARY'S PROPOSALS REGARDING THE TRADE OF LAND FOR PEACE. NEITHER ISRAEL NOR ANY OTHER STATE MADE A NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY, KIMMITT RESPONDED, BECAUSE THE SECRETARY HAD NOT MADE ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO WHICH THEY MIGHT RESPOND. ISRAEL IS WAITING TO HEAR VIEWS FROM OTHER STATES IN THE REGION BEFORE IT DECIDES HOW TO FORMULATE ITS POLICY FOR BRINGING ABOUT LONG-TERM PEACE. KIMMITT CAUTIONED THAT EVERYONE MUST RECOGNIZE THE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS WITHIN WHICH STATES MUST OPERATE. UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 REMAIN THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE. AS A UN MEMBER ISRAEL IS OBLIGATED UNDER ARTICLE FIVE TO ACCEPT THESE AND OTHER UN RESOLUTIONS.

16. HOWEVER IT IS DIFFICULT TO CRITICIZE ISRAEL FOR NOT BEING COOPERATIVE IN THE PEACE PROCESS, KIMMITT SAID. PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR HAS OFFERED TO MEET THE LEADER OF ANY ARAB NATION WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, BUT NOT ONE HAS BEEN WILLING TO STEP FORWARD. OVER A DECADE AGO, SADAT SHOWED THE WAY BY ENTERING INTO A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL, AND AS A RESULT EGYPT GOT ITS LAND BACK. FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES, ISRAEL WILL NOT DISCUSS TRADING LAND FOR PEACE IN THE ABSTRACT AND IT CONTINUES TO USE TERMS LIKE JUDEA AND SUMERIA THAT EMPHASIZE ITS CLAIMS, BUT THE ONLY WAY TO TEST ISRAEL'S WILLINGNESS IS TO TALK TO THEM AND NO ONE HAS OFFERED TO DO THIS.

U.S. POSITION ON IRAQ

17. ZHU THEN ASKED ABOUT THE U.S. POSITION ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN IRAQ. SOME U.S. OFFICIALS, HE SAID,

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HAVE BEEN QUOTED AS SAYING THAT WE WANT SADDAM HUSSEIN TO FALL. OTHERS SAY WE DO NOT WANT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN IRAQ'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE ARE REPORTS THAT U.S. FORCES HAVE MOVED 60 KM FARTHER INTO IRAQ. KIMMITT SUGGESTED THREE POINTS OF ANALYSIS:

- (1) WE WOULD NOT BE SORRY TO SEE SADDAM HUSSEIN FALL; BUT
- (2) IRAQ'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS ARE FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE TO HANDLE, AS WE HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY;
- (3) IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR IRAQ TO REJOIN THE

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS LONG AS SADDAM HUSSEIN RULES.

THERE HAVE BEEN MOVEMENTS OF OUR FORCES IN IRAQ. THESE ARE SIMPLY PART OF REORDERING OUR POSITIONS AS VARIOUS FRONT LINE UNITS ARE WITHDRAWN AND OTHERS MOVE FORWARD TO TAKE THEIR PLACE. IF A CEASE FIRE RESOLUTION WERE PASSED TOMORROW IN THE UNSC AND ACCEPTED BY IRAQ, WE WOULD WITHDRAW OUR UNITS IMMEDIATELY.

THE CHINESE POSITION

18. ZHU THEN SAID HE HAD A FEW POINTS TO MAKE. 61

19. KIMMITT OFFERED HIS THOUGHTS ON THE U.S. ROLE IN A MIDDLE EAST PEACE. THE U.S. CANNOT PRESSURE ANY PARTY IN THE REGION, NOR CAN IT "DELIVER" ISRAEL OR ANY OTHER PARTY IN THE CONTEXT OF A SETTLEMENT. WE CAN ENCOURAGE ALL PARTIES TO CONTRIBUTE WHAT THEY CAN TO A PEACE SOLUTION. OURS IS A SUPPORTING ROLE. WE HAVE WORKED WITH ISRAEL. ANY ARAB LEADER WHO IS WILLING TO DISCUSS PEACE WITH ISRAEL CAN INVITE SHAMIR TO HIS CAPITAL OR SEE HIM IN ISRAEL. THIS IS THE FIRST STEP. WHEN EGYPT TOOK SUCH A STEP IT LED TO CAMP DAVID.

POSSIBLE KIMMITT TRAVEL

20. KIMMITT THANKED ZHU FOR COMING AND PROMISED TO SEEK MORE TIME LATER IN THE WEEK TO DISCUSS INDOCHINA. HE THEN INFORMED ZHU THAT HE WILL BE TRAVELLING TO HONG KONG APRIL

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27 TO MAY 4 TO PARTICIPATE IN PREPARATORY MEETINGS FOR THE G-7 SUMMIT IN LONDON IN JULY. HE SAID HE HOPED IT MIGHT BE CONVENIENT FOR HIM TO TRAVEL TO BEIJING FOR MEETINGS EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER HIS MEETINGS IN HONG KONG. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED TRAVELLING TO CHINA AFTER A/S SCHIFTER AND U/S BARTHOLOMEW. KIMMITT SAID HE WOULD NOT WISH TO GO AS FAR AS HONG KONG WITHOUT ALSO

VISITING CHINA. WITH THIS IN MIND, KIMMITT REQUESTED ZHU'S THOUGHTS ON A VISIT, BEFORE OR AFTER HIS HONG KONG STOP, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AVAILABILITY OF VFM LIU HUAQIU AND OTHERS HE MIGHT SEE. ZHU PROMISED TO CHECK ON THE BEST TIMING AND ASKED HOW LONG KIMMITT WAS PLANNING TO SPEND IN BEIJING. KIMMITT RESPONDED THAT PERHAPS TWO OR THREE DAYS WOULD BE BEST, BUT HE WOULD APPRECIATE AMB. ZHU'S THOUGHTS ON THE MATTER. BAKER

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INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000R

DRAFTED BY: EAP/CM:DJKEEGAN:DJK

APPROVED BY: P:RMKIMMITT

EAP:KWIEDEMANN

P:CKARTMAN

S/S:RALAMANTIA

S/S-O:TKRAJESKI

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AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY

STATE 105256

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*** End of Listing *****

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CHINA AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

- o Over the past three years, China has been a supportive, albeit somewhat reserved, Perm Five participant.
- o Despite its abstention on UNSC Resolutions 678, 686, and 688 (1991), China has supported efforts in the Security Council to restore peace and security to the Gulf. Beijing abstained on texts which could set precedents which could potentially infringe on national sovereignty.
- o China has also expressed qualms on PanAm 103. While it voted for UNSC Resolution 731, it threatened to vote against but ultimately abstained on Resolution 748 imposing limited sanctions on Libya.

--We have raised directly with the PRC reports that a Chinese ship delivered military equipment to Libya after April 15. We question their claim that the ship unloaded prior to the effective date of sanctions, but have chosen to focus on unqualified future assurances China has provided.

- o China took advantage of the Middle East Peace Process to back away from unqualified support for the PLO and recognize Israel. However its ability to contribute to the peace process has been constrained by historical rhetoric and reluctance to reduce arms sales to the region.
- o China has been helpful in putting pressure on the Khmer Rouge to allow the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) access to KR-controlled areas to undertake reconnaissance of cantonment sites.

-- China will join the other Perm Five in supplying 47 military observers for UNTAC. It is also supplying a 400-man engineer unit due to arrive shortly.

- o Recently, we have received a number of reports indicating that the Chinese are looking for a good excuse to break consensus with the Perm Five and exercise their veto in the Security Council, thus underscoring their independence from the West.

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OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
CITY OF **CORAL SPRINGS** FLORIDA

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O B "BEN" GEIGER
Mayor

9551 WEST SAMPLE ROAD
P O BOX 754501
CORAL SPRINGS, FL 33075-4501
TELEPHONE (305) 752 3410

November 12, 1985

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
The White House
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Reagan:

As the mayors of cities from every section of the United States, we want to share with you the profound concern felt by men and women of conscience in our communities about a most oppressed minority, the Jews of the Soviet Union.

We know you share that concern.

The situation of Soviet Jews has not eased under the new Soviet leadership. Quite the contrary. It has deteriorated.

Emigration remains tragically low. 51,000 were able to leave in 1979. This year - just 820, through the end of October.

The authorities crack down on any signs of organized Jewish life. Hebrew teachers are sent to prison: Edelstein, Kholmiansky, Volvosky, Brodsky, Nepomniaschy, Levin, Zelichonok, and others - all within the past year.

But even in the face of this repression, Soviet Jews courageously demand the Soviet government grant the most elementary right: to permit them to live as Jews, to permit them to emigrate to Israel.

General Secretary Gorbachev must be held to his recent public statement that even Soviet citizens who know "state secrets" have only to wait "five or ten years" to leave. Thousands of Soviet Jews have waited that requisite term, and are still waiting. Prestin...Abramovich...Goldshtein...Lerner...Taratuta...and the list goes on and on.

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Letter to President Ronald Reagan
November 12, 1985

Page 2

The Soviet Union must be held to its international commitments on human rights, especially the Helsinki Final Act. How can Americans trust the word of the Soviet authorities on issues of war and peace, when they refuse to honor the solemn international obligations they have undertaken? This is the test of their credibility.

Mr. President, we, and our fellow Americans, look to you to carry the message of Soviet Jews to General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. We look to you to hold the Soviets to their commitments on the human rights of Soviet Jewry.

Our thoughts and prayers go with you to Geneva.

Respectfully,


O.B. "Ben" GELGER
Mayor

OBG:jr

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THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

NOVEMBER 22, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ATTN: WILL BALL

ACTION REQUESTED:
DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 352153
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED NOVEMBER 13, 1985
TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM: THE HONORABLE PATRICIA SCHROEDER
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON DC 20515

SUBJECT: ASK THAT DURING YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH
MR. GORBACHEV YOU BRING UP THE CASE OF IDA
NUDEL, WHO HAS BEEN TRYING TO EMIGRATE TO
ISRAEL SINCE 1971.

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/CR/IR #14 Date: 3/17/97

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November 18, 1985

Dear Mrs. Schroeder:

The President has asked me to thank you for your November 13 letter, cosigned by 49 of your House colleagues, urging that the case of Ida Nudel, who has been refused permission to emigrate to Israel since 1971, be raised during talks with General Secretary Gorbachev at the meetings in Geneva.

Your comments are appreciated. You may be assured that President Reagan will bring up the important issue of human rights, and please know that your special interest in Ms. Nudel's case has been brought to the attention of the President's foreign policy advisers.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Patricia Schroeder
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

MBO:KRJ:MDB:jz (MBO3)

cc: w/copy of inc to Will Ball, Legis Affairs, Dept of
State - for DIRECT response

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC - FYI

#352153

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
 Washington, D.C. 20515

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November 13, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
 The White House
 Washington, D.C.

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Dear President Reagan,

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We are writing on behalf of Ida Nudel. We ask that during your discussions with Chairman Gorbachev at the summit meeting this month you bring up Ms. Nudel's case and urge Mr. Gorbachev to grant her an exit visa.


Ida Nudel has been trying to emigrate to Israel since 1971. She has already served four years in Siberia for her efforts to obtain an exit visa.


Ms. Nudel has been diagnosed as having cancer. Reports on her health are not good. It is especially urgent that she be allowed to reunite with her family in Israel.

Sincerely,



 Patricia Schroeder, M.C.

✓ 
 Tony Hall, M.C.

✓ 
 Joseph Addabbo, M.C.

✓ 
 William Lehman, M.C.


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 Hamilton Fish, M.C.


 Norman Lent, M.C.

✓ 
 Philip Sharp, M.C.

✓ 
 Dante Fascell, M.C.

✓ 
 Joseph McDade, M.C.

✓ 
 Thomas Downey, M.C.

✓ Sidney R. Yates
Sidney Yates, M.C.

✓ Claude Pepper
Claude Pepper, M.C.

✓ Walter Fauntroy
Walter Fauntroy, M.C.

✓ Bill Green
Bill Green, M.C.

✓ Howard Berman
Howard Berman, M.C.

✓ Chester Atkins
Chester Atkins, M.C.

✓ Stephen Solarz
Stephen Solarz, M.C.

✓ Gary Ackerman
Gary Ackerman, M.C.

✓ Major Owens
Major Owens, M.C.

✓ Peter Kostmayer
Peter Kostmayer, M.C.

✓ Dan Mica
Dan Mica, M.C.

✓ Mickey Leland
Mickey Leland, M.C.

✓ Ed Markey
Edward Markey, M.C.

✓ Les AuCoin
Les AuCoin, M.C.

✓ John Porter
John Porter, M.C.

✓ Sam Gejdenson
Sam Gejdenson, M.C.

✓ Steny Hoyer
Steny Hoyer, M.C.

✓ Tommy Robinson
Tommy Robinson, M.C.

✓ Jim Moody
Jim Moody, M.C.

✓ Dan Burton
Dan Burton, M.C.

✓ Charles Schumer
Charles Schumer, M.C.

✓ Robert A. Mrazek
Robert A. Mrazek, M.C.

✓ Bill Nelson
Bill Nelson, M.C.

✓ Barbara Boxer
Barbara Boxer, M.C.

✓ Bill Richardson
Bill Richardson, M.C.

✓ Thomas J. Manton
Thomas Manton, M.C.

✓ Bill Hughes
William Hughes, M.C.

✓ Bernard Dwyer
Bernard Dwyer, M.C.

✓ Gerry Sikorski
Gerry Sikorski, M.C.

✓ Richard Durbin
Richard Durbin, M.C.

✓ William J. Coyne
William Coyne, M.C.

✓ Matthew B. Martinez
Matthew Martinez, M.C.

✓ Ben Erdreich
Ben Erdreich, M.C.

✓ Tom Luken
Thomas Luken, M.C.

✓ Charles Wilson
Charles Wilson, M.C.

✓ Mario Biaggi
Mario Biaggi, M.C.

✓ Edward Feighan
Edward Feighan, M.C.

✓ Bruce A. Morrison
Bruce Morrison, M.C.

✓ Albert Bustamante
Albert Bustamante, M.C.

✓ Charles Rangel
Charles Rangel, M.C.

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CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.DECLASSIFY to ☐ S or ☐ CUNION OF COUNCILS FOR SOVIET JEWSStatement of PolicyonEmigration and the Treatment of Soviet Jews

The Union of Councils for Soviet Jews is the umbrella organization for 38 local Soviet Jewry organizations throughout the United States. We have over 50,000 members nationally, and have long been dedicated to furthering the rights and interests of Soviet Jews in two critical respects: first, for those Soviet Jews who desire to do so, to be able to emigrate from the Soviet Union to another country; and second, for those Soviet Jews who desire to remain in the Soviet Union, or who are awaiting permission to emigrate, to be able to study and express their religious and cultural heritage, free from persecution and intimidation.

The Union of Councils believes that official dealings between the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union provide an extremely important forum for expressing the strong concern of the American people over Soviet transgressions of fundamental human rights. We fully recognize the need on the part of the U. S. government to maintain a flexible approach in dealing and negotiating agreements with the Soviet Union. However, within this framework of "flexibility", we urge that the issues of emigration and fundamental human rights not be forgotten, diluted or bargained away. More specifically:

- I. We believe that continuing substantial performance by the Soviet Union in permitting Jewish emigration must be considered a prerequisite to the granting of waiver privileges under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, a law which proudly reflects the fundamental philosophy of the American people and its government to protect and foster respect for human rights and personal liberty throughout the world.

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act^{1,2} took effect on January 3, 1975. The Amendment assured "...the continued dedication of the United States to fundamental human rights..." and denied Most Favored Nation (MFN) status and the extension of credit guarantees by the Export-Import Bank to any country that:

- a) "denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate;
- b) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the visas or other documents required for emigration, for any purpose or cause whatsoever; or
- c) imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice..."

In addition, in an exchange of letters between Senator Henry M. Jackson, one of the principal authors of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and then



UNION OF COUNCILS FOR SOVIET JEWS

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Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, dated October 18, 1974, further assurances were given that the USSR would not punish individuals seeking to emigrate. Among the abuses that were understood by the Soviets and Kissinger and Jackson to be abandoned were: (a) criminal prosecution, (b) punitive draft, (c) loss of job or demotion, (d) withholding of documents, and (e) requirement of parental permission for adult applicants. The punitive actions specified in this exchange of letters were not considered a complete listing, and additional actions taken by the Soviets were not to be condoned simply because they were absent from these letters. Hardship cases were to be processed sympathetically. Persons become eligible for emigration within three years of their exposure to such material. Prisoners, on their release, were to be given prompt consideration for emigration and might even be given an early release. The rate of emigration from the USSR would begin to rise promptly from the 1973 level to correspond to the number of applicants.

As Senator Jackson himself noted a few years later in a speech delivered in Washington, D. C., June, 1979,⁴ "We have seen how cruel and capricious their (Soviet) emigration policies can be, sometimes permitting the numbers to rise, sometimes holding them down.... We have seen enough in short to know that without a firm commitment to a freer emigration from the Soviets themselves, any concessions on trade or credits would be leaping in the dark with consequences for the prisoners and refuseniks and all who desire to emigrate that cannot be foreseen."

In this connection, "substantial performance" on the part of the Soviet Union would be evidenced, we believe, by the following actions:

A. The prompt release and emigration of the Prisoners of Conscience listed on Appendix A.

A prisoner of Conscience is a person imprisoned for political and/or religious views. Many of these individuals have been tried under the pretext of economic crimes (bribery, dealing illegally on the black market), malicious hooliganism, parasitism (being without a job), anti-Soviet slander, drug abuse, and in the case of Anatoly Shcharansky, treason. In reality, the true reason for conviction was the individual's beliefs and not an illegal activity. These individuals are deliberately used as examples to others who may contemplate applying to emigrate, or merely consider gathering a few friends to celebrate the Sabbath.

Prisoners who protest the illegal, harsh treatment in the labor camps where they serve long terms on fabricated charges are further penalized by confinement in even more barbaric punishment cells within the camps, where food and warm clothing are withheld.⁵ Letters to and from prisoners are regularly intercepted and confiscated. The pitifully small, legally allowed packages of food, warm clothing or medicine are often confiscated. Permitted family visits are suddenly cancelled without

explanation. Several prisoners have resorted to protest by long hunger strikes, as have their spouses and children at home.

One of the more alarming aspects of the plight of Soviet Jews is the recent increase in arrests and trials on trumped up charges and the deliberate campaign of physical abuse against Jews who have tried to maintain a sense of community while waiting to emigrate. Hebrew teachers in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Odessa have been arrested, and some have been assaulted by persons who deliberately beat healthy men to the point of a nearly total loss of eyesight or hearing; two have been injured within hours of peaceful arrests, and their families told they resisted arrest or inflicted the wounds upon themselves. Their elderly parents have been threatened and beaten for daring to inquire about extensive, illegal searches of their apartments and unlawful confiscation of books and belongings.⁸ Several refuseniks have been imprisoned after Soviet authorities planted drugs or firearms in their apartments. Jews who refuse to testify as witnesses against friends under arrest on trumped up charges are themselves arrested and fined.¹⁰


Young men are punished by being drafted into the Soviet army,¹¹ often after being denied admission to the university or being expelled before graduating. Several have served prison terms for refusing to be drafted, and one young man is serving a second term in a labor camp for refusing to serve in the army.

Jews arrested with non-Jews for similar offenses notice that the non-Jews¹² never come to trial, but the Jews receive stiff prison sentences. Families are torn apart deliberately and cruelly by a regime that punishes Jews for wanting to emigrate to a country where Judaism is not a crime.

- B. The prompt release and emigration of the former Prisoners of Conscience listed on Appendix B.

Ex-prisoners, who in the early 1970s might have been allowed to emigrate after serving long and brutal prison terms, now are released from labor camps but are not permitted to return to their homes, and settle hundreds of miles from their family and friends.¹³

- C. The prompt emigration of all Refuseniks who have been waiting for visas for ten years or more.
- D. The expeditious emigration of all Refuseniks who have been waiting for visas for five years or more.
- B. The expeditious emigration of all Refuseniks who were refused permission to emigrate prior to April 1982.



The Soviet Jewish refusenik (a refusenik is a Soviet Jew who has applied to emigrate and been turned down) community has itself requested that the United States Congress remain firm on the emigration provisions as outlined in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.¹⁴ Speaking on behalf of refuseniks at their request, the UCSJ shares in their determination to urge the Soviet government to comply with established law as a prerequisite for increased trade benefits.

In testimony before House Subcommittees on International Trade in July, 1979,¹⁵ two past presidents of the UCSJ, Robert Gordon and Irene Manekofsky stated:

"...The Union of Councils for Soviet Jews welcomes the search for understanding with Moscow, which would create more beneficial conditions for U. S.-Soviet cooperation, trade, and human rights. Our organization has sufficient flexibility in approaching this complex task. Nevertheless, it is our firm position that some form of linkage between trade benefits for the USSR and Soviet emigration policies should be preserved. The fate of courageous individuals fighting for free emigration should not be sacrificed to promote superpower accommodation." (Robert Gordon)

"...It is not the Union of Councils' position that the Soviets' treatment of emigration issues to date qualified them for a waiver, even if the requirement of assurances is removed and replaced with an emphasis on performance. While we are, of course, encouraged by the increase in the number of Soviet exit visas, as well as by the release of some prisoners of conscience, it is our firm belief that we are talking about only the first and most modest Soviet steps, which deserve recognition and encouragement, but surely not a waiver at this point. This is particularly true since the encouraging signs are mixed with some very disturbing signals, including an apparent growth in official Soviet anti-Semitism, restrictions on Jewish college enrollment, and limitations on professional employment, actually forcing many people to emigrate. We also have not yet forgotten the outrageous political trials of last summer (editor's note: the trials of Vladimir and Maria Slepak, Ida Nudel and Anatoly Shcharansky), which indicated to many Soviet Jews that they could not feel safe in Russia...." (Irene Manekofsky)

According to statistics published in the Congressional Record,¹⁷ between 1968 and 1981, 630,414 first affidavits were sent from Israel to Jews in the Soviet Union. In other words, over 630,000 Jews in the USSR were sent invitations from Israel -- the first step in the application process to emigrate from the USSR. It is also known from published figures,^{18,19} that 250,187 Jews had left the USSR by 1981, and another 4,899 left between 1982 and 1984; a total of 255,086.

Thus, if the total number of those individuals who actually emigrated is subtracted from the number of Jews who received invitations from Israel, that would leave 374,328 Jews who are still in the USSR, the majority of whom have at least begun the emigration process.

Number of invitations from Israel, 1968-1981:	630,414
Number of emigres, 1968-1984:	<u>-255,086</u>

Approximate number of Jews who have applied to emigrate and are awaiting permission:	374,328
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The total number of Jews residing in the Soviet Union is estimated to be between two and three million.

In 1979, the high point of Soviet Jewish emigration, over 50,000 were allowed to leave. Since then the rate of emigration has dropped sharply. In 1984, only 896 Jews were permitted to leave and in the first five months of 1985, only 463 individuals emigrated. Thus, although thousands of Jews are known to have requested permission to leave the Soviet Union, relatively few have actually been granted permission to do so, despite the claim of an official of the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Union, Samuil L. Ziv,²⁰ that all who wished to emigrate have already left.

In addition to those Jews who have already requested invitations from Israel, many more would probably apply to emigrate if they felt it possible to do so without risking years of unemployment, harassment and perhaps even arrest, with no assurance that permission to leave would ever be granted.

P. The emigration hereafter of substantial numbers of Soviet Jews who desire to emigrate, in accordance with procedures fairly and consistently applied irrespective of age, sex, family status or place of residence, including —

(1) Applications for emigration shall be considered in order of receipt, including those previously filed. Applicants will be notified of decisions within three months of submission of documents. Applicants refused permission to leave due to security factors will be informed of the date on which they may expect to become eligible for emigration; the security period shall not exceed three years.

(2) Applicants for emigration will not be subject to unreasonable or onerous procedural requirements or to other unlawful impediments for completion of the application process. Invitations from abroad will be requested and delivered without interference. Authorities will provide all required documentation. OVIR offices will be open to receive and process applications at reasonable times during normal working hours and on a regular schedule. Jews residing in areas where no OVIR office is located will be permitted to apply through the nearest OVIR office without impediment.

6-

- (3) Parental permission to emigrate shall not be required for persons eighteen years of age and older.
- (4) Officially sanctioned punitive actions shall not be initiated against persons seeking to emigrate, including: dismissal from work; demotion in work; public incrimination; disconnection of telephone service or interception of mail; physical and psychiatric abuse; intimidation; military conscription of persons who have sought to emigrate or are beyond normal conscription age; and the bringing of baseless or trumped-up criminal charges.
- (5) Recognition shall be given to the distinct and separate rights of repatriation and family reunification (regardless of the country involved), either of which shall alone be sufficient grounds to emigrate. The repatriation of Soviet Jews to Israel shall be permitted regardless of whether the applicant has family in Israel.
- (6) The so-called "first-degree relative" requirement shall be abolished.
- (7) The practice of causing families to be separated by allowing some, but not all, individual members the right to emigrate shall cease.
- (8) Applications of separated families, Holocaust survivors, World War II veterans, and hardship cases (including, especially, people with special medical problems) shall be processed sympathetically and on a priority basis.
- (9) Collection of the so-called "education tax" shall remain suspended.

Constitution of the USSR²¹

Chapter 4, Article 29: "The USSR's relations with other states are based on observance of the following principles: ...respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; the equal rights of peoples and their right to decide their own destiny; cooperation among states; and fulfillment in good faith of obligations arising from the generally recognized principles and rules of international law, and from the international treaties signed by the USSR."* (editor's note: This includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords.)

Universal Declaration of Human Rights²²

- a) Article 13 (2): "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."*

*(emphasis added)

- b) Article 14 (1): "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."*

Helsinki Accords²³

- a) "Reunification of Families: The participating States will deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family," with special attention being given to requests of an urgent character such as requests submitted by persons who are ill or old.

They will deal with applications in this field as expeditiously as possible.

They will lower where necessary the fees charged in connection with these applications to ensure that they are at a moderate level.

Applications for the purpose of family reunification which are not granted may be renewed at the appropriate level and will be reconsidered at reasonable short intervals by the authorities of the country of residence or destination, whichever is concerned; under such circumstances fees will be charged only when applications are granted.

Until members of the same family are reunited, meetings and contacts between them may take place in accordance with the modalities for contacts on the basis of family ties.

The participating States will support the efforts of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies concerned with the problems of family reunification."

- b) "Marriage between Citizens of Different States: The participating States will examine favourably and on the basis of humanitarian considerations requests for exit or entry permits from persons who have decided to marry a citizen from another participating State.

The processing and issuing of the documents required for the above purposes and for the marriage will be in accordance with the provisions accepted for family reunification."

- II. In addition to the foregoing, in determining whether to cooperate with or grant benefits to the Soviet Union in connection with trade, scientific and cultural exchange, and other areas of mutual interest, the U. S. Government should consider as an important factor the continuing violation of fundamental human rights in the USSR. Specifically, assurances should be sought that, in compliance with its own Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords, the

*(emphasis added)

Soviet Union will promptly terminate, and take action to rectify, injustices suffered by Soviet Jews as a result of the following official policies and practices:

- A. The arrest and prosecution of law abiding Refuseniks and Hebrew teachers based on fabricated charges or "planted" evidence of criminal activity.

FREEDOM FROM UNFAIR ARREST, PROSECUTION AND SENTENCING

Constitution of USSR²¹

- a) Preamble: "...The Soviet Government carried through far-reaching social and economic transformations, and put an end once and for all to exploitation of man by man, antagonism between classes, and strife between nationalities."
- b) Chapter 7, Article 50: "...Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights²²

- a) Article 5: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
- b) Article 9: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile."
- c) Article 11 (1): "Everyone charged with a penal offense has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has all the guarantees necessary for his defense."
- d) Article 13 (2): "Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state."

FREEDOM FROM ILLEGAL SEARCH OF HOME AND CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY

Constitution of USSR²¹

Chapter 7, Article 55: "Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed inviolability of the home. No one may, without lawful grounds, enter a home against the will of those residing in it."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights²²

Article 12: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation...."

B. The publication and distribution, or any other communication, of anti-Semitic propaganda.

Excerpts from a speech by U. S. Ambassador Max M. Kampelman at the Madrid review of the Helsinki Accords; December 1, 1981:

"It is with regret that our delegation has concluded that the Soviet Union is clearly identified with a pattern of anti-Semitic behaviour that could not function without government support and acquiescence.... During the past fifteen years, a total of at least 112 Soviet books and brochures with anti-Semitic overtones of various degrees have been identified, some of them printed and reprinted in editions of 150,000 -- 200,000 copies. Anti-Semitic propaganda is also carried out through lectures, stimulated by the Communist Party and the state.

Soviet anti-Semitism is not limited to domestic consumption. It is also widely exported to Arab, African and other Third World countries. The writings of outspoken Soviet anti-Semites -- Kichko, Begun, Korneyev and others -- have been featured prominently in publications of the PLO, for instance. In addition, their writings are often published in English and distributed throughout the English-speaking world.

...There are many other instances of blatant government-condoned anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. These are accompanied by harassment and imprisonment of Jewish leaders, discrimination against Jews in education and employment, active and frequently violent interference with the study of Hebrew and the possession of articles of prayer, and by a drastic reduction in the number of Jews being allowed to escape this pervasive anti-Semitism through emigration."

Antisemitica Sovietica: New Intensity in an Old Campaign: excerpts from an article by Betsy Gidwitz; Spring, 1982:

"The latest Soviet anti-Jewish campaign dates from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. ...As the propaganda campaign intensified, it soon became obvious that Soviet anger embraced more than 'international Zionism' and Israel. The term 'Zionist' being employed as a euphemism persists to this day, it has been joined since the mid 1970s by blatant racist attacks on Jews and Judaism without anti-Zionist camouflage.

The Soviet Union has mobilized mixed mass media and personnel to disseminate its anti-Semitic disinformation and propaganda to the far reaches of the USSR and even beyond its borders. Articles appear frequently in newspapers, including such national stalwarts as Pravda and Izvestia; republic and local newspapers; and special interest newspapers, ranging from the intellectual Literaturnaya Gazeta to the narrowly-focused Gudok (Whistle) newspaper for railroad workers....Of special note are the youth and military publications that carry either especially strong or exceptionally large numbers of anti-Semitic articles. The publishing house of the prestigious Academy of Sciences, Nauka (Science), has issued at least half a dozen anti-Semitic books, each in the style of a scientific treatise.

...In addition to conventional printed media attacks on Jews and Judaism, Soviet authorities also exploit television and film for propagation of anti-Semitism. A notorious television special called 'Traders of Souls' was shown twice during prime time in 1977. In this special, a number of Soviet Jewish activists, identified by name and address, were portrayed as currency speculators, hooligans, drunks, and CIA agents. Another anti-Semitic television special, 'Lies and Hatred,' was aired in 1980. A limited circulation film, 'Secret and Open Things,' has been shown in some public theatres, but its main audiences are closely-controlled groups, such as army units....

Disinformation and propaganda form only one component of the Soviet anti-Semitic assault. Intensified application of anti-Semitic quotas in educational institutions and in career selection is widespread. False charges, rigged judicial proceedings, and subsequent harsh prison sentences have claimed a number of Jewish victims, of whom Anatoly Shcharansky is the best known. Punitive military conscription has been applied much more frequently to would-be Jewish emigrants than to others desiring to leave, such as Volga Germans. Jews are subject to frequent anti-Semitic verbal attacks by passersby on the street and fellow employees at places of work. Physical assaults, especially on children, are not uncommon.

Although permission to travel abroad is tightly controlled for all citizens, opportunities to travel outside the Soviet Union are even more circumscribed for Soviet Jews. Jewish specialists invited to present papers or receive awards at various conferences abroad are frequently denied the right to attend these events.

Considered by official Soviet ideology to constitute both a religious group and a nationality, Jews are accorded the rights of neither. Unlike other religious groups in the Soviet Union, Jews have no national organization, no institution for the training of clergy, no relevant publications, and no contacts with co-religionists abroad. Unlike other groups regarded as nationalities in the Soviet Union, Jews alone lack an infrastructure that would facilitate and encourage the development of their national heritage.

...Related to the historical expression of anti-Semitism is a deep-rooted popular sense of Russian cultural identity -- a perception of homogeneity so strong that non-Russians are viewed not only as others, but also as aliens.

...The proclamation of Birobidzhan as an area of Jewish settlement in the Soviet Far East (1928) and the establishment of the Jewish anti-Fascist Committee (1942-1948) followed in the same path of centrally-operated (and manipulated) national Jewish associations. The latter organization was clearly designed to encourage domestic and foreign Jewish support for the Soviet armed forces during World War II. Both the organization and the Jewish intellectuals around

It were liquidated when their services were no longer required. Birobidzhan still exists in 1982 as the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, something of a farce as Jews constitute only 5.4 percent of its total population. Jewish ethnicity remains an official Soviet nationality and one's nationality is still inscribed in the fifth paragraph of the internal passports (identity cards) carried by Soviet citizens. Jews, however, are permitted none of the infrastructure promoting national identity (publications in a widely understood language, national organizations, etc.) which is provided other Soviet nationalities."

- C. The arbitrary denial or discontinuance of telephone service applied for or previously granted Soviet Jews; and the illegal interference with postal, telephone and telegraphic communications between Soviet Jews and persons in foreign countries.

FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATION

Constitution of USSR²¹

Chapter 7, Article 56: "The privacy of citizens and of their correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications is protected by law."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights²²

Article 12: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation...."

- D. Restrictions on the admission of Jews to Soviet universities and institutes; and the arbitrary removal of academic degrees, titles and honors held by Soviet Jews.

RIGHT TO EDUCATION

Constitution of USSR²¹

Chapter 7, Article 45: "Citizens of the USSR have the right to education... by the free issue of school textbooks, by the opportunity to attend a school where teaching is in the native language; and by the provision of facilities for self education."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights²²

Article 26 (1): "Everyone has the right to education. ...Higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit."

- E. Attempts to discourage or prohibit private visits to Soviet Jews by invited foreign citizens.

RIGHT TO VISIT CITIZENS OF ANOTHER STATE

Helsinki Accords;²³ "Contacts and Regular Meetings on the Basis of Family Ties: ...participating States will favourably consider applications for travel with the purpose of allowing persons to enter or leave their territory temporarily, and on a regular basis if desired, in order to visit members of their families."

Helsinki Accords;²³ "Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons: The participating States intend to facilitate wider travel by their citizens for personal or professional reasons...."

- F. Attempts to discourage or prohibit the unhindered and open practice of Judaism — including education in Judaism and Jewish culture and instruction in, and use of, the Hebrew language.

RIGHT TO PRACTICE THE JEWISH RELIGION AND CULTURE, INCLUDING THE STUDY OF HEBREW AND THE RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE PEACEFULLY FOR RELIGIOUS OR CULTURAL PURPOSES


Constitution of USSR²¹

- a) Chapter 7, Article 52: "Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of conscience, that is, the right to profess or not to profess any religion and to conduct religious worship....Incitement of hostility or hatred on religious grounds is prohibited."
- b) Chapter 7, Article 50: ..."Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations."
- c) Chapter 3, Article 27: "The State concerns itself with protecting, augmenting and making extensive use of society's cultural wealth for the moral and aesthetic education of the Soviet people, for raising their cultural level. In the USSR, development of the professional, amateur and folk arts is encouraged in every way."
- d) Chapter 6, Article 34: "Citizens of the USSR are equal before the law, without distinction of origin, social or property status, race or nationality, sex, education, language, attitude to religion, type and nature of occupation, domicile, or other status."

The equal rights of citizens of the USSR are guaranteed in all fields of economic, political, social and cultural life."

- e) Chapter 6, Article 36: "Citizens of the USSR of different races and nationalities have equal rights."

Exercise of these rights is ensured ...by the possibility to use their native language and the languages of other peoples of the USSR.



Any direct or indirect limitation of the rights of citizens or establishment of direct or indirect privileges on grounds of race or nationality, and any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness, hostility or contempt, are punishable by law."

- f) Chapter 7, Article 46: "Citizens of the USSR have the right to enjoy cultural benefits.

This right is ensured by broad access to the cultural treasures of their own land and of the world that are preserved in state and other public collections; by the development and fair distribution of cultural and educational institutions throughout the country; by developing television and radio broadcasting and the publishing of books, newspapers and periodicals; and by extending the free library service; and by expanding cultural exchanges with other countries."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights²²

- a) Article 18: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom either alone or in community with others and in public or private to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."
- b) Article 20 (1): "Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association."

Heisinki Accords, I, a, VII:²³ "Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief."

...The participating States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms....

...In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Declaration of Human Rights."

RIGHT TO WORK AT A DECENT JOB, INCLUDING RIGHT TO TEACH HEBREW AS A PROFESSION

Constitution of USSR²¹

- a) Chapter 7, Article 40: "Citizens of the USSR have the right to work..., including the right to choose their trade or profession, type of job and work in accordance with their inclinations, abilities, training and education, with due account of the needs of society."

- b) Chapter 2, Article 17: "In the USSR, the law permits individual labor in handicrafts, farming, the provision of services for the public and other forms of activity based exclusively on the personal work of individual citizens and members of their families."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights²²

Article 23 (1): "Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment."



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Dear Senator Bingaman:

I am replying further to your October 30 letter to President Reagan requesting that he raise the cases of two Soviet prisoners, Vladimir Brodsky and Roald Zelichonok, during his discussions with Soviet Secretary Gorbachev.

We, too, are concerned over the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to respect basic human rights, such as freedom of movement. We are particularly dismayed in light of its commitment in the Helsinki Final Act "to deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family."

The U.S. Government has consistently encouraged Soviet authorities to adopt a more favorable attitude toward Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not been responsive to our efforts, labelling them as "interference" in their internal affairs. They further reject U.S. attempts to represent individual Soviet citizens seeking to emigrate to a third country, such as Israel. In short, U.S. influence on Soviet emigration practices and decisions remains extremely limited.

We will continue to exercise what influence we have. In raising the subject of human rights at the Geneva meeting, President Reagan stressed to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev that respect for the individual and the rule of law is as fundamental to peace as arms control. In this regard, the President pressed for greater Soviet adherence to international agreements such as the Helsinki Accord. The Soviets agreed in the Joint Statement to the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in a cooperative spirit.

The Honorable
Jeff Bingaman,
United States Senate.

9303906

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/PS/CR/IR #14 Date: 7/17/97
☒ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PART

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
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
We have included the Vladimir Brodsky and Roald Zelichonok family names on the Department of State's list of Soviet Jews who have been repeatedly denied permission to emigrate. We present this list periodically to high-level Soviet officials to emphasize the deeply felt belief of the American people and government that Soviet Jews should not be forced to stay in the Soviet Union against their will. The Brodsky and Zelichonok family names will remain on this list until their cases are resolved favorably.

Sincerely,

WLB
William L. Ball, III
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

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R

BARBAT MITZVAH



TWINNING

South Florida Conference on Soviet Jewry

a committee of the
Greater Miami Jewish Federation's Community Relations Committee

4200 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida 33137

Note: Be sure that your Rabbi has been consulted about incorporating the Twinning program within your congregation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/OR/IR

Date:

3/17/97

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HOW MANY JEWS HAVE LEFT?

Since 1970, two-hundred-fifty thousand (250,000) Jews have succeeded in emigrating from the USSR. Until 1979, more and more Jews were allowed out each year. Fifty thousand (50,000) Jews left in 1979. But each year since the numbers have gotten smaller. In 1980, twenty-one thousand (21,000) Jews got out; but by 1981 only nine thousand (9,000) were permitted to leave. The year of 1982 saw a drastic decline to 2,670. In 1983, it was an alarming 1,314. Through June 1984, only 484 Jews had emigrated from the USSR.

WHAT HAPPENS TO A JEW WHO WANTS TO LEAVE?

When a Jew decides to emigrate from the Soviet Union, he must apply for a visa. In order to apply, he must first present a letter from a relative already living in Israel who is willing to take care of the emigrant and his or her family when they first arrive. Many times the Soviet Government holds up the mail and the invitation from Israel never is delivered. Sometimes he must wait years before he gets the letter and can officially apply to leave.

When the application is submitted, the Jew is in danger of losing his or her job. When people find out that a family wants to leave, the husband or wife of the applicant is fired also. Sometimes they are forced to move out of their apartment.

In the Soviet Union, anyone who is not working can be charged with "parasitism," that is, not contributing to the Soviet state. Many Jews fired from their jobs have been sent to prisons and labor camps as "parasites." For those who are not arrested, it is impossible to find other jobs.

The children of applicants often are dismissed from schools and training programs. The entire family lives on the outer edges of society. Their friends avoid them, the KGB harasses them, they can no longer live as they did. They sit and wait for the Government to allow them to leave. Sometimes they wait months; many times they wait for years.

WHAT CAN WE DO TO HELP?

Twine your Bar or Bat Mitzvah. You help a young Soviet Jew to tell the world that he/she is part of the Jewish people. Your letters and the tape of the ceremony, if possible, will teach the family and friends of this young person all about this important event in the life cycle.

Writing to a Soviet Jewish family helps them to "keep up their spirits" during their long wait for exit permits. You can tell your Soviet twin about your life and share some of your religious learning experiences with him/her.

REMEMBER: EVERY LETTER WE WRITE, EVERY CONTACT SHOWS THE USSR THAT WE CARE AND WE ARE WATCHING OUT FOR OUR SOVIET JEWISH BROTHERS AND SISTERS. THE USSR WILL LISTEN TO OUR VOICES IF WE ARE LOUD ENOUGH. WE MUST CONTINUE TO HELP AS MUCH AS WE CAN UNTIL EVERY JEW WHO WANTS TO LEAVE IS PERMITTED TO EMIGRATE!

WRITING LETTERS TO YOUR "TWIN"

1. Your letter should be personal. Introduce and describe yourself. Write about your family, where you live, and your hobbies. Send photographs. (Make several copies of this letter.)
2. Explain about your Bar/Bat Mitzvah and that you would like to share this with him/her. You may want to explain what the "twinning" program is to your twin. **DON'T WRITE ANYTHING ANTI-SOVIET OR MENTION JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS.** It is OK to mention the synagogue.
3. Number your letters on the inside, which will enable your twin to know if he/she has received all your letters. Make copies of your letters.
4. Encourage them to write to you and indicate which number letters they have received. Let them (and the Soviet censors) know that you, your friends and your Congressmen have heard about them and are very concerned.
5. Take your first letter to the Post Office and mail it REGISTERED, RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED. It will cost \$4.25 and will give your letter a better chance of reaching its destination. Regular letters should be addressed to one of your twin's parents rather than to the twin himself/herself. This also gives you a better chance of having it delivered.
6. Write once a month. Mail some of your letters to your twin regular postage - air mail, especially until you have established contact and received an answer from your twin. Include a copy of the introductory first letter with a new, short note each month until you receive an answer.
7. In addition to your personal letter, send holiday cards and special greetings whenever you can - birthdays, Rosh Hashanah, Chanukah and Passover.
8. Be sure to answer all letters promptly! If no response is forthcoming, continue to write since some letters might not be delivered.
9. If information is included on relatives of your twin living in Israel or somewhere else outside the USSR, you can write to the relatives. You may want to send the relative a copy of your letter too.
10. If you receive any answers, please call the person in charge of twinning at your congregation. We would like to share them with the congregation. News needs to be shared.

GOOD LUCK! Remember you are their link. Your letters will let the Soviet KGB know that your Soviet Jewish family is known and supported in the West.

If you have any questions, please call me. I will be happy to help you in any way possible.

Shalom,

Congregational Twinning Chairman

Address: _____

Phone: _____

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

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(E3)

NON-PROLIFERATION:
US/SOVIET POSITIONS AND CONSULTATIONS

I. Background

US and USSR have completed six rounds of non-proliferation consultations. Latest round ended October 23 in Washington. Next round may occur in Moscow June 1986, with additional safeguards discussions scheduled for margins of February IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna.

Consultations have been businesslike and constructive, with Soviets showing interest in detailed discussion of improving IAEA safeguards, strengthening export controls, and pursuing multilateral non-proliferation discussions.

The NPT RevCon was recently completed in Geneva with a relatively successful outcome. Soviets refrained from inflammatory rhetoric against US in Geneva, but Soviet media elsewhere did accuse US of bad faith on arms control and of providing sensitive nuclear technology to Israel and Pakistan.

Soviet Views and Objectives

Now that the NPT RevCon is completed, Soviets are pushing harder, publicly and privately, on favorite issues such as CTB, demilitarization of space, and nuclear-free zones.

Although Soviets remain prepared to cooperate on safeguards, export controls, and other issues of importance to them such as safeguards financing, they will continue to criticize US political support for Israel/Pakistan as undercutting non-proliferation objectives.

- o Expect Soviets to focus on NPT RevCon's call for resumption of CTB negotiations.

III. US Views and Objectives

- o US has made clear that while a CTB is a long-term goal, deep equitable and verifiable cuts are the course to be pursued now. US has reiterated President's initiative to allow Soviet experts to monitor a US nuclear test in order to improve verification.
- o Non-proliferation consultations remain productive as a means of establishing similar US/USSR positions on matters of common interest. They also provide opportunity to obtain information on Soviet nuclear supply policies, especially to sensitive countries like Libya, Cuba, Iraq, Syria.

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I. U.S. POLICY

- o Based on UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, Camp David Framework and September 1 initiative.
- o Ultimate objective just and lasting peace between Israel and all its Arab neighbors.
- o Essential next step direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan, with Palestinian participation.

II. CURRENT SITUATION

- o Hussein and Peres seeking to develop negotiating process
 - take advantage of 1985 "window of opportunity"
 - focus on process, rather than outcome
- o Recent visits to Washington of Hussein and Peres: further progress toward negotiations.
 - Hussein spoke of Israel's right to exist, direct negotiations pursued in absence of belligerent acts
 - Peres affirmed importance of moving toward peace with Jordan through negotiations without pre-conditions
- o Jordan and Israel must take into consideration each other's political requirements and limits in developing realistic scenario leading to direct negotiations.
- o Murphy prepared to meet with Jordanian-Palestinian group as part of such scenario.
- o Jordan needs supportive international context but one which facilitates, not impairs, move to direct negotiations. Peres prepared to consider international forum to initiate negotiations and Soviet participation if Soviets agree to re-establish relations.
- o U.S. position on recognition of and negotiation with the PLO remains unchanged.
- o No Israeli government will enter negotiations if PLO present
- o Improved Egyptian-Israeli relationship important; cornerstone of broader peace process

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ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS579 MCN = 95293/36014 TOR = 952932125
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ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

P 202124Z OCT 95
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUCBSAA/LANTCOM IDHS NORFOLK VA
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE

P 202119Z OCT 95
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8561
INFO RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 0074
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE 0044
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RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 0005
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CONTROLS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 006633

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR INR, ARA/BSC, IO/D, IO/ESA, USUN/W

E.O. 12356: N/A

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

TAGS: SOCI, EAID, AR KNSD
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA CONFIRMS FUNDING FOR WHITE
- HELMETS AND REACHES OUT FOR OTHER
- SUPPORT

REF: (A) USUN 3960 (B) USUN 4025 (C) STATE 23311

1. SUMMARY: ARGENTINE COORDINATOR FOR THE WHITE
HELMETS (WH) HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE OCTAVIO FRIGERIO
TOLD EMBASSY THAT THE GOA HAD AT LAST FINALIZED ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO THE SPECIAL WH FUND ADMINISTERED BY
THE UN VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATION. FRIGERIO HOPED THE
CONTRIBUTION WOULD SPUR ACTION ON OTHER PENDING
PROMISES OF SUPPORT AND ALLOW IMPLEMENTATION OF
SEVERAL PLANNED WH MISSIONS TO MOVE FORWARD.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/13/97
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FRIGERIO DESCRIBED PLANS FOR A WH OPERATION TO DISTRIBUTE MEDICINE AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES IN IRAQ, WHICH COULD POTENTIALLY ESTABLISH THE INITIATIVE ON A SIGNIFICANT, INTERNATIONAL SCALE. WHILE NOTING FEELERS FOR POSSIBLE WH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM SOURCES AS DIVERSE AS THE REVEREND MOON AND SHADY ARGENTINE MAGNATE ALFREDO YABRAN, FRIGERIO STRONGLY URGED A "CONCRETE USG GESTURE OF SUPPORT" FOR THE WH INITIATIVE. END SUMMARY.

2. ON OCTOBER 19 POLCOUNS SPOKE WITH GOA COORDINATOR FOR THE WHITE HELMETS (WH) HUMANITARIAN VOLUNTEER INITIATIVE, OCTAVIO FRIGERIO, TO GET AN UPDATE ON THE PROGRAM. FRIGERIO WAS PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE THAT THE FULL ONE MILLION DOLLAR GOA CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNV SPECIAL WINDOW HAD FINALLY BEEN RELEASED BY A RELUCTANT ECONOMY MINISTER DOMINGO CAVALLO. NOW REAL IMPLEMENTATION COULD PROCEED WITH A RANGE OF PENDING WH DEPLOYMENTS IN ADDITION TO INITIAL PROJECTS IN NORTHERN ARGENTINA, AZERBAIJAN, AND HAITI. HE HOPED THAT THE WH OPERATION IN HAITI TO DISTRIBUTE FOOD COULD SOON BE EXPANDED TO OTHER POPULATION CENTERS AWAY FROM PORT AU PRINCE AS PART OF THE EFFORT TO SLOW MIGRATION TO THE CAPITAL. FRIGERIO ADDED THAT PENDING PROJECTS IN THE GAZA STRIP (WITH THE COLLABORATION OF ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITIES), ANGOLA (WITH POSSIBLE FINANCIAL AID FROM GERMANY AND SPAIN), AND OTHERS WOULD NOW AT LAST BE ABLE TO MOVE BEYOND THE PLANNING STAGE (REF A).

3. FRIGERIO SAID THAT HE WAS ACTIVELY ENGAGED WITH A PROPOSAL FOR THE WHITE HELMETS TO HELP DISTRIBUTE HUMANITARIAN AID IN IRAQ, ESPECIALLY BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY AMONG THE KURDS. WHILE SADDAM HUSEIN'S REGIME HAD REJECTED RED CROSS PARTICIPATION IN THIS AID DISTRIBUTION, THE IRAQUIS HAD ACCEPTED THE WHITE HELMETS IN THIS ROLE. FRIGERIO SAID THAT THE CLEVELAND CLINIC IN THE U.S. AND VARIOUS USG AGENCIES WERE INVOLVED IN THE PROJECT WHICH WAS TO MEET THE KIND OF URGENT HUMANITARIAN CRISIS FOR WHICH THE WH INITIATIVE HAD BEEN DESIGNED. WITH THE WH POTENTIALLY HANDLING THE DISTRIBUTION OF HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS WORTH OF ASSISTANCE, THE INTERNATIONAL PROFILE OF THE INITIATIVE WOULD BE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED. FRIGERIO EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS FULLY IN AGREEMENT THAT THE WH SHOULD PRIMARILY BE FOCUSED ON ADDRESSING HUMANITARIAN CRISES RATHER THAN LONGER TERM STRUCTURAL POVERTY AS WAS THE CASE WITH EXISTING PROJECTS. IT WAS JUST THAT NO "RWANDAS" HAD ARISEN SINCE WH DEPLOYMENTS HAD BECOME POSSIBLE.

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4. FRIGERIO ADDED THAT HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY TWO UNUSUAL SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR THE WH FOUNDATION ESTABLISHED IN ARGENTINA TO RECEIVE PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INITIATIVE. HE ASKED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL USG REACTION TO A STILL UNCONFIRMED CONTRIBUTION FROM THE SHADY ARGENTINE TYCOON ALFREDO YABRAN WHO HAS BEEN LINKED TO MONEY LAUNDERING AND INFLUENCE PEDDLING. IN HIS VIEW, FRIGERIO SAID, UNLESS SOME HARD EVIDENCE COULD BE PRODUCED TO PROVE YABRAN'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES, HE WAS INCLINED TO ACCEPT HIS MONEY AS LONG AS NO STRINGS WERE ATTACHED. THE CONTRIBUTION WOULD, IN EFFECT, "SANCTIFY ITSELF" WHEN PUT TO USE IN HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS. FRIGERIO SAID THAT HE WAS ALSO NEGOTIATING WITH THE REVEREND SUN MYUNG MOON FOR A POTENTIAL WH CONTRIBUTION. IN RESPONSE TO A "VISION," REVEREND MOON HAD BASED HIS NEW LATIN AMERICA MISSION IN THE ARGENTINE PROVINCE OF CORRIENTES AND WAS LOOKING TO IMPROVE HIS IMAGE BY A HUMANITARIAN GESTURE NOT LINKED WITH THE UNIFICATION CHURCH. FRIGERIO EMPHASIZED THAT HE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE PRIVATE

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
RATHER THAN GOVERNMENT FUNDS SHOULD BE THE MAINSTAY OF THE WH INITIATIVE.

5. FRIGERIO CONCLUDED BY THANKING THE USG FOR ITS CONTINUED MORAL SUPPORT OF THE INITIATIVE AND U.S. ASSISTANCE WITH A NEW WH RESOLUTION IN THE CURRENT UNGA SESSION. WHILE HE CONTINUED TO BE ENCOURAGED BY ORGANIZATIONAL PROGRESS ON A U.S. ROLE, HE APPEALED FOR A "CONCRETE U.S. GESTURE" WHICH WOULD SOLIDIFY INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE INITIATIVE. IF BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS CURRENTLY MADE A SIGNIFICANT U.S. CONTRIBUTION PROBLEMATIC, FRIGERIO HOPED THAT AT A MINIMUM A U.S. WHITE HELMETS CONTINGENT COULD BE OPERATIONAL FOR ONE OF THE PROJECTED MISSIONS. EVEN A SYMBOLIC USG CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNV WHITE HELMETS FUND WOULD ALSO HAVE GREAT IMPACT. FRIGERIO AGREED THAT A U.S. COMMITMENT TO MOVE FORWARD WITH ASSISTING AND ORGANIZING VOLUNTEER PROGRAMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO SUSTAINING THE WH INITIATIVE.

6. COMMENT: WHILE YABRAN AND THE REVEREND MOON MIGHT BE DUBIOUS SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR THE WH, FRIGERIO AND THE GOA ARE PLAINLY DETERMINED TO GET ASSISTANCE WHEREVER THEY CAN TO FULLY LAUNCH THE INITIATIVE. WE AGREE THAT AT LAST A USG COMMITMENT TO OFFER MORE THAN VERBAL SUPPORT FOR THE INITIATIVE MIGHT HELP TO HEAD OFF THE NEED FOR CONTRIBUTIONS PROVIDED WITH EVIDENT ULTERIOR MOTIVES. A MORE ACTIVE U.S. ROLE -

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EVEN IN PURELY ORGANIZATIONAL TERMS - COULD HELP
PROVIDE THE MOMENTUM THE WH STILL NEEDS.

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ENVELOPE

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HEADER

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RUCIAEA/NAIC WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH//SCIR//
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RUWSMXI/AMC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
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RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 4752
RUCPDC/USDOC WASHDC
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RUHQHQB/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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USTR FOR CHATTIN/COLLINS

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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, ECON, KS, US
SUBJECT: DAILY SEOUL PRESS TRANSLATIONS, JULY 26, 1994

CAPTIONS CONT:

TREASURY FOR OASIA/MBRETTSCHEIDER
USDOC FOR 4430/IEP/OPB/EAP/JDONIUS
STATE PASS USDA ELECTRONICALLY FOR FAS/ITP/HEMPHILL
STATE PASS DOL/ILAB GLENN HALM

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TOP HEADLINES
-----EDITORIALS

1. NOTEWORTHY MOVE FOR WON CURRENCY APPRECIATION
2. WHAT WHOLESALE ARRESTS MEAN

FEATURES

3. U.S. KOREA TO CONSULT CHINA, RUSSIA ON N/KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE
4. U.S. REACTION TO "MESSAGE BROUGHT BY" PAK BO-HI
5. FOUR POWERS' POSITION AND PROSPECT OF "DIALOGUE POSTURE" UNDER KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM
6. TASKS AHEAD OF KOREAN ECONOMY TO BECOME ADVANCED TYPE

NEWS

7. VIETNAM HOPES FOR EARLY SUPPLY OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION LOAN
8. KOREA "LAST" APPEALING AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT
9. CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS ASSOCIATION SENDS OPEN QUESTIONNAIRE TO BLUE HOUSE ON N/KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

ECONOMIC HIGHLIGHTS

CHEIL FUTURES SIGN CONTRACT ON ESTABLISHING RSF WITH U.S. FIRM
INFLOW OF FOREIGN CAPITAL ESTIMATED AT \$5 BILLION
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JUSTICE MINISTER KIM: LEFTIST GROUPS SHALL BE THOROUGHLY ISOLATED FROM THIS SOCIETY

TONGA ILBO (7/26)

WATER RATIONING FEARED

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
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KOIS ASKS THAT SEGYE ILBO PRESIDENT PAK BO-HI BE FIRED

SEGYE ILBO (7/26)

"PAN-NATIONAL DROUGHT COMMITTEE" FORMED

DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

NORTH KOREA SAYS BETTER RELATIONS WITH SEOUL NOT CONDITION
FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES (HANKYOREH)
KOREA'S INVESTMENT MERIT IS WORST AMONG DEVELOPING
NATIONS; FORTUNE (TONGA, HANKUK)
USE OF PLASTIC BAGS BANNED (SEGYE)
LOCAL PHONE CALL CHARGES RISE TO 40 WON (ALL)

INTERNATIONAL NEWS

FOREIGN MINISTER HAN PROPOSES CREATION OF COLLECTIVE
SECURITY SYSTEM FOR NORTHEAST ASIA (ALL)
ISRAEL, JORDAN END 46 YEARS OF HOSTILITY, WILL SIGN PEACE
TREATY IN A FEW MONTHS (ALL)
GOJ REWRITING DEFENSE PLAN IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE
EXODUS OF NORTH KOREANS (ALL)
NORTH KOREA MAY OPEN MORE CITIES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT
(ALL)
U.S. REQUIRES ALL MOTOR PARTS BE LABELED WITH CERTIFICATE
OF ORIGIN (ALL)

EDITORIALS

1. NOTEWORTHY MOVE FOR WON CURRENCY APPRECIATION
(CHUNGANG ILBO 7/25, FULL)

IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO CONCLUDE WHETHER THE CURRENT
TREND OF APPRECIATING THE WON CURRENCY VALUE IS FIRM
ENOUGH. YET, IT SEEMS CERTAIN THAT THE WON-DOLLAR AND
WON-YEN EXCHANGE RATES HAVE TURNED FROM THE TREND OF
DEPRECIATION OR MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO TO THAT OF
APPRECIATION.

DURING THE PAST YEAR, THE KEYNOTE OF KOREA'S EXCHANGE
RATES HAS BEEN MAINTAINED AT A LOW VALUE OF THE WON
AGAINST THE WEAK DOLLAR AND STRONG YEN CURRENCIES. THIS
BECAME EVEN MORE CLEAR WHEN WE RECALL THAT THE EXCHANGE

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RATE AT THE END OF LAST YEAR WAS MARKED AT W722 TO THE U.S. DOLLAR. AT PRESENT, THE EXCHANGE RATE HAS MAINTAINED A LEVEL OF W800 TO THE U.S. DOLLAR OR TO 100 JAPANESE YEN. SHOULD THE EXCHANGE RATES TURN TO THE STRONG WON, IT WILL HAVE CONSIDERABLE EFFECTS NOT ONLY IN INDUSTRIAL FIELDS, BUT ALSO IN THE MONEY AND BANKING SECTORS. ACCORDING TO THE PRIMARY EFFECT, THE PRICES FOR EXPORT GOODS WILL RISE, AND THOSE FOR IMPORTED GOODS WILL GROW CHEAPER.

THE GOVERNMENT GIVES THE IMPRESSION OF REMAINING INDIFFERENT TO SUCH A CHANGE IN THE KEYNOTE OF THE EXCHANGE RATES. THIS MIGHT BE BECAUSE IT HAS COME TO REALIZE THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO THINK ABOUT PRICES AND STABILITY, RATHER THAN BUSINESS CONDITIONS. IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE FIRST HALF OF THIS YEAR MIGHT BE ESTIMATED AT OVER 8 PERCENT; AND THIS TREND IS EXPECTED TO ENSUE IN THE LATTER HALF OF THIS YEAR. SO,

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

THE GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO HAVE CONCENTRATED ON CALMING THE BUSINESS CONDITION, REMOVING "BUBBLES" FROM THE ECONOMY, AND MAINTAINING THE STABILITY KEYNOTE. EXPERTS, THEREFORE, HOLD THAT THIS TREND OF A WON CURRENCY APPRECIATION WILL CONTINUE IN THE LATTER HALF OF THIS YEAR, MAINTAINING THE EXCHANGE RATE AT W790 OR W800 TO THE DOLLAR.

IT IS NOT KNOWN HOW FAR THIS TREND OF WON APPRECIATION BY A SMALL MARGIN WILL PUT THE BRAKES ON THE TREND OF AN INCREASE IN EXPORTS, WHICH RESULTED THANKS TO THE STRONG YEN. IN SOME INDUSTRIES, BUSINESSMEN SEEM CONCERNED ABOUT THIS MOVE FOR WON APPRECIATION. THE OECD, IN WHICH KOREA'S ADMISSION IS JUST AROUND THE CORNER, ADVISES THAT KOREA SHOULD STRENGTHEN ITS ECONOMIC STABILITY SINCE IT HAS JUST PASSED THE BOTTOM OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE. SOME OBSERVERS HOLD THAT THE CURRENT TREND OF LOW WON VALUE SHOULD BE HALTED AT TODAY'S LEVEL, EVEN IN CONSIDERATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF THE WON CURRENCY.

KOREAN BUSINESSES AND BANKING INSTITUTIONS SHOULD NOW ADAPT THEMSELVES TO THIS CHANGE, AND TAKE IT AS A MOMENTUM FOR STRENGTHENING THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND STEPPING UP THEIR STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT. IT IS NOT A FIRMLY-SET TREND YET, BUT NOW IS THE TIME FOR THE GOVERNMENT, BUSINESSES, AND HOUSEHOLDS ALIKE TO BE PREPARED FOR THE ARRIVAL OF AN ERA FOR APPRECIATION OF THE WON CURRENCY VALUE.

2. WHAT WHOLESALE ARRESTS MEAN (HANKYOREH SHINMUN 7/26: SUMMARY)

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IT ACTUALLY IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHERE OUR SOCIETY IS NOW HEADED. IS THE COLD-WAR CURRENT OVER THE KOREAN PENINSULA IN THE PROCESS OF THAW OR NOT? IS THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF OUR SOCIETY MAKING PROGRESS OR RETROGRESSING? IT IS HARD TO ACCURATELY PINPOINT OUR STANDING, WHETHER INTERNATIONALLY OR DOMESTICALLY.

IT ALL ORIGINATES FROM THE INCONSISTENT ATTITUDE SHOWN BY THE KIM YOUNG-SAM GOVERNMENT. RECENTLY, THE SO-CALLED "CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT" REVEALED ITS ATTITUDE OF DEPENDING ONLY ON POLICE TROOPS FOR DEALING WITH ALL KINDS OF SOCIAL TROUBLES. IT ONCE PROFESSED TO PROCEED TOWARD NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN SUMMIT TALKS, BUT IT HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN INCREASING TENSIONS BY CREATING A MCCARTHYIST ATMOSPHERE, TOGETHER WITH OLD GUARD MEMBERS.

WHAT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FORCES HAVE BEEN DRIVING THE KIM YOUNG-SAM GOVERNMENT INTO A DIRECTION AGAINST DEMOCRACY AND AGAINST UNIFICATION? WHAT ARE THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CAUSES OF SUCH A DRIVE? LET'S PUT ASIDE THESE QUESTIONS FOR A WHILE. YET, THERE IS ONE THING THAT MUST BE CLARIFIED; IT IS THE FACT THAT FOR TODAY'S CHAOS, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE HELD ENTIRELY RESPONSIBLE.

THE RECENT SERIES OF WHOLESALE ARRESTS OF PEOPLE ARE PROOF OF HOW FAR THE GOVERNMENT HAS GONE TO LOSE REASON AND A SENSE OF BALANCE. IN WHAT IS CALLED "THE NEW SECURITY-RIDDEN SITUATION" CREATED LAST MONTH, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ARRESTED 288 PERSONS. THE NUMBER IS AS MANY AS 100 PERSONS MORE THAN THE NUMBER OF ARRESTS MADE AT THE HEIGHT OF THE ROH TAE-WOO GOVERNMENT'S "SECURITY-RIDDEN POLITICAL SITUATION" BACK IN JULY 1989. CONSEQUENTLY, THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IMPRISONED FOR WHAT ARE CALLED "OFFENSES RELATED TO THE POLITICAL SITUATION" HAS INCREASED BY TEN OVER THE

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/
FIGURE REGISTERED AT THE TIME OF KIM GOVERNMENT'S INAUGURATION.

THE MOBILIZATION OF POLICE FORCES HAS GONE FAR BEYOND COMMON SENSE. THE NUMBER OF THOSE ARRESTED HAS BEEN EXPANDING DAY AFTER DAY. THIS REALITY CAN IN NO WAY BE A USUAL ONE. ALL THESE DEMONSTRATE WELL THAT THE KIM GOVERNMENT IS NO DIFFERENT FROM THE DAYS UNDER THE FIFTH AND SIXTH REPUBLIC GOVERNMENTS, IN THAT IT TRIES NOT TO RESOLVE SOCIAL TROUBLES BY REASON AND THAT IT BREEDS DISCORD AND ANTAGONISM BETWEEN MAJOR SOCIAL FORCES REPEATEDLY.

WHEN DOMESTIC POLITICS HAVE BEEN PUT IN SUCH AN

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ANTIDEMOCRATIC SITUATION, THERE IS NO REASON FOR NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS TO DEVELOP IN A FORWARD-LOOKING FASHION. WITH THE CONTROVERSY OVER "CONDOLENCES" AND THE STIRS CREATED BY SOGANG UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT PARK HONG'S REMARKS, REASONABLE DISCUSSIONS OR CONVERSATIONS ON THE UNIFICATION ISSUE HAVE ALREADY DISAPPEARED. THE ULTRARIGHTIST ATMOSPHERE IS NOW MANIPULATING POLITICS AND FURTHER REIGNING OVER THE PEOPLE'S CONSCIOUSNESS.

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, NO ONE CAN SAY DEFINITELY THAT THE NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN SUMMIT TALKS WILL BE REALIZED PROPERLY AND SUCCESSFULLY. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE UNIFICATION ISSUE ALWAYS HAVE INSEPARABLE RELATIONS. IF THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TRULY AIM AT PEACEFUL UNIFICATION, IT SHOULD FIRST POLITICALLY OVERCOME THE OLD GUARD AT HOME.

FEATURES

3. U.S., KOREA TO CONSULT CHINA, RUSSIA ON N/KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE (HANKYOREH SHINMUN 7/25; FULL)

(BY REPORTER KIM SONG-HO IN BANGKOK)

KOREA AND THE U.S. HAVE AGREED TO CONVINCE CHINA AND RUSSIA TO TAKE PART IN AND PLAY A ROLE IN THE SOLUTION OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM. THIS IMPLIES THAT KOREA AND THE U.S. WILL SEEK TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE THROUGH A MULTIPARTY COOPERATIVE SYSTEM, RATHER THAN ON THE INITIATIVE OF KOREA AND THE U.S. REALIZING THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF CHINA AND RUSSIA IS CRUCIAL TO THE COMPLETE SOLUTION OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM, KOREA AND THE U.S. HAVE ALREADY CONCLUDED DISCUSSIONS ON CONCRETE WAYS TO ENCOURAGE CHINA AND RUSSIA TO HAVE A VOICE IN THE EARLY STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

ACCORDINGLY, KOREA AND THE U.S. HAVE BEGUN TO PERSUADE CHINA AND RUSSIA TO TAKE PART IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE. FOREIGN MINISTER HAN SUNG-JOO, WHO IS VISITING BANGKOK TO ATTEND THE ASEAN CONFERENCE AND HIS CHINESE COUNTERPART, QIAN QICHEN, HAD TALKS ON JULY 24 TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC WAYS FOR CHINA TO TAKE PART IN THE SOLUTION OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM. STRESSING THAT CHINA'S ROLE IS IMPORTANT FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, FOREIGN MINISTER HAN CALLED FOR "CHINA'S CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE." FOREIGN MINISTER HAN ALSO CALLED ON CHINA TO PERSUADE NORTH KOREA TO GIVE UP ITS NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

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FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN, RESPONDING TO THIS SAID:

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"CHINA WILL CLOSELY COOPERATE WITH KOREA FOR A SMOOTH SOLUTION OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM." FOREIGN MINISTER HAN ALSO HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS RUSSIAN COUNTERPART, KOZYREV AND CALLED FOR RUSSIA'S ACTIVE ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR MATTER. MEANWHILE, IT HAS BEEN LEARNED THAT ROBERT GALLUCCI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, WILL VISIT CHINA AND RUSSIA TO DISCUSS WAYS FOR THE TWO COUNTRIES TO TAKE PART IN THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE. KOREA AND THE U.S. BELIEVE THAT CHINA AND RUSSIA COULD TAKE PART IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE BY HELPING NORTH KOREA BUILD LIGHT WATER-MODERATED REACTORS, MANAGING THE NUCLEAR FUEL RODS EXTRACTED FROM NUCLEAR REACTORS, AND SUPPLYING ENERGY THAT CAN REPLACE NUCLEAR ENERGY.

4. U.S. REACTION TO "MESSAGE BROUGHT BY" PAK BO-HI
(HANKUK ILBO 7/26: FULL)

(BY CORRESPONDENT YI SANG-SOK IN WASHINGTON)

AFTER HIS RECENT VISIT TO PYONGYANG, PAK BO-HI, PRESIDENT OF THE SEGYE ILBO CO., TOLD THE PRESS ABOUT "KIM CHONG-IL'S MESSAGE," SAYING THAT KIM CHONG-IL IN NORTH KOREA "HOPES TO VISIT THE U.S. AND HAVE A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON." TO THIS QUESTION, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S REACTION WAS COOL, IN A NUTSHELL.

THIS MESSAGE CONVEYED BY PAK, AN OPERATOR OF A DAILY NEWSPAPER COMPANY, IS NOT ONLY UNCLEAR IN ITS TRUE INTENTION, BUT IS ALSO A "RHETORICAL MENTION" OF WHICH THE FEASIBILITY IS SLIM, ACCORDING TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S JUDGEMENT. SUCH A REACTION IS NOT MUCH DIFFERENT FROM THE ATTITUDE SHOWN WHEN KIM IL-SONG HIMSELF REPORTEDLY TOLD FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS, INVITED TO HIS 82ND BIRTHDAY PARTY LAST APRIL, THAT "I WISH TO GO FISHING AND HUNTING IN THE U.S."

VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE APPEARED IN AN NBC INTERVIEW PROGRAM ON CURRENT TOPICS ON JULY 24 (EST). ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BETWEEN KIM CHONG-IL AND PRESIDENT CLINTON, HE BRUSHED IT ASIDE BY SAYING, "IT'S A PROPOSAL IMPOSSIBLE OF REALIZATION." "WE ARE NOT ENGAGED IN DIPLOMACY THROUGH NEWSPAPERS," HE SAID. GORE SAID THAT THE U.S. HAS BEEN FOCUSING PRIORITY INTEREST AND CONCERN ON THE THIRD-ROUND HIGH-LEVEL TALKS BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND THE U.S. TO BE RESUMED IN GENEVA ON AUG. 5, WHETHER OR NOT NORTH KOREA'S COMMITMENT ON NUCLEAR FREEZE IS FULFILLED.

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VICE PRESIDENT GORE'S REMARKS DO NOT DEPART FROM THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S CONSISTENT POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA THAT NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA WILL BE SOUGHT, DEPENDING ON PROGRESS IN RESOLVING THE PRESENT NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE.

IN THIS WAY, THE U.S.'S PRIMARY REACTION TO KIM CHONG-IL'S MESSAGE MAY WELL BE DESCRIBED AS BEING NEGATIVE. THIS MAY PROBABLY BE BECAUSE THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT GIVE ANY PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE TO THE CAPACITY OF THE ONE WHO CONVEYED THE MESSAGE -- PAK BO-HI, PRESIDENT OF SEGYE ILBO.

IF THE REAL INTENTION OF KIM CHONG-IL'S MESSAGE THAT HE HOPES TO VISIT THE U.S. SHOULD BE CONFIRMED MORE CONCRETELY THROUGH ANOTHER CHANNEL, THEN THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT APPEAR LIKELY TO PERSIST IN ITS NEGATIVE ATTITUDE. THE ADMINISTRATION HOLDS THE VIEW THAT

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 006 *****/

THE EMERGENCE OF A STRONG LEADER IN NORTH KOREA IS IN ACCORD WITH THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE U.S. FROM THIS VIEWPOINT, THE U.S. MAY WELL BE REGARDED AS FEELING REASSURED BY THE WAY KIM'S SUCCESSION TO POWER IS MAKING PROGRESS WITHOUT ANY PARTICULARLY UNTOWARD INCIDENTS.

THEREFORE, IF KIM CHONG-IL SHOULD ADOPT A FRIENDLY POLICY TOWARD THE U.S., INCLUDING THE ABANDONMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, AND HAVE IT CONFIRMED BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD, IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO ASSUME THAT THE U.S. IS READY TO EMBRACE HIM. MOREOVER, IF THE OPENING OF THE NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT TALKS SHOULD BE "A MATTER OF TIME," AS KIM REPORTEDLY DISCLOSED TO PAK, THE QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND THE U.S. AND KIM CHONG-IL'S VISIT TO THE U.S. MAY POSSIBLY TAKE AN EVEN MORE CONCRETE FORM.

DOS OFFICIALS HOLD THAT IF KIM'S EXPRESSION OF HIS INTENT TO VISIT THE U.S. IS TRUE, IT MIGHT BE ANOTHER SIGNAL HINTING AT HIS SMOOTH SUCCESSION TO POWER. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT IT MAY PROVIDE A MOMENTUM TO WIPE OUT THE WESTERN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES' NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT OF KIM CHONG-IL.

THEIR IDEAS ARE BASED ON THE FACT THAT KIM CHONG-IL, DURING THE PAST 10-ODD YEARS, HAS PLAYED THE LEADING ROLE IN NORTH KOREA'S EXPERIMENT IN LIBERALIZATION. ACCORDING TO THEM, KIM CHONG-IL HAS TAKEN THE LEAD, BEHIND THE SCENES, IN THE WORK FOR OPENING THE DOOR TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD. FOR INSTANCE, IN 1991, WHEN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE ABOUT TO FALL, KIM INVITED MUN SON-MYONG,

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UNIFICATION CHURCH FOUNDER, AND PAK, PRESIDENT OF SEGYE ILBO CO., AND OTHER UNIFICATION CHURCH OFFICIALS TO NORTH KOREA; AND HE ALSO HASTENED THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES.

SOME U.S. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS PAY ATTENTION TO KIM TAL-HYON AND YUN KI-POK, WHO ONCE PLAYED INTERMEDIATORY ROLES FOR A NORTH KOREA VISIT BY CHURCH FOUNDER MUN AND HIS PARTY UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM KIM CHONG-IL AND WERE LATER DEMOTED. FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF KIM IL-SONG, THEY ARE BACK AGAIN AND SECRETLY PLACE EXPECTATIONS ON THE FULL-FLEDGED OPENING OF THE KIM CHONG-IL REGIME.

THE KIM CHONG-IL REGIME'S WILL TOWARD IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE U.S.'S INTENSIVE TEST AT THE GENEVA TALKS TO BE RESUMED NEXT MONTH. THE REAL INTENTION OF THE KIM CHONG-IL MESSAGE APPEARS LIKELY TO BE VERIFIED, IN DETAIL, AT THE UPCOMING TALKS.

5. FOUR POWERS' POSITION AND PROSPECT OF "DIALOGUE POSTURE" UNDER KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM (TONGA ILBO 7/26; SUMMARY)

U.S.

(BY REPORTER NAM CHAN-SUN IN WASHINGTON)

IT IS PREDICTED THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND THE U.S., IN THE WAKE OF THE INAUGURATION OF THE KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM, WILL ENTIRELY DEPEND ON HOW THE NEW KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM WILL DISPOSE OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE. AS IT HAS ALREADY REVEALED DURING KIM IL-SONG'S LIFETIME, THE U.S. HAS ASSUMED A POSITION THAT IT WILL ADOPT A POLICY OF

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 007 *****/

ESTABLISHING A LIAISON OFFICE IN PYONGYANG AS A PRELUDE TO NORMALIZING DIPLOMATIC TIES, IF NORTH KOREA SHOULD FREEZE ITS NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND GUARANTEE THE TRANSPARENCY OF ITS PAST NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT HISTORY.

IN OTHER WORDS, IT HAS BEEN THE U.S. LOGIC DURING KIM IL-SONG'S LIFETIME AND AT THE PRESENT THAT THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE IN ITS POSITION THAT THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WILL SERVE AS A WEATHERCOCK IN BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND PYONGYANG. MOREOVER, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO RESOLVING THIS SPECIFIC NUCLEAR PROBLEM BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC AS A YARDSTICK FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY.

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TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE TIMING, THE OVERHEATED CAMPAIGN FOR THE UPCOMING NOVEMBER OFF-YEAR ELECTION IN THE U.S. WILL REACH ITS PEAK AFTER THIS SUMMER VACATION. COINCIDING WITH THIS, THE KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM IN NORTH KOREA WILL BE SET IN MOTION. FOR THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, THE FORTHCOMING OFF-YEAR ELECTION WILL BE AN IMPORTANT EVENT TO ASSESS ITS PAST TWO YEARS POLICY ACHIEVEMENTS AS WELL AS TO JUDGE THE DIRECTION OF THE 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE GIVEN THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERABLY FAVORABLE MARKS IN TERMS OF ITS DOMESTIC POLICIES. THIS IS BECAUSE THE AMERICAN ECONOMY HAS GREATLY IMPROVED. NEVERTHELESS, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS GAINED VERY BAD MARKS IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY. IT HAS BEEN EVALUATED THAT THE U.S. WORLD LEADERSHIP HAS STOOD AT A FAR LOWER LEVEL THAN IT HAD UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION.

THE NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR ISSUE IS THE VERY CORE OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY. THEREFORE, IF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR QUESTION IS TO BE AMICABLY SETTLED BEFORE THE NOVEMBER OFF-YEAR ELECTION, IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS WILL HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE ELECTION.

THE JUDGMENT BY THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION OVER HOW THE NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR ISSUE UNDER THE KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM WILL BE CONCLUDED TENDS TO BE CAUTIOUS BUT OPTIMISTIC. THIS IMPLIES THAT THE NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR PROBLEM WILL HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON THE POLITICAL ARENA IN THE U.S. THE MOST IMPORTANT REASON FOR THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION TO ARRIVE AT THIS JUDGMENT IS BASED ON THE FACT THAT NORTH KOREA HAS EXPRESSED ITS INTENTION TO RESUME THE THIRD ROUND HIGH-LEVEL TALKS WITH THE U.S.

OF COURSE, CONCERN HAS BEEN VOICED BY MANY PEOPLE IN THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION ABOUT THE GROWING EMERGENCE OF HARDLINERS, SUCH AS THE MILITARY, IN NORTH KOREA. BECAUSE OF THIS APPREHENSION, HOWEVER, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS CONSIDERED THAT IT WILL PROVIDE ALL AVAILABLE MEASURES SO THAT THE KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM MAY BE ABLE TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. ABOUT ITS NUCLEAR ISSUE.

IN A NUTSHELL, THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR QUESTION WILL BECOME THE KERNEL OF A MATTER RELATED TO IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM AND THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION. HENCE, IT IS PREDICTED THAT THE U.S. WILL HAVE TO TAKE "A FAR BROAD-MINDED " STAND IN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA BECAUSE OF THE U.S. POLITICAL SCHEDULE, SUCH AS THE OFF-YEAR ELECTION AND THE

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POSSIBILITY OF HAWKS GAINING POWER IN NORTH KOREA.

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 008 *****/

CHINA

(BY REPORTER KIM CHUNG-SIK IN BEIJING)

CHINA HAS REFRAINED FROM ASSESSING, ANALYZING AND PREDICTING THE POWER TRANSITION PROCESS AND THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH KOREA SYSTEM FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF KIM IL-SONG AS IF IT DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND NOT ONLY THE RULING IDEA AND THE LEADERSHIP OF KIM CHONG-IL, BUT ALSO HIS DIPLOMATIC CAPABILITIES. IT IS, HOWEVER, CERTAIN THAT CHINA HAS BELIEVED AND HOPED THAT KIM CHONG-IL WILL FOLLOW HIS FATHER'S POLICY OF MAINTAINING TRADITIONAL FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN BEIJING AND PYONGYANG. THAT'S WHY CHINA DECLARED IMMEDIATELY AFTER KIM IL-SONG'S DEATH THAT IT WILL RECOGNIZE KIM CHONG-IL'S HEREDITARY POWER SUCCESSION.

CHINA HAS ALREADY PROCLAIMED THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND STABILITY AS WELL AS THE REALIZATION OF THE DENUCLEARIZATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AS THE KEYNOTE OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY. THUS, CHINA HOPES THAT NORTH KOREA WILL NO LONGER CAUSE TROUBLE WITH EITHER THE U.S. OR KOREA. SHOULD THE PEACE STRUCTURE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA BE DESTROYED, STABILITY IN ITS NORTHEASTERN BORDER WILL BE ENDANGERED AND REFORM AND LIBERALIZATION, WHICH IT HAS NOW BEEN LABORIOUSLY UNDERTAKEN, WILL FACE A SERIOUS SETBACK.

CHINA IS APPARENTLY ATTEMPTING TO UTILIZE ITS INFLUENCE OVER NORTH KOREA TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE EXISTING FRIENDLY TIES BETWEEN BEIJING AND PYONGYANG. NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE NUMEROUS POTENTIAL FACTORS IN BRINGING ABOUT CHANGES IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. FIRST OF ALL, CHINA HAS DECLARED ITS READINESS TO EXTEND ITS OUTFLANK SUPPORT FOR NORTH KOREA. THE MANAGEMENT AND THE EXISTENCE ABILITY OF THE KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM WILL HAVE A TREMENDOUS IMPACT ON BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND NORTH KOREA.

MOREOVER, IT IS LIKELY THAT NORTH KOREA-U.S. NEGOTIATIONS SCHEDULED TO REOPEN IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WILL SERVE AS A NEW VARIABLE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN BEIJING AND PYONGYANG. THERE IS ALSO A HIGH POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN WILL EMERGE AS A VARIABLE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY BECAUSE TOKYO HAS BEEN WATCHING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO USE ITS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AS A CARD FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA.

JAPAN

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(BY REPORTER PAE IN-CHUN IN TOKYO)

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND JAPAN WILL BE GREATLY INFLUENCED BY THE ALLEVIATION OF NUCLEAR SUSPICIONS BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND THE U.S. AND THE TREND OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THEM OVER THE ISSUE OF IMPROVING THEIR RELATIONS UNDER THE KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM. WHILE THE U.S. HAS PLACED TOP PRIORITY ON ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA FOR KEEPING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY INTACT, JAPAN HAS REGARDED THE NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR ISSUE AS THE REALISTIC DANGER TO IT.

IN HIS TALKS WITH FORMER PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER LAST MONTH, KIM IL-SONG EXPRESSED HIS HOPE FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND HOLDING A SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN PYONGYANG AND TOKYO. IF THE KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 009 *****/
SHOULD STOP PUSHING AHEAD WITH ITS NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND TRY TO USE THE NUCLEAR CARD FOR ITS DIPLOMATIC PURPOSES, ITS OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN WILL MOVE FASTER THAN EXPECTED, ALONG WITH THE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.S.

UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, MOST IMPORTANT IS FOR NORTH KOREA TO SECURE ECONOMIC COOPERATION FROM JAPAN IN ORDER TO FIND A WAY OUT OF ITS DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION. THERE IS A GOOD POSSIBILITY THAT THE EXISTENCE OF CHOCHONGNYON, A PRO-PYONGYANG ASSOCIATION OF KOREANS RESIDING IN JAPAN, WILL WORK AS AN ESSENTIAL VARIABLE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND JAPAN IN THE FUTURE. WHEN NORTH KOREA TURNED AWAY FROM RESUMING TALKS WITH JAPAN FOR THE NORMALIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS EARLIER THIS YEAR, THE TOKYO GOVERNMENT STARTED CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE OPERATION OF CHOCHONGNYON AND CLOSELY WATCHED THE REMITTANCE OF MONEY FROM PRO-KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN TO PYONGYANG.

IF NORTH KOREA SHOULD CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH TOKYO AND MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF DISPELLING ITS NUCLEAR SUSPICIONS, JAPAN IS EXPECTED TO STRENGTHEN ITS FOUNDATION FOR MAKING FULL-FLEDGED ECONOMIC INROADS INTO NORTH KOREA. THIS JAPANESE APPROACH IS MOST LIKELY TO BE MADE IN THE FORM OF A MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM OR THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, EVEN PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FORMAL DIPLOMATIC TIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

IT IS ALSO ANTICIPATED THAT THE EMERGENCE OF A SOCIALIST PARTY LEADER AS THE NEW JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER, SHORTLY

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BEFORE THE INCEPTION OF THE KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM, WILL SERVE AS AN ELEMENT OF ACCELERATING THE RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN TOKYO AND PYONGYANG. THIS IS PARTICULARLY SO BECAUSE THE NORTH KOREAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY HAS MAINTAINED CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF JAPAN FOR OVER 30 YEARS.

HOWEVER, IF THE KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM SHOULD ADOPT A HARDLINE POLICY, SUCH AS THE DEVELOPMENT OF MISSILES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, JAPAN WILL GO HEAD WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM AND THE AUGMENTATION OF ARMAMENT AT A RAPID PACE. THEREFORE, THERE IS A SERIOUS CONCERN THAT SUCH A NORTH KOREAN ATTITUDE WILL ENCOURAGE JAPAN TO POSITIVELY SEEK MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES BY LEGALIZING THE EXERCISE OF ITS COLLECTIVE DEFENSE RIGHTS.

RUSSIA

(BY REPORTER MUN MYONG-HO IN MOSCOW)

RUSSIA HAS BEEN REARRANGING THE BASIC PERCEPTION OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY WHICH HAS BEEN THROWN INTO CONFUSION FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. RUSSIA HAS SHOWN THE NECESSITY OF REESTABLISHING ITS RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA WHILE RIDDING ITSELF OF BEING EXCESSIVELY INCLINED TOWARD KOREA. IN FACT, RUSSIA HAS KEPT NORTH KOREA AT A DISTANCE IN DEALING WITH THE QUESTION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

RUSSIA HAS ALSO BELIEVED THAT ITS NORTH KOREAN CARD WILL NOT ONLY BRING ADVANTAGES TO ITS RELATIONS WITH KOREA, BUT WILL ALSO BRING DIPLOMATIC BENEFIT TO ITS RELATIONS WITH NORTHEAST ASIA AND THE U.S. STRICTLY SPEAKING, HOWEVER,

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 010 *****/

RUSSIA HAS JUST BEGUN TO SEEK A NEW DIRECTION OF DIPLOMACY TOWARD NORTH KOREA. IN OTHER WORDS, RUSSIA HAS TO REESTABLISH ITS STRATEGY AND POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA AFTER CLOSELY EXAMINING THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM.

CLEARLY, RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND RUSSIA WILL ENTER A NEW ERA WHILE COMPLETELY FREEING ITSELF FROM THE FRAMEWORK OF OLD RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION FOLLOWING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF KIM IL-SONG, WHO ASSUMED THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE IN THE ESSENTIAL QUALITIES OF RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARD THE KOREAN PENINSULA IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THIS IS BECAUSE RUSSIA IS SUPPORTING

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AND PURSUING POLITICAL AND MILITARY STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

ONE OF THE MAJOR CONCERNS OF RUSSIA IS THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE. IT DOES NOT SEEM THAT THERE WILL BE ANY ALTERATION IN THE GRAND PRINCIPLE OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN SUPPORT OF THE OBSERVANCE OF THE NPT AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF IAEA NUCLEAR INSPECTIONS BY NORTH KOREA. NEVERTHELESS, RUSSIA BELIEVES THAT INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA HAS LOST ITS EFFECTIVENESS. THEREFORE, RUSSIA IS NOT LIKELY TO ACT IN CONCERT WITH THE U.S. AND OTHERS IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS AGAINST PYONGYANG, EVEN IF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE RESOLVED THROUGH NORTH KOREA-U.S. NEGOTIATIONS AND INTER-KOREAN TALKS.

RUSSIA IS EXPECTED TO STRENGTHEN ITS EFFORTS TO DEVELOP ITS TRADE RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA IN A NORMAL WAY. IT IS, THEREFORE, ANTICIPATED THAT THESE RUSSIAN EFFORTS WILL BE FURTHER ACCELERATED IF THE KIM CHONG-IL REGIME SHOULD FAVORABLY RESPOND TO THEM AND THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM SHOULD BE PEACEFULLY RESOLVED.

6. TASKS AHEAD OF KOREAN ECONOMY TO BECOME ADVANCED TYPE
(SEOUL SINMUN 7/26: FULL)

(BY PROF. KIM SE-WON OF SNU)

A FEW DAYS AGO, I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO ATTEND A SEMINAR TO WHICH GATT SECRETARY-GENERAL SUTHERLAND HAD BEEN INVITED. FIRST OF ALL, IT IS VERY AMBIGUOUS AS TO WHAT KIND OF TREATMENT THE KOREAN ECONOMY HAS BEEN GETTING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE TERM "NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRY" OR "SEMI-ADVANCED COUNTRY" IS OFTEN EMPLOYED, BUT THIS IS A TENTATIVE EXPRESSION USED EXPEDIENTLY. NO OFFICIAL POSITION CAN BE FOUND IN ANY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, INCLUDING GATT, ON THIS QUESTION.

THEREFORE, A QUESTION IS RAISED AS TO WHICH CATEGORY BETWEEN ADVANCED COUNTRIES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES KOREA BELONGS. AND THE INTERNATIONAL TREATMENT OF KOREA IS BOUND TO VARY, DEPENDING ON THE ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE COURSE OF UR NEGOTIATIONS, KOREA APPARENTLY RECEIVED TREATMENT AS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY ON THE OPENING OF THE RICE MARKET AND SO FORTH, IN THE AREA OF TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE. IN THE CLAUSE FOR PAYMENT OF SUBSIDIES OR AGREEMENT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, NOTHING HAS BEEN DEFINITELY DETERMINED ON THE TREATMENT OF KOREA. GATT HAS ALMOST ESTABLISHED ITS POSITION THAT KOREA WILL HAVE TO FOLLOW THE OBLIGATIONS OF

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 011 *****/
AN ADVANCED COUNTRY. AND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON SOME
SERVICE INDUSTRY TO BE RESUMED IN THE COMING DAYS, SUCH A
CONCLUSION APPEARS HARDLY ESCAPABLE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) HAS DECIDED TO
GIVE KOREA ITS GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP)
BENEFITS. THIS SHOWS THAT IT WILL STILL TREAT KOREA AS A
DEVELOPING COUNTRY.

AT ANY RATE, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO APPROPRIATELY
GRADUATE THE TREATMENT OF NICS, LIKE KOREA, DEPENDING ON
THE DETAILS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING THE UR
ACCORD. IN OTHER WORDS, IT WILL BE INEVITABLE TO PROVIDE
SOME EXCEPTIONAL TREATMENT ON A TEMPORARY BASIS, UNTIL
SUCH TIME AS THE COUNTRY COMPLETELY SHEDS ITS STATE OF
BEING A DEVELOPING COUNTRY. AND KOREA SHOULD MAKE
PREPARATIONS FOR THIS LOGIC, WITH WHICH TO PERSUADE
ADVANCED COUNTRIES.

NEWS

7. VIETNAM HOPES FOR EARLY SUPPLY OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION
LOAN (CHOSON ILBO 7/25)

(BY REPORTER PAK TU-SIK IN BANGKOK)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER HAN SUNG-JOO, WHO IS CURRENTLY
VISITING THAILAND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ASSOCIATION OF
SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN), REGIONAL FORUM (ARF),
HELD TALKS WITH VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN MANH
CAM ON JULY 24. THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS EXCHANGED VIEWS
ON WAYS TO PROMOTE BILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

DURING THE MEETING, VIETNAM DISCUSSED EARLY REALIZATION OF
ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH KOREA AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINISTER HAN EXPRESSED A POSITIVE RESPONSE. VIETNAM
PARTICULARLY HOPED THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
FUND LOAN, WORTH \$50 MILLION WHICH KOREA HAD PROMISED TO
PROVIDE, WOULD BE FURNISHED AT AN EARLY DATE.

8. KOREA "LAST" APPEALING AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FOR
FOREIGN INVESTMENT (HANKUK ILBO 7/26: FULL)

DESPITE RAPIDLY GROWING INVESTMENTS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES BY ADVANCED COUNTRIES, KOREA HAS BEEN SURVEYED
AS THE MOST UNATTRACTIVE PLACE TO FOREIGN INVESTORS,
ACCORDING TO A REPORT ON JULY 25. KOREA TRADE PROMOTION

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CORPORATION (KOTRA) SAID THAT FORTUNE MAGAZINE, IN ITS LATEST ISSUE DATED JULY 25, SAID THAT SOME \$50 BILLION IN INVESTMENT FUNDS HAVE BEEN POURED INTO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE FORM OF OVERSEAS DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN 1992, UP ABOUT 30 PERCENT FROM THE PRECEDING YEAR'S \$39 BILLION. THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC MAGAZINE PRESENTED THE FIGURES BY QUOTING THE STATISTICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF).

IT SAID, HOWEVER, THAT FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN KOREA HAVE BEEN SLOW, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE 1990'S. FORTUNE MAGAZINE POINTED OUT THAT KOREA MARKED THE LOWEST AMOUNT IN THE ACTUAL DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, INTRODUCED IN 1992, AMONG OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. CHINA WAS THE COUNTRY WHICH ATTRACTED THE LARGEST AMOUNT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS WITH \$11.2 BILLION. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY \$5.6 BILLION BY SINGAPORE, \$5.4 BILLION BY MEXICO, \$4.2 BILLION BY ARGENTINA, AND \$4.1 BILLION BY MALAYSIA.

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 012 *****/

IN THE SAME YEAR, THAILAND INTRODUCED FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AMOUNTING TO \$2.1 BILLION. INDONESIA ATTRACTED FOREIGN INVESTMENTS OF \$1.8 BILLION, INDIA \$1.4 BILLION, AND HUNGARY \$1.1 BILLION, RESPECTIVELY. THE AMOUNT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS INTRODUCED BY KOREA DURING THE YEAR BARELY AMOUNTED TO \$600 MILLION, THE LOWEST LEVEL AMONG ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE COUNTRIES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA.

FORTUNE MAGAZINE POINTED OUT THAT FOREIGN INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES IN KOREA HAVE BEEN INACTIVE LARGELY FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: NAMELY, THE WORSENERD CLIMATE FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENTS SUCH AS THE RAPID RISE IN LABOR COST AND HIGH INTEREST RATES AND INFLATIONARY SPIRAL, AND VARIOUS REGULATIONS SUCH AS ON APPROVAL AND AUTHORIZATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ON BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN KOREA BY FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES. ANOTHER FACTOR RESPONSIBLE, ACCORDING TO THE MAGAZINE, WAS THE WEAK FOUNDATION LAID FOR FAIR COMPETITION WITH KOREAN ENTERPRISES.

9. CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS ASSOCIATION SENDS OPEN QUESTIONNAIRE TO BLUE HOUSE ON N/KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE (CHOSON ILBO 7/26)

THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS ASSOCIATION (CHAIRMAN KIM CHU-IN), A FRATERNITY OF FORMER LAWMAKERS, SENT A SIX-POINT OPEN QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE BLUE HOUSE ON JULY 25. THE QUESTIONNAIRE INCLUDED ITS CALL FOR THE CRACKDOWN ON ALL PRO-NORTH KOREAN LEFTIST FORCES AND THE REPLACEMENT OF CLOSE PRESIDENTIAL AIDE(S) WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

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IS DOUBTFUL. THE ASSOCIATION ALSO EXPRESSED ITS OPPOSITION TO HOLDING A SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA, AS WELL AS PRESIDENT KYS'S VISIT TO PYONGYANG IN A SITUATION WHERE THE TRANSPARENCY OF NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS NOT GUARANTEED.

ECONOMIC HIGHLIGHTS

CHEIL FUTURES SIGN CONTRACT ON ESTABLISHING RSF WITH U.S. FIRM (KYONGHYANG SINMUN 7/26)

CHEIL FUTURES, THE FUTURES BROKERAGE COMPANY IN WHICH CHEIL FOODS & CHEMICALS HAS INVESTED CAPITAL, HAS SIGNED A CONTRACT WITH CARGILL INVESTOR SERVICE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE "RISING SUN FUND," THE LARGEST INVESTMENT FUND IN KOREA SPECIALLY DESIGNED FOR OVERSEAS FUTURES. THE RSF WILL GO INTO OPERATION ON A FULL SCALE BEING AUG. 1, THE COMPANY SAID.

THE RSF WILL BE ESTABLISHED WITH A CAPITAL OF \$10 MILLION, BY GATHERING WORKING CAPITAL FROM FIVE DOMESTIC INVESTMENT COMPANIES. THEY ARE CHEIL FUTURE, DONG-AH INVESTMENT & FINANCE, KOREA HOUSING BANK, JUNGANG INVESTMENT & FINANCE, AND SAMSUNG SECURITIES. PART OF ITS CAPITAL WILL BE MANAGED BY INVESTOR COMPANIES DIRECTLY ON A SELF-PAYING BASIS OVERSEAS.

INFLOW OF FOREIGN CAPITAL ESTIMATED AT \$5 BILLION (MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN 7/26)

THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE SAID ON JULY 25 THAT AN ADDITIONAL INFLOW OF FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE LATTER HALF OF THIS YEAR

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 013 *****/
IS PROJECTED AT \$5 BILLION. THE AMOUNT BREAKS DOWN INTO \$3 BILLION IN FOREIGNERS' STOCK INVESTMENT FUNDS, \$1 BILLION IN FUNDS DUE TO AN EXTENSION OF THE DEFERRED-PAYMENT IMPORT PERIOD AND AN EXPANSION OF THE LIMITS TO AUTHORIZED RECEIPT OF ADVANCE PAYMENT FOR EXPORTS, \$450 MILLION IN FUNDS FOR PURCHASES OF KOREAN-MADE MACHINERY, AND \$200 MILLION IN FUNDS DUE TO AN EXPANSION OF THE CEILING FOR SHORT-TERM BORROWINGS OVERSEAS BY FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES.

THE PROJECTED AMOUNT ACCOUNTS FOR 40 PERCENT OF THE POSSIBLE MONEY SUPPLY (APPROX. W10 TRILLION), AND IS EXPECTED TO WORK AS AN OBSTACLE TO MONETARY CONTROL DURING THE HALF-YEAR PERIOD.

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TRADE DEFICIT IN 1ST HALF YEAR ESTIMATED AT \$3.5 BILLION
(MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN 7/26)

DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THIS YEAR, TRADE DEFICITS WERE REGISTERED AT \$3.55 BILLION, UP \$1.18 BILLION FROM THE SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR. THE IMPORT GROWTH RATE SURPASSED THE GROWTH RATE OF EXPORTS DURING THIS PERIOD. EXPORTS DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THIS YEAR AMOUNTED TO \$43.78 BILLION, UP 12.5 PERCENT FROM THE JANUARY-JUNE PERIOD OF LAST YEAR. THE PERCENTAGE SHOWS THE HIGHEST GROWTH RATE EVER MARKED SINCE 1989. IMPORTS DURING THE PERIOD INCREASED BY 14.6 PERCENT TO \$47.34 BILLION, THE KOREA FOREIGN TRADE ASSOCIATION SAID ON JULY 25.

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DEPT FOR EAP/K, INR/EAP/K AND INR/IL/P
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E.O. 12356: N/A

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

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TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, ECON, KS, US
SUBJECT: DAILY SEOUL PRESS TRANSLATIONS, JULY 25, 1994

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KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

GOVERNMENT STUDYING COMPENSATION PLAN FOR THOSE WHO HAD
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EDITORIALS

1. ATTEMPT TO START NEW BUSINESS BY SAMSUNG AND HYUNDAI (CHOSON ILBO 7/25: SUMMARY)

SAMSUNG AND HYUNDAI BUSINESS GROUPS, TWO TYPICAL CHAEBOLS
OF KOREA, HAVE MADE IT CLEAR, AS IF AGREED BEFOREHAND,
THAT THEY WOULD START NEW BUSINESSES DESPITE OPPOSITION BY
THE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES CONCERNED. SAMSUNG SAID THAT
IT WOULD MAKE ADVANCES INTO THE PASSENGER CAR BUSINESS,
WHILE HYUNDAI SAID IT WOULD PROMOTE CONSTRUCTION OF AN
INTEGRATED IRON AND STEEL MILL. WE PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION
TO THEIR ATTITUDE OF DISCLOSING THEIR POSITION TO START
NEW LARGE-SCALE BUSINESS PROJECTS, IN DEFIANCE OF THE
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES' PLAN TO NOT GRANT PERMISSION FOR
THEIR PROJECT PLANS.

SAMSUNG SAID THAT THE AUTO MARKET HAS BEEN OPENED,
ALLOWING IMPORTED CARS TO BE FREELY SOLD HERE, AND THAT
UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS NO JUSTIFIABLE REASON
TO BLOCK A PARTICULAR DOMESTIC CORPORATION FROM PRODUCING
PASSENGER CARS. HYUNDAI CLAIMS THAT THERE IS A SHORTAGE
OF STEEL SUPPLY FORECASTED FOR THE 2000'S, AND THAT UNDER
SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE BUSINESS GROUP, AS A SPECIFIC
CHAEBOL ENTERPRISE, CANNOT BE BLOCKED FROM CONSTRUCTING

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ITS OWN STEELWORKS.

IT HAS ALREADY BEEN PROVEN IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES THAT A PRIVATE, AUTONOMOUS ECONOMY IS THE MOST EFFICIENT. AS SUCH, ACCORDING TO SOME ASSERTIONS, PROMOTING LARGE-SCALE PROJECTS SHOULD BE LEFT ENTIRELY UP TO THE RESPECTIVE BUSINESS' JUDGEMENT. ACCORDING TO THEM, THE SO-CALLED 21ST CENTURY-TYPE STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES, SUCH AS PASSENGER CARS, STEEL, SEMICONDUCTORS, SHIPBUILDING AND PETROCHEMICALS SHOULD BE THE INDUSTRIAL FIELDS TO BE RUN BY LARGE INTERNATIONAL-LEVEL CORPORATIONS LIKE THOSE OF SAMSUNG AND HYUNDAI GROUPS.

THE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, LIES WITH THE INDISCRIMINATE BUSINESS EXPANSION AND THE OPERATION OF MANY-SIDED TYPES OF BUSINESS BY KOREAN CHAEBOL ENTERPRISES, REPRESENTED BY SAMSUNG AND HYUNDAI. IN FACT, SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, VARIOUS REGULATIONS HAVE BEEN RELAXED DRASTICALLY; AND WITH THIS, THE BUSINESS GROUPS' EXPANSION OF THEIR BUSINESS REALM HAS BEEN ALMOST UNRESTRAINED.

SAMSUNG GROUP HAS RECENTLY TAKEN OVER THE MANAGEMENT OF KOREA FERTILIZER AND THE SOHYUN RAILWAY STATION BUILDING. AND HYUNDAI HAS ADVANCED INTO THE OIL REFINING BUSINESS. THESE ARE PROOF OF HOW MUCH THE PROFESSED RESTRAINT PUT ON THE CHAEBOLS' EXPANSION OF THEIR BUSINESS REALM AND THE CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER ON THEM HAS BEEN AN EMPTY SLOGAN. AT THIS MOMENT, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE KOREAN ECONOMY CANNOT DEVELOP PROPERLY UNLESS A SOLUTION IS FOUND FOR THE CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER IN CHAEBOLS. IF THEY SAID THAT THEY WOULD DO BUSINESS IN THE STRATEGIC INDUSTRY FIELDS, SUCH AS PASSENGER CARS AND STEEL PRODUCTS, AND EVEN IN OTHER BUSINESSES RANGING FROM TRADING AND INSURANCE TO HOTELS AND DEPARTMENT STORES, IT'S HARD TO CONVINCE ANYONE.

THE LEADING BUSINESS GROUPS OF KOREA HAVE ACCUMULATED THEIR TREMENDOUS FINANCIAL POWER IN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. DESPITE THE AUTHORITIES' PLAN NOT TO PERMIT THEIR NEW PROJECTS, THEY SAY THAT THEY ARE GOING TO START THE LARGE-SCALE BUSINESSES THAT COST NEARLY W10 TRILLION. THIS ATTITUDE TELLS US THAT THEIR FINANCIAL POWER IS NOW STRONG ENOUGH.

THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE AUTHORITIES CONCERNED TO TAKE SOME FUNDAMENTAL MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE CHAEBOL STRUCTURE (BUSINESS CONGLOMERATES), RATHER THAN NEGATIVELY COPE WITH THE SITUATION BY BLOCKING THEIR PARTICIPATION IN NEW

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BUSINESS. LARGE CORPORATIONS SHOULD BE FOSTERED, BUT ANY ATTEMPT FOR THEIR UNRESTRAINED, "OCTOPUS-LIKE" EXPANSION MUST BE BLOCKED. IF A CHAEBOL WANTS TO START A NEW BUSINESS, IT SHOULD FIRST SELL OUT THE ENTERPRISES ENGAGED IN THAT EXISTING TYPE OF BUSINESS FIRST. THIS SHOULD ABSOLUTELY BE THE PRECONDITION FOR PROMOTING THEIR NEW BUSINESS.

2. CONDITIONS FOR THIRD ROUND N/KOREA-U.S. TALKS (CHOSON ILBO 7/23; SUMMARY)

NORTH KOREA DID NOT DENOUNCE THE U.S. AS "AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS" AT ANY TIME DURING ITS MEMORIAL SERVICE FOR KIM IL-SONG. NORTH KOREA HAS READILY AGREED TO HOLD THE THIRD ROUND HIGH-LEVEL TALKS WITH THE U.S. IN EARLY AUGUST. HOWEVER, NORTH KOREA HAS BEEN SEVERELY SLANDERING PRESIDENT KYS AS IF IT WERE DETERMINED TO BREAK UP THE NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA SUMMIT MEETING, ALTHOUGH OUR SIDE HAS REPEATEDLY ASSERTED THAT THE PROJECTED SUMMIT STILL REMAINS IN EFFECT.

IT CAN BE SAID THAT NORTH KOREA HAS FOLLOWED A POLICY OF ONLY DEALING WITH THE U.S., WHILE ALIENATING SOUTH KOREA FROM NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS EVEN FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF KIM IL-SONG. NORTH KOREA SEEMS TO ASSUME SUCH AN ATTITUDE IN THE BELIEF THAT IT WILL GET SOMETHING FROM ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.S. BUT WILL LOSE MUCH FROM ITS TALKS WITH SOUTH KOREA. IN FACT, IT IS LIKELY THAT NORTH KOREA WILL EXPECT ASSURANCES FROM THE U.S. FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, ASSISTANCE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF LIGHT-WATER REACTORS AND NO USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST IT.

ON THE OTHER HAND, NORTH KOREA APPEARS TO BE WORRYING

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/

ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT MAY SEE ITS SYSTEM IN JEOPARDY RATHER THAN SECURING ECONOMIC BENEFITS IF EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS ARE TO INCREASE. WHAT NORTH KOREA IS MORE AFRAID OF IS "THE EVIL INFLUENCE OF CAPITALISM" WHICH WILL RUSH INTO THE NORTH FROM THE SOUTH IF THESE EXCHANGES SHOULD BE EXPANDED AFTER THE DEATH OF KIM IL-SONG, WHO HAS RULED NORTH KOREA WITH HIS CHARISMA.

IF THE NORTH KOREA-U.S. TALKS SHOULD HELP PAVE THE ROAD FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE NORTH KOREAN ISSUE AND THE KOREAN QUESTION, WE WILL BE MORE THAN HAPPY TO EXTEND OUR COOPERATION SO AS TO HAVE OUR INTENTION REFLECTED IN THEIR TALKS. WE MUST NOT BE OBSESSED BY THE IDEA THAT IN NO WAY SHOULD WE BE ESTRANGED FROM THE U.S.-NORTH KOREA TALKS. SPECIAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO THIS POINT BOTH IN

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GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND PUBLIC OPINION ALIKE. SUCH AN IMPERATIVE IDEA WILL NOT BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO US AT ALL.

WHAT WE SHOULD DO IS DO OUR BEST TO ACCOMPLISH OUR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE, EVEN IF WE DO NOT DIRECTLY PARTICIPATE IN THE NUCLEAR TALKS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NORTH KOREA. IN THIS RESPECT, NOT ONLY SHOULD NORTH KOREA'S PRESENT AND FUTURE NUCLEAR PROGRAM BE FROZEN, BUT ALSO ITS PAST NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY ASCERTAINED. IT IS NEEDLESS TO SAY THAT SHOULD KOREA PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE LIGHT-WATER REACTOR CONSTRUCTION, THOSE REACTORS MUST BE KOREAN-TYPE ONES, NOT RUSSIAN-MODEL ONES.

ECONOMIC EXCHANGES BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WILL BE REALIZED AND A KOREAN NATIONAL COMMONWEALTH WILL BE ACHIEVED SOMEDAY. VIEWED FROM THIS FAR-SIGHTED STANDPOINT, IT IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR US TO BUILD RUSSIAN-TYPE REACTORS IN NORTH KOREA WITH AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF MONEY. NORTH KOREA MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THIS POINT.

FEATURES

3. DP LAWMAKERS SKETCH N/KOREAN RUMORS HEARD DURING PRC VISIT (CHOSON ILBO 7/23; FULL)

(BY REPORTER HO YONG-POM)

ON THE AFTERNOON OF 22 JULY, 194 NON-MAINSTREAM LAWMAKERS, PARTY EXECUTIVES, AND PARTY MEMBERS WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (DP), INCLUDING STANDING ADVISERS, KIM SANG-HYUN AND CHYUNG DAI-CHUL, RETURNED FROM A SEVEN-NIGHT, EIGHT-DAY VISIT TO CHINA. THEY SAID THAT DURING THEIR VISIT TO CHINA, "THEY HEARD ALL KINDS OF RUMORS ON REASONS FOR KIM IL-SONG'S DEATH AND KIM CHONG-IL'S HEALTH." THEY CONVEYED SOME OF THE RUMORS THAT PREVAILED AMONG THE ETHNIC KOREANS IN YANBIAN AND THE CHINESE.

ADVISER CHYUNG REVEALED: "WHEN I MET AN INCUMBENT MINISTER OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT, HE SAID THAT 'IT IS KNOWN WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT THAT KIM CHONG-IL'S HEALTH IS NOT VERY GOOD BECAUSE OF INJURIES INCURRED WHEN HE FELL OFF A HORSE AND BECAUSE OF CHRONIC ILLNESS FROM DIABETES AND HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE.'" ADVISER CHYUNG ALSO SAID: "I HEARD FROM KOREAN RESIDENTS LIVING IN CHINA THAT RIGHT AFTER KIM IL-SONG'S DEATH, FIVE NORTH KOREANS TRIED TO CROSS THE TUMEN RIVER BUT THREE OF THEM WERE SHOT TO DEATH AND OTHER TWO ARE UNDER THE PROTECTION OF ETHNIC KOREANS IN CHINA."

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 *****/

CHAIRMAN YI HUI-SUK OF THE KWACHON AND UIWANG DISTRICT CHAPTER SAID: "I HEARD A SIMILAR STORY. I HEARD THAT THREE NORTH KOREANS ATTEMPTED TO CROSS THE RIVER." THESE POLITICIANS THINK THAT THIS SHOWS THAT NORTH KOREANS MAY BE MAKING MORE EFFORTS TO ESCAPE BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE CONFUSING SITUATION DUE TO KIM IL-SONG'S DEATH. ADVISER KIM SANG-HYUN SAID: "WHAT IMPRESSED ME WAS THE FACT THAT THE OWNER OF A FAMOUS "PYONGYANG COLD NOODLE" RESTAURANT, WHICH IS SITUATED ALONG THE ROAD TO MT. PAEKTU, RETURNED TO NORTH KOREA TO PARTICIPATE IN KIM IL-SONG'S FUNERAL. I ALSO HEARD THAT MANY SONS OF HIGH-RANKING NORTH KOREAN OFFICIALS STUDYING AT BEIJING UNIVERSITY ALSO RETURNED HOME TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FUNERAL."

MEANWHILE, THEY NOTED THAT CHINA AND YANBIAN WERE NOT AS PREOCCUPIED WITH KIM IL-SONG'S DEATH AND NORTH KOREA'S SITUATION AFTER KIM IL-SONG'S DEATH AS THEY WERE. LAWMAKER PAK CHUNG-HOON SAID: "IT SEEMED THAT OUR FELLOW COUNTRYMEN AND THE CHINESE DID NOT KNOW MUCH ABOUT NORTH KOREA'S SITUATION. THERE WERE PEOPLE WHO DID NOT EVEN KNOW THAT KIM IL-SONG HAD DIED." ADVISER KIM SANG-HYUN SAID: "I DID NOT SEE ANYONE ON THE STREETS WHO WORE A BLACK RIBBON OR TALKED ABOUT KIM IL-SONG AS A TOPIC OF INTEREST."

LAWMAKER KIM MAL-RYONG SAID: "PROFESSORS OF YANBIAN UNIVERSITY AND OFFICIALS OF JILIN PROVINCE, WERE INTERESTED IN PROMOTING TRADE AND DISCUSSING ECONOMIC ISSUES WITH KOREA. THEY DID NOT SHOW MUCH INTEREST IN KIM IL-SONG'S DEATH." THEY SAID THAT AMID THIS KIND OF SITUATION, CHINESE OFFICIALS AND VARIOUS FIGURES WERE PREDICTING THAT NORTH KOREA WOULD CONSOLIDATE THE KIM CHONG-IL'S SYSTEM AND THAT THIS IN TURN WOULD PROMOTE NORTH KOREA'S OPENNESS. ADVISER KIM SAID: "WHEN I MET AN ELDER WHO WAS A FORMER SECRETARY OF DENG XIAOPING AND CHOU ENLAI, HE SAID 'NORTH KOREA MUST BE MAINTAINED UNDER KIM CHONG-IL'S SYSTEM SO THAT THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA CAN BE STABLE. THIS IS THE REASON CHINA IS HOPING THAT KIM CHONG-IL WILL VISIT CHINA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.'"

ADVISOR CHYUNG SAID: "THERE WERE RUMORS THAT KIM IL-SONG WAS ASSASSINATED BY KIM CHONG-IL, BUT THOSE RUMORS ARE QUESTIONABLE AND HAVE NOT BEEN CONFIRMED. WHILE SUCH UNCONFIRMED RUMORS ARE WIDESPREAD, YANBIAN'S OVERALL ATMOSPHERE WAS ITS PEACEFUL SELF."

4. PAK BO-HI'S INTERVIEW ABOUT KIM CHONG-IL (CHOSON ILBO 7/24; FULL)

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(BY REPORT BY PAK SUNG-CHUN ON A NEWS CONFERENCE BETWEEN
PAK BO-HI, PRESIDENT OF THE SEGYE ILBO COMPANY, AND KOREAN
CORRESPONDENTS IN BEIJING ON JULY 23)

(REPORTER'S NOTE) PAK BO-HI, PRESIDENT OF THE SEGYE ILBO
COMPANY, WHO ENTERED PYONGYANG ON JULY 13 TO EXPRESS HIS
CONDOLENCES, GAVE A SERIES OF NEWS CONFERENCES: FIRST TO
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS AT THE WORLD CHINA HOTEL IN
BEIJING, THEN LATER THAT DAY TO KOREAN REPORTERS IN HIS
HOTEL ROOM. THE FOLLOWING ARE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FROM
THE SECOND NEWS CONFERENCE.

Q: -- THE MOST IMPORTANT CONCERN NOW IS HOW SOLID THE KIM
CHONG-IL REGIME IS. WERE THERE SIGNS OF A POWER STRUGGLE
IN NORTH KOREA?

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 006 *****/

A: -- I DID NOT SEE ANY ABNORMALITIES IN SECRETARY KIM
CHONG-IL'S HEALTH WHEN I MET HIM PERSONALLY. HIS HANDS
WERE WARM AND HIS VOICE ROTUND. HE PLAYED A LEADING ROLE
IN ORGANIZING THE FUNERAL, EVEN PERSONALLY SELECTING A
PICTURE OF KIM IL-SONG AMONG HUNDREDS AND HAVING A KIM
IL-SONG PORTRAIT PAINTED BASED ON THAT PICTURE. THAT
LARGE PORTRAIT WAS ABOARD THE HEARSE WHICH PRECEDED KIM
IL-SONG'S COFFIN.

(REPORTER'S NOTE) THROUGHOUT THE NEWS CONFERENCE WITH
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS, WHICH TOOK PLACE PRIOR TO HIS NEWS
CONFERENCE WITH KOREAN CORRESPONDENTS, PRESIDENT PAK
CALLED KIM CHONG-IL "HIS EXCELLENCY" OR "SECRETARY KIM
CHONG-IL."

Q: -- HOW DO HIGH-RANKING NORTH KOREAN OFFICIALS VIEW THE
KIM CHONG-IL REGIME?

A: -- HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS SAID: "IT HAS BEEN SAID
OUTSIDE NORTH KOREA THAT THE KIM CHONG-IL REGIME MAY LAST
FOR THREE DAYS AT THE SHORTEST OR THREE YEARS AT THE
LONGEST. THIS IS AN INSULT TO NORTH KOREA." THEY ADDED,
"KIM CHONG-IL IS A PERSON WHO CAN DO BOLD THINGS IN THE
FUTURE WITH A SURPRISINGLY PROGRESSIVE AND MORE VIGOROUS
ATTITUDE."

Q: -- WHAT IS THE POLITICAL STANDING OF KIM PYONG-IL IN
THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP?

A: -- I HEARD THAT KIM SONG-AE AND KIM PYONG-IL WERE
PRESENT AT THE BIER ON THE FIRST DAY (JULY 11). KIM
CHONG-IL'S SISTER, KIM KYONG-HUI, WAS PRESENT EVERY TIME.

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Q: -- YOU CALLED KIM CHONG-IL "HIS EXCELLENCY" DURING YOUR NEWS CONFERENCE WITH FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS. THIS TERM CAN BE TRANSLATED "KIM CHONG-IL KAKHA."

A: -- DO NOT TAKE ISSUE WITH THIS. I'VE ALWAYS CALLED HIM "SECRETARY KIM CHONG-IL" IN KOREAN. AS FOR THE ENGLISH EXPRESSION, I MERELY READ WHAT AMERICANS WROTE FOR ME. THIS IS NOT A "RECKLESS REFERENCE."

Q: -- WOULD YOU ELABORATE ON YOUR MEETING WITH KIM CHONG-IL?

A: -- AFTER THE MEMORIAL SERVICE, I MET HIM AT THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF THE KUMSUSAN ASSEMBLY HALL FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR, FROM AROUND 1120 UNTIL RIGHT BEFORE LUNCH ON JULY 20. UPON SEEING ME, SECRETARY KIM ASKED ME TO CORDIALLY CONVEY HIS APPRECIATION TO MOON SUN-MYONG, PRESIDENT OF THE UNIFICATION CHURCH.

Q: -- DO YOU PLAN TO DISBAND THE ANTICOMMUNIST ALLIANCE (LED BY THE UNIFICATION CHURCH)?

A: -- NO.

Q: -- DID KIM CHONG-IL MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT PRESIDENT KIM YOUNG-SAM DURING HIS MEETING WITH YOU?

A: -- NO.

Q: -- HOW DID KIM CHONG-IL VIEW THE NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT?

A: -- I SAID: "PRESIDENT KIM IL-SONG PASSED AWAY RIGHT BEFORE THE NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT. WHAT WILL YOU DO ABOUT A

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 007 *****/
NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT?" HE REPLIED, "I WILL PROCEED WITH THE TALKS IN OBEDIENCE TO MY FATHER'S WILL. PREPARATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE. ALL THAT IS LEFT IS TO SET A DATE."

(REPORTER'S NOTE) AFTER USING THE TERM "SOGO" (PASSED AWAY), HE ADDED: "I SHOULD USE SUCH AN EXPRESSION IN HIS PRESENCE."

Q: -- HOW DO YOU APPRAISE THE SUPPORT FOR KIM CHONG-IL BASED ON WHAT YOU SAW IN PYONGYANG?

A: -- IT SEEMS KIM CHONG-IL IS IN THE SAME POSITION AS KIM IL-SONG. MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE FIRST GENERATION OF REVOLUTIONARIES WILL REMAIN IN THEIR POSTS WHILE THE ELITE, INCLUDING KIM YONG-SUN, WILL ADVANCE RAPIDLY. THE

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ELITE DEPLORES THE FACT THAT "THE OUTSIDE KNOWS TOO LITTLE ABOUT THE NORTH."

Q: -- WHAT IS THE BACKGROUND OF THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE FUNERAL?

A: -- THEY SAID TOO MANY LOCAL CADRES WANTED TO HAVE A FINAL LOOK AT THE BIER AND PAY HOMAGE. IF THEY DID NOT GET A CHANCE IT WOULD BE TOO HEARTBREAKING, THUS THE POSTPONEMENT WAS INEVITABLE.

Q: -- DID YOU RECEIVE ANY NEGATIVE IMPRESSIONS ABOUT THE KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM DURING YOUR CONDOLENCE ACTIVITIES IN PYONGYANG?

A: -- I COULD NOT SEE ANY SIGNS OF THAT KIND DURING THE TEN DAYS. THE TWO YOUNG MAIDS WHO CLEANED MY LODGING KEPT CRYING WHILE THEY CLEANED THE TOILET. THE COOK ALSO CRIED SO MUCH HIS EYES TURNED RED.

Q: -- WHAT WAS YOUR GENERAL IMPRESSION REGARDING THE FUNERAL OF KIM IL-SONG?

A: -- THE MOURNING WAS NOT FAKE BUT NATURAL. MY EYES WERE ALSO FILLED WITH TEARS WHEN I SAW THE COMPATRIOTS CRYING. IT WAS SIMILAR TO THE SORROW OF LOSING A PARENT.

Q: -- WHAT WAS THE EXACT CAUSE OF KIM IL-SONG'S DEATH?

A: -- THEY SAID IT APPEARED HE HAD OVERWORKED HIMSELF DURING HIS MEETING WITH FORMER U.S. PRESIDENT CARTER IN JUNE. HE LOOKED HEALTHY, BUT APPARENTLY KNEW HE WAS DYING. KIM IL-SONG REPORTEDLY MADE AN EXTRAORDINARY FINAL EFFORT TOWARDS THE END. THERE IS ALSO A SAYING THAT HE WAS SHOCKED BY THE RECENT DEATHS OF HIS BELOVED GENERALS, ONE AFTER ANOTHER.

Q: -- ARE YOU GOING TO KEEP CALLING HIM "MR. SECRETARY KIM CHONG-IL", WHEN YOU ARE BACK IN SEOUL?

A: -- RECONCILIATION IS POSSIBLE WHEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH RESPECT EACH OTHER, ISN'T IT? OF COURSE I WILL CALL HIM "SECRETARY KIM CHONG-IL" ON FORMAL OCCASIONS, AND "MR. SECRETARY KIM CHONG-IL" ON INFORMAL ONES.

Q: -- HOW DO YOU THINK SEGYE ILBO READERS WILL REACT TO YOUR CONDUCT IN NORTH KOREA IN REGARD TO YOUR NATIONALITY (AS A KOREAN CITIZEN) AND THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S SENTIMENT?

A: -- PLEASE, LET SEGYE ILBO HANDLE THE BUSINESS OF SEGYE ILBO. IS IT NOT MUTUAL FORGIVING AND LOVE THAT FORM THE

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/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 008 *****/

BASIS FOR REUNIFICATION? IN FACT, THERE IS NO NEWSPAPER THAT IS MORE ANTI-COMMUNIST THAN SEGYE ILBO. BECAUSE OF ITS ANTI-COMMUNIST CHARACTER, IT IS UNLIKELY TO INVOLVE ITSELF WITH CHUCHE FOLLOWERS. AS A BIG BROTHER, SOUTH KOREA SHOULD LOOK UPON NORTH KOREAN AFFAIRS WITH CONFIDENCE AND SYMPATHY.

Q: -- DO YOU THINK NORTH INVADED SOUTH KOREA OR THAT SOUTH KOREA INVADED NORTH KOREA IN THE KOREAN WAR?

A: -- (LOOKS AT THE QUESTIONER FOR A WHILE) ARE YOU ASKING THIS QUESTION BECAUSE YOU REALLY DO NOT KNOW? I FIRMLY BELIEVE NORTH KOREA INVADED SOUTH KOREA AND I AM ONE OF THE VICTIMS. I WAS DEPLOYED AS A BULLET SHIELD ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE KOREAN WAR, BUT GOD SAVED MY LIFE.

Q: -- THEN HOW AM I SUPPOSED TO UNDERSTAND THE FACT THAT YOU WERE FULL OF TEARS WHEN YOU OFFERED CONDOLENCES?

A: -- TEARS ARE NATURAL. I NEVER SAID I SHED TEARS, AND EVEN IF I DID, IT IS PERSONAL. AFTER ALL, WE HAVE A CONNECTION WITH NORTH KOREA BECAUSE OF ME, ONE OUT OF 45 MILLION PEOPLE.

A: WHICH PASSPORT DID YOU USE TO ENTER NORTH KOREA?

A: -- I HAD BOTH A KOREAN PASSPORT AND A U.S. GREEN CARD.

5. NEGATIVE VIEW PREVAILS REGARDING RICE SUPPORT TO NK AS "INTER-KOREAN TRADE" (MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN 7/23: SUMMARY)

(BY REPORTER KIM SE-HYONG)

THE NORTH KOREAN REGIME, LED BY KIM CHONG-IL FOLLOWING KIM IL-SONG'S DEATH MIGHT ADOPT A PRC-TYPE OPEN POLICY LINE. AMID SUCH WISHFUL THINKING, ATTENTION HAS BEEN FOCUSED RECENTLY ON WHETHER THE "TRADE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA" CAN BE REGARDED AS A SPECIAL TRADE RELATIONSHIP, THAT IS, AS INTER-KOREAN TRADE. THIS QUESTION HAS BEEN PROMPTED BY TWO RECENT EVENTS.

ONE IS THAT CHAIRMAN OF THE FEDERATION OF KOREAN INDUSTRIES (FKI) CHOI JONG-HYON SAID, TO THE EFFECT, THAT THE KOREAN "BUSINESS CIRCLES HAVE TENTATIVELY AGREED TO SUPPLY 10 MILLION TONS OF RICE AND ELECTRIC POWER TO NORTH KOREA." THE OTHER IS THE STATEMENT MADE BY GATT SECRETARY GENERAL SUTHERLAND, UPON HIS VISIT TO KOREA, ON WHETHER THE TRADE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WILL BE REGARDED AS WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED "INTER-KOREAN TRADE." TO STATE

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THE CONCLUSION FIRST, IT HAS BEEN DISCLOSED THAT THE ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS WERE ALL "NEGATIVE."

ON DIRECT NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN TRADE, NO TARIFFS HAVE BEEN CHARGED AS "SPECIAL TRADE" OR "INTER-KOREAN TRADE" UNDER THE BASIC AGREEMENT. NO FOREIGN COUNTRY, HOWEVER, HAS EVER PROVOKED A QUARREL ON THIS QUESTION SINCE THE CUMULATIVE TOTAL OF THE TRADE IN QUESTION HAS BARELY AMOUNTED TO SOME TENS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS AT BEST. THERE ONCE WAS A DISPUTE OVER 5,000 TONS OF RICE SENT TO NORTH KOREA THROUGH THE INTERMEDIATION OF PAK KYONG-YUN. AGAINST THIS, A LAWSUIT WAS LODGED BY THE AMERICAN GRAIN MILLERS ASSOCIATION; AND THE USTR ALSO SHOWED A SENSITIVE REACTION BY SAYING, "THE QUESTION MAY BE TAKEN TEMPORARILY."

IF THE FKI SHOULD BUY 10 MILLION TONS OF RICE FROM THAILAND AND SUPPLY IT TO THE NORTH WITHOUT COMPENSATION,

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 009 *****/

IT WILL CAUSE SOME TREMENDOUS INTERNATIONAL STIRS; ASIDE FROM WHETHER IT COULD BE CARRIED OUT SUCCESSFULLY OR NOT, ACCORDING TO AN ANALYSIS BY EXPERTS. FIRST OF ALL, IN THE EVENT OF SUPPLYING RICE AND OTHERS FREE OF CHARGE TO A DEVELOPING COUNTRY, PRIOR APPROVAL HAS TO BE OBTAINED UNDER THE REGULATIONS OF THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION. THE U.S. AND OTHER RICE EXPORTING COUNTRIES WILL INTERFERE WITH THE MATTER SINCE THEY LOSE THEIR SALES MARKET. BESIDES, IN THE CASE OF KOREAN RICE, IT HAS BECOME IMPOSSIBLE TO SUPPLY IT FROM THE DOMESTIC RICE STOCK, WHICH HAS ALREADY RUN SHORT OF MEETING THE DEMAND AT HOME.

THE ANNUAL RICE CONSUMPTION IN KOREA IS ESTIMATED AT SOME 5.5 MILLION TONS. FOR PURCHASING 10 MILLION TONS OF RICE, IT COSTS \$4 BILLION (W3.2 TRILLION) AT A THAI RICE PRICE BASIS, \$5.2 BILLION AT AN AMERICAN RICE PRICE BASIS, AND \$18 BILLION AT A KOREAN RICE PRICE BASIS.

SUTHERLAND HAS TAKEN AN AMBIGUOUS ATTITUDE REGARDING THE QUESTION OF "INTER-KOREAN TRADE." THIS IS A FAVORABLE TERM IN THAT THE SOUTH KOREAN ENTERPRISE MAY CONDUCT COMMODITY TRANSACTIONS WITHOUT THE NEED TO PAY TARIFFS. BUT IT ALSO HAS SOME NEGATIVE SIDES -- THAT IS, IF THE AMERICAN OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY'S BUSINESSES SHOULD ESTABLISH THEIR OWN FACTORIES IN NORTH KOREA AND TAKE AN OFFENSIVE TOWARD THE SOUTH KOREAN MARKET, IT IS GOING TO BE A HEAVY BURDEN.

THE "INTER-KOREAN TRADE METHOD," HOWEVER, IS COMPREHENSIVELY FOR OUR BENEFIT AND PROFIT, THE GOVERNMENT

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SHOULD POSITIVELY COPE WITH THIS QUESTION, PARTICULARLY WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AS A GOOD MOMENTUM.

6. RADIO PYONGYANG HEARD IN TOKYO (TONGA ILBO 7/24: SUMMARY)

(BY CH'OI IL-NAM, A WRITER)

A DEGREE OF FRESHNESS IS MOST IMPORTANT IN DEALING WITH FISH. FOR THE SAME REASON, FRESHNESS IS WHAT COUNTS MOST IN NEWS. BUT INFORMATION ON NORTH KOREA IS A FAR CRY FROM SUCH A PRINCIPLE. FIRST OF ALL, YOU CANNOT LISTEN TO THEIR RADIO BROADCASTS SINCE THEY ARE BLOCKED AT THEIR SOURCE. THIS WAS THE TARGET OF CRITICISM AMONG OPPOSITION LAWMAKERS AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CULTURE AND SPORTS COMMITTEE LAST WEEK.

THE PRESEN PRACTICE OF RECEIVING INFORMATION ON NORTH KORA THROUGH THE NAEWE NEWS AGENCY HAS INFRINGED UPON THE MISSION OF NEWSPAPERS -- TO PROVIDE NEWS SPEEDILY AND ACCURATELY, ACCORDING TO THEIR CRITICISM. THIS PRACTICE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED UNDER A BYLAW OF THE NSP, AND NOT BY ANY LAW. WHEN QUESTIONED WHETHER SUCH AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO BE INFORMED IS PROPER OR NOT, INFORMATION MINISTER OH IN-HWAN HAD THIS TO SAY: "IN THE EVENT OF DIRECTLY LISTENING TO RADIO BROADCASTS FROM NORTH KOREA, ONE MAY POSSIBLY CONFUSE NEWS STORIES WITH PROPAGANDA. IN MY JUDGEMENT, WE HAVE NOT REACHED A POINT YET WHERE THE NEWSPAPER REPORTS COULD BE MADE BY APPROPRIATELY BY FILTERING THE BROADCASTS."

ONE WONDERS WHY THE PRESS HAS BEEN QUIET ABOUT SUCH INSULTING REMARKS. THEY OUGHT TO HAVE SHOWN A REACTION THAT IT IS EXTREMELY REGRETTABLE IN THAT THE AUTHORITIES

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 010 *****/

CONCERNED STILL REGARD THE PRESS LIKE THAT EVEN TODAY.

TO REMEDY THE SITUATION, WE SHOULD CONDUCT NORTH KOREAN STUDIES DEVOTEDLY FROM NOW ON. EXPERTS IN NORTH KOREAN AFFAIRS STILL REMAIN AS THE SAME OLD ONES. TO IMPROVE THE CONDITIONS FOR ACADEMIC STUDIES, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD FIRST LIFT ITS CONTROL OF THE PAST WAYS. THE AUTHORITIES SHOULD LET THE JOURNALISTS LISTEN TO NORTH KOREAN RADIO BROADCASTS, TRUSTING THEIR QUALITY STANDARDS AND THEIR SOLID CONSERVATISM.

7. THREE PRINCIPLES OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD N/KOREA (HANKUK ILBO 7/24; SUMMARY)

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(BY KIM CHONG-WON, DIRECTOR OF THE KOREAN FUTURE RESEARCH INSTITUTE)

THIS WRITER COULD MEET WITH A NUMBER OF LEADING FIGURES IN VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS DURING MY RECENT VISIT TO THE U.S., WHEN THE KOREAN PENINSULA WAS ENTIRELY IN AN UPROAR BECAUSE OF KIM IL-SONG'S DEATH. I ALSO COULD EXCHANGE OPINIONS WITH THEM ABOUT THE FUTURE OF NORTH KOREA AND THE QUESTION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THROUGH MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THEM, THIS WRITER COULD CONFIRM SOME PRINCIPLES THAT THE U.S. HAS UPHELD IN ITS POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA AND THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE.

ONE THING PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY IS THAT THESE IMPORTANT FIGURES HAVE MAINTAINED A SKEPTICAL POSITION IN REGARD TO THE KIM CHONG-IL SYSTEM. WHAT IMPRESSED ME MOST WAS THE FACT THAT THE CONCERN AND INTEREST OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN KIM IL-SONG'S DEATH AND KIM CHONG-IL'S HEREDITARY POWER SUCCESSION ORIGINATED FROM AN EXTREMELY REALISTIC REASON. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY ARE FUNDAMENTALLY INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT PROGRESS THE NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS UNDERTAKEN THUS FAR BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND THE U.S. WILL MAKE IN THE FUTURE FOLLOWING KIM IL-SONG'S DEATH.

THE U.S. OUGHT TO FREEZE NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES BY THE END OF THIS YEAR IN ORDER TO EXTEND THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. THEY HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE IN THEIR PRINCIPLES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM, REGARDLESS OF WHOEVER BECOMES THE NEW NORTH KOREAN LEADER. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS, ONE THING WORTH MENTIONING IS THAT THEY HAVE HELD FAST TO A SKEPTICAL STAND TOWARD THE KIM CHONG-IL POWER SYSTEM.

MOREOVER, THE U.S. HAS CONSIDERED THE ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH KOREA VERY IMPORTANT AND HAS MAINTAINED FIRMLY THE PRINCIPLE IN DEALING WITH THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE. THE FACT IS THAT THEY HAVE MADE AN ACCURATE JUDGEMENT ON THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE BASED ON VAST INFORMATION. THROUGH MY TALKS WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, THIS WRITER COULD AFFIRM THE FOLLOWING THREE ABSOLUTE PRINCIPLES THE U.S. HAS IN ITS POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA:

FIRST, THE U.S. AND KOREA HAVE MAINTAINED AN ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP FOR SEVERAL DECADES. THIS RELATIONSHIP IS IMPERATIVE AND UNCHANGEABLE. THE U.S. WILL NEVER KEEP KOREA AT A DISTANCE IN PROCEEDING TO NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA. THEY HAVE REPEATEDLY STRESSED THE POINT THAT THE U.S. WILL MAKE ALL DECISIONS IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH KOREA. MOREOVER, THEY HAVE POINTED OUT

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THAT ONCE IN A WHILE KOREA AND THE U.S. HAVE SHOWN

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DIFFERING VIEWS OVER THE ISSUE OF DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA
BUT THESE ARE ONLY TACTICAL DIFFERENCES. THERE HAS NOT
BEEN AN IOTA OF DISPARITY IN THEIR BASIC STRATEGY OF
PRESERVING STABILITY AND PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

SECONDLY, THE U.S. WILL NEVER TOLERATE NORTH KOREA COMING
INTO POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE PAST, AT THE
PRESENT AND IN THE FUTURE. THE U.S. WILL THOROUGHLY
ASCERTAIN NORTH KOREA'S PAST NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. SOME
QUARTERS IN THE KOREAN SOCIETY HAVE CAST SUSPICIOUS EYES
ON THE U.S. ATTITUDE IN DEALING WITH THE NORTH KOREAN
NUCLEAR QUESTION. BUT THE U.S. WILL NEVER ADMIT THIS
PHENOMENON UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. WITH THIS, THIS
WRITER COULD CONFIRM THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE U.S. IS TO
"COMPLETELY AND THOROUGHLY REMOVE" NUKES FROM NORTH KOREA.

THIRDLY, THE U.S. GOAL IS TO UNDOUBTEDLY DELVE INTO NORTH
KOREA'S NUCLEAR REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES. IN ADDITION, THE
U.S. WILL NEVER ALLOW NORTH KOREA TO BECOME CAPABLE OF
DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE. THE U.S.
HAS VERY ACCURATE INFORMATION ON THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR
ISSUE, CONTRARY TO WHAT HAS BEEN TALKED ABOUT IN RECENT
DAYS. THE U.S. HAS DEVOTED ITSELF TO ESTABLISHING A 100
PERCENT SATISFACTORY POLICY WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT
THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE HAS AN ABSOLUTE IMPACT ON
THE SECURITY OF NOT ONLY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, BUT ALSO
ON THE STABILITY OF THE ENTIRE WORLD.

HOWEVER, NORTH KOREA DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE RECOGNIZED
THESE THREE ABSOLUTELY UNCHANGEABLE U.S. PRINCIPLES.
TAKING A LOOK AT THIS REALITY, NORTH KOREA IS ADVISED TO
ENTER TALKS WITH THE U.S. IN A MORE SINCERE WAY.
FURTHERMORE, NORTH KOREA NEEDS TO REALIZE THAT THE
COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE KOREAN
PENINSULA WILL BE A SHORT CUT TO ACHIEVING UNIFICATION
WHICH IS A LONG-CHERISHED DESIRE OF OUR 70 MILLION KOREAN
PEOPLE.

NEWS

8. AMERICAN RICE LIKELY TO BE IMPORTED NEXT YEAR (KUKMIN
ILBO 7/22: SUMMARY)

THE GOVERNMENT IS NOW STUDYING A PLAN FOR IMPORTING
AMERICAN RICE FOR MARKET LIBERALIZATION NEXT YEAR, AND FOR
USING THE RICE FOR STOCKPILING (FOR ADJUSTMENT OF THE

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SUPPLY AND DEMAND PROGRAM) INSTEAD OF FOR PROCESSING. THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHERIES SAID ON JULY 22 THAT THE GOVERNMENT PLANS TO IMPORT 51,000 TONS (354,000 SOK) OF RICE UNDER THE MINIMUM MARKET ACCESS (MMA) METHOD NEXT YEAR AT W24.9 BILLION. THE AMOUNT TO BE EARMARKED IN ITS BUDGET FOR NEXT YEAR IS BASED ON THE PRICE FOR AMERICAN RICE, THE MINISTRY SAID.

THE MINISTRY REQUESTED FROM THE ECONOMIC PLANNING BOARD A BUDGETARY MEASURE OF W24.9 BILLION FOR RICE IMPORTS NEXT YEAR. THE BUDGET REQUEST WAS MADE LATE LAST MAY. IN THE REQUEST, THE MINISTRY CALCULATED THE IMPORT COST ON THE BASIS OF THE PRICE FOR CALIFORNIAN RICE, MEDIUM GRADE 1 (ALSO CALLED "CALROSE"), OF \$606 PER TON.

AT THAT TIME, THE PRICE FOR THAI RICE, GRADE 1, WAS QUOTED AT \$465 PER TON, OR \$141 CHEAPER THAN THE CALIFORNIAN RICE. WITH THE MINISTRY'S REQUEST MADE FOR IMPORTING

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 012 *****/
CALIFORNIAN RICE, WHICH IS 30 PERCENT MORE EXPENSIVE THAN THAI RICE, THE GOVERNMENT CHANGED THE ORIGINAL PLAN FOR USING THE IMPORTED RICE FOR PROCESSING. SOURCES SAY THAT IT MIGHT BE PLANNING TO USE AMERICAN RICE FOR STOCKPILING FOR ADJUSTMENT OF THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND PROGRAM.

9. DISPUTE ARISEN OVER TARIFF ADJUSTMENT ON CHEMICAL PRODUCTS (MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN 7/24: FULL)

THE MINISTRY OF TRADE, INDUSTRY AND ENERGY HAS WORKED OUT A PLAN TO REDUCE TARIFFS ON CHEMICAL PRODUCTS AND HAVE BEGUN CONSULTATIONS WITH RELATED GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES. THE U.S. RECENTLY MOVED TO APPLY ITS TRADE PRESSURE BY CHARGING THAT THE TARIFF RATES ON CHEMICAL PRODUCTS, OUT OF THE CONCESSION TARIFF RATES ALREADY SET IN THE UR NEGOTIATIONS, WERE DIFFERENT FROM THE ORIGINALLY PROMISED RATES.

THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, HOWEVER, CLARIFIED ITS OPPOSITION TO THE PLAN. THE TRADE MINISTRY PROPOSED THAT FOR SMOOTH TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN KOREA AND THE U.S., THE WORKING TARIFF RATE ON THE FOLLOWING SEVEN CHEMICAL ITEMS BE REDUCED FROM THE PRESENT 13 TO 6.5 PERCENT; NAMELY, LIQUID SODIUM HYDROXIDE, SODIUM CARBONATE, SYNTHETIC ORGANIC COLORING AGENCY, ORGANIC SURFACE ACTIVE AGENT, POLYVINYL ALCOHOL, POLYACRYLAMIDE, AND PETROLEUM RESIN.

THE FINANCE MINISTRY SAID THAT SINCE THE UR NEGOTIATIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SETTLED, THERE CAN BE NO ADDITIONAL REDUCTION IN TARIFF RATES. THIS QUESTION STEMMED FROM THE DIFFERENT VIEWS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ON THE

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CONCESSION TARIFF RATES ON FIVE CHEMICAL PRODUCTS, INCLUDING DYESTUFF, WHICH WERE AGREED UPON IN THE UR TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS ON MANUFACTURED GOODS LATE LAST YEAR.

THE GOVERNMENT DISCLOSED THAT AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THEM AS THE TARGET ITEMS FOR APPLYING THE 13-PERCENT TARIFF. THE U.S., HOWEVER, ARGUED THAT THEY WERE INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF ITEMS SUBJECT TO THE 6.5-PERCENT RATE. EARLIER THIS YEAR AND AGAIN IN MAY, THE U.S. RAISED A STRONG OBJECTION TO THE KOREAN POSITION BY SENDING OFFICIAL LETTERS IN THE NAME OF USTR MICKEY KANTOR.

ECONOMIC HIGHLIGHTS

AUTO INDUSTRY TO INVEST W1.6 TRILLION IN LATTER HALF YEAR
(MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN 7/23)

THE KOREA AUTO INDUSTRY COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION IN ITS FORECAST OF INVESTMENTS IN THE LATTER HALF OF THIS YEAR SAID THAT THE SEVEN COMPLETE KNOCKDOWN CAR MAKERS, INCLUDING HYUNDAI, KIA AND DAEWOO, PLAN TO INVEST W1,665.4 BILLION IN EXPANSION OF PRODUCTION LINES AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTS. THE AMOUNT REPRESENTS AN INCREASE OF 67.8 PERCENT FROM THE SAME PERIOD OF LAST YEAR AND AN INCREASE OF 47.9 PERCENT FROM THE FIRST HALF OF THIS YEAR.

OPINIONS ON MAJOR POLICIES CONFLICT BETWEEN MOF AND BOK
(MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN 7/23)


THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND THE BANK OF KOREA HAVE SHOWN THEIR CONFLICTING VIEWS ON MAJOR POLICY ISSUES. THE BANK OF KOREA HAS TRIED TO EXPAND THE REPAYMENT SIZE OF SPECIAL LOANS SUPPLIED TO INVESTMENT AND TRUST COMPANIES, WHILE

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 013 *****/
THE MINISTRY HAS BEEN TRYING TO CUT IT BACK.

THE MONETARY BOARD MEETING HELD ON JULY 21 PUT THE BRAKES ON THE FINANCE MINISTRY'S EFFORT TO SET SOME SUPPLEMENTARY RULES ON THE SUPPLY OF POPULAR LOANS, WHICH IS RELATED TO THE LAW CLOSING DOWN THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK. THE BANK OF KOREA, MEANWHILE, RAISED ITS OBJECTION TO LEGISLATION OF THE ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER LAW PROMOTED BY THE FINANCE MINISTRY. ALSO, THERE WILL LIKELY BE CONFLICTING VIEWS BETWEEN THE BOK AND THE FINANCE MINISTRY OVER THE QUESTION OF "INDEPENDENCE OF BOK" IN THE REGULAR SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY THIS SEPTEMBER.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

EXCISE

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Chapter 15 # 2-15 X
P 1-1

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei
Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs
Wang Hai-jung
Two Other Chinese Officials
Tang Wang-shen, Interpreter
Shen Jo-yen, Interpreter
Chinese note-taker
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Ambassador David Bruce, Chief U.S.
Liaison Office
Ambassador Robert Ingersoll, U.S.
Embassy Tokyo
Ambassador Robert McCloskey, State
Department Press Spokesman
Winston Lord, Director of Planning and
Coordination, Department of State
John Holdridge, Deputy Chief U.S.
Liaison Office

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IM/PS/CR/IR Date: 11/20/97
☐ RELEASE
☒ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE
☐ DENY
EO Citations
IN PART

FOIA Exemptions: *b-1*
PA Exemptions: *b-1*
TS authority to
CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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LOT 91D414, Box 1

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DATE AND TIME: Sunday, November 11, 1973
3:15 p.m. - 7:00 p.m.

PLACE: Great Hall of the People, Peking
Peoples Republic of China

(After the press took pictures and there was light banter, the journalists and photographers left the room. There was then preliminary conversation in informal plenary session, from 3:15 - 3:25 p.m., highlights of which follow.)

Prime Minister Chou: Dr. Kissinger suggested that we separate into two groups to speed up the work. I also agree.

Secretary Kissinger: I thought, Mr. Prime Minister, that we might have one group dealing with the essential political-international problems and the other group on some of the technical issues.

Prime Minister Chou: I agree to the two groups. Perhaps we can divide ourselves now. Who will be in the other?

Secretary Kissinger: Hummel will be in charge of the technical side and with me will be Ambassador Bruce, Ingersoll, McCloskey, Holdridge and Lord. We may change later.

Prime Minister Chou: Who will be with the other group?

Secretary Kissinger: Hummel, Armstrong, Jenkins and Solomon.

Prime Minister Chou: Mr. Solomon -- is this Solomon the same one as the Indians?

Secretary Kissinger: I thought they had Moynihan.

Prime Minister Chou: It is a different case; and one of them is Solomon. Is he the same Solomon as the bib

Secretary Kissinger: I have seen no evidence of that. He is very shy so he may not show it.

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Prime Minister Chou: I thought he was interested in Confucius. If you are interested, I am also. I also have the interest to discuss it with you because we began our revolutionary activity by struggling to overthrow the school of Confucius during the reform movement.

They will go to the other hall. We will stay here. Shall we separate now? (The groups for the technical meeting left the room.)

You must be familiar with this hall by now.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. What is the name of this hall?

Prime Minister Chou: Just a reception hall. It does not have the name of any province.

Secretary Kissinger: You met here with the President.

Prime Minister Chou: The first time when we met with the President it was in this hall and Mr. Ziegler was making the announcement to the press outside.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, about the (Mao) meeting. They were speculating about the great difficulties because the meeting started late.

Prime Minister Chou: But, of course, after the news got out, there were other ideas. Perhaps that is why there was a similar practice in Moscow.

Secretary Kissinger: The first meeting?

Prime Minister Chou: But that time your name did not appear, but I could determine that you must have been there.

Secretary Kissinger: You were right. That was the first evening of my arrival. He does everything openly, but it takes me a week to find out all of the implications of what he has said.

Prime Minister Chou: Ambassador Ingersoll, do you smoke?

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Ambassador Ingersoll: No, my wife takes care of that. I have never done well with smoking.

Prime Minister Chou: First of all, we would like to express our welcome to our old friend who is now concurrently Secretary of State, and because of this dual capacity, we suppose we should express a dual welcome to you. But if you see Mr. Rogers, please also convey our regards to him.

Secretary Kissinger: I shall do that. Mr. Prime Minister, my colleagues and I always appreciate the opportunity to come here. I think that our two peoples and our two governments have established a very unique relationship which is founded on principle and in which we understand each other's over-all approach in an unusual and complete manner. We have agreed that we were brought together by mutual necessity, but since then we have built on this foundation on a basis of candor and honesty, and a long-range view. There is no leader with whom we speak as comprehensively as with the Prime Minister. It is due to the fact that there are not many leaders in the world who can think in so complicated a fashion.

Prime Minister Chou: You have overestimated me, and I think the credit should go to Chairman Mao. And as his comrade in arms, I have not learned enough. I agree to what you said just now, that we have built on the basis of our initial relations, based on a principled manner and in a candid and honest way taking the long view. And in view of such amelioration of attitudes we can discuss anything.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know how the Prime Minister would propose we should proceed in our discussion.

Prime Minister Chou: Yesterday we said that we would like to hear you first, and if you want to begin with an over-all picture or main issues, it is up to you.

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Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, why don't I begin with a general review of the situation as we see it.

(There was then a brief, humorous discussion of the stenotype machine of Mrs. Hill. During this discussion there was reference by the Prime Minister to future visits by Secretary Kissinger to China. He assumed two trips a year.)

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister I will not go into the bilateral relations. That will be discussed by the other group. If they have any difficulties, I may take the liberty of raising them with you. There is only one issue which is on my list and sometime while I am here we should settle it. We understand your point of view. It has to do with the Marine detachment, but we can reserve that for another occasion. It goes without saying that we will abide by your wishes, and our only concern is the impact in other countries where it has been our custom.

The primary thing I would say about our bilateral relations, leaving aside that one issue, is that we believe they are going well, and secondly, they have both a substantive and a symbolic aspect. The substantive issues will be discussed in the other group. The symbolic aspect is that our relationship continues to grow closer and beyond the technical side. We are prepared on our side to consider all means by which we can emphasize this symbolic aspect which we believe is very important.

Turning now to our political relationships we recognize that the greatest difficulties we have had in our relationship has concerned the question of Taiwan. I would like to summarize again the understanding which we believe exists. We will conform strictly to the Shanghai Communiqué which affirms there is only one China and this is respected on both sides of the Formosa Straits.

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and sentence.

Mr. Chou: That is...

Kissinger: Second... we talked about the

Mr. Chou: But in... the second point is that
Taiwan... any independence move-

Kissinger: That... we will...
ment on... going to bed I read

Mr. Chou: And the... that we received
an... regarding the Taiwan
saying... I did not quite
independ...
believe... but if you should

Kissinger: That... any of our people are
have... appreciate it if you would
doing... be totally unauthorized
inform... correct.
I don't... to be reliable, we

Mr. Chou: If the... the first instan
would... we then would not
it is... and even think of telling
notifying... that piece of information
the... waste of time.
It would...

Kissinger: Mr. Pri... firm policy is to
oppose... policy. We have talked
about... previous visits and we will
strictly... out.

Mr. Chou: And we... news from the United
States... wanted to add two consu--
later... Consulates General in
the Uni...

Mr. Chou: I was go... into this. I am familiar
with one... they are planning to set
up for the... they may move in the
direction... exchange of diplomatic
relation... and Washington, and
it is in... point of contact in the
United S... contingency of the

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evolution of our policy. It is not intended as an expansion of their representation but as a contingency plan for their position they recognize as coming in the future. I do not know about a second one. I know about a Consulate General in New York. The basic direction which we established in July 1971 is one on which you can count on, and we will not engage in little maneuvers within that context, much less outside it.

Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps the Chaing Kai-shek side put that forward.

Secretary Kissinger: That may be, but it is a reflection of the reduction of their position in the United States, not an attempt to increase it.

We have also understood that we would not support any attempt by third countries to move into Taiwan.

Prime Minister Chou: And this has something to do with both our sides.

Secretary Kissinger: Fourthly, the United States will support any peaceful resolution of the problem.

And finally, we would discourage any military moves from Taiwan against the Mainland. In the context of the Shanghai Communique and our understandings we have kept you informed about the nature of our military establishments on Taiwan. We are in the process of carrying out the military movements which I informed you of in February -- the withdrawal of the transportation squadrons from Taiwan.

In the same spirit, I would like to inform you of our plans for next year. During 1974 we shall remove the two squadrons of Phantom planes that are now on Taiwan -- one squadron in each half of the year. One-half in the first half and the second squadron in the second half. [We will remove the U-2 planes from Taiwan. And we will remove the nuclear weapons which are in Taiwan.] This will...

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reduce our presence on Taiwan to communications and logistics. We will keep you informed of the further reductions which will take place after that.

It is also our intention, which we have mentioned to you and which the President reconfirmed to you, to complete the full normalization of the relations between China and the United States during this term of office, before the middle of 1976. We are prepared at any point to intensify the existing relationship or to establish full diplomatic relations, but we have the difficulty of how to handle the relationship with Taiwan in the interim period. But we will be prepared to listen to any proposal that you might have in this connection and make every attempt to meet it. If at any point the Chinese thought the formulation of the Shanghai Communique or an adaptation would provide ~~some way to have diplomatic relations~~ we would be prepared to proceed on that basis.

In the meantime, we need to be prepared to expand the status of the Liaison Offices so that they become more and more similar to full diplomatic recognition. I think it is obvious that your Ambassador in Washington today enjoys a more direct access to our top officials than any other Ambassador in Washington, certainly, more than the representative of Taiwan. We would be prepared to establish trade offices and other institutional links that you might consider appropriate. I wanted to emphasize that the course which we have established will be strictly maintained. Now perhaps I should turn to other matters, Mr. Prime Minister, unless you wish to discuss these issues further.

Prime Minister Chou: I will dwell on them later. I will dwell on the other aspects of this issue later. There is only one question I would like to

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ask. We hear you intend to assist Taiwan in building an airplane assembly factory, and we would like to know what form it would take -- rented, leased, a gift, sold on credit or...

Secretary Kissinger: You asked me that...

Prime Minister Chou: Of course, there is no question the material would come from you, the United States.

Secretary Kissinger: You asked me that the last time, and in fact we have the details with us and I will answer you. I will answer you tomorrow. I will do it at the beginning of our discussion tomorrow. I don't have them here with me. I may say now, Mr. Prime Minister it is for an airplane of short range. It cannot reach the Mainland. It is a defense airplane, and a means of avoiding our having to sell longer range airplanes to Taiwan and to separate its military procurement to a greater degree from direct American sales. We have, as you know, Mr. Prime Minister, a rather delicate process of disengagement to conduct -- in which the Chinese side has shown great patience and wisdom if I may say -- but we understand the outcome that our current policy will have.

Now turning to other international problems. Let me speak first of our relations with the Soviet Union. There are many detailed issues which I am prepared to discuss, having to do with specific negotiations. I think the basic point to understand, Mr. Prime Minister, is that I believe analytically that the Soviet Union and we are pursuing almost identical policies toward each other and it remains to be seen whose judgment is better. The Soviet Union is pursuing a policy of relaxation of tensions with the West for a variety of reasons. One of the reasons undoubtedly is the Soviet conviction that if they can create the appearance of detente, the unity of the West will disintegrate and the defense of the West will weaken.

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I have no quarrel with many of the comments that we have received from the Chinese side privately, and many of the analyses from the Chinese side that we have seen publicly about the problem of the direction of Soviet policy. I stated our position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in a speech before a conference and in my press conference a few weeks ago. I don't know whether the Prime Minister has seen those. I stated then we would resist any aggressive tendencies directed outward. I said we would not permit detente to be used to undermine or weaken our relationships with our friends. And thirdly, that we would resist any attempts by the Soviet Union to use international trouble spots to expand its positions.

While these are our principles, we have a complex tactical problem about how to apply them. One of the problems is that while many of our commentators in America are very heroic in intervening in domestic affairs of other countries they are very unwilling to face the consequences of what these policies would involve. We believe that it is important for us to demonstrate that we have made a major effort to preserve the peace in order to be in a position to resist when aggressive action occurs. [When aggressive action occurs, we will act decisively, and if necessary brutally, but we require the prior demonstration that we have been provoked. And I think we have proved this in our handling of the Middle East crisis.]

I have read with great care your Vice Minister's criticisms of the Treaty for the Prevention of Nuclear War, and, of course, I have had the benefit of direct communications with the Prime Minister. I do not quarrel with the specific points made by either the Prime Minister or the Vice Minister in terms of Soviet intentions. And it does not affect...

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Prime Minister Chou: Why are there so many differing opinions inside your country concerning your President's action in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: In the Middle East?

Prime Minister Chou: That is, your alert. We are in favor of it.

Secretary Kissinger: I have always believed, Mr. Prime Minister, that the people who understand our foreign policy best are in Peking.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you for your just and fair words. Put that in the record.

Secretary Kissinger: This record never leaves my office. There are several reasons for this. Actually we have not had many domestic difficulties about this alert. It was relatively minor. In fact, after I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a group which does not generally support the Administration, Senator Symington, who almost always is critical of the Administration, went on TV and fully supported the alert; and so did Senator Fulbright.

Prime Minister Chou: I read about that.

Secretary Kissinger: This alert happened in the week in which public excitement about the Watergate problem was very high and some of the critics of the Administration merged those two issues. You have in America now in any event, Mr. Prime Minister, a combination of various forces that produce a rather contradictory pattern in the public discussion of foreign policy -- not in the conduct of it. You have a combination of the intellectuals, who dislike the President for other reasons, with the old professional anti-communists of the right, so that, for the first time, some of these right wing groups are being given intellectual respectability. Basically, the alert had very wide public support and there was a public poll which showed that by about two to one the American people favored it.

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But the reason, Mr. Prime Minister, we can maintain support for our foreign policy is partly because of its record and partly because of its record and partly because of our using this strategy of forcing the Soviet Union into a posture of provocation. Sometimes our judgment may be wrong, but our strategy is clear. We have explained that treaty to you. Our judgment was that it was better to deprive it of the significance that the Soviet Union wanted to give it and to remove it as an issue from a public debate and from international quorums, than to have an endless debate in which public opinion would suffer more damage than it did from the treaty as in fact it was written.

I must point out, Mr. Prime Minister, that this session is a culture shock to my colleagues on the right, except for Ambassador Bruce, who have not been acquainted in the past with our method of talking with one another. In traditional diplomacy, we express ourselves more carefully.

But the primary thing we have accomplished in the Treaty is to link all its obligations but also third countries and to link conventional war to nuclear war in such a way that it is impossible to resort to conventional war without (sic) negating any obligations with respect to nuclear war and finally to make it impossible to resort to any war without prior consultation. And therefore, we have been given for the first time a legal basis to resist in areas where we have no formal obligation.

Therefore, on the night that we went on alert we received a message, as I told you, from General Secretary Brezhnev in which he demanded that we join a Soviet-American expedition force to the Middle East and, failing that they would then move unilaterally. They were demanding an immediate reply. We first of all did not reply but went on alert and replied only after we had been on alert

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for several hours. And then we told the Soviet Union that a unilateral Soviet move would violate Article 2 of the Treaty for the Prevention of Nuclear War and would be resisted accordingly.

Prime Minister Chou: We were clear about that. But the Soviet Union can evade that and engage in expansionism in other forms.

Secretary Kissinger: There is no question that legal obligations prevent Soviet expansionism. Our problem is how to get into a position to resist, and the strategy we are following is to try to create as many legal obstacles as possible and, failing that, to use those legal obstacles as American obligations, especially in those areas where we have no formal obligation and therefore would have difficulties domestic

The Prime Minister might note that I said publicly, in explaining the treaty, that operations such as in Czechoslovakia, or massive movement of arms across the frontier would be in violation of that treaty and would be so treated by the United States.

Prime Minister Chou: Did you note that your alert also arose dissatisfaction on the part of your Western Alliance? They said you had not told them beforehand.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, I was going to talk about our Western Alliance. Our Western allies are distressed when we engage in activities as we did and are dissatisfied when we go on alert and dissatisfied when we conduct a disagreeable policy and dissatisfied when we conduct a half policy. It seems to be our destiny that they are doomed to be dissatisfied. I will give my explanations later.

Prime Minister Chou: Are they also dissatisfied with your journey to the Arab countries? Of course, the Soviet Union would be dissatisfied.

Secretary Kissinger: As a matter of fact, Mr. Prime Minister...

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Prime Minister Chou: We appreciate that.

Secretary Kissinger: One has to analyze what is meant by dissatisfaction. If you want to play for high stake with very little risk, then you are likely to be in a continued state of dissatisfaction. The secret dreams of our Western Allies in the Middle East is to restore their position of 1940 without any risk or effort on their part and therefore, to the extent that we are more active, there is a vague feeling of jealousy and uneasiness.

I think, Mr. Prime Minister, the nature of the European so-called dissatisfaction has to be understood. You have met many of the European leaders and you will have your own judgment as to their vision and ability to see matters comprehensively. But each of them faces the problem that for domestic reasons he has to say one thing while deep down he understands that what we are doing is essentially correct. Therefore, they very often, particularly after the event is already over, take a public position which is at variance of their understanding of the real situation.

On the question of the alert, we received the letter from Brezhnev threatening unilateral action at 10:00 at night, which is 3:00 in Europe. He demanded an immediate reply. The letter was supported by intelligence, which I believe we gave to your Ambassador, that the Soviet Union had alerted seven of eight of its airborne divisions. I think I gave your Ambassador that. Under those circumstances we had no time to consult.

Secondly, speaking very frankly with you, Mr. Prime Minister, there is no point in consulting if there is only one thing you can do. If the European countries had not agreed with us, we still would have had to go on alert. Therefore, we had to proceed unilaterally, and I must say that in situations where we believe that the over-all

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equilibrium will be disturbed we will continue to behave in this manner if there is no time.

With respect also to the occasional criticism of our Soviet policy by our European allies, this has to be weighted against their equally strong criticism in the previous period. I think it is healthier for them to be worried about how far we might go and to have them in a position where they will try to make great efforts in their own defense, than to have them pursue the policies which occurred while Ambassador Bruce was in London when they were constantly pushing us to be less intransigent to the Soviet Union and were constantly approaching us with ideas on how to bring about detente. If there is to be detente, we had rather manage it than have the Europeans do so.

But, if the Prime Minister wishes, I will be prepared to have a longer session on our relations with the Western Europeans. Despite the surface phenomena, I believe our relations are going along in a good direction. I am also prepared during this visit to go over with the Prime Minister the specific negotiations now going on with the Soviet Union, but I don't want to take all the time this afternoon.

Let me make a few comments now about the Middle East and about Southeast Asia, and perhaps we can leave all the other topics for later discussion.

Prime Minister Chou: All right.

Secretary Kissinger: You will remember that I saw your Ambassador the night the Middle East war started, and I explained to him what our basic strategy would be. I told him that for this period we were not interested in the merits of the dispute between the Arabs and Israelis, but

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we were primarily interested in preventing a situation in which the Soviet Union would achieve its predominance in the Middle East. We believed that a Soviet victory in the Middle East like 1971 in the Indian subcontinent would have disastrous consequences not only there but elsewhere, and would encourage adventurism on a global scale.

You will see many tactical moves over the next month, and while I am here, I think we should have an opportunity to have a full discussion of the Middle East so you will understand specifically what we will do; but for this purpose, you should understand our basic strategy is to convince the Arabs that they can get weapons from the Soviet Union but a political settlement only from the United States. And therefore, we will always resist proposals that come to us from the Arabs through the Soviet Union. We are not asking for Chinese support on the specifics of the negotiations because the Chinese position is well known. We do think, however, that this basic strategy is in the common interest of both of our countries. We have no interest in a predominant position in the Middle East. That is not achievable, nor is it desirable. We are interested in keeping any other country from having a predominant position.

In this negotiation which we are now beginning, one of the big problems is that the Arab leaders are very active as individuals but are somehow given to excessive romanticism and to great impatience. We have, Mr. Prime Minister, a complex domestic situation with respect to the Arab/Israeli dispute. It cannot be an accident that the United States should become so heavily committed to a nation of two and one-half million at a distance of 6,000 miles which has no strategic or economic importance to the United States. These factors cannot be changed from one day to the next, any more than some of the factors in our relationship can be changed from one day to the next.

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Prime Minister Chou: But perhaps Dr. Kissinger being the Secretary of State would be in a better position to change this situation. Perhaps...

Secretary Kissinger: Quite true.

Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps you would have more effect in remedying this situation.

Secretary Kissinger: Quite correct, but it has to be carefully organized. It would be a great mistake to fight the battle prematurely before we are organized and on minor issues. And I can tell the Prime Minister that we are as determined to bring about a just settlement in the Middle East as we were two years ago to improve our relationship with the People's Republic of China. But we are dealing with

Prime Minister Chou: But it will be considerably more difficult to obtain that.

Secretary Kissinger: It will be very difficult.

Prime Minister Chou: Madame Golda Meir styles herself a socialist.

Secretary Kissinger: My secret dream is to involve Madame Meir in negotiations with President Thieu.

Prime Minister Chou: They will have to go to London where they will meet their socialist friends.

Secretary Kissinger: She is in London now.

Prime Minister Chou: That is what I was saying. There are all kinds of socialists now.

Secretary Kissinger: It will be very difficult. It will be difficult with Israel and it will be difficult with the Arabs.

Prime Minister Chou: The passing of a United Nations resolution we were reading your Newsweek magazine.

Secretary Kissinger: That is the international edition. I have not seen it. In the domestic issue there was a different cover.

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Prime Minister Chou: You can also see from your expressions that it was extremely difficult.

Secretary Kissinger: If Mrs. Meir only gets ninety-eight percent of what she asks for she considers herself betrayed.

Prime Minister Chou: With regard to the resolution about Israel passed in the United Nations in 1947, the historical routes would go back to the Balfour Declaration. At that time you had heavy domestic pressure. Also there are Soviet intentions. Do you agree with that?

Secretary Kissinger: I agree that in 1947, when Israel was formed the Soviet supported it because it wanted to create difficulties in the Middle East. No question about that. Nevertheless, while the United States is now supporting a peace settlement which will bring about an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory, we are for the existence of Israel. We will defend the existence of Israel.

Prime Minister Chou: Does Mrs. Meir understand that if she continues in such an absurd manner that that will increase the possibilities of Soviet troops entering into the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: The Israelis are going through a traumatic experience at this moment because they had assumed they could remain militarily supreme for a long time. Even though they won the battles in this war, they have lost their supremacy. So they need a little time to adjust to a totally new reality for them. I don't know whether the Prime Minister agrees the most important aspect of the ceasefire that was achieved last week when I was in Cairo was not the specific terms -- they are important -- but that it was negotiated between Egypt and the United States without the Soviet Union.]

Prime Minister Chou: [I had thought of toasting you on that last night, but I was afraid the correspondents would hear us.]

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Prime Minister Chou: You can also see from your expressions that it was extremely difficult.

Secretary Kissinger: If Mrs. Meir only gets ninety-eight percent of what she asks for she considers herself betrayed.

Prime Minister Chou: With regard to the resolution about Israel passed in the United Nations in 1947, the historical routes would go back to the Balfour Declaration. At that time you had heavy domestic pressure. Also there are Soviet intentions. Do you agree with that?

Secretary Kissinger: I agree that in 1947, when Israel was formed the Soviet supported it because it wanted to create difficulties in the Middle East. No question about that. Nevertheless, while the United States is now supporting a peace settlement which will bring about an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory, we are for the ~~existence of Israel~~. We will defend the existence of Israel.

Prime Minister Chou: Does Mrs. Meir understand that if she continues in such an absurd manner that that will increase the possibilities of Soviet troops entering into the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: The Israelis are going through a traumatic experience at this moment because they had assumed they could remain militarily supreme for a long time. Even though they won the battles in this war, they have lost their supremacy. So they need a little time to adjust to a totally new reality for them. I don't know whether the Prime Minister agrees the most important aspect of the ceasefire that was achieved last week when I was in Cairo was not the specific terms -- they are important -- [

Prime Minister Chou: [I had thought of toasting you on that last night, but I was afraid the correspondents would hear us.]

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Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: We also talked to the Egyptians.

Secretary Kissinger: I was going to say, to the extent...

Prime Minister Chou: They said you would not do it because you are of Jewish descent. We said you would also look at the problem from the point of view that everything divides into two. There are also good Jewish persons and Karl Marx, whom we believe in, was also Jewish. Perhaps what we said had some effect on him.

Secretary Kissinger: It is very possible. To the extent, Mr. Prime Minister, that you can continue to do this, because there will be difficult periods in which we will not be able to move as fast as they want, but they can be sure we will move in the direction we have discussed here and that we have told them, and to the extent that you feel you could talk to them it would be very helpful to our common approach.

I think I have already talked too long. On Southeast Asia there are two problems.

Prime Minister Chou: Have you finished with your Middle East issues?

Secretary Kissinger: On the Middle East, I thought we should have another discussion of the detailed tactics in the future. Let me make one point. These negotiations will start soon -- we think in December -- and there is no possibility of excluding the Soviet Union from the formal discussion. We have discussed with the Egyptians and with the Jordanians that the formal meetings should be conducted as the Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, which is to say with only a repetition of formal positions as Ambassador Bruce knows only too well. The real negotiations will take place separately between the Egyptian Foreign Minister, who has been especially designated for this task, and myself and the Israelis. But separately.

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Prime Minister Chou: We noticed that. Would that have an adverse effect on Syria?

Secretary Kissinger: I was going to say to the Prime Minister that we invited the Deputy Foreign Minister to visit me in Washington. And we have now sent a message to the Syrian Government through the Shah, and also through King Faisal who is paying for their reconstruction, that we would be prepared to talk to them at a higher level, and I am planning to visit Damascus in early December. They have indicated that they wanted to see me.

Prime Minister Chou: What about the knot in Iraq?

Secretary Kissinger: We have to prevent Iraq from dominating Syria.

Prime Minister Chou: But to put it another way, the Soviet Union is trying to dominate Iraq.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union is trying to dominate Iraq and have one front in the Mediterranean and another in the Persian Gulf. That is why our strategy is -- first of all I wanted to say Mr. Prime Minister, we are pursuing, in that region from Iran to the Mediterranean the policy that we discussed with Chairman Mao when I was here last time. Our present policy is to keep as much pressure on the Government of Iraq as we can through Iran and other sources so that it is absorbed as much as possible in its domestic difficulties rather than with others. And as you know, they have a very significant problem with the Kurdish population. They were quiet during the Arab-Israeli war because it was not desirable to have all Arabs concentrate on the problems of the Kurds. But we will now make an attempt to establish the same relationship with Syria that we have established with Egypt, and to negotiate with Syria the Syria-Israeli settlement the same as the Egyptian settlement.

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Prime Minister Chou: Anyhow the Soviet Union will not let loose of Iraq.

Secretary Kissinger: No. Unless Iraq throws them out as Egypt did.

Prime Minister Chou: That will take a period of time.

Secretary Kissinger: That is why we have to...

Prime Minister Chou: You perhaps will also know that even the Shah of Iran could not help from sort of dealing with the Soviet Union in that he also had to agree to consider the Soviet proposal of a collective security system. Of course, we knew that it was only a tactic to put the Soviet Union off, but he could not help saying that.

Secretary Kissinger: He misunderstood its significance also.

Prime Minister Chou: But ~~the~~ Shah does not seem very confused.

Secretary Kissinger: No. He is very good. One of the outstanding leaders.

Prime Minister Chou: He is in his middle age.

Secretary Kissinger: He is 54.

Prime Minister Chou: A little older than you.

Secretary Kissinger: A little. He understands the situation very well, and he will not make mistakes in practice. His was the only country that was bordering the Soviet Union that did not permit the overflight of Soviet planes during this crisis, and when one of his ministers permitted eight planes to fly over he fired him. It took great courage.

Until Iraq becomes disinvolved from the Soviet Union, we have to keep them isolated and from gaining success through its action with the Soviet Union. We will see what can be achieved in the discussions with

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the Syrians in December. We have talked to Jordan and that is not a problem for us, and we have also established a preliminary contact with the Palestinians. Our basic strategy is to set up a formal conference which will have some UN blessing and some Soviet participation, and a series of bilateral negotiations in which we will attempt to be the intermediary together with whatever help we can get, but without the help of the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: Have the Palestinians agreed to participate?

Secretary Kissinger: In the conference? Yes. We will do it in two stages, Mr. Prime Minister. The initial phase of the conference will deal with disengagement of military forces and that does not involve the Palestinians. And since the Palestinians present a major problem for the Jordanians and Israel, we thought it best... and since some success should be achieved rapidly, we thought in the first conference there should be only Syria, Egypt, Israel and Jordan dealing with military disengagement. And when the frontiers issue arises, the Palestinians should participate; and they have agreed and so has the King of Jordan. None of this is generally known, Mr. Prime Minister, and I have not discussed this, obviously, with the Soviets at all. But Egypt has agreed to this procedure. And I think it will work.

Prime Minister Chou: Because in the 1947 resolution the issue of Palestine was not solved. For instance, they have their military forces in Syria and other areas. Is it not possible for the Palestinians to participate in the military aspects also?

Secretary Kissinger: They will participate in the military aspect of disengagement after the first phase of the disengagement of forces that are now in contact. The immediate problem is to get some movement. If the negotiation immediately gets bogged down in procedural details, we

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will be back to 1967 in which the new line develops a sanctity of its own and the Israelis on the West Bank...the probabilities for a new outbreak will be overwhelming. We thought we should get a negotiation in the first instance where we are not talking about forces now in contact with each other, that involves only those countries that have forces involved in contact.

Prime Minister Chou: I understand.

Secretary Kissinger: We expect that this first phase will be a matter of a few months. But in the meantime we will continue to talk to the Palestinians. We think it is important that this phase of talks, in which we are involved separately, be kept secret as long as possible because not every country has an interest in having it succeed.

Maybe I should say a word about Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia we have two problems. One is the problem of maintaining the ceasefire in Vietnam. And the second is the problem of Cambodia. We believe that the resumption of large military operations in Vietnam would be extremely undesirable and have the potentiality of major involvement of our two countries. We would like to normalize our relations.

As far as Cambodia is concerned, I leave it up to the Prime Minister whether he wishes to have a more extended discussion. I simply want to say we are not, in principle, opposed to Sihanouk. In many of his private statements and public statements, he seems to be under the misapprehension that the United States Government is, in principle, opposed to him. That is absolutely incorrect. If he could return to Cambodia in a position of real independence for himself, we would be very interested in him as a leader. We are not interested in him if he is a captive of one particular faction that is simply using him for a very brief period of time in order to gain international recognition.

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Prime Minister Chou: Have you taken note of the recent actions of the Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. With respect to Sihanouk?

Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps Ambassador Bruce is more familiar.

Secretary Kissinger: I am familiar with it. I have taken note of it. Our interest in Cambodia, insofar as we have interest, is to keep it out of great power confrontation, and we are interested in a truly independent, neutral Cambodia. We want no position for the United States in Cambodia. And we are not committed to any particular group of individuals in Cambodia. I leave it up to the Prime Minister whether this is a subject that he wants to pursue at a later meeting.

Prime Minister Chou: We will have to consider this for a while before we can raise our opinions. I would like to ask now why it is that the two South Vietnamese sides have shown no progress in their Paris meetings on the political aspect

Secretary Kissinger: I think the same qualities that make the Vietnamese a heroic people make them politically an extremely uncompromising people; and they sometimes combine, at least the ones I know, the worst aspects of Confucianism and the French Lycee. For example, when I negotiated this additional communique in June which will be my last one -- I will never again negotiate with them -- we had everything settled, when both parties conceived a new theory of international law: the order of obligations in which they appear in paragraph determines the order in which they have to be performed. Each side attempted to push the obligations of the others into the beginning of the document and its own obligations to the end so its opponent would have to perform first. We spent nearly a week on the problem, although no treaty could ever be written if this became an accepted practice.

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Prime Minister Chou: The protocol you mean?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. The protocol in June. Eventually, the objective situation in Vietnam will change for both sides, and then there will be real negotiating possibilities.

Prime Minister Chou: If we go into Cambodia, we will have to link it to the whole of Indochina, and if we are going to discuss it, we can do that later.

Secretary Kissinger: It is up to you, Mr. Prime Minister, and I will be prepared to do it. I will be prepared to discuss the whole of Indochina.

Prime Minister Chou: Of course, compared to the overall international situation, this is but a very small corner now, although it had troubled you for more than four and one-half years since your President came into office.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Prime Minister Chou: But from the point of view of the overall international strategy, you have taken too much time on that small issue.

Secretary Kissinger: That is true, too.

Prime Minister Chou: And you also said you no longer wished to continue Vietnam negotiations.

Secretary Kissinger: There was one moment, Mr. Prime Minister -- the Vietnamese specialize in creating deadlocks on irrelevant issues. There was a dispute over who should sign the document, the protocol. We made a proposal, the South Vietnamese made a proposal, and the North Vietnamese made a proposal. We then offered a compromise which accepted the North Vietnamese position, whereupon the South Vietnamese rejected it and moved to our original position, and the North Vietnamese moved to the original position of the South Vietnamese. At that point we had the North Vietnamese position, and the North Vietnamese had the South Vietnamese position. After three days of negotiations.

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Prime Minister Chou:

But you cannot blame them for this because it was the precedent established by your esteemed Secretary of State John Dulles. Because we have said that we were taken in and we have said this many times to our Vietnamese friends. You know that President Ho Chi Minh was a very eloquent man and he was a very open man too, and in his discussions with our Chairman, he did not agree to say that we had been taken in at that time. We continue to say we should have made greater efforts at the Geneva Conference. We should say that on the first Geneva Conference we should take some of the moral responsibility. Because, if at that time if we had refused to sign unless Dulles signed, he would have signed. But even though he would have signed, SEATO would have been established.

Secretary Kissinger:

The lack of signature was not the determining factor.

Prime Minister Chou:

No it was not, but it established a precedent. We have to admit our mistakes on that. It can be said to be a twist of history.

Now with one agreeing and one dissenting how are you going to get the Nobel Prize? I wonder who suggested that it go to two persons together.

Secretary Kissinger:

It was domestic politics in Norway. Le Duc Tho has written me a very warm letter. It is like two war veterans exchanging ideas. It reminded me of our conversations at the last session of our peace talks.

Prime Minister Chou:

Do you think we could take a rest for a few minutes?

(There was then a break from 5:30 to 5:45 p.m.)

Prime Minister Chou:

So the two sides, Israel and Egypt, are going to sign at 9:00, Peking time.

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Secretary Kissinger: I don't know the exact time. I know they will sign today.

Prime Minister Chou: That would be 4:00 their time.

Secretary Kissinger: That seems reasonable. They were supposed to meet at 2:00, and I guess it would take until 4:00.

Prime Minister Chou: First, the Soviet Union issued a news report and then they cancelled it.

Secretary Kissinger: They have never acknowledge the agreement, have they? They have not reported it in the press.

Prime Minister Chou: We heard that earlier that Tass had issued a news report saying that there were two different texts of the agreement issued -- one in the United States and the other in Egypt.

Secretary Kissinger: That is ~~not~~ true.

Prime Minister Chou: Later on they cancelled that news item and reissued another one according to the Egyptian text.

Secretary Kissinger: Which is exactly the same as the other text.

Prime Minister Chou: I did not go into that in such detail.

Secretary Kissinger: There is only one text. My letter was approved by both the Egyptian Foreign Minister and the Israeli Cabinet before I sent it.

Prime Minister Chou: It was also the same as that you gave to Kurt Waldheim.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly.

Prime Minister Chou: Is it five or six points?

Secretary Kissinger: Six.

Prime Minister Chou: At the beginning there were reports there were only five.

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Secretary Kissinger: That was wrong too. I think we gave your Ambassador a letter 24 hours before it was published.

Prime Minister Chou: So shall we continue? Is there anything else you would like to say?

Secretary Kissinger: I think there are other topics we have discussed in the past, such as South Asia and Iran, that we can keep for another occasion. I wanted to cover the basic issues today.

Prime Minister Chou: In my view, South Asia is always an important aspect. What do you think of the developments there?

Secretary Kissinger: India is making a major effort to improve its relations with us, and we assume also with you.

Prime Minister Chou: Why do they have to insist on detaining those 195 prisoners of war?

Secretary Kissinger: That is the problem -- the problem is that I think they want to keep them until Pakistan recognizes Bangladesh and until Bangladesh gives up the claim to try them. Now as part of this negotiation which brought about the settlement, we obtained from India an assurance that those 195 would not be turned over to Bangladesh. We would make it a matter of American Government policy if they broke this agreement.

Prime Minister Chou: There is the need to exert a certain pressure on them in this aspect because it is too unreasonable. Because in Pakistan they have already passed a resolution in their national assembly agreeing to the recognition of Bangladesh, giving the Prime Minister the authority to recognize Bangladesh at the proper time.

Secretary Kissinger: We are supporting Pakistan on the return of the 195. We have made this clear to India.

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Prime Minister Chou: We also discussed this issue with Mr. Whitlam when he came this time.

Secretary Kissinger: That is an issue in which he may be willing to support you. Whitlam, I would suspect, would support you on this.

Prime Minister Chou: At the beginning, he expressed his opinion, being more favorable to Bangladesh, and that he did not understand our position. But later, after we explained our position, he did not say anything more. He said he had not read Maxwell's book, and I gave him a copy.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Prime Minister has increased the sales of that book.

Prime Minister Chou: Indeed. And we believe that that book was written in a very fair manner because we had never known him before, and we did not provide him any documents. He reached those conclusions entirely on Indian documents. Perhaps it did draw on my letter. I think he did quote my letter to Nehru, but I don't think he quoted the letter that I wrote -- after we had returned the prisoners of war and ammunition -- to India and to all other heads of State and heads of government concerned. We sent a letter to the five intermediary states and to all the heads of government. Of course, you would now have a copy of that. He is now commencing to write a book on the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Secretary Kissinger: We have seen articles on that in the London Times.

Prime Minister Chou: He said he is coming again.

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to India, our policy is to see what we can do that they will have greater freedom of action from the Soviet Union but basically we are moving very slowly. We are settling some economic issues with them now -- the rupee debt and matters of this kind.

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Prime Minister Chou: We believe the rupee debt should be settled rather generously. How many rupees do you have on your hands for food purchases?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't have the exact figure, but it was settled at I think about 15 percent. It depends on how you calculate it. You can calculate it without interest -- it would be about 60 percent -- without interest it would be less. The rupees were blocked in India; we could not get them out of India; we have nothing to spend them on in India; and, therefore, what we adopted was what we thought a rather realistic program.

Prime Minister Chou: In your settlement, would you have the portion that was to be returned converted in hard currency?

Secretary Kissinger: No. But we have established fixed categories on which it can be spent in India which was not the case before.

Prime Minister Chou: Can you invest with those rupees in India?

Secretary Kissinger: No. It is mostly for American governmental expenditures in India; for our Embassy and matters like this, and buildings.

Prime Minister Chou: But that should be a very small sum.

Secretary Kissinger: And buildings and things of this kind.

Prime Minister Chou: Would you buy commodities out of India with that sum?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think so. I will get the details and let you know tomorrow.

Prime Minister Chou: I believe I have already told you of how they broke the Sino-Indian border negotiations in order to obtain that rupee settlement for buying grains from the United State. Do you remember my telling you that?

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Secretary Kissinger: You told me that after these negotiations broke down, that they received a great deal of help. You think they broke them in order to get the help?

Prime Minister Chou: Exactly. Because when I met with the foreign press in India, I told them no issue had been solved, and therefore I had nothing to say to them, the correspondents. But, of course, other correspondents also put questions to me. But a correspondent from your country asked me whether I knew or not that the Indian Minister of Food was in your country waiting to sign. I thanked him for telling me this news, and I understood. And the day after the talks broke down and I went to Kathmandu, Nepal for a visit, I read in the papers that the deal had been signed. And it was decided that by that agreement that India would be buying American food grains with rupees -- I think the sum of about 15 million tons; of course, not one year, that was not the manner of buying grains, but it was going to be done over a period of five years or six years. But the actual deal perhaps exceeded that amount. I think there was something to do with that. They would not break it. Otherwise, they could have signed something [with us] that was very abstract, and in principle, and no go into details. Nehru could have done that but at that time he refused to make any concessions. Because at the end of those talks I summarized a few points in his words to be taken as the basis for an agreement in principle to be later further discussed in detail, and he still refused to sign. But today you find that the rupees finally can be used in India and only a restricted number.

Secretary Kissinger: It was always the case that the rupee could only be used in India. I think the basic problem was what we called the counterpart fund; these accumulated funds which theoretically give one enormous power in a country where

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one has them. It is really not the purpose for which they were set up. They were set up so they could be spent there for development projects for the government concerned.

The second problem is that as foreign aid develops more and more countries owe us money; then if, for any reason, we shut off aid we shut off repayment of their debts, so that we are in the position of giving them aid so they can repay debts to us. This whole problem we are now examining, since it has consequences that were never intended

Prime Minister Chou: I think your President said at one time that all the debts together accounted for nearly \$10 billion.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: So perhaps you are preparing for the day when finding it difficult to pursue them, you will just wipe them off as with the stroke of one's beard.

Secretary Kissinger: No, but we have to do something creative with them because whether they are wiped off or not does not depend on us so completely anymore.

Prime Minister Chou: Correct. Of course, you would know that the Soviet Union whenever it leases something determines what it must be paid back in -- for instance, in jute. You would know that, of course.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and also in the Middle East.

Prime Minister Chou: You will know that recently that Egypt has had to pay in hard currencies for the ammunition that it obtained from the Soviet Union. Because the Soviet Union told Egypt since you have so many friends who are rich in oil resources, you should pay us in money and not in goods.

And then we saw that you suddenly put a bill to your Congress concerning aid to Israel amounting to \$2 billion. Of course, we understand that if you had not done that public opinion in the United States would not have been able to understand.


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Secretary Kissinger: We did this as a pressure on the Soviet Union

Prime Minister Chou: But they wanted money. They did not care for anything else. They, of course, would not pass a bill saying they would provide military arms immediately to Egypt.

Secretary Kissinger: But they were providing a great deal of arms during the war.

Prime Minister Chou: Of course, but for a price. Boumedienne went to the Soviet Union and held sixteen hours of discussion with the Soviets for the same purpose. They wanted to be paid. They gave him some things, but there were also other things they did not give him. One cannot fight well if one relies on such if that is on what one must rely to fight with.

Have you paid attention to the prospects of the developments in Afghanistan?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We have looked at that situation since the coup, and, of course, Prince Daud is well known as having some pro-Soviet orientation; and many of the younger officers with him have no political experience and were trained in the Soviet Union. You are familiar with the fact there was a Soviet military mission there in the last few weeks that inspected the border with Pakistan. We talked to the Shah of Iran, and we also told the Soviet Union that if the Afghans spilled across their border that this would be considered an international development which we would take very seriously. We are concerned with the Pushtunistan agitation.

Prime Minister Chou: They also engage themselves in Baluchistan agitation. The final intention of the Soviet Union is to get it all in the Soviet hand. They have a map. We don't know whether President Bhutto showed it to you.

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Secretary Kissinger: Yes. He showed me the map. It allegedly is an Afghanistan map because it has a very small slice of Soviet territory.

Prime Minister Chou: A piece of Pakistan, a piece of Iran, and a small piece of the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger: The Shah of Iran is very concerned. He is building up his defenses at a considerable rate, and we are giving him more modern equipment. We have talked to Bhutto and so our help has been primarily in the economic field, and we are now thinking of helping him build a port which is a project which he is extremely interested in. We have not yet fully solved the problems of weapons for Pakistan. We are trying to do it through Iran. And we are also...

Prime Minister Chou: I believe Prime Minister Bhutto wants to obtain weapons directly from you.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. It is a very difficult problem for us because of Congress. We have given him a little, but it is really not very meaningful

Prime Minister Chou: Can Iran give them some?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. That is what we are working on now. We had our Ambassador from Iran visit Pakistan to see what arrangements could be worked out.

Prime Minister Chou: So India has such a great influence on your domestic public opinion.

Secretary Kissinger: India has a considerable influence on our domestic public opinion, not so much on the public at large which does not like it, but on the intellectuals which have had a romantic idea about India as a nonviolent country. We are also working with the Shah, as I told you earlier, on the problem of Iran and the Gulf States. And we have this week, as you may have noted, sent one of our aircraft carriers and an escort into the Persian Gulf in order to demonstrate our presence. There have been Soviet ships there, but we have not had American ships there.

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Prime Minister Chou: Anyway, those places are getting tense. You are spending such a huge amount in military expenditures in assisting other countries, could you not appropriate a portion of that -- a portion of your expenditures to military assistance to other countries -- could you not give a portion of that to Pakistan?

Secretary Kissinger: We are not spending that much, unfortunately. The budget is being decreased by Congress every year. Secondly, a specific prohibition was passed against direct military aid to either India or Pakistan. India does not need it because they are getting it from the Soviets. We have to look for indirect ways of doing it. I have talked to Prime Minister Bhutto about it, and I will look into it again when I get back to the United States. We agree with the necessity. Our problem is to find the legal means of doing it.

Prime Minister Chou: Another question is that of Korea. We have reached a compromise, but we believe the speed has to be slowed down -- that is, the time when the draft resolution should be put to the First Committee, and the Chairman of the General Assembly, will be postponed. Because it was originally scheduled to have the discussion in the First Committee on the Korean issue on the 14th or 15th and you had already left Washington when you presented it with our Korean friends, and then we had to tell our delegation at the United Nations. Our delegation was very enthusiastic about this, as was your Ambassador.

Secretary Kissinger: He is by nature enthusiastic.

Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps something like Ambassador Huang Hua.

Secretary Kissinger: I did not have that impression from Ambassador Huang Hua.

Prime Minister Chou: But they very quickly agreed.

Secretary Kissinger: We were under the impression you were in a hurry. We are in no particular hurry.

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Prime Minister Chou:

Because you had not returned and we had not met you, and they even went into the details of drawing up the wording. Perhaps even before you authorized your Ambassador.

Secretary Kissinger:

No. I approved the wording. It was sent to me as a cable, and I approved it.

Prime Minister Chou:

Because we knew that you were very busy and preoccupied with the Middle East at that time, and we did not think there was the need to be so hasty because we also have to consult with other sponsor countries which Korea had mobilized, and we thought also that you would have to discuss with your sponsor countries. In the course of such consultation, it would be bound to leak. For instance, you will discuss it with Japan. You told Japan.

Secretary Kissinger:

"Might possibly leak" is one of the kindest sentences I have heard. I was told that you were in a hurry. We had no particular reason to hurry. We were for it, and I approved the schedule, and I would have accepted any schedule you gave us. I am still prepared to accept it.

Prime Minister Chou:

Yes, I think the main thing is we should give them some time because our Korean friends need to discuss and persuade some other sponsor countries. We think it would be very bad if we two decided after discussing it and tried to impose it on others.

Secretary Kissinger:

I agree.

Prime Minister Chou:

So I would kindly ask you to convey this to Ambassador Scali, and he could go into further consultations with Ambassador Huang Hua, that is to say that originally the issue was to be put to the First Committee on the 14th and what we mean is we don't think it need be done in such a hurry -- that's the date...

Secretary Kissinger:

The compromise was to be on the 14th on the Korean issue?

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Prime Minister Chou: No, it was originally scheduled that the issue would be put to the Committee on the 14th and then all sides would have their say and then go on to the resolutions. But we would propose that it would be better to postpone the discussion of the issue to a later date -- later than the 14th. We think it would be beneficial if you could notify your Ambassador at the United Nations and he and our Ambassador could discuss it and see if they approved. If they thought it was suitable to postpone it then it could be done.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know about your Ambassador, but if you and I agreed that it should be postponed ours will postpone it.

Prime Minister Chou: But you know there is also the question of Korea. We agree with your assessment that our Ambassador seems to be in a hurry and I don't know why he became all of a sudden so enthusiastic over this. Because originally when our Vice Minister was at the United Nations we agreed he should first consult the nonaligned countries and Korea, and we should not enter this consideration in such haste.

There now has appeared another issue -- another aspect -- of the issue and that is you are now in China. Because you know that on our side the Soviet Union and its followers are included in the sponsor countries and they would have something to say about this, and would try to create trouble on the basis of the fact that you were visiting China now and might create some confusion in other countries.

Secretary Kissinger: We have no reason to bring it to a decision this week. I don't know what the parliamentary situation is -- how much trouble it would be to postpone it. The Vice Minister knows about the technical details. If it is possible to postpone it, I have no objection. I am assuming the same compromise is still agreed to, and you are just talking about a delay, not about changing the agreement.

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Prime Minister Chou: No change of the compromise.

Secretary Kissinger: How much of a delay -- two weeks?

Prime Minister Chou: We can ask them to discuss that.

Secretary Kissinger: All right.

Prime Minister Chou: Because in that interim period we can also discuss it more thoroughly with the nonaligned countries. The Soviet group will definitely try to create trouble on this issue and they will stand on the so-called left. They constantly forget that the United Nation troops were sent into Korea when they were absent from the United Nation Security Council. And Ambassador Bruce...

Secretary Kissinger: We will instruct Ambassador Scali as soon as we return to our Guest House to get in immediate touch with your Ambassador that they should both work out a delay for a period.

Prime Minister Chou: If necessary.

Secretary Kissinger: How do they determine what is necessary?

Prime Minister Chou: They can discuss it among themselves.

Secretary Kissinger: Our Ambassador is a little excitable. And unless I tell him the definition of necessity. Let me put it this way -- to make it easier. I am prepared to go ahead, then he should go ahead. We will leave it up to your Ambassador and hope that my judgment of him is correct that he is not excitable.

Prime Minister Chou: Well, he is usually not so very easily excited but this time he has been over-enthusiastic.

Secretary Kissinger: That is more than I ever manage to achieve with him. Maybe I should have Scali work on Chinese problems.

Prime Minister Chou: I don't think this has anything to do with Ambassador Scali this time; perhaps because

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our two sides have reached agreement, he thought he would express his zeal in carrying out the order. He forgot the other sponsor countries, especially since he neglected the fact that there was the Soviet group among those sponsor countries.

Secretary Kissinger: Ambassador Scali will be instructed so there is no misunderstanding as of Monday morning New York time. Should they get together? I will instruct him to meet whenever Huang Hua wants. I don't know where Scali is this weekend. We will send a message when we reach the Guest House and that will take three to four hours. If Scali is in New York he should have it by the end of the day Sunday New York time.

Prime Minister Chou: I think it can wait until Monday morning.

Secretary Kissinger: You can assume that at the opening of business Monday, New York time, Ambassador Scali will be instructed. Who gets in touch with whom? We leave it to him. I will tell Scali if he has not heard from Ambassador Huang Hua in the morning he should call him. I shall instruct him first that the compromise remain in effect, but if Ambassador Huang Hua would like a delay, then Scali should cooperate with him to get a delay for the time period that Ambassador Huang Hua recommends. And that Scali should work with the sponsors on our side to bring the delay about if it is desired. You can count on that being done.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you. We don't want to give the Soviet Union an opportunity.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree, and if there is no necessity, there is no hurry.

Prime Minister Chou: Correct. You are going to Japan. What are your views on Japan?

Secretary Kissinger: My views on Japan are that what we discussed last February are still true -- that Japan is at a crucial point and necessity will drive

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it to decide between a more traditional nationalism and maintaining its present orientation. And it has many temptations. It is very much affected by the Middle East oil situation.

Prime Minister Chou: I believe about 80 percent of its oil comes from the Middle East.

Ambassador Ingersoll: Eighty-five percent I would say; that is only about 40 percent from the Arab countries and 45 percent from Iran.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: It has temptations from the Soviet Union. It has temptations by its own economic strengths. And it is concerned that it will be left alone in any arrangement that we make with the Europeans. This is one reason why we may try to find a formula to associate Japan with our efforts in Europe. The intention is not to link it militarily with Europe but primarily psychologically, to prevent a total sense of isolation.

Prime Minister Chou: And have you expressed support or are you waiting to see the outcome of events with regard to your joint exploration of Siberia?

Secretary Kissinger: One problem is that no one knows exactly how much natural gas there is. There is some dispute between what the Soviets have told us and what some experts have said.

We have just authorized a loan which will be a joint American/Japanese exploration in Siberia to get a precise determination of what is involved. We have agreed in principle to make it a joint project with the Japanese. And we believe, for political reasons, it would be undesirable to have the Japanese so completely dependent on Soviet political decisions. And the Soviet Union will probably be more reluctant to tackle both the United States and Japan simultaneously than Japan alone. We have a problem in our Congress whether we can get any support for these

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long-term investments in the Soviet Union. And that will not be decided until the early part of next year.

Prime Minister Chou: Their salesmen don't seem to be very effective.

Secretary Kissinger: Soviet salesmen?

Prime Minister Chou: That is the impression we received both from West Germany, Japan and from you. Is the data and the material of the salesmen credible?

Secretary Kissinger: There are some questions in our mind about the reliability of these figures. The second question we have is to what degree we want to commit massive American investments in the Soviet Union. Our strategy up to now, quite candidly, has been to do enough to give the promise of future investments but not so much as to make a strategic difference in their situation.

Prime Minister Chou: That is a very complicated strategy.

Secretary Kissinger: That is true.

Prime Minister Chou: Ambassador Ingersoll will be, of course, very familiar with the lesson that General Secretary Brezhnev taught Prime Minister Tanaka. He brought out his map and began his lectures.

Secretary Kissinger: He has only one lecture. And I have heard it ten times.

Prime Minister Chou: He came at the same time when Brezhnev went to visit Bonn.

Secretary Kissinger: It is dangerous to underestimate German shortsightedness. My apologies to the Vice Minister.

Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps you say that out of your unhappiness with the present Brandt Government.

Secretary Kissinger: That too, but it is a historical phenomenon. The Germans have had only one leader of stature -- that was Adenauer.

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Prime Minister Chou: Yes, because he had been active.

Secretary Kissinger: Who, Adenauer?

Prime Minister Chou: Adenauer.

Secretary Kissinger: He knew the importance of it, but he never let himself be deflected. While Brandt, if he persists in his present policy, will have given the Soviet Union veto over German policy.

Prime Minister Chou: There is such a danger. And the opposition party did not carry out the elections very well either.

Secretary Kissinger: No. They had very incompetent leadership. You met their best man but he is not very energetic, Schroeder. He is their best man.

Prime Minister Chou: He is not so very active. Why not? Because of temperament or because of his position in the party?

Secretary Kissinger: Schroeder, he is not the new leader. I have not met the new leader. Schroeder was ill for a while, and he also does not have and is not good in appealing to public opinion. And he was not very strong nor able to take over the party himself.

Strauss was with Ambassador Bruce in Germany for many years. Strauss is extremely intelligent and a very forceful personality, but he is a South German phenomenon so he has not much support in the north. His self discipline leaves something to be desired. I think I told the Prime Minister once about what Adenauer said to me about Strauss.

Prime Minister Chou: At that time you did not mention a specific name. I thought it might be him.

Secretary Kissinger: It was Strauss.

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Prime Minister Chou: Yes, you can see the clarity of Adenauer's mind because he must have spoken to you when he was over 80.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. A month before his death, 88. He was a man of very clear views. He understood the danger for Germany if it maneuvered too much.

Prime Minister Chou: It is time for a short break, and you are going to the ballet. We will have more time tomorrow. Perhaps this evening, if we have something more to discuss, I might pay a call on you.

Secretary Kissinger: It would be very nice.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20521

ADJ'S REVIEW

CHAP. 15

#3

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONPARTICIPANTS:

Prime Minister Chou En-lai

Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei

Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua

Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs
Wang Hai-jung

Two Chinese Foreign Minister Official

Tang Wang-shen, Interpreter

Shen Jo-yen, Interpreter

Chinese Notetaker

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Ambassador David Bruce, Chief, U.S.
Liaison OfficeAmbassador Robert Ingersoll
U.S. Embassy TokyoWinston Lord, Director of Planning and
Coordination, Department of State

Alfred Jenkins, U.S. Liaison Office

DATE AND TIME:Monday, November 12, 1973
3:00 - 5:30 p.m.PLACE:Guest House Villa #3, Peking
Peoples Republic of China

CLASSIFIED BY FRANK WISNER
DATE TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
ORDER 11662
EXEMPTED AT TWO-
DECEMBER 31, 1991

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FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

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Secretary Kissinger:

I have the answer for you, Mr. Prime Minister, on the production of planes in Taiwan. It is not a production of airplanes but an assembly for which we supply the parts. And it is for short-range fighter aircraft which will not increase the total number of airplanes on Taiwan. When we stop supplying the parts, they will no longer be able to produce them. So in practice it is different than giving them the airplanes. They have no independent capability for producing the airplane being developed. And that is true of all other co-production arrangements. It is an F5E, and there are to be 100 for a period between 1973-1978.

Prime Minister Chou:

In this way Chiang Ching-kuo will be reassured.

Secretary Kissinger:

Our impression is that he (Chiang Kai-shek) is not active today.

Prime Minister Chou:

It is impossible for him to be, and it is difficult for him to live for another five years. But I am not asking him to die. He can live as long as he wishes. If he wishes he can live to be 100. What I meant was in that way Chiang-Ching-Kuo will be reassured because he could run the country until 1978.

Secretary Kissinger:

We have no plans on this plane, on this project, beyond 1978.

Prime Minister Chou:

You say it is a short distance one. Actually, the radius can stretch as far as 180 kilometers. That is the fighting radius.

Secretary Kissinger:

And come back? One way, it is possible, but not to come back.

Prime Minister Chou:

If he has a refueling tank, he will be able to come back.

Secretary Kissinger:

F5E?

Prime Minister Chou:

Yes. It does not matter even if the plane is bigger. I just wanted to make clear whether it is an assembly plant.

Secretary Kissinger:

It is an assembly plant, not a production. We supply the parts. They do not produce the parts. So they have no independent capability.

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Prime Minister Chou: Is Japan able to produce planes like this or greater?

Secretary Kissinger: Japan has not produced any planes like this, but it certainly has the capability. I have to check but -- do you know, Ambassador Ingersoll if we have some co-production?

Ambassador Ingersoll: Not on the F5s; on the F4s.

Secretary Kissinger: They are producing F4s. F4s have radius to reach effectively. The F5 is not a bombing plane. The F4 can be used effectively for bombing.

Prime Minister Chou: Actually, the F5E is also capable of bombing. The only difference is, it is lighter. The F4, which is the Phantom type, can carry greater weight.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. The F4 can carry greater weight.

Prime Minister Chou: But the distance is the same for both.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't believe this. I really don't have the characteristics in mind. We have always considered it, strategically thinking, that the F5 is pure a fighter plane, with no bombing capability. We use it for tactical support.

The F4 is something we call deep interdiction which goes further behind the line and has a strategic impact, but I don't know the exact characteristics. In our own strategic planning for Vietnam, for example, the F5 was always considered to be used for support of ground troops at the front line with bombs, and the F4 for the interdiction of communications because it has a heavy bomb load, and I thought it had a longer range. I will have to check on that. I will have the answer tomorrow.

Ambassador Ingersoll: The F4 is refuelable.

Prime Minister Chou: It does not matter. It would be pretty good if it could be delayed for another five years, because in that way they can envisage it for another five years. In that case, your recent word will be able to be realized in this way: It will

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not give rise to the ambitions of a third country. I see it in this way. It does not matter whether it is 100 planes or 200 planes.

And there is, of course, another point. It could be allowed to attack the Mainland, but if they insist on attacking the Mainland, we welcome them. Let them have a try.

Secretary Kissinger: You have our assurance they will not be allowed to attack the Mainland. If they do, they will lose American support completely.

Prime Minister Chou: If they ever try to do that, they will do it unilaterally.

Secretary Kissinger: There will be no attack nor an American-sponsored attack in the future or any attacks that our President can control.

Prime Minister Chou: What you told me yesterday has already been reported to the Chairman. There was one point that I did not explain very much because I did not entirely understand. Yesterday you mentioned that there was a possibility of finding, that you would like to find, a way with regard to our bilateral relations to find some wording similar to the Shanghai Communique or slightly altered that would be able to promote the development of our relations. I did not have the opportunity to issue a communique or some other form?

Secretary Kissinger: I wanted to ask the Prime Minister whether he thought it appropriate to issue a communique at the end of my visit and if so we will be prepared to do this. My comment was in reference to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. We cannot go faster than the schedule which I gave you if it is on the Japan formula. However, if we could find a formula which is more flexible, as long as we understand that we will end up there, we are prepared to establish diplomatic relations sooner.

Prime Minister Chou: Yesterday you mentioned that you also reaffirmed that you would not support the idea of two Chinas. Under this condition, what kind of flexible formula have you in mind? It is also a difficult problem to us. Perhaps you have worked out a good idea

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Secretary Kissinger: No, I have not actually yet worked out a good idea. If the Prime Minister would like, I might submit one to him later today after I have had an opportunity to meet with my colleagues. I have in mind something like the Shanghai Communique which would make clear that the establishment of diplomatic relations does not mean giving up the principle that there is only one China.

Prime Minister Chou: She (the interpreter) had made a good guess of what you meant. When we were with the Chairman I dared not explain the statement, but she dared to make an explanation of the statement.

Secretary Kissinger: As I understand it, Mr. Prime Minister, your problem in having diplomatic relations while we have relations with Taiwan is that it might give rise to a two-China policy which we have agreed not to support. What we should search for is a formula for consideration that makes clear that that principle is not being abandoned; that there is only one China by either side.

Prime Minister Chou: She (the interpreter) has guessed very correctly what you think.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: So the elder people are not as good as the younger people.

Secretary Kissinger: She had a long talk with Mr. Lord on the airplane.

Mr. Lord: We had our own counterpart talks.

Interpreter: Another matter was discussed on the plane.

Prime Minister Chou: There is another matter that is mentioned concerning the Consulate General. Perhaps you have not made an investigation concerning this point. As far as we know, there are twelve in all at the moment. Originally there were ten. Recently they have added two.

Secretary Kissinger: I know of one in New York.

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Mr. Jenkins:

There is one in Atlanta.

Secretary Kissinger:

This one must be in honor of Mr. Jenkins.

I have not paid attention to the one in New York. And our interpretation, which we made to ourselves, is the one which I gave you yesterday: that the Taiwan authorities are preparing for the day that we will move toward the sole recognition of Peking; a day which we know is inevitable. At that time, they want to have a representation in America that permits them to continue exchanges with us, and I believe for that reason they have chosen the Consulate General in New York, since it would be inappropriate to have it in Washington. That was our own interpretation.

And our own internal interpretation of it also was that this was envisaged as a possible contact point with the People's Republic of China whenever discussions would take place.

Interpreter:

You mentioned yesterday a point of contact with Chaing Kai-shek.

Secretary Kissinger:

A contact point to the United States after we have moved, say from no later than the middle of 1976, and secondly, a possible point at which the Taiwan authorities would negotiate with the People's Republic of China. This is not based on knowledge but on our interpretation of their motives. This second interpretation may be wrong.

Prime Minister Chou:

That is just an idea.

Secretary Kissinger:

It is our own analysis of the problem.

Prime Minister Chou:

Is there anything you would like to tell me first.

Secretary Kissinger:

I have some information now on the rupee negotiations situation which you were interested in. Our difficulty was that we could not spend all the rupees we had accumulated. And, therefore, what we did was to settle for 35 percent of the total amount of rupees in these blocked accounts that could be spent only in India, but even that will take us twenty years to spend. The real difficulty was that we

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permitted such huge debts to accumulate without analyzing what we could ever do with them. There was also a speed-up in dollar debts that they owed us, but of a much smaller amount. That was the basic reasoning of that.

Prime Minister Chou:

So the phenomenon in India..you do not have the similar phenomenon in other countries.

Secretary Kissinger:

Not to quite the same extent. We had it in Japan, but it is being settled. We do have another phenomenon in other countries where aid loans that were given over a period of years become repayable and where, in effect, we give more aid so that they can repay the loans; and when we don't give aid they don't repay the loans so they get aid anyway. For example, we helped Pakistan, which holds a substantial amount of our money, by rescheduling its debt after the 1971 war which was a way really of giving it additional money.

Two other small items. I understand that Ambassador Huang Hua has already met a representative from our Mission, and as I understand from our telegram, they have had a satisfactory meeting. If that is not correct, we will change it. We will give appropriate instructions. I think they have achieved an adequate understanding.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you, and we have heard about this point.

Secretary Kissinger: Your information is the same.

Prime Minister Chou: The same.

Secretary Kissinger: We will proceed. We have instructed our Mission that we follow Ambassador Huang's recommendation so you have the initiative as to timing.

The only other item I have is that I understand that in these talks on the private blocked assets, there is only one item that is still unsettled which has to do with your proposal that blocked assets belonging to third country banks be excluded from the

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settlement. That is one item that is impossible for us to accept because we could never get Congressional approval for the agreement if that item were excluded.

Prime Minister Chou: It seems the third countries have already given us the money. What shall we do? Give them back the money?

Secretary Kissinger: Our people believe that they can sue those banks and get the money.

Prime Minister Chou: Take for instance, Belgium.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I know. That is the primary problem.

Prime Minister Chou: The figure is not very big but they were very... once they established diplomatic relations with us, they gave us the money.

Secretary Kissinger: But illegally from our point of view.

Prime Minister Chou: For us, it is legal.

Secretary Kissinger: The difficulty for us is it would reduce the pro rata payments from 40 percent to 25 percent which we do not believe Congress would accept.

Prime Minister Chou: Do you mean that by excluding the money given to us already by the third country banks there is only 25 percent left?

Secretary Kissinger: Then I think it would be about 22 percent in blocked assets as against private claims. While with that money it would be about 40 percent. And our experience has been that the Congress would not approve a settlement that was as low as 22 percent.

Prime Minister Chou: But to us the figure is very small. Up to now I still find it difficult to understand the proportion of the taxes levied between those countries which you have given most favored nation treatment and those which you have not. To me, that is if we are not given most favored nation treatment your taxes are different.

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Secretary Kissinger:

We are in principle prepared to grant you most favored nation treatment. However, we have not been able to do this in the past when there were outstanding claims. If this settlement were made, we would in principle be prepared to grant most favored nation status to the PRC. The difficulty that now arises with most favored nation has nothing to do with China, but people who are adding amendments which are aimed at the Soviet Union which may apply to the PRC even though the people may be favorable to the PRC. Like Senator Jackson. I will have to have a meeting with Senator Jackson as soon as I return to remove those obstacles. I know he has no intention of directing his measures against the PRC. His measures are against the Soviet Union. Insofar as the administration is concerned, we are prepared to grant most favored nation status to the PRC, and we are prepared to grant them the same economic status as the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou:

Whereas just now you talked politics with me, as to the point you mentioned, I fully understand it. Because what I want to know is financially speaking does the most favored nation treatment mean the reduction of taxes?

Secretary Kissinger:

From the United States? There are not any export taxes. We don't have any export taxes.

Prime Minister Chou:

It is limited to import taxes?

Secretary Kissinger:

Yes.

Prime Minister Chou:

What is the difference between the taxes levied on those countries which enjoy the most favored nation treatment and those who do not enjoy that treatment?

Secretary Kissinger:

I will have to check, but it is substantial and it varies; but in several categories it is very substantial. I will have the answer for you tomorrow.

Prime Minister Chou:

You give most favored nation treatment to Japan

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Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We give it to about 100 nations.

Prime Minister Chou: They belong to different categories.

Secretary Kissinger: The socialist states were excluded after the Korean War. This is really the origin of the discrimination.

Prime Minister Chou: And Yugoslavia?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We have given it to Yugoslavia and to Poland.

Prime Minister Chou: And Romania?

Secretary Kissinger: No, but we will give it to Romania. Romania has had to wait because in the past in order to get most favored nation status we have had to submit a separate bill to the Congress for each country. We have not submitted a bill to the Congress which gives the Executive Branch the discretion to grant most favored nation status to any country and that bill is still before Congress. We would prefer to be able to do it on a general basis, but, if necessary, we still have the possibility of introducing action for individual countries.

Prime Minister Chou: But as far as the bill for giving most favored nation treatment to the Soviets, it has been postponed.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, this is not a bill to give most favored nation....

Prime Minister Chou: It is demanded by your government.

Secretary Kissinger: It is not a bill to give most favored status to the Soviet Union but a bill to give the Executive Branch the discretion to give it to almost anybody and therefore the Soviet Union. I can explain to the Prime Minister the complexity which led us to the postponement of that bill. The reason is that in the Senate we expect an amendment sponsored by Senator Jackson which would not only not enable us to give most favored nation status to the Soviet Union but would also limit the possibility of credits, and is so written that it would also apply to China. Jackson has not thought of thi

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It refers to emigration. Jackson is thinking of the Jewish problem. We have to find a refinement of this bill. In order to do this we have to get a maximum difference between the House and the Senate so when these two bills become reconciled there is an area of negotiation. Therefore, we first asked the House to eliminate most favored nation completely. When they did not do this, we asked them to postpone consideration of the bill for two reasons. One, to have some control of Soviet behavior on the Middle East, and secondly in order to enable us to discuss with the Senators and Congressmen the fact that we have written a bill which they are aiming at the Soviet Union but which applies to too many other countries and therefore defeats its own purpose. But it will definitely come to a vote no later than the first part of February.

Prime Minister Chou:

We will make a study of this question. There is only one item left, and there is no other question as to the blocked assets.

Secretary Kissinger:

Yes. One item. That is the only item. I think the other questions can be settled. You raised the third question. We can settle two of them.

Prime Minister Chou:

I like to make several clarifications on some international questions. As we have discussed the situation in the Middle East, it is complex. Yesterday you mentioned the two steps to be taken and the first step is to carry out the disengagement of military forces, and the agreement has already been signed between Egypt and Israel.

Secretary Kissinger:

No, Mr. Prime Minister. There are three steps in that sense. The first is stabilizing the ceasefire. Then peace negotiations begin. These peace negotiations will have two steps. A first step is what we call disengagement of forces, but whose real purpose is to move the Israeli forces back some distance, and a second step which settles the final border.

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Prime Minister Chou: And there is also the question of carrying out the observed ceasefire on the part of Syria. They will also sign it?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Syria has already agreed to the ceasefire. But we believe that Syria should become an integral part of the negotiations and our impression is that it is prepared to be.

Prime Minister Chou: Then, when it comes to the discussion of disengagement of military forces will there be a conference held for discussing of this question or will it be discussed separately?

Secretary Kissinger: No, it will be the first phase of the peace conference. But, as I explained to the Vice Minister this morning, and I believe to you yesterday, my judgment is that the formal peace conference will not be much more productive than the formal Vietnam Conference. And it is probable that the real negotiations will take place separately outside the formal framework. As I explained to the Vice Minister this morning, the problem is that at the formal conference, the Soviet Union will probably attempt to regain some of the territory it has lost by taking rather extreme positions. Therefore, it may be necessary for us on occasion to create a stalemate in order to demonstrate that this is not the road to a settlement.

Prime Minister Chou: Will Britain and France take part in the conference?

Secretary Kissinger: It is not finally settled yet. I would doubt it because Israel will not participate if Britain and France participate. But Britain and France may move to a position closer to the Soviet position. So it is not such an asset to have them there.

Prime Minister Chou: But in their public opinion they have expressed their desire to take part in the conference.

Secretary Kissinger: There is always, as I told you yesterday, a difference in what they say publicly and what they say privately. Not always, but very often

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Prime Minister Chou: In order to meet their demands at home?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We will not exclude them if they want to participate and if the others want them. We have no reason to exclude them. But frankly, I cannot imagine a settlement occurring in a public forum of this composition. With so many different groups represented as it is.

Prime Minister Chou: It seems that among the Arab states they have also quite a few extremist positions.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Iraq and, to some extent, Algeria.

Prime Minister Chou: Libya.

Secretary Kissinger: Libya, Southern Yemen. Libya was not exceptionally heroic during the war, but its courage has increased as the ceasefire has been prolonged.

Prime Minister Chou: Libya has not severed relations with you?

Secretary Kissinger: No. They have only made impossible the life of the people who are there. They are very anti-Soviet.

Prime Minister Chou: He is also a friend of Chaing Kai-shek.

Secretary Kissinger: Really? This I did not know.

Prime Minister Chou: A very peculiar phenomenon. But we don't look into that matter. There are so many queer things in the world. Is that the companies in the United States which have investments in oil sources in Libya?

Secretary Kissinger: There are many European countries that also have investments there, and most of the Libyan oil goes to Europe, not to the United States. Only 12 percent of our oil comes from the Middle East. Most of that comes from Saudi Arabia.

Ambassador Ingersoll: And Iran.

Secretary Kissinger: Six percent. We get another 6 percent from Iran.

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Prime Minister Chou: So the total proportion would be nearly 20 percent?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Eighteen percent.

Prime Minister Chou: What do you think of King Faisal?

Secretary Kissinger: A complex phenomenon.

Prime Minister Chou: He is also an old friend of mine and I came to know him very well at the Bandung Conference.

Secretary Kissinger: A very complex man. Of a previous period. Very principled, but in a very traditional framework. He is in a very complex situation because he is encircled on the one hand by Iraq on the north and South Yemen on the south. So he is very vulnerable to the radical states. On the other hand, emotionally, he is a good friend of the United States. My impression is that he is attempting to find a way to escape from the policy he adopted in the war. I think he will find a way in the next month or two. I am talking about the oil policy, escape from the oil policy.

Prime Minister Chou: The Japanese oil is from Iran and Kuwait.

Ambassador Ingersoll: They get about 85 percent of their oil from the Middle East as such. About 40-45 percent from Iran and the balance from Iraq and others. Five percent from Indonesia, Borneo and Eastern Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: We have started a major program to reduce, and to eventually eliminate, our dependency on oil from abroad. We believe that we can successfully conclude this within this decade.

Prime Minister Chou: That would be a very grand plan, and you will have to economize in the United States with oil.

Secretary Kissinger: We are doing this. You may have seen the President's speech. There may be an interim period where we have to economize on the use of oil. We are trying to liquify coal, for which we have the scientific way to do this, but we must make it economically feasible. We will use oil shale and rely on Alaskan oil and oil from Canada. With this combination, we believe we can be self-sufficient

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by the early 1980s.

Prime Minister Chou: The production cost is very high for liquified coal.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but we expect to reduce that cost very substantially during this decade. We know the scientific principle. It is primarily a production problem. On engineering problems we are very good.

Prime Minister Chou: Is it true that most of the oil from Venezuela goes to your country?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, a substantial part.

Ambassador Ingersoll: I was going to say that the increase in the price of oil in the Middle East is making it economical to use this liquified coal and the shale. It is an incentive for us to work harder at it.

Prime Minister Chou: What is Japan going to do?

Ambassador Ingersoll: They wish they knew. They have been trying to diversify for a long time, but they have not many other sources for oil than the Middle East.

Secretary Kissinger: We may be prepared to share with Japan in some common research and development on alternative resources, and also on some joint ventures on nuclear energy.

Prime Minister Chou: But at the beginning, perhaps the cost is also very high.

Secretary Kissinger: Of what? Of nuclear energy, yes. At the beginning, but we have that under study. I think the installations are very expensive, but if the cost of the nuclear fuel can be reduced, of which there is a good possibility, then it becomes much more economical.

Prime Minister Chou: It would be better if there are any by-products.

Secretary Kissinger: Unfortunately, most of the by-products are most useful for nuclear weapons.

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Prime Minister Chou:

That is also a subject for debate between the two big powers. Do you really believe that the Soviet Union will reduce her quantity of nuclear weapons?

Secretary Kissinger:

The first problem is to stabilize the number of nuclear weapons because they are still increasing the number. And, of course, they have the theory that they need nuclear weapons for more than one threat. So we believe in the strategic arms limitation talks. We first have to place a ceiling on the total number of weapons, and then bring about a gradual reduction.

In the first phase of the agreement, the Soviet performance has been, to put it kindly, ambiguous. They are supposed to destroy one category of weapons as replacement for submarine-based weapons called SS7s. They are old. And they have destroyed a few of those, but they appear to have replaced them with mobile missiles which are technically not banned by the agreement but which are certainly not in the spirit of the agreement. If this continues, we will have to take countermeasures, and then the agreement will be meaningless. We will put missiles into airplanes which is also not banned by the agreement.

Prime Minister Chou:

About the Korean question. At first, I intended to discuss it at some other occasion, but now I think we had better discuss it. What is your idea of the next step to be taken? I am not referring to the step taken this year. I am referring to the step that will be taken in the future. There is an Armistice Committee at the demarcation line, and this Committee meets often. What do you think will be a way out for that?

Secretary Kissinger:

Our problem with respect to the United Nations is that its disappearance would also remove the legal basis for the armistice.

Prime Minister Chou:

That is why I was asking. What form would it take in order to settle the question of the Armistice Committee? If you have not anything in your mind, we had better not discuss it today.

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Secretary Kissinger: I do not have a concrete proposal, but we are prepared to discuss it over the next year on the schedule we have discussed.

Prime Minister Chou: But there is an advantage here that the Soviet Union has not had a hand in the Korean question

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot judge on the North Korean side.

Prime Minister Chou: You can or cannot?

Secretary Kissinger: We do not have a judgment.

Prime Minister Chou: But it is possible that there would be minor troubles, but one cannot find a legal basis for that because the Soviet Union is not a participant to the armistice agreement. Because there were only four parties which signed the armistice agreement, but it was fortunate that the Soviet Union was not a participant in that. So over the last twenty years nothing -- no troubles had occurred with regard to the armistice agreement. Although Dulles refused to settle this question, peace has been maintained over more than twenty years. This has given Korea an opportunity to move towards peaceful communication. Of course, this is something that will call for a long period of time before it can be settled.

Anyway, a way must be found out how to settle this. We should pay attention to this question.

Secretary Kissinger: We will work with you during the next year to find a solution to the question of the legal basis of the armistice, and we will do that. We will make a major effort before the next General Assembly to come to an agreement with you on that issue. Should we discuss this with Ambassador Huang Chen? Of course, Ambassador Bruce will also be instructed on this.

Prime Minister Chou: But we think that the members of the four nations with the Advisory Committee are very comfortable. They were just stationed there, without asking to withdraw from Korea, whereas the Canadians have been withdrawn from Vietnam and they stayed there for quite

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a long period of time. The International Committee has been there for a long time with nothing to do. That is why members often came to Peking. Who pays the expenses for those? The Vice Minister also took part in the negotiations then.

I would like to ask you a question. It has been proven that expansionism in the world is doomed to failure. But the Soviet Union wants to follow in the steps of their predecessors, and they want to overtake them and they are stretching their hands everywhere. Do you think this can be stopped?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is a difficult problem of this period.

Prime Minister Chou: It is also a crucial issue.

Secretary Kissinger: It is the most crucial issue. I told the Vice Minister in the car today that I had no illusions, for example, that in the Middle East, if it were not for the Soviet Union, you and we would have quite different views. But we have a first objective to prevent the domination by the Soviet Union. I believe if the countries that are potential victims of expansionism cooperate in a formal way, but they have to understand the main lines of each other's policy. I believe that major military expansionism can be stopped. That is our policy -- to resist if the Soviet Union engages in a major military movement. But I think it can be stopped.

Prime Minister Chou: Do you mean that it is not easy to stop political expansionism?

Secretary Kissinger: The political expansionism is more difficult to stop.

Prime Minister Chou: For instance, the so-called friendship treaty between the Soviet Union and India.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the political expansionism can also be stopped if one pursues an intelligent policy and if the countries against which it is directed keep in mind the principal requirement. I think if you, we and Western Europe understand

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each other, and if we behave intelligently in other parts of the world, we can contain Soviet expansionism. I don't believe that Soviet policy is very intelligent. It is very brutal, but not very intelligent.

Prime Minister Chou: But sometimes they have put on many masks.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but sooner or later the brutality comes forward.

Prime Minister Chou: But so far as the Soviet Union itself is concerned this is perhaps their main aspect.

Secretary Kissinger: Brutality?

Prime Minister Chou: But as for their opponents, things will be complicated. For instance, it will not be so easy for the Western European countries to share their common view.

Secretary Kissinger: Of the three major components that I mentioned, the West Europeans are the weakest link in terms of their understanding. But on the other hand, they are also the most difficult area for the Soviet Union to attack. So they are trying to undermine them by such measures as the European Security Conference and other negotiations. And what the Prime Minister has to understand is that if in these efforts we keep slightly to the left of the West Europeans, this is a means to prevent them from going further because then they will be afraid we will make a separate arrangement with the Soviet Union and that will worry them sufficiently so that they start thinking about their own defense.

Prime Minister Chou: You also mentioned this point the day before yesterday and also yesterday. But as for this point, the people would not be able to comprehend it.

Secretary Kissinger: I admit to you, Mr. Prime Minister, that this is the great danger in the present course. If at the same time we do two things, if we insist that the discussions are very detailed so that they cannot have many symbolic successes, and if secondly, we resist brutally whenever there is the slightest military

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threat, that danger can be reduced if not eliminated. I forgot, of course, to mention Japan which is a very crucial one.

Prime Minister Chou: Although it is crucial, the reaction would not be as quick as the European countries.

Secretary Kissinger: No. If they are not submitted to too many temptations by having too many pressures put on them from too many sides, I think they can be kept on their present course. I think you and we have acted wisely in this direction.

Prime Minister Chou: Because it is easier than dealing with the Western European countries.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. They are a tougher people. And then, of course, we have to build this southern axis through the Near East.

Prime Minister Chou: It seems you will have to make a very great effort towards this end. It is not easy to do that.

Secretary Kissinger: No, but we are prepared to do more with Turkey as soon as its governmental crisis is overcome.

Prime Minister Chou: So the crisis is not yet over?

Secretary Kissinger: They still don't have a firm government. And they did not behave very strongly during during the Middle East crisis. They permitted Soviet airplanes to fly over their territory.

Prime Minister Chou: It is said so. Is that bridge across the strait built by you?

Secretary Kissinger: It is now open -- over the Bosphorus -- it was opened on October 3. I don't know whether it was built by us. I don't know.

Prime Minister Chou: I learned of it from the television.

Secretary Kissinger: Did it say so?

Prime Minister Chou: It did not say so, but perhaps with your help.

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Secretary Kissinger: I don't know. I would not be surprised. I don't have the same attention for detail as you, Mr. Prime Minister. But I would suspect so. We will find out overnight.

Prime Minister Chou: Of the four fleets owned by the Soviet Union, three are in the Mediterranean.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes and a part of the Atlantic Fleet came in during the crisis. They had over one hundred ships in the Mediterranean at the height of the crisis. At one point they had over 103. They are now withdrawing them.

Prime Minister Chou: It is difficult for them to move about because they are separated from each other. Not linked together.

Secretary Kissinger: The Russian fleet is the only fleet in modern history that has ever surrendered. It surrendered to the Japanese in 1903.

Prime Minister Chou: The war was started in 1904.

Secretary Kissinger: But they surrendered in 1903 because they had to come around from St. Petersburg. They first sank some British fighting vessels, thinking the Japanese had come into the English Channel to stop them. They came all the way around the world.

Prime Minister Chou: From the Cape of Good Hope.

Secretary Kissinger: What today is Vietnam, and steamed straight into a Japanese trap. The Japanese were waiting there.

Prime Minister Chou: You know that the Japanese made a film for the feats he performed in the war. In the film they slandered Lenin. Upon seeing the film, the Soviets were quiet indifferent. They also praised the Russian admiral that surrendered. And the Soviets seemed very pleased.

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Secretary Kissinger: He was the one who attacked us.

Prime Minister Chou: Togo also appeared in that film. In that film they slandered Lenin, saying he bought ammunition in Europe in order to carry out the uprising of 1905 to tie down the Russian Emperor. It was also said in the film that Lenin helped the Japanese to get information. In that way the Japanese Navy gave money to Lenin to buy ammunition. Out of that Lenin staged the uprisings of 1905 in Moscow.

Secretary Kissinger: It was not staged by Lenin to begin with.

Prime Minister Chou: But Lenin had something to do with it.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. He took part, but he was not the principal.

Prime Minister Chou: It was just a slander by the Japanese, but the present Soviet authorities should stay apathetic about it and should have accepted it. Actually it was sheer slander. And the Soviets should have accepted it as something very queer.

Secretary Kissinger: The impression of our Navy people is that the Soviet Navy lacks a great deal of experience, from observing their maneuvering and their reaction to our action.

Prime Minister Chou: You have the experience of the Carribean Sea.

Secretary Kissinger: And many other experiences.

Prime Minister Chou: They deliberately carried out many demonstrated actions here in the Far East. Their Far Eastern fleet deliberately carried out many actions here in order to tie down your Seventh Fleet. And they also deliberately passed through the S. Straits to the middle section of the Pacific to Midway Island and Guam to make military operations there. After your fleet went there, they also left the place.

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Secretary Kissinger: Our impression is that they could not stand up to our fleet on the open sea.

Prime Minister Chou: And sometimes their planes will circle around that area. But your Ambassador is familiar with this fact.

Secretary Kissinger: I know the time they went through these straits. But we never make our fleet movement depend on what they do.

Prime Minister Chou: But sometimes you will have to make some reactions and to make some movements.

Secretary Kissinger: We did it when they tried to build a submarine base in Cuba. Then we took strong action in 1970. We put a destroyer in the mouth of that harbor and we publicly reaffirmed what President Kennedy had said about the Cuban crisis, and then they pulled out their submarine support.

Prime Minister Chou: So much for their opponents. That is, they posed a threat to Western European countries and just now you added Japan. And now their focus of contention is in the Middle East. Just what you mentioned just now, the period for the contention will be very short but will last for a period of time. I hope that in this case you would not spend such a long time as four and a half years as you settled the Vietnam question.

Secretary Kissinger: No. It is a different problem. In Vietnam we were directly involved.

Prime Minister Chou: The direct involvement, of course, is one of the reasons, but that was left over. It was left over by your predecessor. But you yourself had made some mistakes. Perhaps you would not agree to what I say. I would not say it very straightforwardly because we understand this possibility. It is inevitable that human beings will make mistakes.

Secretary Kissinger: We may have. I think if the North Vietnamese had proposed the settlement that we achieved

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in the end in the first year we would have accepted it at any point. Our difficulty was that the North Vietnamese always asked us to overthrow a friendly government and that we could not do. That was the one thing I have always told you, Mr. Prime Minister, that it was a point of honor with us.

Prime Minister Chou: This question again is left over historically. The responsibility should not remain entirely on your present Administration.

Secretary Kissinger: This problem is easier from one point of view and more difficult from another. It is easier because no one is asking us to destroy a friend government. But now all parties accept the existence of Israel which is essential for us too.

Prime Minister Chou: I think that it would not be so quick that all parties would recognize the existence of Israel.

Secretary Kissinger: All parties to which I have talked accept the existence of Israel.

Prime Minister Chou: But the party with which you have discussions, the number is not so big. You think so. It is not so easy. While the fighting was going on, there was an illwind of break in diplomatic relations with Israel on the part of African countries. This was part of a just voice on the part of the Africans, and you cannot say they are not correct. Because you cannot expect everyone to be like us who have combined principles with realities. We objected to the establishment of Israel to start with. Now the population of Israel has reached 2.5 million and as we know perhaps reached 3 million -- can you drive them to the sea? No. So when your press people ask me about it, I answer them, "of course not." I ask them how can there be any strength in things like that in the world. That is why one is bound to find some way to settle this question. Would that be a reason to have the Palestinians driven out? This question should also be settled.

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Secretary Kissinger: I agree this question should be handled.

Prime Minister Chou: It would not be fair if this question would not be settled at the same time. Only when these two questions are settled can there be any co-existence, and a peace to be spoken of. Otherwise, there would be no co-existence. This is why that we agree to your having direct dealings with the Arab States. This is just a first step. But I think, although the first step has been taken, the journey will be even longer than the journey you traveled when you first came to China to prepare for the visit of President Nixon. Because it only took half a year for your President to come for a visit to China.

Secretary Kissinger: I think it will take more than a half a year but not half a year to show progress. We can show progress in less than half a year.

 Prime Minister Chou: There might be some progress, but it is not so easy to settle the question because it is very complex.

Secretary Kissinger: The most difficult is Jerusalem. We can settle the Palestinian question. We had some discussion with Sadat and even with the Palestinians. The question is not easy, but the issue regarding Jerusalem is very hard.


Prime Minister Chou: Is it that there is some blind faith in the fact? It seems that the problem of Jerusalem is even harder than the question of Taiwan.

Secretary Kissinger: The question of Taiwan, I think -- the nature of its solution is obvious. It is only a question of timing.

Prime Minister Chou: Jerusalem.

Secretary Kissinger: Jerusalem. The nature is not obvious, because both sides consider it a holy city.

Prime Minister Chou: Would it not be better if this city would be shared by both sides?

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Secretary Kissinger:

That is my solution, but I can find no one to agree with me. I once proposed this to the Israelis. And once I thought I had agreement from the Israelis to give up the three mosques on the hill looking toward Israel, but it turned out the Israelis would not agree to give up one hill and one street because they said it was a holy place.

Prime Minister Chou:

That is a kind of superstition. Well, we will not dwell upon this in detail, but anyway, I think the Middle East is not an easy thing to settle.

Secretary Kissinger:

I know. It has frontiers, Palestinians, Jerusalem. They all have to be settled simultaneously, except Jerusalem.

Prime Minister Chou:

I hope you won't spend another three years and a half in order to settle this question.

Secretary Kissinger:

That is why I think there should be an initial withdrawal of Israeli forces in order to give the Arabs some hope and courage.

Prime Minister Chou:

Besides you have also to meet with your domestic difficulties. And only you as the Secretary of State will show the responsibility to settle these questions. Just now we discussed the question of the Soviet expansionism in the world. Actually, there is consensus between the expansion and the old expansionism. Some of your press people asked me if it is possible for you to go back to isolationism. I told them it was absolutely impossible, but they did not believe me. I think the times are different. Although people might talk about it as a congress, the real politics would not be like that.

Secretary Kissinger:

I agree that it is objectively impossible, but I do not agree that it is subjectively inconceivable.

Prime Minister Chou:

Although some people might think of it that way, actually they would not be able to realize it. If they should become a president themselves they would have to pursue your present policies.

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Secretary Kissinger:

The danger is that someone may attempt to pursue an isolationism policy and thereby permit expansion of other countries and by the time he realizes what the dangers are he may have paid a very heavy price. I think the probability is that the policy we are now pursuing -- in these main outlines, not necessarily in its tactics which are complex -- will be pursued in the future.

Prime Minister Chou:

It would not do for you not to contract it. What I say is the policy you are pursuing now is not an isolation policy, but you have contracted yourself a bit, retracted yourself a bit on certain questions in order to concentrate on settling the main questions. Your government had overstretched itself.

Secretary Kissinger:

I agree.

Prime Minister Chou:

You spent a lot of money and a lot of energy but the question had not been solved. If you would ask us as revolutionaries, of course, we would say we agree with your spreading yourself out. From a point of a revolutionary, we would be in favor of your spreading yourself out to be loose and vulnerable. But since now we have come together yourself and we are discussing some realistic and practical questions, we must talk about politics.

Secretary Kissinger:

It was partly inexperience and partly the weakness of every other country.

Prime Minister Chou:

There are so many countries -- would you take care of them all? Did you ever expect that there would be a student movement in Bangkok? Does the CIA learn about it beforehand?

Secretary Kissinger:

If Dulles had been more polite in 1954 he could have learned a lot.

Prime Minister Chou:

It was impossible for him to do so because the developments of things are sometimes independent of human will.

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Let's do some preparation because Chairman Mao has invited you to go there. Mr. Lord can come too.

Secretary Kissinger: Can I take Ambassador Bruce, as well?

Prime Minister Chou: I thought you would bring Mr. Lord along because of your habits. I did not ask.

Secretary Kissinger: If it is difficult...

Prime Minister Chou: We will ask. (Miss Wang goes out to inquire.) Perhaps we should call the attention to Mr. Jenkins that, according to news from sources of Chaing Kai-shek the guided missile ship OKLAHOMA CITY... Do you have such a guided missile cruiser?

Secretary Kissinger: All cruisers are named after states.

Ambassador Ingersoll: It is the flagship of the Seventh Fleet.

Prime Minister Chou: At 1:37 this afternoon, the cruiser had approached an island near the Taiwan Straits. It passed through the Taiwan Straits. It was only about 25 kilometers from our territory.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, there is no defense against stupidity. I cannot watch every cruiser in the American Navy. I tell you the truth, Mr. Prime Minister, I ordered every airplane to stop flying near your territory. I would have thought that when one ordered airplanes not to fly that they would have thought the cruisers should not go either.

Prime Minister Chou: It is nothing very particular. Only they are nearing our territorial waters. I did not pay much attention to that.

Secretary Kissinger: It should not happen at anytime this close, and it should not happen while I am in China under any circumstances.

Prime Minister Chou: They have intruded into our territory by mistake. Just tell them and ask them to leave.

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Secretary Kissinger: I will take care of it tonight. Wherever they are I will move them away. If they can tell the difference between left and right, they will move away.

(The Chinese side then confirmed that Ambassador Bruce was also invited to see the Chairman.)

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HAS BEEN RESISTING THIS ACTION BUT THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT IT MAY BE FORCED TO ACT AS FUEL LEVELS DROP. KISSINGER HAS ALWAYS BELIEVED IN LINKAGE, THE INTER-LOCKING NATURE OF WORLD DIPLOMACY. DURING HIS STAY IN JAPAN HE SEES LINKAGE ENSHRINED INTO A POLICY OF IMPOSED AND RELUCTANT EXPEDIENCY. OIL, OIL FOR THE LAMPS OF JAPAN.

2. BRUCE DUNNING--CBS-RADIO FROM TOKYO: THE MAN MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR KEEPING JAPAN STOCKED WITH OIL, TRADE MINISTER NAKASONE, RUSHED FROM A MEETING WITH HENRY KISSINGER TO A SESSION A HALF HOUR OR SO LATER WITH THE OTHER JAPANESE LEADERS KISSINGER HAS MET, PM TANAKA, FM OHIRA, FINANCE MINISTER AICHI, AND HAVING FAILED TO GET ANYTHING MORE CONCRETE THAN CAUTIOUS HOPE FOR ME PEACE FROM KISSINGER THEY THRASHED OUT THE OPENING ROUND IN WHAT MAY BE A LONG-RUNNING AUSTERITY PROGRAM FOR OIL.

3. HERBERT KAPLOW--ABC-TV - EVENING NEWS FROM TOKYO: THE LAST NIGHT AND ANOTHER BANQUET, THIS TIME THE VISITOR HIRED THE HALL. KISSINGER THE HOST, CHOU THE RANKING GUEST OF HONOR. COMMENTS FROM KISSINGER, SOME WONDERED WHETHER WATERGATE WAS HIS THOUGHT, OFFICIALS LATER SAID IT WAS NOT.

KISSINGER: QTE LET ME THANK YOU ON BEHALF OF ALL OF OUR COLLEAGUES FOR THE WARMTH OF OUR RECEPTION AND FOR THE WORK YOU ENABLED US TO DO HERE AND TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN OUR RELATIONSHIPS WILL BE CONTINUED IN THE YEARS AHEAD, WHATEVER HAPPENS IN THE FUTURE AND WHATEVER THE ADMINISTRATION. UNQTE

THEN THE ROUNDELAY OF TOASTS. A JOINT COMMUNIQUE TODAY SAID THE LEADERS AGREED TO EXPAND TRADE AND CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC AND JOURNALISTIC EXCHANGES AND TO EXPAND THEIR DIPLOMATIC LIAISON OFFICES IN EACH OTHER'S CAPITAL. THERE ALSO WAS THE SUGGESTION THAT MAO AND CHOU WERE UNCLASSIFIED

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MODERATING THEIR DEMANDS THAT THE US REJECT TAIWAN BEFORE PEKING WOULD AGREE TO FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON. THE FINAL DAY ALSO SAW KISSINGER VISITING A COMMUNE JUST OUTSIDE PEKING...AND NOW KISSINGER IS HERE IN JAPAN TELLING ITS LEADERS ABOUT HIS RECENT VISIT TO CHINA AND ABOUT SOME OF THOSE OTHER COUNTRIES HE JUST VISITED IN WHICH JAPAN HAS SUCH DEEP AND VITAL INTERESTS. RUSH

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STATE FOR EAP/CM WILLIAMS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE H.W.), CH, US
SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA: SUGGESTIONS
REGARDING WHAT WE AND THE CHINESE HOPE TO
ACCOMPLISH

1. ~~REDACTED~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF A SERIES OF EMBASSY
ASSESSMENTS TRANSMITTED TO ASSIST WASHINGTON
PREPARATIONS FOR PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISIT TO CHINA.

3. THE EMBASSY SUBMITS THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS
REGARDING WHAT WE AND THE CHINESE HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH
DURING THE PRESIDENT'S FEBRUARY 25-27 VISIT TO CHINA.
THE MATERIAL IS BROKEN OUT INTO GENERAL GOALS AND
SPECIFIC TOPICS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL AND
BILATERAL ISSUES:

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I. A. WHAT THE U.S. WANTS FROM THE VISIT

-- PROVIDE SYMBOLISM OF CONTINUITY IN A HEALTHY,

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STILL DEVELOPING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP; REINFORCE POSITIVE MOMENTUM AS THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION BEGINS, SETTING THE TONE AND FRAMEWORK FOR THE AGENDA OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS..

---DEEPEN PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH OLDER AND YOUNGER GENERATION OF CHINA'S LEADERS DURING POLITICAL SUCCESSION PHASE IN CHINA.

-- DEMONSTRATE CONTINUING HIGH PROFILE OF U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS, EVEN AS PRC MOVES FINALLY TO "NORMALIZE" RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WITH MID-MAY SUMMIT.

--- SHARE ASSESSMENTS AT HIGHEST LEVEL OF EACH SIDE'S VIEW OF ITS OWN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS.

-- LAUNCH A MORE CONCRETE DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE WITH THE CHINESE COVERING PRC PARTICIPATION IN BALLISTIC MISSILE, CHEMICAL AND NON-PROLIFERATION AREAS..

-- HIGHLIGHT BILATERAL ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL ACHIEVEMENTS AS CONCRETE MANIFESTATIONS OF OUR STRENGTHENING TIES.

-- SET FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLUTION OF BILATERAL ECON/COMMERCIAL PROBLEMS AT A TIME CHINA IS ASSUMING AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC

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COMMUNITY.

I. B. SPECIFIC U.S. OBJECTIVES/POINTS TO RAISE:

1) INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

A) THE SOVIET UNION

-- OBTAIN CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE DIRECTION OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

-- OBTAIN CHINESE ASSURANCES THAT SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS WILL NOT UPSET THE STRATEGIC BALANCE, I.E., THAT THE EMERGING SINO-SOVIET DIALOGUE WILL

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&Q" UNDERCUT U.S. INTERESTS.

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-- SHARE WITH CHINESE OUR ASSESSMENT OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS; ASSURE CHINESE THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS WILL NOT AFFECT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PRC.

---ELICIT CHINESE ASSESSMENTS OF GORBACHEV'S POSITION, LIKELY SOVIET DIRECTION IN FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC REFORMS IN UPCOMING YEARS.

B) BALLISTIC MISSILES

--SEEK REAFFIRMATION OF CHINESE ASSURANCES THAT PRC WILL NOT SELL INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES TO COUNTRIES OTHER THAN SAUDI ARABIA. MENTION OUR IMMEDIATE CONCERN ABOUT PAKISTAN.

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STATE FOR EAP/CM WILLIAMS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, ECON, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE H.W.), CH, US

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA: SUGGESTIONS

--SEEK, AS POSSIBLE, AN EXPLICIT CHINESE STATEMENT THAT THESE ASSURANCES APPLY TO ALL MISSILES WITH A RANGE GREATER THAN 300KMS.

--URGE CHINESE ASSOCIATION WITH MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO CONTAIN MISSILE PROLIFERATION.

C) ARMS CONTROL

--SUGGEST INTENSIFICATION OF OUR ONGOING DIALOGUE ON ARMS CONTROL THROUGH THE ANNUAL ACDA-MFA TALKS AND THE NEWLY INITIATED POLITICO-MILITARY TALKS.

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--SEEK AGREEMENT ON CONTINUED EXCELLENT COOPERATION WITH CHINA IN GENEVA IN BRINGING A COMPREHENSIVE, VERIFIABLE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS INTO BEING WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

D) NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

--DISCUSS OUR ONGOING CONCERNS REGARDING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WITH THE ACCENT ON SOUTH ASIA.

--REPEAT OUR CONCERN AND ASK FOR ASSURANCES CONCERNING CHINA'S INTENTIONS RE PAKISTAN IN THE NUCLEAR AREAS.

E. AFGHANISTAN

--DESCRIBE THE KEY ROLE SINO-AMERICAN COOPERATION PLAYED IN FORCING SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN.

--SEEK AUTHORITATIVE CHINESE VIEWS ON WHAT CAN BE DONE TO ENSURE AFGHAN STABILITY, INDEPENDENCE, NEUTRALITY AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FOLLOWING SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

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F. CAMBODIA

--AGREE ON THE NEED FOR CONTINUED COOPERATION AND CLOSE CONSULTATION IN ACHIEVING SHARED GOALS IN CAMBODIA AS THE MULTILATERAL DIPLOMATIC PROCESS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE BECOMES INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AND COMPLEX.

--REITERATE THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT NORMALIZE

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RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM UNTIL ALL VIETNAMESE TROOPS HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM CAMBODIA IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

--ELICIT AUTHORITATIVE CHINESE VIEWS ON THE PROGRESS OF THEIR TALKS WITH THE VIETNAMESE AND THE SOVIETS ON CAMBODIA, INCLUDING CLARIFICATION OF WHEN CHINA WILL BEGIN REDUCING AID TO THE KHMER ROUGE.

--SEEK SPECIFIC CHINESE ASSURANCES THAT, IN THE EVENT OF A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT, CHINA WOULD ENSURE THAT THE WORST OF THE KHMER ROUGE LEADERS WILL NOT REMAIN IN CAMBODIA.

--PROJECT U.S. SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK, INCLUDING POSSIBLY BY ARRANGING A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND SIHANOUK.

--PRESS THE CHINESE ON THEIR VIEWS OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE AND OTHER MEASURES TO PREVENT KHMER ROUGE DOMINATION.

G. KOREA

-- DEEPEN DIALOGUE WITH SENIOR CHINESE LEADERS IN SHARED EFFORT TO DRAW PYONGYANG OUT OF ISOLATION AND PROMOTE CONTINUED PROGRESS IN THE ONGOING NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE.

-- EXPRESS SATISFACTION WITH CHINA'S INCREASED CONTACT WITH SOUTH KOREA.

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SECTION 03 OF 06 BEIJING 03421

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR STEVE STUDDERT AND JOHN KELLER

STATE FOR A/TSS JEANNIE BULL

STATE FOR EAP/CM WILLIAMS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, ECON, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE H.W.), CH, US

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA: SUGGESTIONS

-- THANK THE CHINESE FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE IN ARRANGING
OUR TWO MEETINGS IN BEIJING WITH DPRK EMBASSY OFFICIALS.

H. JAPAN

-- NOTE THAT THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE PROVIDES TOKYO
WITH A SENSE OF SECURITY WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO
PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION.

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-- EMPHASIZE US-JAPAN MILITARY COOPERATION IS
GEARED STRICTLY TOWARD JAPAN'S SELF-DEFENSE;
WHILE WE BELIEVE JAPAN COULD AND SHOULD DO MORE
IN TERMS OF SHOULDERING MORE OF ITS SELF-DEFENSE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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BURDEN, BOTH WE AND JAPANESE ARE AGAINST A MILITARY
POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY FOR JAPAN.

I. MIDDLE EAST

--EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR CHINA'S EFFORTS IN URGING
PLO TO PLAY MORE CONSTRUCTIVE AND POSITIVE ROLE
IN PEACE PROCESS.

--WELCOME CHINA'S RECENT DECISION TO MAINTAIN
DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL THROUGH THE PRC UN MISSION IN
NEW YORK.

--ENCOURAGE CHINA TO CONTINUE IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH
ISRAEL, NOTING THAT THIS IS ESSENTIAL IF CHINA WISHES
TO BE RELEVANT TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS.

J. SOUTH ASIA

-- SHARE ASSESSMENTS OF TRENDS IN THE SUBCONTINENT.

-- URGE CHINESE INPUT INTO ACCELERATING INDO-PAK
NORMALIZATION, INCLUDING THROUGH SINO-INDIAN
NORMALIZATION, AND THROUGH FOREBEARANCE IN
CHINESE NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN AND MISSILE
SALES IN THE REGION.

-- PROBE CHINESE VIEWS ON HOW WE COULD COOPERATE TO
DISCOURAGE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH
ASIA.

K. UNITED NATIONS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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--NOTE EXCELLENT COOPERATION WITH CHINA DURING MOST
RECENT UNGA ON HIGH PRIORITY ISSUES, INCLUDING: RETURN

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OF THE KOREA ISSUE TO THE UNGA AGENDA, MAKING POSSIBLE THE FIRST-EVER SPEECH TO THE GA BY A SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENT, THE SUCCESSFUL ACHIEVEMENT OF A CEASEFIRE IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, AGREEMENT ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA AND NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE, AND LIMITATION OF THE SIZE AND COST OF UNTAG.

--NOTE DIFFERENCES STILL REMAIN; FOR EXAMPLE, WE WERE VERY DISAPPOINTED BY CHINESE SUPPORT OF NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT
CRITICISM OF OUR DOWNING OF LIBYAN
JETS IN SELF-DEFENSE OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

2) BILATERAL ISSUES

A) ECONOMIC REFORM

-- OBTAIN ASSESSMENT FROM CHINA'S LEADERS OF NATURE, PACE AND PROGNOSIS OF ECONOMIC REFORM

-- SUPPORT FURTHER REFORMS AND POINT OUT THAT THEY ARE NECESSARY AND CONSISTENT WITH CHINA'S ASSUMING LARGER WORLD ECONOMIC ROLE.

B) GATT

--REITERATE STRONG SUPPORT FOR CHINA'S ACCESSION TO GATT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH CHINA ACCEPTS AND IMPLEMENTS THE RESPONSIBILITIES SUCH MEMBERSHIP

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EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR STEVE STUDDERT AND JOHN KELLER

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE H.W.), CH, US
SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA: SUGGESTIONS

ENTAILS.

C) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

--STRESS CONCERN THAT THIS ISSUE IF NOT ADDRESSED
COULD BECOME A BILATERAL POLITICAL AS WELL AS
ECONOMIC SOURCE OF FRICTION. TRADE BILL SANCTIONS
MAY RESULT IF CHINA DOES NOT DEVELOP ADEQUATE IPR
PROTECTION LEGISLATION AND PROPER ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISM. WE STAND PREPARED TO WORK EVEN MORE
CLOSELY WITH CHINA TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE.

D) TRADE AND INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT

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--HIGHLIGHT DRAMATIC RISE IN BILATERAL TRADE AND
U.S. INVESTMENT IN CHINA IN 1988 AS INDICATIVE OF
OUR STRENGTHENED TIES.

--STRESS IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING GROWING NUMBER OF
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DISPUTES TO AVOID DAMAGING
CHINA'S ATTRACTIVENESS TO THE U.S. BUSINESS

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COMMUNITY. (SOME ILLUSTRATIVE CASES MAY BE RAISED.)

E) CIVIL AVIATION

--EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR POSITIVE CONCLUSION TO CURRENT CIVAIR AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

--NOTE OUR READINESS TO WORK WITH CHINA TO ENHANCE AVIATION SECURITY AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL.

F) DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

--ENCOURAGE CONTINUED CONTACT AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE U.S. AND CHINA.

--ENCOURAGE CHINA'S DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT TO BECOME MORE AWARE OF CHINA'S RESPONSIBILITIES AS A REGIONAL AND WORLD ACTOR, PARTICULARLY IN SALES OF ARMS, MISSILES, CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPON COMPONENTS.

G) HUMAN RIGHTS/TIBET

--NOTE THAT CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WILL CONTINUE TO BE A FACTOR IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND WILL INFLUENCE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

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--MAKE CLEAR TO THE CHINESE THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO WATCH CAREFULLY SUCH ISSUES AS TREATMENT OF PRISONERS IN TIBET, FAMILY PLANNING PRACTICES, AND THE TREATMENT OF DISSIDENTS.

--SEEK CHINESE AGREEMENT TO A REGULAR CHANNEL FOR INFORMATION ON TIBETAN PRISONERS.

--SEEK MORE CONCRETE ASSURANCES ON PRESS ACCESS TO TIBET.

--ELICIT CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF THE PANCHEN LAMA AND PROSPECTS FOR PRC-DALAI LAMA TALKS.

H) EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

--ENCOURAGE FURTHER EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENTAL AND

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NON-GOVERNMENTAL EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL AND ATHLETIC
EXCHANGES.

--EXPRESS U.S. SATISFACTION WITH AGREEMENT ON
ARRIVAL THIS YEAR OF THE FIRST PEACE CORPS CONTINGENT.

I) LAW ENFORCEMENT

--ENCOURAGE GREATER BILATERAL EXCHANGE IN ORDER TO
ENHANCE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF CREATING A CADRE OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS WHO WILL BE ADVOCATES
FOR POSITIVE CHANGE WITHIN THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM.

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STATE FOR EAP/CM WILLIAMS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, ECON, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE H.W.), CH, US

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA: SUGGESTIONS

--PROPOSE THAT A VISIT BY THE DEA ADMINISTRATOR BE
RESCHEDULED FOR 1989.

--PROPOSE THAT OUR AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM VISIT BEIJING IN THE NEAR FUTURE
TO DISCUSS JOINT EFFORTS TO TRACK AND
COUNTER REGIONAL AND GLOBAL TERRORISM.

II. A. WHAT THE CHINESE HOPE TO GAIN FROM THE
PRESIDENTIAL VISIT

-- CONFIRM HEALTHY AND IMPROVING SINO-AMERICAN

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RELATIONS FOR U.S., PRC AND WORLD AUDIENCE.

-- BRING TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S ATTENTION CHINA'S
VIEWS AND BILATERAL COMPLAINTS WHILE THE NEW TEAM
IS STILL FORMULATING ITS FOREIGN POLICY.

-- PROVIDE BALANCE AND POSSIBLY SOME LEVERAGE
VIS-A-VIS THE PARADE OF SOVIETS AND VIETNAMESE WHO
WILL BE COMING TO BEIJING DURING THE NEXT FEW
MONTHS.

-- OBTAIN U.S. ASSESSMENT OF US-SOVIET TIES, INTERNAL
SOVIET SITUATION.

--PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR TOP LEADERS OF BOTH
COUNTRIES TO COORDINATE ON FAST-BREAKING DEVELOPMENTS
IN CAMBODIA, KOREA AND AFGHANISTAN. ENCOURAGE US-
DPRK TIES, SEEK REAFFIRMATION OF TOUGH U.S. STAND
ON CAMBODIA.

-- EASING OF U.S. RESTRICTION REGARDING STRATEGIC
TRADE CONTROLS, IMPORT QUOTAS, ANTI-DUMPING
PROVISIONS, LACK OF UNCONDITIONAL MFN AND GSP, AND
U.S. FIVE POINTS ON GATT ACCESSION.

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-- STRESS STRONGLY-HELD BELIEF THAT U.S., DESPITE STATEMENTS CITING CHINA AS A FRIENDLY COUNTRY DOES NOT TREAT CHINA, ACCORDINGLY IN BILATERAL ECONOMIC TIES.

-- AT OUTSET OF BUSH ADMINISTRATION, GET AN AUTHORITATIVE U.S. STATEMENT OF "ONE CHINA" POLICY AND AMERICAN DISSOCIATION FROM PRO-INDEPENDENCE

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SENTIMENT ON TAIWAN.

II. B. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES/POINTS THAT THE CHINESE MAY RAISE:

1) INTERNATIONAL

THE SOVIET UNION

-- REASSURE U.S. IN GENERAL TERMS THAT RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE CERTAIN LIMITS AND WILL NOT AFFECT RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

-- PROVIDE ASSESSMENT OF UPCOMING SINO-SOVIET SUMMIT.

-- ELICIT U.S. IMPRESSIONS ON WHERE AND HOW FAST WE ARE GOING WITH THE SOVIETS IN US-SOVIET TIES, INCLUDING IN DISARMAMENT AREAS, U.S. ANALYSES OF GORBACHEV'S PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS.

CAMBODIA

-- SEEK ASSURANCES THAT U.S. INTENDS TO KEEP UP ITS PRESSURE ON VIETNAM TO WITHDRAW FROM CAMBODIA. DRAW THE U.S. INTO THE PRC EFFORT TO UNDERCUT VN-SOVIET EFFORT TO LEGITIMIZE HUN SEN REGIME.

-- DRIVE HOME THAT CHINESE GOALS IN CAMBODIA HAVE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE H.W.), CH, US
SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA: SUGGESTIONS

NOT CHANGED, DESPITE RECENT PROGRESS IN SINO-SOVIET
RELATIONS AND SOME MOVEMENT IN SINO-VIETNAMESE
RELATIONS.

-- MAINTAIN AMBIGUITY ON CHINESE INTENTIONS REGARDING
DISPOSITION OF THE KHMER ROUGE LEADERSHIP.

2) BILATERAL

A) TAIWAN

-- PROBE FOR INDICATIONS THAT THE NEW BUSH ADMINISTRATION

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WILL BE RECEPTIVE TO PRC PRESSURES AIMED AT DISASSOCI-
ATING THE U.S. FROM TAIWAN.

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-- POSSIBLY LAY DOWN MARKER OF CONTINUED DISPLEASURE
WITH QUANTITY, QUALITY AND RATE OF REDUCTION OF U.S.
ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.

-- ELICIT A U.S. STATEMENT OF OPPOSITION TO PRO-
INDEPENDENCE SENTIMENT ON TAIWAN.

-- REITERATE THAT U.S. SHOULD PLAY A ROLE IN
ENCOURAGING KMT TO ENGAGE IN DIRECT TALKS WITH THE
CCP.

-- ENCOURAGE U.S. OPPOSITION TO TAIWAN'S EFFORTS TO
ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY, E.G., GATT
ENTRY BEFORE CHINA.

B) "INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS":

-- REGISTER CONCERN WITH U.S. ACTIONS PERCEIVED AS
INTERFERENCE IN PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

-- SEEK, IF POSSIBLE, THE FOLLOWING FROM U.S.:

- REAFFIRMATION OF U.S. RECOGNITION OF
- CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER TIBET
- PLEDGE TO SUPPORT THE NEW UNFPA PROGRAM
- FOR CHINA
- ADMINISTRATION COMMITMENT TO RESTRAIN FROM
- COMMENT ON CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS
-

C) EXPORT CONTROLS

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--PRESS FOR MAJOR RELAXATION OF U.S. AND
COCOM STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS ON CHINA.

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D) GATT

-- SEEK U.S. SUPPORT FOR PRC'S SPEEDY GATT ENTRY WITHQ
ONLY PREREQUISITE BEING TARIFF REDUCTIONS.

-- REQUEST UNCONDITIONAL MFN AND GSP FOLLOWING GATT
ENTRY.

E) BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY

-- PRESS FOR U.S. TO FOLLOW JAPAN'S EXAMPLE LAST YEAR
IN SIGNING AN INVESTMENT TREATY.

F) SOFT LOANS

-- STRESS THAT U.S. FOLLOW OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES'
LEAD IN THIS AREA.
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DECAPTIONED
EXDLS

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir
(1) Release () Excise () Deny (1) Declassify
Date 5/28/98 Exemption

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR LORD

FOR SECRETARY BAKER

ALSO PLEASE PASS TO NSC - GENERAL SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, CH, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)

SUBJECT: LOOKING FORWARD: YOUR RETURN TO CHINA

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.)

- LOOKING FORWARD: YOUR RETURN TO CHINA

2. SINCE YOU WERE LAST HERE THREE YEARS AGO, CHINA HAS
PROSPERED IN THE WORLD AND FLOUNDERED AT HOME. IT HAS
MOVED FROM BEING A REGIONAL POWER TO ONE WHOSE INFLUENCE
IS INCREASINGLY EVIDENT AROUND THE GLOBE. BUT ITS BOLD
DOMESTIC ODYSSEY IS AT LEAST TEMPORARILY BOGGED DOWN,
AND NO ONE -- INCLUDING THE LEADERS IN ZHONGNANHAI --
KNOWS WHETHER CHINA IS NAVIGATING ANOTHER OF ITS
INEVITABLE ROUGH PATCHES OR HAS RUN INTO A GREAT WALL.

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CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

3. THE CHINESE ARE PURSUING THE MOST SOPHISTICATED
FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY IN THE WORLD. FOR THE NEXT

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CENTURY THEIR GOAL IS TO RESTORE THE MIDDLE KINGDOM IN TERMS OF PRE-EMINENCE, THOUGH CLEARLY NOT IN TERMS OF SECLUSION. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THEY MUST FIRST PASS THROUGH DECADES OF VULNERABILITY UNTIL ECONOMIC STRENGTH CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO REAL MILITARY POWER AND POLITICAL CLOUT. DURING THIS PERIOD CHINESE DIPLOMACY IS THEREFOREGEARED TO SHAPING AN ENVIRONMENT WHICH ALLOWS THEM TO FOCUS THEIR ENERGIES AND RESOURCES ON MODERNIZATION. THE CENTRAL THEME IS INDEPENDENCE. THE PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS:

-- NURTURE A MULTIPOLAR WORLD. THIS HELPS TO MAINTAIN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL BALANCES AND CHECK POTENTIAL THREATS TO CHINESE SECURITY. BEIJING PLACES GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE EMERGING POWER CENTERS AROUND THE GLOBE WHICH DILUTE SUPERPOWER INFLUENCE. NEVERTHELESS THE UNITED STATES, THE FAR BARBARIAN, REMAINS THE CRUCIAL, THOUGH NOW UNACKNOWLEDGED, OFFSET TO NEAR BARBARIANS. THE LATTER INCLUDE THE FUTURE JAPAN AS WELL AS THE CURRENT SOVIET UNION, INDIA, AND VIETNAM.

-- REDUCE THREATS AROUND CHINA'S PERIPHERY. THIS INVOLVES THE SELECTIVE USE OF LIMITED RESOURCES, TOGETHER WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, TO DRIVE THE SOVIETS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN AND CONTAIN VIETNAMESE HEGEMONISM. IT ALSO FEATURES ACTIVE EFFORTS TO REDUCE TENSIONS WITH NEIGHBORS ---HIGHLIGHTED BY THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW AND THE SUMMIT WITH GORBACHEV;

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RAPPROCHEMENT WITH NEW DELHI; SUPPORT OF CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS; AND THE NEWLY RESUMED DIALOGUE WITH HANOI.

-- PROJECT GROWING PROWESS. CHINA LAUNCHES SATELLITES AND SELLS MISSILES. IT ASSERTS ITS CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA. THROUGH COUNTLESS EXCHANGES OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITS, TRADE, AND ARMS SALES IT EXPANDS ITS TIES IN VARIOUS REGIONS. IT IS MUCH MORE ACTIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

-- IDENTIFY WITH THE THIRD WORLD. THE CHINESE HAVE MODERATED THEIR OBNOXIOUS RHETORIC, BUT THEY INSTINCTIVELY SIDE WITH THIRD WORLD MAJORITIES ON ISSUES LIKE THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND A NEW WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER. (AT HOME SOME CHINESE CAN BE LESS CHARITABLE, AS THE RECENT BLOW-UPS WITH

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RESIDENT AFRICAN STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED.) GONE ARE ANY REFERENCES TO TACIT ALLIANCES WITH US AND OUR ALLIES. BUT THEY ARE EQUALLY EMPHATIC (LIKE THE SOVIETS) THAT THEIR WARMING RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW WILL NOT RETURN TO THE 1950'S.

-- PROMOTE NATIONAL UNITY. THUS THEIR AGREEMENTS ON HONG KONG AND MACAO, THEIR CONCILIATORY OFFENSIVE TOWARD TAIWAN, AND THEIR SHRILL DENUNCIATIONS OF THOSE WHO PROMOTE AN INDEPENDENT TIBET.

-- GAIN ASSISTANCE FOR MODERNIZATION. THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF ALL. THE UNITED STATES,

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EXDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR LORD

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FOR SECRETARY BAKER

ALSO PLEASE PASS TO NSC - GENERAL SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, CH, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)

SUBJECT: LOOKING FORWARD: YOUR RETURN TO CHINA

JAPAN, AND WESTERN EUROPE WILL REMAIN THE ESSENTIAL MARKETS AND PROVIDERS OF CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND MANAGEMENT. THE CHINESE TURN TO ANYONE, REGARDLESS OF IDEOLOGY, WHO CAN HELP THEM: ISRAEL FOR MILITARY TECHNOLOGY; SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN FOR TRADE AND INVESTMENT; IRAN, IRAQ AND VARIOUS UNSAVORY PARTNERS FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE. THEY PRESS THEIR CASE FORCEFULLY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GROUPS, SEEKING AID FROM BANKS AND ADMISSION TO THE GATT.

THE DOMESTIC SCENE

4. WHILE ENHANCING THEIR SECURITY AND PRESTIGE ABROAD,

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THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN STUMBLING AT HOME. ANY CHINESE WILL TELL YOU THEY ARE BETTER OFF THAN WHEN YOU WERE FIRST HERE. BUT MANY CHINESE WILL TELL YOU THEY ARE WORSE OFF THAN WHEN YOU WERE LAST HERE.

5. DURING YOUR SUCCESSIVE VISITS, YOU HAVE SEEN THE DRAMATIC PROGRESS THAT DENG'S REFORMS AND OPENING HAVE WROUGHT. FROM HUSHED STREETS AND SOMBER HUES TO TRAFFIC SNARLS AND BRIGHTLY CLAD PEDESTRIANS EXPLORING FREE MARKETS. FROM MUD HUTS TO BRICK HOUSES IN THE COUNTRY-SIDE WHERE PRODUCTION HAS DOUBLED AND INCOME HAS TRIPLED. FROM A HANDFUL OF REVOLUTIONARY BALLETS TO 120 MILLION TELEVISION SETS SHOWING MICKEY MOUSE IN PRIME TIME. WITHIN A STONE'S THROW OF CHAIRMAN MAO'S MAUSOLEUM SITS THE WORLD'S LARGEST KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN.

6. BUT WHAT HAVE YOU DONE TO US LATELY? ASK MANY OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE. SOARING INFLATION. SOURING CORRUPTION. IMPATIENT EXPECTATIONS, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE YOUNG, FED BY COMPARISON WITH TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA, LET ALONE JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES. DIVERGING INCOMES-- BETWEEN THE FAVORED COASTAL PROVINCES AND THE BLEAK INTERIOR; BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURS KEEPING AHEAD OF

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INFLATION AND THOSE ON FIXED INCOMES FALLING BEHIND. THE BARBER'S SCISSORS EARNS MORE THAN THE SURGEON'S SCAPEL. MANY PREFER THE "IRON RICE BOWL" OF GUARANTEED SECURITY TO THE UNCERTAINTIES OF GREATER FREEDOM AND HARDER WORK. SOME POINT OUT THAT IN THE 1950'S AT LEAST THERE WAS SOME IDEALISM AND A CARING FOR ONE ANOTHER. INTELLECTUALS AND DISSIDENTS CHAFE AT THE SLOW PACE OF GLASNOST IN CHINA. IN BOTH THE CITIES AND COUNTRYSIDE THERE IS GROWING CYNICISM OVER SHIFTING POLITICAL WINDS, STOP-AND-GO ECONOMIC POLICIES, "BACK

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DOOR" INFLUENCE, NEPOTISM AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS AND OUTRIGHT GRAFT.

7. THE DISCONTENT TARNISHES THE REPUTATION NOT ONLY OF PARTY CADRE AND GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRATS BUT EVEN THE HIGHEST LEADERS. THE COMMENTS AND THE RUMORS SPREAD: DENG IS LOSING HIS TOUCH AND IS INCREASINGLY IRASCIBLE, SHADES OF MAO'S FINAL YEARS. ZHAO, THE PROGRESSIVE REFORMER, IS LOSING GROUND -- AND POSSIBLY DENG'S FAVOR. LI PENG, AN ENGINEER, LACKS CHARISMA, MANAGERIAL SKILL AND VISION.

8. IT WOULD BE AS WRONG FOR US TO EXAGGERATE THIS MALAISE AS TO IGNORE IT. THE VERY COMPLAINING IS A SIGN OF PROGRESS: WHEN YOU SERVED HERE I SUSPECT FEW CHINESE DARED TO EXPRESS DISSATISFACTION ABOUT ANYTHING. FOR ALL THE PROBLEMS, THE ECONOMY HAS BEEN GROWING AT A TRULY IMPRESSIVE RATE AND MOST PEOPLE ARE LIVING MUCH BETTER. FOR EVERY STUDENT WHO COMPLAINS, THERE ARE HUNDREDS OF WARMER AND FATTER PEASANTS WATCHING TELEVISION. FOR EVERY INTELLECTUAL WHO BEMOANS HIS STATUS, THERE IS ANOTHER PUBLISHING BOLD IDEAS IN A NEW JOURNAL. THERE ARE BOUND TO BE SETBACKS AND DETOURS WHEN ONE TRIES TO MOVE A BILLION PEOPLE FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER AND FROM ONE CENTURY TO ANOTHER IN A LAND THAT IS ONE TENTH ARABLE AND THREE QUARTERS URBAN SPRAWL, MOUNTAINS, AND SAND. PERIODS OF RETRENCHMENT HAVE OCCURRED BEFORE. MOREOVER, THERE ARE NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE GENERAL PATH OF REFORM AND OPENING. NO ONE WANTS TO RETURN TO THE

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0867

SECTION 03 OF 10 BEIJING 03855

EXDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR LORD

FOR SECRETARY BAKER

ALSO PLEASE PASS TO NSC - GENERAL SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, CH, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)

SUBJECT: LOOKING FORWARD: YOUR RETURN TO CHINA

CULTURAL REVOLUTION. VERY FEW WISH TO REVERT TO
STALINIST CENTRAL PLANNING. (INDEED CHINESE LEADERS
ADVISE THIRD WORLD VISITORS TO AVOID THE SLOUGH
OF SOCIALISM.) THE DEBATES ARE MORE ABOUT PACE THAN
DIRECTION, MORE BETWEEN BEIJING AND THE PROVINCES THAN
AT THE CENTER. ONE SHOULD NEVER UNDERESTIMATE THE
RESILIENCE AND THE PLUCK OF THE TALENTED CHINESE
PEOPLE WHO HAVE PROVEN
THEMSELVES FROM SAN FRANCISCO

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TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, IN HONG KONG AND TAIWAN.

9. THUS YOU ARE COMING HERE AT A TIME WHEN THE CHINESE ARE BOTH ENJOYING CONSIDERABLE DIPLOMATIC ACHIEVEMENTS AND GRAPPLING WITH THE MOST SERIOUS DOMESTIC CHALLENGES

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SINCE DENG LAUNCHED HIS BOLD PROGRAMS TEN YEARS AGO. ON YOUR NEXT TRIP IT IS LIKELY THAT THE REINS OF POWER WILL HAVE FULLY SLIPPED FROM HIS GRASP. IT IS A VERY IMPORTANT TIME FOR YOU TO SKETCH THE AGENDA OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP -- WITH THE LONG MARCHERS LEAVING BEHIND THEIR LEGACY AND WITH THE NEXT GENERATION OF LEADERS WHO WILL DOMINATE THE COMING FOUR YEARS.

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

10. OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IS BROAD AND MATURING. ITS BREADTH REFLECTS THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH IN A WIDE RANGE OF FIELDS. WE HAVE MULTIPLIED CONSTITUENCIES ON BOTH SIDES. THIS HELPS US TO WEATHER DIFFICULT PERIODS, SUCH AS LAST YEAR WHEN CHINA'S MISSILE SALES TO IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA CAST A CHILL. ITS MATURITY MEANS THAT WE ARE SETTTLING DOWN TO A STEADIER VISION, AFTER WIDE HISTORICAL SWINGS FROM RED HERRINGS TO ROSE-COLORED GLASSES. IT ALSO MEANS THAT WE FACE FRESH PROBLEMS SPAWNED BY OUR VERY SUCCESS AND GROWING INTERACTION.

11. JUST SINCE YOUR 1985 TRIP OUR ANNUAL TRADE HAS MUSHROOMED FROM \$8 BILLION TO OVER \$14 BILLION IN 1988, A 40 PERCENT JUMP IN ONE YEAR ALONE. IN ADDITION TO INDUSTRIAL TRADE, THIS INCREASE INCLUDES A RESURGENCE OF OUR AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS, THANKS LARGELY TO SUBSIDIZED GRAIN SALES. WITH \$3.4 BILLION COMMITTED BY OUR BUSINESSMEN, WE ARE THE LARGEST OUTSIDER INVESTOR AFTER HONG KONG; AMERICAN PROJECTS ROSE FROM 400 TO 630 LAST YEAR, UP ALMOST 60 PERCENT. WE ARE NEGOTIATING AN EXTENSION OF THE LARGEST SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ACCORD THAT EITHER OF US HAS WITH ANY COUNTRY. LAST YEAR WE FORGED IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS ON TEXTILES,

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MARITIME ISSUES AND THE USE OF CHINESE ROCKETS TO

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LAUNCH OUR SATELLITES. WE HAVE BEGUN TO COOPERATE ON CONTROLLING THE FLOW OF DRUGS. WE BOTH SEEK TO EXPAND CIVIL AVIATION LINKS. AFTER A PAUSE INDUCED BY THE MISSILE CONTROVERSY, OUR MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IS POISED TO MOVE AHEAD WITH SEVERAL HIGH-LEVEL VISITS AND CAREFULLY CONTROLLED MILITARY SALES. EVERY DAY HUNDREDS OF ARTISTS, EXPERTS, AND TOURISTS CRISS-CROSS THE PACIFIC. THE CHINESE ARE ENTRUSTING TO OUR UNIVERSITIES AND OUR VALUES MANY OF THEIR FINEST MINDS-- OVER 40,000 HAVE ALREADY COME. THOUSANDS OF AMERICANS HAVE BEEN TEACHING AND STUDYING IN CHINA. THE AMERICAN IMPRINT ON CHINA'S FUTURE IS DEEP AND SPREADING. THIS SUMMER CHINA WILL BE THE FIRST COMMUNIST NATION EVER TO WELCOME PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS. CABINET AND WORKING LEVEL DELEGATIONS ARE ENRICHING OUR DIALOGUE ON A BROAD AGENDA OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES.

12. MOST OF THIS PROGRESS IS QUIET, NOT THE STUFF OF HEADLINES. INDEED POPULAR AND CONGRESSIONAL ATTENTION TENDS TO FOCUS ON SPECIFIC PROBLEMS RATHER THAN ON THE GENERALLY SOUND STATE OF OUR TIES. BUT THESE PROBLEMS ARE REAL, REQUIRING CAREFUL HANDLING AND MUTUAL SENSITIVITY SO AS TO INSULATE THEM FROM THE CORE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

13. TODAY WE FACE THREE BROAD CHALLENGES -- POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL. ALL OF THEM HAVE INTENSIFIED SINCE YOUR 1985 VISIT.
POLITICAL ADJUSTMENT

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TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0868

SECTION 04 OF 10 BEIJING 03855

EXDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR LORD

FOR SECRETARY BAKER

ALSO PLEASE PASS TO NSC - GENERAL SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, CH, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)

SUBJECT: LOOKING FORWARD: YOUR RETURN TO CHINA

14. IN THE 1950'S THE CHINESE OPPOSED US. IN THE 1960'S THEY OPPOSED BOTH US AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE 1970'S THEY LEANED TOWARD US AND AGAINST THE SOVIETS. THERE WAS SILLY TALK OF "CARDS" AND EXAGGERATED REFERENCES TO "TRIANGLES". THE REALITY, HOWEVER, WAS THAT BEIJING SAW MOSCOW ON THE MOVE, MILITARILY AND GEOPOLITICALLY, AND THEY SAW THE POST-VIETNAM, POST-WATERGATE "MALAISE" AMERICA ON THE DEFENSIVE. THEY URGENTLY SOUGHT TO CHECK SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. NOW THEY ARE WORKING TO IMPROVE TIES WITH BOTH SUPERPOWERS, EVEN WHILE POSTURING AS A THIRD WORLD LEADER. THE REASONS FOR THEIR POLICY CHANGE ARE

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CLEAR.

15. DURING THE 1980'S, THEY HAVE CLOSELY MONITORED A REVIVED UNITED STATES REDRESSING THE GLOBAL BALANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. GORBACHEV, FACED WITH DOMESTIC CRISIS AND WESTERN FIRMNESS, SEEKS TO CUT THE COSTS OF ADVENTURISM. SINCE YOUR PREVIOUS VISIT HERE

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HE HAS TAKEN A LEAF FROM THE BOOK OF DENG'S REFORMS. HIS 1986 VLADIVOSTOK SPEECH SET IN MOTION THE PROCESS OF SINO-SOVIET NORMALIZATION WHICH WILL BE SEALED WHEN HE ARRIVES IN MAY. THE CHINESE HAVE TOUTED THE TREND TOWARD A MORE MULTIPOLAR WORLD WHICH HAS BECOME EVEN CLEARER THE PAST THREE YEARS: JAPAN'S ASCENDANCY, EUROPE HEADING TOWARD 1992, THE IMPRESSIVE GROWTH OF ASIAN NICS, -- AND A MORE ASSERTIVE CHINA.

16. AGAINST THIS BACKDROP IT HAS BECOME FASHIONABLE TO DISMISS THE RELEVANCE OF THE GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS WHICH FIRST DROVE CHINA AND AMERICA TOGETHER. THE PUNDITS SUGGEST THAT WE FOCUS ON ECONOMICS ALONE. I DISAGREE. TO BE SURE, OUR SHARED GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS ARE MORE SUBTLE AND INTRICATE THAN THEY WERE IN THE 1970'S. IN THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH US THE CHINESE WILL NOT TALK ABOUT THE "POLAR BEAR" OR THE NEED TO COMBAT SOVIET HEGEMONISM -- NOR SHOULD WE. OUR BROADENED BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH CHINA NOW STOUTLY STANDS ON ITS OWN, REGARDLESS OF OUR RESPECTIVE POLICIES TOWARD MOSCOW. WE CAN SINCERELY WELCOME THE EASING OF SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS, WHICH IN TURN HAS ABETTED CO-OPERATION AMONG THE PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS (E.G. THE IRAN-IRAQ AND ANGOLA-NAMBIA ISSUES) AND COULD PROMOTE PROGRESS IN KOREA (BOTH MOSCOW AND BEIJING ARE DEALING WITH SEOUL) AND EVEN THE MIDDLE

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EAST (BOTH ARE TALKING TO ISRAEL).

17. MOREOVER, WE AND THE CHINESE CONTINUE TO SHARE A STAKE IN PRESERVING GLOBAL AND REGIONAL BALANCES -- AS WE HAVE IN AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA. NEITHER OF US CAN MORTGAGE OUR FUTURE TO GORBACHEV'S STAYING POWER. IN ANY CASE HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY, AND CHINA'S NEED FOR WESTERN ASSISTANCE FOR MODERNIZATION PLACE INHERENT LIMITS ON SINO-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT. CHINA WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK TO THE DISTANT POWER TO BALANCE THE NEAR ONES. WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSIDER CHINA'S INTEGRITY AS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE GLOBAL BALANCE.

18. A TRANSFORMED WORLD REQUIRES MORE, NOT LESS, DIALOGUE BETWEEN US ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. DURING THE PAST THREE YEARS WE HAVE ALREADY STEPPED UP THE PACE OF SUCH EXCHANGES. WE HAVE COOPERATED CLOSELY, OR CONSULTED, ON ISSUES SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, CAMBODIA, KOREA AND ARMS CONTROL. DESPITE OUR DIFFICULTIES WE

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HAVE WORKED OUT AN AGREEMENT ON THE LAUNCHING OF AMERICAN SATELLITES BY CHINESE ROCKETS. DESPITE THEIR DIFFICULTIES, THE CHINESE HAVE MET US PART WAY ON THE ISSUE OF MISSILE PROLIFERATION. BUT THERE IS ROOM FOR MORE INTENSIVE EXCHANGES, WHERE OUR VIEWS DIVERGE AS WELL AS WHERE THEY CONVERGE.

19. THE FUTURE HEALTH OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS DOES NOT DEPEND ONLY ON OUR TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY. IT REQUIRES AN AMERICA THAT DOES NOT GET DRIVEN OUT OF EUROPE NOR TURN OVER ASIAN SECURITY

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0869

SECTION 05 OF 10 BEIJING 03855

EXDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR LORD

FOR SECRETARY BAKER

UNCLASSIFIED

ALSO PLEASE PASS TO NSC - GENERAL SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, CH, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)

SUBJECT: LOOKING FORWARD: YOUR RETURN TO CHINA

DUTIES TO JAPAN NOR SHRINK FROM OUR EFFORTS TO EASE REGIONAL CONFLICTS. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT YOU PROJECT TO THE CHINESE LEADERS A RESOLUTE NATION THAT WILL CONTINUE TO FULFILL ITS GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

ECONOMIC EXCHANGE

20. THE SURGE IN OUR ECONOMIC DEALINGS HAS PRODUCED SOME HARD BARGAINING AND HARD FEELINGS AS WELL AS HARD CASH. OUR VERY PROGRESS FORCES US TO CONFRONT THE VAST DIFFERENCES IN OUR LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT AND DOMESTIC SYSTEMS. CHINA HAS A LONG WAY TO GO TO OPEN UP ITS TRADING SYSTEM CONSISTENT WITH GATT ACCESSION.

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WE ARE PRESSING THE CHINESE TO LOWER TARIFFS AND IMPORT BARRIERS, LOOSEN FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROLS, AND ALLOW COMPETITION IN THE SERVICES SECTOR. THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE, WHILE GREATLY IMPROVED, IS STILL PLAGUED BY OPAQUE REGULATIONS; AN EMBRYONIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK; UNEVEN IMPLEMENTATION; UNILATERAL REVISION OF CONTRACTS; SLOTHFUL BUREAUCRACY; EXCESSIVE HAGGLING; UNCERTAINTIES CONCERNING LABOR, RAW MATERIALS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE; AND THE GENERAL CLASH BETWEEN THE CHINESE DRIVE TO EARN FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND OUR DESIRE FOR ACCESS TO THE ENORMOUS DOMESTIC MARKET. PERHAPS THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM ON THE HORIZON IS THE INADEQUATE CHINESE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, A TARGET OF THE NEW TRADE BILL.

21. THE CHINESE HAVE THEIR OWN LITANY OF DEMANDS. THEY WILL CALL ON YOU TO KEEP OUR MARKET OPEN. LOOSEN OUR CONTROLS ON TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS. REVISE OUR ANTI-DUMPING LEGISLATION. HELP THEM JOIN THE GATT ON THEIR TERMS. GRANT UNCONDITIONAL MFN TREATMENT AND GSP. OFFER MORE CONCESSIONAL FINANCING. TREAT THEM LIKE THE FRIENDLY NATION WE PROFESS THEM TO BE.

22. WE HAVE ONLY BEGUN TO TAP THE HUGE POTENTIAL OF

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OUR ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

SOCIAL INTERACTION

22. ON THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PLANE, EXPANDED CONTACTS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES INCREASE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, BUT THEY HIGHLIGHT OUR FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT VALUES AS WELL. WHILE FAMILIARITY HAS NOT BRED CONTEMPT NEITHER HAS IT BRED CONTENTMENT.

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23. THE MOST PRICKLY MANIFESTATION IN THIS AREA IS HUMAN RIGHTS. AS WE TAKE A CLOSER, LESS SENTIMENTAL LOOK AT THE CHINESE SCENE, CERTAIN ISSUES LOOM LARGER. AS WE DO AROUND THE GLOBE, THE UNITED STATES PROJECTS OUR IDEALS AS WELL AS OUR INTERESTS. WE HAVE DONE SO FAITHFULLY IN CHINA BUT ALSO WITH SOME MODERATION BECAUSE WE RECOGNIZE THE AWESOME CHALLENGES THE CHINESE FACE IN OVERHAULING THEIR NATION OF A BILLION PEOPLE; THE DIFFERENCES IN HISTORIES AND CULTURES; AND THE TREMENDOUS PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE SINCE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

24. TO BE FAIR, WE MUST NOT MERELY TAKE A SNAPSHOT OF CHINA'S POLITICAL AND CULTURAL SCENE BUT ALSO ASSESS THE OVERALL TRENDS. THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS SUPREME, BUT THERE IS MORE CONSULTATION AND REFLECTION OF THE POPULAR WILL. THE CHINESE PRESS IS CONTROLLED, BUT LIVELIER AND MORE DISSONANT. THERE IS A DETERMINED EXPANSION OF THE RULE OF LAW, AND EVEN THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS IS UNDERGOING SOME REFORM.

25. THE CHINESE PEOPLE REMAIN IN A CAGE -- BUT IT IS MUCH LARGER AND AIRIER THAN A DECADE AGO.

26. NEVERTHELESS AS THE CONGRESS AND MEDIA ZOOM IN ON PARTICULAR CHINESE BLEMISHES, AND AS GLASNOST IMPROVES MOSCOW'S IMAGE, SINO-AMERICAN FRICTIONS OVER HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE SURFACED. IN OUR COUNTRY THERE IS SYMPATHY FOR MARCHING YOUTH BRANDISHING PORTRAITS OF THE STATUE OF LIBERTY AND QUOTING THOMAS PAINE. FOR A RETURNED

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TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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SECTION 06 OF 10 BEIJING 03855

EXDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR LORD
FOR SECRETARY BAKER

ALSO PLEASE PASS TO NSC - GENERAL SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, CH, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)
SUBJECT: LOOKING FORWARD: YOUR RETURN TO CHINA

CHINESE STUDENT JAILED FOR HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES;
A DISSIDENT CHINESE SCHOLAR PREVENTED FROM TRAVELLING
ABROAD; "DEMOCRACY WALL" ACTIVISTS STILL LANGUISHING
IN JAIL.

27. THE MOST PROMINENT ISSUES TO DATE ARE TIBET AND
POPULATION POLICY. TIBET IS IMPORTANT TO THE CHINESE
IN TERMS OF SOVEREIGNTY, EXTERNAL SECURITY (THE BORDER
WITH INDIA), AND INTERNAL CONTROL (THEY HAVE NOTED
GORBACHEV'S PROBLEMS WITH MINORITY NATIONALITIES). AS

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DOES EVERY OTHER GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD, WE RECOGNIZE CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY. (EVEN THE DALAI LAMA STOPS SHORT OF DEMANDING INDEPENDENCE). WE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT

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THE CHINESE HAVE PURSUED A MUCH MORE ENLIGHTENED POLICY IN TIBET SINCE 1980. BUT WE NEED TO KEEP PRESSING THE CHINESE ON THE HARSH SUPPRESSION OF DISSENT, THE ROUGH TREATMENT OF PRISONERS, AND THE LACK OF ACCESS TO OUTSIDERS, INCLUDING JOURNALISTS.

28. THREE YEARS AGO WE CUT OFF FUNDING TO THE UNITED NATIONS POPULATION PROGRAM FOR CHINA BECAUSE OF ABUSES LIKE FORCED ABORTION (EVEN THOUGH THE UN PROGRAM HAS PROVIDED NO FUNDS FOR ABORTIONS OF ANY KIND). THE CHINESE FACE THE CLASSIC MALTHUSIAN DILEMMA; THEIR FUTURE IS DOOMED IF THEY CANNOT CONTROL THEIR POPULATION GROWTH. IN ORDER TO REGAIN AMERICAN SUPPORT, THEY AND THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE BEEN QUIETLY WORKING TO ALTER THE UN PROGRAM SO THAT ITS ASSISTANCE WILL BE SOLELY FOR EDUCATION AND CONTRACEPTIVES -- WHICH WILL CUT DOWN THE NUMBER OF ABORTIONS. BUT COERCION BY OVERZEALOUS CADRE PERSISTS, AND THE CHINESE PROVIDE NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE PUNISHING THE ABUSERS. THIS ISSUE IS EMOTIONALLY EXPLOSIVE IN THE UNITED STATES. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL FACE A DIFFICULT DECISION THIS SPRING: EITHER TO RESUME OUR CONTRIBUTION OR TO SEE THE ENTIRE UN PROGRAM IN CHINA (WHICH REQUIRES A CONSENSUS) WIPED OUT -- AND ABORTIONS INCREASE. MEANWHILE RECENT DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND COURT DECISIONS HAVE OPENED A FAMILY PLANNING LOOPHOLE THAT COULD PRODUCE THOUSANDS OF APPLICATIONS BY CHINESE FOR ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES.

29. THERE WILL BE NO WAY TO AVOID OR EASILY RESOLVE THE TENSIONS THAT FLOW FROM THE MESHING OF OUR SOCIETIES AND CULTURES. WE WILL -- AND SHOULD -- CONTINUE TO RAISE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. THE CHINESE DO NOT SEEK TO

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IMPOSE THEIR CONCEPTS ON US AND THUS WILL CONTINUE TO RESENT WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS OUR ATTEMPT TO DO SO ON THEM. AS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD, WE WILL NEED TO

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STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN OUR COLLECTIVE CONSCIENCE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY, THE CRITERIA OF EFFECTIVENESS AND OUR OVERALL STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC STAKES.

YOUR INTERLOCUTORS

30. CHINA HAS ALREADY ENTERED THE SUCCESSION STAGE. YOUR MEETINGS WITH ZHAO AND LI WILL THEREFORE BE NO LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE ONES WITH DENG AND YANG.

31. TO BE SURE, CHAIRMAN DENG REMAINS THE SINGLE MOST INFLUENTIAL FIGURE, THOUGH INCREASINGLY REMOVED FROM DAILY DECISIONS. THIS PARTLY REFLECTS HIS LONG-HELD GOAL OF INSTITUTIONALIZING HIS POLICIES AND GIVING EXPOSURE, EXPERIENCE, AND CREDIBILITY TO HIS SUCCESSORS. IT ALSO REFLECTS HIS AGE AND DECLINING STAMINA. YOU KNOW HIM WELL. YOU WILL FIND HIM AS MENTALLY SHARP AS EVER, THOUGH SOMEWHAT SLOWER IN STEP AND HARDER OF HEARING. HE WILL BE SURE TO MAKE SOME KEY POINT WHILE THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS IS STILL ASSEMBLED FOR PICTURE-TAKING, PERHAPS A REFERENCE TO YOU OR TO SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. HE WILL HAVE THREE OR FOUR MAIN TOPICS ON HIS MIND WHICH HE WILL COVER IN SEEMINGLY CASUAL FASHION. AMONG THE LIKELY CANDIDATES: OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, CAMBODIA, TAIWAN, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CHINESE REFORMS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TAIWAN, THESE WOULD ALSO BE GOOD

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SECTION 07 OF 10 BEIJING 03855

EXDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR LORD

FOR SECRETARY BAKER

ALSO PLEASE PASS TO NSC - GENERAL SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, CH, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)

SUBJECT: LOOKING FORWARD: YOUR RETURN TO CHINA

ISSUES FOR YOU TO RAISE WITH HIM. YOU COULD RANGE
CONCEPTUALLY OVER THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION GENERALLY.
AS ALWAYS WITH DENG YOU WILL CONVERSE AT THE STRATEGIC,
NOT THE TACTICAL, LEVEL.

32. YOU WILL RECALL YOUR RELAXED AND FASCINATING
SEQUOIA CRUISE IN 1987 WITH PRESIDENT YANG. IN MY
MEETING WITH HIM THISDECEMBER HE SPOKE WITH GREAT WARMTH
ABOUT THAT EVENING AND HIS RESPECT FOR YOU. YANG IS
THE FRIENDLIEST AND MOST STRAIGHTFORWARD OF THE
CHINESE LEADERS. WHILE THE PRESIDENCY HAS ASSUMED MORE
IMPORTANCE UNDER HIM, HIS REAL POWER DERIVES FROM THE
ACCUMULATED AUTHORITY OF HIS CAREER, HIS CLOSENESS TO

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DENG, AND HIS DAY-TO-DAY CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY.
OUR BEST JUDGMENT IS THAT HE SUPPORTS ECONOMIC REFORMS
AND THE OPENING, WHILE HE IS QUITE CONSERVATIVE ON
POLITICAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES -- BUT IN THIS OPAQUE
SYSTEM ONE IS NEVER SURE. IF DENG PREDECEASES HIM,
YANG WOULD BE A STABILIZING FORCE AND COULD BE THE
KINGMAKER, THE TANAKA (FORMERLY) OF CHINESE POLITICS.
THE MOST LIKELY AGENDA TOPICS FOR YOUR MEETING AND
BANQUET WITH HIM INCLUDE OUR RESPECTIVE DEALINGS WITH

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MOSCOW, THE SINO-AMERICAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP, ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, AND VARIOUS REGIONAL TOPICS SUCH AS CAMBODIA, AFGHANISTAN AND KOREA.

33. EVEN AS YOU RENEW OLD FRIENDSHIPS WITH THE TWO LONG-MARCHERS, YOU WILL WANT TO TAKE STOCK OF THE HEADS OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT WHO WILL LIKELY BE THE KEY FIGURES DURING YOUR ADMINISTRATION. ZHAO HAS COME UNDER INCREASED FIRE IN RECENT MONTHS, PARTICULARLY SINCE LAST SUMMER'S INFLATION CRISIS. BUT THE HONG KONG TABLOIDS HAVE EXAGGERATED HIS POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES. PART OF HIS PROBLEM IS THAT HE IS NUMBER TWO, THE HEIR-APPARENT. (FORTUNATELY, THIS IS NOT A PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES|) ASK LIU SHAOQI, LIN BIAO, AND HU YAOBANG. OR ZHOU-ENLAI WHO SURVIVED PRECISELY BECAUSE HE AVOIDED THAT POSITION. THE FACTS ARE THAT ZHAO HAS HANDLED WITH GREAT SKILL A SUCCESSION OF KEY PARTY AND GOVERNMENT ROLES AROUND THE COUNTRY AND IN BEIJING. HE HAS MANY APPOINTEES AND SUPPORTERS IN THE PROVINCES. HE IS DENG'S DEPUTY ON THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION, ALTHOUGH WE DON'T KNOW HOW WELL HE IS CONSOLIDATING HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PLA. HE IS THE MOST CONCEPTUAL OF THE SECOND-GENERATION OF LEADERS, AND THE ONE MOST ANXIOUS TO SEEK OUTSIDE ADVICE, MILTON

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FRIEDMAN BEING BUT ONE EXAMPLE. HE WOULD BE THE MOST INTERESTING ON CHINA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS. YOU COULD ALSO DISCUSS THE OUTLINES OF OUR FUTURE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, INCLUDING THE INCREASINGLY CRUCIAL ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS.

34. YOUR SESSION WITH LI PENG WILL BE THE LONGEST AND MOST WORKMANLIKE, WITH DELEGATIONS FACING EACH OTHER ACROSS A GREEN-COVERED TABLE RATHER THAN DEPLOYED IN A CRESCENT OF ARMCHAIRS. THIS IS APPROPRIATE FOR THIS TECHNOCRAT WHO IS MUCH MORE AT EASE DISCUSSING TREES THAN FORESTS. (IN A DINNER WITH LEE IACOCCA WHICH I ATTENDED LI FOCUSED ON THE NUMBER OF TRAINS AND CARS IN CHINA AND NEVER ONCE ASKED HIS GUEST ABOUT ECONOMIC POLICIES OR EVEN MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES.) BECAUSE OF HIS SOVIET TRAINING, THERE HAS BEEN MUCH SUPERFICIAL SPECULATION ABOUT LI'S PRO-SOVIET LEANINGS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF THIS. HE IS MORE CAUTIOUS THAN ZHAO ABOUT THE PACE OF REFORMS AND THE RISKS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY. HE IS MORE AT HOME WITH SOME CENTRAL

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PLANNING BECAUSE OF HIS PAST PORTFOLIOS IN SECTORS LIKE ENERGY, TRANSPORTATION, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS. HE KNOWS, HOWEVER, THAT THE WEST OFFERS THE CAPITAL, TECHNOLOGY, AND MANAGEMENT CHINA NEEDS, AND HE HAS SPENT MORE TIME WITH AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN THAN ANY OTHER LEADER. IN YOUR MEETING YOU CAN EXPLORE VARIOUS REGIONAL ISSUES AND THE MANY TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES WE FACE. YOU CAN ALSO SUGGEST SOME NEW DEPARTURES IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP DURING THE NEXT FOUR YEARS -- FOR EXAMPLE, INCREASED COOPERATION

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EXDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR LORD

FOR SECRETARY BAKER

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ALSO PLEASE PASS TO NSC - GENERAL SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, CH, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)

SUBJECT: LOOKING FORWARD: YOUR RETURN TO CHINA

ON DRUG CONTROL; THE INITIATION OF EXCHANGES ON
TERRORISM; DISCUSSIONS ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS;
DEEPENED DIALOGUE ON ARMS CONTROL; AND A MORE
SYSTEMATIC SERIES OF WORKING LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON
REGIONAL ISSUES.
YOUR OBJECTIVES

35. YOUR BULGING BRIEFING BOOKS COVER SUGGESTED OBJECTIVE
FOR YOUR TRIP. I CONCLUDE WITH A STACCATO RUNDOWN OF
PRINCIPAL THEMES.

36. THE VERY FACT THAT YOU ARE TRAVELLING HERE ONE MONTH
INTO YOUR ADMINISTRATION ACCOMPLISHES YOUR MAJOR GOALS:

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-- YOU ARE HIGHLIGHTING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SINO-
AMERICAN RELATIONS.

-- TOGETHER WITH STOPS IN JAPAN AND KOREA, YOU ARE
UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE OF ASIA TO AMERICAN NATIONAL
INTERESTS.

-- YOU ARE INJECTING BALANCE INTO THE GEOMETRY OF SINO-
SOVIET AND US-SOVIET RELATIONS.

37. ON A PERSONAL LEVEL YOU WILL SET THE TONE AND PARA-
METERS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINESE LEADERS
AND THE BROADER CHINESE PUBLIC. YOUR HOMECOMING WILL BE
LAVISHLY PUBLICIZED IN THE CHINESE MEDIA. YOU WILL ENLIST
THE AUTHORITATIVE STAMP OF THE VETERANS DENG AND YANG FOR
FUTURE CHINESE POLICY EVEN AS THEY PASS THE BATON TO THEIR
SUCCESSORS. YOU AND YOUR NEW NATIONAL SECURITY TEAM
TRAVELLING WITH YOU WILL SIZE UP THOSE SUCCESSORS, THEIR
VISION AND THEIR ABILITIES -- AND ESTABLISH PERSONAL TIES
FOR FUTURE EXCHANGES.

38. THE CHINESE, NATURALLY, WILL HAVE THEIR OWN AGENDA.
SINCE YOU ARE AN "OLD FRIEND", THEIR EXPECTATIONS ARE
HIGH. THEIR TRADITIONAL TECHNIQUE IS TO TEST "OLD FRIENDS"
AND YOU ARE LIKELY TO BE SUBJECTED TO THIS APPROACH ON

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TOPICS RANGING FROM TAIWAN TO TECHNOLOGY CONTROLS. FOR
EXAMPLE, AMBASSADOR HAN XU, IN HIS FEBRUARY 6 MEETING WITH
SECRETARY BAKER, SIGNALLED THE CHINESE INTENTION TO RAISE
WITH YOU AT LEAST TWO DIMENSIONS OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE.
BEIJING IS CONCERNED OVER GROWING INDEPENDENCE SENTIMENT
ON TAIWAN AND OVER TAIWAN'S EFFORTS TO EXPAND ITS INTER-
NATIONAL POLITICAL TIES THROUGH AN "ELASTIC DIPLOMACY".

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39. IN A WORKING VISIT OF FORTY HOURS, FOUR MEETINGS, AND
THREE BANQUETS YOU CAN ONLY LAY DOWN A FEW BRUSH STROKES,
TO BE FILLED IN DURING THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS. YOU
CAN PROJECT OR ELICIT THE FOLLOWING:

- OUR INTENTIONS TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION.
- CHINESE INTENTIONS TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION.
- COMPARISON OF ASSESSMENTS ON GORBACHEV'S POLICIES
AND PROSPECTS.
- THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE BALLISTIC MISSILE AND
CHEMICAL PROLIFERATION ISSUES. THE NEED FOR CHINA
TO ACT RESPONSIBLY.
- SUPPORT FOR PRINCE SIHANOUK.. PREVENTION OF
BOTH VIETNAMESE PROXY RULE AND KHMER ROUGE DOMINATION
IN CAMBODIA. STEADINESS IN OUR POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM.
- MORE DETAILED CHINESE POSITIONS ON THE LINK
BETWEEN OUTSIDE AID TO CAMBODIAN FACTIONS AND
VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWALS; AND ON AN INTERNATIONAL
PRESENCE AND OTHER MEASURES TO CHECK THE KHMER ROUGE.
- EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN.
- EXPLANATION OF OUR APPROACH TO NORTH KOREA AND
THE NEED TO FOSTER NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE. ENCOURAGEMENT
OF CHINESE TIES WITH SOUTH KOREA AND POSITIVE INFLUENCE

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SECTION 09 OF 10 BEIJING 03855

EXDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR LORD

FOR SECRETARY BAKER

ALSO PLEASE PASS TO NSC - GENERAL SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, CH, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)
SUBJECT: LOOKING FORWARD: YOUR RETURN TO CHINA

ON NORTH KOREA.

-- OUR VIEWS ON THE FUTURE ROLE OF JAPAN IN ASIA
AND THE WORLD. THE STEADYING INFLUENCE OF US-JAPAN
SECURITY TIES.

-- ENCOURAGEMENT OF INDO-PAKISTANI AND SINO-INDIAN
RAPPROCHEMENT. DISCOURAGEMENT OF NUCLEAR AND MISSILE
PROLIFERATION IN THE SUBCONTINENT.

-- THE URGING OF CHINESE DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL AS
PART OF MORE CONSTRUCTIVE CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE

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MIDDLE EAST.
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-- OUR CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO THE THREE JOINT SINO-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUEs AND A ONE CHINA POLICY. OUR CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO UNOFFICIAL U.S. FRIENDSHIP WITH TAIWAN.

-- THE WELCOMING OF RECENT MAINLAND-TAIWAN INTER-ACTIONS. OUR VIEW THAT THIS PROCESS MUST BE PURSUED PEACEFULLY BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES, WITHOUT EITHER AMERICAN ADVOCACY OR OBSTRUCTION. POLITE BUT FIRM REJECTION OF ANY SUGGESTION THAT WE CAN BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN.

-- CHINESE REAFFIRMATION OF THEIR PEACEFUL APPROACH TOWARD TAIWAN.

-- OUR PLANS TO RESIST PROTECTIONISM, LOOSEN TECHNOLOGY CONTROLS, AND WORK FOR CHINESE ACCESSION TO THE GATT. THE NEED FOR EXPANDED AIR SERVICE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

-- CHINESE ASSURANCES TO OPEN UP THEIR MARKET, IMPROVE THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE, PROTECT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND PURSUE REFORMS CONSISTENT WITH GATT ACCESSION.

-- MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE VALUE OF OUR GRADUALLY DEVELOPING MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. WELCOMING OF FUTURE HIGH-LEVEL TRIPS, SHIP VISITS, AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION.

-- MUTUAL APPRECIATION OF RECENT BREAKTHROUGHS IN OUR RELATIONS SUCH AS THE INVITATION TO THE PEACE

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CORPS, THE SIGNING OF THE MARITIME ACCORD, AND THE AGREEMENT TO USE CHINESE ROCKETS FOR AMERICAN SATELLITES.

-- THE NEED FOR ENLIGHTENED CHINESE POLICY TOWARD

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HUMAN RIGHTS, RANGING FROM STUDENTS TO DISSIDENTS TO PROSPECTIVE MOTHERS TO TIBETAN MONKS.

-- CHINESE INTENTIONS TOWARD TIBET FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF THE PANCHEN LAMA. THE PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DALAI LAMA.

-- THE INTRODUCTION OF FRESH ITEMS FOR OUR FUTURE AGENDA SUCH AS DRUGS, TERRORISM, THE ENVIRONMENT AND ARMS CONTROL.

-- PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE HIGH-LEVEL VISITS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS OF POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC LEADERS. LOOKING FORWARD

40. "A NEW CHINA WAS EMERGING AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC WOULD BE CRUCIAL IN THE YEARS TO COME, NOT JUST IN TERMS OF ASIAN BUT OF WORLDWIDE AMERICAN POLICY."

41. THE AUTHOR OF THESE WORDS WAS LOOKING FORWARD PERCEPTIVELY TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS TODAY, AND INTO THE NEXT CENTURY.

42. THE GOOD NEWS IS THAT THE BOOK FROM WHICH THIS

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EXDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR LORD

FOR SECRETARY BAKER

ALSO PLEASE PASS TO NSC - GENERAL SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, CH, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)

SUBJECT: LOOKING FORWARD: YOUR RETURN TO CHINA

EXCERPT IS DRAWN IS NOW A BEST-SELLER IN CHINA IN
EIGHT DIFFERENT EDITIONS. THE BAD NEWS IS THAT THE
AUTHOR IS RECEIVING NO ROYALTIES -- A PRIME EXAMPLE
OF WHY WE MUST PRESS THE CHINESE TO PROTECT
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.

43. MR. PRESIDENT: THE CHAIRMAN, THE PASTOR, THE TENNIS
PRO, A BILLION ABSENTEE VOTERS, A THOUSAND AMERICAN
POINTS OF LIGHT, MRS. LORD AND I ALL ARE "LOOKING
FORWARD" TO WELCOMING YOU AND MRS. BUSH BACK TO CHINA.
RESPECTFULLY, WINSTON LORD.

LORD

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AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL SHENYANG POUCH)

Dept of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir

() Release () Excise () Deny () Declassify

Date 5/28/95 Exemption

SECTION 01 OF 10 BEIJING 26114

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: OREP (SOLARZ, STEPHEN), PREL, PGOV, PARM, CH,
UR, US, TWSUBJ: CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ AUGUST 24 DISCUSSION AT THE
- CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

1. [REDACTED] - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ON AUGUST 23 CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ MET
WITH VARIOUS EXPERTS AT THE CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES FOR OVER THREE HOURS. THE ROUND TABLE
DISCUSSION COVERED A BROAD RANGE OF TOPICS:
COMPARISONS BETWEEN CHINESE AND SOVIET REFORM
EFFORTS, THE SEPARATION OF PARTY AND STATE, POLITICAL
REFORM, THE CHINESE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, THE
GLOBAL TREND TOWARDS PEACE, ARMS CONTROL, AND
TAIWAN. REGARDING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, THE CHINESE
ACCUSED US OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS OF BEING TOO
IDEOLOGICAL AND NOT PRACTICAL ENOUGH. SOLARZ REPLIED

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THE CHINESE NEED NOT BE TOO CONCERNED: THE U.S.
WOULD CONTINUE TO "SEEK TRUTH FROM FACTS". END
SUMMARY.

3. ON AUGUST 23 CONGRESSMAN STEPHEN SOLARZ MET WITH

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EXPERTS AT THE CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (CASS) FOR OVER THREE HOURS. CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ WAS ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD BUSH AND EMBASSY OFFICERS. REPRESENTING CASS WERE CASS VICE PRESIDENT LI SHENZHI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF TAIWAN STUDIES LI JIAQUAN, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN STUDIES SPECIALIZING IN SINO-US RELATIONS ZI ZHONGYUN, RESEARCH FELLOW IN THE INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE YAN JIAQI, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF MARXISM-LENINISM-MAO DEZONG THOUGHT PENG KEHONG, RESEARCH FELLOW IN THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND POLITICS SPECIALIZING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA CHEN BISAN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CASS' FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUREAU LIN DI, SONG YOUMING OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS' TAIWAN OFFICE, AND ZHANG JINGYI, RESEARCH FELLOW IN THE INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN STUDIES.

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4. SOVIET AND CHINESE POLITICAL REFORM EFFORTS. CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ STARTED OFF THE DISCUSSION EXPLAINING THAT HE HAD JUST SPENT A WEEK IN THE SOVIET UNION. HE NOTED THAT MOST PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT ALTHOUGH CHINA IS AHEAD IN ECONOMIC REFORM, THE SOVIET UNION HAS GONE FARTHER WITH GLASNOST OR DEMOCRATIZATION. LI REPLIED THAT HE WOULD NOT DISPUTE THAT ASSESSMENT BUT BELIEVED THAT IT WAS SUPERFICIAL. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS JUST INITIATED THESE REFORMS AND GORBACHEV NEEDS THE SUPPORT OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA AND MASS MEDIA.

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ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION IS REAPPRAISING MANY HISTORICAL QUESTIONS, CHINA BEGAN THE PROCESS TEN YEARS AGO. LI COULD NOT GIVE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF SOVIET POLITICAL REFORMS BUT POINTED OUT THAT BOTH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE BEEN GRAPPLING WITH THE SEPARATION OF PARTY AND STATE. HE SAID THAT FRANKLY THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE PROGRESS IN CHINA BUT EVEN LESS IN THE SOVIET UNION. FOR EXAMPLE, DURING LAST MONTH'S SOVIET 19TH PARTY CONGRESS, GORBACHEV STATED THAT THE GOAL OF THE SEPARATION OF PARTY AND STATE PERMITTED THE PARTY FIRST SECRETARY ALSO TO SERVE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET. CRITICS, HOWEVER, SUCH AS MR. GRIMAKOV, BELIEVE THAT THIS IS DIRECT (#)

5. CONGRESSMAN (#)
FOR EXAMPLES OF CHINESE

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POLITICAL REFORMS OVER THE PAST DECADE, SINCE THE ADOPTION OF THE FOUR MODERNIZATIONS PROGRAM. IN YAN JIAQI'S PERSONAL OPINION, TRUE REFORMS BEGAN IN 1982 WHEN THE NEW CONSTITUTION SPECIFIED THAT THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER CAN ONLY SERVE TWO TERMS. HE SAID THAT IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES THIS WOULD PREVENT THE CREATION OF A "KING". IN RESPONSE TO SOLARZ'S QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT THE TWO TERM LIMITATION ALSO APPLIED TO PARTY POSITIONS, YAN EXPLAINED THAT ALTHOUGH ORIGINALLY PARTY TERMS WERE TO BE LIMITED AS WELL, THE FINAL DRAFT IN 1982 ONLY DEALT WITH THE STATE. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DECIDED TO LIMIT PARTY MEMBERS TO TWO TERMS IN CERTAIN POSITIONS BUT HAD NOT DECIDED WHEN THE TWO TERMS WOULD START.

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NOTE BY OC/T: (#) OMISSIONS PARAS 4,5; CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL SHENYANG (POUCH)

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E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: OREP (SOLARZ, STEPHEN), PREL, PGOV, PARM, CH,
UR, US, TW

SUBJ: CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ AUGUST 24 DISCUSSION AT THE

6. YAN ARGUED THAT CHINA HAS MADE FURTHER PROGRESS THAN THE SOVIET UNION IN SEPARATING THE PARTY AND STATE. HE SAID IN THE SOVIET UNION FOR EXAMPLE, THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ITSELF HAS MANY MINISTRIES, CREATING A GOVERNMENT ABOVE THE GOVERNMENT IN THE PARTY. ZI ZHONGYUN, DIRECTOR OF THE AMERICAN STUDIES INSTITUTE, SAID THAT BECAUSE THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (CPC) HAD NO MINISTRIES BEFORE REFORMS BEGAN, CHINA WAS FURTHER AHEAD. SHE ALSO NOTED THAT ENTERPRISES HAVE DONE MUCH TO SEPARATE THE PARTY AND STATE. IN RESPONSE TO SOLARZ' QUESTION ON THE JUSTIFICATION AND BENEFITS OF SEPARATING PARTY AND STATE, YAN SAID THAT PREVIOUSLY BOTH CHINA AND THE

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SOVIET UNION HAD ALLOWED INTERNAL PARTY CONFLICTS TO INFLUENCE STATE POLICY, I.E., THE SOVIET ATTACK ON TROTSKY AND PRC CAMPAIGNS AGAINST LIU SHAOQI AND PENG DEHUAI. HE CLAIMED THAT IN CONTRAST INNER PARTY DISSENTION DOES NOT AFFECT GOVERNMENT POLICY IN THE US AND JAPAN. HE BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIET 19TH PARTY CONGRESS HAD NOT SOLVED THIS PROBLEM. EXPLAINING THE ROLES OF THE PARTY AND THE STATE, YAN SAID THAT THE PARTY INFLUENCES THE STATE THROUGH PARTY MEMBERS WHO HOLD POSITIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT THEN IMPLEMENTS THE POLICIES. THE SEPARATION OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT IS OFTEN MENTIONED IN PROPAGANDA BUT NEEDS MUCH WORK.

7. WHEN SOLARZ ASKED WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES WERE FOR ENTERPRISES WHEN THE PARTY AND STATE ARE SEPARATED, YAN PULLED OUT A PEOPLE'S DAILY ARTICLE FROM THE DAY BEFORE WHICH DISCUSSED ENTERPRISES IN JILIN THAT DO NOT COME UNDER ANY PARTY OR GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS. YAN SAID THAT THIS AUTONOMY IS VERY RARE IN BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA BUT CRITICAL FOR ESTABLISHING A MARKET ECONOMY. THEORETICALLY, THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS THE HIGHEST FORM OF THE

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WORKING CLASS AND DURING THE REVOLUTION THE PARTY CONTROLS EVERYTHING. WITH THE PARTY IN POWER FOR 30 YEARS IN CHINA AND 70 YEARS IN THE SOVIET UNION, HOWEVER, BOTH GOVERNMENTS KNOW POLICIES MUST CHANGE. ACCORDING TO YAN, THE PARTY CAN ONLY MAKE POLICY AND CARRY OUT IDEOLOGICAL WORK BUT THE ULTIMATE POWER BELONGS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

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8. SOLARZ COUNTERED IF THE PARTY DETERMINES POLICY AND THE GOVERNMENT ONLY IMPLEMENTS, HOW CAN THE

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GOVERNMENT HAVE ULTIMATE POWER. VICE PRESIDENT LI RESPONDED THAT GOVERNMENT/STATE RULE IS THEORETICAL AND IS IN THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION. ALTHOUGH THE PARTY MAKES POLICY THEY MUST BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE STATE AND DISCUSSED WITH THE STATE, I.E., THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS. YEN ADDED THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IS THAT THE PARTY OPERATES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW.

9. SOLARZ ASKED JUST HOW ESSENTIAL ARE POLITICAL REFORMS FOR CONTINUED MODERNIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND WHAT REFORMS ARE NEEDED. YEN REPLIED THAT A MARKET ECONOMY IS LINKED TO DEMOCRACY -- IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR A CONTROLLED ECONOMY AND DEMOCRACY TO CO-EXIST. IN THE SOVIET UNION, FOR EXAMPLE, THERE IS "GLASNOST" BUT THE ECONOMY REMAINS HIGHLY CONTROLLED. YEN EXPLAINED THAT CHINA'S MAJOR CHANGES HAVE BEEN IN MOVING TO A MARKET ECONOMY WHILE MAINTAINING STATE OWNERSHIP. A CONTINUING QUESTION IN ECONOMIC REFORM IS WHETHER OWNERSHIP SHOULD BE MODIFIED, THEREFORE SHARE AND RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED.

10. SOLARZ ASKED ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND A MARKET ECONOMY. LI REPLIED THAT WITHOUT POLITICAL REFORMS THERE CAN BE NO ECONOMIC REFORM, THIS IS STATED IN CHINESE NEWSPAPERS EVERYDAY. THE CONGRESSMAN FOLLOWED UP BY ASKING WHAT ADDITIONAL POLITICAL REFORMS ARE NEEDED TO GUARANTEE ECONOMIC REFORMS. YEN RESPONDED THAT HE PERSONALLY BELIEVES THAT REFORM IN THE 1990'S WILL REQUIRE A

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AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL SHENYANG POUCH)

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E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: OREP (SOLARZ, STEPHEN), PREL, PGOV, PARM, CH,
UR, US, TW

SUBJ: CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ AUGUST 24 DISCUSSION AT THE

STABLE CONSTITUTION WITHOUT CHANGES. THE
CONSTITUTION SHOULD ONLY CONTAIN THREE PARTS -- THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND HOW POWER IS
DISTRIBUTED, THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PEOPLE, AND
HOW THE CONSTITUTION COULD BE CHANGED IN THE FUTURE.
HE FELT THAT USING THESE CRITERIA, NEITHER CHINA, THE
SOVIET UNION, NOR YUGOSLAVIA HAD CONSTITUTIONS.

11. CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ THEN ASKED WHETHER THE PARTY

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MAKES DECISIONS REGARDING PRICES, INFLATION, AND UNEMPLOYMENT FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT OR DOES THE GOVERNMENT MAKE THESE DECISIONS WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTY? YEN RESPONDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FIRST SUBMIT A DRAFT DECISION TO

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THE PARTY FOR APPROVAL, THEN THE GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTS THE POLICY.

12. SOLARZ NOTED THAT GORBACHEV HAS PROPOSED AND THE PARTY HAS ENDORSED THE NOMINATION OF MULTIPLE CANDIDATES AND SECRET BALLOTS FOR PARTY AND GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS. HE ASKED WHETHER SUCH REFORMS FOR ALL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT POSITIONS WOULD BE SUITABLE AND SENSIBLE FOR CHINA? YEN RESPONDED THAT CHINA WILL ADOPT SUCH POLICIES IN THE FUTURE. CHINA ALREADY HAS MULTIPLE CANDIDATES AND SECRET BALLOTING BUT THE NOMINATING PROCESS IS POOR. YEN EXPLAINED THAT PRIOR TO THE 13TH PARTY CONGRESS, THE SOVIET UNION NOMINATED ONE PERSON PER POSITION WHICH WAS FOLLOWED BY DIRECT ELECTION. IN CHINA, HOWEVER, THERE ARE INDIRECT ELECTIONS WITH CANDIDATES NOMINATED FROM THE GRASSROOTS. HE OBSERVED THAT MOSCOW IS TRYING TO IMPROVE ITS ELECTION SYSTEM AND BEIJING HOPES TO DO THE SAME. YEN QUOTED DENG XIAOPING AS SAYING THERE WILL BE DIRECT ELECTIONS IN 10 TO 15 YEARS. HE SAID THAT DIRECTLY ELECTED DELEGATES WILL BE MORE RESPONSIVE AND REPRESENTATIVE OF VOTERS.

13. SOLARZ MENTIONED THAT IN HIS ONE WEEK IN THE SOVIET UNION HE COULD SEE THE FAR REACHING EFFECTS OF GLASNOST. EXAMPLES ARE SOVIET PUBLICATION OF ARTHUR KOESTLER'S DARKNESS AND GEORGE ORWELL'S ANIMAL FARM AND 1984. A RECENT SOVIET FILM COMPARED STALIN TO HITLER WHILE LIVELY DEBATES AND DISAGREEMENTS AT THE 19TH PARTY CONGRESS WERE WIDELY COVERED BY THE MEDIA. HE MENTIONED THAT JUST A FEW DAYS EARLIER A SOVIET GENERAL DOING A STUDY ON STALIN WHO HAD ACCESS

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TO STALIN'S PERSONAL ARCHIVES SAID THAT STALIN WAS

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ONE OF THE WORST FIGURES IN HISTORY. SOLARZ MENTIONED THE EXAMPLE OF THE EDITOR OF IVESTIA WHO SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE WORKS 12-14 HOURS A DAY, HE CANNOT WAIT TO GET UP IN THE MORNING BECAUSE HE IS SO EXCITED ABOUT HIS FREEDOM TO PUBLISH SO MANY DIFFERENT OPINIONS. COMPARED WITH THESE DEVELOPMENTS, THE CONGRESSMAN ASKED, HOW FAR HAS GLASNOST GONE IN CHINA COMPARED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HOST LI WAS QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT CHINA HAD PUBLISHED 1984 AND ANIMAL FARM TEN YEARS AGO ALONG WITH ALDOUS HUXLEY'S BRAVE NEW WORLD. HE SAID THAT CHINA VERY MUCH APPRECIATES SOVIET PROGRESS IN FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION BUT AS A STUDENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICS HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER GLASNOST HELPS OR HINDERS SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM. THERE HAS BEEN GLASNOST IN THE SOVIET UNION FOR ONLY TWO YEARS WHILE CHINA HAS BEEN CARRYING OUT SUCH REFORMS FOR OVER 10 YEARS. LI ARGUED THAT CHINA'S REFORMS HAVE MORE DEPTH AND BREADTH AMONG INTELLECTUALS. SOLARZ COUNTERED BY ASKING WHAT WERE THE RESULTS OF POLITICAL MOVEMENTS SUCH AS THE ANTI-SPIRITUAL POLLUTION CAMPAIGN.

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14. PENG KEHONG OF THE INSTITUTE OF MARXISM-LENINISM-MAO ZEDONG THOUGHT EXPLAINED THAT CHINA HAS FOUR BASIC PRINCIPLES AND DISCUSSIONS THAT ABIDE BY THE FOUR PRINCIPLES ARE PROTECTED. DURING THE ANTI-BOURGEOIS LIBERALIZATION CAMPAIGN ONLY PARTY MEMBERS WERE REQUIRED TO ABIDE BY THE FOUR PRINCIPLES, NON-PARTY MEMBERS WERE FREE TO DISCUSS

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E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: OREP (SOLARZ, STEPHEN), PREL, PGOV, PARM, CH,
UR, US, TW

SUBJ: CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ AUGUST 24 DISCUSSION AT THE

WHATEVER THEY WANTED. MS ZI OF THE AMERICAN
INSTITUTE ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION AND
CHINA ARE SIMILAR, THEY ALSO HAVE DIFFERENCES AND
EACH HAS ITS OWN COURSE IN REFORMS. SHE ADMITTED
THAT THE GENERAL HIGHER LEVEL OF EDUCATION IN THE
SOVIET UNION ACCOUNTS FOR A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF
GLASNOST'S SUCCESS. SHE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT REFORM
IS NOT A STRAIGHT LINE AND TWISTS AND TURNS ARE
INEVITABLE. SOVIET GLASNOST HAS BEEN IN PLACE FOR
ONLY TWO YEARS AND NO ONE KNOWS IF THEY WILL HAVE
THEIR OWN ANTI-BOURGEOIS LIBERALISM CAMPAIGN IN THE
FUTURE. SHE ARGUED THAT CONSERVATIVE FORCES IN THE
SOVIET UNION ARE STRONG AND IF GLASNOST GOES TOO FAR,
IT MAY ACTUALLY DO A DISSERVICE TO GORBACHEV'S AND

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THE GOVERNMENT'S GENERAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE
PUBLIC'S GENERAL THINKING. SOLARZ SAID THAT
ALEXANDER YELTZIN AND THE ARMENIANS WOULD AGREE WITH
MS ZI'S ANALYSIS REGARDING THE INEVITABILITY OF
TWISTS AND TURNS.

15. ZHANG JINYI, A RESEARCH FELLOW IN THE INSTITUTE

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FOR AMERICAN STUDIES, ADDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS IN A "SENSATIONAL" PHASE WHICH THE PRC HAS ALREADY PASSED THROUGH. IN 1980 CHINA ADOPTED A DOCUMENT ON CERTAIN HISTORICAL PROBLEMS WHILE THE SOVIET UNION IS CARRYING OUT SUCH RE-EVALUATIONS NOW. SOLARZ MENTIONED THAT THIS DOCUMENT ON CERTAIN HISTORICAL QUESTIONS JUDGED MAO ZEDONG'S ACTIONS AS 70 PERCENT POSITIVE AND 30 PERCENT NEGATIVE. SOME CHINESE, HOWEVER, SAY 30 PERCENT POSITIVE AND 70 PERCENT NEGATIVE. SOLARZ ASKED WHAT WERE THE 70 PERCENT POSITIVE AND 30 PERCENT NEGATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS AND WHETHER THIS IS A FINAL JUDGEMENT BY THE PARTY FOR ALL TIME OR IS THE EVALUATION SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION, DEBATE, AND LATER RE-EVALUATION.

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16. THE VICE PRESIDENT OF CASS RESPONDED THAT CHINA PREFERS FIGURATIVE WORDS RATHER THAN MATHEMATICAL FORMULATIONS. THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAS ASSESSED HISTORICAL EVENTS BUT DOES NOT CLAIM THAT THIS IS A FINAL, UNCHANGEABLE DECISION. HE SAID HE COULD QUOTE A CHINESE PARTY LEADER (WOULD NOT SAY PRECISELY WHOM) WHO SAID THAT MAO IS CRITICIZED EVERYDAY; EVERYDAY THE PEOPLE'S DAILY VOICES DIFFERENT VIEWS ABOUT THE PAST. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS HISTORY WILL JUDGE AND THEREFORE THERE CAN BE NO FINAL JUDGEMENT. SOLARZ SAID THAT THE 30 PERCENT NEGATIVE MUST INCLUDE THE

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GREAT LEAP FORWARD AND CULTURAL REVOLUTION (THE CHINESE ALSO SUGGESTED THE ANTI-RIGHTIST MOVEMENT), HOWEVER, HE ASKED FOR EXAMPLES OF 70 PERCENT POSITIVE. THE FOUNDING OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC WAS QUICKLY MENTIONED.

17. MULTIPLE PARTIES IN CHINA. SOLARZ ASKED SINCE CHINA IS PURSUING A MARKET ECONOMY VERSUS A PLANNED ECONOMY, WHAT ABOUT A MULTIPLE PARTY POLITICAL SYSTEM. YEN JIAQI RESPONDED THAT EACH COUNTRY HAS ITS OWN POLITICAL SYSTEM -- IN THE US IT IS DIFFICULT FOR A THIRD PARTY TO EXIST WHILE FRANCE CAN NOT HAVE ONLY TWO PARTIES. EACH COUNTRY HAS DIFFERENT TYPES OF DEMOCRACY. YEN SAID THAT GLASNOST IN THE SOVIET UNION IS A PHENOMENON THAT IS INEVITABLE IN COUNTRIES WHERE LEADERS HOLD POWER FOR SO LONG, I.E., STALIN, BREZHNEV, AND MAO. CHINA IS TRYING TO DEMOCRATIZE AND GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ADJUST POLICIES EVERY FEW YEARS. CHINA IS TRYING TO DETERMINE WHAT IS THE BEST

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WAY TO CARRY OUT DEMOCRATIC REFORMS. YEN POINTED OUT THAT WITHOUT CONVENTIONAL DEMOCRATIC MECHANISMS, CHANGE COMES VIA STRIKES, REBELLIONS AND COUPS, I.E., THE PHILIPPINES, BURMA, POLAND AND THE TIAN AN MEN INCIDENT IN BEIJING. IN THE WEST, COUNTRIES ARE RULED BY LAW AND HAVE TWO PARTY SYSTEMS; CHINA MUST FIND ITS OWN WAY.

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18. YEN RECALLED THAT DURING THE REPUBLICAN PERIOD CHINA HAD SEVERAL PARTIES AND PRIOR TO 1949 THERE WERE THE KUOMINTANG AND COMMUNIST PARTIES, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE AT WAR. TODAY CHINA STILL HAS MULTIPLE

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E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: OREP (SOLARZ, STEPHEN), PREL, PGOV, PARM, CH,
UR, US, TW

SUBJ: CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ AUGUST 24 DISCUSSION AT THE

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PARTIES, ALTHOUGH THESE ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE IN THE WEST -- THEY ARE COOPERATIVE PARTIES THAT DO NOT COMPETE WITH EACH OTHER. YEN STATED THAT POLITICAL REALITY IN CHINA IS DECIDED BY THE PARTY AND SUPPORTED BY THE PEOPLE. SINCE 1949 THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAS MADE MANY MISTAKES BUT BECAUSE IT HAS MADE ITS OWN INTERNAL CORRECTIONS, IT STILL ENJOYS THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE.

17. SOLARZ OBSERVED THAT ALTHOUGH DENG IS NOT A POLITBURO MEMBER AND DOES NOT HOLD ANY STATE OR PARTY HIGH OFFICE, HE IS CONSIDERED TO BE CHINA'S SUPREME LEADER. IF HE HAS INDEED RETIRED, HOW CAN HE BE CONSIDERED THE PRE-EMINENT LEADER? WHAT DOES THIS

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SAY

ABOUT THE SOURCE OF POLITICAL POWER AND INFLUENCE IN CHINA AND THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE?

18. IN RESPONSE, VICE PRESIDENT LI ASKED SOLARZ TO LOOK AT CHINESE CULTURE, HISTORY, AND CHARACTER. THE FACT THAT DENG IS NUMBER ONE, ALTHOUGH HE DOES NOT HOLD IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT AND PARTY POSTS, IS A CHINESE CULTURAL PHENOMENON WHICH IS DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN. THE CHINESE PEOPLE, HOWEVER, ARE NOT AGAINST THIS. ALTHOUGH LI DID NOT THINK THE SITUATION WOULD LAST LONG, HE ALSO IS NOT AGAINST DENG HOLDING THE PREEMINENT POSITION. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IN FUTURE THERE WILL BE AN INSTITUTIONALIZED SYSTEM.

19. SOLARZ NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH THE WEST HAS BEEN IMPRESSED WITH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGES IN CHINA OVER THE PAST 40 YEARS, THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN SHARP TURNS TO THE LEFT, I.E., THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. SOLARZ ASKED HOW LIKELY ARE SIMILAR SHIFTS TO THE LEFT IN THE FUTURE. MS. ZI ZHONGYUN STATED THAT WITHOUT AN UNDERSTANDING OF CHINESE POLITICAL REFORM, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN. IN HER OPINION, HOWEVER, REFORM IN CHINA

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HAS REACHED A POINT OF NO RETURN. EVEN IF LEADERS WANT TO CHANGE, DUE TO THE DECENTRALIZED ECONOMY, REFORMS WILL CONTINUE. OF COURSE, SHE ADDED, NOT EVERYTHING WILL NECESSARILY BE SMOOTH -- CHAOS AND ECONOMIC CHANGES ARE POSSIBLE -- BUT CENTRAL ECONOMIC PLANNING WILL NOT RETURN.

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20. SOLARZ ASKED IF IN A LENINIST MODEL POWER IS HELD BY ONE PARTY AND CONCENTRATED AT THE TOP, WHY

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ARE SHIFTS NOT THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE. LEADERSHIP CHANGES OR CHANGES IN THINKING COULD PRODUCE FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC CHANGES. IN CHINA, HE SAID, IT SEEMS THAT MARXISM HAS BEEN TURNED ON ITS HEAD AND POLITICS DETERMINES ECONOMICS. MS ZI RESPONDED THAT ONE SHOULD NOT OVERESTIMATE THE CONCENTRATION OF POWER IN CHINA. AT PRESENT MANY POLICIES ARE NOT CARRIED OUT AT GRASSROOTS LEVELS BECAUSE OF DECENTRALIZATION. SHE ALSO BELIEVED THAT THE PRESENT MOMENTUM OF REFORM IS TOO GREAT TO TURN BACK. HER PERSONAL OPINION AS A CHINESE CITIZEN, WAS THAT REFORMS ARE INEVITABLE AND POWER HAS DECENTRALIZED TO THE POINT WHERE THE LOWER LEVELS DO WHAT THEY WANT. SHE CAUTIONED AGAINST PAYING TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO PROPAGANDA IN THE PAPERS. FOR EXAMPLE, ZI SAID, PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT OR THE MEDIA MAY LEAD TO ANTI-BOURGEOIS LIBERALISM. DISCUSSIONS, BUT THIS TYPE OF INFLUENCE CHANGES EVERYDAY.

21. LEGITIMACY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY. SOLARZ POINTED OUT THAT THE POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY HAS NO LEGITIMACY IN THE EYES OF ITS OWN PEOPLE. FOLLOWING THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD AND CULTURAL REVOLUTION, HOW MUCH LEGITIMACY DOES THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY HAVE AMONG THE PEOPLE? ZI RESPONDED THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IS DIFFERENT FROM THE POLISH PARTY. ALTHOUGH SOLARZ WAS RIGHT THAT THERE HAS BEEN A TREND OF ECONOMIC FAILURE, THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY HAS BEEN THE ONLY PARTY TO EFFECTIVELY LEAD THE PEOPLE, AND CHANGES CAME FROM WITHIN THE PARTY, NOT FROM

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E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: OREP (SOLARZ, STEPHEN), PREL, PGOV, PARM, CH,
UR, US, TW

SUBJ: CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ AUGUST 24 DISCUSSION AT THE

BELOW. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN SOME ANTI-PARTY
ACTIONS, THE PEOPLE REALIZE THAT THEY ARE NOT
POLITICALLY FREE TO REPLACE THE COMMUNIST PARTY.
CASS VICE PRESIDENT LI ADDED THAT ONLY THE COMMUNIST
PARTIES OF THE SOVIET UNION, YUGOSLAVIA, AND CHINA
LED THE PEOPLE. EVEN COMPARED WITH THE SOVIET UNION,
THE CHINESE REVOLUTION HAS GREATER LEGITIMACY AND
GRASSROOTS SUPPORT. THIS IS STILL DEBATED IN THE
SOVIET UNION SINCE THE BOLSHEVIKS WERE A RELATIVELY
SMALL, NEW PARTY WHEN THEY CAME TO POWER WHILE THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD GONE THROUGH MANY YEARS

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OF WAR. LI POINTED OUT THAT THE FORMER POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY WAS DISBANDED BY THE SOVIETS AND THE CHAIRMAN SHOT IN SIBERIA. ALTHOUGH THE CHINESE

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COMMUNIST PARTY HAS MADE SEVERAL MISTAKES, THE PARTY HAS ADMITTED THEM. REGARDING SHARP TURNS TO THE LEFT, LI SAID THEY WERE THE RESULT OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN CHINESE AND WESTERN CULTURES. REFORMS IN THE QING DYNASTY, KMT, AND CPC ERAS ALL RESULTED FROM EFFORTS TO CATCH UP WITH THE WEST. HE CLAIMED THAT THE PRESENT COURSE IS CLOSER TO THE NORMAL COURSE OF MODERNIZATION IN THE WORLD. HE WOULD NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANGES IN THE FUTURE BUT SAID THE SWINGS WOULD BE SLOWER. LI ADDED THAT AS THE CPC WAS THE ONLY POLITICAL FORCE IN MODERN TIMES TO ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE FOR CHINA, IT IS SEEN AS LEGITIMATE AND HAS THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE.

22. EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC REFORM ON FOREIGN POLICY. SOLARZ ASKED FOR VIEWS ON HOW MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM INFLUENCE FOREIGN POLICY. LI RESPONDED THAT IN THE PAST FOREIGN POLICY HAD BEEN DETERMINED BY IDEOLOGY AND THE MAJOR ISSUES WERE WORLD REVOLUTION AND CLASS STRUGGLE. AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS STRESS MODERNIZATION AND NATIONAL INTEREST.

23. CHANGING CHINESE PERCEPTION OF THE SOVIET UNION. SOLARZ NOTED THAT WHEN HE FIRST VISITED CHINA TEN YEARS AGO, CHINA SAW THE SOVIET UNION AS THE MAJOR THREAT. CHINA NOW NO LONGER SEES WAR AS INEVITABLE AND SUPPORTS ARM CONTROL -- WHY THE CHANGE? LI EXPLAINED THAT BEIJING'S ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET AND US THREATS HAD CHANGED. IN THE PAST CLASS STRUGGLE DETERMINED FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PROLETARIAT HAD TO OVERCOME THE BOURGEOISIE. THEREFORE, AT ONE POINT THE US WAS SEEN AS THE MAIN

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ENEMY. MAO HAD DISAGREEMENTS WITH MOSCOW BECAUSE HE FELT THAT IT WAS SOFT ON THE US. LATER CHINA DETERMINED THE SOVIET UNION TO BE A GREATER SOCIAL

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IMPERIALIST THAN THE US. DURING MAO'S LAST YEARS, CHINA'S MAIN FOREIGN POLICY THEME WAS TO FORM A UNITED FRONT AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS THERE HAVE BEEN FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN CHINA, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE WORLD. LI STATED THAT CHINA SEES GLOBAL PROBLEMS TO BE MAINTAINING WORLD PEACE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. REVOLUTION IS NOT GOING TO OCCUR SOON AND WORLD WAR IS NOT INEVITABLE. DURING THE CONGRESSMAN'S FIRST VISIT, CHINA'S TWO MAIN SLOGANS WERE WAR WOULD LEAD TO REVOLUTION AND REVOLUTION WOULD PREVENT WAR. NOW, HOWEVER, CHINA'S MAJOR TASKS ARE NOT WAR AND REVOLUTION AND ITS PERSPECTIVE IS APPROACHING THAT OF THE US. THIS CHANGE IN PERCEPTION MAY BE DUE TO THE REALIZATION THAT PAST ASSESSMENTS WERE NOT IN ACCORD WITH REALITY. MS ZI ADDED THAT REALITY HAS ALSO CHANGED WITH THE SOVIET UNION LESS AGGRESSIVE AND THE WORLD TREND TOWARDS PEACE. SHE ALSO NOTED THAT PRC LEADERS' KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD HAS IMPROVED SO THEIR OBSERVATIONS ARE CLOSER TO REALITY.

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24. GLOBAL TRENDS TOWARDS PEACE. THE CONGRESSMAN PICKED UP ON THIS THEME NOTING THAT DURING THE PAST FEW MONTHS THERE HAD BEEN POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN, CEASEFIRE BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA AND WITHDRAWAL OF CUBANS FROM ANGOLA, AND DEVELOPMENTS IN NICARAGUA. HE ASKED WHETHER THE

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E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: OREP (SOLARZ, STEPHEN), PREL, PGOV, PARM, CH,
UR, US, TW

SUBJ: CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ AUGUST 24 DISCUSSION AT THE

EVENTS WERE ISOLATED OR RELATED. ZHANG JINGYI
RESPONDED THAT WHEN ANALYZING THE SOVIET SITUATION,
US SCHOLARS HAVE THREE QUESTIONS: WILL GORBACHEV'S
REFORMS SUCCEED, ARE THEY IN THE INTEREST OF THE US,
AND HOW WILL THE US DEAL WITH THEM. HE ARGUED THAT
THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO ARMS CONTROL BECAUSE THEY
ARE OVER EXTENDED. FROM A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE THE
GLOBAL ATMOSPHERE HAS RELAXED BUT TO SEE HOW FAR, ONE
MUST EXAMINE DEEDS, NOT JUST WORDS. ZHANG SAID THAT
WHEN CHINA SAYS WAR IS NO LONGER INEVITABLE, IT MEANS
WORLD WAR. LOCAL WARS, OR TO USE US TERMINOLOGY, LOW
INTENSITY CONFLICTS, STILL EXIST. ZHANG SAID THAT
SURROUNDING CHINA, FOR EXAMPLE, VIETNAME IS
BELLIGERENT AND OCCUPIES CAMBODIA. BEHIND MANY OF

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THESE CONFLICTS ONE CAN FIND THE SOVIET SHADOW AND
CHINA DOES NOT THINK THERE IS NO DANGER.

25. CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET ARMS CONTROL:
SOLARZ MENTIONED THAT THERE APPEAR TO BE TWO MAIN
OBSTACLES IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS
(START) -- DIFFERENCES OVER SDI AND LIMITATIONS ON
SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. WITH SDI THE SOVIETS
WILL NOT AGREE TO A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR

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STRATEGIC WARHEADS UNLESS THE US ABANDONS ITS TRADITIONAL VIEW OF THE ABM TREATY. MOSCOW ALSO WOULD LIKE TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. BECAUSE THERE IS NO WAY TO VERIFY LIMITS ON SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, HOWEVER, THE US OBJECTS. SOLARZ ASKED FOR CHINA'S POSITION? ZHANG SAID THAT CHINA IS JUST LEARNING ABOUT ARMS CONTROL. MOST COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD HAVE WEAK ARMIES AND DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL. TEN YEARS AGO CHINA SAID THAT US AND SOVIET ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS WERE A SHAM OR TRAP. AND HISTORICALLY SPEAKING, TEN YEARS AGO, IN REALITY NOT MUCH WAS DONE. TODAY, HOWEVER, CHINA HAS A MORE POSITIVE ASSESSMENT. ZHANG SAID THAT OBJECTIVELY SPEAKING THE US OPENLY TALKS ABOUT SDI WHILE THE SOVIETS DO NOT, ALTHOUGH THEY ALSO HAVE IT. HE DID OBSERVE THAT A CONTINUED ARMS RACE WOULD HINDER DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION.

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26. SOLARZ ASKED SINCE THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT SDI WILL LEAD TO AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ARGUES THAT SDI WILL PREVENT NUCLEAR ATTACK, WHERE DOES CHINA STAND. ZHANG RESPONDED THAT

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THE QUESTION WAS VERY COMPLICATED. IF THE SOVIET POSITION IS HONESTLY CORRECT THAT SDI MEANS AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE, THEN CHINA AGREES WITH MOSCOW. IF, HOWEVER, REAGAN IS RIGHT THAT SDI WILL PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR, THEN CHINA CANNOT DISAGREE WITH WASHINGTON. RICHARD BUSH FOLLOWED UP BY OBSERVING THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION HAS SDI, THEN CHINA'S RELATIVELY SMALL NUCLEAR FORCE WOULD BE NEUTRALIZED. ZHANG RESPONDED THAT THE QUESTION HAD TWO ASPECTS POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ACTUAL WAR FIGHTING. SINCE CHINA'S NUCLEAR FORCE IS SMALL AND IF THE SOVIET UNION HAS SDI, PSYCHOLOGICALLY, CHINA'S DETERRENCE IS GONE. HOWEVER, SDI CAN NOT PROTECT ALL OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM CHIENSE MISSILES. SOLARZ ASKED IF CHINA WOULD SUPPORT AN AGREEMENT TO ELIMINATE ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR DID CHINA BELIEVE THIS IS UNVERIFIABLE. ZHANG RESPONDED IN TWO PARTS. CHINA WAS THE FIRST TO RAISE THE ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR MISSILES. SECONDLY, GENUINE VERIFICATION IS COMPLICATED AND VERY EXPENSIVE. SOLARZ STATED THAT A

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SITUATION IS DEVELOPING WHERE THE SOVIET UNION CAN
FUNDAMENTALLY TRANSFORM THE ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE US. DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS THE WITHDRAWAL
FROM AFGHANISTAN, WHICH WOULD WERE UNTHINKABLE NOT
LONG AGO, ARE PROMISING. THE SOVIETS HAVE
SIGNIFICANT SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS,
TANKS, ARTILLARY, ETC. BETWEEN THE ATLANTIC AND THE
URALS. SHOULD MOSCOW APPROVE A CONVENTIONAL ARMS
AGREEMENT WHERE BOTH SIDES AGREE TO AN EQUAL NUMBER
OF ALL KINDS OF WEAPONRY, THIS WOULD REQUIRE AN
ASYMMETRICAL SOVIET REDUCTION OF ALL KINDS OF

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TAGS: OREP (SOLARZ, STEPHEN), PREL, PGOV, PARM, CH,
UR, US, TW

SUBJ: CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ AUGUST 24 DISCUSSION AT THE

WEAPONS. SOLARZ SAID IF THE SOVIETS SERIOUSLY AGREE TO RELINQUISH SUPERIORITY, THIS WOULD SIGNAL A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE. AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS ARE CLAIMING OVERALL PARITY AND THERE IS NO EXCHANGE OF DATA. THE MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION TALKS IN VIENNA HAD NO RESULTS BECAUSE THE US AND USSR COULD NOT AGREE ON THE DATA. SOLARZ SAID THAT ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO BE OPTIMISTIC, FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II, IT IS POSSIBLE TO THINK A SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE. AND, IF THERE IS SUCH AN AGREEMENT, THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND CENTRAL AMERICA COULD CREATE THE BASIS FOR LASTING PEACE INTO THE 21ST CENTURY. SOLARZ QUOTED CHURCHILL FOLLOWING THE

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DEFEAT OF ROMMEL BY MONTGOMERY IN WORLD WAR II THAT THIS IS NOT THE END OF THE BEGINNING, NOR THE BEGINNING OF THE END, BUT THE BEGINNING OF THE BEGINNING.

27. NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND INDIA AND PAKISTAN. SOLARZ MENTIONED THE INCIPIENT ARMS RACE BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN WILL NOT AGREE TO SIGN THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) UNLESS INDIA DOES AND INDIA IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE NUCLEAR THREAT FROM PAKISTAN AND CHINA. SOLARZ SAID THAT IF CHINA DOES NOT SIGN THE NPT THEN INDIA WILL LIKELY NOT SIGN EITHER. SOLARZ ASKED, IN THE INTERESTS OF REGIONAL PEACE AND PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE, WOULD CHINA SIGN THE NPT, PROVIDED INDIA AND PAKISTAN DO. HE ALSO ASKED WHETHER CHINA WAS CONCERNED ABOUT A PAKISTAN-INDIAN NUCLEAR WAR.

28. LI RESPONDED THAT CHINA DOES NOT WANT WAR BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN AND HAS ALWAYS HOPED THAT THE BOMBS DROPPED ON HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI ARE THE FIRST AND LAST NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BE USED. HE EXPLAINED THAT CHINA HAS A MORAL STANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- THEIR TOTAL ELIMINATION. ALTHOUGH CHINA HAS NOT SIGNED THE NPT, IT HAS STATED THAT IT IS AGAINST PROLIFERATION. THE CHINESE PREMIER HAS

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STATED THIS AT THE WHITE HOUSE. LI NOTED THAT MANY NATIONS HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IF THE US COULD CONVINCE ISRAEL TO SIGN THE NPT, CHINA MIGHT CONSIDER IT.

29. PRC-TAIWAN RELATIONS. WITH RECENT PRESS REFORMS, THE ELECTION OF A TAIWANESE PRESIDENT,

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GROWTH OF OPPOSITION PARTIES, AND INCREASED FREEDOM, SOLARZ ASKED, WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OR IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINESE-TAIWAN RELATIONS? LI RESPONDED THAT IN GENERAL, CHINA WELCOMES THESE DEVELOPMENTS. HE PERSONALLY WAS VERY RELIEVED TO SEE THAT CHAOS DID NOT FOLLOW CHIANG CHING-KUO'S DEATH BECAUSE CHAOS WOULD MAKE CHINESE-TAIWANESE RELATIONS DIFFICULT AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE MIGHT BE UPSET.

30. LI RECALLED THAT FOUR YEARS AGO WHEN HE WAS IN WASHINGTON, SOLARZ HAD DISCUSSED DEMOCRATIZATION WITH HIM. SINCE CHINA IS SEEKING DEMOCRACY, WHY SHOULD IT OPPOSE SIMILAR DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN? IN TERMS OF CHINESE TRADITION, HOWEVER, OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE A NEW PHENOMENA. IN TERMS OF FUTURE DEMOCRATIZATION, LI MENTIONED THAT THREE WEEKS EARLIER HE HAD MET WITH DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY (DPP) LEGISLATIVE YUAN STAFF AIDES IN BEIJING. THEY TOLD HIM THEY HAD A DILEMMA -- THEY WANT INDEPENDENCE BUT ARE AFRAID, AND THEY WANT REUNIFICATION BUT ARE ALSO AFRAID. LI SAID HE FRANKLY TOLD THEM THEY SHOULD SEEK REUNIFICATION. HE SAID THAT CHINA IS CONCERNED TAIWAN WILL SEEK INDEPENDENCE. CHINA AND TAIWAN DO NOT HAVE PERFECT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS. LI SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE CPC AND KMT ARE BOTH REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES AND THERE IS NO CONCEPT OF LOYAL OPPOSITION; HE HOPED THAT THE DPP WOULD BE A LOYAL OPPOSITION PARTY. LI SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT SOLARZ HAS INFLUENCE WITH THE DPP. HE SAID THE WITHIN THE KMT, PEOPLE WANT TO ELIMINATE ANTAGONISM AND WORK ON COMMON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. CASS VICE PRESIDENT LI

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R 020918Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8600
INFO AIT TAIPEI
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL SHENYANG POUCH)

SECTION 09 OF 10 BEIJING 26114

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: OREP (SOLARZ, STEPHEN), PREL, PGOV, PARM, CH,
UR, US, TW

SUBJ: CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ AUGUST 24 DISCUSSION AT THE

NOTED THAT CHEN LI-FU, THE KMT'S SECOND MOST
ANTI-COMMUNIST FIGURE, HAD SAID TAIWAN SHOULD
NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH CHINA. BEIJING WELCOMED THIS
DEVELOPMENT.

31. SOLARZ NOTED THAT DEMOCRATIZATION IN TAIWAN IS
MOVING FORWARD TO THE POINT THAT PERHAPS BY THE END
OF THE CENTURY IT MIGHT HAVE A GENUINE MULTI-PARTY
SYSTEM AND THE DDP MIGHT BE THE RULING PARTY. HE
ASKED IF BOTH THE KMT AND DPP WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO
BEIJING. LI SAID HE COULD NOT ANSWER BUT FOUND IT
HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THE DPP WOULD TAKE POWER. HE
THOUGHT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO JUDGE WHETHER THE KMT OR

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DPP IS PREFERABLE BUT SAID THAT HE HAD SUGGESTED TO
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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THE DPP THAT IN ORDER TO SUCCEED THEY MUST CONSIDER THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 19 MILLION PEOPLE ON TAIWAN; PARTISAN POLITICS WOULD OBSTRUCT THEM.

32. LI SAID THAT ISSUES OF DEMOCRATIZATION, THE EMERGENCE OF OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES, OR THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN POLITICAL CONCEPTS IN TAIWAN ARE NOT AS IMPORTANT AS PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION WITH THE MAINLAND. HE SAID THAT REUNIFICATION WOULD NOT ONLY BE GOOD FROM A NATIONALISTIC PERSPECTIVE BUT IMPROVED MAINLAND-TAIWAN RELATIONS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE IN EAST ASIAN AND THE WHOLE WORLD.

33. HONG KONG AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TAIWAN. SOLARZ ASKED HOW MUCH A SUCCESSFUL REUNIFICATION OF HONG KONG WILL INFLUENCE TAIWAN. LI SAID THAT THE TWO SITUATIONS ARE CERTAINLY RELATED AND CHINA HOPES THE TRANSITION WILL BE SMOOTH; CONDITIONS FOR A SMOOTH TRANSITION EXIST. FRANKLY SPEAKING HE SAID THAT IF HONG KONG'S TRANSITION IS NOT GOOD, THERE WILL BE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON REUNIFICATION EFFORTS WITH TAIWAN. SOLARZ ALSO ASKED IF CHINA'S "ONE-COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS" POLICY IS A PERMANENT RELATIONSHIP OR A TRANSITIONAL ONE FOR 50 YEARS. LI DEMURRED THAT HE WAS NOT A PROPHET AND THAT THE "ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS" CONCEPT IS DENG'S IDEA. HE SAID THE "ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS" SITUATION CAN LAST FIFTY YEARS AND CONTINUE FOR ANOTHER FIFTY YEARS AND AFTER THAT WILL NOT BE NEEDED. LI SAID IT IS HARD TO PREDICT WHAT WILL BE HAPPENING ON THE MAINLAND OR TAIWAN IN 50 OR 100 YEARS OR WHAT POLITICAL SYSTEMS THEY WILL HAVE. HE DID SAY HE HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD HAVE ONE SYSTEM -- MOST LIKELY ONE DIFFERENT FROM
[REDACTED]
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WHAT THEY HAVE NOW, COMBINING THE BEST FORM BOTH SYSTEMS.

34. CHINESE CONCERNS ABOUT US POLICY. SOLARZ ASKED IF HIS CASS HOSTS HAD ANY QUESTIONS THEY WOULD LIKE

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TO POSE. LI EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT DURING THE PAST DECADE IDEOLOGY HAS HAD GREAT INFLUENCE ON US FOREIGN POLICY. CHINA BELIEVES THAT THIS IS NOT PRACTICAL. REGARDING PERESTROYKA AND GLASNOST IN THE SOVIET UNION, LI SAID, THE SPEED OF THE REFORMS MAY IN FACT HELP OR HINDER GORBACHEV'S REFORMS. HE SAID THAT SOVIET REFORMS ARE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF CHINA AND THE US. FROM A NON-IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, HE HOPED THAT THE REFORMS WOULD RELAX WORLD TENSION AND MOVE THE SOVIETS TOWARDS A MARKET ECONOMY. HE ALSO HOPED THAT DEMOCRACY WOULD PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND FELT THAT THESE ARE COMMON VALUES -- WHAT IS GOOD FOR THE SOVIET UNION IS GOOD FOR CHINA AND THE WHOLE WORLD. SOLARZ RESPONDED THAT CHINA NEED NOT BE TOO CONCERNED WITH THE US MERGING IDEOLOGY WITH FOREIGN POLICY. THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK TRUTH FROM FACTS.

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35. LI CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIBET AND THE DOLE AMENDMENT REGARDING MISSILE PROLIFERATION HAD HURT CHINA'S NATIONALISTIC FEELINGS. FURTHERMORE, SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE TIBETAN PEOPLE EITHER. HE SAID CHINA WOULD LIKE THE US TO SEEK TRUTH FROM FACTS IN FOREIGN POLICY AND AVOID IDEOLOGY. IN CONCLUSION SOLARZ SAID HE WAS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8601
INFO AIT TAIPEI
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL SHENYANG POUCH)

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SECTION 10 OF 10 BEIJING 26114

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: OREP (SOLARZ, STEPHEN), PREL, PGOV, PARM, CH,
UR, US, TW
SUBJ: CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ AUGUST 24 DISCUSSION AT THE

GLAD CHINA WAS LISTENING TO WHAT CONGRESS HAD TO SAY
BECAUSE NO ONE IN THE US WAS. LORD

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INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5268
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USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
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AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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CASE #
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USTR FOR GODEC
USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA
USIS FOR BILL MURPHY

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: IN, PREL, PGOV

SUBJECT: INDIAN MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 29
- FEBRUARY 13, 1996

SUBJECTS COVERED IN THIS REPORT

1. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
2. NUCLEAR ISSUES: SOUTH ASIA
3. NUCLEAR ISSUES: CHINA/PAKISTAN

PAGE ONE STORIES

1. BRITAIN DEPORTS PAKISTAN MISSION EMPLOYEE:

-- THE HINDU FRONT-PAGED A LONDON CORRESPONDENT STORY
STATING THAT A JUNIOR EMPLOYEE OF THE PAKISTAN HIGH
COMMISSION HAS BEEN SERVED WITH A DEPORTATION ORDER BY
THE BRITISH HOME OFFICE ON CONFIRMATION THAT HE WAS
INVOLVED IN THE SMUGGLING OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL. A REPORT
IN THE BUSINESS STANDARD SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE BRITISH

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GOVERNMENT DID NOT GIVE FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT THE
EXPULSION, IT IS BELIEVED THAT MOHAMMAD SALIM WAS
INVOLVED IN ORGANIZING A SHIPMENT OF NUCLEAR-RELATED
EQUIPMENT FROM SWEDEN TO PAKISTAN VIA HEATHROW AIRPORT
LAST NOVEMBER. THE SHIPMENT CONTAINED LASER MEASURING
EQUIPMENT USED IN NUCLEAR CENTRIFUGES TO ENRICH URANIUM.

1. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

--"JUSTICE IN BOSNIA," EDITORIAL IN THE STATESMAN:

"THE UNITED NATIONS FACE A NEW CRISIS OF CONSCIENCE IN BOSNIA. THE DAYTON ACCORDS BIND ALL PARTIES--TO DO ALL IN THEIR POWER TO BRING THOSE INDICTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL TO TRIAL, BUT THE SERBS HAVE ALWAYS HAD RESERVATIONS...THE QUESTION ARISES WHO IS TO HUNT THEM DOWN AND TAKE THEM INTO CUSTODY....

"THE PROBLEM LIES IN THE LACK OF POLITICAL WILL ON THE PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY BUT IS DEPENDENT ON NATO FORCES IN THE FIELD TO DELIVER THOSE INDICTED. THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN ARE COMMITTED TO PURSUE THE CRIMINALS BUT OTHERS ARE SWAYED BY ALL MANNER OF EXTRANEIOUS CONSIDERATIONS.... THERE CAN BE NO TWO OPINIONS THAT UNSPEAKABLE HORRORS HAVE BEEN COMMITTED AND NOT ONLY BY THE SERBS....

"THE CALL IS NOT FOR VENGEANCE, IT IS FOR JUSTICE.
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THE POPULATION OF THE WHOLE OF BOSNIA MUST BE REASSURED THAT SUCH CRIMES WILL NEVER RECUR AND THE ONLY WAY TO CARRY THAT ASSURANCE IS TO BRING THE GUILTY TO JUSTICE.... THERE WILL BE NO PEACE IN BOSNIA, NEVER MIND THE DAYTON OR ANY OTHER ACCORDS, UNTIL JUSTICE HAS BEEN DONE, OR MORE TO THE POINT, IS SEEN TO BE DONE. PUSSYFOOTING IS NOT GOING TO HELP. IT NEEDS NO GREAT PERCEPTION TO SEE THAT THE INDICTED LEADERS ARE LYING LOW HOPING THE STORM WILL PASS. IF THEY ARE NOT HUNTED DOWN AS THEY DESERVE, THEY WILL RAISE AGAIN WHEN THEY THINK THE TIME IS RIGHT.... THEY ARE LAUGHING AT NATO AND AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL. LASTLY IT IS BEYOND BELIEF THAT MLADIC AND KARADZIC CANNOT BE APPREHENDED AND BROUGHT TO THE HAGUE IF THERE IS THE WILL TO ENFORCE THE LAW."

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2. NUCLEAR ISSUES: SOUTH ASIA

--"WELCOME PROPOSAL," EDITORIAL IN THE TIMES OF INDIA:

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AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

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USIS FOR BILL MURPHY

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TAGS: IN, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: INDIAN MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 29
- FEBRUARY 13, 1996

"BREAKING WITH TRADITION... MAHBUB UL HAQ, THE FORMER
FINANCE AND PLANNING MINISTER OF PAKISTAN, HAS SUGGESTED
THAT INDIA AND PAKISTAN FORGE A NEW UNDERSTANDING ON THE
NUCLEAR ISSUE RATHER THAN EMBARRASS EACH OTHER IN
INTERNATIONAL FORUMS.... HAQ FORCEFULLY ARGUES IN FAVOR
OF PAKISTAN AND INDIA MAKING COMMON CAUSE ON THE
QUESTION OF FULL MEMBERSHIP OF THE WORLD NUCLEAR CLUB,
WHICH, ACCORDING TO HIM, HAS SEVEN AND NOT FIVE
MEMBERS. ONCE THAT IS DONE, BOTH COUNTRIES CAN ACCEPT
THE RIGHTS AND THE OBLIGATIONS THAT GO WITH THE NPT,
INCLUDING SIGNING THE CTBT.... LAST YEAR, FORMER
PAKISTANI FOREIGN SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER ABDUL

SATTAR...HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE THREE NUCLEAR CAPABLE STATES, ISRAEL, PAKISTAN AND INDIA BE MADE TO ACCEPT THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NPT THROUGH A PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY.... THESE PAKISTANI IDEAS ARE COMPLEMENTARY TO THE INDIAN OFFER TO PAKISTAN CONVEYED IN THE NON-PAPER OF JANUARY 1994 TO CONCLUDE A BILATERAL TREATY ON NO
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FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY BY EITHER COUNTRY....

"PAKISTAN HAS SIGNALLED THROUGH THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF...BENAZIR BHUTTO...NAWAZ SHARIF AND GENERAL ASLAM BEG AFTER THEY DEMITTED OFFICE THAT IT HAS DETERRENT CAPABILITY. SO HAS INDIA THROUGH ITS OFFER OF NO FIRST USE. IF THE TWO NATIONS CAN ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE AND CAN COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A NO-FIRST USE DOCTRINE THEN THEY WILL BE ABLE TO REMOVE THE ISSUE FROM THE AMBIT OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH CAN ONLY BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF BOTH COUNTRIES.... THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE INDIAN STRATEGIC COMMUNITY...SHOULD PRESS FOR EXPERT-LEVEL DIALOGUES AT BOTH OFFICIAL AND NON-OFFICIAL LEVELS WITH THEIR PAKISTANI COUNTERPARTS."

3. NUCLEAR ISSUES: CHINA/PAKISTAN

SUMMARY:

THE HINDU'S STRATEGIC AFFAIRS EDITOR C. RAJA MOHAN WROTE FROM GENEVA THAT THE DEEPENING SINO-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR NEXUS AND THE U.S. RESPONSE--OR THE LACK OF IT--VINDICATE MUCH OF THE INDIAN SKEPTICISM ON NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES WHETHER REGIONAL OR GLOBAL. MOHAN OBSERVED, ALSO REFLECTED IN TWO OTHER EDITORIALS, THAT WASHINGTON'S HESITATION IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS ON CHINA, MAINLY DUE TO POLITICO/COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, HAS
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STEADILY ERODED THE CREDIBILITY OF AMERICAN
PRONOUNCEMENTS ON NON-PROLIFERATION. THE BUSINESS
STANDARD'S WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT SUJATA SHENOY NOTED
THAT U.S. OPINION WAS SPLIT ON THE ISSUE OF IMPOSING
SANCTIONS ON CHINA.

BLOCK QUOTES:

--"WILL U.S. WRIGGLE OUT," EDITORIAL IN THE INDIAN
EXPRESS:

"PRESIDENT CLINTON IS NOT ABOUT TO THANK PAKISTAN
FOR PUTTING HIM IN A TIGHT SPOT ON NON-PROLIFERATION.
THE QUESTION IS WHAT SPECIFIC ACTION IS HE CONTEMPLATING
FOLLOWING THE LATEST CHINESE TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR
EQUIPMENT TO PAKISTAN'S SUSPECTED WEAPONS FACILITY...AT
KAHUTA...IT WILL NOT BE EASY FOR...CLINTON TO WRIGGLE
OUT OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES THIS TIME. HE MAY STILL GET
AWAY W
ITH PRETENDING, AS HE DID WITH THE SALE OF M-11
MISSILES TO PAKISTAN, THAT THE EVIDENCE IS NOT

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AMEMBASSY BEIJING
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AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
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AMCONSUL KARACHI
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STATE FOR NSC
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USTR FOR GODEC
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USIS FOR BILL MURPHY

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SUBJECT: INDIAN MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 29

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ADEQUATE. HE MAY STILL BE ABLE TO PERSUADE SOME AMERICANS THAT THE NATIONAL INTEREST IS SERVED BY TURNING A BLIND EYE TO CONTRAVENTION OF DOMESTIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL TREATY....

"EACH TIME WASHINGTON DUCKS ACTION AND REPOSES FAITH IN THE PROTESTATIONS OF INNOCENCE FROM THE ACCUSED, IT EXPOSES ITS LOUDLY PROCLAIMED MISSION OF POLICING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TO THE RIDICULE OF ITS ALLIES AND THE CONTEMPT OF RISING POWERS LIKE CHINA.... WHAT IS HOLDING...CLINTON BACK FROM TAKING ACTION? CLEARLY CHINA MORE THAN PAKISTAN.... HAVING SUCCEEDED IN BREAKING THE HUMAN RIGHTS-TRADE LINKAGES, BEIJING HAS EVIDENTLY BEEN TEMPTED TO TEST THE LIMITS ON NON-PROLIFERATION....

"ISLAMABAD...BELIEVES WASHINGTON WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ACT SELECTIVELY AGAINST PAKISTAN. IN SHORT, NEITHER COUNTRY TAKES AMERICA AT ITS WORD. WHILE THE U.S.

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LEADERS DIGEST THE MEANING OF THIS IT MIGHT DO SOME GOOD TO REMIND THEM OF CERTAIN OTHER FACTS. THE RECORD SHOWS INDIA HAS BEEN A SCRUPULOUS NON- PROLIFERATOR, NEITHER EXPORTING WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY NOR MAKING CLANDESTINE PURCHASES. THIS COUNTRY SHOULD NOT BE PRESENTED WITH

--"CHINA SHATTERS THE NUCLEAR ORDER," ANALYSIS IN THE HINDU BY STRATEGIC AFFAIRS EDITOR C. RAJA MOHAN WRITING FROM GENEVA: --

"IN CONTINUING TO ASSIST THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM OF PAKISTAN, CHINA HAS DRIVEN A STAKE INTO THE HEART OF THE GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. BY PARALYSING THE U.S. INTO INACTION ON THIS BLATANT TRANSGRESSION OF THE NPT AND AMERICAN DOMESTIC LAW, BEIJING HAS ALSO HELPED REVEAL THE TRUE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. THE PURSUIT OF NATIONAL INTEREST BY STATES REMAINS THE SUPREME LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, DESPITE THE FORMAL NOISES THAT GREAT POWERS MAKE ON COMMITMENT TO SUCH UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES AS NON-PROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS....

"THE U.S. HAS NOT BEEN UNAWARE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COOPERATION BETWEEN BEIJING AND ISLAMABAD THAT BEGAN IN THE LATE 1970S AND HAS DEEPEENED SINCE.... THE CHINESE TRANSGRESSION OF THE NPT VINDICATES ONCE AGAIN THE INDIAN REJECTION OF THE TREATY. THE INDIAN CRITIQUE OF THE NPT AS BEING 'UNJUST' AND 'DISCRIMINATORY' IS WELL-KNOWN. LESS
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APPRECIATED IS THE INDIAN ASSESSMENT THAT THE NPT IS 'INEFFECTIVE'.... THE GREATEST WEAKNESS OF THE NPT LIES IN DELIBERATE ABSENCE OF PROVISIONS TO VERIFY WHETHER THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES ARE IMPLEMENTING THEIR NON-PROLIFERATION COMMITMENT UNDER THE TREATY....

"HOWEVER HIGH THE PRIORITY ATTACHED TO UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES SUCH AS NON-PROLIFERATION IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, NO GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. CAN IGNORE THE LARGER POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN THE ENGAGEMENT OF CHINA.... BY LAW THE U.S. IS TODAY MANDATED TO IMPOSE SEVERE TRADE SANCTIONS AGAINST CHINA ON TWO COUNTS: ONE SET ARISING OUT OF CHINESE TRANSFER OF M-11 MISSILES TO PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER LOT GENERATED BY THE CHINESE TRANSFER OF RING MAGNETS FOR THE PAKISTANI ENRICHMENT PROGRAM. BUT THE STATEMENTS FROM THE SPOKESMEN OF THE

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CLINTON ADMINISTRATION MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE U.S. IS
UNDER CONSIDERABLE COMPULSION TO FUDGE THE ISSUE....
THE PROBLEM FOR THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IS NOT THE
LACK OF EVIDENCE, BUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMPOSING THE
SANCTIONS. NON-PROLIFERATION LAWS THAT SOUND TOUGH BUT

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	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01	EB-01	EUR-01	INLB-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	PA-00	PM-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	T-00	SNIS-00
	NISC-00	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	/030W		

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O 130859Z FEB 96
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4401
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5271
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
FBIS BANGKOK TH
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

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USIA FOR NEA, R/MR, I/TIC, I/R, I/GAR, I/REC, I/RW,
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STATE FOR SA/INS, PM/CBM, PM/PRO T AND ACDA
STATE FOR NSC
STATE FOR AID/APRE-A
USTR FOR GODEC
USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA
USIS FOR BILL MURPHY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: IN, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: INDIAN MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 29
- FEBRUARY 13, 1996

ARE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT HAVE STEADILY ERODED THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE AMERICAN PRONOUNCEMENTS ON
NON-PROLIFERATION. BUT THE DILEMMAS OF THE CLINTON
ADMINISTRATION ARE INDEED REAL....

"THE DEEPENING SINO-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR NEXUS AND THE
U.S. RESPONSE--OR THE LACK OF IT--VINDICATE MUCH OF THE
INDIAN SCEPTICISM ON NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES WHETHER
REGIONAL OR GLOBAL. MORE IMPORTANT, IT FORCES NEW DELHI
TO CONFRONT THE FACT THAT IT CANNOT DEPEND ON GLOBAL
ARMS CONTROL REGIMES OR THE LAWS OF THE U.S. TO ENSURE
ITS SECURITY. FOR INDIA THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO
BUILDING ITS OWN STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES."

--"U.S. OPINION SPLIT ON CHINA SANCTIONS," ANALYSIS IN
THE BUSINESS STANDARD BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT
SUJATHA SHENOY:

"U.S. BUSINESS GROUPS ARE PRESSING FOR SANCTIONS
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AGAINST CHINA, BUT MANY IN GOVERNMENT FEEL THAT THE
EMBARGO SHOULD BE WAIVED 'IN THE LARGER NATIONAL
INTEREST'.... U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE MICKEY
KANTOR...IS REPORTEDLY AMONG THOSE PRESSING FOR
SANCTIONS.... WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION ITSELF, SAY
SOURCES, UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR SECURITY AFFAIRS
LYNN DAVIS IS URGING SANCTIONS TO SEND A CLEAR SIGNAL
ABOUT THE U.S. STANCE ON PROLIFERATION ISSUES. OTHER
SENIOR OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, ARE WEIGHING THE POSSIBLE
FALLOUT OF BLACKLISTING TRADE WITH CHINA....
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ARE NOW HAVING TO CONTEND WITH
INCREASING SCRUTINY BY CONGRESSIONAL CRITICS....

"CHINA IS ALREADY UNDER FIRE ON CAPITOL HILL FOR ITS
POOR HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD AND THE RECENT ADOPTION OF AN
AGGRESSIVE POSTURE TOWARDS TAIWAN. TWO YEARS AGO, THE
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION CHOSE TO DELINK HUMAN RIGHTS FROM
CHINA'S...MFN STATUS AFTER THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
REFUSED TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS. THE DECISION WAS A
REVERSAL OF CLINTON'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN PLEDGE."

--"AMERICAN DOUBLESPEAK," EDITORIAL IN FEBRUARY 10
HINDI-LANGUAGE NAVBHARAT TIMES:

"CHINA HAS MADE A MOCKERY OF U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION
EFFORTS LIKE NO ONE ELSE HAS. THE U.S. EXPRESSES
CONCERN EVERY TIME CHINA VIOLATES THE NPT AND THE MTCR,
BUT DESISTS FROM TAKING ANY ACTION SAYING THAT THERE IS
NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE.... THE U.S. OBSEQUIOUSNESS ONLY
MAKES CHINA EVEN MORE DIFFERENTLY TOWARDS IT. CHINA
KNOWS THE U.S. WEAKNESS ONLY TOO WELL--IT WILL SACRIFICE
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ITS PRINCIPLES AT THE ALTAR OF ITS ECONOMIC INTERESTS.
WILLS

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ACTION SA-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00
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	INR-00	IO-00	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	PA-00	PM-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	T-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	/029W

-----39D60B 161035Z /38

O 161025Z MAY 96
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4997
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7966
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
FBIS BANGKOK TH
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CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
USDOC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 005534

USIA FOR NEA, R/MR, I/TIC, I/R, I/GAR, I/REC, I/RW,
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CASE #
9702298

Date Printed: 07/17/1997

DOC_NUMBER: 96NEWDE05534

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STATE FOR SA/INS, PM/CBM, PM/PRO T AND ACDA
STATE FOR NSC
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USTR FOR GODEC
USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA
USIS FOR BILL MURPHY

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: IN, PREL, PGOV

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION MIDDLE EAST ASIAN SECURITY
-NUCLEAR ISSUES

SUBJECTS COVERED IN THIS REPORT

1. MIDDLE EAST
2. ASIAN SECURITY: U.S.-CHINA
3. NUCLEAR ISSUES

PAGE ONE STORIES

1. PRESIDENT INVITES BJP LEADER VAJPAYEE TO FORM GOVERNMENT:

-- DAYS OF SPECULATION AND POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY IN NEW DELHI ENDED ON WEDNESDAY WHEN PRESIDENT S.D. SHARMA INVITED HINDU- NATIONALIST BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY (BJP) LEADER ATAL BEHARI VAJPAYEE TO HEAD THE UNION GOVERNMENT AND PROVE HIS MAJORITY ON THE FLOOR OF THE LOK SABHA (LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT) BY MAY 31. VAJPAYEE, A

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PARLIAMENTARIAN OF NEARLY 40 YEARS STANDING, WAS SWORN IN AS INDIA'S 11TH PRIME MINISTER AT THE RASHTRAPATI BHAWAN (PRESIDENTIAL PALACE) AT NOON TODAY AT THE HEAD OF A 11-MEMBER MINISTRY. THIS IS THE FIRST-EVER BJP-LED GOVERNMENT AT THE CENTER. REPORTS SAID PRESIDENT SHARMA ASKED VAJPAYEE TO FORM THE NEW GOVERNMENT SHORTLY AFTER 2 P.M. ON WEDNESDAY, SETTING AT REST SPECULATION ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT NO PARTY HAD

EMERGED A CLEAR WINNER IN THE ELECTIONS TO THE 11TH LOK SABHA. VAJPAYEE REPORTEDLY ASSURED THE PRESIDENT THAT THE BJP AND ITS ALLIES WOULD BE ABLE TO FORM A COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH THE SUPPORT OF OTHER PARTIES.

-- THE BJP-LED BLOCK COMMANDS A STRENGTH OF 195 RIGHT NOW IN THE 543-MEMBER LOK SABHA (OF WHICH ELECTIONS WERE HELD FOR 537 SEATS). THE BJP HAS 160 SEATS ON ITS OWN AND ITS ALLIES--SHIV SENA (16), SAMATA PARTY (EIGHT), AKALI DAL (EIGHT) AND HARYANA VIKAS PARTY (THREE)--HAVE A STRENGTH OF 35 MEMBERS.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO INVITE BJP TO FORM THE GOVERNMENT WAS MET WITH ANGUISH AND ANGER BY THE THIRD FRONT, THE CONGLOMERATE OF 16 POLITICAL PARTIES LED BY THE NATIONAL FRONT- LEFT FRONT COMBINE. EVEN THOUGH THE CONGRESS PARTY WITH 136 MEMBERS HAD PLEDGED ITS SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE TO THE THIRD FRONT, REPORTS SAID THE RELEVANT OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION DID NOT REACH THE PRESIDENT UNTIL AFTER VAJPAYEE GOT THE GO-AHEAD ON WEDNESDAY. THE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO VAJPAYEE WAS IN LINE WITH CONVENTION AND PREDOMINANT LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL OPINION THAT THE PARTY EMERGING AS THE
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SINGLE LARGEST ONE IN A HUNG PARLIAMENT SHOULD BE INVITED FIRST TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF FORMING THE GOVERNMENT. REPORTS SAID AN ENRAGED THIRD FRONT HAS DECIDED TO LAUNCH A COUNTRYWIDE AGITATION TO PROTEST PRESIDENT SHARMA'S DECISION.

2. TWO BRITISH HOSTAGES FEARED KILLED IN KASHMIR:

-- SEVERAL NATIONAL DAILIES CARRIED A PTI WIRE SERVICE REPORT FROM LONDON STATING THAT THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE IS INVESTIGATING THE CLAIM THAT TWO BRITONS, AMONG FOUR FOREIGN HOSTAGES BEING HELD BY PAKISTANI MERCENARIES (AL-FARAN MILITANTS) IN KASHMIR VALLEY SINCE JULY 4 LAST, HAVE BEEN KILLED. REPORTS FROM SRINAGAR SAID THE JAMMU AND KASHMIR GOVERNMENT NEITHER CONFIRMED NOR DENIED THE FOREIGN PRESS REPORTS.

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3. U.S. IMPOSES SANCTIONS ON CHINA:

-- THE HINDUSTAN TIMES FRONT-PAGED AN AP REPORT FROM
WASHINGTON STATING THAT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS

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ACTION SA-01

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	INL-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01	EB-00	EUR-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	PA-00	PM-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	T-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	/029W

-----39D616 161035Z /38

O 161025Z MAY 96
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4998
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7967
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
FBIS BANGKOK TH
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
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USIA FOR NEA, R/MR, I/TIC, I/R, I/GAR, I/REC, I/RW,
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STATE FOR SA/INS, PM/CBM, PM/PRO T AND ACDA
STATE FOR NSC
STATE FOR AID/APRE-A
USTR FOR GODEC
USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA
USIS FOR BILL MURPHY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: IN, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION MIDDLE EAST ASIAN SECURITY
-NUCLEAR ISSUES

TARGETED THREE BILLION DOLLARS IN CHINESE CLOTHING AND
ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS FOR WHAT WOULD BE THE LARGEST TRADE
SANCTIONS IN U.S. HISTORY. THE BUSINESS STANDARD'S
SUJATHA SHENOY WROTE FROM WASHINGTON THAT INDIA MAY BE
THE GAINER FROM THE U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST CHINA, AS
MOST OF IT IS DIRECTED AT LOW-COST CHINESE TEXTILE
IMPORTS.

1. MIDDLE EAST

--"RABIN VINDICATED," EDITORIAL IN CENTRIST THE

STATESMAN:

"OPERATION GRAPES OF WRATH...HAD AS MUCH TO DO WITH NATIONAL SECURITY AS WITH THE ELECTIONS TO THE KNESSET SCHEDULED FOR MAY 29. AFTER MORE THAN TWO WEEKS OF BOMBING AND SHELLING, AN ODD CEASEFIRE...HAS NEITHER

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HASTENED THE ADVENT OF PEACE IN THE REGION NOR IMPROVED SHIMON PERES'S PROSPECTS AT HOME. BY POUNDING THE GUERRILLAS' BASES, HE HOPED TO BRING THEIR OTHER MENTOR, SYRIA, OUT INTO THE OPEN AND SETTLE THE DISPUTE OVER THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. NOT ONLY DOES PRESIDENT HAFEZ AL-ASSAD CONTINUE TO PULL STRINGS FROM BEHIND THE SCENES BUT SYRIA, ALONG WITH LEBANON, PICKS HOLES IN THE WRITTEN UNDERSTANDING WITH ISRAEL REACHED AT THE INSTANCE OF SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER....

"ANOTHER REASON FOR PERES'S FAILURE TO BOOST HIS POPULARITY WITH AN UNCHARACTERISTIC DISPLAY OF HAWKISHNESS MAY PERHAPS BE FOUND IN NETANYAHU'S PROMISE TO PRIVATIZE 50 OF THE 160 STATE- OWNED INDUSTRIES OF ISRAEL AND TO REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON THE ANNUAL U.S. AID OF \$1.2 BILLION, SHOULD HIS PARTY COME TO POWER. HERE IS EVIDENCE OF YITZHAK RABIN'S POSTHUMOUS VICTORY: ECONOMIC CONCERNS HAVE AT LAST DISLODGED DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY ON THE RIGHT-WING LIKUD'S LIST OF PRIORITIES.... THE DEEP DIVISION WITHIN ISRAELI SOCIETY APPEARS TO BE HEALING. ALL PERES NEEDS TO DO IS TO KEEP COOL AND NOT LET HIMSELF BE PROVOKED BY INCIDENTS LIKE THE DEATHS OF SEVEN SOLDIERS IN A HEZBOLLAH-ENGINEERED EXPLOSION IN SOUTH LEBANON 15 DAYS AFTER THE TRUCE."

2. ASIAN SECURITY: U.S.-CHINA

--"CHINA POLICY LEAVES U.S. IN A TIGHT SPOT," ANALYSIS
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IN CENTRIST THE HINDU BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT
SRIDHAR KRISHNASWAMI:

"THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IS ONCE AGAIN FACED WITH A SITUATION WHERE A LOT OF EXPLAINING HAS TO BE DONE ON WHAT EXACTLY HAS BEEN ACHIEVED WITH CHINA IN THE REALM OF THE LATTER'S NUCLEAR EXPORT PLANS. THE ADMINISTRATION WHICH WAS EARLIER GOING TO TOWN WITH ITS SO CALLED ACHIEVEMENT IN ITS DIALOGUE WITH BEIJING IS NOW PUT ON THE DEFENSIVE FORCING IT TO COME UP WITH ALL SORTS OF EXPLANATIONS.... THE CHINESE STATEMENT ACCORDING TO MEDIA REPORTS HAD NO IRON CLAD GUARANTEES.... BEIJING HAS APPARENTLY MADE NO MENTION OF FUTURE SALE OF RING MAGNETS OR RELATED NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT TO WOULD-BE PROLIFERATORS. AND AS IF TO FIND ONE MORE WAY OUT OF THE MESS, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS ONCE AGAIN TRIED TO BAIL BEIJING OUT BY ARGUING THAT THE ABSENCE OF PUBLIC PROTEST MEANT THAT CHINA HAD AGREED TO THE PROPOSALS IN PRIVATE.... THE LAST THING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WANTS IS ANY KIND OF A MAJOR EMBARRASSMENT ON THE FOREIGN POLICY FRONT IN AN ELECTION

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ACTION SA-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	INLB-01	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00
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	PA-00	PM-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	T-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	/029W

-----39D61F 161035Z /38

O 161025Z MAY 96
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4999
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7968
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
FBIS BANGKOK TH
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
USDOC WASHDC

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USIA FOR NEA, R/MR, I/TIC, I/R, I/GAR, I/REC, I/RW,
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STATE FOR SA/INS, PM/CBM, PM/PRO T AND ACDA
STATE FOR NSC
STATE FOR AID/APRE-A
USTR FOR GODEC
USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA
USIS FOR BILL MURPHY

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TAGS: IN, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION MIDDLE EAST ASIAN SECURITY
-NUCLEAR ISSUES

YEAR....

"THE DISTURBING ELEMENT IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S STANCE ON SANCTIONS AGAINST CHINA OVER THE SALE OF RING MAGNETS IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS WILLING TO GO TO MAKE EXCUSES FOR CHINA AND IN THE PROCESS CREATING DANGEROUS PRECEDENTS. BUT IF THE ENTIRE LOGIC OF THE ADMINISTRATION AGAINST SANCTIONS WAS BASED ON THE 'ROCK-SOLID' AGREEMENT IT WAS TO HAVE HAD WITH CHINA, WHERE DOES IT LEAVE THE UNITED STATES IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY GENUINE STATEMENT FROM BEIJING ON THE SUBJECT?... THE ADMINISTRATION'S WEAKNESS--THAT IS, A PREFERENCE FOR THE PRIMACY OF ECONOMICS--IS WELL EXPLOITED BY THE CHINESE WHO HAVE SAID PLAINLY THAT ANY FORM OF PUNITIVE MEASURE WOULD BE MET WITH A RESPONSE IN KIND. 'THE TOOTH FOR TOOTH' SCENARIO DOES NOT STOP WITH NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY BUT COVERS THE WHOLE RANGE OF BILATERAL ISSUES. AND...THE TWO COUNTRIES WILL ONCE AGAIN BE ON A COLLISION COURSE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

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RIGHTS AND PIRACY.... INDICATIONS FROM BEIJING ARE THAT IT IS NOT ABOUT TO TAKE ANY LAST MINUTE ACTIONS IN CURBING SOFTWARE PIRACY THAT WOULD FORCE A CHANGE OF HEART OF THE UNITED STATES.... BUT THE PUNITIVE MEASURES ARE NOT AN END IN ITSELF: THE UNITED STATES HOPES THAT THE THREAT OF SANCTIONS WOULD FORCE CHINA TO MOVE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS SO THAT THE SANCTIONS COULD BE WITHDRAWN.... GRANTED THAT A TRADE

WAR BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF BOTH, WASHINGTON HAS BEEN MAKING THE POINT THAT ANY EFFORTS ON THE PART OF BEIJING TO RETALIATE WOULD ONLY MAKE THE MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS RENEWAL ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT."

3. NUCLEAR ISSUES

--"DISABLING THE NUCLEAR MONSTER," ANALYSIS IN CENTRIST THE HINDU BY MADRAS-BASED DEPUTY EDITOR C.V. GOPALAKRISHNAN:

"MEDIA REPORTS ON THE EFFORTS BEING MADE BY THE BIG NUCLEAR WEAPON POWERS FOR THE SIGNING OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. (CTBT) WOULD BE READILY INTELLIGIBLE IF THEY THROW MORE LIGHT ON THE OBLIGATIONS THE TREATY WOULD OR SHOULD IMPOSE ON THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. THE DISREGARD SHOWN BY FRANCE AND CHINA TO THE WORLDWIDE CONDEMNATION OF THE TESTING OF THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRESUMABLY AROSE FROM THE NEED FELT TO ENSURE THAT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THEY HAVE HAVE THE DEADLY DESTRUCTION

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CAPABILITY BUILT INTO THEM. AND THEY CAN SATISFY THEMSELVES THAT THEY HAVE SUCH CAPABILITY ONLY BY TESTING THEM.... EVEN WITH THE REDUCTION OF THE STOCKPILE AGREED TO UNDER THE START-II IN 1991, THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA TOGETHER WITH THE REST OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION WOULD STILL BE LEFT WITH ENOUGH NUCLEAR WEAPONS THE USE OF WHICH WOULD LEAVE THE EARTH AS A DEAD PLANET.....

"THE END OF THE COLD WAR SHOULD HAVE LIBERATED THE NUCLEAR WEAPON POWERS OF THEIR OBSESSION LASTING FOR OVER FOUR DECADES WITH THE NUCLEAR BOMB BEING THEIR ONLY SECURITY AGAINST AGGRESSION. THIS HAS NOT HAPPENED FOR REASONS WHICH IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND.... IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER A CREDIBLE TECHNOLOGY HAS BEEN DEVELOPED FOR EFFECTIVELY DISABLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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WHICH WAS REGARDED AS FEASIBLE BY THE U.S. CONGRESS WHEN
IT PROVIDED FOR THE FUNDING OF THE NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAM.
EVEN MORE DISTURBING IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT EVEN IF SUCH
A TECHNOLOGY IS AVAILABLE, THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES MAY
NOT HAVE THE WILL TO PRESS THE SAME INTO SERVICE." WILLS

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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ACTION SA-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	EAP-01	EB-01	EUR-01	INLB-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
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	NISC-00	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	/030W		

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O 191014Z MAR 96
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4641
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6210
FBIS BANGKOK TH
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL KARACHI
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AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
USDOC WASHDC

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USIA FOR NEA, R/MR, I/TIC, I/R, I/GAR, I/REC, I/RW,
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CASE #

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STATE FOR SA/INS, PM/CBM, PM/PRO T AND ACDA
STATE FOR NSC
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USTR FOR GODEC
USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA
USIS FOR BILL MURPHY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: IN, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: INDIAN MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 50
- MARCH 19, 1996

SUBJECTS COVERED IN THIS REPORT

1. MIDDLE EAST PEACE
2. U.S. - CHINA
3. NUCLEAR ISSUES: SOUTH ASIA
4. NUCLEAR ISSUES: CTBT

PAGE ONE STORIES

-- DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE RUN-UP TO THE LOK
SABHA (LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT) ELECTIONS DOMINATED
PAGE ONE COVERAGE IN ALL NATIONAL DAILIES. PAPERS
MOSTLY RAN SPECULATIVE STORIES ON THE EMERGING PARTY
AFFILIATIONS AND THE BICKERING WITHIN EACH POLITICAL
PARTY.

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- 1. MIDDLE EAST PEACE

--"BATTLING TERROR," EDITORIAL IN THE INDIAN EXPRESS:

"THE ANTI-TERRORISM SUMMIT IN EGYPT...OUGHT TO HAVE
A SALUTARY EFFECT BEYOND THE WEST ASIAN THEATER...STAKES

IN WEST ASIA AS WELL AS INTERESTS NEARER HOME UNDERLIE THE SUMMIT'S STRONG CONDEMNATION OF ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM AND SHOULD ENSURE THAT PRACTICAL STEPS PROMISED IN THE BATTLE AGAINST ARMED GROUPS WILL INDEED BE IMPLEMENTED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME.... TO BE TRULY EFFECTIVE, HOWEVER, THE MEASURES MUST INCLUDE CRACKING DOWN ON THE ILLEGAL ARMS TRADE IN SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS WESTERN GOVERNMENTS....

"AS REGARDS WEST ASIA, THE SUMMIT CAN BE SAID IMMEDIATELY TO HAVE IMPROVED THE ATMOSPHERE FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION ON COMBATING MILITANCY AND TO SOME EXTENT SHORED UP SHIMON PERES DOMESTIC POSITION, BOTH OF WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR THE EVENTUAL RESUMPTION OF PEACE TALKS. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT SYRIA...IS BEING HANDLED WITH KID GLOVES BY THE AMERICANS, ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS IN THE HOPE OF ENGAGING DAMASCUS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. NOT SO IRAN, WHICH ALL THREE ACCUSE PUBLICLY OF AIDING VIOLENT MILITANCY.... EUROPE'S OPENMINDED APPROACH TO IRAN ALSO NEGATES U.S. ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND ISOLATE IT. IT WILL HAVE TO BE ASSUMED, THEREFORE, THAT HAMAS AND HIZBOLLAH ELEMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE THE

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MEANS, ALBEIT PERHAPS LIMITED, TO STRIKE. ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD NOT RISK EASING THEIR SECURITY MEASURES."

2. U.S. - CHINA

--"U.S. WALKING TIGHTROPE TO EASE TENSIONS WITH CHINA,"
ANALYSIS IN THE HINDU BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT
SRIDHAR KRISHNASWAMI:

"THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IS UNDOUBTEDLY GOING THROUGH A ROUGH PHASE TRYING TO COME UP WITH A POLICY ON CHINA THAT WOULD GO BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS IN THE STRAITS OF TAIWAN.... THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN AGGRESSIVELY PURSUING AN ECONOMICS ORIENTED FOREIGN

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POLICY THAT SEEKS MARKETS FOR AMERICAN COMPANIES. IT IS
FOR THIS REASON...BILL CLINTON AND HIS FOREIGN POLICY
ADVISORS WERE RELUCTANT TO MOVE AGAINST CHINA ON NUCLEAR
VIOLATIONS, THE FEAR BEING THAT THE RESPONSE WOULD BE
ONE OF SLAMMING THE DOOR TO AMERICAN COMPANIES IN THE

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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
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USIS FOR BILL MURPHY

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TAGS: IN, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: INDIAN MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 50
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MEGA MARKET OF \$750 BILLION. BUT IT WAS THE CRISIS IN THE STRAITS OF TAIWAN THAT SHOWED THE REALITY OF WHAT IS GOING ON. THE ECONOMICS APART, THERE HAD TO BE A MESSAGE SENT TO BEIJING WHICH WOULD ALSO REMIND THEM THAT THERE WERE COSTS IN PURSUING A CERTAIN KIND OF POLICY, NOT MERELY IN THE REALM OF THE BILATERAL BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ASIA PACIFIC AS WELL....

"SEVERAL POINTERS HAVE COME ABOUT AS A RESULT OF THE CRISIS IN THE STRAITS OF TAIWAN AND IT GOES FAR BEYOND THE IMPLICATIONS TO BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES. THE CRISIS HAS SHOWN THE IMPERATIVE OF THE NEED FOR A POLICY THAT HAS TO BE

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RELEVANT IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA.... CRITICS OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION ASK HOW IS IT RELEVANT TO KEEP TALKING ABOUT CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT WHEN CHINA DOES NOT SEEM TO BE KEEN ON PLAYING BY THE RULES OF THE GAME. ALTHOUGH A MEANINGFUL SHOW OF FORCE IS VALID AND A DETERRENT, THE SUCCESS OF THE OVERALL POLICY ALSO

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HINGES ON THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO COUNSEL TAIWAN AGAINST ANY BRASH MOVES THAT WOULD UPSET NOT ONLY THE FIRMLY LAID OUT ONE CHINA POLICY BUT ALSO THE STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS IN THE REGION. JUST AS THE EMPHASIS HAS BEEN ON TELLING CHINA TO BACK OFF FROM ANY MOVE TO INVAD TAIWAN, AN EQUAL EMPHASIS OUGHT TO BE THERE IN TELLING LEADERS OF TAIWAN TO ABANDON THEIR INDEPENDENCE MOVES."

3. NUCLEAR ISSUES: SOUTH ASIA

--"WILL PAKISTAN RETURN THE RING MAGNETS," ANALYSIS IN THE HINDU BY STRATEGIC AFFAIRS EDITOR C. RAJA MOHAN:

"THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IS SAID TO BE PRESSING PAKISTAN TO RETURN THE 5,000 RING MAGNETS IT ACQUIRED CLANDESTINELY FROM CHINA TO BOOST ITS NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM.... FROM THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW, SUCH A RE-TRANSFER WILL SAVE THE FACE OF ALL THREE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE, AND FINESSE THE PROBLEM OF SINO-PAK NUCLEAR WEAPON COOPERATION AT LEAST FOR NOW. IT WOULD ALLOW THE U.S. TO AVOID MAKING THE FORMAL DETERMINATION THAT A SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TRANSFER FROM CHINA TO PAKISTAN, IN VIOLATION OF AMERICAN NON-PROLIFERATION LAW, HAS TAKEN PLACE.... THERE IS CONCERN IN WASHINGTON THAT THE NUCLEAR DISPUTES WITH CHINA AND PAKISTAN ARE THREATENING TO UNDERMINE THE DELICATE BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE TWO COUNTRIES....

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"THE ONGOING TAIWAN CRISIS HAS FURTHER SOURED SINO-U.S. RELATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN ON A DOWNWARD SLIDE IN RECENT MONTHS.... PRESIDENT...CLINTON'S ATTEMPT TO BIND BEIJING IN A CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IS WIDELY SEEN IN THE U.S. AS A FAILURE AND HIS CHINA POLICY COULD EMERGE AS AN IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.... RECENT REVELATIONS IN WASHINGTON THAT PAKISTAN HAD BOUGHT THE RING MAGNETS...HAVE EMERGED AS AN OBSTACLE IN THE AMERICAN EFFORTS TO REBUILD POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN.... THERE IS A BROAD CONSENSUS IN WASHINGTON AND ELSEWHERE THAT THE CHINESE SALE OF RING MAGNETS TO PAKISTAN IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF BEIJING'S COMMITMENTS UNDER THE NPT.... BESIDES BEING A VIOLATION OF THE NPT, THE CHINESE RING MAGNET SALE IS A CLEAR TRANSGRESSION OF AMERICAN DOMESTIC NON- PROLIFERATION LAW....

"DESPITE THE APPARENT OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ON THE RING MAGNET SALE GATHERED BY ITS OWN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION APPEARS KEEN ON AVOIDING MAKING A DETERMINATION ON THE TRANSFER AND

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IMPOSING SANCTIONS AGAINST CHINA AND PAKISTAN. BUT TIME MAY BE RUNNING OUT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION.... THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT WASHINGTON MAY BE PREPARED TO WAIVE THE SANCTIONS IF CHINA AGREES NOT TO MAKE SUCH TRANSFERS IN THE FUTURE. AN EARLIER DISPUTE OVER CHINESE TRANSFER OF M-11 BALLISTIC MISSILES TO PAKISTAN AND THE CONSEQUENT THREAT OF AMERICAN TRADE SANCTIONS WAS FINESSED WHEN CHINA AGREED NOT TO SELL SUCH MISSILES IN THE FUTURE."

4. NUCLEAR ISSUES: CTBT

--"DETERRENCE AND THE TEST BAN TREATY," ANALYSIS IN THE PIONEER BY PETER LYNN SINAI WHO WAS THE GOVERNOR FOR INDIA IN THE IAEA BOARD FROM 1989-91:

"PRIME MINISTER...NARASIMHA RAO ASSURED THE RAJYA SABHA THAT INDIA 'WOULD NOT RELENT' IN LINKING THE CTBT
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WITH A DEFINITE TIME FRAME FOR ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.... WITH NATIONAL ELECTIONS DUE IN BETWEEN THERE IS LITTLE SCOPE FOR ALTERING INDIA'S STANCE TILL A NEW GOVERNMENT TAKES CHARGE. REJECTED BY THE WEST AND HAVING ELICITED NO SUPPORT EVEN FROM NON-ALIGNED (NAM) SYMPATHIZERS, INDIA'S INSISTENCE ON LINKAGE AT THIS LATE STAGE CASTS IT IN THE ROLE OF A SPOILER, THREATENING TO OBSTRUCT OR WITHDRAW FROM A TREATY IT CO-SPONSORED FOR

DECADES....

"APART FROM IMMEDIATE SECURITY NEEDS VIS-A-VIS PAKISTAN, RETAINING THE WEAPONS OPTION IN A STATE OF READINESS WILL BE REQUIRED OVER A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD UNTIL A NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE WORLD CAN BE ATTAINED. DISARMAMENT-CUM-NON-PROLIFERATION PROPOSALS LIKE THE CTBT HAVE TO BE VIEWED BY INDIA IN TERMS OF THEIR EFFECT ON THE CREDIBILITY OF HER WEAPONIZING AT SHORT NOTICE.... INTERVENTIONIST DOCTRINES COUPLED WITH INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE DISCRIMINATORY NON PROLIFERATION TREATY WHICH VIRTUALLY LEGITIMIZED PERMANENT RETENTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY A FEW, MAKES IT ALL THE MORE NECESSARY FOR INDIA TO RETAIN THE DETERRENT CREDIBILITY OF ITS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY...A QUALIFIED CTBT COULD HELP IT DO SO.... THE STRESS LAID ON THE NEED FOR COMMITMENT TO TIMEBOUND ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SERVED TO STRENGTHEN PUBLIC AWARENESS. BUT OVER INSISTENCE ON IT AS A PRECONDITION FOR CTBT IS PROVING COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. A QUALIFIED TEST BAN, PERMITTING WITHDRAWAL IN SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST, AS DEMANDED BY U.S., EXCLUDING PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, OR INTRUSIVE MONITORING, AS DESIRED BY CHINA, WOULD FAR

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BETTER SERVE INDIA'S REQUIREMENT....

"CTBT BY SEPTEMBER COULD CURB INCIPIENT EFFORTS TO CONTINUALLY REFINE EXISTING ARSENALS, PREVENT REVIVAL OF THE 'STAR WARS' PROGRAM, ENCOURAGE RATIFICATION BY RUSSIA OF START II, PROMOTE A CONVENTION ON 'NO FIRST USE' AND PROVE A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARDS DISARMAMENT. INDIA'S ACCESSION WILL ENABLE IT ON THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS TO INFLUENCE 'ANY SUBSTANTIVE FUNCTIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE IAEA', IN IMPLEMENTING CTBT...INDIA MUST NOT FOREGO THE BENEFITS OF A SUITABLY QUALIFIED BAN." WILLS.

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AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
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*Case #
9702298*

SUBJECTS COVERED IN THIS REPORT

1. MIDDLE EAST PEACE
2. ASIA SECURITY: CHINA-TAIWAN
3. CUBA
4. NUCLEAR ISSUES: SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
5. NUCLEAR ISSUES: CTBT

PAGE ONE STORIES

1. "PAKISTAN WILL NOT GO NUCLEAR--BENAZIR":

-- THE PIONEER MONDAY FRONT-PAGED A UNI WIRE SERVICE REPORT FROM ISLAMABAD STATING THAT PM BENAZIR BHUTTO HAS CLAIMED THAT PAKISTAN WOULD NEVER GO FOR A NUCLEAR TEST UNLESS THERE WAS A THREAT TO THE SURVIVAL AND SECURITY

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OF THE COUNTRY. "PRESENTLY WE DON'T THINK THAT THERE IS ANY THREAT TO PAKISTAN'S SECURITY," BHUTTO SAID. SHE ALSO REPORTEDLY CLARIFIED THAT THERE WAS NO TRUTH IN THE U.S. ALLEGATIONS THAT PAKISTAN HAD RECEIVED RING MAGNETS FROM CHINA FOR NUCLEAR PURPOSES.

2. GOI URGED TO INDUCT "AGNI" MISSILE SOON:

-- THE TIMES OF INDIA GAVE SECOND LEAD ATTENTION TODAY TO STORY STATING THAT A JOINT PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE HAS URGED THE GOI TO TAKE AN EXPEDITIOUS DECISION FOR SERIAL PRODUCTION OF THE INDIGENOUSLY DEVELOPED "AGNI" INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE FOR INDUCTION INTO THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES. THE STORY SAID THE RECOMMENDATION BY THE STANDING COMMITTEE FIGURES PROMINENTLY IN A REPORT ON 'DEFENSE POLICY, PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT' TABLED IN THE LOK SABHA (LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT) ON MARCH 8. THE DEMAND HAS BEEN MADE "IN VIEW OF THE CHANGE IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENTS OF MILITARY

SIGNIFICANCE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD BEARING ON THE SECURITY OF THE NATION." THE AGNI PROJECT REPORTEDLY HAS BEEN CAPPED AFTER INDIA TEST-FIRED THREE MISSILES--TWO SUCCESSFULLY--BUT WITHOUT WARHEADS.

3. WESTERN HOSTAGES SAFE, 80 MILITANTS SURRENDER IN KASHMIR:

-- THE HINDU GAVE PROMINENT LEAD ATTENTION MARCH 11 TO A REPORT FROM JAMMU STATING THAT 80 MILITANTS IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR SURRENDERED ON MARCH 7 WITH THEIR ARMS AND
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AMMUNITION BEFORE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE (DGP) M.N. SABHARWAL. THE DGP TOLD REPORTERS AT THE SURRENDER FUNCTION THAT EFFORTS WERE ON AT VARIOUS LEVELS TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE FOUR WESTERN TOURISTS HELD HOSTAGE BY THE AL-FARAN MILITANT OUTFIT SINCE JULY 1995. THE HOSTAGES WERE SAFE, ACCORDING TO INFORMATION WITH THE STATE GOVERNMENT, HE SAID.

4. INDIA TOPPLE PAKISTAN IN CRUCIAL WORLD CUP CRICKET MATCH:

-- CRICKET, FOR ONCE, UPSTAGED POLITICS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS FROM THE FRONTPAGES OF ALL MAJOR INDIAN NATIONAL DAILIES ON SUNDAY, AFTER INDIA TOPPLED DEFENDING CHAMPIONS PAKISTAN IN A CRUCIAL WILLS WORLD CUP QUARTER-FINAL MATCH IN BANGALORE ON MARCH 9. ALL MAINSTREAM DAILIES RAN BANNER HEADLINES ON INDIA'S CONVINCING VICTORY OVER ARCH-RIVALS PAKISTAN. ALTHOUGH A QUARTER-FINAL ROUND, THE MATCH WAS DUBBED TO BE MORE A BATTLE OF NERVES THAN OF CRICKETING SKILLS. INDIA THRASHED PAKISTAN BY 39 RUNS, EXCEEDING ALL

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EXPECTATIONS. FOR THE INDIAN AND PAKISTANI CRICKET
FANS, THIS VICTORY IS AS GOOD AS INDIA WINNING THE WORLD
CUP.

1. MIDDLE EAST PEACE

--"A SUMMIT FOR PEACE," EDITORIAL IN MARCH 11 THE
HINDUSTAN TIMES:

"BOTH...SHIMON PERES AND...YASSER ARAFAT ARE FACING
A NEW MOMENT OF TRUTH. THE SPATE OF SUICIDE BOMBINGS
WHICH HAS KILLED AT LEAST 57 ISRAELIS IN THE LAST TWO
WEEKS HAS POSED THE BIGGEST THREAT TO PEACE IN WEST
ASIA. HOPE HAS GIVEN WAY TO DESPAIR. SUDDENLY THE
ISRAELIS LOOK MOST VULNERABLE. IT IS ALSO A BLOW TO
...ARAFAT'S AUTHORITY. THE INTERNATIONAL SUMMIT, WHICH
IS BEING HELD IN EGYPT, HAS THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF

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SAVING THE PEACE PROCESS.... THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
HAS ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO RALLY MODERATE ARAB STATES TO
SUPPORT ISRAEL AND TO SEEK THEIR HELP TO ISOLATE
SUPPORTERS OF THE HAMAS ORGANIZATION.... THE SUMMIT
WILL PUT PRESSURE ON CERTAIN REGIMES THAT ARE KNOWN FOR
BACKING HAMAS.... THE HAMAS MOVEMENT...HAS BEEN
RECEIVING FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM ABROAD.... THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDS TO RALLY BEHIND
BOTH...PERES AND...ARAFAT AND HELP THE TWO PROTAGONISTS
OF THE PEACE PROCESS WREST THE INITIATIVE FROM THE
HAMAS."

2. ASIA SECURITY: CHINA-TAIWAN

SUMMARY:

COMMENTING ON THE CHINESE MISSILE TESTS CLOSE TO
TAIWAN, AN EDITORIAL IN THE TIMES OF INDIA OBSERVED THAT
THE ISSUE IS OF CHINA'S PROJECTION OF ITS POWER AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES. AN EDITORIAL IN THE
HINDUSTAN TIMES CONCLUDED THAT THE AMERICAN ASSURANCE TO
TAIWAN OF ITS SUPPORT IS IN LINE WITH WASHINGTON'S
POLICY OF "STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY WHEN IT COMES TO THE
VEXATIOUS CHINA-TAIWAN ISSUE."

BLOCK QUOTES:

--"TENSION IN TAIWAN," EDITORIAL IN MARCH 9 THE
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HINDUSTAN TIMES:

"CHINA HAS BEEN FLEXING ITS MILITARY MUSCLE IN THE

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VAST STRETCH OF WATER FROM THE DISPUTED SPRATLY ISLANDS TO THE TAIWAN STRAIT FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS. BUT WHAT MAKES THE PRESENT SITUATION PIQUANT IS THE FACT THAT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN TAIWAN ARE JUST ROUND THE CORNER.... PRESIDENT LEE TENG-HUI'S...PRIVATE VISIT TO THE U.S. LAST YEAR ONLY SERVED TO SUBSTANTIATE BEIJING'S LONG-HELD SUSPICION THAT WASHINGTON'S ONE- CHINA POLICY IS SHALLOW PRETENSE. AND EQUALLY DISTURBING TO CHINA ARE THE PRE-POLL PROJECTIONS THAT PREDICT CERTAIN VICTORY FOR TENG-HUI....

"CHINA...CANNOT BE SERIOUSLY EXPECTED TO INVADE THE ISLAND DESPITE THE MOUNTING TENSION. U.S. OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT IT LACKS THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT FORCES REQUIRED FOR SUCH AN OPERATION. THE AMERICAN ASSURANCE TO TAIWAN OF ITS SUPPORT, IN CASE OF CHINESE AGGRESSION, IS IN LINE WITH WASHINGTON'S POLICY OF STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY WHEN IT COMES TO THE VEXATIOUS CHINA- TAIWAN

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NISC-00	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	/030W		

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O 111030Z MAR 96
 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
 TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4585
 INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5956
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 AMCONSUL KARACHI
 USDOC WASHDC
 AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
 AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
 AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
 AMEMBASSY DHAKA
 AMEMBASSY BEIJING
 FBIS BANGKOK TH
 USMISSION GENEVA
 USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA// -
 CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
 AMEMBASSY TOKYO

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USIA FOR NEA, R/MR, I/TIC, I/R, I/GAR, I/REC, I/RW,
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 STATE FOR SA/INS, PM/CBM, PM/PRO T AND ACDA
 STATE FOR NSC
 STATE FOR AID/APRE-A
 USTR FOR GODEC
 USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA
 USIS FOR BILL MURPHY

E.O. 12958: N/A
 TAGS: IN, PREL, PGOV
 SUBJECT: INDIAN MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 44
 - MARCH 9-11, 1996

ISSUE."

--"THE CHINESE REVENGE," EDITORIAL IN MARCH 11 THE TIMES OF INDIA:

"THE MISSILE TESTS CHINA HAS CARRIED CLOSE TO TAIWAN SEND A POWERFUL MESSAGE NOT ONLY TO THAT ISLAND, BUT ALSO TO THE U.S., JAPAN AND THE SOUTH EAST ASIAN NATIONS.... IT IS NUCLEAR CHINA'S TURN TO TALK TOUGH AND THE U.S. IS INDULGING IN PLAINTIVE PROTESTS.... THE ISSUE HERE IS NOT ONE OF CHINA'S CLAIM TO TAIWAN BUT OF CHINA'S PROJECTION OF ITS POWER AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES. THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE BULLYING ROLE OF THE U.S. VIS A VIS A NON-NUCLEAR CHINA IN THE 50S AND ITS CURRENT DEFERENCE TO A NUCLEAR AND MISSILE-ARMED CHINA WILL NOT BE LOST ON THE ASIAN NATIONS, PARTICULARLY JAPAN AND INDIA....

"WHILE THE APPROPRIATE STRATEGY IN RESPECT OF CHINA
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IS NO DOUBT ENGAGEMENT, THAT SHOULD BE BACKED BY THE CREATION OF A STABLE BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA AND THAT BALANCE OF POWER WILL DEPEND UPON THE COUNTERVAILING CAPABILITIES OF OTHER MAJOR ASIAN POWERS. INSTEAD OF CONTRIBUTING TO SUCH A GENUINE AND STABLE BALANCE OF POWER, THE U.S. APPEARS KEENER ON A EXCLUSIVE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA. THIS SUITS CHINA AS IT BECOMES THE SECOND-RANKING POWER IN THE WORLD.... THIS APPROACH CAN HOWEVER ONLY PROGRESSIVELY ERODE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO SECURITY IN THIS AREA.... THE U.S. PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY FORMULATIONS HAVE PROVED WRONG IN ASIA OVER THE LAST 50 YEARS. WHILE THE U.S. PAID SOME PRICE FOR IT, MOST OF THE COSTS WERE BORNE BY ASIA. THAT HISTORY APPEARS TO BE REPEATING ITSELF AS THE BOURBONS IN WASHINGTON NEITHER LEARN NOR FORGET ANYTHING."

3. CUBA

--"HEAT ON CUBA," EDITORIAL IN MARCH 7 AMRITA BAZAR
PATRIKA FROM CALCUTTA:

"U.S. POLICY IS ALWAYS CHARACTERIZED BY DOUBLE
STANDARDS AND INGRAINED PREJUDICE. THIS IS PARTICULARLY
TRUE OF ITS ATTITUDE TO CUBA.... UNLESS THE U.S. LIFTS
ITS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ISLAND STATE, ITS
ECONOMY WILL RAPIDLY DRIFT TOWARDS UTTER CHAOS. THE
U.S. ATTITUDE, NEVERTHELESS, REMAINS PRETTY HARD. ITS
CUBAN POLICY PRESENTS A CONTRAST TO ITS POLICY TOWARDS
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OTHER ERSTWHILE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. WASHINGTON IS
ALWAYS ANXIOUS TO PUMP RESOURCES INTO YELTSIN'S
RUSSIA.... CHINA...CAN GET AWAY WITH...GROSS VIOLATIONS
OF FAITH AS THE CARRYING OUT OF NUCLEAR TESTS AND
TRANSFERRING OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, NOT TO MENTION THE
BRUTAL SUPPRESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE VOLUME OF TRADE
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA MAKES ALL THE DIFFERENCE....

"BUT CUBA IS STILL VERY MUCH NON GRATA.... THE
DOWNING OF TWO AMERICAN PLANES...HAS EXACERBATED
RELATIONS EVEN FURTHER. THE PROSPECTS OF LIFTING THE
U.S. EMBARGO HAVE RECEDED. THE PRIMARY IN FLORIDA IS IN
SIGHT AND THE REPUBLICANS ARE NATURALLY CRYING FOR
TIGHTENING THE SCREWS ON CUBA. BILL CLINTON ALSO HAS TO
SING THE SAME TUNE. WHETHER OR NOT THE PLANES LOOKING
FOR CUBAN REFUGEES HAD VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL AIR SPACE
IS A NICETY THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION CAN HARDLY TAKE
INTO ACCOUNT. IT WAS A SINGULARLY INDISCREET ACT ON THE
PART OF HAVANA."

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	NISC-00	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	/030W		

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O 111030Z MAR 96
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4586
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5957
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL KARACHI
USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
FBIS BANGKOK TH
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

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STATE FOR AID/APRE-A
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USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA
USIS FOR BILL MURPHY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: IN, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: INDIAN MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 44
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3. NUCLEAR ISSUES: SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

SUMMARY:

THE HINDU'S STRATEGIC AFFAIRS EDITOR C. RAJA MOHAN ARGUED THAT THE OPERATION OF THE KHUSHAB REACTOR BY PAKISTAN IS LIKELY TO FURTHER STRAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NPT REGIME, AND REVEAL WASHINGTON'S INABILITY TO MAKE CHINA ABIDE BY ITS INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS. WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT SEEMA SIROHI LAMENTED IN THE TELEGRAPH FROM CALCUTTA THAT DESPITE EVIDENCE THAT PAKISTAN IS WORKING ON A SECOND URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT AND REPORTS THAT CHINA HAS SOLD RING MAGNETS TO PAKISTAN, THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS FAILED TO EITHER FORGE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION OR TAKE PUNITIVE ACTION AGAINST BEIJING AND ISLAMABAD.

BLOCK QUOTES:
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--"PLUTONIUM REACTOR MAY GIVE PAK. LEVERAGE," ANALYSIS
IN THE HINDU BY STRATEGIC AFFAIRS EDITOR C. RAJA MOHAN:

"REPORTS THAT PAKISTAN IS READY TO BEGIN THE
OPERATION OF A REACTOR, WHICH MAY SIGNIFICANTLY BOOST
ISLAMABAD'S NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITIES, CAN FURTHER
UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE GLOBAL
NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME AND THE AMERICAN ABILITY TO
CONSTRAIN PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. BY THRE
ATENING TO
INITIATE THE PRODUCTION OF UNSAFEGUARDED PLUTONIUM,
PAKISTAN MAY HAVE ACQUIRED IMPORTANT DIPLOMATIC
LEVERAGES IN ITS NUCLEAR DISPUTES WITH THE UNITED
STATES.... THE KHUSHAB REACTOR, TO BE FUELLED BY
NATURAL URANIUM AND MODERATED BY HEAVY WATER, IS
EXPECTED TO GIVE PAKISTAN ACCESS FOR THE FIRST TIME TO
UNSAFEGUARDED PLUTONIUM THAT CAN BE USED IN NUCLEAR
WEAPONS....

"ALTHOUGH PAKISTAN CLAIMS THAT THE KHUSHAB REACTOR
IS ENTIRELY AN INDIGENOUS EFFORT, AMERICAN REPORTS POINT
OF SUBSTANTIVE CHINESE ASSISTANCE TO THE PROJECT..QKISTAN GETS READY TO
ACTIVATE THE KHUSHAB REACTOR, THE
CONCERNS IN THE U.S. ABOUT BEJING'S COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
NPT OBLIGATIONS ARE LIKELY Q. THE OPERATION OF
THE KHUSHAB REACTOR BY PAKISTAN IS LIKELY TO FURTHER
STRAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NPT REGIME, AND...REVEAL
WASHINGTON'S INABILITY TO MAKE CHINA ABIDE BY ITS
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS....

"THE THREAT BY PAKISTAN TO OPERATE THE KHUSHAB
REACTOR COULD BE PART OF AN INTENSE POLITICAL BARGAINING
THAT IS GOING ON BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND ISLAMABAD....

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INDIA NEEDS TO CAREFULLY WATCH THE U.S.-PAK NUCLEAR
BARGAINING, BUT IT SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT

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CHANNEL: n/a

WASHINGTON CAN PUT AN END TO THE ENDURING SINO-PAK
NUCLEAR COOPERATION OR LIMIT PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR
CAPABILITIES. IN THE END, NEW DELHI WILL HAVE TO RELY
ON ITS OWN RESOURCES TO DEFEND ITS SECURITY INTERESTS."

--"U.S. HAS PROOF OF SECOND PAK NUCLEAR PLANT,"
FRONTPAGE DISPATCH BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT SEEMA
SIROHI IN MARCH 8 THE TELEGRAPH FROM CALCUTTA:

"THE U.S. HAS EVIDENCE PAKISTAN IS WORKING ON A
SECOND URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT.... THIS IS IN ADDITION
TO...ACTIVITY FOR A NUCLEAR TEST IN BALUCHISTAN....
U.S. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES...STRESS THEY DID NOT CONSIDER
A TEST...LIKELY AT THIS TIME...BUT THIS HAS NOT STOPPED
WASHINGTON FROM ENGAGING IN SOME QUICK AND
BEHIND-THE-SCENES ARM TWISTING... REPORTS...ABOUT INDIA
AND PAKISTAN PLANNING NUCLEAR TESTS AND THE RESULTANT
PRESSURES ARE SEEN BY BOTH COUNTRIES AS TACTICS BY

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	NISC-00	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	/030W		

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O 111030Z MAR 96
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 TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4587
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 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 AMCONSUL KARACHI
 USDOC WASHDC
 AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
 AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
 AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
 AMEMBASSY DHAKA
 AMEMBASSY BEIJING
 FBIS BANGKOK TH
 USMISSION GENEVA
 USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//
 CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
 AMEMBASSY TOKYO

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 USIS FOR BILL MURPHY

E.O. 12958: N/A
 TAGS: IN, PREL, PGOV
 SUBJECT: INDIAN MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 44
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WASHINGTON TO GAIN THE UPPER HAND ON NUCLEAR QUESTIONS
IN SOUTH ASIA....

"BUT THE BIGGEST WILD CARD IN SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR
GAME IS CHINA AGAINST WHICH THE U.S. HAS SO FAR FAILED
TO ACT. BEIJING IS SELLING RING MAGNETS AND DESIGNS FOR
NUCLEAR PLANTS TO PAKISTAN WHILE THREATENING TAIWAN WITH
MISSILE TESTS OFF ITS COAST AS THE AMERICAN WATCH WITH
CHAGRIN. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS FAILED TO EITHER FORGE
A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION OR TAKE PUNITIVE ACTION AGAINST
BEIJING AND ISLAMABAD.... SOUTH ASIA WATCHERS ARE
HOPING THE U.S. WILL NOT ASK THE CHINESE TO MONITOR
THEMSELVES..."

4. NUCLEAR ISSUES: CTBT

SUMMARY:
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STRATEGIC AFFAIRS ANALYST BRAHMA CHELLANEY ASSERTED
IN THE HINDUSTAN TIMES THAT NEW DELHI SHOULD "DIG ITS
HEELS IN ON A GENUINE, NON-DISCRIMINATORY TEST BAN AND
NOT BE CO-OPTED INTO THE WESTERN CTB PLAN EVEN IF THE
OTHER NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS CRUMBLE TO COERCIVE U.S.
DIPLOMACY ONE BY ONE." A JNU DISARMAMENT STUDIES
PROFESSOR ARGUED IN THE PIONEER THAT THE CHINESE
POSITION ON THE CTBT SEEMS TO BE FAR MORE FLEXIBLE THAN
THAT OF INDIA WHICH WANTS TO APPEAR LIKE "A
SELF-RIGHTEOUS APOSTLE OF DISARMAMENT AND SIMULTANEOUSLY
KEEP ITS NUCLEAR OPTION OPEN."

BLOCK QUOTES:

--"STRATEGIC NOOSE FOR INDIA," ANALYSIS IN MARCH 9 THE
HINDUSTAN TIMES BY STRATEGIC AFFAIRS ANALYST BRAHMA
CHELLANEY:

"INDIA CONFRONTS AN AGONIZING PREDICAMENT OVER THE

NUCLEAR EST BAN TREATY CURRENTLY BEING NEGOTIATED AT GENEVA. AS IT IS THE ONLY NUCLEAR-THRESHOLD STATE NOT TO HAVE RECEIVED TESTED WAR HEAD DESIGNS FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES, THE CTBT WILL HAVE THE GREATEST IMPACT ON INDIA, FREEZING ITS CAPABILITY AT THE LEVEL OF THE CRUDE FISSION DEVICE DETONATED AT POKHARAN ALMOST 22 YEARS AGO.... THE TEST BAN ALONE WILL UNDERMINE INDIA'S NUCLEAR OPTION AND DISARMAMENT POSTURE, LAYING THE PATH FOR THE EVENTUAL JETTISONING OF THE COUNTRY'S TRADITIONAL POLICIES.... INDIA WILL BE SADDLED WITH AN UNDEVELOPED NUCLEAR-WEAPONS CAPABILITY.... THE MAIN EXTERNAL PRESSURE ON INDIA TODAY IS THAT IT SHOULD NOT

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BLOCK CONSENSUS ON A TEST BAN AT THE CD....

"INDIA'S ABILITY TO BLOCK CONSENSUS IS A KEY SOURCE OF CONCERN TO THE STATES TRYING TO PUSH AN IMPAIRED CTB TEXT.... IF INDIA ALLOWS A TEST BAN WITH GAPING LOOPHOLES TO EMERGE AND THEN DECIDES TO STAY OUT OF IT, IT WOULD BE COMMITTING A DOUBLE BLUNDER. INDIA'S INTERESTS DEMAND THAT EITHER THERE BE A TRULY COMPREHENSIVE, DISARMAMENT-ORIENTED TEST BAN OR NO TEST BAN. NEW DELHI SHOULD NOT FALL BETWEEN TWO STOOLS AS ON THE NPT.... NEW DELHI SHOULD DIG ITS HEELS IN ON A GENUINE, NON-DISCRIMINATORY TEST BAN AND NOT BE CO-OPTED INTO THE WESTERN CTB PLAN EVEN IF THE OTHER NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS CRUMBLE TO COERCIVE U.S. DIPLOMACY ONE BY ONE.... INDIA CAN MAKE OR UNMAKE ANY DEAL IN GENEVA. THERE HAS TO BE A QUID PRO QUO FOR INDIA'S SUPPORT AND NEW DELHI CAN NEITHER BE WHEELED NOR COMPELLED INTO HANGING A SUBSTANDARD CTB FROM ITS NECK LIKE AN ALBATROSS....

"INDIA HAS NO REASON TO ACCEPT ANY ARBITRARY

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	NISC-00	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	/030W		

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O 111030Z MAR 96
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4588
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5959
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USDOC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: IN, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: INDIAN MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 44
- MARCH 9-11, 1996

DEADLINE. A FLAWED TEST BAN DETRIMENTAL TO INDIA'S INTERESTS WILL HAVE TO BE STYMIED AT THE WORKING GROUP LEVEL. IF A 'CLEAN TEST' IS ALLOWED TO EMERGE FROM EACH WORKING GROUP, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO BLOCK CONSENSUS IN THE FULL CONFERENCE. THE CURRENT INDIAN NEGOTIATING STRATEGY SPEARHEADED BY AMBASSADOR ARUNDHATI GHOSE IS RIGHT ON TRACK. THE RAO GOVERNMENT AND ITS SUCCESSOR HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE REST OF THE WORLD THAT INDIA HAS THE POLITICAL WILL TO STAY THE COURSE."

--"CHINA PLAYS A WINNING GAME IN THE CTBT," ANALYSIS IN MARCH 11 THE PIONEER BY T.T. POULOSE, PROFESSOR IN JAWAHAR LAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY FOR INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT STUDIES:

"ALTHOUGH INDIA IS TAKING A HARD LINE IN THE LINKAGE BETWEEN CTBT AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AT GENEVA, CHINA SEEMS TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON THIS ISSUE AND SEEMS TO BE MOVING CLOSER TO THE VIEW OF OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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STATES AS IT IS ADVANTAGEOUS TO CHINA TO RETAIN ITS
NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND NUCLEAR DETERRENT AS LONG AS
NUCLEAR WEAPON EXIST.

"AS THE CTBT IS NOT GOING TO REDUCE A SINGLE NUCLEAR
WARHEAD, THE CHINESE WOULD ONLY BE TOO WILLING PROBABLY
TO SIGN SUCH AN ARMS CONTROL MEASURE AND TRADE OFF FOR A
COMPUTER SIMULATION TECHNOLOGY WITH THE U.S. IN SUM,
THE CHINESE POSITION ON THE CTBT SEEMS TO BE FAR MORE
FLEXIBLE THAN THAT OF INDIA WHICH WANTS TO APPEAR LIKE A
SELF-RIGHTEOUS APOSTLE OF DISARMAMENT AND SIMULTANEOUSL
Y

KEEP ITS NUCLEAR OPTION OPEN. THUS, WHILE INDIA'S STAND
ON CTBT IS VIEWED INCREASINGLY AS THE TACTICS OF AN
OBSTRUCTIONIST COUNTRY, CHINA, AN INVETERATE ENEMY OF
ARMS CONTROL IN THE COLD WAR ERA, SEEM TO HAVE EMERGED
AS ITS STAUNCHEST DEFENDER IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA."
WILLS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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7/7/76 22466

S/S - MR. BRIDGES

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FEC/CDR SCK Date: 2/27/97

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FOIA Exemptions
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MR Cases Only:

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ROUTINE
SAO PAULO, SINAI,

ALEMB, DHAHRAN, JERUSALEM, NAPLES, RIO DE JANEIRO,

CFR REPORT, INFORM CONSULS, CINC/SHAPE/MAC FOR POLADS ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: XX, US

* SUBJECT: CURRENT FOREIGN RELATIONS: ISSUE NO. 27,
JULY 7, 1976

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1. EB: "DEBT": STILL A MAJOR ISSUE IN NORTH/SOUTH
DIALOGUE (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

DEBT AND DEBT SERVICE:

THE EXTERNAL DEBT OF THE NON-OIL EXPORTING LDCS HAS ALMOST DOUBLED SINCE 1973, WITH NEARLY HALF OF THE NEW BORROWING COMING FROM PRIVATE SOURCES. THE RATIO OF DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS TO THEIR EXPORTS IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE RISEN FROM 15 PERCENT IN 1973 TO ABOUT 20 PERCENT IN 1975. ACUTE DEBT SERVICING DIFFICULTIES IN 1976-77 ARE, HOWEVER, EXPECTED TO BE CONFINED TO A FEW COUNTRIES. ANY UNEXPECTED SLOWDOWN IN THE ECONOMIES OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES WOULD, HOWEVER, AFFECT ADVERSELY LDC TRADE AND INCREASE GREATLY THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES FOR DEBT RELIEF.

LDC CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT:

THE DEFICIT ON TRADE, SERVICES AND PRIVATE TRANSFERS OF THE NON-OIL EXPORTING LDCS AMOUNTED TO ABOUT \$9 BILLION BOTH 1972 AND 1973. THE AGGREGATE DEFICIT JUMPED TO ABOUT \$28 BILLION IN 1974, AND REACHED THE \$35-40 BILLION RANGE IN 1975. THESE DEFICITS WERE FINANCED, ALTHOUGH THIS ENTAILED EXTERNAL BORROWING--ESPECIALLY MASSIVE COMMITMENTS OF PRIVATE CAPITAL--ON AN UNPRECEDENTED SCALE. EXISTING AND NEW ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE IMF ALSO PLAYED A KEY ROLE.

BUOYED BY THE REVIVAL OF THE INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES' ECONOMIES, THE AGGREGATE CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT IS EXPECTED TO FALL BELOW \$30 BILLION IN 1976 AND DECREASE STEADILY OVER THE REST OF THE DECADE. FINANCING AGGREGATE NON-OIL EXPORTING LDC DEFICITS IS THUS LIKELY TO BE LESS OF A PROBLEM DURING THE PERIOD, ALTHOUGH FINANCING PROBLEMS COULD ARISE FOR A SUCCESSION OF WEAKER COUNTRIES.

THE CONTINUATION OF SIZABLE DEFICITS--EVEN IF SOMEHOW FINANCED--IS A MAJOR DISRUPTIVE ELEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS OF MANY COUNTRIES AND IS LIKELY TO PRECLUDE SOME OF THEM--PARTICULARLY THE POORER--FROM RESUMING THEIR HISTORIC GROWTH TRENDS. THIS HAS PROMPTED INCREASING PRESSURE FROM THE LDCS TO TREAT DEBT RELIEF AS A WAY OF SUPPLEMENTING DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE EFFORTS.

UNCTAD IV:

AT UNCTAD IV THE CREDITOR COUNTRIES SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED GROUP-77 DEMANDS FOR "GENERALIZED" DEBT RELIEF, AND WERE ABLE TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON WAYS OF IMPROVING THE

TRADITIONAL CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH.

THE KEY PARAGRAPH OF THE UNCTAD IV RESOLUTION ON DEBT:

"INVITES APPROPRIATE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL FORA TO DETERMINE, BEFORE THE END OF 1974, WHAT FEATURES MIGHT USEFULLY BE DISCERNED FROM PAST OPERATIONS, TOGETHER WITH OTHERS THAT MIGHT BE IDENTIFIED IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION OF THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, THE MOST SERIOUSLY AFFECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN NEED, WHICH COULD PROVIDE GUIDANCE IN FUTURE OPERATIONS RELATING TO DEBT PROBLEMS AS A BASIS FOR DEALING FLEXIBLY WITH INDIVIDUAL CASES."

THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES AMONG CREDITOR COUNTRIES ON THE "DEBT ISSUE" AT UNCTAD IV. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND OTHER COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO USE DEBT RELIEF AS A FORM OF AID (IN AN AID CONSORTIUM CONTEXT) FOR POOR LDCS. THE US, HOWEVER, HAS LEGAL AND CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS WHICH PRECLUDE US FROM USING DEBT RELIEF AS AID.

THE ROLE OF CIEC AND DEBT:

THERE IS NOW BROAD CONSENSUS THAT THE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION (CIEC) WILL BE THE "APPROPRIATE ... FORA" FOR IDENTIFYING THE "FEATURES" CITED IN THE UNCTAD IV RESOLUTION.

IN DISCUSSING "DEBT" WE ARE CLEARLY CONFRONTED WITH TWO DISSIMILAR TYPES OF COUNTRY SITUATIONS. ONE IS THE ACUTE DEBT CRISIS (E.G. CHILE, ZAIRE) WHERE CREDITORS ARE CALLED UPON TO RESPOND TO WHAT IS IN EFFECT AN EMERGENCY SITUATION. THIS TYPE OF SITUATION ENTAILS A RESCHEDULING EXERCISE COVERING CONDITIONALITY (SUCH AS REMEDIAL MEASURES) AS WELL AS DEBT RELIEF. THE OTHER TYPE OF SITUATION (E.G. INDIA AND PAKISTAN) RELATES TO CASES WHERE DEBT RELIEF IS VIEWED MORE IN THE CONTEXT OF "TRANSFER OF RESOURCES" AND QUALITY OF AID. WE BELIEVE THE CIEC SHOULD DISTINGUISH CLEARLY BETWEEN THESE TWO TYPES OF SITUATIONS.

EXAMINATION OF DEBT "FEATURES" :

IN EXAMINING "FEATURES" FOR ACUTE DEBT CRISIS SITUATIONS, THE US INTERPRETS THE UNCTAD RESOLUTION AS

CALLING FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF FEATURES WHICH WOULD PERMIT EFFICIENT AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE SECURED CREDITOR COUNTRY AGREEMENT TO ENTER INTO RESCHEDULING NEGOTIATIONS. EXAMINATION OF FEATURES FOR THE SECOND TYPE OF DEBT SITUATION, I.E. TRANSFER OF RESOURCES, WOULD BE WITHIN THE BROADER PERSPECTIVE OF OVERALL QUANTITY, QUALITY AND EFFECTIVE USE OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE RESOURCES.

THE CASE OF ZAIRE:

THE UNITED STATES REMAINS WILLING TO CONTINUE COOPERATING WITH OTHER CREDITORS IN MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO ALLEVIATE ACUTE DEBT DIFFICULTIES. SINCE 1956, THERE HAVE BEEN APPROXIMATELY 35 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATING DEBT RELIEF FOR 14 COUNTRIES. THE "CREDITOR CLUB" HAS BEEN THE MOST FREQUENTLY USED FORUM, WITH ZAIRE BEING THE LATEST DEVELOPING COUNTRY TO UTILIZE THIS FORUM FOR ASSISTANCE IN DEBT REORGANIZATION.

THE DEPRESSED LEVELS OF WORLD COPPER PRICES AND UNWISE ECONOMIC POLICIES WERE MAJOR FACTORS BEHIND A SHARP DETERIORATION IN ZAIRE'S EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS WHICH VIRTUALLY EXHAUSTED FOREIGN RESERVES, AND PERMITTED A MASSIVE ACCUMULATION (TO ALMOST \$400 MILLION) OF FOREIGN DEBT ARREARAGES. BY YEAR-END 1975, GROSS FOREIGN RESERVES WERE SLIGHTLY LESS THAN THREE WEEKS IMPORTS.

A STABILIZATION PROGRAM, DEVELOPED IN CONNECTION WITH AN IMF STAND-BY ARRANGEMENT CONCLUDED IN MARCH, INCLUDED A ZAIRIAN COMMITMENT TO RESCHEDULE DEBT. AN AD REFERENDUM AGREEMENT BETWEEN "PARIS CLUB" CREDITORS (INCLUDING THE U.S.) AND ZAIRE WAS REACHED ON JUNE 17. A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF DEBT FALLING DUE THROUGH 1976 WILL BE RESCHEDULED. WHILE THE AGREEMENT ALSO PROVIDES FOR RESCHEDULING OF 1977 PRINCIPAL PAYMENTS, THIS WILL BE REVIEWED AT A PARIS CLUB MEETING IN LATE 1976.

WHILE THE RESCHEDULING IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN ZAIRE'S RECOVERY, SERIOUS FINANCING PROBLEMS REMAIN. ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF FINANCING, ACCOMPANIED BY STRICT ZAIRIAN ADHERENCE TO THEIR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE COMMITMENTS, WILL STILL BE REQUIRED IF THE ECONOMY IS TO BE REVIVED.

2. AF - THE RAID AT ENTEBBE {CONFIDENTIAL}

THE SEIZURE JUNE 27 BY FOUR ARMED HIJACKERS OF AN AIR FRANCE AIRCRAFT CARRYING 276 PASSENGERS AND 12 CREWMEMBERS CULMINATED IN THE RESCUE JULY 3 OF 129 PASSENGERS AT UGANDA'S ENTEBBE AIRPORT BY ISRAELI COMMANDOS. 147 PASSENGERS HAD BEEN RELEASED EARLIER BY THE HIJACKERS--TWO PALESTINIANS, ONE WEST GERMAN AND A TURK.

MOST EVIDENCE CONCERNING THIS HIGHLY PUBLICIZED EVENT SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT PRESIDENT AMIN AND THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT COLLUDED WITH THE HIJACKERS OF THE AIRCRAFT AFTER IT ARRIVED IN UGANDA, INCLUDING ALLOWING FIVE ARMED PLO MEMBERS TO JOIN THE HIJACKERS. INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE DEPARTMENT INDICATES THAT AMIN SHOWED HIMSELF DEFINITELY SYMPATHETIC TO THE HIJACKERS AND THAT HE PERMITTED UGANDAN TROOPS TO RELIEVE THE HIJACKERS IN GUARDING THE HOSTAGES. ONLY MEMBERS OF THE AIR FRANCE CREW HAVE DENIED UGANDAN COMPLICITY, ALTHOUGH THERE IS SOME REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THIS MAY HAVE BEEN PROMPTED BY THE DESIRE TO ASSURE THE EVENTUAL RETURN OF THE FRENCH AIRCRAFT WHICH REMAINS IN UGANDA.

THE RAID WAS DENOUNCED AT THE SUMMIT MEETING OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND UGANDA'S SUSPICION OF KENYAN COMPLICITY IN THE RAID HAS STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND MAY TRIGGER INCREASED ATTACKS ON US FROM AMIN AS WELL. THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS EXPECTED TO CONSIDER THE MATTER THIS WEEK.

US VIEW: IN A LETTER TO ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER RABIN PRESIDENT FORD SAID, "THE AMERICAN PEOPLE JOIN ME IN EXPRESSING OUR GREAT SATISFACTION THAT THE PASSENGERS OF THE AIR FRANCE FLIGHT SEIZED EARLIER THIS WEEK HAVE BEEN SAVED AND A SENSELESS ACT OF TERRORISM THWARTED."

3. AF - AFRICAN UNITY ONLY PARTIAL AT SUMMIT MEETING {CONFIDENTIAL}

AT A POORLY ATTENDED JULY 2-6 SUMMIT MEETING OF THE 48-MEMBER ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) IN PORT LOUIS, MAURITIUS, AFRICAN LEADERS WERE ABLE TO UNITE IN CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL, FRANCE AND SOUTH AFRICA, BUT AGAIN FOUND ISSUES AFFECTING INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS OF AFRICAN STATES DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE. THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT SEYCHELLES ATTENDED AS THE OAU'S FORTY-EIGHTH MEMBER AND MAURITIAN PRIME MINISTER RAMGOOLAH ASSUMED THE OAU CHAIRMANSHIP FROM UGANDA'S IDI AMIN. GABON WAS NAMED AS THE

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SITE FOR THE 1977 MEETING.

THE MAURITIUS MEETING, ATTENDED BY ONLY TEN AFRICAN CHIEFS OF STATE OR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, CONDEMNED "ISRAELI AGGRESSION" FOR ITS COMMANDO RAID INTO UGANDA'S ENTEBBE AIRPORT TO FREE ISRAELI HOSTAGES. THE SUMMIT ALSO CONDEMNED FRANCE FOR ITS SALE OF NUCLEAR REACTORS TO SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS CONTINUED HOLD ON THE ISLAND OF MAYOTTE IN THE COMOROS. AT THE PRECEDING JUNE 24 - JULY 2 COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING, SOUTH AFRICA WAS EXCORIATED FOR ITS POLICIES WHICH PRODUCED THE SOWETO RIOTS (SEE CFR ISSUE NO. 25).

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ALGERIA, MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA OVER THE WESTERN SAHARA, WHICH NEARLY SPLIT THE CONFERENCE, WAS DEFERRED TO A SPECIAL SUMMIT MEETING EXPECTED TO BE HELD BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. SUDANESE PRESIDENT NIMEIRI PUBLICALLY ACCUSED LIBYA OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE ABORTED COUP IN KHARTOUM AND THERE WAS HAND WRINGING ABOUT FIGHTING BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF THE ANTI-SMITH RHODESIAN NATIONALIST FORCES. THE SUMMIT DID ADOPT A RESOLUTION, WELCOMED BY ETHIOPIA, WHICH CALLED UPON ALL STATES TO REFRAIN FROM INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE FRENCH TERRITORY OF THE AFARS AND ISSAS AND TO ABSTAIN FROM ANY ACTION LIKELY TO IMPEDE OR AFFECT ADVERSELY ITS PROGRESS TOWARD INDEPENDENCE.

AT THE PREPARATORY COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING, THE US WAS CRITICIZED FOR ITS VETO OF ANGOLA'S APPLICATION FOR UN MEMBERSHIP AND FOR WITHHOLDING FUNDS FROM UNESCO, THEREBY ALLEGEDLY UNDERCUTTING DIRECTOR M'BOS, THE HIGHEST RANKING AFRICAN IN THE UN SYSTEM. WHILE ISRAEL WAS STRONGLY CRITICIZED FOR THE RAID AT ENTEBBE, THE SUMMIT APPARENTLY DID NOT PUSH FOR ISRAELI SUSPENSION FROM THE UN. THE OTHER KEY MULTILATERAL ISSUES OF PUERTO RICO, KOREA AND THE PANAMA CANAL APPARENTLY ALSO WERE NOT RAISED. AFRICAN INTERIOR AND COASTAL STATES APPEARED UNABLE TO PAPER OVER DEEP DIVISIONS ON A COMMON POSITION ON LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATIONS.

4. NEA - URANIUM SHIPMENT TO INDIA (CONFIDENTIAL)

THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS HAS BEEN CONSIDERING A LICENSE APPLICATION FOR ONE YEAR'S SUPPLY OF ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL FOR THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER STATION LOCATED NEAR BOMBAY AND CONSTRUCTED IN THE 1960'S UNDER THE US AID PROGRAM. ON JULY 2 THE NRC, IN A SPLIT 3-1 DECISION, ISSUED THE LICENSE FOR A PARTIAL SHIPMENT. TARAPUR IS COVERED BY FULL IAEA SAFEGUARDS. UNDER A 1966 SUPPLY CONTRACT, THE US HAS A 30-YEAR OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE FUEL FOR THE FACILITY AND, IN TURN, INDIA HAS AGREED THAT THE PLANT WILL OPERATE ONLY ON AMERICAN ENRICHED URANIUM.

THIS SPRING, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NON-PROLIFERATION GROUPS-- IN THE CLIMATE OF GENERAL CONCERN OVER INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY FOLLOWING INDIA'S EXPLOSION OF A DEVICE IN MAY 1974--OPPOSED CONTINUED EXPORTS TO TARAPUR AND THE NRC AGREED TO HOLD A PUBLIC HEARING THIS SUMMER. BECAUSE OF VARIOUS DELAYS IN THE PUBLIC HEARING, THE USG URGED THAT THE NRC APPROVE A PARTIAL SHIPMENT OF FUEL TO AVERT A POTENTIAL POWER CUT IN THE BOMBAY AREA WHILE THE NRC CONSIDERED THE BROADER ISSUES FOLLOWING THE JULY 20 PUBLIC HEARING. THE INDIAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WOULD HAVE RUN OUT OF FUEL FOR THE FUEL ROD FABRICATING PLANT AT THE END OF AUGUST.

IN RENDERING ITS JULY 2 DECISION, THE NRC TOOK NOTE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1963 AGREEMENT WITH INDIA RELATING TO REPURCHASE OF SPENT FUEL BY THE US AND URGED THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO EXPLORE WITH THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT THIS POSSIBILITY.

IN ADDITION TO THE BROADER QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN CONTINUED SHIPMENTS TO TARAPUR, THE NRC HAS BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE REPROCESSING OF US-ORIGIN SPENT FUEL AT AN INDIGENOUS REPROCESSING PLANT WHICH THE INDIANS HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTING ADJACENT TO THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER STATION. SUCH A POSSIBILITY WAS ENVISAGED IN THE 1963 INDO-US AGREEMENT BUT, BEFORE US FUEL CAN BE REPROCESSED, THE US MUST MAKE A DETERMINATION THAT THE INDIAN REPROCESSING PLANT IS ADEQUATELY SAFEGUARDED. THIS DETERMINATION HAS NOT BEEN MADE AND THE QUESTION WOULD BECOME MOOT SHOULD THE US EXERCISE THE REPURCHASE OPTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE NRC.

5. EA - SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM DECLARED IN HANOI
(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

IN A SESSION THAT BEGAN JUNE 24, THE RECENTLY-ELECTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM FORMALIZED THE REUNIFICATION OF THAT COUNTRY INTO THE "SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM." PENDING DRAFTING OF A NEW CONSTITUTION, THE NEW STATE WILL OPERATE UNDER THE 1959 CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM. TRAPPINGS OF SOVEREIGNTY ARE NORTH VIETNAMESE: THE NATIONAL ANTHEM, THE FLAG, AND THE NATIONAL EMBLEM. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM WAS ESSENTIALLY INSTALLED AS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NEW STATE, WITH THE ADDITION OF SELECTED PRG AND NFELF PERSONALITIES IN A COMPARATIVELY FEW SENIOR POSITIONS. FOURTH-RANKING SOUTHERN-BORN VIETNAM WORKERS' PARTY (VWP) POLITBURO MEMBER PHAM HUNG, LONG HANOI'S PRO-CONSUL AT COSVN, WAS AGAIN NAMED VICE PREMIER AND GIVEN A PLACE ON THE SELECT NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL.

IN A SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, VWP FIRST SECRETARY LE DUAN, PRIMUS INTER PARES AMONG THE VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP, NOTED THE END OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION AND THE BEGINNING OF THE COEXISTENT SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, AND THE NEED TO BUILD SOCIALISM IN THE SOUTH. IN ALL, THE PROCESS OF UNIFICATION HAS CLEARLY REVEALED THE ABSOLUTE CONTROL OF THE VWP POLITBURO OVER NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM AND THEIR DETERMINATION TO BUILD A UNIFIED STATE UNDER THEIR UNCHALLENGED LEADERSHIP.

6. INR - LAOS-THAILAND: TENSIONS ACROSS THE MEKONG
{SECRET}

TENSIONS BETWEEN LAOS AND THAILAND HAVE BEEN INTERMITTENTLY HIGH SINCE THE DE FACTO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF LAOS IN MAY 1975. THE DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY:

--THAILAND'S EARLIER CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH THE NON-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN VIENTIANE;

--THE PRESENCE OF THOUSANDS OF MUONG {MEO} REFUGEES IN NORTH AND NORTHEAST THAILAND AND THAILAND'S PROVISION OF A TEMPORARY REFUGE TO PROMINENT LAO RIGHT-WING FIGURES;

--FREQUENT SHOOTING INCIDENTS ALONG THE MEKONG RIVER BORDER;

--THAI CLOSURE OF THE BORDER ON NOVEMBER 18 FOLLOWING A MEKONG FLARE-UP AND LAO RESENTMENT THAT THE THAI HAVE REOPENED IT AT ONLY TWO POINTS, CAUSING ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC HARDSHIP IN LAOS;

--LAO INSISTENCE THAT THE THAI PROHIBIT US USE OF THAI BASES AGAINST LAOS;

--THAI SUSPICIONS OF LAO SUPPORT TO THE THAI COMMUNISTS AND APPREHENSION THAT THE LAO COMMUNISTS, POSSIBLY ON BEHALF OF THEIR NORTH VIETNAMESE FRIENDS, AIM TO DETACH A SECTION OF NORTHEASTERN THAILAND.

MOST RECENTLY, ON JUNE 12, 1976, KAYSONE PHOMVIHAN, PRIME MINISTER OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC {LPDR}, IN A MAJOR ADDRESS TO THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COUNCIL, STRONGLY CRITICIZED THAILAND FOR SUPPORTING LAO "REACTIONARY TRAITORS" AND ACCUSED THE THAI OF SEEKING WAYS TO KEEP US BASES AND FORCES IN THAILAND UNDER A NEW FORM.

DESPITE THESE FRICTIONS, BOTH COUNTRIES APPEAR TO DESIRE GOOD RELATIONS. KAYSONE'S JUNE 12 SPEECH REITERATED THE LAO DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS AND SETTLE ALL PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. FOR ITS PART, THE THAI GOVERNMENT HAS ATTEMPTED TO PLAY DOWN ISSUES AFFECTING ITS RELATIONS WITH A NEIGHBOR WITH WHOM THE THAI HAVE BOTH NATURAL AND TRADITIONAL AFFINITIES. THAI FOREIGN MINISTER PHICHAI SAID ON JUNE 22 THAT HE IS GIVING PRIORITY TO HIS GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS WITH THE LPDR "BECAUSE THAILAND AND LAOS ARE TRULY BROTHERLY COUNTRIES."

MOREOVER, THE MUTUAL NEEDS OF THE LAO AND THAI GOVERNMENTS FOR CONTINUED RELATIONS MAY COMPEL EACH TO SEEK A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF CURRENT DIFFICULTIES. THE LONG HISTORY OF CLOSE ASSOCIATION ACROSS THE MEKONG ARGUES AGAINST A COMPLETE RUPTURE. IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF LAOS TO MAINTAIN THE FLOW OF RICE AND OTHER ESSENTIAL IMPORTS THROUGH THAILAND, AND THE RTG UNDOUBTEDLY FEELS THAT CONTINUED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ARE A PROTECTION AGAINST EXCESSIVE PATHET LAO SUPPORT TO THE THAI COMMUNISTS AND A BLOCK AGAINST A LAO-NORTH VIETNAMESE TEAM-UP AGAINST THAILAND.

GIVEN THE LONG AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LAO AND VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS, HOWEVER, THE FUTURE STATE OF LAO-THAI RELATIONS MAY DEPEND ULTIMATELY ON THE NATURE OF THAI-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS. IF BANGKOK AND HANOI FAIL TO SOLVE THEIR CURRENT OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES AND IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS, PATHET LAO/NORTH VIETNAMESE SUPPORT FOR THE THAI COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN NORTHEASTERN THAILAND WILL PROBABLY BECOME MORE INTENSE.

7. ARA - THE IDB AND HUMAN RIGHTS (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

THE "HARKIN AMENDMENT" TO IDB LEGISLATION MAY HAVE MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR US RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (IDB).

-- THE AMENDMENT DIRECTS THE US DIRECTOR TO THE IDB TO VOTE AGAINST ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES WITH A "CONSISTENT PATTERN OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS . . . UNLESS SUCH ASSISTANCE WILL DIRECTLY BENEFIT THE NEEDY."

-- THE PROVISION TOOK EFFECT JUNE 1 AND AS A RESULT THE US CAST A NEGATIVE VOTE ON A 21 MILLION DOLLAR INDUSTRIAL CREDIT LOAN TO CHILE.

-- WHILE THE VOTE DID NOT DEFEAT THE LOAN, MANY OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DIRECTORS SEVERELY CRITICIZED THE US FOR BASING ITS VOTE ON WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE POLITICAL VIEWS.

IT IS UNCLEAR HOW MANY OF THE 22 LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN MEMBERS OF THE BANK MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE AFFECTED.

THE IMPACT OF THE HARKIN AMENDMENT COULD AFFECT THE OPERATIONS OF THE IDB IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS:

-- PROJECTS FOR COUNTRIES WHERE THERE IS A CONSISTENT PATTERN OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS MAY BE APPROVED FOR CONCESSIONAL FUNDING ONLY IF THEY DIRECTLY ASSIST THE NEEDY, BECAUSE THE US HAS A VETO ON THE FUND FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS.

-- PROJECTS FOR SUCH COUNTRIES COULD BE APPROVED FOR THE BANK'S HARD WINDOW OVER A US NEGATIVE VOTE, BUT AT OUR POLITICAL COST.

-- DELIBERATIONS REQUIRED TO APPLY THE AMENDMENT COULD SLOW DOWN BANK OPERATIONS IN AFFECTED COUNTRIES.

A SIMILAR HARKIN AMENDMENT ALSO APPLIES TO THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND AND, BY EARLY NEXT YEAR, IT IS CONSIDERED LIKELY THAT SIMILAR AMENDMENTS WILL BE SOUGHT AFFECTING ALL MULTILATERAL BANKS. US BILATERAL ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN SUBJECT TO A SIMILAR HARKIN AMENDMENT SINCE DECEMBER 1975.

THE DEPARTMENT, TOGETHER WITH TREASURY AND OTHER MEMBER DEPARTMENTS IN THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL, IS CONSIDERING GUIDELINES FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE HARKIN AMENDMENT.

8. PA - STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY (UNCLASSIFIED)

-- THE FUTURE OF AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY - SPEECH BEFORE THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, JULY 6.

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CURRENT FOREIGN RELATIONS
ADDITIONAL ACTION ADDRESSEES

NSC
SECDEF
USCINCSO
USDOCOSOUTH
USCINCEUR
USCINCRED
CINCLANT
CINCPAC
USAREUR
USAFE
USNMR SHAPE
MAC SCOTT AFB
CINCUSNAVEUR
XMT ALGIERS
ASUNCION
BANJUL
Dacca
DOHA
PORT MORESBY
SOFIA
YAOUNDE

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DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:

December 30, 1977; 3:45-4:40 p.m.
Conference Room of the Polish Sejm
Warsaw, Poland

First Secretary Gierek welcomed the President and the American delegation, expressing the friendship and respect of the Polish people for the American people and the President personally. The Poles are a sensitive people and thus have shown great interest in the decision to lay wreaths at three Polish memorials.

The visit comes at a time of intensive development of US-Polish relations, indicated by mutual visits and agreements. Mr. Gierek expressed his pleasure for this opportunity to further consolidate relations. He also said that the present is a time of rejuvenation in international relations, which gives the visit added significance. Although there has been a "certain slowdown" in Soviet-US relations which caused Poland particular concern, there is a desire for the further development of friendly relations.

The President's visit provides an important opportunity to exchange views, and the private conversation was a long but useful one.

The President expressed appreciation to the First Secretary and others responsible for the warm welcome received in Poland. The historic ties and common purposes that link the two peoples are part of our consciousness, and we will do what is necessary to perpetuate them.

The visits to the memorials were a reminder of the need to avoid war. Peace is an important responsibility that falls on our shoulders and on those of the leaders of the Soviet Union and other nations. The Polish leaders can help the developing friendship between the U.S. and the USSR. The United States is involved in efforts with the Soviet Union to limit and reduce atomic weapons -- not only strategic intercontinental weapons but also theater weapons deployed on the territories of Poland's neighbors. We are also making progress in the negotiation of a ban on all nuclear explosions, curtailment of forces in the Indian Ocean region, the reduction of conventional weapons sales, elimination of chemical and biological warfare, and attacks against observation satellites and prior notification before test missiles are fired. We hope these negotiations will add impetus to the stalled MBFR talks in Vienna, in which Poland plays an important role. The President noted that he was pleased in recent months by the attitude of Mr. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders, and is looking forward to an early visit by Mr. Brezhnev to conclude these talks. There is good hope for their success.

No difficult bilateral issues exist between the U.S. and Poland. We appreciate this relationship. Trade is expected to reach \$1 billion

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next year. We realize the agricultural problems facing Poland in view of its fourth bad harvest, but understand the efforts to continue with economic development. The U.S. has already approved \$300 million in credits for Polish purchase of grain, and the President indicated that he was willing to offer an additional \$200 million if Poland wished to take advantage of it.

Mr. Gierek interrupted the President to indicate that Poland would take advantage of those credits.

The President hoped that 1978 would be a good crop year, but that Poland might still need agricultural purchases. Therefore, he suggested an annual assessment of Poland's needs for the next several years in order to cooperate with Poland to the greatest degree possible.

The President recognized the importance of Poland's economic viability and said that in view of the country's debt the U.S. would cooperate in extending credit if this should be necessary and if this is worked out on a multinational basis.

He expressed appreciation for Poland's support for the Helsinki Agreement and its commitment to human rights -- a commitment which we have shared for generations. We hope for better exchanges in science, technology, and students in the future.

The ties of kinship and friendship of the Polish Americans, perhaps numbering ten million, gives impetus to our relations. We hope this will be enhanced by an early visit to the United States by First Secretary Gierek to permit repayment of Poland's hospitality.

Mr. Gierek thanked the President for the invitation, and then launched into a long discussion of the history, problems, and aspirations of Poland. He concentrated on the period since 1918 and noted that before the Second World War insufficient effort was spent on economic development. He reiterated the devastation Poland suffered during the war and explained that because the country's liberation came from the East, Poland has since been linked with the USSR. He said that the country is now essentially ethnically Polish, that the birth rate is high, and its population is young. Although Poland's borders are still not completely secure, the United States position has helped with its frontiers in the West.

He summarized Poland's economic growth and the problems that have resulted, mentioning in particular increases in the standard of living and the reasons why supply has fallen below demand for consumer goods and food. As a consequence changes have been introduced in economic plans to reduce the growth rate and deal with shortages. Mr. Gierek admitted that things were difficult in Poland at present and there was no intention to hide this fact.

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They were a consequence of past centuries, but conditions were now right for rectifying the situation. He expressed optimism because of the growth of industry, the qualified work force, the growing number of young people entering the labor force, and the raw materials the country possesses.

One of the greatest strengths of the country was the moral, political, and patriotic unity of the Polish people, which supports the government's development program. In this context one must also see relations with the Church. Understanding and tolerance is part of Polish culture, but no one in Poland wants to turn back the clock. All who wish Poland well want to see it developed and strong.

Mr. Gierek referred to the fact that some of these subjects had been discussed in greater detail in the private conversation with the President. He expressed the hope that the President better understood Poland's place in Europe and in the Warsaw Pact, and also the reasons why cordial ties link its people to the Soviet people. Because of this, great importance is attached to rapprochement between the two Great Powers.

The Polish leader said that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had informed his government of the state of the SALT II negotiations and expressed the hope that the two Great Powers would achieve progress in this regard. Progress on strategic arms limitation would result in greater progress in the MBFR talks.

Mr. Gierek expressed concern with certain nationalistic tendencies in West Germany, noting that he had also discussed these with Chancellor Schmidt. West German efforts to get nuclear weapons, evidenced by FRG's use of testing grounds in Zaire, are also a serious problem. He expressed the hope that the United States would prevent any change in the existing balance of forces in Europe.

The neutron bomb also raises concerns in Poland, and Mr. Gierek hoped that the United States would not deploy this weapon. The Soviet suggestion that both sides renounce the manufacture of neutron bombs is a useful suggestion.

Polish foreign policy is becoming increasingly active, and this was particularly evident in 1977. Relations improved not only with the socialist countries, but with the entire world. A separate peace will not provide security for Israel.

With regard to bilateral US-Polish relations, there has been much progress, but possibilities exist for further development. Poland is interested in broader trade exchanges, including co-production ventures, such as that now existing with International Harvester. Mr. Gierek expressed the hope that the U.S. will lift its quotas on certain goods and resolve the charges of dumping leveled against Polish exports. These topics can be further discussed

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in detail by the Foreign Ministers and other officials. Despite the fact that mutual trade is reaching \$1 billion, it is only a fraction of what is possible. Both sides must work to bring about further expansion.

Quotas imposed on Polish fishing in U.S. waters are a problem and Poland would like to see them raised.

Progress has been made in scientific and technical cooperation, but new areas for scientists should be singled out, including work on how coal might play a more important role as an energy source.

Mr. Gierek again expressed appreciation for the President's visit, the opportunity for the talks, and the spirit of these conversations.

The President noted that he would have to leave soon in order to be on time for his press conference. He, therefore, proposed to discuss personally a few of the items raised by the First Secretary and leave the other items to talks between the Foreign Ministers.

On the Middle East, the President noted that neither the U.S. nor Israel nor Egypt desires a separate peace. The Egyptian-Israeli talks will deal not only with bilateral questions between the two countries, but also with the West Bank and Gaza which indicate a broader peace program.

The United States has good intelligence and good relations with the countries of Western Europe. There are treaty limitations on the acquisition of atomic weapons by West Germany, and we are not aware of any movement or desire by the FRG Government to develop atomic weapons. There is no evidence that West Germany is involved in tests in Zaire or that tests there involve the development of advanced weapons.

We do desire to discuss with the Soviet Union restrictions on theater nuclear weapons. The neutron bomb would not be a destabilizing factor as much as the development of the SS-20 by the USSR, which adds new dimensions to Soviet attack capabilities. We intend to consult closely with the NATO states, all of whom are threatened directly by thousands of nuclear weapons in the European area. We wish to pursue with the NATO and Warsaw Pact states the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether.

The President then excused himself in order to attend the press conference. Mr. Gierek acknowledged the President's departure. He added that what the President had said does not remove the dangers Poland feels, but he expressed thanks that he could convey his concerns.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Vice President
FROM: George P. Shultz
SUBJECT: Your Visit to Israel, Jordan, and Egypt
July 25 - August 5

Objectives

- Underscore administration's continuing support for and special links to Israel, Jordan and Egypt.
- Reaffirm our support for peace process and the ongoing effort to strengthen Egyptian-Israeli relations.
- Urge progress in quality of life in West Bank (Israel/Jordan) and Gaza (Israel/Egypt).
- Reaffirm our understanding of economic problems and support for implementation of necessary reforms.
- Strengthen our dialogue on combatting terrorism.

Discussion

Your trip is the first high-level U.S. visit to this part of the region in more than a year. It follows a period of several political shocks and letdowns, including the collapse of King Hussein's peace initiative and a downturn in the area's economic situation following the fall in oil prices. Against this background, our challenge is to maintain stability in the area and to keep alive some sense of hope for progress in the peace process. Your visit will be an important demonstration of U.S. commitment to working in partnership with these important moderate countries in pursuing these common goals. Our political relations with all three countries remain strong, a point you will want to underscore in your meetings with host officials. Each country has special links to the U.S. that you can emphasize. All of them share some common goals at present--a desire to move forward on peace issues and to improve life in the occupied territories. And each will be looking to the U.S. for some sort of help for their weakened economies. At the same time, host officials recognize that you will not be bringing new ideas or solutions for regional

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problems but rather that you are there to continue the high-level dialogue between good and important friends. They will appreciate this opportunity for a full review of the range of issues.

The peace process has remained on hold since Hussein's break with Arafat in February.

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Peres is also attracted to the idea of improving the quality of life in the West Bank as a means of improving conditions for possible peace negotiations. Both he and Hussein will be looking to us for ideas on how to proceed and for money to help carry them out. On the larger question of negotiations with Jordan, however, the Israeli government has maintained a wait-and-see attitude, which is probably all the traffic can bear as the government approaches its October rotation. While Shamir has affirmed to us his pledge to continue GOI peace-seeking policies after rotation, we anticipate he will be less flexible on peace negotiations and tougher on West Bank issues. Your visit will be important in advancing our dialogue with Shamir just before he becomes Prime Minister.

The Egyptians want to promote negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation to expand the peace process and to reduce their own isolation in the Arab community. They support the Jordan-PLO accord, which they helped broker, but are uncertain how to proceed now that Hussein has broken off with Arafat. They view the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians and as indispensable for progress and would like the Hussein-Arafat dialogue to resume. They are interested in improving the quality of life in Gaza, but Mubarak has made clear his opposition to a Gaza-first alternative or moves not approved by the PLO.

Over the past year, we have been engaged in talks between Egypt and Israel aimed at resolving the Taba dispute through

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arbitration and improving other aspects of their relationship. In recent weeks, Judge Sofaer has achieved progress on the arbitration terms of reference, which might be completed in time for your visit. Mubarak has pledged to return his ambassador to Israel when the document is signed, which could improve overall relations with Israel. Your visit can address the importance we attach to a healthy Israeli-Egyptian relationship.

Syrian-Israeli tensions of past months have receded but the Israelis remain concerned about Syrian encroachments in Lebanon and suspected Syrian support for terrorism, i.e., attempts on El Al in London, Madrid. Our own diplomacy generated public efforts by both Peres and Assad to defuse the situation. The risk of a confrontation now appears considerably reduced, and Syria is attempting to improve its image on terrorism.

In Beirut, there is still no serious effort at national leadership from any of the confessional groups. We can expect a continuation of the present cycle of fighting followed by temporary ceasefires. The economy, already in shambles, now seems to be moving even lower.

Both Egypt, and to a lesser extent Israel, continue to face serious economic difficulties and will be looking to the U.S. for help. Egypt has been particularly hard hit by the fall in oil prices. The Egyptian government's latest economic reform plan is the best we have seen but still falls short of what is need to unlock sorely needed IMF/IBRD resources. We can provide more of our aid in cash but will do so only as the Egyptians put a sound economic program in place. Your visit is an opportunity to engage Mubarak directly on this issue. Mubarak in turn will press hard for military debt relief and cash grant assistance.

Israel has made great progress in reducing inflation, but further budget cuts are needed. It is reluctant to incur the political risks of wage deflation and lacks a growth strategy. The situation will become more problematical as our current aid supplemental runs out. Since our own budget difficulties will limit our ability to offer additional help, the Israelis may have to consider cutting major programs, such as the Lavi.

Jordan, which is also experiencing economic problems due to the general drop off of remittances from the Gulf, should be able to manage politically over the short term. They will be concerned, however, with the absence of major amounts of follow-on ESF money when the current assistance package runs out in 1987 and are also now seeking U.S. financing for West

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Bank projects to enhance Jordan's West Bank credentials. Jordan will also be looking for some reassurance on our military assistance relationship following the congressional turndown of our arms sales proposal.

Despite reduced activity in support of terrorism by both Libya and Syria following recent events in the region and Europe, terrorism remains a central problem for all three governments. While we are all in essential agreement on the need for a tough stance on terrorism, differences in tactics have sometimes caused problems.

You will want to brief your hosts on positive changes in the international climate on terrorism and in terrorist activity in the aftermath of the raid on Libya. In this context you may also wish to review the threatened increase in PLO-sponsored terrorism in Jordan and elsewhere in response to Hussein's effort to push out the PLO.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO ISRAEL, JORDAN, EGYPT

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. POSTS MAY DRAW ON POINTS BELOW IN BRIEFING HOST GOVERNMENTS ON THE VICE PRESIDENT'S (VP) TRIP TO ISRAEL, JORDAN AND EGYPT, JULY 27 TO AUGUST 5.
3. ITINERARY: THE VICE PRESIDENT VISITED ISRAEL, JORDAN AND EGYPT BETWEEN JULY 27 AND AUGUST 5 1986. HE TALKED WITH THE LEADERS OF THOSE COUNTRIES: WITH PRIME MINISTER PERES, VICE PREMIER SHAMIR AND DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN IN ISRAEL; WITH KING HUSSEIN, CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, PRIME MINISTER RIFAI AND CINC BIN SHAKER IN JORDAN; AND WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK, PRIME MINISTER LOTFI, DEFENSE MINISTER GAZALA AND FOREIGN MINISTER MEGUID IN EGYPT.

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4. PURPOSES OF THE TRIP:

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TO LEARN WHERE THE LEADERS IN THE REGION ARE HEADING AND HOW THE U.S. CAN BE HELPFUL IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

- TO EXAMINE FIRST-HAND EGYPT'S DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION.

- TO DO WHATEVER POSSIBLE TO MOVE THE TABA DISPUTE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. PROGRESS WAS MADE.

5. PEACE PROCESS.

- A PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP WAS TO REAFFIRM U.S. INTEREST IN AND COMMITMENT TO PROMOTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND TO EXPLORE CURRENT POSSIBILITIES FOR MOVEMENT TOWARD THAT GOAL.

-- DURING HIS VISIT TO THE REGION, THE VP PRAISED THE COMMITMENT TO PEACE REPRESENTED BY THE RECENT MEETING IN MOROCCO BETWEEN KING HASSAN AND PRIME MINISTER PERES, WHICH WE CONSIDER A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. HE STRESSED THAT THE US HOPED THIS COURAGEOUS STEP WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY OTHERS ON THE WAY TO PEACE.

- HE AFFIRMED THE US BELIEF THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND IMPROVEMENT IN THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN THOSE AREAS IS ESSENTIAL TO GIVING PALESTINIANS HOPE FOR THE FUTURE.

-- DURING THE COURSE OF HIS VISIT, HE RECOGNIZED THAT ATTITUDES IN THE REGION HAVE UNDERGONE AN EVOLUTION IN
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RECENT TIMES AND THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE TOWARD FINDING A COMMON BASIS FOR PEACE IN THE REGION.

-- IN CAIRO, ON HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE REGION, HE LISTED AREAS OF COMMONALITY REGARDING MIDEAST PEACE WHICH HAD BEEN REVIEWED WITH HIS ISRAELI, JORDANIAN AND EGYPTIAN HOSTS. THEY ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(1) A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IS ESSENTIAL, URGENT AND CAN ONLY BE REACHED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

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(2) NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PRODUCE PEACE TREATIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES BASED ON THE RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES AND PEOPLES IN THE REGION TO A LIFE OF PEACE AND SECURITY.

(3) NEGOTIATIONS MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY NEEDS OF ISRAEL, THE SECURITY NEEDS OF ALL OTHER STATES IN THE REGION AND THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

(4) NEGOTIATIONS MUST RESOLVE THE PALESTINE QUESTION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN JORDAN, THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THIS RELATIONSHIP CAN BE ACHIEVED BASED ON UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THE U.S. VIEW IS THAT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 EMBODY THE PRINCIPLE OF SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES FOR ALL STATES IN THE REGION AND THE EXCHANGE OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE.

(5) THE U.S. BELIEVES IN THE IMPORTANCE OF FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS MAY INVOLVE THE FRAMEWORK OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OR FORUM STRUCTURED IN A WAY THAT PERMITS PROGRESS AND NOT

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PARALYSIS; AGREEMENT, NOT DICTATES.

(6) THE FORM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PROVIDE FOR TALKS BETWEEN AN ISRAELI DELEGATION AND A JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN DELEGATION, AS WELL AS BETWEEN SYRIAN AND ISRAELI DELEGATIONS. DELEGATIONS MUST CONSIST OF INDIVIDUALS WHO SEEK PEACE AND OPENLY REJECT VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM.

THE STATEMENT EXPRESSES OUR RECOGNITION OF THE COMMITMENT OF ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS TO THE COMMON GOAL OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE REGION. WHILE WE DID CONSULT THE THREE COUNTRIES THROUGHOUT, THIS IS A US ASSESSMENT OF THE AREAS OF COMMONALITY. IT DOES NOT ANNOUNCE ANY CHANGE OF US POLICY.

- THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT

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THESE AREAS OF AGREEMENT ARE EMBODIED IN THE REAGAN PLAN OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1982, WHICH ITSELF WAS BASED ON UNITED NATIONS SECURITY RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

-- HE STATED HIS BELIEF THAT THESE AREAS OF COMMONALITY PROVIDE A BASIS FOR MOVING THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD, AND CALLED ON PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY AND STEP FORWARD TO SHAPE THEIR OWN DESTINY.

-- AREAS OF COMMON AGREEMENT HAVE NOT ALWAYS CHARACTERIZED THE REGION: SIGNIFICANT IF UNDRAMATIC PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN RECENT YEARS. THIS IMPORTANT FACT IS TOO OFTEN OVERLOOKED AND WE BELIEVED IT IMPORTANT TO RECORD THIS.

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-- WE SHALL CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT THE LEADERS OF THE REGION AS THEY REVIEW THEIR POLICIES AND SEEK CREATIVELY TO ENLARGE THE AREA OF COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS TOWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST AND ENDURING PEACE.

- THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VP'S STATEMENT IN CAIRO IS THE FACT THAT HE COULD GO TO THE LEADERS OF THREE KEY COUNTRIES FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND FIND THEM WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE EFFORT WITH HIM TO DEFINE AREAS OF AGREEMENT. THIS IS PRECISELY THE KIND OF PROCESS WE WOULD NEED TO UNDERTAKE TO REACH BROADER PEACE AGREEMENTS.

6. ISRAEL.

-- THE VP'S SCHEDULE WAS ARRANGED TO PERMIT HIM TO GET A FEELING FOR WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE COUNTRY BEFORE HIS SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS WITH ISRAELI LEADERS. THE MEETING WITH PERES LASTED NEARLY 2 HOURS, WAS EXTREMELY WARM, FRANK, BUSINESSLIKE AND PRODUCTIVE. IN HIS MEETING WITH VICE PREMIER/FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, THE LATTER PROMISED CONTINUITY IN THE POLICIES OF THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT.

-- THE VP DISCUSSED SOME PURELY BILATERAL ISSUES WITH ISRAELI LEADERS:

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-- HE REAFFIRMED THE STRENGTH AND DEPTH OF THE US/ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP AND DISCUSSED BILATERAL COOPERATION IN MANY AREAS.

-- HE EXPLAINED THAT U.S. BUDGET CONSTRAINTS PRECLUDE ADDITIONAL US AID. IN LIGHT OF THESE CONSTRAINTS, HE AGREED TO CONSIDER NON-FUNDED BENEFITS TO ISRAEL IN THE AREA OF OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP SUCH AS JOINT R&D.

-- THE VP INITIALLED A VOA AGREEMENT THAT PERMITS THE US

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TO BUILD A NEW RELAY TRANSMITTER IN ISRAEL.

-- HE SIGNED A JOINT DECLARATION ENCOURAGING EXPANDED TOURISM BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL.

* THE VP DISCUSSED THE ISRAELI ECONOMY AND THE NEED FOR GREATER ATTENTION TO POLICIES THAT WOULD STIMULATE GROWTH.

BEGIN FOR NATO CAPITALS ONLY:

-- HE RAISED US CONCERN OVER THE COST OF THE LAVI AIRCRAFT AND DISCUSSED A STUDY OF THE LAVI AND ALTERNATIVES THAT WOULD MAINTAIN ISRAEL'S HIGH TECH BASE AND MEET ITS NEED FOR A MODERN FIGHTER AT A REALISTIC COST. HE ASSURED THE GOI THAT THE US IS COMMITTED TO A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF BOTH ISRAEL AND THE US.

HE DISCUSSED SOVIET JEWRY AND REAFFIRMED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PLEDGE TO CONTINUE TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITH THE SOVIETS VIA PRIVATE DIPLOMACY.

- THE VP DISCUSSED TERRORISM AND EXPRESSED OUR SATISFACTION WITH EFFORTS TO COMBAT IT.

END FOR NATO ONLY.7. JORDAN.

- THE VP'S TRIP DEMONSTRATES THE HIGH VALUE WE PLACE ON OUR RELATIONS WITH JORDAN, AN OLD, CLOSE FRIEND.

4 -- DURING MEETINGS WITH THE KING, CROWN PRINCE HASSAN,

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PRIME MINISTER RIFAI, AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS,
BILATERAL ISSUES AND THE PEACE PROCESS WERE DISCUSSED.
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-- WE HAVE DECIDED TO HELP JORDAN'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
QUALITY OF LIFE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BY
REALLOCATING TO IT DOLS. 4.5 MILLION OF UNUSED, CURRENT
YEAR AID FUNDS.

- THIS WILL COMPLEMENT OUR OWN LONG-STANDING GOAL OF
ASSISTANCE TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA THROUGH AMERICAN
PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS; THE CURRENT LEVEL OF
OUR PROGRAM IS ABOUT DOLS. 13 MILLION, AND WE ARE
REQUESTING DOLS. 18 MILLION FOR FY 86/87.

8. EGYPT.

* DURING HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND OTHER
SENIOR EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS, THE VP DISCUSSED THE PEACE
PROCESS, TABA AND ECONOMIC ISSUES.

I. TABA

- THE US WISHES TO DO WHATEVER IS POSSIBLE TO HELP MOVE
THE TABA DISPUTE TOWARDS SETTLEMENT.

-- THE VP TALKED WITH BOTH PRIME MINISTER PERES AND
PRESIDENT MUBARAK ABOUT TABA, STRESSING THAT IT IS TIME
TO GET THIS PROBLEM OFF THE AGENDA.

-- BOTH PERES AND MUBARAK SUPPORTED A RENEWED EFFORT TO
REACH AGREEMENT ON A TABA ARBITRATION COMPROMIS. DICK
MURPHY AND OTHERS ARE WORKING INTENSIVELY IN CAIRO AND
TEL AVIV AND, IN FACT, HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CLEARING AWAY
MOST OF THE REMAINING ISSUES.

- AT THE REQUEST OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, THE VP
ASKED MURPHY TO STAY ON IN CAIRO AND TO CONTINUE WORKING
ON THE ISSUE. AN ISRAELI DELEGATION CAME OVER ON TUESDAY

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TO RESUME DIRECT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EGYPTIANS ON TABA.

-- THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUE RELATES TO THE WAY IN WHICH THE TWO PARTIES SET OUT THEIR POSITIONS IN THE ANNEX OF THE COMPROMIS. BOTH EGYPT AND ISRAEL WANT TO ENSURE THAT THEIR POSITION IN THE ARBITRATION IS NOT PREJUDICED.

II. ECONOMIC ISSUES

- THE VP ALSO SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME IN EXAMINING WITH THE GOE EGYPT'S DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION.

-- THE GOE EXPLAINED THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR A HIGHER PORTION OF CASH IN OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND A REDUCTION IN THE BURDEN OF FMS DEBT.

-- THE VP EXPRESSED SYMPATHY FOR EGYPT'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BUT OUTLINED OUR OWN VERY DIFFICULT BUDGETARY SITUATION. HE SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS THESE ISSUES WITH THE PRESIDENT AND TREASURY SECRETARY BAKER ON HIS RETURN.

THE EGYPTIANS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO WORK WITH THE IMF BUT ARGUED THAT SOME IMF CONDITIONS (E.G. PROMPT UNIFICATION OF THE EXCHANGE RATE) COULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLE HARDSHIP. THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE IMF CONDITIONS. THE VP CAUTIONED THAT WE DO NOT DICTATE TO THE IMF.

- WE WILL BE EXAMINING WAYS WE CAN HELP EGYPT IN ITS REFORM EFFORT AND HOPE OTHERS WILL BE ABLE TO JOIN US IN PROVIDING APPROPRIATE SUPPORT TO EGYPT AS IT DEVELOPS A

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COMPREHENSIVE AND WORKABLE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM. WHITEHEAD

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OFFICE

USIA FOR NEA PENNEY

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY VICE PRESIDENT
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BUSH

FOLLOWING IS THE PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT DELIVERED BY
VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH IN CAIRO, EGYPT, ON TUESDAY,
AUGUST 5, 1986:

SEVERAL COMMON THEMES EMERGED FROM MY DISCUSSIONS IN
ISRAEL, JORDAN AND EGYPT. ALL THE LEADERS I MET WITH
REAFFIRMED AND PLEDGED THEIR TOTAL REJECTION OF THE USE
OF TERROR AND VIOLENCE. ALL THE LEADERS ALSO EXPRESSED
THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE

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REGION. WHILE NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE PEACE PROCESS, THEY BELIEVE THAT EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE ECONOMIC SITUATION WILL MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THAT PROCESS.

WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF PEACE, ALL THE PARTIES WANT TO SEE MOVEMENT AND ARE FRUSTRATED BY WHAT THEY SEE AS A STALEMATE. NO ONE IS SATISFIED WITH THE CURRENT IMPASSE. ALL THE PARTIES WANT THE U.S. TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN RE-ENERGIZING THE PEACE PROCESS. WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN PREPARED TO PLAY SUCH A CATALYTIC ROLE.

DURING MY MEETING WITH THE LEADERS OF THE THREE COUNTRIES, I WAS ABLE TO DISCUSS THE COMMON ELEMENTS THAT UNITE THOSE COMMITTED TO MAKING PEACE IN THE AREA. WHILE MUCH STILL DIVIDES THOSE IN THE REGION, I AM CONVINCED AFTER MY TALKS THAT THERE IS ENOUGH COMMON GROUND FOR PROGRESS TO BE MADE IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

I WAS PARTICULARLY STRUCK BY THE AREAS OF COMMONALITY AMONG ISRAEL, JORDAN, EGYPT AND MANY PALESTINIANS. I BELIEVE THIS COMMONALITY CREATES A BASIS ON WHICH PEACE NEGOTIATIONS CAN MOVE FORWARD.

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TO BE SPECIFIC, MY IMPRESSION OF THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT ON THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND THE GOALS OF THAT PROCESS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

-- A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IS ESSENTIAL, URGENT AND CAN ONLY BE REACHED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

-- NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PRODUCE PEACE TREATIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES BASED ON THE RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES AND PEOPLES IN THE REGION TO A LIFE OF PEACE AND SECURITY.

-- NEGOTIATIONS MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY NEEDS OF ISRAEL, THE SECURITY NEEDS OF ALL OTHER STATES IN THE REGION AND THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

-- NEGOTIATIONS MUST RESOLVE THE PALESTINE QUESTION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JORDAN, THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THIS RELATIONSHIP CAN BE ACHIEVED BASED ON UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THE U.S. VIEW IS THAT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 EMBODY THE PRINCIPLE OF SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES FOR ALL STATES IN THE REGION AND THE EXCHANGE OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE.

-- THE U.S. BELIEVES IN THE IMPORTANCE OF FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS MAY INVOLVE THE FRAMEWORK OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OR FORUM STRUCTURED IN A WAY THAT PERMITS PROGRESS AND NOT PARALYSIS; AGREEMENT, NOT DICTATES.

-- THE FORM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PROVIDE FOR TALKS BETWEEN AN ISRAELI DELEGATION AND A
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JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN DELEGATION, AS WELL AS BETWEEN SYRIAN AND ISRAELI DELEGATIONS. DELEGATIONS MUST CONSIST OF INDIVIDUALS WHO SEEK PEACE AND OPENLY REJECT VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM.

THE U.S. BELIEVES THESE AREAS OF AGREEMENT ARE EMBODIED IN THE REAGAN PLAN OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1982, WHICH ITSELF WAS BASED ON UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. I BELIEVE THESE AREAS OF AGREEMENT OR COMMON UNDERSTANDING PROVIDE A BASIS FOR MOVING THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD. I CALL ON PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES NOT TO MISS YET ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE THEIR ASPIRATIONS AS A PEOPLE.

PALESTINIAN REJECTIONISM HAS CONTRIBUTED ONLY TO A TRAGIC HISTORY. IT'S TIME FOR PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY AND STEP FORWARD TO SHAPE THEIR OWN DESTINY.

I WILL RETURN TO WASHINGTON AND REVIEW WHAT I HAVE LEARNED WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND OTHERS. TOGETHER WE WILL DETERMINE WHAT SHOULD COME NEXT, HOW WE CAN BUILD ON THE PROGRESS MADE IN THIS VISIT AND HOW WE CAN IMPLEMENT OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES.

THE ROAD TO PEACE IS TAKEN A STEP AT A TIME, AND I AM ENCOURAGED BY MY TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER PERES, KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK THIS WEEK. I DO BELIEVE THE ATMOSPHERE HAS IMPROVED, AND THAT ALL NATIONS SHOULD ENGAGE IN THE SEARCH FOR A TRUE AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. UNDELAND
UNQUOTE WHITEHEAD

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AND THERE'S A LITTLE MOVEMENT NOW. I DON'T WANT TO OVERSTATE ITS POTENTIAL, BUT THE VERY FACT THAT KING HUSSEIN IS FLYING TO ALEXANDRIA TO SEE PRESIDENT MUBARAK IS POSITIVE. IT'S A LITTLE BIT OF MOTION THERE ON THE PEACE PROCESS.

Q - WHAT'S THE MOVEMENT THE RESULT OF? I MEAN CERTAINLY WE SAW NO INITIATIVES TENDERED, WE SAW NO AGREEMENTS COME OUT OF THIS, WE SAW NO CHANGE IN THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES THAT DIVIDE THE REGION.

A - I THINK YOU DID SEE SOMETHING NEW - AND THAT IS THE AGREEMENT OF THREE LEADERS ON THINGS LIKE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION, LIKE ISRAELI SECURITY, LIKE THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS. NOW YOU HAVE TO HAD DEALT WITH THE MIDDLE EAST, AND ALL ITS NUANCE AND ALL ITS SHADOW TO UNDERSTAND THAT THAT IN ITSELF IS IMPORTANT. ALSO YOU HAVE TO ADD TO THAT THE MEETING BETWEEN KING HASSAN AND SHIMON PERES THAT TOOK PLACE EARLIER ON. YOU HAVE TO UNDERSTAND ROTATION IN ISRAEL. AND ALL OF THESE THINGS COME TOGETHER TO MAKE ME FEEL THAT THERE IS SOME HOPE, MORE HOPE FOR PEACE. I'M NOT SAYING, YOU KNOW, WE'VE SOLIDIFIED THE PEACE PROCESS, BUT THERE'S A DESIRE FOR

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PEACE THERE THAT I BELIEVE IS MORE ACUTE THAN EVER BEFORE.

Q - BUT YOU KNOW AS I DO THAT TERM YOU JUST USED, 'PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION', IS A VERY NEBULOUS ONE. ARE WE ANY CLOSER TO FINDING SATISFACTORY PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES, WHO WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE NOT ONLY TO ISRAELIS BUT ALSO TO MILITANT PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS?

A - BRYANT, I SAT THERE WITH ABBA EBAN(SP), WHO I'VE KNOWN SINCE I WAS AMBASSADOR TO THE U.N. IN '71 AND '72, NOW CHAIRMAN OF THEIR SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND THEIR EQUIVALENT OF THAT IN THEIR DEFENSE COMMITTEE. AND I HEARD HIM READ OFF A FORMULA ACCEPTABLE TO THE LABOR PARTY THAT TALKED ABOUT A WAY TO GET THE PALESTINIANS TO COME TO THE TABLE WITH KING HUSSEIN. I CAN'T TELL YOU, IT'S A GOOD QUESTION, AND I DON'T KNOW WHETHER WE'RE ANY CLOSER TODAY THAN WE WERE A WEEK AGO.

Q - DID YOU GET ANY SENSE OF ANY INCREASE FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF ISRAEL'S LEADERSHIP, INCREASED FLEXIBILITY BROUGHT ON BY THE FACT THAT A MORE CONSERVATIVE LEADERSHIP IS GOING TO TAKE OVER IN OCTOBER?

A - WELL NO, BUT I DID HAVE LONG TALKS WITH SHIMON PERES AND I HAD LONG TALKS WITH SHAMIR. AND I BELIEVE THAT SHAMIR WHO WILL BECOME - NOW THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER - AND COME PRIME MINISTER, HAS A FLEXIBILITY ABOUT HIM THAT

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WILL FOLLOW ON PRETTY MUCH IN WHAT PERES HAS TRIED TO DO. NOW HE HAS SOME PROBLEMS ON HIS RIGHT. THEY'RE PULLING HIM BACK A LITTLE BIT. BUT I THINK YOU'RE GOING TO SEE A CONTINUATION OF THE PERES INITIATIVES AND THEY HAVEN'T YET RESULTED IN PEACE, OR GETTING KING HUSSEIN TO THE TABLE, BUT YOU HAVE A VERY DIFFERENT MOOD IN ISRAEL TODAY.

Q - YOU WENT THERE TO SHOW HIGH PROFILE INVOLVEMENT IN UNCLASSIFIED

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THE PURSUIT OF PEACE.

A - YES.

Q - AND YET YOU DIDN'T MEET WITH SYRIA'S HAFIZ ASSAD WITHOUT WHOM THERE CAN BE NO COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE REGION. NOW WHY NOT?

A - WELL, YOU MAY RECALL THAT THE MINUTE THAT KING HASSAN MET WITH PERES, THE MINUTE THAT HAPPENED, HAFIZ ASSAD IN SYRIA JUMPED ALL OVER THE MEETING - DENOUNCED IT. AND IT WOULD MAKE IT VERY HARD TO SIT DOWN AT THAT PARTICULAR MOMENT WHEN WE WERE ENCOURAGING THE MEETING, AND SALUTING IT AFTER IT TOOK PLACE, TO GO TO SYRIA. SO I THINK THERE HAS TO BE A LITTLE DIFFERENT CLIMATE BEFORE THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OR THE PRESIDENT, OR PERHAPS THE SECRETARY OF STATE CAN GO TO SYRIA.

Q - BUT WOULDN'T ANY EXPRESSION OF GOOD WILL HAVE BEEN VALUABLE, PARTICULARLY WITH SOME OF OUR PEOPLE STILL BEING HELD IN LEBANON AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE'S A ROLE HAFIZ ASSAD CAN PLAY IN THEIR RELEASE?

A - WELL, I THINK THAT WHEN I SENT MY GREETINGS, AND YOU KNOW, THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR FACILITATING THE HAND OVER OF FATHER JENCO, THAT SYRIA KNOWS WE'RE INTERESTED IN THE AMENITIES. THEY KNOW THAT WE'RE INTERESTED WHEN THEY DO SOMETHING THAT WE SALUTE. AND WE DID. WE THOUGHT THAT WHEN JENCO CAME INTO THEIR HANDS, THEY PROMPTLY TRANSFERRED HIM TO THE

AMERICAN EMBASSY THERE. AND THAT'S GOOD. AND I THINK WE SHOULD SALUTE SOMETHING WHEN THEY DO IT THAT WAY. BUT UNCLASSIFIED

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THAT'S QUITE DIFFERENT THAN THEIR DESIRE TO STILL, YOU KNOW, BERATING ANY ARAB THAT TALKS TO ISRAEL - OUR BEST

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FRIEND IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AND WE CAN'T LEND CREDENCE TO THAT BY SEEN AS TO SALUTE HAFIZ ASSAD.

Q - AS YOU WELL KNOW, AT LEAST ONE PERSON INSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE SAID YOUR TRIP WAS NOTHING BUT POLITICS. AND ONE EGYPTIAN OFFICIAL WENT SO FAR AS TO SAY HIS NATION WAS BEING USED AS THE FIRST AMERICAN PRIMARY. HOW DO YOU VIEW THOSE KIND OF CRITICISMS?

A - HEY LISTEN, I'VE HAD THEM SO LONG, YOU KNOW, A YEAR AND A HALF AGO I GOT OFF THE PLANE IN CHINA AND THE FIRST QUESTION WAS, 'ARE YOU IN CHINA TO HELP YOURSELF IN THE 1988 ELECTION?' I GOT TO JUST ROLL WITH THE PUNCH ON THOSE POLITICAL CRITICISMS AND TRY TO DO MY JOB IN SUPPORT IN THIS INSTANCE, OF THE PEACE PROCESS. AND I THINK MOST LEADERS OVER THERE WILL TELL YOU THAT THE VISIT CONTRIBUTED TO PEACE. THEY TAKE A SHOT HERE OR THERE, IT DOESN'T BOTHER ME.

Q - BUT, CERTAINLY YOU CAN'T DENY THE LONG RANGE POTENTIAL OF THIS. I MEAN ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU WERE ACCOMPANIED BY A FILM CREW HIRED BY THE FUND FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE - YOUR POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE.

A - THAT'S RIGHT. I HOPE THAT IT DOES HELP. I HOPE THE VISIT TO CHINA HELPS, I HOPE THAT THE VISIT WE TOOK TO THE GULF COAST COUNTRIES HELP. BUT THAT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH MY DOING MY JOB IN TRYING TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THIS COUNTRY. AND SO IT'S... WE'RE CAUGHT UP IN A POLITICAL PROCESS BRYANT, IT'S FAR TOO EARLY. I'VE GOT TO PLAY BY THE RULES, AND THE RULES ARE OUT THERE. BUT I CAN STILL TRY TO DO THE BEST I CAN IN TERMS OF FOREIGN POLICY - A FIELD IN WHICH I FEEL VERY, VERY COMFORTABLE.

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NOTE: THE REMAINDER OF THE INTERVIEW FOCUSED ON MR. BUSH'S VICTORY AT THE MICHIGAN PRIMARY.

2. SDI - WITH ARMS CONTROL AND SUMMIT PLANNING TALKS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN IN MOSCOW NEXT WEEK, THE PRESIDENT TRIED TO CALM FEARS AMONG CONSERVATIVE SUPPORTERS BY PROMISING THAT HE WON'T TRADE STRATEGIC DEFENSE FOR AN ARMS CONTROL DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS. REAGAN: "LET ME REASSURE YOU RIGHT HERE AND NOW THAT OUR RESPONSE TO

DEMANDS THAT WE CUT OFF, OR DELAY RESEARCH AND TESTING IN CLOSED SHOP, IS NO WAY. SDI IS NO BARGAINING CHIP."

IT WAS A PROMISE SOUGHT BY THE DEFENSE SECRETARY TO KILL SPECULATION THAT MR. REAGAN HAD SHOWN FLEXIBILITY IN HIS

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RECENT LETTER TO MIKHAIL GORBACHEV. WEINBERGER WAS DELIGHTED WITH THE PRESIDENT'S PARTING SHOT. REAGAN: "WHEN THE TIME HAS COME, AND THE RESEARCH IS COMPLETE, YES, WE'RE GOING TO DEPLOY."

AT THE SAME TIME, MR. REAGAN FLATLY REJECTED SUGGESTIONS FROM SDI HARDLINERS IN CONGRESS WHO WANT A PARTIAL SYSTEM NOW TO PROTECT MISSILES, INSTEAD OF WAITING TO SEE IF A BROADER SPACE SHIELD IS POSSIBLE. SEN. LUGAR: "THE PRESIDENT TAKES THE LONGER VIEW, THAT HE WANTS A SOUND PROGRAM THAT WORKS, AND THAT THE OTHER SMALLER STEPS WILL COME INTO IT IF YOU DO THE RIGHT THINGS ALONG THE WAY."

WITH SDI SURVIVING THIS WEEK BY ONLY ONE VOTE IN THE SENATE, AND CRUCIAL VOTES COMING UP IN THE HOUSE, THE PRESIDENT IS WALKING A TIGHT ROPE BETWEEN THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT. OFFICIALS HERE SAY HE'S NOT WORRIED THAT HIS

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STATEMENTS WILL HURT CHANCES FOR A SUMMIT, BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THAT GORBACHEV WANTS A SUMMIT AT ANY COST. (ANDREA MITCHELL - WHITE HOUSE)

B. ABC'S GOOD MORNING AMERICA

1. SDI - THE PRESIDENT FIRMLY ENDED SPECULATION THAT HIS CONTROVERSIAL STAR WARS MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM WAS ON THE ARMS CONTROL BARGAINING TABLE WITH THE SOVIETS. REAGAN: "LET ME REASSURE YOU RIGHT HERE AND NOW, THAT OUR RESPONSE TO DEMANDS THAT WE CUT OFF OR DELAY RESEARCH AND TESTING IN CLOSED SHOP, IS NO WAY. SDI IS NO BARGAINING CHIP. IT IS THE PATH TO A SAFER AND MORE SECURE FUTURE, AND THE RESEARCH IS NOT AND NEVER HAS BEEN NEGOTIABLE." MR. REAGAN WENT FURTHER AND INSISTED THAT WHEN AND IF A SYSTEM IS DEVELOPED TO COUNTERACT INCOMING SOVIET NUCLEAR MISSILES IT DEFINITELY WOULD BE DEPLOYED. WITH THE SENATE HAVING BARELY REJECTED SHARP CUTS IN FUNDING, AND THE HOUSE MORE LIKELY TO DO SO, THE PRESIDENT URGED MORE PRESSURE ON CONGRESS TO KEEP THE STAR WARS MONEY FLOWING. BUT SOME OF THE PRESIDENT'S CLOSEST SUPPORTERS IN CONGRESS TOLD HIM THAT THE PROGRAM IS IN TROUBLE BECAUSE IT'S BEEN MISHANDLED BY THE ADMINISTRATION. JACK KEMP: "THE PROGRAM HAS PROBLEMS ON CAPITOL HILL BECAUSE THERE HAS NOT BEEN ENOUGH FOCUS TO THE PROGRAM BY THE

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THERE ARE PEOPLE WHO CONTINUALLY WANT TO NEGOTIATE AWAY OUR ABILITY TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY SDI."

THE PRESIDENT WON'T HAVE LONG TO WAIT FOR A SOVIET REACTION. HIS HIGH POWERED DELEGATION DUE IN MOSCOW NEXT

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WEEK SHOULD LEARN WHETHER SOVIET STATEMENTS ABOUT
BLOCKING SDI ARE AS FIRM AS MR. REAGAN'S DETERMINATION TO
KEEP IT. (KENNETH WALKER - WHITE HOUSE)

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2. TEXTILE BILL - THE HOUSE VOTE SUSTAINING PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S VETO OF THE BILL TO LIMIT TEXTILE IMPORTS WAS A
VICTORY FOR REAGAN'S TRADE POLICY. HIS ADMINISTRATION IS
COUNTING ON MORE GOOD NEWS ABOUT TRADE, ESPECIALLY NEXT
YEAR, TO EXPAND THE ECONOMY.

THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS PREDICTED
THAT THE ANEMIC 2.4 ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE FIRST HALF OF
1986 WOULD RISE TO 4 IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR, AND
RISE FURTHER TO 4.2 NEXT YEAR. SOME PRIVATE ECONOMISTS
SAY THE NEW FORECAST IS BASED MOSTLY ON FAITH. MANY
ANALYSTS OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT SAY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
IS PINNING TOO MUCH HOPE ON INCREASED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
IN OTHER COUNTRIES TO MAKE THEM WILLING TO IMPORT MORE
U.S. PRODUCTS. THE PRESIDENT INSISTS THAT CAN HAPPEN
WITHOUT TRADE BARRIERS, LIKE THE VETOED TEXTILE BILL.
(SHEILAH KAST - WHITE HOUSE)

3. DEFECTION - A SOVIET MAN AND WIFE HIGHWIRE TEAM
SLIPPED AWAY FROM THE MOSCOW CIRCUS IN BUENOS AIRES LAST
NIGHT AND DEFECTED TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS MORNING
THEY ARRIVED IN MIAMI. THEIR DEFECTION CAME JUST A DAY
AFTER A POLISH SEAMAN ASKED FOR ASYLUM IN CLEVELAND.
(STEVE BELL)

C. CBS MORNING NEWS

1. VICE PRESIDENT BUSH INTERVIEWED BY BRUCE MORTON
(VERBATIM OF Q&AS ON MIDDLE EAST TRIP)

Q: LET ME START BY ASKING YOU A LITTLE ABOUT THE MIDDLE
EAST. IT SEEMS TO ME PEOPLE HAVE BEEN COMING BACK FROM
THERE AND SAYING OPTIMISTIC THINGS ALL MY ADULT LIFE...
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A: MINE, TOO.

Q: SYRIA IS STILL NOT A PLAYER, THE PLO IS STILL NOT A
PLAYER. WHERE DOES YOUR OPTIMISM AT THE END OF THIS TRIP
COME FROM?

A: ONLY BECAUSE YOU'VE JUST SEEN ANOTHER ARAB LEADER MEET WITH A LEADER OF ISRAEL, SEEING KING HASSAN MEET WITH MR. PERES. YOU'VE SEEN AN AGREEMENT, AS A RESULT OF OUR TRIP, ON PRINCIPLES, EACH OF WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN AGREED BY ONE OR ANOTHER, BUT NEVER HAVE BEEN AGREED BY ALL THREE PRINCIPALS BEFORE -- JORDAN, EGYPT, AND ISRAEL. AND, I THINK ANYONE WHO'S BEEN THERE RECENTLY AND TALKED TO THE LEADERS OF ISRAEL OR TO KING HUSSEIN OR TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK GETS THE FEELING THAT THERE IS MUCH MORE THAT THEY'RE CLOSE TO GETTING. AND I DON'T WANT TO BE WRONG ABOUT THIS AND INDICATE I THINK PEACE IS AT HAND, BUT THERE'S SO MUCH MORE COMMON PURPOSE ON PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION, ON ISRAEL'S SECURITY, ON THE NEED AND THE WAY OF NEGOTIATING. SO, I AM A LITTLE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT IT.

Q: THERE'S STILL NO WILLINGNESS, IS THERE, ON THE PART OF KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN TO MEET WITH THE ISRAELIS?

A: YES, THERE'S A WILLINGNESS, BUT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE UNDER, AT THE OUTSET, UNDER SOME INTERNATIONAL UMBRELLA. BUT THE GOOD THING ABOUT THAT, BRUCE, IS THAT THESE ISRAELIS SEEM TO BE WILLING TO DO THAT. AND IF THEY ARE, THE PARTIES ARE, THE FIRST STEP WOULD BE SOME INTERNATIONAL FORUM AND THAT WOULD, I THINK, LEAD TO FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD INCLUDE FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS. SO, THERE IS MORE AGREEMENT ON THAT POINT THAN I THINK MOST PEOPLE FOCUS ON.

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Q: CAN YOU COME TO SOME SORT OF PEACE ARRANGEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITHOUT SYRIA -- I MEAN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS IS ONE OF THE DISPUTED TERRITORIES, SYRIA IS THE BIG MILITARY POWER. HOW DO YOU...?

A: YOU CAN'T SOLVE IT ALL, BUT YOU HAVE A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT. AND SYRIA, NOT ONLY WASN'T A PLAYER THERE, BUT THEY WERE STRONGLY NEGATIVE ABOUT THAT, JUST AS THEY WERE NEGATIVE ABOUT PRIME MINISTER PERES' MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN (SIC). BEFORE THE LANDING GEAR WAS UP ON PERES' PLANE, THE SYRIANS BLASTED THE MEETING. SO, IT'S A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS AND I THINK YOU CAN MAKE PROGRESS WITHOUT SYRIA. EVENTUALLY, IF THEY HAVE TOTAL PEACE IN THE AREA, SYRIA IS GOING TO HAVE TO COME TO THE TABLE.

Q: WELL, THE OTHER MISSING PLAYER IS THE PALESTINIANS -- PRESUMABLY, THROUGH THE PLO, WHICH IS THE ORGANIZATION WHICH THEY SEEM TO FEEL THAT THEY WANT TO REPRESENT THEM, AND THERE'S NO MOVEMENT THERE, IS THERE?

A: WELL, NO, BUT THERE IS MOVEMENT IN TERMS OF HAVING, NOT MOVEMENT AS A RESULT OF MY VISIT, BUT THERE IS MOVEMENT AS A RESULT...IN TERMS OF HAVING PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES BEING WITH KING HUSSEIN WHEN HE MEETS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND MEETS AT THIS INTERNATIONAL FORUM. SO, THERE IS SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THAT. AND THERE'S NOT ONLY FLEXIBILITY ON KING HUSSEIN'S SIDE ON THAT, BUT ON ISRAEL'S SIDE. I SAT WITH ABBA EBAN IN A SENIOR COMMITTEE IN THE KNESSET AND HEARD HIM READ OFF A WILLINGNESS TO HAVE AN UMBRELLA OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORUM.

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2. ARMS CONTROL - IN MOSCOW THIS COMING MONDAY, SOVIET AND U.S. ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS LED BY AMBASSADOR PAUL NITZE WILL BEGIN LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR THIS YEAR'S REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT. BUT THE AMERICAN OFFICIALS, SOURCES SAY, WILL ALSO TRY TO CALM WHATEVER NEW FEARS THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE OVER PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STAR WARS DEFENSE SHIELD. REAGAN: "WHEN THE TIME HAS COME AND THE RESEARCH IS COMPLETE, YES, WE'RE GOING TO DEPLOY."

IN A MAJOR VICTORY FOR ARMS CONTROL HARDLINERS, PRESIDENT REAGAN YESTERDAY MADE IT CLEAR HE WILL NOT DELAY DEPLOYMENT OF SDI IN EXCHANGE FOR CUTS IN SOVIET MISSILES. MR. REAGAN HAS REPORTEDLY OFFERED TO TEST SDI FOR FIVE YEARS AND NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS FOR TWO YEARS ON SHARING AND DEPLOYING THE TECHNOLOGY. IF THERE IS NO AGREEMENT, THE U.S. WOULD GIVE SIX MONTHS NOTICE, WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY AND DEPLOY. SOME ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS SAY THE SOVIETS WILL NEVER GO ALONG. ARMS CONTROL EXPERT JACK MENDELSON: "IF THE PRESIDENT IS NOT PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT AND PLACE SOME LIMITS ON THE SDI PROGRAM, THEN, I'M AFRAID, THE CHANCES OF THERE BEING ANY ARMS CONTROL ARE BASICALLY ZERO."

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TOUGH STAND ON SDI IS AIMED AT MUCH AT A DOMESTIC TARGET AS IT IS AT AN INTERNATIONAL ONE. MR. REAGAN HAS TO KEEP CONGRESS FROM MAKING DEEP CUTS IN SDI FUNDING DURING THE MINIMUM SEVEN AND ONE-HALF YEARS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT. (JACQUELINE ADAMS - WHITE HOUSE)

3. TEXTILE IMPORTS - PRESIDENT REAGAN COULDN'T BE HAPPIER ABOUT HIS TEXTILE BILL VICTORY IN THE HOUSE YESTERDAY. (FAITH DANIELS)

SUPPORTERS OF THE PRESIDENT'S VETO ARGUED THAT PASSAGE OF THE BILL WOULD HAVE HURT THE ECONOMY BECAUSE OF FOREIGN RETALIATION. REP. MICHEL: "THOSE OF YOU WHO WOULD THROW
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A STONE AT OUR TRADING PARTNERS ARE REALLY THROWING A BOOMERANG THAT SURELY WILL COME BACK TO HURT US." BUT THE VOTE MAY HELP DEMOCRATS DIRECT THE BOOMERANG AT THE REPUBLICANS POLITICALLY. AMERICA'S TRADE DEFICIT IS NOW SEVEN TIMES WHAT IT WAS BEFORE PRESIDENT REAGAN TOOK OFFICE. DEMOCRATIC HOUSE LEADERS HOPE TO USE THE TEXTILE VOTE TO REINFORCE THEIR CHARGE THAT THE PRESIDENT IS INDIFFERENT TO AMERICA'S TRADE PROBLEMS. THEY SAY THOSE WHO SUPPORT HIS TRADE POLICIES SHOULD BE MADE TO PAY FOR IT AT THE POLLS. REP. BILL HEFNER: "IN MY DISTRICT, WE'VE LOST THOUSANDS OF JOBS IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY AND WE'LL CONTINUE TO LOSE SOME MORE. BUT I THINK, WITHOUT A DOUBT, IT WILL BE A POLITICAL THING."

REPUBLICANS SAY TRADE IS STRICTLY A BIPARTISAN ISSUE THAT WILL HAVE NO LASTING POLITICAL IMPACT ON EITHER THE PARTY'S CHANCES IN THE FALL OR IN THE 1988 PRESIDENTIAL RACE. WHETHER THE OVERRIDE VOTE WILL DIMINISH REPUBLICAN CHANCES IN THE COMING ELECTION HAS YET TO BE FULLY ASSESSED. BUT, NO MATTER WHAT THE OUTCOME, FOR THE TIME BEING THE BIG WINNER IS THE PRESIDENT. (IKE PAPPAS - CAPITOL HILL)

4. SOVIET DEFECTOR - TWO TOP SOVIET CIRCUS PERFORMERS HAVE DEFECTED. THEY ARRIVED THIS MORNING IN MIAMI HEADING FOR A NEW LIFE AND NEW CAREER IN THE U.S.. THE TWO, A MAN AND WIFE HIGH-WIRE TEAM, WERE TRAVELING WITH THE MOSCOW CIRCUS IN BUENOS AIRES. THEY TOLD U.P.I. THEY MADE THE DECISION TO DEFECT A LONG TIME AGO AND WERE JUST WAITING FOR THE RIGHT CHANCE. (FAITH DANIELS) WHITEHEAD

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INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

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AUG 05 1986

TO: The Secretary

FROM: NEA - Arnold Raphael, Acting ✓

SUBJECT: Vice President's Statement at Conclusion of Trip

Vice President Bush, in a departure statement in Cairo, summarized the "common ground for progress" towards Middle East peace, based on his discussions in Jerusalem, Amman and Cairo. The statement notes a common desire for the U.S. to "play an active role in re-energizing the peace process". The text of the statement is attached.

The heart of the statement is the listing of the "areas of commonality among Israel, Jordan, Egypt and many Palestinians", which offer a "basis on which peace negotiations can move forward." The points of agreement are:

- There is an urgent need for a just and lasting peace;
- Negotiations should produce peace treaties that offer recognition and security to the states and peoples of the region;
- Negotiations should take into account the security needs of all states and the aspirations of the Palestinian people;
- A negotiated settlement of the "Palestine question" should involve a "relationship" between Jordan and the West Bank/Gaza, based on 242/338;
- In The US view, the principles of secure borders and exchange of land for peace are embodied in 242/338;
- Face-to-face negotiations may involve the framework of an international conference or forum; an Israeli delegation should meet with a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation and also a Syrian delegation. Members of delegations must seek peace and openly reject violence and terrorism.

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We are not yet certain of the degree of Israeli (and Egyptian) concurrence with the language of the statement, although we know several versions were discussed with Peres and Mubarak. We understand that PM Rifai signaled in advance his objection to -- and remains concerned about -- the underlined phrases in the sentence "Direct negotiations may involve the framework of an international conference or forum."

As a summary of key US positions there is an important omission in the Vice President's statement: it contains no reference to the need for a transitional period. Also, we have not in the past highlighted a specific US responsibility to "re-invigorate" the peace process.

Although the language varies in some cases from our standard terminology, in only one case does it stray significantly from a traditional U.S. position: it includes a public endorsement of an "international conference or forum." This represents, as well, a departure from the official Israeli position.

We are awaiting reaction from Jerusalem and Amman to the Vice President's statement.

Attachment:

Cairo 18002

Drafted: NEA/JRosenblatt
8/5/86 W#4291a

Cleared: NEA:RSuddarth
NEA/ARN: AGlaspie
NEA/IAI:PWilcox

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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July 24, 1986

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MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD P. GREGG
THE WHITE HOUSE

S/S
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SUBJECT: Middle East Trip: Updated Briefing Papers.

We are forwarding updated versions of the below listed issues papers and meeting papers for the Vice President's consideration during his upcoming visit to the Middle East.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Issues Papers

- Egypt: U.S. Assistance
- Egypt: FMS Debt
- Egyptian-Israeli Natural Gas Pipeline
- Hassan-Peres Meeting

Meeting Papers

- State Dinner with Mubarak
- One-on-One with Mubarak
- Expanded Meeting with Mubarak
- MinDef Abu Ghazala
- FM Meguid
- PM Lotfy

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BRIEFING PAPER
U.S. ASSISTANCE

I. U.S. BUDGET CONSTRAINTS

- o U.S. committed to providing substantial amounts of economic and military assistance to Egypt, but budget constraints preclude higher levels
- o It will be difficult for us to obtain from Congress full amount of our FY 87 request (below):
 - ESF - \$815 million; PL - 480 - \$189.9; FMS - \$1.3 billion

II. WHAT EGYPTIANS WANT

- o Increase in the cash component of ESF from \$115 million to \$500 million in each of the next three years to support their economic reform program
- o Egyptian economic ministers pressed hard for, but did not obtain, U.S. commitment on increased cash grant during their June visit
- o As fall back, Egyptian ministers proposed we exchange ESF dollars for Egyptian pounds for local cost components of AID projects

III. U.S. POSITION

- o We told Egyptian ministers that we can consider increasing the cash component, but need further elaboration on their economic reform program before making a commitment
- o McPherson agreed to review GOE proposal to exchange ESF dollars for Egyptian pounds
 - AID now believes that legal constraints preclude this proposal
- o We agreed to proceed immediately with disbursement of \$110 million cash component of FY 86 ESF as gesture of support for program in return for July 1 implementation of customs reform
 - Customs reform not yet implemented; we are holding back on disbursement until it is
- o Egyptian ministers disappointed with this response

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US ASSISTANCE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
FMS DEBT

I. BACKGROUND

- o Egypt's FMS debt totals \$4.5 billion; average interest rate on loans is 12 percent
 - o Annual interest payments now around \$540 million; 14 percent of Egypt's total debt service
 - o Arrearages total \$500 million, with another \$90 million in late charges
 - o Egyptians making payments just under one year late; narrowly avoiding Brooke Amendment sanctions
- Next Brooke deadline: July 31 payment of \$1.2 million

II. WHAT EGYPTIANS WANT

- o Egyptian June reform package proposed three year moratorium on interest payments; reduction of interest rate (presumably to current market levels)
 - o Mubarak has signalled he wants answer on FMS debt in order to make September visit to Washington
- His irritation growing at lack of U.S. action to his longstanding request for relief
- o GOE strategy is to avoid Paris Club-type rescheduling by making bilateral deals with U.S., other countries

III. U.S. POSITION

- o Administration looking for ways to ease burden, but must find solution that does not require new legislation or budget resources
- o Within these constraints, State/Treasury working on ways to adjust interest rate
- o Bill Schneider told Egyptian ministers June 25 that we hope to have answer by end of this fiscal year
- o Important that Egyptians understand what is possible on FMS debt as they develop their economic reform plan
- o Any easing of FMS burden must be carefully managed to maintain the Egyptian government's momentum on reform
- o Egypt's debt problem exceeds our ability to help; real answer: comprehensive IMF-type reforms supported by multilateral debt rescheduling

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FMS DEBT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI COOPERATION:
NATURAL GAS PIPELINE

I. BACKGROUND

- o Occidental's Armand Hammer raised with Secretary in May possibility of natural gas pipeline between Egypt and Israel
- o Hammer argues Egypt is logical supplier to Israel since its natural gas production potential exceeds current consumption
- o Hammer also sees significant political benefits to creation of such dramatic economic linkage

II. PROBLEMS

- o In addition to obvious political difficulties associated with Egyptian-Israeli cooperation, project does not seem economically viable
- o Egyptian Petroleum Minister Kandil told U.S. Embassy Cairo that Egypt willing to permit gas exports only after domestic demand is met
- o Egypt may not have natural gas for export within ten years because of growing consumption
 - One foreign oil company predicted Egypt will have natural gas shortage by early 1990's unless new reserves found
 - Uncertain whether any new reserves will be discovered

III. TALKING POINTS

- o Understand Occidental Petroleum has proposed natural gas pipeline between Egypt and Israel
- o Such a pipeline, if economically feasible, would help foster ties between Egypt and Israel
- o What is your assessment of its feasibility? Would Egypt be able to export natural gas?

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Natural Gas Pipeline

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
HASSAN-PERES MEETING

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I. Background

- o Hassan has met privately with Israeli leaders in the past: Rabin, Dayan and Peres.
- o In November 1985 Hassan stated in interview that he was willing to meet Peres, but drew back in face of Arab criticism.
- o Although he is Chairman of the Arab League and Islamic Conference Organization, as well as Chairman of the Jerusalem Committee, Hassan met with Peres only on his own as King of Morocco.

II. Meeting

- o Hassan and Peres met over two days. Joint communique stated that Hassan reviewed Fez Plan; Peres presented Israeli (NUG) position.
- o In speech, Hassan highlighted Peres' failure to accept Fez Plan.
- o Arab reaction has been mixed: Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Libya and PLO have been critical; Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia have refrained for the most part from public comment; Egypt has been unreservedly positive. Only Syria has taken tangible step, breaking diplomatic relations.

III. Implications for Peace Process

- o Meeting was not part of larger strategy. Although Peres, on his return, has spoken of continuing contacts, he and Hassan did not, as far as we know, agree to follow-on steps.
- o Hassan's initiative is helpful to Peres, casting him as leader actively pursuing possibilities for peace settlement.
- o Hussein, while not publicly criticizing Hassan's move, is concerned that it will further fragment Arabs, complicating his effort to bring Damascus and Baghdad together and to move to Summit.
- o Visit has enhanced credibility in Arab world of theme of direct dialogue as way to achieve peace settlement, a theme Hassan spoke to in his speech following visit.
- o Most positive impact of meeting is on psychological level: It can only ease Egypt's isolation and, within Israel, make a dent in siege mentality arising from Arab rejection.

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VICE-PRESIDENT'S STATE DINNER
WITH
PRESIDENT MUBARAK
AUGUST 3, 1986

SETTING

This is your first meeting with President Mubarak since his private visit to the U.S. in September 1985, when you hosted a lunch in his honor. You should try to use this opportunity to preview with Mubarak several issues you will raise in the private meeting; expect that President Mubarak will do the same with you.

OBJECTIVES

-- Reaffirm the strength of U.S./Egyptian bilateral relations.

-- As appropriate, preview several of the principal issues to be raised later in private.

ISSUES

- U.S./Egyptian Relations
- Egyptian Economic Situation
- Egypt-Israel

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U.S.-Egyptian Relations

- U.S. relations with Egypt are extremely good. As indicative of the deep friendship that exists between our two countries, both President Mubarak and President Reagan have committed themselves and their governments to the goals of mutual cooperation and trust.
- I see my trip as an expression of the strong relationship that exists between our two nations and as an extension of the close ties that are found between senior officials of both governments.

Egyptian Economic Situation

- The U.S. Government is following with sympathy and concern developments in your economy.
- The economic reform program presented in June in Washington is a serious and broad-ranging effort to deal with your economic problems. We strongly support its objectives and want to work closely with you as you move to implement it.
- We are looking carefully at ways we can support your program by reshaping our assistance.
- We also believe that the technical and financial assistance of the IMF and the World Bank are essential and we are willing to help you reach agreement with them.

Egypt-Israel

- We are pleased by the progress that has been made on the compromise and are confident the remaining issues can be settled quickly. As you know, we will do what we can to help achieve closure.
- It is important to keep up the momentum and not let technical problems (marking claims, selecting arbitrators, etc.) cloud the outlook.
- The return of the ambassador and other improvements in the Egyptian-Israeli relationship will contribute importantly to the climate needed to further the peace process. A summit with Prime Minister Peres would be particularly productive in this regard.

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VICE PRESIDENT'S ONE-ON-ONE MEETING
WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK
August 4, 1986

SETTING

This is your major substantive meeting with President Mubarak and the key substantive event of your visit to Egypt. This meeting will be followed by a brief expanded session which will provide an opportunity to focus on Egypt's economic problems in more depth. Although you will want in this meeting to cover all issues of concern to us, you should bore in on our key concerns: resolution of the Taba dispute and serious engagement by the Egyptian government with us on economic reform. Mubarak, impatient that we have not responded positively on the issue of FMS debt relief, will stress Egypt's critical need for more assistance and the domestic considerations which constrain his actions on economic reform and Egyptian-Israeli relations.

OBJECTIVES

- To move Taba to arbitration (or otherwise resolve dispute) as essential step toward better Egyptian-Israeli ties.
- To commit Mubarak to develop and implement a workable economic reform program and to engage seriously with us, the IMF and the IBRD.
- To coordinate approaches on peace process, with focus on building up Hussein vis-a-vis Arafat.
- To develop Egyptian role for improving quality of life in Gaza.
- To enhance prospects for ad hoc and eventually routine NPW transits.
- Strengthen U.S.-Egyptian cooperation vis a vis Sudan, Libya and the Iran-Iraq war.

ISSUES

- Egyptian-Israeli Relations: Taba
- Egypt's Economic Situation
- Peace Process
- Quality of Life: Egyptian Role
- NPW Transits
- Sudan/Libya/Iran-Iraq

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TALKING POINTS

Egyptian-Israeli Relations

-- We are pleased by the progress that has been made on the compromise and are confident the remaining issues can be settled quickly. We will do what we can to help achieve closure.

-- It is important to keep up the momentum and not let technical problems (marking claims, selecting arbitrators, etc.) cloud the outlook.

-- The return of the ambassador and other improvements in the Egyptian-Israeli relationship will contribute importantly to the climate needed to further the peace process. A summit with Prime Minister Peres would be particularly productive in this regard.

Egyptian Economic Situation

-- I had full report of discussions your economic ministers held in Washington last month.

-- Your program is serious and comprehensive and we fully support its objectives. We are prepared to explore it with you in detail.

-- We can consider your request for significant increase in cash assistance but we - and Congress - must be confident that such assistance will be part of a total effort that can stabilize your economy and eventually achieve sustained growth.

-- We believe it essential to involve both Bank and Fund at an early date. Their technical and financial support will be needed to make your program work. An important objective of further discussions with you on your program is to arrive at a position where we can actively support your efforts to reach agreement with Bank and Fund

-- We recognize burden of FMS interest rates on Egyptian economy. FMS debt relief is a complex and difficult problem. We have been working intensively on it and we hope to have an answer soon

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Peace Process

-- Egypt's positive response to King Hassan's initiative is testimony to your unflagging commitment to the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

-- I would appreciate hearing your views on the effect on the region of this historic development.

-- We remain committed to the positions put forward in the President's Sept 1, 1982 peace initiative, which in our view remain viable.

-- We should not lose sight of the progress that was achieved last year. But time is not on our side, and we share Egypt's concern that we must go forward or risk slipping back.

-- The PLO has not demonstrated an ability to make the decisions necessary for peace. We must work together closely to support Hussein and help him obtain the responsible Palestinian backing he needs to step forward.

Quality of Life: Egyptian Role

-- It is vitally important that the Palestinians who want peace not lose hope. We are particularly concerned about those living in the West Bank and Gaza.

-- We would like to have an active dialogue with Egypt on ideas to improve the quality of Palestinian life, particularly in the Gaza area.

NPW Transits

-- We were pleased to see press reports that your government is working out procedures to permit NPW transits.

-- It is in your interest and ours that we have the flexibility to move our naval assets promptly to respond to continued instability in the region.

-- We want to sit down with you and resolve the issue. The crisis atmosphere and unwanted publicity surrounding exceptional transits are not healthy for our relationship.

-- (If raised) We are prepared to work out the questions of

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fees for past transits when we sit down together.

Libya/Sudan/Iran-Iraq War

-- As we see it, Qadhafi continues to exercise ultimate authority in Libya, but is under increasing pressure because of U.S. actions, a tougher European stance, failures in Chad, and serious economic problems. How do you see the situation in Libya?

-- We will continue to treat Qadhafi as a pariah, working with Egypt, others in the region and the EC to isolate him.

-- We still worry about Libyan influence in the Sudan and the slowness of the new government to come to grips with Sudan's problems. We should stay in close touch on developments in Sudan.

-- I know you share our concern about Iraq's ineffective and self-defeating strategy in the war against Iran. If you agree, I would urge you to express these concerns directly to Saddam Hussein.

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MEETING PAPER

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VICE PRESIDENT'S EXPANDED MEETING
WITH EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK
AUGUST 4, 1986

SETTING

Following your one-on-one meeting with President Mubarak, you will likely be joined by Prime Minister Lotfy, Foreign Minister Abdel Meguid, Presidential Advisor Osama El Baz, and other Egyptian officials. Mubarak's foremost domestic concern is the deteriorating economy, and he will certainly pursue this issue with you. Three of his economic ministers presented a draft economic reform program last month in Washington to the U.S. Government, IMF, and World Bank. Although the program is serious and broad-ranging, the program has many weak points and falls short of the effort needed to win IMF and World Bank financial support.

Mubarak will press for our support of the program, arguing that the plan is the maximum the Egyptians can implement without provoking domestic unrest. He will ask that we provide financial support for the package by increasing the cash component of our \$815 million economic assistance program from \$115 million to \$500 million annually. He will also push for our help in obtaining financial assistance for the program from the IMF, World Bank, and other donor countries. Finally, Mubarak is increasingly irritated and impatient over his longstanding request for military (FMS) debt relief. He will press aggressively for action.

OBJECTIVES

-- Encourage Mubarak to develop and implement a workable economic reform program which can be supported by the U.S., IMF, and World Bank.

-- Reaffirm our willingness to reshape our economic assistance program if the Egyptians implement such a reform program.

-- Convince Mubarak that we are doing our best to find an acceptable means of easing the FMS debt burden, but that economic reform is the real answer to Egypt's debt problems.

ISSUES

- Egyptian Economic Situation
- June Economic Reform Program
- U.S. Assistance
- FMS Debt Relief

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TALKING POINTS

Egyptian Economic Situation

-- The U.S. Government is following very closely developments in your economy and understands that the serious problems you face will make the coming years very difficult.

-- Events beyond your control, such as the sharp drop in oil prices and the unfortunate impact of terrorism on the tourism industry, have exacerbated the situation.

-- We are encouraged by your evident determination to deal wisely and firmly with Egypt's serious economic problems.

-- You can be assured that President Reagan and his Administration stand squarely behind you as you deal with this serious challenge.

June Economic Reform Program

-- The economic reform program presented in June in Washington is a serious and broad-ranging effort to deal with your economic problems.

-- We fully share the objectives of your reform program -- promotion of sustained growth without endangering social stability.

-- We have a number of questions on various elements of your program and believe further elaboration on specific measures would be necessary.

-- Our experts would like to explore further with your officials the impact of these measures and how they will be monitored and implemented.

-- We believe that it is essential to involve both the IMF and World Bank. Their financial assistance will be necessary to mobilize sufficient economic resources to support your reform program.

-- When we have assured ourselves that your program is workable, we will actively support your efforts to reach agreement with these two institutions.

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U.S. Assistance

-- We are prepared to consider your request for an increase in the cash portion of our economic assistance as you further develop and implement your economic reform program.

-- In justifying to Congress an increase in cash assistance, the Administration must be able to demonstrate that Egypt has a workable reform program.

-- The Administration will continue to seek substantial economic assistance for Egypt to help promote economic growth and deal with your immediate financial problems.

-- However, our own difficult budget situation will make it difficult to maintain the full level of our FY 87 request in Congress.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Debt Relief

-- The Administration fully understands that you consider the interest payments on the military debt owed to the U.S. to be an unwelcome burden on the Egyptian economy.

-- FMS debt relief is a complex and difficult issue affecting many of our friends. It has significant implications for our overall budget situation, domestic credit policy, and international debt policy.

-- In response to your government's concerns, we have been working on the problem particularly intensively in recent weeks.

-- I can assure you that any solution we find will be applied to Egypt.

-- We hope to have an answer to this issue soon.

-- Implementation of comprehensive economic reform is the long-term answer to your debt problem.

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Expanded Mubarak Meeting

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VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
DEFENSE MINISTER FIELD MARSHAL ABU GHAZALA
AUGUST 4, 1986

SETTING

Abu Ghazala is the second most important figure in the Egyptian leadership -- he is Senior Deputy Prime Minister as well as Minister of Defense -- and is widely perceived to be the logical successor should Mubarak die or leave office. His position was enhanced by the military's quick and decisive performance in ending the rioting of police recruits in February and restoring public order. Among the current Egyptian leadership, Abu Ghazala has been the most positive and forthright in perceiving a convergence of U.S. strategic interests in the region and Egypt's goals of rebuilding its military, reconstituting its economy, reintegrating with the Arab world, and maintaining peace with Israel.

You last met with Abu Ghazala in Washington on June 19. In addition to defense related issues, the Field Marshal discussed with you and other U.S. officials Egypt's request for FMS debt relief, the need for more aid in the form of cash rather than projects, and the domestic political restraints to Egyptian economic reform. That visit was widely touted in the government owned press as "completely successful" and important in laying the groundwork for the team of economic ministers that arrived in Washington as Abu Ghazala was departing. He will be interested in following up with you on those discussions.

OBJECTIVES

- Underscore our satisfaction with the state of U.S. Egyptian strategic relations.
- Express our appreciation for Abu Ghazala's efforts to obtain approval for NPW transits, and seek his support for a permanent solution to the problem.
- Encourage Egyptian economic reform.

ISSUES

- NPW Transits of the Suez Canal
- FMS Debt relief
- Iran-Iraq war
- Libya
- Sudan

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TALKING POINTS

NPW Transits

-- We appreciate your assistance in our recent request for the transit of the Enterprise battle group. Because the approval was conditioned on payment of the still unresolved fees for previous transits, we sent the Enterprise around the Cape.

-- As we agreed in September, we are prepared to consider the surcharges for past transits when we sit down to talk about the issue of regularized transits.

-- We are aware of President Mubarak's public statements on Egypt's requirements for NPW transits. We want to sit down as soon as possible to work out procedures for routine transits.

FMS Debt Relief

-- We are looking intensively for ways to ease Egypt's debt burden. Because of its implications for our overall budgetary situation, domestic credit policy and our international debt, it is a complex and difficult problem.

-- We hope to have something more specific by the end of this fiscal year.

-- As you know, debt relief alone cannot restore the health of the Egyptian economy. It is important that Egypt go forward with a workable economic reform program.

Iran-Iraq War

-- We continue to be very seriously troubled by the war between Iran and Iraq.

-- Given Egypt's close security cooperation with Iraq, we would welcome your assessment of recent battlefield developments and any comment on Iraqi war strategy and morale.

-- Can Egypt influence Saddam Hussein to improve the effectiveness of the Iraqi war effort?

-- As you know, the United States has actively sought to bring an end to this destructive conflict and refused to

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supply arms to either party. We have urged others not to supply Iran until Iran indicates a willingness to negotiate an end to the war.

--We have information that China has begun a major effort to resupply Iran, including anti-shipping missiles. It would be useful to continue making your views known to the Chinese government, and in general, to be ready to make quick and vigorous approaches to countries that may consider permitting arms sales to Iran.

Libyan-Egyptian Relations

-- Qadhafi appears rattled by the U.S. strike, a tougher stance by the Europeans, and his own economic problems. He is, however, still a threat, and we will continue to work with others to isolate him.

-- (if raised) We reserve the right to maintain access to international waters world-wide. Our flights in the region near the Gulf of Sidra are not meant to provoke Qadhafi, but to reinforce that right.

-- What is your assessment of the current situation in Libya?

Sudan

-- We are concerned about the continued drift in Sudan. The Sadiq el Madhi government appears unable to come to grips with the massive problems confronting the country.

-- We are unable to restore our aid to its previous levels until the security situation for American personnel improves. In the meantime we face pressure to spend the money elsewhere.

-- Since your visit to Washington, Sadiq el Madhi has been to Moscow, but has not taken up the invitation to visit Cairo. How do you see the situation? Do you still believe that a coup is likely with six-seven months?

-- We need to remain in close touch on the situation in Sudan, particularly in light of the continued Libyan presence.

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MEETING PAPER - ABU GHAZALA

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VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MEGUID
AUGUST 4, 1986

SETTING

You last met with Meguid during President Mubarak's private visit to the U.S. in September 1985. Foreign Minister since July 1984, Meguid is one of two foreign policy advisors--the other being Osama el Baz--who have significant influence with Mubarak. In June, Meguid visited Iraq and Eastern Europe (East Germany and Czechoslovakia).

Your meeting with Meguid should focus on the peace process and Egyptian-Israeli relations. Meguid has played an active role in the Taba negotiations, often pushing subordinates to be more flexible, and appears committed to improving Egypt's relations with Israel. Meguid will probably reiterate GOE pleas for U.S. economic assistance in the form of increased cash transfer and FMS debt relief. In addition to the peace process and Taba, he may also want to review other regional developments (Sudan, Libya, Iran-Iraq).

OBJECTIVES

- Reaffirm the strength of U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations.
- Reaffirm our commitment to the peace process.
- Underscore our interest in improved Egyptian-Israeli relations.

ISSUES

- U.S.-Egyptian Relations
- Peace Process
- Egypt-Israel
- Sudan
- Libya
- Iran-Iraq War

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U.S.-Egyptian Relations

-- We are pleased by the continuing strength of our bilateral relationship. It is to the benefit of both that the United States and Egypt continue to work closely together to achieve common goals.

-- I appreciate this opportunity to renew my personal relationships with you, President Mubarak, and the others.

Peace Process

-- Egypt's positive response to King Hassan's initiative is testimony to your unflagging commitment to the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

-- I would appreciate hearing your views on the effect on the region of this historic development.

-- We remain committed to the positions put forward in the President's Sept. 1, 1982 peace initiative, which in our view remain viable.

-- We should not lose sight of the progress that was achieved last year. But time is not on our side, and we share Egypt's concern that we must go forward or risk slipping back.

-- The PLO has not demonstrated an ability to make the decisions necessary for peace. We must work together closely to support Hussein and help him obtain the responsible Palestinian backing he needs to step forward.

-- It is vitally important that the Palestinians who want peace not lose hope. We are particularly concerned about those living in the West Bank and Gaza.

-- We would like to have an active dialogue with Egypt on ideas to improve the quality of Palestinian life, particularly in the Gaza area.

Egypt-Israel

-- We are pleased by the progress that has been made on the compromise and are confident the remaining issues can be

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settled quickly. We will do what we can to help achieve closure.

-- It is important to keep up the momentum and not let technical problems (marking claims, selecting arbitrators, etc.) cloud the outlook.

-- The return of the ambassador and other improvements in the Egyptian-Israeli relationship will contribute importantly to the climate needed to further the peace process. A summit with Prime Minister Peres would be particularly productive in this regard.

Sudan

-- The new government has been slow in addressing the many pressing problems facing Sudan. What is your assessment of the prospects for the fledgling democracy?

-- The Libyan presence in Sudan is still troubling. What can we do, individually or together, to counter Qadhafi there?

-- How do you read recent Sudanese approaches to the Soviet Union and Ethiopia? Are these directed toward a resolution of the civil war in the south, or is there a more fundamental shift taking place?

Libya

-- We will continue to work with the Europeans and regional states to isolate Qadhafi.

-- Even though Qadhafi remains in control following our strike in April, he appears to be subject to increasing pressure from a toughened European stance, being bogged down in Chad and reduced oil revenues.

-- What is your assessment of the situation inside Libya?

Iran-Iraq War

-- We continue to be very seriously troubled by the war between Iran and Iraq. Iraq must be supported in its defense, and we do not want the war to spread to third

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countries. Increased Iranian aggressiveness against ships in the southern Gulf is of current concern to us.

-- As you know, the United States has actively sought to bring an end to this destructive conflict and refused to supply arms to either party. We have urged others not to sell arms to Iran until Iran indicates a willingness to negotiate an end to the war.

-- We have information that China has begun a major effort to resupply Iran, including anti-shipping missiles. It would be useful to continue making your views known to the Chinese government, and in general, to be ready to make quick and vigorous approaches to countries that may consider permitting arms sales to Iran.

-- I understand that you visited Iraq in June. What is your assessment of the situation in Baghdad?

-- I also heard that you visited East Germany and Czechoslovakia in June. I would be interested in your impressions of their views toward the war, particularly with regard to arms shipments to Iran.

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Event Paper - Meguid Meeting

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VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
EGYPTIAN PRIME MINISTER ALI LOTFY
AUGUST 4, 1986

SETTING

Several economic ministers will likely join your meeting, which will precede an official dinner hosted by the Prime Minister. This meeting should focus on the Egyptian economy and serve as a follow-up to your discussions earlier in the day with President Mubarak. You should attempt to elicit further details on the Egyptian government's economic reform program. The Prime Minister will likely reiterate the Egyptian requests for a larger cash component of our economic assistance program, military debt relief, and help with the IMF and World Bank.

Lotfy is a professional economist and is, in a formal sense, Egypt's leading economic policy-maker.

OBJECTIVES

- Encourage the Egyptians to develop and implement a workable economic reform program.
- Engage the Prime Minister on weak points in the reform program, such as budget deficit reduction, pricing, and exchange rate policy.
- Stress the importance of IMF and World Bank involvement in the economic reform effort.
- Reaffirm our willingness to reshape our economic assistance program if the Egyptians implement a workable and comprehensive program with support from the international financial institutions.
- Reiterate that we are doing our best to find a way to ease the military debt burden, but economic reform is the real answer to Egypt's debt problems..

ISSUES

- June Egyptian Economic Reform Program
- IMF/World Bank Role
- U.S. Assistance
- FMS Debt Relief

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TALKING POINTS

June Economic Reform Program

-- The economic reform program presented in Washington in June is a serious and broad-ranging effort to deal with your economic problems.

-- Your program reflects the hard work of you and your ministers as well as many very difficult political decisions.

-- We have a number of questions on various elements of your program and believe further elaboration on specific measures would be necessary.

-- We are going through our own difficult process of reducing the federal budget deficit. I would be interested in hearing more about the measures you plan to implement to reduce your budget deficit.

-- Our experts would like to explore further with you the measures you are planning, particularly in such key areas as budget deficit reduction and exchange rate reform, including how these measures will be monitored and implemented.

IMF/World Bank Role

-- We believe that it is essential to involve the IMF and World Bank at an early stage in developing your reform program.

-- Their technical expertise will be invaluable in helping you to work out the details of implementation of specific reforms.

-- Their financial support will be necessary to mobilize sufficient resources to support your economic reform program.

-- When we have assured ourselves that your program is workable, we will actively support your efforts to reach agreement with these two institutions.

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U.S. Assistance

-- We are prepared to consider your request for an increase in the cash portion of our economic assistance as you further develop and implement your economic reform program.

-- In justifying to Congress an increase in cash assistance, the Administration must be able to demonstrate that Egypt has a workable reform program.

-- The Administration will continue to seek substantial economic assistance for Egypt to help promote economic growth, and deal with your immediate financial problems.

-- However, our own difficult budget situation will make it difficult to maintain the full level of our FY 87 request in Congress.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Debt Relief

-- The Administration fully understands that you consider the interest payments on the military debt owed to the U.S. to be an unwelcome burden on the Egyptian economy.

-- FMS debt relief is a complex and difficult issue affecting many of our friends. It has significant implications for our overall budget situation, domestic credit policy, and international debt policy.

-- In response to your government's concerns, we have been working on the problem particularly intensively in recent weeks.

-- I can assure you that any solution we find will be applied to Egypt.

-- We hope to have an answer to this issue soon.

-- Implementation of comprehensive economic reform is the long-term answer to your debt problems.

-- At your ministers' request, we are also working with you to identify ways in which Egypt can expand its foreign exchange earnings.

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Lotfy Meeting

Drafted: NEA/EGY: JJNerris
7/12/86 x72802 W#4752F

Cleared: NEA: RSuddarth
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T: RBoyce
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PM: RBeers
Treasury: RAnderson

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TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE), JO, SY, IS, EG, US
SUBJECT: STATEMENT AND Q'S AND A'S ON VICE
PRESIDENTIAL TRIP

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE JULY 16 STATEMENT
ISSUED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PRESS OFFICE, AND
QUESTIONS FROM JOURNALISTS PRESENT.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

AT THE REQUEST OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, VICE PRESIDENT BUSH
WILL TRAVEL TO ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND EGYPT FROM JULY 25 TO
AUGUST 5, 1986. THE VISIT WILL DEMONSTRATE THE UNITED
STATES' COMMITMENT TO FURTHERING PEACE AND STABILITY IN
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THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS WITH THESE THREE
COUNTRIES.

THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL MEET WITH PRIME MINISTER PERES,
KING HUSSEIN, AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK AS WELL AS OTHER
SENIOR LEADERS. BILATERAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
TOPICS WILL BE DISCUSSED.

Q: (OFF MIKE)

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7/29/97

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Date: 7/29/97
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MR. DJEREJIAN: THE VICE PRESIDENT HAS NO PLANS TO TRAVEL TO SYRIA.

Q: HE WILL NOT MEET WITH ANY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE...WITH ANY PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE?

MR. DJEREJIAN: I HAVE NOTHING ON THAT. I JUST HAVE NOTHING ON THAT.

Q: I AM NOT TALKING ABOUT THE PLO, I AM TALKING ABOUT ANY PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES.

MR. DJEREJIAN: I HAVE NOT SEEN THE VICE PRESIDENT'S SPECIFIC SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS, AND THEREFORE I JUST CAN'T ANSWER THAT QUESTION AT THIS TIME.

Q: DO WE HAVE ANY NEW INITIATIVES TO TAKE?

MR. DJEREJIAN: AS I STATED, HE WILL BE THERE TO DISCUSS THE OVERALL ISSUES WE HAVE WITH THOSE COUNTRIES, AND OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS. AND TO DISCUSS BASICALLY OVERALL EFFORTS TO FURTHER PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
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Q: DO WE HAVE ANY NEW INITIATIVES?

Q: IS HE STILL GOING TO GO ON THE BASIS OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1982 REAGAN INITIATIVE?

MR. DJEREJIAN: THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER INITIATIVE STILL REPRESENTS THE MAJOR THRUST OF THIS ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARD A SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT.

Q: HOW COULD YOU FURTHER PEACE IN THE MIDEAST WITHOUT TAKING SYRIA INTO ACCOUNT?

MR. DJEREJIAN: THE QUESTION AS POSED IS A VERY MISLEADING ONE. THE VICE PRESIDENT IS SIMPLY MAKING A TRIP TO THREE COUNTRIES, WITH WHICH WE HAVE VERY STRONG TIES, AND VERY CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS. THESE ARE THREE COUNTRIES THAT PLAY A VERY ESSENTIAL ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, AND CERTAINLY IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI, IN ANY ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE SETTLEMENT.

Q: WILL THE VICE PRESIDENT CONCERN HIMSELF AT ALL WITH THE AMERICANS HELD HOSTAGE IN LEBANON DURING THIS TRIP?

MR. DJEREJIAN: I THINK THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL BE

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LOOKING AT A WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES AND CERTAINLY WE DO NOT AVOID ANY OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE THE FATE OF THE U.S. HOSTAGES NOR DO WE SPARE ANY EFFORT FOR THEIR RELEASE.

Q: IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF AVOIDING OPPORTUNITY, IT IS A QUESTION OF (OFF MIKE).

A: OBVIOUSLY, THE VICE PRESIDENT, IN TERMS OF...IN HIS UNCLASSIFIED

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TALKS WITH THESE LEADERS, WHEN THE OPPORTUNITIES ARISE, THIS WOULD BE A SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION, YES. END TEXT.

3. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

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ORIGINAL TO THE WHITE HOUSE

July 17, 1986

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Drafts of Vice President's Public Remarks

Drafts of the Vice President's public remarks -- toasts, arrival and departure statements and the like -- for use during his trip to Israel, Jordan and Egypt are attached.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/PS/CR/IN Date: 7/29/97
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☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY ☐ IN PART

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Attachments as stated.

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Drafted: NEA/RA: NEJohnson
7/10/86 x6125 4185
Cleared: NEA/RA: JBircher
NEA: RSuddarth

P. A. Suddarth

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VICE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL STATEMENT
THE ROSE GARDEN
JULY 27, 1986

THEME: Common Values; Growing Strength of Bilateral Relationship

I am pleased and honored to once again find myself in Israel. Many of us in the United States and around the world find that, whatever our religion, we cannot visit Israel without experiencing a deep sense of self-discovery: our origins, our roots, and our common inspirational source are in this land. We sense that here is where it all began, from whence we all came, and to where it is our pleasure to return.

I am fortunate indeed in that I have visited Israel before. This time it is my pleasure to come on invitation of Prime Minister Peres. But, with all due respect, I must admit that I needed no such excuse to come. I came previously as a private citizen, and would do so again. Americans and all others who hold Israel dear should know that it is as safe and secure a place to visit as exists anywhere in the world.

Israel today, of course, is far more than an ancient repository, a monument to the human past. It is a youthful, modern nation with a well-established democratic tradition. And, of course, it is America's great friend.

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My last visit to Israel was in 1979. I attended a conference on a subject of continuing concern to both the United States and Israel, terrorism, and at that time I thought that ties between the two countries could not be any closer.

I was wrong. In the intervening years I have seen a blossoming of the relationship which has surprised and pleased all concerned. Today the United States and Israel are cooperating on over three hundred and fifty projects in science alone. Israel was among the first countries to join us in strategic defense research. The United States and Israel recently signed a free trade agreement, reducing and eventually eliminating even the commercial barriers which divide our nations.

The desire for peace, the love of democracy, and the insistence on the right of people to move freely across borders give both nations a commonality of purpose.

Furthermore, both Israel and the United States represent freedom and hope for many oppressed people throughout the world.

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I have looked forward to this visit for a long time and for many reasons. I look forward to meeting further with Prime Minister Peres, Foreign Minister Shamir, and Defense Minister Rabin. I look forward to touring Jerusalem with Mayor Teddy Kollek, and I anticipate meeting with the American Community living in Israel. I plan to visit the forests and deserts, the mountains and the lowlands that make up Israel.

Although the schedule is ambitious, I know I will not be satisfied until I have breathed enough of the rarefied air that inhabits this place, for which so many have fought, in which so many have died, and about which so many have dreamed.

America has been described as a "city set on a hill," whose light shines as a symbol of hope for all. Jerusalem is quite literally such a city, with a similar charge and a similar responsibility. It is a city where we encounter ourselves: the legacy of our past and the hope for our future. All of us -- Israelis, Americans, and the human family-at-large -- owe it our best efforts to keep it that way.

Again, Mrs. Bush and I are very happy to be here.

Thank you very much.

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ARRIVAL STATEMENT, JULY 27, 1986

Drafted: NEA/IAI: Embassy Tel Aviv
#4676F; 7/16/86; x 73672

Cleared: NEA/IAI: PCWilcox
NEA: RSuddarth
I: ASteinfeld

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DINNER HOSTED BY PRIME MINISTER PERES AND
SPEAKER OF THE KNESSET HILLEL
SUNDAY, JULY 27, 1986

THEME: Strength of the Bilateral Relationship

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Peres, Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Hillel,
honored guests and friends:

I know I speak for everyone here, and for all Americans
in saying that we share the thoughts expressed by your
eloquent words -- thank you so much.

President Reagan and the American people send to the
people of Israel our best wishes, warm affection and our
sincere hope for peace.

It is a special pleasure for Mrs. Bush and me to return
to Israel -- this time in an official capacity -- and have
the honor of speaking in the Knesset, where the vibrant
democracy of Israel is reaffirmed every day.

Mr. Prime Minister and Mr. Speaker, we are especially
grateful to you for your warmth and your gracious
hospitality. I am confident that my consultations with the
Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and many
other Israelis over the next three days will strengthen even
more our partnership. I look forward to our meetings and to
the visits in this magnificent country.

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As we stand here together in this historic hall, I am reminded of the ties that hold our friendship together -- a respect for democracy, a love of national independence, and a reverence for freedom. I am pleased to say that America's partnership with Israel is stronger than ever before.


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We are working together for prosperity with the establishment of a free trade area, which will allow your entrepreneurs to take advantage of the potential of the American market without trade barriers and to fashioning an economic and commercial environment that will attract increase in American investment in Israel. Culturally, we have a vigorous and growing exchange program, allowing Israelis to come and learn about our nation, and Americans to visit and live in yours.




For over 38 years, we have rejoiced in the progress of this nation, shared your joys and felt your sorrows. Together, we share now the hope for peace, and for prosperity in this beautiful land.

Now I would ask you to rise and toast to the Prime Minister and to the Speaker, and above all a toast to the people of Israel, the friendship of our peoples and the vigorous partnership in the pursuit of peace and prosperity in this region. Le'haim.

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DINNER HOSTED BY PRIME MINISTER PERES AND SPEAKER OF THE
KNESSET HILLEL, SUNDAY, JULY 27, 1986

Drafted: NEA/IAI: Embassy Tel Aviv 
#4796F; 7/16/86; x 73672

Cleared: NEA/IAI: FChilcox 
NEA: RSSuddarth 
F: ASteinfeld 

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VICE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS
AT MEVASSERETT ZION ABSORPTION CENTER,
MONDAY, JULY 28, 1986

THEMES: -- U. S. Support for Free movement of People
-- Unity and Diversity of Israel

- o Meeting new Israeli citizens at Mevasserett Zion is a moving experience; what I see here expresses so much about Israel and the Israeli people.
- o It is inspiring to see newcomers from many countries being welcomed here as they begin their new lives as Israeli citizens. I am delighted to have the chance to meet with families who come to Israel from the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, Romania and elsewhere.
- o One of many common bonds that join the United States and Israel is our common commitment to the free movement of people. We have long supported Israel's programs to welcome and absorb refugees from other lands, I am deeply impressed with the work that is being done here at Mevasserett Zion.
- o Here I see a vivid manifestation of the principle that is embodied in Israel: its mission as a new home and refuge for Jews seeking freedom.

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- o This experience reminds me, however, of the plight of many Jews, especially in the Soviet Union, who are being denied the right to emigrate to Israel. Our hearts go out to them, and we pledge our continuing, steadfast efforts to work for their freedom.
- o Peoples here who have come from many lands symbolize the richness and diversity of Israeli society as well as the unity of all Israelis in their commitment to their nation and common commitment to freedom and democracy.
- o I am moved by the parallel between what I see here and the experience of my country, where peoples from many lands have settled to become one nation.

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VICE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS AT MEVASSERETT ZION ABSORPTION
CENTER, MONDAY, JULY 28, 1986

Drafted:NEA/IAI:PCWilcox, Jr. *W*
7/17/86 4886F X73672

Cleared:NEA:RSSuddarth *RS*
F:ASteinfeld *W*

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DINNER HOSTED BY VICE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH
MONDAY, JULY 28, 1986

THIME: U.S. Commitment To the Search for a Just and Lasting
Peace

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Peres, Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Hillel
and distinguished guests:

It is with great pleasure that Barbara and I bring you
the warm regards of the American people. It is always a joy
to come to this generous and welcoming land.

It is impossible to visit Israel, and to see the ancient
land without getting a sense of its heritage -- echoes of the
struggle for the creation of the Jewish State, and the
struggle for survival of a people.

No one who has witnessed the courage of this small
nation, no one who has talked to new immigrants -- their
faces shining with hope -- as I did this morning, and felt
the deep commitment within the hearts of your people, can
ever question the resolve of the Israeli people to keep their
nation free forever.

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This unyielding determination continues even though you have never known a day of genuine peace. America stands beside you in this unending search for the one thing every Israeli yearns for -- peace. Our peoples are joined by the ties of love, kinship and history that unite our two democracies.

And of the commitments we share, none is more compelling than the hope for a lasting peace in the Middle East. This Administration has worked hard in the pursuit of a just and lasting peace.

We will continue in our effort to reach that goal, in spite of the frustrations. We have no illusions about the difficulties of that challenge. But if there is a chance for peace, no work is too hard, no effort too great. No one who has children, or grandchildren, can fail to see that peace must be our paramount objective. For 38 years, Israel and its neighbors have had to bear the awful burden of war. We must all work to lift that heavy burden as soon as possible.

I would ask you to rise with me in a toast to the health of the Prime Minister, the Speaker and to peace -- a lasting peace for our generation and those to come and to the great friendship and partnership of our two peoples. Let us drink a le h'aim to shalom.

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DINNER HOSTED BY VICE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH, MONDAY, JULY 29, 1986

Drafted: NIA/IAI: Embassy Tel Aviv *BA*
#4797F; 7/16/86; x 73672

Cleared: NEA/IAI: PChilcox *BA*
NEA: RSuddarth
P: ASteinfeld *BA*

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO
BEN GURION'S GRAVESITE, SDE BOKER
TUESDAY, JULY 29, 1986

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THEMES: -- Realism and Idealism: Characteristics
Attributed To Ben Gurion and Their Relevance To
Israel Today
-- Challenges of the Present and Future

- o Proud as an American, and as a friend and admirer of Israel, to pay tribute to one of Israel's founding fathers on the 100th anniversary of his birth; to express satisfaction at our own role in Israel's development and the expansion of the peace process; and to associate my government and the American people with the spirit of realism and idealism which marked David Ben Gurion's life and which left its imprint on the future of Israel and the Jewish people.
 - o Shimon Peres, after Ben Gurion's death, wrote that Ben Gurion embraced the two most important components of true leadership: "earthy realism and lofty idealism."
 - o Especially here in the Negev -- the crossroads between fertility and barrenness, between man's accomplishments and nature's vicissitudes -- can we look at where we are and where we are heading.
-
- o The lofty idealism of today and tomorrow: harmonizing the ethical and the material; looking beyond the

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limitations posed by geographic and scientific space to build bridges of understanding, mutual respect and peace among different peoples.

- o Ben Gurion's vision: a Jewish state, an ingathering of the exiles, and an Israeli people able on its own soil to contribute to mankind's welfare and ethics.
- o Ben Gurion wrote: "The essence and the significance of Jewish history lie in the preference of quality over quantity. For our security, survival and status in the world and the preservation of the legacy of our prophets to the end of time, Israel must strive incessantly for moral, cultural, technological and social improvement and to be a unique people."
- o Ben Gurion's realism: the need for compromise on territorial issues, accommodation and peace with Arabs.
- o Ben Gurion wrote: "A cardinal factor in security is a foreign policy of peace: an honest aspiration to be at peace with our neighbors, and with all nations; a

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vigorous effort to establish relations of friendship with countries great and small, in East and West; avoidance of all and any warlike provocation from whatever quarter it comes, and in whatever form it be revealed; undeviating support of every step aimed at defeating aggression and achieving peace in the Middle East and all over the world."

- o These characteristics of Ben Gurion's leadership -- earthy realism and lofty idealism -- provide not only insight into his accomplishments and a testimonial to his rightful place among the giants of history, but also a guide for the future.

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BEN GURION'S GRAVESITE, SDF ECKER, JULY 29, 1960

Drafted: NEA/IAI: EKBodin
#4745F; 7/16/86; 73672

Cleared: NEA/IAI: PCWilco
NEA: RSuddarth
P: ASteinfeld

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VICE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS TO CHILDREN
BEN GURION'S HOME AT KIBBUTZ SDE POKER
TUESDAY, JULY 29, 1986

THEMES:-- Common bonds Between Israel and the United States
-- Peace and Ben Gurion

Points:

- o Coming to Sde Paker and the Negev is like coming home to Texas: challenge of the desert, tough pioneering people, importance of self reliance.
 - o People of the United States and Israel share a great deal. I grew up with the same values you are taught: democracy, freedom, justice. Words that shape the souls of individuals and of our two nations.
 - o My visit has brought home to me how close the United States and Israel are, a closeness based on these shared values.
 - o We also share determination to defend these values. Your brothers, fathers and grandfathers have endured the risks and horrors of war for their sake.
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- o Real security for these values comes not through war but through peace. Challenge for my generation, and for yours, is achievement, strengthening of just and lasting peace.

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- o Only through peace can your energies, the energies of the new generation, be used fully to create, to build, as David Ben Gurion used his to create this Kibbutz and forge a nation.
 - o Ben Gurion helped to create and defend Israel in a time of war, but was a man of peace. He recognized far more clearly than most that true security could only come through a policy of peace.
 - o Israel has no firmer friend in its search for peace than the United States. It is a path with many obstacles and frustrations, but we will persevere with you.
 - o The goal is well worth the journey, no matter how difficult. A lasting peace between Israel and its neighbors is the greatest gift that could be bestowed on your generation, and it is the obligation of mine to exert every effort toward this end.
-
- o Ben Gurion was dedicated to peace and contributed much toward achieving it. In his name, and in yours, we pledge to continue the process.

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VICE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS TO CHILDREN
BEN GURION'S HOME AT KIBBUTZ SDI BOKER
TUESDAY, JULY 29, 1986

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Drafted: NEA/IAI:RCCrocker
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NEA/IAI:PCWilcox, Jr.
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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO
HATZERIM AIR FORCE BASE
JULY 29, 1986

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THEMES: -- Close US-Israel Security Relationship
-- US Regard For Israeli Anti-terrorism Efforts

My visit today to Hatzerim Air Base and meeting with Minister of Defense Rabin has been an excellent occasion to review the close military relationship between our two nations and to renew the firm commitment of President Reagan and the United States to the security of Israel.

My talks with Minister Rabin covered a variety of subjects, including regional issues, security assistance and US-Israel cooperation in a number of security related fields.

I wish to thank the Commander of Hatzerim Air Base and express my appreciation to his men for the outstanding presentations we have seen today. Their skill and dedication to their country merits our highest praise -- as in all free nations, the price of liberty has always been eternal vigilance.

We saw an excellent example of Israel's counter-terrorism capabilities today, capabilities which have more than once been used to save the lives of innocent citizens of Israel

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and other nations. The struggle against terrorism can only be won if all nations around the world unite in putting an end, once and for all, to this terrible scourge. As Israel and the United States well know, this effort sometimes requires the ultimate sacrifice. We are confident, however, that such sacrifices are not in vain, and live as an inspiration to free men everywhere.

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO HATZERIM AIR BASE, JULY 29, 1986

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NEA:RSuddarth
P:ASteinfeld

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VICE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS
AFTER FINAL MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER PERES
WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 1986

THEME: -- Commitments to Peace Process, Necessity¹ of
Continuing Efforts
-- Growing Strength of Bilateral Relations

Prime Minister Peres and I have had a very useful meeting. It has been a wonderful visit, and I want to express our thanks to you, Mr. Prime Minister, for your government's warm and gracious hospitality.

Israel and the United States are close friends and partners in many endeavors, and my meeting with the Prime Minister was an opportunity to explore our common objectives and cooperation in some detail.

The most important subject of all on our common agenda is peace in the Middle East between Israel and all its neighbors. While the path is long and tortuous, and there have been setbacks and frustrations, the search must continue. I assured the Prime Minister that the United States remains committed to this process, and we will
~~continue to work with Israel, Egypt, Jordan and others in the~~

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region who are searching for a way toward direct negotiations. Your commitment, Mr. Prime Minister, to the same goal strengthens our resolve. Indeed, I have been deeply impressed by the yearning for peace which I have heard from all the Israelis I have met. The stakes are high for Israel, the Palestinians and neighboring Arab states. So we must all keep faith in the goal of peace and redouble our efforts.

Prime Minister Peres and I also discussed the extraordinary range of bilateral activities and cooperative programs in which Israel and the United States are partners. Americans can feel proud and satisfied that over the past six years, the close relations between our two countries have grown even stronger, thanks to the many new forms of cooperation between us. I have no doubt these activities will grow and flourish, since they strengthen us both.

In our meeting the Prime Minister and I devoted special attention to two important areas: our support for Israel's security and Israel's efforts to stabilize its economy and promote economic growth. We have been a partners in both areas, through our security assistance that helps Israel maintain a strong defense as well as economic stability and well being.

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One matter of special importance that we discussed was Israel's plans for renewed economic growth, now that you are embarked on the continuing task of beating back inflation. The development of Israel's great potential for growth will take time and effort, but the promise is bright, and we look forward to working with you in this cause.

Mr. Prime Minister. This has been a very intense and rewarding three days. I am grateful for our talks. I am inspired by the strength of our relations and all that we are doing together.

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VICE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS AFTER FINAL MEETING WITH PRIME
MINISTER PERES, WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 1986

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Drafted:NEA/IAI:PCW ~~PCW~~ Cox, Jr.
7/17/86 4892F x73672

Cleared:NEA:RSSuddarth *RS*
P:ASteinfeld

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VICE PRESIDENT'S DEPARTURE STATEMENT
THE ROSE GARDEN
JULY 30, 1986

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THEME: Common Bonds and Goals; Israeli Achievements

The time has come for me to take my leave of this great country. As I reflect back over my experiences of the past few days, I feel the usual emotions one feels when a successful journey has come to a close. There is the reluctance to go, the happiness from having been, and the anticipation of moving on and using what one has learned.

I have learned a lot. Travel is usually undertaken to experience something different -- new sights, new sounds, new lands, different cultures. But I inevitably come away with a sense of sameness -- that despite the differences that divide, in the end there is more common ground. This is particularly true of the United States and Israel. Behind me stands the Knesset, the symbol of Israeli democracy that reminds me of our own Capitol Building. I have now had the privilege of speaking in each and knowing great leaders in each -- leaders who share similarities that go beyond the symbolic -- whose commitment to democratic values, pluralism, and individual freedom are identical and unquestioned.

In my visit to the gravesite of David Ben-Gurion, that great Israeli pioneer, political leader, and philosopher, I was struck by the many similarities between him and our own

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founding fathers. They too were men and women of "earthy realism and lofty idealism," to use Prime Minister Peres's phrase, people of thought and action who were at ease with pen or plow; equally at home in the halls of diplomacy or on plantation, farm, or Kibbutz.

Sde Boker reminded me of the flowering deserts of my southwestern home, where man has striven to reclaim, conquer, utilize, yet preserve.

I was reminded at Yad Vashem of man's capacity to destroy; of what can happen when the rule of law is supplanted by the rule of whim; when inalienable, God-given rights are subject to the will of a privileged group. Anti-semitism, racism, and other social pathologies must never be allowed to triumph over tolerance, pluralism, and our better selves.

Mark Twain once wrote that "devotion to petrified opinion never broke a chain nor freed a human soul." The philosophy of the terrorist holds that nothing, especially innocent human life, is more important than his cause. Afraid to strike back at those he perceives to be his true enemies, he instead seeks to become a hero by specifically targeting the defenseless.

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My visit to the Absorption Center reminded me that both Israel and the United States are nations of immigrants. Throughout our histories, our populations have been supplemented, renewed, and strengthened by those who came with different histories, cultures, and outlooks.

The Israel I have visited the past four days is not the same Israel I visited six years ago. To be sure, many of the problems that existed then still challenge us today. But many changes have occurred.

Today Israel is winning its battle with inflation. As the Israeli economy becomes more confident of its own strength and ability to compete in the world marketplace, government controls are less necessary. Free trade agreements with the United States and the European Community will give Israel an equal place alongside the free economies of the rest of the developed world.

The security of its Egyptian border is now taken as a given, and disputes are aired around a table rather than on a battlefield. Diplomacy is seen as a realistic tool for problem solving, not as a cynical instrument of last resort.

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And so I take with me feelings of immense satisfaction and accomplishment. I have seen many old friends and made many new ones. I am convinced that relations between our two countries are stronger and more mutually beneficial than ever, and that the future will see continued cooperation in every field.

Yet Mrs. Bush and I also leave with feelings of regret. This is unavoidable, I suppose, and the mark of a successful trip.

But part of me will always be here, the part of me that never left: my past, my roots, my heart, my soul -- call it what you will. No one can make a trip, a journey, a pilgrimage here and remain unchanged.

Thank you for a most enjoyable and productive visit.

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DEPARTURE STATEMENT, JULY 30, 1986

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Drafted: NEA/IAI: Embassy Tel Aviv
#4676F; 7/16/86; x 73672

Cleared: NEA/IAI: PChilcox
NEA: RSuddarth
P: ASteinfeld

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DRAFT PUBLIC REMARKS

VICE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL IN JORDAN
WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 1986

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THEME: Stress that your visit is another demonstration of the ties between Jordan and the United States.

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Your Majesties, Mr. Prime Minister, Distinguished Friends,
I am delighted to be here with you in Jordan. I bring you,
Your Majesties, the warm greetings of President and Mrs. Reagan
and all your many friends in the United States. While we have
had the pleasure of welcoming you in Washington, this is my
first opportunity in some time to enjoy the famed hospitality
of the Jordanian people. Jordan and the United States are old
friends. While friends may sometimes differ, and surely our
friendship has been no exception, mutual trust, assistance and
daily contact between our two peoples at every level have built
a firm, unshakeable basis for that friendship. I know some
have questioned the strength of these close bonds, but let
there be no doubt that nothing can or will shake them. I come
here as the representative of the American people to
demonstrate yet again our confidence in that long established
relationship. Your Majesties, Mr. Prime Minister, I am
delighted by this chance to see your land and your problems
through your own eyes. I know that my visit will be fruitful,
informative and invaluable in broadening our mutual
understanding.

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Draft Public Remarks: Arrival in Jordan

Drafted:NEA/ARN:TDowling *TM*
#0666K 7/16/86 X74453

Approved:NEA:RSSuddarth *RS*
Cleared:NEA/ARN:AGlaspie *ig*
NEA:WKirby *wt*
P:ASteinfeld *AS*

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DRAFT PUBLIC REMARKS

VICE PRESIDENT'S DINNER HOSTED BY
KING HUSSEIN AND QUEEN NOOR
THURSDAY, JULY 31, 1986

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THEME: Stress our friendship, and common search for peace in the Middle East.

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Your Majesties, Mr. Prime Minister, Distinguished Friends,
It is both a privilege and a pleasure to be here with you in Jordan this week. Although our two countries were forged by different histories, we share deep and lasting ties borne of thirty years of mutual trust and support. Today, we stand together as old friends working to resolve the issues of the day. Let no one doubt how highly we Americans value that friendship.

Among the issues we confront, there is none more important than the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Your Majesty, Jordan's demonstrated commitment to a negotiated peace is indispensable to that search. We know all too well the price that you and your nation have paid to honor that commitment. Despite the sacrifices imposed upon you by those whose only answer is the gun, Jordan has not waived. History will show that the steady pursuit of peace requires the highest courage.

Tonight, here in Amman, permit me to reaffirm our gratitude for your friendship. Let us also remind ourselves that there can be no higher achievement than peace. As I mentioned, our two countries have reached the present by different paths. Let us continue to go forward together in the search for a peaceful future.

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Draft Public Remarks: Dinner hosted by King Hussein and Queen Noor

Drafted: NEA/ARN: TDowling *TD*
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Approved: NEA: RSSuddarth *RS*
Cleared: NEA/ARN: AGlaspie *AG*
NEA: WKirby *W*
NEA/P: MAustrian *MA*
P: ASteinfeld *AS*

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DRAFT PUBLIC REMARKS

VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PETRA
FRIDAY, AUGUST 1, 1986

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The remains of Petra are magnificent testimony to the great civilization that flourished here so many centuries ago. For us, coming from a young country, it is sobering to be reminded again of how ancient are the cultural roots of the nations of the Middle East. Although the people of Petra have vanished, they have left you, their inheritors, a legacy of achievement. We should never forget that Petra's greatness was based not on conquest but on peaceful trade. Seeing Petra reminds us that our common goal remains a just, lasting peace. Let us continue working for the day when all the countries of the Middle East are once again linked together in peaceful commerce.

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Draft Public Remarks: Visit to Petra

Drafted:NEA/ARN:TDowling *TD*
#0669K 7/16/86 X74453

Approved:NEA:RSSuddarth *RS*
Cleared:NEA/ARN:AGlaspie *ag*
NEA:WKirby *WK*
P:ASteinfeld *AS*

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DRAFT PUBLIC REMARKS

VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO UMM QAIS
SATURDAY, AUGUST 2, 1986

THEME: Note how Umm Qais demonstrates the complex links among Jordan, Israel and Syria.

Standing here amidst the relics of Roman rule, I am struck both by how ancient are the civilizations that have passed across this landscape and the complex relations that geography imposes on their modern successors. While neighbors are now divided by fortified borders, flourishing agriculture bears witness to what can be achieved through hard work and cooperation. We are especially proud that we worked closely with Jordan on this great achievement.

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Draft Public Remarks: Visit to Umm Qais

Drafted: NEA/ARN: TDowling *TD*
#0670K 7/16/86 X74453

Approved: NEA: RSSuddarth *RS*
Cleared: NEA/ARN: AGlaspie *ay*
NEA: WKirby *WN*
P: ASteinfeld *AS*

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VICE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON WITH CINC BIN SHAKER
SATURDAY, AUGUST 2, 1986

THEME: Reassuring that we will do all we can to meet Jordan's defense needs.

General bin Shaker,

I thank you for both an extremely informative tour and most delightful lunch. As you well know, there is no substitute for the chance, as I had with you today, to see both the geographic setting and the vital contribution of your armed forces to the maintenance of peace and security in this troubled region. We fully recognize that this contribution requires unremitting hard work and dedication by the men of the Jordan Arab Army. Please express to them our congratulations for a job well done. For more than 30 years, our two armed forces have been bound together by friendship, trust and mutual assistance. Let us continue to work together in that spirit for the day when peace will once again prevail throughout the region.

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Draft Public Remarks: Luncheon with CINC bin Shaker

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Approved:NEA:RSSuddarth^{RS}
Cleared:NEA/ARN:AGlaspien^{AS}
NEA:WKirby^{WK}
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P:ASteinfeld^{AS}

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DRAFT PUBLIC REMARKS

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VICE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE
SATURDAY, AUGUST 2, 1986

Theme: Emphasize success of your visit in reaffirming the close friendship between Jordan and the U.S.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Today marks the close of my visit to Jordan. It has been an invaluable chance to become better acquainted with the people and the issues. King Hussein and Jordan have been close friends of the United States for more than thirty years. As I told His Majesty, we value highly that friendship. Time and shared efforts for the prosperity of Jordan and peace in the Middle East have forged unbreakable ties between our two countries. I hope that my visit has further strengthened that mutual understanding and trust. Sharing the highest of common goals, the achievement of a just, lasting peace for the entire Middle East, we exchanged views on how we might move further towards its attainment. We also discussed how we might work together in helping Jordan meet its needs and those of the people of the West Bank. Lastly, I had the chance to see some of the unique treasures of Jordan's rich and ancient heritage. I have learned much and enjoyed myself even more. To His Majesty and all the people of Jordan, I say thank you for your gracious, warm welcome. Although I am returning to Washington, I must say that I felt fully at home with friends throughout my stay. I would now be happy to answer whatever questions you may have.

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Draft Public Remarks: Vice President's Press Conference

Drafted: NEA/ARN:TDowling *TM*
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Approved: NEA:RSSuddarth *RS*
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P:ASteinfeld *AS*

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DRAFT PUBLIC REMARKS

AMERICAN COMMUNITY EVENT
SATURDAY, AUGUST 2, 1986

THEME: The importance of the American community in sustaining
Jordanian-American friendship.

It is a great pleasure to meet with all of you today at the conclusion of my visit to Jordan. As residents of Jordan, I do not have to remind you of the long and close friendship between our two countries. That friendship is based, in large part, on the daily contacts between the Jordanian people and Americans such as yourselves. Although you are a long way from home, please be sure that we fully recognize your contribution to good relations. There are many challenges and many rewards to life in the Middle East; I envy you your opportunity to enjoy daily close friendships with the people of Jordan. I bring you the best wishes of the Americans at home and I will take back to them good memories of this trip and your kind thoughts.

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Draft Public Remarks: American Community Event

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DRAFT PUBLIC REMARKS

DEPARTURE CEREMONY
SATURDAY, AUGUST 2, 1986

THEME: Reemphasize how this visit reinforces the close ties
between Jordan and the U.S.

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Your Majesties, Mr, Prime Minister, Distinguished Friends,
Sadly, the time has come for me to leave Jordan at the
conclusion of a memorable visit. I am grateful for the chance
to meet with you, enjoy your hospitality, and obtain a better
understanding of the problems which concern us all. As I said
upon my arrival, my visit is a further demonstration of the
long, close ties which bind together our two countries. Let us
not consider this the end of an excellent visit, but rather yet
one more step forward together in the long search for a just
and lasting peace in the Middle East. I will bring back to the
President your warmest good wishes and happily report that we
were received with that special warmth for which Jordan is so
rightly famed. Again, please accept our sincere thanks for
your hospitality and for the chance for all of us to come to
know one another a bit better than before.

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Draft Public Remarks: Departure Ceremony

Drafted: NEA/ARN:TDowling *TD*
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Approved: NEA:RSSuddarth *RS*
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THE VICE-PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL STATEMENT
AT
LUXOR AIRPORT
AUGUST 2, 1986

First of all, let me say thank you for this warm reception. It is another sign of the strong relationship between our countries.

My wife and I are delighted to arrive here in Luxor this evening. Our visit here is a personal and public honor for me, as I take great pride in the special relationship and deep friendship that exists between our two countries. I believe our special relationship can only grow and prosper.

My wife and I have looked forward to this visit with great enthusiasm. We have always wanted to see the world-renowned wonders of ancient Egypt.

Once again, I thank you for this warm and kind welcome; I know this visit will prove enjoyable in every way.

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STATEMENT: ARRIVAL AT LUXOR

draft:NEA/EGY:TGGallagher
7/15/86 W#4811F x2802

cleared:NEA/P:MAustrian
S/P:AMiller
P:ASteinfeld
NEA:RSuddarth
NEA/EGY:DJDunford

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Entering Egypt through Luxor and the Valley of the Kings, I was impressed anew by the great heritage to which all of us in today's world lay spiritual claim. In my conversations here I have been no less struck by the warmth and dignity that is the special birthright of a people backed by thousands of years of history and cultural development.

One of the brightest spots is the great progress that has been achieved on the Taba issue. After long and tough negotiations an agreement on terms of reference for submitting this dispute to arbitration is at hand. I am

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confident that this achievement will clear the way for a fully productive Egyptian-Israeli relationship. The benefits of such an outcome are substantial. Egypt and Israel have already demonstrated that peace can work. What has yet to be demonstrated is how well it can work. As your peace partner, the United States has a deep and abiding interest in helping you realize the full promise of the treaty which you have entered into. I assure you that we will not abdicate that responsibility.

Let us rededicate ourselves to the task of clearing away the obstacles that have impeded the broader peace process. The most pressing need is to ensure that the Palestinian people retain hope while the the groundwork for negotiations is being laid. We recognize that much must be done before the objective of direct negotiations between Israel and a new Arab partner. But we should not lose sight of how far we have come over the past two years. Breaking through the remaining obstacles is not only possible; it is essential. Faltering on the way to peace is not an option.

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Inherent in peace is the promise of prosperity--and we stand with you and your government, Mr. President, in the effort to promote economic stabilization and growth. We have begun a useful dialogue, and we will continue to assist you as you move forward. We know the path is difficult, but be assured you will not walk it alone. We also stand arm and arm with you against threats to our mutual security. Egypt is a vital force for moderation in the region. A strong Egypt is inseparable from the goal of regional peace and stability.

In this spirit of friendship, cooperation and common cause, I lift my glass to you, Mr. President, and to the Egyptian people.

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Draft Toast for Mubarak Dinner

Draft:NEA/EGY:DGGreenlee *BRH for*

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Clear:NEA/EGY:DJDunford *DD*

NEA/P:MAustrian

S/P:AMiller

P:ASteinfeld *BRH*

PA:PMartinez

NEA:RSuddarth

NEA:WKirby *BRH for*

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DRAFT STATEMENT
VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTICIPATION IN THE
DEDICATION OF THE ROD EL RARAQ WATER TREATMENT PLANT
AUGUST 4, 1986

THEME: -- Underscore U.S. commitment to helping meet basic human needs and U.S. interest in continued economic policy dialogue and support for Egyptian reform efforts.

(Recognition of Egyptian dignitaries). I am delighted to have this opportunity today to help dedicate this new plant to the service of the people of Cairo. This successful project and its importance to the health and welfare of so many people here truly represents the positive spirit and nature of today's partnership between Egypt and the United States. This partnership is one based on shared national values and mutual aspirations for peace and a better life for ourselves and future generations.

Our two governments, under the leadership of President Mubarak and President Reagan, have brought to our partnership a renewed emphasis on economic development that touches the lives of all Egyptians and actively and strongly supports the Egyptian Government's efforts to meet the basic human needs of its people.

We cannot have peace and stability in the Middle East without addressing the constraints to economic development which challenge our efforts to fight poverty and improve living standards. For this reason the United States has major development assistance programs in the region and, in

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terms of joint economic development projects, Egypt is the largest U.S. program, not only in the Middle East, but in the world, with some \$10.0 billion expended since 1975. This fact may not be commonly known. But the economic cooperation between Egypt and the United States is strong testimony to the value the American people place on our friendship with the Government and people of Egypt.

Our joint economic development program is, without question, having a positive impact on the lives of many Egyptians. Clean water and sanitation have been areas of great concern, as well as some progress, as we can see here today. Our program in child survival and village services has paralleled our investment in larger scale infrastructure. I am told that due to the national campaign in oral rehydration therapy, for example, there has been a dramatic drop in infant mortality in Egypt in recent years. I am proud the U.S. can join hands with Egypt to support this type of effort.

Our two countries have benefitted greatly from consultations both here and in Washington. Close collaboration in economic matters has become especially important during the past year as Egypt has had to struggle with serious economic reversals. The U.S. has also been faced with budgetary difficulties. Nevertheless, we remain

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willing and interested in supporting Egypt's efforts to bring
needed reform to the economy. In fact, during the most
recent ministerial visit to Washington led by Deputy Prime
Minister Ganzouri, we agreed to support the Government as it
carries out measures to reduce Egypt's budget and balance of
payments deficits. We also agreed to study ways of expanding
bilateral trade. On this point, I would like to emphasize
that American companies retain their confidence in Egypt's
future, as evidenced by the recent large General Motors
investment, and we continue to support the important role the
private sector can play in Egypt's economic growth and
development.

Once again, let me say it is a great pleasure to share in
today's ceremony marking further progress in Egypt's strong
economic development program. The benefits of the
U.S.-Egyptian partnership, in this case, should have a
positive impact for many years to come.

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Drafted:AID/ANE/E:TLiercke
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Cleared:NEA/EGY:DJDunford
NEA/P:MAustrian
S/P:AMiller
P:ASteinfeld
PA:GSmalley
NEA:RSuddarth

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VICE PRESIDENT'S PRESS STATEMENT
AFTER MUBARAK MEETING
AUGUST 4, 1986

THEME: -- Emphasize the strength and warmth of
U.S.-Egyptian relations.

President Mubarak and I have had an extremely useful session. We discussed the range of issues that so greatly concern both Egypt and the United States, including, of course, the peace process and our mutual interest in furthering Egyptian economic development and prosperity. Our talks took place in the atmosphere of warmth and friendship that has characterized our bilateral relations and that I am confident will continue as we move forward together.

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Statement - Comments for Press

Draft:NEA/EGY:DGGreenlee *DRH*

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Clear:NEA/EGY:DJDunford *DJD*

S/P:AMiller

NEA/P:MAustrian

PA:PMartinez *DRH*

P:ASteinfeld

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VICE PRESIDENT'S TOAST AT
OFFICIAL DINNER HOSTED BY
EGYPTIAN PRIME MINISTER ALI LOTFY
AUGUST 4, 1986

THEMES: -- The Vice President's trip has underscored the strength of U.S.-Egypt relations.

-- The strength of our bilateral relationship is reflected in extensive economic and commercial ties.

-- The Administration strongly supports the Egyptian government's efforts to bring fundamental reform to the economy.

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Lotfy, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to express my deep appreciation for the warm hospitality shown to me and Mrs. Bush by the Egyptian government and people. We will always cherish the memories of this visit to your ancient and beautiful country.

Mr. Prime Minister, my talks with President Mubarak, yourself, and the members of your government have reaffirmed the closeness and enduring strength of our bilateral relationship. Our two countries share a broad-range of common goals and aspirations. None of these is more important than our mutual commitment to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. I am confident that, through our efforts, this goal can be achieved.

The strength and depth of our bilateral relationship is reflected in the extensive economic and commercial ties

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between our two countries. Through our economic assistance program, the United States is actively supporting the Egyptian government's policies to promote economic growth and development. The Rod El Farag water purification plant which the Prime Minister and I dedicated today is but one symbol of our joint efforts to improve the quality of life for the citizens of Egypt. We have accomplished a great deal together since 1974 when the U.S. began its economic assistance program to Egypt, but much remains to be done. I can assure you that the United States will continue to provide substantial levels of assistance to help foster further growth and development in Egypt.

Through their investments in Egypt, private American companies are also helping to promote economic development through technology transfer, job creation, and professional development. American firms have already invested about \$1.3 billion in petroleum exploration, with another \$180 million in the industrial and manufacturing sector. The number of joint ventures in this sector has grown from 15 to 26 in the last 18 months and should soon exceed 30 with the formation of the General Motors passenger car joint venture and component companies. We hope American investment will continue to grow and contribute to Egypt's prosperity. In this regard, we expect the Bilateral Investment Treaty, recently ratified by the Peoples Assembly, will enhance the

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investment climate for American firms in Egypt and hope the Senate will soon complete U.S. ratification procedures.

The Egyptian government is currently engaged in a bold effort to bring fundamental reform to the economy. We know from experience in our country that it is never easy to undertake difficult economic measures. It is nonetheless certain that comprehensive steps will help ensure economic health and growth. We strongly support the Egyptian government's economic reform efforts and are confident of Egypt's ability to achieve sustained growth.

Now, I would like to propose a toast:

-- to the health of Prime Minister and Mrs. Lotfy;

-- to a continued close partnership between the United States and Egypt;

-- and to the friendship between the Egyptian and American peoples.

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Drafted:NEA/EGY:JJN *gh*ris
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Cleared:NEA:RSuddarth
NEA/EGY:DJDunford
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S/P:AMiller
NEA/P:MAustrian
PA:PMartinez

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DRAFT STATEMENT
THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE
CAIRO, EGYPT
AUGUST 5, 1986

THEMES: -- The U.S. and Egypt have a special relationship based on mutual respect and common interests.
-- The U.S. is committed to the search for peace and economic development in the region.

I've had a good round of discussions with President Mubarak, Prime Minister Lotfy, and other members of the cabinet. As usual, our talks were marked by the candor and good will that characterize the special relationship shared by our two countries.

We discussed the current state of the Middle East peace process and exchanged views on what should be done to move it forward. While we may differ on some points, the U.S. and Egypt agree that a just and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict can only be achieved through direct negotiations.

We also discussed the current economic situation in Egypt with an emphasis on ways the U.S. can assist Egypt in its efforts to overcome its economic problems and put its economy on a path of sustained growth.

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Before taking your questions, I want to express my sincere appreciation for the warm hospitality our Egyptian hosts have shown us since we arrived. In accordance with that grand Arab tradition, everyone we have met has gone out of his way to make us feel at home in Luxor, in the Sinai and in Cairo. This visit was also special because of the brief opportunity we had to tour the temples and tombs in Luxor. I only wish I had been able to spend more time viewing these ancient wonders. There is no question in my mind that Egypt welcomes foreign visitors warmly and openly, and I would encourage others to visit as I have done.

I am ready for your questions.

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Draft Press Conference Statement

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO EGYPT
THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY RECEPTION
AUGUST 5, 1986

THEME: -- The official American community in Cairo is working under difficult circumstances and can take pride in their accomplishments.

Ladies and gentlemen of the official American community in Cairo:

Nothing can better illustrate the weighty importance of U.S.- Egyptian relations than the size of this gathering. Thirteen years ago, we did not have diplomatic relations with the Arab Republic of Egypt. Today, our relationship with Egypt is one of our most important relationships throughout the world. I understand that some of the Egyptian employees in this audience have loyally served the U.S. government both through the difficult years between 1967 and 1974 and through the good years of the relationship since 1974. I want to express to you, on behalf of the American people, our warm appreciation for a job well done.

Having visited Jordan and Israel - and now Egypt - I am struck by the genuine desire of all three peoples for peace.

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It is true that the promising efforts of last year to broaden the peace process have not yet borne fruit. Extremists and terrorists are still active in the region. Economic problems have accelerated. Considering these points, it is easy to become discouraged but I want to stress that it is wrong to do so. Through your superior efforts, we are demonstrating that peace works. U.S. economic assistance has improved the lives of the Egyptian people. U.S. military assistance has helped Egypt to become a force for stability in this volatile region. However, we are far from done and it is certainly no time to rest on our accomplishments. There is much to do to realize the full promise of Camp David. But we have accomplished a great deal and we can break through the remaining obstacles.

This setting also underscores the personal challenges each of you face. The Embassy buildings are much the same as they were when the U.S. maintained only an interest section Cairo. A new modern Embassy building is under construction behind me but, in the meantime, many of you have to work on a construction site. While Cairo is a remarkably safe city, I know that the terrorism and violence in the region has

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imposed stressful conditions on all of you who work and live here. You should know that your commitment to this service and your efforts to bring peace, stability and prosperity to this part of the world are genuinely recognized and deeply appreciated by the President and I.

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STATEMENT: V.P. TO AMERICAN COMMUNITY, CAIRO

draft:DJJDunford⁰³⁹
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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
 TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)
 SUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMENT OF VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP

1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.

2. WHITE HOUSE INTENDS TO MAKE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT
 WEDNESDAY, JULY 16 AT 12 NOON EDT.

QUOTE: VICE PRESIDENT BUSH WILL TRAVEL TO ISRAEL, JORDAN
 AND EGYPT FROM JULY 25 TO AUGUST 5, 1986. THE VISIT WILL
 DEMONSTRATE THE UNITED STATES' COMMITMENT TO FURTHERING

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PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH
 PARTNERSHIPS WITH THESE THREE COUNTRIES.

THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL MEET WITH PRIME MINISTER PERES,
 KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK, AS WELL AS OTHER
 SENIOR LEADERS. BILATERAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
 TOPICS WILL BE DISCUSSED. END QUOTE.

2. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE ADVISE HOST GOVERNMENT THAT
 ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE NOON EDT JULY 16. PLEASE

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CONVEY OUR REGRETS TO HOST GOVERNMENT THAT WE DID NOT
OBTAIN PRIOR CONSENT TO ANNOUNCEMENT AND ITS TIMING.
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TAGS: SOPN, OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF WEEKLY MAGAZINES
NO. 5

1. TIME MAGAZINE, FEBRUARY 1, 1982, "KEEPING THE LINES OPEN
A MEETING IN GENEVA, DESPITE TENSION AND CRITICISM"
WHEN SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG AND SOVIET FOREIGN
MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO LAST MET, RECALLS ONE SENIOR
AMERICAN OFFICIAL, "THERE WAS NO NAME CALLING, AND NOT A
LOT OF RHETORIC." BUT THAT WAS IN SEPTEMBER, AND THERE
WAS ALSO NO CRACKDOWN IN POLAND. SINCE THEN, U.S.-SOVIET
TENSIONS HAVE ESCALATED INTO SANCTIONS. NONETHELESS,
TO THE RELIEF OF EUROPEAN ALLIES AND THE DISCONTENT OF
MANY AMERICAN CONSERVATIVES, HAIG AND GROMYKO WILL MEET
AGAIN THIS WEEK, IN GENEVA. "IT'S GOING TO BE A PRETTY
FROSTY ATMOSPHERE," SAYS A HAIG ASSISTANT. EVEN SO,
NOTES WILLIAM HYLAND, ONCE A POLICY AIDE TO FORMER SECRET-
ARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER, "THE MOST INTERESTING THING
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ABOUT THE MEETING IS THAT IT WILL TAKE PLACE."

THE DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH THE LONG SCHEDULED TALK, AT
A TIME WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS CHARACTERIZED THE

SITUATION IN POLAND AS "DETERIORATING," HAS HIGHLIGHTED SHARPLY CONTRADICTORY VIEWS ABOUT WHAT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD BE. THE WHITE HOUSE POSITION, AS PROPOUNDED BY HAIG, IS THAT "IN TIME OF CRISIS, COMMUNICATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS IS MORE, RATHER THAN LESS IMPORTANT." BUT CRITICS ARE ARGUING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT GRASP THE NEED TO BACK UP DENUNCIATIONS OF SOVIET PRESSURE ON POLAND WITH CLEAR, TELLING ACTIONS. IN THIS VIEW, THE VERY DECISION TO TALK GIVES THE SOVIETS A PROPAGANDA COUP. CONCEDES ON STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: "EVERYBODY IN POLAND WILL SEE HAIG AND GROMYKO SITTING DOWN TOGETHER. IT WILL LOOK LIKE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROVES MARTIAL LAW."

INDEED, THE SOVIETS ARE EAGER TO HAVE THE MEETING DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CRISIS OVER POLAND HAS PASSED. IN A CONCILIATORY SPEECH, PREMIER NIKOLAI TIKHONOV SAID LAST WEEK, "THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT SEEKING CONFRONTATION. WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING WE CAN TO DIRECT THE COURSE OF EVENTS INTO CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE." HAIG, MINDFUL OF APPEARING SOFT ON THE ISSUE OF POLISH REPRESSION, DE-EMPHASIZED THE TALKS BY SAYING HE WOULD ATTEND ONLY ONE DAY OF MEETINGS, NOT THE PLANNED TWO. HE ALSO TOLD AIDES THAT HE WOULD DEFLECT QUESTIONS OF A SUMMIT MEETING SOON BETWEEN REAGAN AND SOVIET PRESIDENT BREZHNEV AND WOULD RESIST EFFORTS BY GROMYKO TO BARGAIN TOWARD THE SOVIETS' KEY OBJECTIVE, A DATE FOR REOPENING GENERAL STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS (START). INSTEAD, SAID AN AIDE TO HAIG, THE SECRETARY WOULD DEAL

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ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY WITH "POLAND AND THE WHOLE RANGE OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES DETRIMENTAL TO OUR INTERESTS AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES."

THIS IS A REVERSION TO THE CONCEPT OF LINKAGE, THE IDEA THAT ALL THE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS ARE CONNECTED. INTOLERABLE SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN ONE AREA, BY THIS RECKONING, MUST AFFECT U.S. COOPERATION ELSEWHERE. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ADOPTED THIS POLICY A YEAR AGO, BUT SEEMED TO BE EDGING AWAY FROM IT. HAIG NOW PLANS TO BRING UP ITEMS LIKE THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND WARN THAT THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN POLAND WILL AFFECT START NEGOTIATIONS. SAID A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN: "THE SECRETARY HAS EMPHASIZED THAT THE CONTINUING REPRESSION OF THE POLISH PEOPLE, IN WHICH SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY IS CLEAR, OBVIOUSLY CONSTITUTES A MAJOR SETBACK FOR CONSTRUCTIVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS."

HAIG DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE MEETING IN PART BECAUSE

THE NATO ALLIES FAVOR A STEADY EAST-WEST DIALOGUE. WESTERN EUROPE IN PARTICULAR SEES THE ENCOUNTER AS HELPFUL TO THE GENEVA-BASED U.S.-SOVIET TALKS ON LIMITING MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE. U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THOSE TALKS ON INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES(INF) HAS BEEN THE ALLIES' QUID PRO QUO FOR ALLOWING THE INSTALLATION OF NEW U.S. MISSILES IN EUROPE.

HAIG HAS STRESSED THAT INF TALKS SHOULD NOT BE HALTED BY THE CRISIS OVER POLAND. SAID HE: "THESE INF TALKS MUST BE DEALT WITH OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF MORE NORMAL EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIPS, BECAUSE THERE ARE FUNDAMENTAL ADVANTAGES TO THE U.S. IN CONTINUATION." ONE ADVANTAGE IS ENTIRELY PRACTICAL: THE SOVIETS INSTALL AN ADDITIONAL SS-20 MISSILE EVERY FIVE DAYS, ACCORDING TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT; THE SOONER A LIMITATION PACT IS IN EFFECT, THE UNCLASSIFIED

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SMALLER WILL BE THE BALLISTIC THREAT LOOKING OVER EUROPE.

EVEN IF THE POLISH CRISIS HAD NOT ARISEN, HAIG MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN READY TO LAUNCH THE BROADER START TALKS WITH GROMYKO. ALTHOUGH TECHNICAL PREPARATIONS ARE FAIRLY FAR ALONG, TO U.S. OFFICIALS "JUST HAVEN'T TAKEN THE FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS" ON POLICY YET, SAYS ONE ARMS CONTROL SPECIALIST. THE BARGAINING PACKAGE WILL BE READY "BY EARLY SPRING," PROJECTS EUGENE ROSTOW, CHIEF OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY. BUT THAT DEADLINE COULD BE POSTPONED BECAUSE OF THE DIVERGENT VIEWS OF THE ARMS CONTROL AGENCY, THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE PENTAGON. AS ONE BELEAGUERED COMBATANT PUTS IT, "THE SOVIETS RANK ABOUT FIFTH ON OUR LIST OF ENEMIES."

THE ADMINISTRATION'S DELAY AND DISORDER IN FOREIGN POLICY HAVE BROUGHT MOUNTING CRITICISM. THE ATTACK LAST WEEK THAT ATTRACTED THE MOST PUBLIC NOTICE, AND CAUSED THE MOST CONSTERNATION AT THE WHITE HOUSE, CAME FROM HENRY KISSINGER HIMSELF, AN ARCHITECT OF DETENTE WHO HAS GROWN MORE MISTRUSTFUL OF THE SOVIETS AND HAWKISH TOWARD THEM SINCE LEAVING OFFICE. IN TWO ARTICLES FOR THE OP-ED PAGE OF THE NEW YORK TIMES, KISSINGER CHARGED THE ADMINISTRATION WITH FAILING TO LEAD THE WEST IN THE POLISH CRISIS AND WITH LACKING A CONHERENT APPROACH TO THE WORLD. THOUGH HE SAID, "I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION EMBODIES THE

BEST CHANCE FOR FREE PEOPLES," KISSINGER URGED PUBLIC DEBATE ON A GRAIN EMBARGO AGAINST THE SOVIETS AND A CREDIT FREEZE ON DEBT-RIDDEN POLAND. HE CALLED FOR A SUSPENSION OF ALL HIGH-LEVEL U.S. TALKS. INSTEAD OF SEEING A CLEAR, AND POTENTIALLY EFFECTIVE RESPONSE, LAMENTED KISSINGER.

"FREEDOM -LOVING POLES WHO LOOKED WEST SAW DITERING PRO-
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CRASTINATION, SOPHISTICATED JUSTIFICATION FOR IMPOTENCE, OR RHETORIC INCAPABLE OF RISING TO SERIOUS ACTION."

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS REFUSED TO COMMENT. BUT FORMER KISSINGER ASSOCIATES SPECULATED THAT IF HE WERE STILL IN OFFICE, HE WOULD HAVE BEEN AMONG THE FIRST TO WARN OF THE RISKS AND DIFFICULTIES OF REACTING SO FORCEFULLY. HAIG'S REACTION WAS VISCERAL. RATHER THAN TAKE KISSINGER'S CRITIQUE AS AN INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGE TO ADMINISTRATION POLICY, WHICH IT WAS, THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOLD AIDES THAT HE SAW IT AS A POWER GRAB -- A PLOY BY KISSINGER-TO GET HIS OLD JOB BACK. -- BY WILLIAM A. HENRY III. REPORTED BY GREGORY H. WIERZYNSKI/WASHINGTON. END.

2. NEWSWEEK - FEBRUARY 1, 1982 "PERISCOPE"
HEAD - "THE PRESIDENT'S TRAVEL PLANS"

PRESIDENTIAL AIDES SAY THAT RONALD REAGAN HAS DECIDED AGAINST A PROPOSED TOUR OF EUROPE THIS SPRING TO REASSURE THE NATO ALLIES ABOUT HIS COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL AND- TO HELP RELIEVE SOME OF THE TENSIONS IN THE ALLIANCE OVER THE POLISH CRISIS. REAGAN THINKS HE CAN ACCOMPLISH THE SAME RESULT BY EXPANDING HIS SCHEDULED TRIP TO FRANCE THIS SUMMER FOR AN ECONOMIC SUMMIT. HE WOULD VISIT OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND PERHAPS ATTEND A SUMMIT MEETING OF NATO HEADS OF STATE IN LUXEMBOURG. REAGAN'S AIDES ALSO REPORT THAT HE HAS DROPPED THE IDEA OF MAKING A "STATE OF THE WORLD" SPEECH ON FOREIGN POLICY LATER THIS YEAR. -

HEAD - "CUBA'S NEW SHIPMENT OF MIG'S"

WHEN SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG MEETS SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO IN GENEVA THIS WEEK, HAIG MAY - COMPLAIN ABOUT A RECENT SHIPMENT OF A DOZEN MIG-23 JET FIGHTERS TO CUBA. THE ISSUE HAS BEEN KEPT QUIET SO FAR, SOURCES SAY, BECAUSE HAIG AND OTHER U.S. OFFICIALS DIDN'T
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WANT TO DIVERT WORLD ATTENTION FROM THE POLISH CRISIS OR PROVOKE DEMANDS FROM CONSERVATIVE CRITICS THAT RONALD REAGAN DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP. MEANTIME, THE PENTAGON IS CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION TO FIND OUT HOW ITS INFORMATION ON THE MIG SHIPMENT LEAKED INTO PRINT. THE WASHINGTON POST BROKE THE STORY THAT U.S. INTELLIGENCE HAD SPOTTED THE SOVIET JETS WHILE THEY WERE STILL IN THEIR PACKING CRATES AT THE AIRFIELD -NEAR HAVANA.

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE - HEAD -"RECIPE FOR A STALEMATE"

IT WAS BELOW FREEZING IN WASHINGTON ALL LAST WEEK - BUT NO CHILLIER THAN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND MOSCOW. SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG CUT HIS MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN GENEVA THIS WEEK TO A SINGLE DAY OF TALKS. CONTRARY TO PAST HINTS, HAIG'S AIDES LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HE WOULD NOT SET A DATE FOR STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS, NOR WOULD HE AGREE TO A SUMMIT MEETING SOON BETWEEN RONALD REAGAN AND LEONID BREZHNEV. INSTEAD, HAIG INTENDED TO CONCENTRATE ON POLAND -- WARNING GROMYKO THAT UNLESS MARTIAL LAW EASES, U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE. BOTH MEN CAN BE BLUNT, AND THE ATMOSPHERE IN GENEVA, ONE U.S. OFFICIAL PREDICTED, WILL BE "VERY COLD AND ACRIMONIOUS."

THAT HAIG WAS KEEPING HIS APPOINTMENT IN GENEVA AT ALL REFLECTED THE ADMINISTRATION'S MEASURED -- AND INCREASINGLY CONTROVERSIAL -- RESPONSE TO THE POLISH CRISIS. IN THE SIX WEEKS SINCE MILITARY RULE BEGAN, REAGAN HAS LIMITED U.S. REPRISALS TO A FEW MOSTLY SYMBOLIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SANCTIONS AGAINST WARSAW AND MOSCOW. AT THE SAME TIME, HE HAS WARNED OF STIFFER STEPS TO COME,

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PATIENTLY COAXING THE ATLANTIC ALLIES TO HELP PUT TOGETHER A SET OF WESTERN SANCTIONS WITH TEETH. BUT THE PRESIDENT'S STEP-BY-STEP DIPLOMACY HAS DISMAYED A SIZABLE CHORUS OF HIS OWN CONSERVATIVE SUPPORTERS -- AND, IRONICALLY, EVEN A MAN HE ONCE SCORNE AS AN ARCHITECT OF DETENT: HENRY KISSINGER. IN A PAIR OF ESSAYS IN THE NEW YORK TIMES KISSINGER ROUNDLY CRITICIZED THE DELAY AND "EMPTYNESS" OF REAGAN'S RESPONSE, STRESSING THAT "DETENTE IS NOT APPEASE-

MENT." HE ADDED: "I BELIEVE IT WOULD HAVE ULTIMATELY SERVED THE CAUSE OF NEGOTIATIONS FAR BETTER HAD THE UNITED STATES, EARLY IN THE POLISH CRISIS, DECLARED A MORATORIUM ON HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION."

HAIG HAD CONSIDERED BUT DECIDED AGAINST CALLING OFF THIS WEEK'S GENEVA MEETING, HIS SECOND WITH GROMYKO AFTER A STAFF ENCOUNTER IN NEW YORK LAST FALL. THE ADMINISTRATION CONCLUDED THAT, MANO A MANO WITH HIS SOVIET COUNTER PART HAIG COULD MAKE THE U.S. CASE ON POLAND FORCEFULLY. WASHINGTON ALSO HESITATED TO GIVE EUROPEANS ANY REASON TO DOUBT THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL DIPLOMACY, AND THEREBY LOSE A POINT TO MOSCOW IN THE PROPAGANDA WAR FOR WEST EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION.

SETTING THE SOVIET TONE FOR GENEVA, THE KREMLIN PUBLISHED A GLOSSY, 79-PAGE BOOKLET ON U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH ARGUING -- IN COUNTERPOINT TO A RECENT PENTAGON PAMPHLET ON THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP -- THAT IT IS THE UNITED STATES THAT SEEKS A "WORLD DIKTATE." IN A MOSCOW SPEECH, PRIME MINISTER NIKOLAI TIKHONOV DECLARED THAT "THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT SEEKING CONFRONTATION WITH ANY WESTERN COUNTRY, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. AS IN THE PAST, WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING WE CAN TO DIRECT THE COURSE OF EVENTS INTO THE CHANNEL OF CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE."

'MAN OF PEACE': AS THE GUEST AT THE AMERICAN MISSION TO THE U.N. IN GENEVA GROMYKO WILL OPEN THE EXCHANGE WITH HAIG.
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U.S. OFFICIALS EXPECT THE SOVIET VETERAN TO ARRIVE WITH A WELL-REHEARSED MAN-OF-PEACE SCRIPT. GROMYKO PROBABLY WILL HOLD OUT THE PROMISE THAT IF THE SPUTTERING GENEVA TALKS ON EUROPE - AN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL MAKE PROGRESS, THE WAY IS OPEN FOR FURTHER BREAKTHROUGHS TOWARDS DISARMAMENT. HE ALSO MAY PRESS HAIG TO AGREE ON A DATE FOR RESUMING U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH HAVE LANGUISHED THROUGH REAGAN'S FIRST YEAR. A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR SUPERPOWER HARMONY, GROMYKO DOUBTLESS WILL ADD, IS THAT THE UNITED STATES RESPECT WHAT THE SOVIETS CALL "THE RESULTS OF WORLD WAR II" -- BY BACKING AWAY FROM AN EAST-WEST SHOW-DOWN OVER POLAND.

HAIG WILL TELL GROMYKO THAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO POSTPONE ANY NEW ROUND OF STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS -- ONCE PLANNED FOR AS EARLY AS MARCH -- UNTIL NEGOTIATIONS CAN TAKE PLACE IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL

TRUST AND CONFIDENCE. HAIG'S PLANNERS SETTLED ON THAT ULTIMATUM EARLY IN THE POLISH CRISIS. THE UNSPECIFIED U.S. TEST IS WHETHER THE SOVIETS SHOW MODERATION IN PLACES LIKE AFGHANISTAN, LATIN AMERICA -- AND ESPECIALLY POLAND.

HAIG AND OTHER ADMINISTRATION POLICY-MAKERS WERE STUNG BY DOMESTIC CRITICISM OF THEIR STRATEGY ON POLAND. MANY OF THE CRITICS DEMAND SIMPLY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WIELD ITS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEAPONS MORE FORCEFULLY ON BEHALF OF POLISH REFORM. IN THEIR OWN DEFENSE, REAGAN'S ADVISERS ARGUE THAT SUCH UNILATERAL SANCTIONS AS JIMMY CARTER'S GRAIN EMBARGO DID MORE TO UPSET AMERICAN AND ALLIED INTERESTS THAN TO HURT MOSCOW -- AND THAT ONLY A PROGRAM OF TRADE AND FINANCIAL SANTIONS AGREED TO BY THE ENTIRE WESTERN ALLIANCE CAN SWAY THE KREMLINE. "THE SO-

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CALLED HARD-LINERS ONLY WANT TO DO THINGS THAT MAKE THEM FEEL GOOD," SAYS ONE ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. "BUT THE RUSSIANS ONLY RESPOND TO PAIN."

THE SOVIETS HAVE BEGUN TO WINCE EVER SO SLIGHTLY. APPARENTLY DISMAYED THAT WESTERN RESOLVE ON POLAND SEEMS TO BE GROWING RATHER THAN DECLINING, THE KREMLIN HAS STEPPED UP ITS PROPAGANDA ATTACKS ON NATO. CONTRARY TO MOSCOW'S USUAL ATTEMPTS TO DIVIDE THE ALLIANCE, RECENT COMMENTARIES HAVE LUMPED THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE TOGETHER AS CONSPIRATORS WHO WERE EAGER TO "SHARE THE SPOILS" OF POLAND. IN REPLY, REAGAN THREATENED TO TURN THE SCREWS EVER TIGHTER ON MOSCOW. "WE'RE NOT GOING TO WAIT FOREVER FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE (POLISH) SITUATION," HE SAID. WITH THE HOPE OF A JANUARY THAW VANISHING, RELATIONS ARE LIKELY TO GET EVEN COLDER BEFORE WINTER IS OUT. BY STEVEN STRASSER WITH JOHN WALCOTT IN WASHINGTON AND ANDREW NAGORSKI IN MOSCOW. END.

HEAD: "HAIG REGAINS THE HELM"

ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT BECOME QUITE THE "VICAR" OF FOREIGN POLICY HE HAD HOPED TO BE, SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG IS CLEARLY IN CHARGE -- AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT. HIS TWIN NEMESSES AT THE WHITE HOUSE ARE OUT OF THE WAY: NATIONAL-SECURITY ADVISER RICHARD ALLEN HAS RESIGNED AND PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR EDWIN MEESE III NOW PLAYS A REDUCED ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. DURING THE LAST FEW MONTHS, U.S. FOREIGN

TRUST AND CONFIDENCE. HAIG'S PLANNERS SETTLED ON THAT ULTIMATUM EARLY IN THE POLISH CRISIS. THE UNSPECIFIED U.S. TEST IS WHETHER THE SOVIETS SHOW MODERATION IN PLACES LIKE AFGHANISTAN, LATIN AMERICA -- AND ESPECIALLY POLAND.

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CALLED HARD-LINERS ONLY WANT TO DO THINGS THAT MAKE THEM FEEL GOOD," SAYS ONE ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. "BUT THE RUSSIANS ONLY RESPOND TO PAIN."

THE SOVIETS HAVE BEGUN TO WINCE EVER SO SLIGHTLY. APPARENTLY DISMAYED THAT WESTERN RESOLVE ON POLAND SEEMS TO BE GROWING RATHER THAN DECLINING, THE KREMLIN HAS STEPPED UP ITS PROPAGANDA ATTACKS ON NATO. CONTRARY TO MOSCOW'S USUAL ATTEMPTS TO DIVIDE THE ALLIANCE, RECENT COMMENTARIES HAVE LUMPED THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE TOGETHER AS CONSPIRATORS WHO WERE EAGER TO "SHARE THE SPOILS" OF POLAND. IN REPLY, REAGAN THREATENED TO TURN THE SCREWS EVER TIGHTER ON MOSCOW. "WE'RE NOT GOING TO WAIT FOREVER FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE (POLISH) SITUATION," HE SAID. WITH THE HOPE OF A JANUARY THAW VANISHING, RELATIONS ARE LIKELY TO GET EVEN COLDER BEFORE WINTER IS OUT. BY STEVEN STRASSER WITH JOHN WALCOTT IN WASHINGTON AND ANDREW NAGORSKI IN MOSCOW. END.

HEAD: "HAIG REGAINS THE HELM"

ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT BECOME QUITE THE "VICAR" OF FOREIGN POLICY HE HAD HOPED TO BE, SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG IS CLEARLY IN CHARGE -- AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT. HIS TWIN NEMESSES AT THE WHITE HOUSE ARE OUT OF THE WAY: NATIONAL-SECURITY ADVISER RICHARD ALLEN HAS RESIGNED AND PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR EDWIN MEESE III NOW PLAYS A REDUCED ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. DURING THE LAST FEW MONTHS, U.S. FOREIGN

POLICY HAS TURNED FROM THE DOCTRINNAIRE CONSERVATISM THAT REAGAN PROMISED DURING HIS CAMPAIGN TO HAIG'S OWN BRAND OF CONSERVATIVE PRAGMATISM. WASHINGTON'S HANDLING OF THE POLISH CRISIS, THE REFUSAL TO SELL MORE SOPHISTICATED U.S. JET FIGHTERS TO TAIWAN AND THE CURRENT ATTEMPT TO REVIVE THE STALLED TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT ON PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY ALL BEAR HAIG'S FINGERPRINTS.

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ALLIES: AFTER A YEAR OF PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL FEUDING WITH ALLEN AND MEESE, HAIG NOW FACES A FRIENDLIER TEAM AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. HAIG'S FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, WILLIAM P. CLARK, HAS REPLACED ALLEN. LAST WEEK CLARK NAMED AS HIS SECOND IN COMMAND FORMER STATE DEPARTMENT COUNSELOR ROBERT MCFARLANE, ONE OF HAIG'S CLOSEST ADVISERS. HAIG HAS ALSO SURROUNDED HIMSELF WITH HIS OWN PEOPLE AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT -- A MARKED CHANGE FROM A YEAR AGO WHEN NORTH CAROLINA SEN. JESSE HELMS AND OTHER HAWKS FOUGHT HAIG APPOINTMENTS, OFTEN WITH THE SUPPORT OF WHITE HOUSE POLITICAL ADVISER LYNN OFZIGER,

WHO HAS ALSO LEFT THE ADMINISTRATION. CAREER DIPLOMAT WALTER STOESSEL, CLARK'S REPLACEMENT AT STATE, AND THE NEW NO. 3 AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER ARE BOTH HAIG ALLIES. EAGLEBURGER IS EXPECTED TO PLAY A BROAD ROLE IN FORMULATING U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, WESTERN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

HAIG'S AGGRESSIVE IMAGE, THE SOURCE OF SO MUCH TROUBLE A YEAR AGO, SEEMS TO BE CHANGING. AT A WASHINGTON FOOTBALL-AWARDS DINNER THIS MONTH, REAGAN JOKED THAT HAIG WAS A QUARTERBACK WHO CALLED ONLY PLAYS "IN WHICH HE CARRIED THE BALL HIMSELF." HAIG REPLIED THAT IT WAS ON THE FOOTBALL FIELD THAT HE HAD "LEARNED THE TEAMWORK THAT HAS SERVED ME SO WELL WITH YOU." HAIG'S NEW SENSE OF HUMOR HAS ALSO HELPED HIM THROUGH A TIGHT SPOT OR TWO ON THE ROAD. DURING A RECENT NEWS CONFERENCE IN TEL AVIV A CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALIST ASKED HIM IF GOD HAD GIVEN ISRAEL TO THE JEWISH NATION AND TO NO ONE ELSE. "GOD BLESS YOU," HAIG REPLIED, TO AN OUTBURST OF LAUGHTER FROM JOURNALISTS.

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TESTS: DESPITE HAIG'S COMEBACK, HE AND HIS TEAM FACE STIFF TESTS AHEAD. HAIG MUST STILL FILL FOUR KEY STATE DEPARTMENT POSTS; CONSERVATIVES, ANGERED BY THE PROMOTIONS OF STOESSEL AND EAGLEBURGER, WANT THE PRESIDENT TO FILL THEIR VACANT SLOTS WITH LOYAL REAGANITES. THE REPUBLICAN RIGHT HAS LAUNCHED AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST SOME REAGAN POLICIES INCLUDING SOME OF HAIG'S. THEY HAVE DENOUNCED THE DECISION NOT TO SELL ADVANCED PLANES TO TAIPEI; THEY HAVE CALLED FOR TOUGHER ACTION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION; THEY HAVE ACCUSED HAIG OF KEEPING HIS APPOINTMENT WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO IN GENEVA MERELY TO APPEASE TIMID WEST EUROPEANS. SOME OF THOSE CRITICISMS ARE SHARED PRIVATELY BY SEVERAL KEY STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING U.N. AMBASSADOR JEANE KIRKPATRICK AND UNDER SECRETARY JAMES BUCKELY. HAIG IS ALSO GAMBLING IN HIS BID TO RESTART THE PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY TALKS; IF HE FAILS, DEFENSE SECRETARY CASPAR WEINBERGER AND OTHER CRITICS MAY CHARGE THAT HE PUT TOO LITTLE PRESSURE ON ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN.

IF HAIG'S EFFORTS DON'T PAY OFF, ONE INTRIGUING QUESTION IS WHAT CLARK WILL DO NEXT. THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER ENJOYS STRONG TIES TO THE PRESIDENT AND WON'T HESITATE TO ASSERT HIMSELF IF HE THINKS HAIG'S FOREIGN POLICY IS DAMAGING REAGAN POLITICALLY. IN AN APPARENT BOW TO REAGAN'S RIGHT-WING ALLIES, CLARK HAS NAMED THREE NOTABLE HARD-LINERS -- COLUMNIST WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR., CLARE BOOTHE LUCE AND FORMER AIR FORCE SECRETARY THOMAS REED -- TO HELP HIM UPGRADE THE NSC STAFF, PROBABLY TO INCLUDE THREE POWERFUL SENIOR AIDES. THE RETOOLED NSC SHOP COULD SERVE AS A FAR MORE FORMIDABLE COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAN RICHARD ALLEN'S LOW-KEY OPERATION FOR ALL HIS RECENT SUCCESSES, THAT COULD HURT HAIG WHERE HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN WEAKEST -- ON THE POLITICAL FRONT AT HOME.

BY JOHN WALCOTT. END.

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(3) U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, "TAKING ON AN UNRULY WORLD"

SUBHEADLINE: "RUSSIA, TAIWAN, CUBA, MIDEAST -- THE PRESIDENT IS ALTERING COURSE ACROSS THE BOARD AS COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS CLOSE IN. AMERICA'S ALLIES WELCOME THE CHANGE A LOT MORE THAN REAGAN'S 'NEW RIGHT' BACKERS"

"UP AGAINST THE HARSH REALITIES OF A TROUBLESOME WORLD, RONALD REAGAN IS BEING DRIVEN TO ALTER DRASTICALLY MANY OF THE PREMISES HE CARRIED TO THE WHITE HOUSE A YEAR AGO.

TO THE DISMAY OF HIS STANUCHEST CONSERVATIVE SUPPORTERS, THE PRESIDENT HAS MODIFIED WHAT WAS WIDELY SEEN AS AN ESSENTIALLY IDEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO A HOST OF CRITICAL FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES INVOLVING RUSSIA, CHINA, THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE MIDEAST.

THE PRESIDENT CONTINUES TO STAND FIRM ON THE ADMTNISTRATION'S TWO BASIC OBJECTIVES--REARMING AMERICA AND MEETING MORE VIGOROUSLY THE CHALLENGE OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. BUT AT THE START OF HIS SECOND YEAR IN THE WHITE HOUSE, HE FINDS HIMSELF MOVING BROADLY IN THE DIRECTION THAT AMERICAN PRESIDENTS HAVE PURSUED INTERNATIONALLY FOR A QUARTER OF A CENTURY OR MORE. THUS --

--STIFF ANTI-SOVIET RHETORIC THAT STIRRED WIDESPREAD CONCERN ABOUT A RETURN TO THE COLD WAR LAST YEAR NOW IS MUTED IN FAVOR OF ARMS-CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND SUMMITRY WITH THE RUSSIANS.

--PRESERVING UNITY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS GIVEN PRIORITY.
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TY IN THE POLISH CRISIS OVER DEMANDS FOR FULL-SCALE SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA AND THE MILITARY REGIME IN WARSAW THAT AMERICA'S PARTNERS ARE RELUCTANT TO IMPOSE.

--WASHINGTON'S DRIVE FOR A "STRATEGIC CONSENSUS" IN THE MIDEAST, ONCE A TOP PRIORITY, IS BEING SUBORDINATED TO THE SEARCH FOR AN ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE SETTLEMENT.

--THREATS OF MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST CUBA TO NEUTRALIZE FIDEL CASTRO'S SUPPORT FOR MARXIST GUERRILLAS IN CENTRAL AMERICA ARE GIVING WAY TO GREATER EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES TO MEET THE DANGER.

--CLOSER STRATEGIC COOPERATION WITH CHINA, VIEWED INITIALLY WITH SUSPICION BY MANY CLOSE TO REAGAN, IS GETTING PREFERENCE OVER CAMPAIGN PROMISES TO UPGRADE RELATIONS WITH

TAIWAN.

BEHIND THESE WIDE-RANGING SHIFTS IN ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN

POLICY IS THE DISCOVERY THAT GLOBAL REALITIES OFTEN DO NOT CORRESPOND TO THE VIEWS VOICED BY REAGAN IN THE 1980 CAMPAIGN. MANY OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE'S ORIGINAL INITIATIVES OVERSEAS BOOMERANGED--ALARMING U.S. ALLIES, FUELING A PEACE MOVEMENT IN EUROPE TO THE DELIGHT OF RUSSIA, IMPOSING SEVERE STRAINS ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA, ALIENATING BLACK AFRICA AND MUCH OF THE REST OF THE THIRD WORLD AND ALLOWING THE DANGEROUS PALESTINIAN PROBLEM TO FESTER.

BEYOND THAT, WHAT HAS BEEN BROUGHT HOME TO REAGAN IS THAT AMERICA'S ABILITY TO INFLUENCE INTRACTABLE ALLIES AND ADVERSARIES IS LIMITED, WHETHER IN RESPONDING TO THE ANNEXATION OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS BY ISRAEL'S MENACHEM BEGIN OR THE ARMY CRACKDOWN IN POLAND INSTIGATED BY RUSSIA'S LEONID BREZHNEV. MILITARY POWER, THE PRESIDENT HAS DISCOVERED, IS OF LIMITED UTILITY--EVEN AGAINST INTERNATIONAL PYGMIES

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SUCH AS CUBA'S FIDEL CASTRO OR LIBYA'S MUAMMAR QADHAFI.

THE RESULT HAS BEEN AN INCREASING TENDENCY BY REAGAN, IN DEALING WITH TESTS OVERSEAS, TO OVERRULE HASKISH ELEMENTS IN HIS ADMINISTRATION IN FAVOR OF THE MORE PRAGMATIC LINE USUALLY, BUT NOT ALWAYS, ESPOUSED BY ALEXANDER HAIG'S STATE DEPARTMENT. A CONSPICUOUS EXAMPLE: THE ADMINISTRATION'S MEASURED RESPONSE TO MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND, WHICH A RIGHT-WING LEADER--RICHARD VIGUERIE--DENOUNCES AS REAGAN'S BEING SOFT ON THE SOVIETS.

IT IS NOT ONLY THE SUBSTANCE OF FOREIGN POLICY BUT ALSO ITS MANAGEMENT THAT REAGAN IS ALTERING. HE IS EMBRACING A PLAN THAT HE ORIGINALLY SPURNED BY RECASTING IN JANUARY THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL-SECURITY ADVISER INTO ONE OF THE MOST-POWERFUL IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND NAMING THE JOB TO A CLOSE CONFIDENT, WILLIAM CLARK, TO REPLACE RICHARD ALLEN. CRITICIZED AS AN INEFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATOR WITH A STRONG IDEOLOGICAL BIAS, ALLEN HAD SO LITTLE STATUS THAT HE WAS REQUIRED TO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT THROUGH WHITE HOUSE COUNSELOR EDWIN MEESE III, WHO IS WITHOUT EXPERIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

WITH THE REORGANIZATION, THE PRESIDENT IS ATTEMPTING TO ELIMINATE THE HIGH-LEVEL ARGUMENTS TURF BATTLES INVOLVING HAIG AND WEINBERGER, AS WELL AS ALLEN. THE FEUDING, WHICH REAGAN PROMISED WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED IN HIS ADMINISTRATION

GAVE RISE TO CONFUSION OVER WHO, IF ANYONE, WAS IN CHARGE

OF FOREIGN POLICY. IN THE NEW SETUP, HAIG APPEARS TO BE EMERGING WITH GREATLY ENHANCED AUTHORITY.

STAUNCH CONSERVATIVES DEPLORE THE CHANGES. THEY SEE THE UNCLASSIFIED

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ELIMINATION OF ALLEN AND TH- PROMOTION OF PROFESSIONAL FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS TO TOP STATE DEPARTMENT POSTS AS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT DIPLOMATIC CAREERISTS ARE GAINING CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION.

WHATEVER THE MISGIVINGS OF THE PRESIDENT'S RIGHT-WING SUPPORTERS, A SURVEY BY THE MAGAZINE'S BUREAUS ABROAD INDICATES THAT THE CURRENT DIRECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY IS ENDORSED BY U.S. ALLIES. REFLECTING A WIDELY SHARED VIEW IN EUROPE. THE MAGAZINE'S LONDON BUREAU REPORTS: "TO THE BRITISH, REAGAN IS MOVING FROM RHETORIC AND IDEOLOGY IN HIS FIRST YEAR TO GREATER DIPLOMACY AND REALISM IN HIS SECOND."

THE ADMINISTRATION'S HANDLING OF FOUR OF THE MOST CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL ISSUES POINTS UP HOW FAR IT HAS MODIFIED ITS ORIGINAL PREMISES IN AN EFFORT TO FIND AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH A WORLD CROWDED WITH INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS AND DEFIANT NATIONS--ALLIES NO LESS THAN ADVERSARIES.

A NEW LINE TOWARD RUSSIA

REAGAN'S HARD-LINE STRATEGY FOR HANDLING RUSSIA HAS BEEN TEMPERED BY TWO EVENTS--THE SPECTACULAR RISE OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE MILITARY CRACKDOWN IN POLAND.

IN ITS INITIAL APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW, THE ADMINISTRATION STRESSED THAT ARMS-CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT A SIGNIFICANT U.S. MILITARY BUILDUP AND THAT A REAGAN-BREZHNEV SUMMIT WOULD DEPEND ON EVIDENCE OF SOVIET GOOD BEHAVIOR INTERNATIONALLY--IN AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND PARTICULARLY.

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AT THE SAME TIME, KEY MEMBERS OF THE REAGAN FOREIGN-POLICY TEAM INDULGED IN WHAT SOME CRITICS, ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE, BRANDED AS UNNECESSARILY STRIDENT, ANTI-SOVIET RHETORIC-- FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESIDENT'S ASSERTAION THAT SOVIET LEADERS "RESERVE UNTO THEMSELVES THE RIGHT TO COMMIT ANY CRIME, TO LIE, TO CHEAT" TO ATTAIN THETR GOAL OF WORLD DOMINATION. ALSO, THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF TALK BY THE PRESIDENT, HAIG AND WEINBERGER ABOUT LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR IN EUROPE-- A SENSITIVE SUBJECT THAT PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS HAD ASSIDUOUSLY AVOIDED.

A TOP ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL INSISTS THATALL THIS WAS NECESSARY TO SEND A CLEAR SIGNAL TO RUSSIA OF A DEFINITE CHANGE IN WASHINGTON. HIS WORDS: "AS WE EVOLVED AN EAST-WEST STRATEGY, WE NEEDED IN THE EARLY STAGES TO CLARIFY OUR POSITIONS. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW THAT CONFUSION IS THE GREATEST THREAT TO WORLD PEACE. WE SET OUT TO STRIP AWAY THE AMBIGUITIES. WE WANTED TO MAKE SURE TAHT THE SOIVETS UNDERSTOOD WHERE WE STAND."

WHAT ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DISCOVERED WAS THAT THEY WERE FRIGHTENINGAMERICA'S ALLIES MORE THAN THE RUSSIANS AND FUELING THE EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENT THAT THREATENED TO UNDERMINE NATO'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY.

THE CHANGE IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSTURE TOWARD RUSSIA WAS SIGNALLED DRAMATICALLY BY REAGAN'S NOVEMBER 18 STATEMENT PROPOSING A "ZERO OPTION" AGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS TO LIMIT MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE AND ALSO CALLING FOR OTHER ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH RUSSIA. WITH THAT MOVE, HE SEEMED TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE FROM MOSCOW IN A FATEFUL STRUGGLE FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN OPINION THAT THE U.S. HAD BEEN LOSING BY DEFAULT.

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SUBSEQUENTLY, THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED WHAT WAS SEEN AS A REVERSAL OF HIS POLICY ON SUMMITRY. HE DECLARED HIS TINTEREST IN A SUMMIT MEETING WITH SOVIET PRESIDENT BREZHNEV WITHOUT LINKING IT TO SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN AFGHANISTAN, POLAND OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL CRISIS SPOTS AS IN THE PAST.

WASHINGTON'S REACTION TO THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND UNDERSCORES HOW FAR THE ADMINISTRATION IS PLAYING DOWN ITS ORIGINAL POLICY OF "LINKAGE" AND EMPHASIZING WHAT COULD BE CALLED A "NATO FIRST" APPROACH. DESPITE HIS IN-

DICTMENT OF MOSCOW FOR COMPLICITY IN THE ARMY CRACKDOWN IN POLAND, REAGAN IS RESISTING PRESSURE FROM SOME SUPPORTERS TO BREAK OFF ARMS TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS, DROP ANY NOTION OF A SUMMIT AND EMBARGO ALL TRADE WITH RUSSIA. HAIG DID INFORM THE SOVIETS THAT HE WAS UNPREPARED TO DISCUSS A DATE FOR BEGINNING STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS AT A LATE JANUARY MEETING. IN GENEVA WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO. THIS WAS SEEN AS A REACTION TO SHARP CRITICISM BY FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER AND THE NEW RIGHT, BUT NOT AS A NEW DECISION TO SPURN ARMS NEGOTIATIONS.

ADJUSTING MIDEAST PRIORITIES

HAIG'S LATEST MIDEAST TRIP--HIS SECOND IN TWO WEEKS--POINTS UP THE SWITCH IN ADMINISTRATION PRIORITIES IN THAT VOLATILE REGION. ORIGINALLY THE EMPHASIS WAS ON BUILDING AN ANTI-SOVIET "STRATEGIC CONSENSUS" EMBRACING MODERATE ARAB STATES AS WELL AS ISRAEL. WITH THE SEARCH FOR AN AGREEMENT ON THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM PUSHED TO THE BACK BURNER.

THE THEORY WAS THAT A GREATER SENSE OF SECURITY IN THE AREA WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR ISRAEL AND THE ARABS TO COME TO TERMS. EVENTS HAVE DEFLATED THAT ASSUMPTION. IN THE WORDS OF A FORMER HIGH-LEVEL STATE DEPARTMENT SPECIALIST

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"HAIG TRIED TO CONVINCING THE ARABS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE THE MAIN PROBLEM, BUT IT DIDN'T WORK. THE PEOPLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST MADE IT CLEAR THEY WOULDN'T BUY IT."

SAUDI ARABIA, CAST FOR A KEY ROLE IN REAGAN'S REGIONAL DEFENSE PLAN, STILL OPPOSES AN AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA, WHILE THE ASSASSINATION OF EGYPT'S PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT HAS RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THAT COUNTRY IN THE FUTURE.

AS FOR ISRAEL, EVEN THOUGH WASHINGTON SIGNED A STRATEGIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH THE JERUSALEM GOVERNMENT, PRIME MINISTER BEGIN WAS NOT DETERRED FROM DEFYING THE U.S. BY ANNEXING THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THE UPSHOT WAS SUSPENSION OF THE ACCORD, A BITTER BEGIN ATTACK ON THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND A MAJOR CRISIS IN U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS.

SAYS AMOS JORDAN, VICE CHAIRMAN OF GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY'S CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN WASHINGTON: "BOTH HAIG AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE VIEWED THE

MIDDLE EAST IN TERMS OF U.S.-SOVIET CONFRONTATION-AND NOT IN TERMS OF INTERNAL DYNAMICS. BOTH ARE IN THE PROCESS OF LEARNING."

AS A RESULT OF THE LEARNING PROCESS, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS REVERSED ITS MIDDLE EAST PRIORITIES. HAIG, IN HIS TRAVE S TO THE AREA, NOW IS CONCENTRATING ON AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE A BREAKTHROUGH IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND- -- EGYPT, WHILE SOFT-PEDALING THE QUESTION OF AN ANTI-SOVIET DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT.

DOWNGRADING TAIWAN

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IF THERE WAS ONE INTERNATIONAL ISSUE ON WHICH CANDIDATE RONALD REAGAN HELD PASSIONATE PERSONAL VIEWS DATING BACK MANY YEARS, IT WAS ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.

WHEN HE MOVED TO THE WHITE HOUSE, HE ASSUMED THAT HE COULD UPGRADE AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY TIES WITH THE TAIPEI GOVERNMENT AND AT THE SAME TIME REINFORCE STRATEGIC COOPERATION WITH CHINA. BUT IN ITS FIRST MAJOR TEST, THAT POLICY PROVED UNWORKABLE. THE ISSUE: TAIWAN'S REQUEST FOR AN ADVANCED FX WARPLANE TO AUGMENT ITS FORCE OF F-5E PLANES.

CHINESE LEADERS SERVED NOTICE THAT SUCH ARMS DELIVERIES TO AN ISLAND THAT THEY CLAIM AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THEIR COUNTRY WOULD JEOPARDIZE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AFTER MONTHS OF TOUGH BEHIND-THE-SCENES DEBATE IN THE ADMINISTRATION, THE PRESIDENT IN EARLY JANUARY DECIDED TO REJECT TAIWAN'S REQUEST FOR MORE-SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT BUT ALLOW FURTHER DELIVERY OF THE F-5E'S THAT ARE PRODUCED ON THE ISLAND. HE ACTED ON THE UNANIMOUS ADVICE OF HAIG, WEINBERGER AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTOR WM CASEY THAT, CONTRARY TO THE CLAIMS OF TAIWAN LEADERS, THE ISLAND DOES NOT FACE A THREAT THAT REQUIRES MORE ADVANCED AIRCRAFT.

THE DECISION REFLECTED AN ADMINISTRATION JUDGMENT THAT FOR COMPELLING STRATEGIC REASONS. RELATIONS WITH CHINA SHOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER LINKS WITH TAIPEI. UPWARD OF 50 SOVIET DIVISIONS ARE BEING TIED DOWN IN THE FAR EAST BY THE FACE-OFF WITH CHINA. FURTHERMORE, PEKING DIVERTS OTHER RUSSIAN FORCES BY SUPPORTING GUERRILLAS IN AFGHANISTAN AND CONTRIBUTES TO STABILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA BY DETERRING VIETNAM FROM CONTEMPLATING ADVENTURES BEYOND

CAMBODIA. CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICANS REJECT THIS RATIONALE, ACCUSING THE ADMINISTRATION OF KOWTOWING TO PEKING. EVEN SO, CHINESE LEADERS ARE NOT HAPPY.

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THE MAGAZINE'S PEKING BUREAU REPORTS: "THE CURRENT PATTERN OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN, WITH NO INCREASE IN THE SOPHISTIC-ATION OF WEAPONS SUPPLIED, PROBABLY WILL AVIOD A DOWN-GRADING OF OFFICIAL U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS. BUT IT WILL SET BACK FOR AN INDEFINITE PERTOD THE SURPRISING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO OLD ENEMIES THAT WAS EXPANDING SO RAPIDLY LAST -YEAR. REAGAN'S WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE SELLING TAIPEI ANY MILITARY AIRCRAFT MAKES THE CHINESE WONDER WHETHER HE EVER ACTUALLY ABANDONED HIS PRO-TAIWAN 'TWO CHINA' VIEW."

STOPPING CASTRO WITHOUT GUNBOATS

MORE THAN ANYWHERE ELSE, IN CENTRAL AMERICA THE ADMIN-ISTRATION IS CONFRONTED WITH THE LIMITS ON THE UTILITY OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER.

HAIG AND OTHERS, FROM THE OUTSET, HAVE TALKED REPEATEDLY OF POSSIBLE ARMED ACTION TO CUT OFF THE FLOW OF WEAPONS FROM CASTRO'S CUBA TO MARXIST GUERRILLAS ATTEMPTING TO SEIZE POWER IN EL SALVADOR AND ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SET THE TONE WITH AN EARLY THREAT THAT THE U.S. WOULD "GO TO THE SOURCE" IF EXTERNAL ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE INSURGENTS CONTINUED.

HIGH-RANKING ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS CONCEDE THAT THEY ARE ENGAGED IN A GAME OF BRINKSMANSHIP WITH CASTRO. AS ONE PUT IT: "IT IS TRUE THAT WE ARE DEALING IN CALCULATED AM-BIGUITIES WITH OUR THREATS TO CASTRO, BUT SINCE WHEN DO YOU TELL YOUR ENEMY WHAT YOU WILL AND WILL NOT DO?"

THE FACT IS THAT CUBA HAS CONTINUED ITS ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL AMERICAN GUERRILLAS AND THE ADMINISTRATION HAS
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REFRAINED FROM RESPONDING WITH MILITARY ACTION.

WEINBERGER'S PENTAGON REPORTEDLY IS TAKING A STRONG STAND AGAINST THE USE OF AMERICAN ARMED FORCES TO TRY TO NEUTRALIZE CASTRO ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT PROBABLY WOULDN'T WORK AND IT WOULD BE WIDELY OPPOSED IN THE U.S.

ALSO, HAIG HAS FOUND ONLY MINIMAL SUPPORT AMONG LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION. IN FACT, MEXICO, WHICH REAGAN VIEWS AS AN ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT ALLY STRESSES ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH CASTRO AND OPPOSES AND AMERICAN NAVAL BLOCKADE OR ANY OTHER FORM OF ARMED ACTION TO NEUTRALIZE CUBAN SUPPORT FOR MARXIST GUERRILLAS IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

THE DANGER, WARNS ONE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERT, IS THAT CASTRO WILL CALL WASHINGTON'S BLUFF. TO QUOTE PROF. LUIS E. AGUILAR OF GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY IN WASHINGTON: "IT'S LIKE A WESTERN MOVIE: YOU'D BETTER BE WILLING TO DRAW YOUR GUN OR THEY WILL MAKE YOU EAT IT."

DESPITE THE THREATENING POSTURE, THE FOCUS OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY IS SHIFTING AWAY FROM MILITARY OPTIONS TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES DESIGNED TO REINFORCE CENTRAL AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS UNDER ATTACK BY LEFTIST REBELS.

WASHINGTON IS COUNTING HEAVILY ON ELECTIONS TO BE HELD IN EL SALVADOR IN MARCH AND A CARIBBEAN BASIN DEVELOPMENT PLAN TO HELP TURN THE TIDE AGAINST THE ARMED REVOLUTIONARIES. BUT ADMINISTRATION POLICYMAKERS CONCEDE THAT THEY ARE WORKING AGAINST HEAVY ODDS.

THUS, REAGAN COULD FIND HIMSELF IN A NO-WIN SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA, INHIBITED FROM USING THE MILITARY POWER OF THE UNITED STATES AND UNABLE TO DEVISE AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL ANTIDOTE TO THE THREAT POSED BY MARXIST RE-

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OLUTIONARIES.

FOR THE PRESIDENT, ALL OF THIS UNDERSCORES A CLEAR LESSON: ANY AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION, SOONER OR LATER, MUST RECOGNIZE THAT IN THE COMPLEX REAL WORLD THERE ARE FEW SIMPLE PROBLEMS AND NO SIMPLE SOLUTIONS."

STOESSEL

MONDAY, JUNE 28, 1993

Internet Creates a Computer Culture of Remote Intimacy

By John Burgess
Washington Post Staff Writer

It may be the world's most eclectic community: scientists and comic book fans, hunters and gun-control activists, prudes and pornographers, kindergartners and septuagenarians, computer hackers and their trackers, rock-and-rollers and classical musicians, Serbs and Croats.

It is perhaps 15 million strong and growing fast—Bill Clinton and Al Gore joined this month.

Members almost never meet face to face. Scattered all over the world, they are bound together by a computer communications system known as the Internet. Ham radio operators use the airwaves; this new global tribe uses satellites, fiber-optic cables and desktop computers to trade a rich and varied flood of information. Much of it is being sold.

Much of it is brief "electronic mail" messages typed on computer keyboards. But increasingly the network is shuttling video footage, photos, government studies, novels, dissertations, music, sounds—information of all kinds in the digital form that computers understand.

"The size of the planet is no boundary to communications," writes Jeff Ashurst, a resident of Britain responding by E-mail to a Washingtonian's electronic query.

Along the way, the Internet has evolved into a remarkable culture of remote intimacy, in which people convey love and contempt, excitement and boredom without ever laying eyes on each other.

They rail at each other in electronic "forums" on subjects that run from genetic research to European elections. They jump to the aid of fel-

See INTERNET, A8, COL 1

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority for _____
 PA Exemptions _____ () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec. _____
 () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

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DECLASSIFY ON: DATE BY

() RELEASE DATE BY

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low network navigators who have a real problem, such as how to combat disease in Africa, or just need to know something—a good hotel to stay at in the Thai city of Chiangmai, for instance.

Occasionally, they meet in the flesh and marry.

Laszlo and Andrea Kiss, for instance. They "met" on an Internet forum devoted to their home country, Hungary. From Japan, where he was conducting physics research, he transmitted to the forum a satirical essay on feminism; she, reading it from Purdue University, where she was working on a doctorate, responded with comments of her own.

As Internet users often do, they then began exchanging electronic mail privately. Soon they discovered that they shared a deeply religious bent. They began courting—sometimes 10 messages a day flew across the Pacific.

After exchanging photographs and \$3,000 worth of phone calls, they decided to get married. "Everybody told me that we were mad," Laszlo recalled. "... Without the Internet, it would not have happened." They now live in Sweden with their 5-month-old son and remain on "the net."

Today the network is open to anyone who has a personal computer with a modem and communications software, a phone line and an account with a computer services company that is linked to the Internet.

In the Washington area, these firms include PSI Inc. of Herndon, Digital Express Group Inc. of Greenbelt and UUNET Technologies Inc. of Falls Church. For the most basic type of connection, charges start at about \$10 a month.

To begin a session, the home user commands his or her computer to use the phone line to link up to a "host" computer at the services company. Messages typed on the home screen are sent over the phone line to the host, which in turn puts them on the network; incoming information is displayed on the user's screen.

It is the closest thing yet to a functioning "information highway," the digital conduit that theorists predict will one day allow any human anywhere to trade information effortlessly with any other.

"The Internet may well be setting the model for the entire future of telecommunications," said Anthony Rutkowski, who heads the Reston-based Internet Society.

Along the way it is demonstrating both the benefits and dubious by-products that such a creation would bring. Laboratories, schools and companies give testimonials on how its instant communication has spurred learning and productivity. Yet at the same time, the network is getting clogged with mind-rot: lame humor, endless stream-of-consciousness musings and some of the hardest-core smut imaginable.

The Internet was born in 1969 as a Pentagon experiment aimed at helping researchers trade information by computer. It continues to draw about \$30 million in federal subsidies annually from the National Science Foundation, but most of its money comes from states, universities and many individual users.

Traffic on the network has doubled in the past year. But as Stephen Wolff of the National Science Foundation notes: "There is no supreme deity in charge."

Rather, the Internet is a confederation of about 12,000 small networks of linked computers, most of them at universities, government agencies and companies. Just as the postal systems of countries agree to trade letters, these member networks agree to exchange the modern equivalent, electronic packets of digital information.

The Internet does not have its own private set of communications wires. Instead, it uses whatever is available. An ordinary phone line is likely to carry data out of the home. The links between the 12,000 small networks are typically big-bore cir-

cuits leased from a telecommunications company—the data might travel over fiber-optic strands or satellites.

The network is growing fast in part because it has banished the great demon of computer technology—incompatible standards that make one machine unable to talk to another. Users address and transmit their material by precise rules, or standards.

In its simplest form, the "net" is electronic mail. A person types a message onto a computer screen, including the recipient's private electronic mail "address."

The message flows over telephone or data lines to hub computers, which sort it using the address and send it on its way. It normally arrives in seconds. The addressee reads it on a computer screen and can reply in the same way.

Since early this month, network users have been able to send their thoughts to President Clinton and Vice President Gore this way—though White House staffers, not the two leaders themselves, scan the messages.

The Internet also provides thousands of "bulletin boards," electronic meeting places for people who share an interest. There are boards on computer programming, superhero comic books, DNA research, Iranian society and David Letterman.

As with cork boards, people post messages for anyone to read. With a few strokes on the keyboard, other Internet users order their machines to link up to the bulletin board and transfer the messages posted there to their own screens for reading.

With billions of bits of information flying back and forth, a vibrant electronic culture has sprung up. Friendships, feuds and collaborations form over the net. Network users may spend hours at their screens, checking bulletin boards, firing off E-mail. To add nuance to messages, people often use "smiley" symbols. Many a stern statement on the Internet is followed by this symbol: ";-)"

It is a semicolon, a hyphen and a parenthesis. Viewed with the head turned to the side, it resembles a winking face. It means "just kidding."

Many messages contain purposeful information. Others are from people just having fun.

Said Brett Berlin, an Alexandria technology consultant, "a lot of the traffic is people experimenting with communicating in new ways." It is much like ham radio operators chatting with someone who lives in a distant country they've never before reached.

"I have made many friends on nearly every continent," wrote Russell Noble, an Internet user in Wolongong, Australia. "Next year I am planning a trip to the U.S.A. and many of the people I have mailed with are going to let me stay in their homes."

But many Internet transactions are between person and machine. More and more, companies, government agencies and universities are putting their computerized data banks on line. That allows the network users to reach across the world and browse through what they find, then transfer it to their own machines.

Libraries have put card catalogues on-line. Elsewhere, you can find the full texts of "Hamlet" and H.G. Wells's "The War of the Worlds."

State Department travel advisories are available, as are the academic schedules of George Washington University and the surrender documents that ended World War II. Available too are countless computer programs—the network may well be the world's biggest distributor of software.

It seems that almost every day a new use is invented. One computer offers a song lyrics database: Type in a line from your home computer and the distant machine will search through its files and list all the songs it knows that contains those words.

Much information on the Internet is "in the public domain," that is, not owned by anyone or protected by copyright. That helps lower costs, as people generally are paying not for the information itself, just for transport.

Each year, the transport becomes cheaper because of advances in digital technology. The network further reduces costs because, unlike the long-distance phone system, it does not establish a private two-way circuit between points.

Rather, a message feels its way across the network on a one-way basis, slowing down during periods of congestion, but seeking out the fastest, lowest-cost route.

In some cases, said Duncan Briggs of InterCon Systems Corp., a Herndon company that makes Internet software, "The message gets busted up and may go by several routes. It gets reassembled at the other end." The answer is likely to come back by yet another route.

Data transmission is so cheap that people give no thought to whether the computer they're linking up with is across the street or around the globe. Either way, the cost to them is the same.

Thus it is that Internet messages from Singapore to Malaysia, which are separated by just a mile of water, go first to the United States, then back to Malaysia.

Typical of the traditional user is Scott Ramsay, a Washington area computer programmer. If he's stumped late at night over a software problem, he posts a cry for help on one of the world's hundreds of programming bulletin boards.

"I come back and someone will have an answer," Ramsay said. It may be from Taiwan, from England, from the United States. To him that's not important—the answer is. The Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta use the Internet to stay in touch with outside researchers and to distribute findings. "Every worker at the CDC, except janitors, has a computer and electronic mail," David Ross of the CDC told a recent conference. "We couldn't live without it. It lets us work."

But the net has more than a few users after-hours. They flock to bulletin boards to argue over the motivations of soap opera characters, advise each other on shopping for a sailboat and exchange tips on antique firearms. Political junkies dissect Ross Perot's latest speech (the text will have been posted there), rock-and-rollers compare notes—Nikko Suhonen, an Internet user in Finland, relies on it to stoke his passion for the Beatles.

Serbs all over the world feud with Croats all over the world, by way of a Yugoslavia bulletin board. Other members of the two groups use the net to try to join hands—peace activists in two cities in Serbia and Croatia use the Internet to stay in touch.

Popular boards quickly become cluttered—people who tap into one after a week's absence may find 200 new messages to wade through. If a board gets too busy, people often get disgusted and split off to start new ones. This is a prime complaint about the Internet—too much information. Some people get hundreds of pieces of E-mail a day, far too many to read and respond to.

As software technology advances and the data "pipes" become bigger, the Internet is going "multimedia," carrying pictures, video and sound. All are reduced to the ones and zeroes of "digital" computer language for the ride.

City Hall in Wellington, New Zealand, has a computer that, among other things, stores children's artwork in digital form for the world to see. Responding to a distant typed command, it sends a stream of code that represents a picture. Using special software, which may well have been obtained from another Internet computer, the recipient can turn it into a full-color picture.

From Arlington, Internet devotee and author Carl Malamud has set up "Internet Talk Radio." It is an hour and a half a week of professionally produced talk shows on technical

subjects. It flows over the network to about 30 countries, decoded into sound by the computers it reaches. Others groups are using the network to send video signals.

Because of the inherent anonymity the Internet can accord, the network has generated a vast sexual subculture as well. One bulletin board specializes in bondage, another contains reviews of bestiality videos. Still others provide a place where amateur writers post their efforts at hard-core adult fiction. And pictures scanned from adult magazines are increasingly there for the asking.

Not surprisingly, the network has given birth to new forms of harassment. One woman recently found that a man was sending her unsolicited erotic pictures over the network.

Given developments like this, the community is struggling to craft rules of use. It starts with common courtesy. Many network users try to get people to avoid the invective that physical separation seems to encourage whenever there's even a small disagreement. And to resist posting a message on a bulletin board that has nothing to do with the subject at hand. Anyone who does is likely to be "flamed," Internet-speak for being the target of venomous E-mail.

At issue too is the illegal circulation over the network of copyrighted material. Users aren't supposed to do it. Sometimes network operators back up their rules with technology: a campus computer that provides students a copyrighted on-line dictionary, for instance, may be programmed to slam the door to anyone trying to get access from off-campus.

But most Internet users turn thumbs down to any effort to control content. From its earliest days, the net has been a place where no idea or expression is too extreme, too daring to be denied exposure.

The University of Michigan is taking what has become a standard approach. It doesn't censor. But it is rewriting its campus code of conduct to ask that students at least be considerate: If a student has been using a library computer to look at potentially offensive material, it should be cleared off the screen so the next person won't see it inadvertently.

Brian Reese, computer director at George Washington University, said, "We have to face such issues as, can the parents of a 17-year-old student

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sue the university for creating a network over which pornography is available? . . . At the same time, could another student sue us for not making it available, for violating his right to information?"

For now, probably the main thing slowing the growth is that for the technologically uninitiated the network remains a less than welcoming place.

"I think the Internet is cool," said Mark McCahill, a University of Minnesota software engineer who has done pioneering work in designing the Internet. "My mom and dad aren't so sure."

Much of the information found there is highly specialized—one bulletin board is for discussion of the field of geophysical fluid dynamics. And getting at the general interest material can be a challenge. The user must type a bewildering slew of arcane commands on the screen to "navigate."

Publishing guidebooks to the Internet has become a cottage industry of sorts, but the fact of the matter is that no one has a full list of what's out there, just as no one knows all the restaurants to be found along all the roads of the United States.

"I always have this feeling that there's more out there—if I just knew how to get to it," said David Whip, an Internet user in Baltimore.

Software engineers are working to simplify the search. Along the net they are placing computers that act as directories, so that if you're looking for information on French cooking you can find which computer contains it rather than searching thousands individually.


Companies are creating software to make the job of navigation easier—InterCon, for instance, makes a program that lets a user explore with the basic commands of the Macintosh computer.

But for now, the typical Internet user often is someone who enjoys the hunt as much as the catch, the type of person who bores friends with stories of tapping into a computer in Israel at 11:45 the night before. Or in Brazil, or South Africa, or Mexico.

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A GROWING NETWORK


COMPUTERS ON THE INTERNET



NOTE: Most computers have more than one user.

SOURCE: Sprint International

INFORMATION TRAFFIC ON THE INTERNET, MONTHLY



NOTE: Figures are for only the portion of the network maintained by the National Science Foundation.


THE WASHINGTON POST

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HOW THE INTERNET WORKS

The Internet is a huge network of independent computer systems around the globe that communicate through common computer commands, allowing users to send messages to other users, post and receive messages through communal "bulletin boards," and draw out information—text, sound or images—from distant databases.



NOTE: Some links may be open only a few times a day, which can delay a message.

BY MICHAEL DREW—THE WASHINGTON POST

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06/28/93

10:20

703 875 6647

PM/DTC StateDept

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001

*** ERROR TRANSMISSION REPORT ***

TX FUNCTION WAS NOT COMPLETED

TRY TRANSMISSION AGAIN

TN #	6132
CONNECTION TEL	814082914151
CONNECTION ID	
START TIME	06/28 10:20
USAGE TIME	00' 00
PAGES	0
TOTAL ERROR PAGES	1
ACTUAL ERROR PAGE	1
ERROR CODE	#018



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

CENTER for DEFENSE TRADE**OFFICE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS****PM/DTC*****Only UNCLASSIFIED Information may be transmitted by FAX***

TO: S/A Robin Sterzer USCS 6/28/93
(Name) (Office) (Date)

FAX #: 408-291-4151TEL #: 408-291-4162



United States Department of State

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Washington, D.C. 20520

Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

CENTER for DEFENSE TRADE

OFFICE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS

PM/DTC

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TO: S/A Robin Sterzer USCS 6/28/93
(Name) (Office) (Date)

FAX #: 408-291-4151

TEL #: 408-291-4162

FROM: John Sonderman PM/DTC/CEB
(Name) (Office)

FAX #: 703-875-5663


TEL #: 703-875-5650

SUBJECT: Washington Post article from today on the
Internet.

Number of Pages Transmitted in this FAX: 6

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CIRCULAR LETTER



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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January 2, 1974

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Dear Colleague:

Enclosed is PM's present for your perusal as the New Year begins. We have attempted a more analytical approach to several of the topics discussed, which is partly a reflection of the Secretary's oft-reiterated desire to have all reasonable options presented for his consideration, and partly because we cannot hope to rival wire service tickers and cable traffic. I hope you find these circular letters useful, but I cannot stress too strongly that they be treated as strictly confidential bureau views, especially where they concern on-going negotiations.

* * * * *

First off, I would like to pass on to you some observations I made to the Secretary after my brief trip to Brussels, Paris, Bonn and London November 7-16:

Alliance Relationships. The Alliance is at a critical juncture. The new generation in Europe, devoid of historical memory of World War II, Berlin, Cuba, etc., is prone to doubt the utility of the Alliance. Thus, crises such as the Middle East present the danger of divisiveness within the Alliance. It was felt by some that the US played into the hands of those (such as the French?) who wish to undercut US leadership. Failure on our part to articulate the problem and inadequacy of consultation were cited. The Middle East crisis has clearly left a bad taste on both sides of the Atlantic. However, it may well be possible to seize upon it as an opportunity rather than a liability. I believe our allies are conscious that their own performance left much to be desired, even as they criticize the handling of the Alliance by the US. Moreover, they generally applaud the resolute way the US handled the matter in the Middle East and vis-a-vis the Russians.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

() RELEASE
() EXCISE
() DENY
() DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

9203244
ISIP/KR/Line Date: 4/8/96

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() CLASSIFY as () S or
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

GDS

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Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War. Whatever purposes this agreement may serve, it has complicated our relations with the Europeans. Rightly or wrongly, it appears to our allies, at its best, as a shift in priority of US interests from them to the Soviets and, at its worst, as the epitome of super power condominium. As you know, the Secretary spoke at the NATO Ministerial on US perspectives with regard to the Agreement, emphasizing that: (a) its main purpose is to codify the requirement for consultation between the two major nuclear powers in advance and during a crisis (a matter no ally denies to be a valid requirement); (b) it explicitly provides for consultations with our allies and explicitly provides that the Agreement in no way diminishes commitments to our allies, including our nuclear commitment; and (c) it provides an important check upon aggressive Soviet politico-military behavior which could otherwise lead to crisis situations and in turn to nuclear war.

Relations with France. Uniformly, French actions seem, to our people in Europe, calculated to separate the US from its NATO allies. However, military to military cooperation continues. A preliminary indication has even been given that when the French finish their planning on tactical nukes, they will be willing to explore the possibility of some coordination with the US, though how far this will go is most uncertain. But, at a political level, there is less evidence of cooperation.

UK Defense Effort. In a lengthy luncheon conversation I learned that the British are considering, on a very close-hold basis, a cut in their defense effort. Though this was in no way suggested as imminent (after 1976 was the time frame), the problem the British are now having could well increase pressure on their defense budget. (Indeed, it already has.) They are interested in our views, or at least so indicated, as to how we would prefer to see such a cut distributed as between Europe and elsewhere. Their own priority is NATO and, interestingly enough, the development of a European defense entity (though precisely how this would impact on British defense planning is unclear). I think we could influence them, within limits, if we were clear what British military presence we found most important to us.

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Deputy Secretary Rush requested in late November a critique of Middle East crisis management and we responded with a paper on both substantive and procedural matters. One outgrowth of this process, of special interest to you, is that Mr. Rush approved our recommendations that: (1) the Operations Center, under the direction of the Executive Secretary, adopt procedures for automatic notification to all Embassies and missions abroad when confirmation has been obtained that we have instituted a change in the alert posture of US military forces; and (2) the Operations Center, under the direction of the Executive Secretary, and in consultation with other appropriate officials, direct Ambassadors in those countries with which we have security agreements or in which we have significant military forces to inform host governments that our forces have changed their alert posture. Other Ambassadors would be instructed to await specific guidance from Washington, but could request such guidance urgently if necessary. A cable incorporating this procedure has now been sent to the field. We have had some useful comments, notably from USNATO, which we are now considering.

On the PM front office personnel side, Lou Nosenzo has come over from Lulejian Associates to be a resident strategic policy analyst for the Bureau. Hawk Lindjord is up and about again and has resumed working full time. Boris Klosson is in town during the SALT recess. Jim Hall has departed for Saigon and Andy Spisak, fresh from the A-100 course at FSI, is our new Staff Assistant. Chris Jones has moved over to ISO and Dee Nicholson from the M staff, as our Staff Assistant for Administration, will be assisting Tom Stern in backstopping you.

Season's greetings and our best wishes for a happy and peaceful New Year to you and yours,

Sincerely,


Seymour Weiss
Director

Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

Enclosures

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4.

SALT

The SALT negotiations recessed November 16 after having achieved little progress in the last round. Resumption is expected in the latter half of January 1974.

The Soviet October 9 draft SALT agreement (described in the October circular letter) showed little change from their earlier positions. Although they hinted at some flexibility and clarified some aspects of their draft, major ambiguities, such as their MIRV proposal, remain subjects for negotiation. Toward the end of the session Semenov did indicate that the Soviets could agree to the establishment of "agreed aggregate numerical levels" for ICBM and SLBM launchers and strategic bombers, but provided that the US withdraw its so-called "forward-based systems" and that there be "mandatory account for the existence of nuclear systems in third countries." This position is similar to the Soviet posture in much of SALT ONE. The Soviets continue to show no inclination to accept a non-circumvention solution to "FBS". We continue to find unacceptable proposals for the unilateral withdrawal of US non-central systems forward deployed in support of alliance commitments, and Ambassador Johnson has reaffirmed to Semenov our unilateral statement of SALT ONE with respect to the non-inclusion of Allied NATO ballistic missile submarines.

Late in the last round, the Soviets also suggested a possible separate agreement on non-transfer. Our position remains that we cannot address the question of non-transfer until the main elements of a strategic offensive agreement have been worked out, i.e., until we know what is to be limited. We continue to support an equal aggregate level of 2350 ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers for each side--a level which would require modest Soviet reductions and allow a slight US buildup.

Ambassador Johnson consulted with the North Atlantic Council on November 12, shortly before the SALT recess, and discussed the main elements of the Soviet draft. The PermReps agreed that the draft was disappointing, particularly on "FBS".

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5.

The US-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), established to help implement the SALT ONE agreements, also adjourned in late November with the next session expected to begin in February or March, 1974. The US and Soviet commissioners achieved progress in some areas, including agreement ad referendum on limiting ballistic missile submarines under construction to a number consistent with a normal construction schedule, but significant differences remain on ICBM and SLBM dismantling and destruction procedures and on the question of "prior" notification of such activities.

During the holiday recess, we are taking stock of the current status of the negotiations with a view toward developing an approach for the resumption. The Verification Panel has met twice and is expected to meet again soon. Senator Jackson has suggested an approach of his own for SALT, involving deep reductions, as you have undoubtedly read in the press. An Ad Hoc Committee of the Verification Panel Working Group has also been active. Our principal focus has been the time-urgent question of possible limitations on Soviet MIRV development--particularly prospects for constraining MIRV development for the new Soviet heavy ICBM, the SS-X-18. The utility of seeking MIRV limits, and possible prices for achieving them, are being assessed. As you can imagine, there are differences of view on these points, but the useful discussions in the Verification Panel are at last beginning to sort out where the main issues are. As the Secretary pointed out in his year end press conference, we are dealing with a new and more complex set of issues in SALT TWO. Both sides are having problems in developing a conceptual frame-work for dealing with qualitative as well as quantitative issues. However, we believe there are good prospects for coming up with some new approaches, particularly to the MIRV problem, by the time the next session convenes.

MBFR

The talks have proceeded in a businesslike, serious manner from the outset, but at a brisker pace than we had anticipated. Contrary to expectations, the Warsaw Pact tabled the first proposal on November 8, shortly after the opening of the conference. The West countered by tabling a framework proposal on November 22. Essential elements of the two proposals are compared below:

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6.

Allied

Warsaw Pact

Area

--NATO Guidelines Area
(NGA - FRG, Benelux, GDR,
Czechoslovakia, Poland)

--NGA

--NGA in the first instance,
but done in manner designed
to avoid creation of special
juridical zone.

--Hungary issue reserved.

--Ground forces.

--Ground, air and nuclear forces.

--US-Soviet in 1st phase

--All forces, all countries,
in all phases.

Basic Mechanism

--Negotiate to a common
ceiling, in course of
which major disparities
and threatening elements are
to be redressed by special
cuts on the Soviet side
(heavier manpower cuts,
tanks, etc.).

--Maintain the correlation of
forces through equal proportional
cuts not only in manpower, but by
types of units.

Program of Reductions

--Two separately negotiated
phases involving: a 15% cut
of US and Soviet ground forces
in phase one; reduction to
common ceiling in phase two.

--A single phase negotiation
resulting in three reduction
steps: first, a 20,000 man cut
(1975); second, a 5% cut (1976);
third, a 10% cut (1977)--with
reduction applying at each step
to all MBFR direct participants,
on basis proportional to
present composition.

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7.

Disposition of Troops

--US has option to reduce by thinning out.

--Soviets must withdraw units.

--Associated measures (not yet formalized in Alliance) may involve additional demands regarding geographic and other restrictions on redeployment of withdrawn Soviet units.

--Foreign forces to be removed to national boundaries.

--Indigenous forces to be demobilized.

--Position on reserves indicates opposition to placing demobilized forces in reserve.

Disposition of Equipment

--US to have option to preposition heavy equipment.

--Soviet equipment must be withdrawn.

--Foreign equipment to be returned to national boundaries along with withdrawn units.

--Indigenous equipment to be removed from active service (no indication yet if Soviets have mothballing, destruction, etc., in mind).

Verification

--National means and a variety of other negotiated measures (mobile inspection teams, choke points, etc.).

--National means.

Associated Measures

--Assorted measures under discussion in NATO. (The former so-called prereduction constraints and other possible constraints directly associated with reductions, i.e., stabilizing and non-circumvention measures).

--Notification at outset and conclusion of "practical measures" to effect agreed reductions.

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8.

For the time being, the two sides will be arguing for their proposals and probing the other's position. The real Soviet priorities are not yet entirely clear. On the basis of the Eastern proposal, however, it would appear that the East's primary concerns in the talks are to secure (a) reductions of Western air and nuclear forces, (b) cuts in the Bundeswehr, and (c) restraints on possible future European defense cooperation. The agreed Allied position provides bargaining room to meet the first two Eastern concerns, but the Allies show increasing determination to preserve maximum flexibility with regard to the evolution of European defense cooperation. The current problem in Washington is to determine what is "tradeable" and what will be sought from the East as quids in return for our responsiveness on matters of concern to them. There is a growing conviction here that the West ought to take some steps early in the year to move the negotiations forward on ground that is favorable to us; but we want to avoid any major concessions early in the negotiations on issues that appear to have useful negotiating leverage, such as the Bundeswehr.

NSSM 171 Developments

The lengthy, diffuse planning exercise on Strategy and Forces for Asia (NSSM 171) continues to produce studies, but appears further than ever from engaging the real policy issues. It is now clear that we will not derive from this effort the long-range projection of our East Asian force posture that we hoped for earlier this year. Decisions are still demanded by circumstances, the paramount ones being the evolution of our relations with Peking and the uncertain military situation in Indochina.

On Thailand, the President has directed that our combat units remain until the end of the current dry season. Defense has been instructed to prepare plans for redeployments that would bring US personnel strength down to 27,400 men -- beginning in May 1974, and carrying through to the end of FY-75. Some largely cosmetic, non-combat-related reductions are to be considered in the meantime, in the event Thai political pressures grow intense. We are informing the Thai of our short-term planning and of the hold on major withdrawals until next May, indicating we hope then to resume withdrawals of combat aircraft in consultation with the RTG.

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On Taiwan, the departure last month of the last of the American C-130's, originally deployed in 1966 for Viet Nam support, will leave our numerical presence at approximately pre-Viet Nam levels. A further decision on withdrawals is being considered, but timing depends on the evolution of our relations with the PRC. Obvious candidates are the two US F-4 squadrons sent to Taiwan last year in connection with Enhance Plus. Their departure hinges on replacement of the F-5's the ROC transferred to us for the Vietnamese as well as on political considerations, and is thus somewhat flexible. Removal of these units would bring US military personnel levels down sharply. Of equal or greater significance, it would signal a qualitative shift in our presence on the island, as we would no longer have combat forces stationed there. 17

The concept of converting the US Army Division in Korea into a mobile reserve for the Western Pacific has gathered no ground swell of support, either here (it would reduce flexibility and perhaps intrude upon the North-South dialogue) or, more saliently, among the senior levels at the Pentagon.

UN Peace-Keeping Operations

In the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War, PM organized and chaired a working group in the Operations Center to coordinate U.S. assistance to the United Nations for its peace-keeping operations. In addition to assisting in the initial deployment of UN forces from Cyprus, our UNEF Working Group has continued to facilitate UN airlifts of national contingents and support equipment. To date, the USG has provided on a non-reimbursable basis approximately \$4.5 million in airlifts of national contingents from Finland, Ireland, Peru, Panama, and Indonesia. We also picked up 220 Austrians and their gear in Vienna after they were left stranded by the Soviets, who had originally agreed to transport them. Currently 5,200 of the planned 7,500 UN troops are on the ground in the Middle East on six-month assignments. The peace-keeping is expected to cost \$30 million during the first six months, of which the US will pay \$8.6 million. In addition, we have done more than any other nation on a nonreimbursable basis in this operation. We continue to be approached by the UN for help, due in large measure to the fact that UN force contributors have regarded ours as the most efficient and helpful airline. Fly USAF!

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The working group also coordinated the augmentation of UNTSO by 36 Soviet and American observers, as called for in the cease-fire agreements. The US has added 28 new officers to the 8 who were already on detail to UNTSO at the start of the war.

Iceland Negotiations

Foreign Minister Agustsson has met with the chief U.S. negotiator, Ambassador Porter, for two separate negotiating rounds, one in Washington and the other in Iceland, during the fall of 1973; another round is scheduled for mid-January 1974. No conclusions have been reached, but the Icelandic side, as expected, has indicated that if the base is to stay, there must be a reduction of the U.S. military presence by about one-third, making replacements as necessary and possible from among Icelandic or American civilians. The negotiations have been conducted in a friendly atmosphere made even more hopeful by the successful resolution of the bitter Anglo-Icelandic fisheries dispute. Among the issues in the current negotiation include the improvement of conditions for those American servicemen who would remain and the matter of consolidating the American presence on base.

Azores Negotiations

Ambassador Porter has held two negotiating sessions thus far with the Portuguese negotiator, Ambassador Themido. In these, the US has managed to convey its interest in retaining the Azores facilities, and has expressed its gratitude to the Portuguese for their cooperation during the aerial resupply effort to Israel. We have also listened to the Portuguese lament about how little the Portuguese Government has gotten out of the last extension and how important it will be--if there is to be a new extension--that the Portuguese Government feels satisfied at the bargain struck.

The Portuguese have obviously set a high price, but they have not yet tipped their hand to us on specifics. However, they have indicated their interest in sophisticated weaponry. Finally, they have also expressed keen interest in a rather full educational exchange package geared toward improving their business, managerial and technical skills.

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A special study (NSSM 189) is now in preparation to reassess the value of the Azores base, especially in light of the use to which Lajes was put during our aerial resupply of the Israelis during the 1973 war. We are now awaiting a more complete Portuguese shopping list before moving to further analysis of possible "quids" we can offer, including rental, for the Lajes facility. (We remain committed to dealing with the NATO uses of the facility--both ASW and transit--in the burden-sharing context and hope to work out an agreement with Lisbon to pay only for the US uses.)

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Status of FY-74 Security Assistance Legislation

Congress passed authorizations and appropriations for FY-74 security assistance programs which, in addition to regular programs, provide funding to meet emergency program requests for Israel and Cambodia. Details are outlined below:

1. Worldwide programs (in millions):

a.	MAP	\$450
b.	FMS	
	NOA	\$325
	Program Ceiling	\$730
c.	Security Supporting Assistance	\$112.5

2. Israeli emergency assistance: \$2.2 billion
(up to \$1.5 million available as grant assistance--the remaining on credit terms).

3. Cambodian emergency assistance: the Authorization bill allows the President to use the drawdown authority of Section 506 to provide up to \$200 million from Defense Department stocks to meet the emergency requirements for Cambodia.

This security assistance legislation was the subject of intense debate within Committees, on the floor of each House, and in the House-Senate Conferences. The Executive Branch succeeded in having a number of restrictive provisions dropped from the legislation. Although overall appropriations for MAP and FMS are low, the fact that the legislation passed at all represents a considerable triumph for the Administration.

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Lowenstein and Moose in Europe

On December 2, 1973, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee published its unclassified version of the Report on Europe: Burdensharing, MBFR and Nuclear Weapons. The report was written by Messrs. Lowenstein and Moose and, in its classified version, provides a most comprehensive analytic status report of the three areas it addresses. The Executive Branch security review of the report, which was coordinated by PM, required the intensive participation of more than seventy-five officials from State, DOD, ACDA and AEC and we believe it produced a valuable and informative unclassified summary. Although Senator Symington was not entirely satisfied with some of the deletions in the unclassified version of the report, he did state publicly that: "Nevertheless it represents a significant step forward in breaking down arbitrary barriers to information heretofore applied."

We expect that DOD and State will, in the near future, conduct a comprehensive review of our policies concerning the classification of information on nuclear weapons, which will be followed by executive session hearings sponsored by the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in February.

It may interest those of you in Europe who were involved in assisting Lowenstein and Moose that, on their return to Washington, they told us this had been the most satisfactory trip they had made in their long experience as Senate investigators. END UNCLASSIFIED.

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Offset and Burdensharing

The President's goal of 100% offset of our military balance of payments (BOP) deficit in NATO Europe received substantial impetus November 16 with the passage of the Jackson-Nunn Amendment. This legislation requires the President to reduce our troop strength in Europe by the same percentage that our military BOP for FY-74 is not offset. Although the language and the legislative history of the Amendment would suggest that our allies have 22 1/2 months to offset 12 months of our expenditures, the intent of Congress is obviously to offset the military BOP deficit on an annual basis, and our planning is based on this assumption. Our military BOP expenditures in Europe for FY-74 are estimated at \$2.5 billion. Excluding "non-NATO" related items, such as our strategic deterrent forces in Europe (which the Jackson-Nunn Amendment allows us to do), reduces this total to about \$2.2 billion, possibly less, pending final determination by the Departments of Commerce and Defense.

The most important offset package is the one now being negotiated with the FRG for FY-73/74. The Germans have so far offered "hard" offset (chiefly military procurement) totaling about \$1.4 billion for the two years, and it is unlikely that they will go higher. Indeed, the case can be made that if an agreement is not signed soon, the continuing improvement of the overall US BOP with Europe and the exigencies of the energy crisis may erode the position already obtained. It is generally agreed that a 100% offset figure for Germany is a political necessity--but that the Germans will never offer enough "hard" offset to cover the gap between their current \$1.4 billion offer and the \$3.3 billion which we estimate as our total BOP expenditure in Germany for FY-73/74. PM and EUR's position is that we should try and close the German negotiations quickly by filling the remaining gap with loans negotiated at concessionary rates of interest. However, the economic agencies (including some elements in State) object to loans as having no real BOP effect, and there is also some risk that Congress will not consider loans as valid offset. It is our hope that during January this can be sorted out both in Washington and with the Germans. One more effort will be made, however, to increase the hard offset component.

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It is generally conceded that not much movement will take place on multilateral burdensharing until the FRG agreement is nailed down. We have presented our non-German allies with an illustrative program of procurement and budgetary support which would offset our non-German military BOP expenditures for FY-74, using approximately the NATO infrastructure formula. This proposal has resulted in some promises of additional procurement. In addition, we may be able to negotiate some reduction in our NATO infrastructure costs. Increased allied procurement and lowered US infrastructure costs should cause our BOP receipts from our non-German allies to come very close to fully offsetting the non-German side of the BOP deficit, estimated at from \$550 to \$750 pending final determination. We should therefore not have to resort to loans in the multilateral context.

The concept of "budgetary support" (payment by our European allies of incremental US budgetary costs associated with the stationing of US troops in Europe) has, for some time now, been folded into the overall problem of BOP offset. All of the programs for relieving our military BOP deficit have included some offset of budgetary costs as a component. We will probably receive on the order of \$150 million in budgetary support from our European allies for FY-74 (all of which counts as BOP offset). There is some movement in the bureaucracy to give budgetary support greater emphasis, but we see little prospects of getting much more from our allies, and some danger that any further increases in direct budget support will be at the expense of allied force improvements.

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FILE

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

December 24, 1973

TO : The Secretary

FROM: PM - Leon Sloss, Acting

Growing Difficulties of Access to Overseas Bases

Introduction

You have asked us to identify issues which do not require immediate decision but which will require some study, and involve decision at some later point. The growing difficulty in maintaining our worldwide base structure is an example of such an issue.

The Problem

Our ability to secure overseas base and facility rights for U.S. forces in many areas of the world will encounter increasingly tough-minded negotiating tactics by host governments, accompanied by tighter restrictions on our ability to use freely the bases and facilities in question. At the same time our ability to offer satisfactory guids for base rights has diminished.

We are now engaged in negotiations with Iceland, Portugal, and the Bahamas regarding the retention of important U.S. military facilities in each. There is a strong probability that DOD will seek our approval in the near future to move ahead with Phase II of homeporting the Carrier Task Group in Athens, involving deployment in 1974 of an aircraft carrier, its embarked air wing and a hospital support ship. Australian Defense Minister Barnard is scheduled here in early January to discuss the future status of the U.S. Navy communications facility at Northwest Cape. As we look beyond 1973, we will be under increasing pressures in Japan and Okinawa for further reductions and consolidation of our facilities there. The agreement covering our access to facilities and bases in Spain must be renegotiated by 1975; and there is every likelihood that President Marcos, probably within the next 18 months, will request a review of the status of our base arrangements in the Philippines.

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Background:

We discern a distinct trend for host governments increasingly to demand more in terms of a quid pro quo in exchange for base rights. This comes at a time of sharply curtailed resources available to the Executive Branch for such quids (military grant and/or credit assistance, PL 480, economic aid, EX-IM Bank drawing rights, etc.). Similarly, the Administration is confronted with Congressional efforts to circumscribe its leverage in providing political quid, such as new or broadened security commitments. (The Spanish have indicated that a U.S. security commitment may be central to their consideration of an extension of the 1970 base agreement.) Concurrently, we are likely to be faced again with legislative proposals that any subsequent basing arrangements must be either submitted to the Senate for "advice and consent" or be subjected to approval by a majority of both Houses of the Congress.

An associated and also vexing problem relates to usage of bases and facilities. We are finding it increasingly difficult to be assured of unfettered use of overseas military installations to serve U.S. interests, especially in situations where the policy the U.S. is following is one on which the host country has not been consulted or from which it wishes to disassociate itself. Furthermore, we find our ability to project military power from the Atlantic Basin into the Middle East and beyond limited not simply by an absence of dependable basing, but also by the restrictions imposed on our military overflights and, to a lesser extent, on U.S. Navy port visits. Some of these problems also relate directly to the upcoming Law of the Sea negotiations. For example, the issue of free passage through international straits could affect the Gibraltar Straits, which is pivotal to access of our ships and aircraft to the Mediterranean.

While this problem of restrictions, based on divergent national interests, can be seen almost everywhere we have bases, it was most graphically demonstrated during the recent Middle East War, and the conclusion is ominously clear. Our ability to project military power of any sort in the Middle East/Indian Ocean area is based on a rather slender structure of bases and agreements, without which we would be unable to back up our political initiatives in the Middle East area. This points up the central importance of Lajes (Azores), Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean), and Bandar Abbas (Iran) to our resupply of Israel and the ability to sustain the deployment of a carrier task group in the Indian Ocean. Of equal

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importance is our continued ability to have operational access through the Mediterranean and the Iranian/Turkish corridor for our military aircraft engaged in supporting U.S. military activities in the Western Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea area.

In view of the above considerations, we have informally been reviewing within the Department and with DOD how we can minimize the constraints, both foreign and domestic, which now affect, or promise to affect, our more essential overseas basing requirements. The issues identified below address (1) the need to subsidize base rights, (2) our Congressional problems, and (3) the limitations in our Mediterranean base structure. It should be emphasized that each base rights negotiation presents a range of problems that are unique to the negotiation at hand, a judgment that points to the continued need for case-by-case analysis.

Analysis

ISSUE 1: The feasibility of DOD service-funding of straight rental or leasing arrangements as an alternative, but not a complete substitute, for underwriting guid costs for essential overseas base and operating requirements.

Advantages:

Service funding (a) recognizes the fact that program resources to fund adequately essential base rights (MAP, FMS, various forms of economic aid to include PL 480 and EX-IM credits) are increasingly hard to obtain, and (b) acknowledges the need for additional funding sources to meet rising host government guid expectations.

The precedent for service funding already has been established in the COMIDEASTFOR stationing agreement with Bahrain, the Kagnaw Station (Eritrea) leaseholds, and in the authorized guidance for the contemplated negotiations for Bahamas facilities.

Further, given projected DOD budgetary stringencies, service funding will place overseas base requirements in a

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competitive position with other service programs. This should compel the services to develop a more rational and clearer order of priorities in overseas basing requirements than has obtained in the past when DOD has tended to argue that virtually all overseas basing requirements were of co-equal importance.

Finally, service funding may prove more acceptable to the Congress since we will be paying directly for facilities in lieu of using MAP or other less easily identifiable authority and funds. This should neutralize some past Congressional critics who have contended that the use of Security Assistance and other programs as quid payoff for base rights is a distortion of the purposes of such programs.

Disadvantages:

DOD is less than enthusiastic with service funding since they view base rentals as adding new funding obligations to already strained service budgets. DOD is also concerned with the undesirable precedent of utilizing base rentals in one country, which could create a precedent to apply to base negotiations worldwide. The concept may also be unattractive to certain host governments who do not wish their relationship with the U.S. to be identified as exclusively materialistic (selling facilities for cash). 1.5

applied to any NATO country (e.g., Portugal, Turkey), we would invite criticism in the Congress and elsewhere that base rentals run counter to the Alliance principle of mutual self help in general and our burdensharing efforts in particular.

Additional Congressional criticism may be generated, particularly from the SFRC and the HFAC, on the grounds that we were finessing Congressional foreign affairs prerogatives by hiding base rights requirements in service budgets subject to review and approval by the Armed Services Committees. Finally, base rentals may fall short of the quid expectations of host governments. DOD, under statute, is enjoined from paying more than "fair value" for base rentals and while DOD lawyers see some flexibility in applying the "fair value" formula to extract more quid, it is questionable that this alone would be sufficient to meet our negotiators needs.

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Next Steps:

The issue of service funding of any explicit base arrangement does not require a decision from you now. However, it would be useful to us to have your general guidance on the issue. The dollar order of magnitude we may expect from the DOD budget to underwrite base rights requirements will impact, inter alia, on what percentage our planners should allocate from Security Assistance to compensate for essential base rights. Meanwhile we intend to pursue with DOD, in concert with the Regional Bureaus concerned, the feasibility of the base rentals option.

ISSUE 2: The submission of base arrangements, as Treaties or in some other form, for Congressional approval rather than as Executive Agreements.

In the last session of Congress, the Senate endorsed two amendments by Senator Case, one on the submission of the Azores Agreement and the other providing for a broader requirement for submitting all new base agreements to the Senate for ratification as treaties. While both amendments were finally eliminated, for differing reasons, from the legislation, it is clear that there is considerable sentiment for requiring some form of Congressional approval for base arrangements. We believe that this question will arise again, particularly as we conclude new agreements. This is an issue which has been vetted in NSSM 179 on Spain and which is currently being explored in NSSM 189 on the Azores Base Agreement Negotiations. The latter is likely to be the next agreement to raise the issue in concrete form.

The draft Azores NSSM identifies 4 options to deal with base agreements:

1. To submit the agreement to the Senate as a treaty for ratification.
2. To proceed as we have in the past with an executive agreement without Congressional approval.
3. To submit the agreement voluntarily for Congressional approval by joint or concurrent resolution.

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4. To seek Congressional approval through a mechanism of obtaining authorizing legislation and specific appropriations for the quid pro quo in the agreement.

Next Steps:

These four options in the draft Azores NSSM would seem to cover the range of practical possibilities for other agreements as well. Accordingly we will continue our assessment of these options with the Regional Bureaus, H, and L. Receipt of the guidance that emerges from the President's decision on NSSM 179 (Spain) will be a key factor in determining future policy on this issue.

ISSUE 3: Our base and operating rights infrastructure in the Mediterranean area is particularly vital to operations in the Middle East, and has become increasingly vulnerable to political denial by the host governments.

Restrictions on our Israeli airlift operations pointed up the tenuous quality of our base structure in the Mediterranean basin, as well as in Western Europe. The vulnerability of our European base structure for unilateral U.S. actions outside a NATO context clearly requires searching reexamination. We should undertake an inventory of our assets (which seem few), identification of their limitations, and a re-assessment of our means of consultation to determine how we can best repair the fissures.

Our Assets

Our main assets stem from the fact that friendly nations on the Mediterranean littoral share our objective of promoting stability in the Middle East and avoiding great power confrontation. While there is a reluctance to become involved, which is heightened by the increased vulnerability of the European nations to the "oil weapon," when it can be demonstrated that U.S. actions promote stability we will have good prospects of securing cooperation from our allies. These prospects will be enhanced if they are not forced to take public positions which appear hostile to the Arab states. Many of our requirements are for peacetime "visible" presence rather than wartime or emergency capability. Ways might be found to reduce our requirements, particularly for facilities of limited value in real emergencies (as was the case in Spain in the 1970 Jordanian crisis and in October-November this year).

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If we are forced into another situation comparable to the most recent Arab-Israeli crisis, the most logical operating base between Lajes and the Eastern Mediterranean appears to be Sigonella, Sicily. It should be reviewed as the priority facility that we should consider expanding in view of its central geographic location in the Mediterranean.

Our Liabilities

However, it seems likely that a review will only confirm what we already know. European governments who host our forces and facilities will permit our use of their territory on a case-by-case basis only when their national interests coincide or are not in conflict with ours. Accordingly, any effort to build what in effect was a sovereign base at Sigonella (or elsewhere), where we would have exclusive use to support U.S. contingencies, would probably encounter extremely tough political opposition. Moreover, recent events in Athens could cast a shadow over our long-term use of Greek facilities and further implementation of homeporting. Finally, our base and operating rights throughout Western Europe, including the Mediterranean, occupy a central role in our capability to support NATO and, in this respect, are essential and must be retained even if not available to support unilateral U.S. actions.

- Next Steps:

EUR, NEA, AF, and PM agree that an assessment of our basing and vulnerability in the Mediterranean should be undertaken as a matter of priority. EUR notes, however, that our Mediterranean bases play an essential role in our ability to support NATO and sustain our own NATO commitments without reference to the use of such bases for U.S. unilateral contingency operations. NEA considers that any assessment of Mediterranean basing should include an examination of alternatives to bases which we cannot rely on using to supply and protect Israel or to meet other possible U.S. unilateral uses. Such measures might include alternative deployments of our global naval strength, an overall increase in U.S. Naval strength, more C-5A's, etc.

The lessons derived from a Mediterranean study could provide a useful backdrop to a more comprehensive study of worldwide base vulnerability.

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Your preliminary views or guidance on the foregoing
would be appreciated.

Drafted: PM/ISO:JDStoddart:ml; PM:LSloss:sac
12/24/73

Concurrences:

EUR - Mr. Romine
NEA - Mr. Schiff
ARA - LCOL Williams
AF - Mr. Navez
EA - Mr. Chapman
S/PC - Mr. Perez
L/PM - Mr. Fields

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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November 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO: S/P - Mr. Brown

FROM: INR/RSF - Seymour Weiss *sey.*

SUBJECT: US Security Interests Outside Europe:
A Reappraisal With Force Planning Implications

May I say at the outset that the draft of November 5 is an enormous improvement over the earlier version. The rationale for the positions advanced is clearer and more persuasive. However, there are still a number of questions which the latest draft raises; these are identified in the following paragraphs.

PART I. Major Policy Considerations Affecting US Security Role Outside Europe

1. Page 1, paragraph 1. Here and elsewhere in the paper reference is made to the "relative values" which may in the future be attached to devoting resources to foreign, as contrasted to domestic needs, with the strong implication that the latter will increasingly take higher priority. I am, of course, aware of a widely shared belief that the bad taste left by Vietnam on the one hand, and pressing domestic needs on the other, will inevitably cause the US to withdraw (at least to some degree) from its international responsibilities in order to attend to its domestic problems. Doubtless these influences will bear on our future policy, however it is far from inevitable that the decision will be or should be made for meeting domestic needs in preference to international needs. The uncertainty as to how the resources allocation problem will resolved goes to two points: First, I doubt that the issues will present themselves in quite such clean and clear-cut alternatives. We might very well, for example, be faced with an international crisis which seems to American leadership, as well as the US body politic, one which we cannot afford to ignore. Accordingly, as a result of both emotional and rational reasons, it is possible that we will decide to involve ourselves largely without regard to the impact which such involvement would have on domestic needs. (I recall vividly, for example, that at a time when Louis Johnson was intent on keeping the Defense budget down to about \$14 billion, we projected ourselves into the middle of a Korean War, which, of course, totally changed both our budgetary situation as well as our international involvement posture.) Second, I would suggest that what we do in the international arena has a much closer interrelationship to what we do on the domestic front than would be implied by an "either/or" approach. For example, the draft recognizes that the position that we

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take with regard to Black Africa is not unrelated to our domestic problems in the US. Though the draft does not explicitly so state a similar situation exists with regard to Israel. To generalize on the matter, it has often been argued that we cannot conduct our international relations effectively without having our own domestic house in order. To some extent, the obverse is also true, i.e., we may not be able to conduct our domestic affairs rationally without being prepared to accept the considerable responsibility for involvement in the international community which our power position has thrust upon us.

How much it is worth injecting some aspect of the foregoing thought into your paper, assuming that you agree with any of it, I leave open. I simply wanted to call to your attention the fact that the paper seems too heavily weighted in quite a different direction.

2. Page 2, first paragraph. There is a point which perhaps should be generalized here in Part I, but which should certainly appear in the specific treatment of country problems in Part II. This point is that in the underdeveloped areas our willingness to provide support, whether against external invasion or externally supported insurgency, has been based in part on the assumption that these areas would, if given the time to develop unhindered by aggression, develop reasonably sound political and economic institutions which would permit the nations in question to evolve into reasonably stable entities. It was the thesis in the early 1960s that externally supported aggression threatened these nascent institutions before they had sufficient strength and resiliency to stand up against the threat. To some extent, this thesis still has some validity. It may well be that for other reasons we may choose to avoid involvement in underdeveloped areas in order to buy the time for their indigenous institutions to develop. However, I am inclined to think that this criteria should be one which should be considered when we analyze the prospects and possibilities of US military involvement in support of underdeveloped countries. Thus, when you address yourself to the problem of insurgency movements, you suggest that the countries must rely upon their own resources, including their own "nationalism" as well as regional organizations. This may simply not be enough. And if not, what then?

3. Page 3, first full paragraph. Another point which might be introduced is that the enemy's resources are no more unlimited than our own. Simultaneous capacity on the part of the Chinese to involve themselves in support of a North Korean invasion of South Korea, and a Vietnamese invasion of Southeast Asia, are no more realistic than multi-fold projections of simultaneous Soviet military actions. Thus, in calculating US general purpose force requirements, the various threats, are not all additive, thereby justifying a huge US force. The enemy is constricted by resource restraints just as we are.

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4. Page 4, subparagraph a. While I would agree with the comment that underdeveloped areas are neither as susceptible to external exploitation by our opponents, nor as responsive to external amelioration through our help as we had supposed, this may lead to a somewhat erroneous implication. Is one to conclude that the foregoing means that underdeveloped areas are not considerably susceptible to external exploitation by the communists? Or, alternatively, that our help is not a major factor in resisting such external exploitation? Some refinement of the thought seems warranted.

5. Page 5, first full sentence. I suggest that you may wish to include the word "direct" before the word "effect." In short, it seems to me that the effect of a communist takeover on the balance of power will relate to more than the location of the nation in question and the nature of the relationships between the local communist party and other communist parties. Indeed, as your paper itself recognizes elsewhere, the indirect adverse effects on the balance of power could be far-reaching, if such a takeover implies a general impotence on the part of the US or an unwillingness to honor commitments, etc. This could be true even if the geographic location of the nation in question was unimportant and the relationship of its communist parties to other communist parties was unclear.

6. Page 7, e. There may indeed be less reason to expect the "domino theory" to work than formerly seemed to be the case, but it is not clear to me that this point is very effectively substantiated by the evidence set forth in this paragraph.

7. Page 8, 2. a. As a minor suggestion you may wish to change the word "necessarily" to "useful" or "desirable." It is not at all clear that it will be necessary to make the distinction which you suggest. Similarly, in paragraph b. on page 9, it is not clear why a distinction "must be" made between contingencies designed to cover direct aggression -- and the more likely contingency of externally-supported insurrection. The latter is clearly more difficult to cope with and less susceptible to application of US force, but I do not see that it is any the less significant a problem for the US. As I indicated earlier, I certainly do not agree that the main reliance in facing indirect aggression must be "local nationalism" reinforced where feasible by "regional cooperation." If this statement is to be taken at face value it might well mean that we would have to concede the battlefield to the communist concept of wars of national liberation. It is, of course, correct, as the paper points out, that a difficult dilemma presents itself in guarding against the substitution of US forces for reliance on local willingness to accept responsibility for defense. And, it may also be true that in the total absence of such will, US forces cannot by themselves do the job. But, is it not possible that we may confront circumstances in the future, as we have in the past, where there may be a degree of local will for self-defense, where there is no regional organization which can provide effective support, and where, therefore, US support may be the only answer if the nation in question is to escape communist domination? Does this section imply that

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we would not be prepared to provide such support in cases such as these?

8. Pages 9-10, paragraph c. I had a little difficulty with the meaning and intent of this paragraph. Certainly "full account should be taken" of the several factors cited, but after taking such full account, then what? And, further, is one to imply that this is the full account of the factors which should be considered?

9. Page 10, d. This category of interests is rather vague (I appreciate that you attempt to clarify matters in Part II), and, as I noted previously, I wonder whether we are justified in reaching a conclusion that security needs under this category may be less important than domestic needs? What is the basis for making this decision and is it appropriate for inclusion in this sort of policy paper?

10. Page 11, last full paragraph. What did you have in mind in suggesting that we should adjust certain arrangements "to create a situation of greater independence and self-help?" Granted that such would be desirable, how does one accomplish it, and if it is not accomplished, do we wash our hands of the security interest? Further, with regard to provision of military assistance (a point with which I very much agree), you may wish to at least recognize two significant problems. First, military assistance is increasingly difficult to obtain from the Congress, and, therefore, this alternative may simply not be a feasible one. Second, the very provision of military assistance in and of itself tends to develop a close political association between the US and the recipient which leads to the very status of "dependency" which this paragraph argues against.

11. Pages 12-13, last paragraph. Aside from the fact that I am not entirely clear what the word "essential" means in this context, I wonder whether what our policy should be if the doubts subsequently referred to do not result in stimulating the countries in question to greater self-help efforts, but instead leads to despair and eventual accommodation to communist pressures.

12. Page 13. I am not persuaded that the previous argument does in fact lead to the three desiderata that you identify on page 13. Certainly some aspects of the previous argumentation lead in this direction, but by no means all of them. For example, it is not clear that the maintenance of US forces "outside the immediate locale of potential conflict" will adequately meet the need for deterrence. It is, in my view, inadequate to point to our increasing mobility as an illustration of our ability to get forces quickly into troubled areas. The point that needs to be kept in mind is that there is an enormous difference between capabilities and intentions. I do not think there is much doubt about US capabilities. But especially if we follow a policy which seems to be implied in this draft of withdrawing our forces and hedging our commitments, our intentions are likely to be highly suspect, regardless of how impressive our military capabilities are...

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13. Page 14. The view that US forces maintained for employment in the underdeveloped world should be "structured mainly for combat support operations" warrants close scrutiny. On the surface it makes a great deal of sense. Insofar as we are able to do so, we should supply the hardware and the logistic support, and let others engage in combat with its attendant personnel losses. The difficulty, it seems to me, is that this is easier said than done. In the first place, this is a little bit like the concept of attempting to lead from the rear. I am not sure that one can get others to shed their blood while attempting to protect one's own skin. But quite aside from that, I think there is a hidden danger in this concept which should at least be recognized explicitly. Once the US commits itself in any major way to providing support for combat operations, it has launched itself on the first step toward deeper commitment. Our experience in Vietnam illustrates the point very well. It was not our intention there, initially, to place combat forces in the field. However, our combat support operations, which started modestly and which grew incrementally as the need seemed to demand, finally left us with a political as well as military commitment of very substantial proportions. It might well be argued, both with regard to Vietnam, and as a general principle, that when having exhausted our ability to support a combat operation without that support having achieved substantial or complete success, we ought then to disengage rather than throwing in combat forces. The difficulty is that by that point in time the US has taken so many steps toward committing its position that disengagement carries a good many, if not most, of the disadvantages of out-and-out defeat.

The foregoing is not necessarily to argue against the concept of the US providing support for combat operations, in the first instance, but rather to argue that if this is the line we adopt, we ought to go into it with our eyes quite wide open. In short, the policy planner should be warned that provision of such support could lead to much broader involvement at a later date. He may still choose to follow the route of combat support as an initial action, but, alternatively, he may choose to avoid any involvement whatsoever.

PART II. Kinds of Protection Required For US Security Interests Outside of Europe

1. Page 1. I strongly support your conclusion as to the significance of Japan for US security. What troubles me is whether the US can maintain Japanese confidence in the US commitment if, at one and the same time, we reduce our presence in the Far East, as suggested in your draft, concurrently restricting our commitment to the security of other states, in the area.

2. Page 1. With regard to the threats against Japanese security during the next decade, I am not sure we can be as categorical in discounting them as the draft seems to be. The likelihood of these threats,

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and their efficacy, will depend on a series of factors, not all of them, incidentally, under US control. First, there is the attitude of the Soviet Union. The Japanese continue to fear the Soviets. Should Soviet Government attitudes stiffen, or revert to a cold war hard line policy, I could well conceive of Japan feeling itself threatened beyond the extent implied in the draft, whether or not the practical likelihood of an attack by the Soviets was very high. Second, there is the question of what the US does in the Far East. If, as I have indicated above, the US begins a major retrenchment in both the physical sense and the political commitment sense from the area, I believe that the Japanese could believe that the threat to themselves had increased. It is also possible that the Soviets and the Chinese communists could believe that their latitude for bringing political pressure against other states in the area as well as against Japan, had expanded. Third, there is the question of the US/USSR strategic balance. In this connection, it would appear most likely that this balance is going to shift toward clearer acknowledged parity. Insofar as this turns out to be the case, the ability of the US to guarantee the security of allies, including Japan, will inevitably decrease. This will not necessarily be because the US wishes it to be the case, but because the credibility of our willingness to engage our nuclear forces in defense of a third party at the expense of unleashing a nuclear attack against ourselves, will increasingly be called into question. Fourth, and finally, there is the question of potential Japanese nuclear aspirations and how the US reacts to them. It is anyone's guess as to whether Japan will eventually opt for development of an independent nuclear capability. It would not be totally unreasonable from Japan's point of view for her to do so. Especially if other powers first make the move (for example, Israel), the internal political pressures may be irresistible. Should Japan decide to move in this direction, it is almost certainly bound to create great tensions in US/Japanese relationships. This, in turn, could effect how Japan sees the threats to its security from third parties. For all of the foregoing reasons, I tend to feel that the exposition of the threat in the draft is somewhat oversimplified. And this, in turn, oversimplifies the prescription of the US force requirement including reducing the treatment of the nuclear threat to a footnote.

3. Pages 2-5. In part the problem of Korea is related to the comments I have just offered with regard to Japan. Insofar as US policy involves a gradual removal of US forces from Korea, within the next several years, Japanese uncertainty about its own security is likely to be increased. As to the prospect of Chinese involvement in an attack on South Korea, it seems to me that it may be related to other questions beyond the issue of whether China's borders are threatened (though I agree this is a prime consideration). Some of these reasons are of the same nature as those to which I have alluded above, most particularly including the extent to which US involvement in Far East affairs seemed a less likely or more likely probability.

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4. Page 4. I referred earlier to the problem of obtaining MAP assistance in sufficient quantity to permit allies to stand on their own. I wonder whether this doesn't apply very specifically to Korea. When I last looked at the matter, Korean MAP requirements were very large indeed. Nevertheless, I certainly agree with the desirability of making these forces more self-reliant through provision of MAP assistance.

5. Page 4. I have already commented upon the relationship of US force withdrawals, especially within the near-range time period cited, and Japanese concerns for their own security. Beyond this, however, I wonder whether it is clear that a "token deployment" of US forces will present a persuasive evidence either to the South Koreans or the North Koreans of a continuing US commitment. In this connection, whether this token deployment is related to maintenance of a US nuclear capability is somewhat ambiguous (as contrasted to your earlier draft). Indeed, as you discuss this matter further (page 5) you suggest that we keep our policy with regard to nuclear usage intentionally ambiguous in order to keep the Chinese communists uncertain. I certainly comprehend the advantage of this as a deterrent to Chinese action (at least in contrast to a clear statement that we will not use our nuclear weapons). On the other hand, this concept troubles me, in that while it may serve as an adequate declaratory policy, it is not very helpful as a guide to the policy maker as to what our actual policy should be. As you undoubtedly know, the wisdom, or lack thereof, of employing nuclear weapons in a future Korean War has been a matter of very lively debate within the government. I would have thought that some attempt to outline further guidance as to what our actual policy might be would have made a quite constructive contribution. As a practical matter, I wonder whether we do not need an assumption, one way or the other, both for our own US force planning as well as for formulating our diplomatic position vis-a-vis the Republic of Korea.

6. Page 6. It was not clear to me whether the conclusion that "Taiwan forces were adequate to fend off likely communist invasion threats" was based on the assumption that they could accomplish this without US air and naval forces. I rather drew the implication that such was intended since the next sentence suggests that as something of a hedge we might, nevertheless, wish to commit such air and sea forces. 1.5

Beyond the foregoing issue, there is once again the question of extending the US nuclear guarantee to Taiwan as protection against Chinese growing nuclear threats. If we build an effective ABM force, and so long as that force is given a high probability of protecting against a Chinese nuclear threat, extension of the US commitment should be persuasive. However, I note that a separate S/P paper developed by

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Wreath Gathright on strategic force issues seems to argue against the advisability of a US ABM deployment. While I recognize that it can be argued that the Chinese would be deterred, even in the absence of a US ABM, by our overwhelming nuclear striking power, I don't know that this is something which can be guaranteed since as Chinese nuclear capabilities grow, the threat of significant damage to US cities could well neutralize the effectiveness of our threat against Communist China. In any event, I do not see us lightly using the Seventh Fleet nuclear capabilities without recognizing that this could result in a nuclear attack against the US. (This assumes, of course, that the Chinese develop such a capability within the decade, which we now estimate to be the case.)

7. Page 7. I am unclear as to the basis for the judgment that the Philippine bases are not of sufficient value to warrant US intervention to protect them. I do not argue that the contrary is the case, I simply state that the draft does not demonstrate the validity of the contention.

8. Page 8. Why is it that the paper discounts the possibility of a major resurgence of the Huk type of internal revolt, supported to some degree externally?

9. Page 8. With regard to the requirements for US military forces, see my previous comment with regard to the nuclear issue.

10. Page 8. Depending upon what is meant by "direct interests," I think it worth noting that in the case of Indonesia we are speaking of a nation of 100 million population with enormous potential wealth.

11. Page 9. The discussion of the threat to Indonesia seems to me to ignore what may be the most likely threat, namely, a takeover by elements friendly to the Chinese communist government. Though I would not necessarily believe this a high likelihood at this time, the fact is that we came within an eyelash of precisely that happening and I have seen recent reports which suggest that despite the widespread bloodshed there are still important Chinese communist elements operating in Indonesia.

12. Page 9. With regard to local insurgencies, the paper would seem to suggest that the US would not be prepared to play a very active role. Reference is made to "Australia and other outside powers" assisting with supplies, although I am unclear as to whether this is intended to include the US or not.

13. Page 11. The conclusion with regard to the remoteness of a Chinese invasion of Thailand, seems once again to depend at least in part upon certain developments which are not yet clearly foreseen. Principal among these is the nature of the settlement in Vietnam. If, for example, that settlement turns out to be on very unfavorable terms, and, further, if the US withdraws its presence from the area, pressures against Thailand

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which could include a Chinese involvement, seem not implausible. Nor do I understand why the draft views as relatively unlikely an escalation in the insurgency situation at the Thai borders leading to a conventional attack by the Vietnamese. In this connection, what would the paper's conclusion be as to the policy which the US should follow in the event that defense of Thailand, including US air bases, against insurgent attack are unsuccessfully met by the Thai armed forces themselves?

14. Page 13. Though the conclusion may be a correct one, what is the basis for the statement that we should not make the assumption "that we should be able to effectively repel an invasion /Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia/ with US ground forces?" We may not wish to do so for good and sufficient reasons, but it is not entirely clear that we could not do so if we deemed it in our interest. Further, in this same connection, the question of how to treat deterrence of a Chinese invasion is discussed in terms of declaratory policy, i.e., we should give the Chinese no assurance that nuclear weapons won't be employed. But, suppose there is overt Chinese military invasion, what then is our real policy supposed to be?

15. Page 14. Your treatment of the threat from the Soviet Union to South Asia, though it may be correct, does not really explore alternative Soviet motivations which are considerably less benign. It is not at all inconceivable, for example, that the Soviets wish to inject their influence into the area, thereby excluding ours, and prefer to do so if at all possible without resort to military action. In other words, it is not entirely clear that one can be confident that the Soviets share as much in common objectives with us, as I think is implied. If this should be the case, where does the policy prescription contained in the draft leave us?

In the same vein, in my judgment, the draft takes a very relaxed view of Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean. In one sense it may be correct to say that this activity is not currently directed at the nations of the subcontinent. At the same time, it seems to me that, in addition to offsetting Chinese influence, increased Soviet presence is quite consistent with the notion of a Soviet policy at least equally directed at excluding US influence. In the absence of an offsetting US military presence in the area, and especially if the Soviet naval presence continues to grow, I would think that this might very well result in bringing considerable political pressure against the Indian subcontinent. It would certainly not be the first time that naval forces were used by nations to project their presence and assert their influence in distant lands. Finally, this section recognizes that the Soviets should, after all, be expected to have a presence in the area, given the possibility of deployment of US missile carrying subs to the Indian Ocean. While I do not dispute this, the whole tone of this section frankly appears to, be overly apologetic for projection of Soviet force into the area, without, as I indicated earlier, raising the possibility that their policy may have more nefarious objectives.

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16. Page 16. The reference to the general adequacy of the US naval force "inventory" for meeting Indian Ocean requirements, is, I think, open to question. There was, as perhaps you know, an extensive discussion between State and Defense sometime ago concerning the advisability of stationing a carrier or a small carrier task force in that area of the world. Aside from other considerations, it was the Defense Department contention that we did not have the assets to spare. This, of course, raises the whole question of the size of the US carrier fleet which, under Secretary McNamara, was considerably reduced in size. Unless one is to interpret the draft's intent as foreseeing a need for an extremely modest and perhaps only occasional naval presence in the area, I think it goes too far to categorically state that there would be no requirement for an augmentation of our inventory (or at least a reactivation of currently moth-balled assets).

17. Pages 16-18. With regard to Iran, I am not at all sure that the Soviets can in all circumstances be deterred by an "expectation of US involvement" which does not involve an apparent willingness and capability to deploy land forces to the area. Perhaps Iran is not worth such an involvement -- this is not a matter I am addressing myself to at this point. It seems to me dangerous, however, to accept on the one hand the assumption that Iran can quickly and easily be overrun by a Soviet attack, while on the other hand arguing such an attack is likely to be deterred out of fear of possible US involvement, if at the same time we doubt our ability to involve our ground forces. The proposal that we convey to the Soviets a veiled threat that an attack on Iran might result in counter-moves "not confined to that locale" seems to me a threat which we would be better off not making unless we had something rather specific in mind. If we do have something specific, what is it?

18. Page 20. I was struck by the cryptic explanation of the US interest in Israel's future. Indeed, in no other part of the paper does one find a one sentence justification of US interests. No doubt this is in part attributable to the assumption that the reasons which dictate US support for Israel are well known and, in any event, from a domestic political point of view, largely outside of State's cognizance. Nevertheless, I would recommend an expansion of this section which would attempt an objective assessment of how and in what way Israel is important to US security (on the face of it, it does not measure up to some of the criteria set forth in Part I. of the paper), and insofar as the policy is dictated by domestic political considerations, I would recommend that we say so.

19. Page 21. I would be inclined to estimate the prospect of direct Soviet military intervention against Israel to be "uncertain" and very much dependent upon circumstances. Note, for example, the recent Soviet warning to Israel not to attack the Aswan Dam lest Soviet interests be directly engaged.

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20. Page 21. With regard to the requirement for US military force, I strongly recommend that this section be expanded. Depending upon how far into the future the requirements are to be projected, it is not at all clear that US ground forces would not be needed to protect Israel, assuming that its survival is, as stated in the draft paper, important to the US. Certainly ground forces are not now required against attack from Arab states, although in time, as Arab capabilities develop, such a requirement might present itself. With regard to the Soviet Union, if they were to become directly involved on the side of the Arabs, it is doubtful that anything short of a US ground effort could assure Israel's survival. Without further discussion, I do not see that the sentence at the top of Page 22, which discounts the need for US ground forces, is justified.

21. Page 22. As a totally separate consideration with regard to Israel, one not covered in the draft, I wonder whether it would not be well to speculate upon the policy consequences of the Israelis obtaining a nuclear capability. This is currently an item receiving intensive study within the intelligence community. As pointed out with regard to Japan, if Israel should opt for a nuclear capability, it would raise a number of highly complex issues which have direct relevance to our future security commitments in the Middle East. I would think that the policy paper would make a significant contribution if it attempted to sketch out in what way our policy might be affected by the aforementioned development.

22. Page 24. With regard to our security interests in Africa, you might wish to consider, including (a) refueling rights in South Africa (which will remain highly important so long as Suez remains closed), and (b) space tracking requirements.

23. Page 28. While the judgment may be a correct one, it is not entirely clear why the draft concludes that it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will attempt to involve itself in the export of subversive or insurgent movements to Latin America.

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I. NEW YORK TIMES

(1) HEADLINE "HAIG SEEKS BONN'S HELP AT MADRID TALKS"
(PAGE NO. 3)

BYLINE: JAMES M. MARKHAM

LEAD: "SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER M. HAIG JR. AND
FOREIGN MINISTER HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER OF WEST GERMANY
MET TODAY TO TRY TO RECONCILE DIFFERING APPROACHES TO THE
MADRID CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY, WHICH RECONVENES
TUESDAY IN A SESSION THAT THE WEST HOPES TO USE TO
DENOUNCE THE MILITARY CRACKDOWN IN POLAND."

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MAJOR POINTS: AFTER THE MEETING, AN OFFICIAL IN HAIG'S
PARTY SAID THAT ONE GOAL HAD BEEN "TO COORDINATE THEIR
RESPECTIVE STRATEGIES" AT MADRID AND THAT "THE COORDINA-
TION WAS EFFECTIVE." A HIGH-RANKING WEST GERMAN DIPLOMAT
SAID TWO MEN HAD AGREED THAT GIVEN THE FLUIDITY OF THE
SITUATION AT THE CONFERENCE HERE IT "WOULD BE UNWISE TO
DECIDE ON ANYTHING AS TO THE FUTURE PROCEDURE."

--UPON ARRIVING IN MADRID SUNDAY NIGHT, MR. HAIG DECLARED
THAT IT WAS "ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL" FOR THE 35 DELEGATIONS

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TO THE TALKS "TO VIEW THE SITUATION IN POLAND AS A FUNDAMENTAL, AND PERHAPS FATAL THREAT TO THE ENTIRE HELSINKI PROCESS."

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--MAX M. KAMPELMAN HAS UNDERSCORED WASHINGTON'S TOUGH POSITION BY NOT BRINGING WITH HIM ANY OF HIS SPECIALIZED NEGOTIATORS ON EUROPEAN MILITARY SECURITY QUESTIONS OR HUMAN RIGHTS. BUT HE IS KNOWN TO BELIEVE THAT THE MEETING WILL CONTINUE AT LEAST UNTIL NEXT WEEK BEFORE BOTH NATO AND WARSAW PACT STRATEGIES ARE CLARIFIED.

--CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDS TUESDAY'S SESSION. UNDER A SYSTEM OF ROTATION, THE CHAIRMAN SHOULD BE POLAND'S REPRESENTATIVE, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER JOZEF WIEJACZ.

--LATE TONIGHT, THE POLISH DELEGATION, DIPLOMATS IN THE SPANISH-RUN SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE AND THE DUTCH WERE NEGOTIATING TO ACCOMMODATE AT LEAST 14 WESTERN NATIONS THAT HAVE SOUGHT TO SPEAK TUESDAY AND SEVEN WARSAW PACT NATIONS ADDED BY MR. WIEJACZ AT THE LAST MINUTE.

--HAIG'S POSITION IN THE SPEAKING ORDER APPEARED TO HAVE UNCLASSIFIED

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DROPPED FROM 9TH TO 14TH AS A RESULT OF THESE LAST-MINUTE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH HAD THE GOAL OF AVOIDING A MAJOR DIPLOMATIC DISPUTE TUESDAY.

(2) HEADLINE: "POLAND OUTLINES ECONOMIC PROGRAM" (PAGE 3)

BYLINE: JOHN DARNTON

LEAD: "THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED THE OUTLINE OF A PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGES TODAY INTENDED TO MAKE POLAND ECONOMICALLY INDEPENDENT FROM THE WEST AND SELF-SUFFICIENT IN FOOD PRODUCTION."

MAJOR POINTS: CALLS FOR THE PLANNING COMMISSION AND VARIOUS MINISTRIES TO SUBMIT PLANS IN FEBRUARY, MARCH AND APRIL FOR OVERCOMING THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISIS.

--ONLY THE OVERALL GOALS WERE ANNOUNCED TODAY. THEY INCLUDE EXPANSION OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH OTHER SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES, A REORIENTATION OF INDUSTRIAL

PRODUCTION FOR AGRICULTURE, A MOVE TO LESSEN THE DEPENDENCE OF THE ECONOMY ON IMPORTS FROM THE WEST, AND WAGE AND PENSION REFORM.

--THE PROGRAM WAS A FURTHER REFINEMENT OF THE LINE Laid

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DOWN BY GEN. JARUZELSKI IN A SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT ON JAN. 25. THE CABINET MEETING ON FRIDAY AND THE PUBLICITY GIVEN IT TODAY WERE DESIGNED TO SUGGEST THAT THE MARTIAL-LAW REGIME WAS WORKING ON THE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS.

--A MAJOR ISSUE, WITH SOLIDARITY WILL BE THE FUTURE SHAPE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT.

--UNIONS, THE DOCUMENT SAID, ARE TO BE "AUTHENTIC, INDEPENDENT AND SELF-GOVERNING REPRESENTATIVES" OF THE

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WORKERS, BUT IT ADDED THAT THEY MUST BE "HARMONIOUSLY INTEGRATED" INTO THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE OF "CONSOLIDATING THE STATE AND SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY."

--TODAY A NEW SERIES CALLED "WE ACCUSE" BEGAN OVER THE RADIO. IT IS A COMPENDIUM OF QUOTATIONS FROM SOLIDARITY LEADERS AND INTERPRETATIONS DESIGNED TO SUBSTANTIATE THE NOTION THAT THE UNION HAD BEEN AFTER NOTHING LESS THAN AN OVERTHROW OF COMMUNISM.

--NEWSPAPERS HAVE BEGUN PUBLISHING ARTICLES TRYING TO SHOW THAT SOLIDARITY LEADERS WERE UNDEMOCRATIC AND LOOSE WITH UNION FUNDS. CHARGES OF EMBEZZLEMENT HAVE BEEN RAISED.

--THE DOCUMENTS CALLED FOR A SWITCH IN PRODUCTION TO GOODS THAT CAN BE MANUFACTURED WITH DOMESTIC RAW MATERIALS AND ALSO FOR EXPANDED COOPERATION WITH COMECON, THE SOVIET BLOC'S ECONOMIC ALLIANCE.

--ZLOTY DEVALUED WITHIN SOVIET BLOC

--AS A SIGN OF FURTHER EASING IN TENSIONS, POLICEMEN IN FRONT OF THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY PERMITTED POLES TO ENTER TO APPLY FOR VISAS FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE MARTIAL LAW WAS IMPOSED DEC. 13. AND TRAVEL CURBS WERE EASED FOR WESTERN DIPLOMATS, WHO MAY NOW TRAVEL WITHIN POLAND AFTER NOTIFYING THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THEIR PLANS...

(3) HEADLINE: "GOAL IN SALVADOR IS NOT MILITARY, STATE DEPT. SAYS"

BYLINE: BARBARA CROSSETTE (PAGE NO. 1)
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LEAD: "THE ADMINISTRATION DECLARED ONCE AGAIN TODAY THAT IT WAS NOT SEEKING A MILITARY SOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR BUT THAT FURTHER MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID WERE NEEDED THERE."

MAJOR POINTS: "OUR GOAL IS NOT A MILITARY VICTORY," ENDERS TOLDSFRC. "WE WANT TO HELP THE SALVADORANS PREVENT THE INSURGENTS FROM DISRUPTING THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS THAT ARE NOT UNDER WAY."

--A POLITICAL RESOLUTION IS THE ONLY SOLUTION FOR EL SALVADOR, SAID MR. ENDERS.

--HOWEVER, HE SAID, "WE ARE GOING FOR A LARGER AMOUNT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND A LARGER AMOUNT OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE."

--PERCY SAID IN INTRODUCTORY REMARKS THAT CONGRESS WAS UNDER STRONG PUBLIC PRESSURE TO REJECT THE ADMINISTRATION'S DECLARATION THAT EL SALVADOR WAS MAKING PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

--PELL ADDED THAT PUBLIC OPINION WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY INFLAMED ON THE ISSUE.

--MR ENDERS WAS SHARPLY QUESTIONED TODAY BY THREE DEMOCRATIC SENATORS, TSONGAS, DODD AND ZORINSKY, BUT HE WOULD NOT COMMENT DIRECTLY ON RECENT STATEMENTS BY HAIG THAT UNITED STATES MILITARY ACTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA WAS STILL A POLICY OPTION.

--"NOTHING HAS BEEN RULED OUT, BUT NOTHING HAS BEEN RULED IN," HE SAID.

--PRESSED FOR PROOF THAT EL SALVADOR HAD REDUCED THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE, AND QUESTIONED ON HOW THE

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UNITED STATES EMBASSY THERE HAD COLLECTED ITS EVIDENCE, ENDERS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT EL SALVADOR'S LEGAL SYSTEM "HAD VERY LARGELY BROKEN DOWN," THAT ITS JUDICIAL SYSTEM WAS "LARGELY INOPERATIVE" AND THAT ITS PROSECUTORS WERE SLOW IN PURSUING CASES.

--BUT HE REJECTED SUGGESTIONS THAT THE JUNTA SHOULD NEGOTIATE A NEW FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN WHICH THE GUERRILLAS WOULD TAKE PART. HE SAID THAT WOULD BE TO "HAND OVER" THE COUNTRY TO THE INSURGENTS.

--"WE ARE NOT SAYING THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN THE COUNTRY HAVE BEEN RESOLVED," MR. ENDERS SAID. "ON THE

CONTRARY, WE BELIEVE THAT MASSIVE PROBLEMS REMAIN."

--MR. ENDERS AND ELLIOTT ABRAMS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WHO ALSO TESTIFIED, SAID THAT THE ORGANIZATIONS REPORTING HIGHER FIGURES WOULD NOT SAY WHERE THEIR INFORMATION CAME FROM.

--"WE ARE NOT SEEKING A LOW BODY COUNT," MR. ABRAMS SAID, "WE ARE SEEKING AN ACCURATE BODY COUNT."

4. HEADLINE: "STUDY BY BONN FORESEES TROUBLE FOR THE MILITARY"

BYLINE: JOHN VINOCUR, P. 12, BONN, 2/8

LEAD: "THE WEST GERMAN ARMED FORCES, GENERALLY REGARDED AS THE STRONGEST COMPONENT IN WESTERN DEFENSE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, HAVE ENTERED A PERIOD OF DIFFICULTY AND POSSIBLE DECLINE, ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL STUDY PREPARED FOR DEFENSE MINISTER HANS APEL.

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-- IT WARNS THAT A WEB OF FINANCIAL, PERSONNEL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS HAS CREATED CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT IS INCREASINGLY QUESTIONABLE IF WEST GERMANY CAN FULLY MAINTAIN OVER THE NEXT DECADES ITS COMMITMENTS TO NATO, ITS FORCE LEVELS AND THE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGICAL STATUS OF ITS FIGHTING UNITS.

-- THE OFFICIALLY STATES GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE WAS OFFERED LAST MONTH BY MR. APEL AS PARLIAMENT APPROVED A 1982 MILITARY BUDGET THAT MAKES A DECREASE IN REAL MILITARY SPENDING IN THE YEAR A VIRTUAL CERTAINTY.

-- THE EXTENT OF THE DIFFICULTIES IS SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION.

THESE ARE SOME STATMENTS FROM THE DEFENSE MINISTRY STUDY:

"DEVELOPMENTS THAT ARE ALREADY APPARENT TODAY WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN THE HIGH LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE REQUIRED FOR SECURITY POLICY."

"THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE ALLIANCE ARE NOW HARDLY REALIZABLE."

"REAL GROWTH RATES FOR THE DEFENSE BUDGET ARE NOT TO BE EXPECTED."

"THE NATO 3 GOAL (AN INCREASE IN REAL SPENDING OF 3 PER YEAR) HAS NO CHANCE."

"WE ARE, IN FACT, NOT SECURED AGAINST ALL RISKS."

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-- IN GENERAL, FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES ARE NOT ONLY A RESULT OF NEW MONEY SHORTAGES BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF GROWTH IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE CONTINUING EXPANSION OF SOCIAL COSTS, BUT ARE ALSO A RESULT OF LONGER-TERM DEVELOPMENTS IN WHICH MILITARY SPENDING LOST OUT TO OTHER MORE POLITICALLY PALATABLE OR SEEMINGLY URGENT SECTORS OF GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT, SUCH AS DEVELOPMENT AID OR SOCIAL COSTS OR SERVICING THE NATIONAL DEBT.

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OPMENTS IN WHICH MILITARY SPENDING LOST OUT TO OTHER MORE POLITICALLY PALATABLE OR SEEMINGLY URGENT SECTORS OF GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT, SUCH AS DEVELOPMENT AID OR SOCIAL

COSTS OR SERVICING THE NATIONAL DEBT.

-- THE PROBLEM TAKES IN ALL THE POLITICAL PARTIES, AND NOT JUST THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND FREE DEMOCRATIC COALITION OF THE LAST 12 YEARS.

-- THE REPORT ALSO SAYS THAT THE PART OF MILITARY OUTLAYS GOING TO RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING FELL IN THE PAST 10 YEARS TO LOWER LEVELS THAN THOSE OF THE U.S., FRANCE AND BRITAIN.

-- IF, THEORETICALLY, NEW FUNDS COULD SLOW SOME OF THE TRENDS, MONEY STILL CANNOT COMPENSATE FOR THE COMING DECADES OF PERSONNEL SHORTAGES.

-- STARTING NEXT YEAR, THE NUMBER OF POTENTIAL RECRUITS FOR THE CONSCRIPT ARMY WILL BEGIN TO SINK AS A RESULT OF A FALL IN THE BIRTH RATE THAT ACCOMPANIED THE INTRODUCTION OF BIRTH CONTROL PILLS HERE A GENERATION AGO.

-- IN 1988, THE AVAILABLE POOL WILL SINK BELOW 252,000 FOR THE FIRST TIME, 1994 TO A LEVEL WHERE IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THERE WILL BE A SHORTAGE OF 109,000 RECRUITS.

NUMBER TRYING TO AVOID MILITARY SERVICE HAS GROWN, GOING FROM 45,000 IN 1979 TO 58,000 LAST YEAR.

-- THE INTERNAL REPORT WENT SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT PROMOTION PROBLEM "CAN DIRECTLY AFFECT THE FIGHTING CAPABILITY

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OF THE FORCES" BECAUSE OF THE AGE GAP BETWEEN MANY OFFICERS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE TROOPS. THE REPORT

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ALSO NOTED THAT SOME SPECIFIC JOBS WERE INCREASINGLY BEING HANDLED BY LESS THAN FULLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL.

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5. HEADLINE: "U.S. AND BONN AGREE ON A COMBAT-SUPPORT ACCORD"

BYLINE: BONN, 2/8, P. 13

LEAD: "AFTER MORE THAN TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE U.S AND WEST GERMANY HAVE AGREED ON A PROGRAM AIMED AT INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AMERICAN UNITS THAT WOULD BE FLOWN HERE AT A TIME OF CRISIS OR WAR."

-- THE AGREEMENT ON HOST NATION SUPPORT PROVIDES FOR THE ACTIVATION OF 90,000 WEST GERMAN RESERVISTS TO BACK UP THE "SIX ARMORED, MECHANIZED AND INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND ASSOCIATED FLYING SQUADRONS" THAT WOULD BE DISPATCHED HERE TO REINFORCE THE 4 AMERICAN DIVISIONS AND AIR FORCE SQUADRONS STATIONED IN WEST GERMANY.

THE AGREEMENT MUST STILL BE SIGNED BY BOTH SIDES. A DRAFT TEXT OF THE DOCUMENT WAS CIRCULATED TODAY AMONG MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT PREPARATORY TO ITS DISCUSSION ON WEDNESDAY BY THE BUNESTAG'S DEFENSE COMMISSION.

-- TRANSFERS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOGISTICAL TASKS FROM AMERICAN UNITS TO WEST GERMAN ARMED FORCES. THIS WOULD ALLOW THE AMERICANS TO CONCENTRATE ON PROVIDING COMBAT TROOPS IN THE REINFORCEMENT PLAN.

-- THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR BOTH WEST GERMAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SUPPORT.

-- APEL ESTIMATED THE COST OF SETTING UP THE PROGRAM WOULD BE \$325 MILLION, TO BE PAID EQUALLY BY THE 2 COUNTRIES OVER A 7 YEAR PERIOD. HE SAID THE ANNUAL OPERATIONAL COSTS THEREAFTER WOULD BE IN THE ORDER OF \$24 MILLION A YEAR.

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THE PROGRAM WILL BE STAFFED BY 1,200 WEST GERMAN TROOPS IN PEACE TIME. WHERE THE 90,000 RESERVISTS NEEDED FOR THE PLAN WILL COME FROM IS NOT CLEAR AND APPEARS TO BE A POTENTIAL ELEMENT FOR SOME POLITICAL DIFFICULTY.

6. HEADLINE: "INDONESIA EXPELS SOVIET AIDE AND ARRESTS AEROFLOT OFFICIAL"

BYLINE: JAKARTA, INDIA, 2/8, (AP), P. 13

LEAD: "INDONESIA ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT IT HAD EXPELLED A SOVIET DIPLOMAT AND ARRESTED A SOVIET AIRLINE EXECUTIVE ON CHARGES OF ESPIONAGE."

IT WAS THE FIRST EXPULSION OF A SOVIET DIPLOMAT BY INDONE-

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SIA, OFFICIALS SAID.

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S.P. YERGOROV, AN ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE, WAS DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA ON FRIDAY AND ORDERED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY WITHIN 24 HOURS. HE WAS SAID TO HAVE BEEN ARRESTED THURSDAY AT A RESTAURANT WHILE RECEIVING AN IMPORTANT DOCUMENT FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED INDONESIAN MILITARY OFFICIAL.

-- THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SAID ALEKSANDR FINENKO, WHO HEADS THE JAKARTA AEROFLOT WAS ARRESTED SATURDAY WHILE SEEING MR. YEGOROV OFF AT THE AIRPORT. IT SAID MR. FINENKO'S AEROFLOT POST WAS A COVER FOR HIS ROLE IN THE K.G.B.

-- SEVERAL SOVIET DIPLOMATS ASSAULTED INDONESIAL SECURITY OFFICERS AT MR. FINENKO'S ARREST, THE MINISTRY SAID.

7. HEADLINE: "SAUDIS SAY DIFFERENCES MAR TALKS WITH WEIN-

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BERGER"

BYLINE: RICHARD HALLORAN, P. 5, DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, 2/8

LEAD: "SEC. OF DEFENSE WEINBERGER ENDED 2 DAYS OF TALKS WITH SAUDI ARABIAN LEADERS TONIGHT WITH SAUDI OFFICIALS SUGGESTING THAT THE DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN TROUBLED BY FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES."

-- AMERICAN OFFICIALS DECLINED TO COMMENT.

-- ALTHOUGH DECLINING TO DISCUSS THE NATURE OF THE TALKS, AMERICAN OFFICIALS SAID THAT, BARRING LAST-MINUTE CHANGES, WEINBERGER HAD BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN PERSUADING PRINCE FAHD TO VISIT THE U.S. SO AS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON AND IN COMPLETING THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER LETTERS OF AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH THE \$8.5 BILLION SALE OF AWACS RADAR WARNING PLANES WOULD MOVE FORWARD.

-- THE AMERICAN OFFICIALS FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT WEINBERGER'S OFFER OF SUPPORT TO THE NEWLY FORMED GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AND HIS SUGGESTION THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE FORTHCOMING ON A PROPOSAL TO HELP BUILD A REGIONAL ARMS INDUSTRY HERE FELL ON DEAF EARS.

-- THE OFFICIALS ASSERTED THAT THE U.S. SALE OF AWACS RADAR PLANES AND F-15 FIGHTERS TO SAUDI ARABIA CONTRIBUTED LITTLE TO A POLITICAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. "YOU ARE JUST ARMS SALESMEN," SAID A GENERAL, "AND WE PAY CASH."

-- THOSE OFFICIALS DIFFERED IN THEIR VIEWS OF THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE THAT THE U.S. HAS BEEN BUILDING UP TO

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HELP DETER A SOVIET THREAT TO THE REGION. A MILITARY OFFICER SAID THE DEPLOYMENT FORCE WOULD BE INVITED IN ONLY AS A LAST RESORT. "WE DON'T WANT YOUR R.D.F.," HE SAID. THE SAUDI OFFICIALS SCORNE THE CAMP DAVID PEACE PROCESS. -- AFTER ONE CONVERSATION, A SENIOR INFORMATION OFFICIAL

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WAS ASKED WHETHER ANYTHING GOOD AT ALL HAD COME FROM THE CAMP DAVID EFFORT. "ONLY THE DEATH OF SADAT," HE REPLIED.

8. HEADLINE: "CHINESE TRY TO QUELL RUMORS THAT DENG'S POWER IS FADING"

BYLINE: CHRISTOPHER S. WREN, P. 4, PEKING, 2/8

LEAD: "SEVERAL CHINESE OFFICIALS AND EDITORS SOUGHT TODAY TO DAMPEN SPECULATION THAT CHINA'S 77 YEAR OLD LEADER, DENG XIAOPING, HAD LOST AUTHORITY THROUGH AN INTERNAL POWER STRUGGLE."

-- ONE EDITOR OBSERVED TODAY THAT MR. DENG HAD BEEN PULLING BACK FROM DAY-TO-DAY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SOME TIME.

--- THIS EVENING, ZENG TAO, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, TOLD CORRESPONDENTS AT A RECEPTION THAT THERE HAD BEEN "NO CHANGE IN THE DECISIONS" OF THAT SESSION, AT WHICH MR. DENG RETAINED HIS POST AS A DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE PARTY. DENG ALSO ASSUMED THE IMPORTANT POSITION OF CHAIRMAN OF THE PARTY'S MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMISSION, WHICH CONTROLS THE ARMY.

-- CHINESE OFFICIALS HAVE SAID PRIVATELY IN THE 4 WEEKS SINCE HE HAS BEEN OUT OF THE PUBLIC EYE THAT DENG HAS BEEN TRAVELING IN THE SOUTH. REPORTS FROM HONG KONG OVER THE WEEKEND PLACED HIM FOR THE FIRST TIME IN CANTON ON A TRIP BELIEVED TO BE CONNECTED WITH AN EXPECTED PURGE OF CORRUPT AND INCOMPETENT BUREAUCRATS.

-- THE GENERAL VIEW HERE IS THAT DENG WANTS TO AVOID BEING DRAINED BY DAILY COMMITMENTS AND MEETINGS SO THAT HE CAN

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DEVOTE HIS STRENGTH TO LARGER ISSUES, INCLUDING THE UNFINISHED 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE OVERHAUL OF THE BUREAUCRACY.

-- CHINESE OFFICIALS WHO HAS SUGGESTED THAT MR. DENG WAS IN THE SOUTH WOULD NOT CONFIRM THE HONG KONG REPORTS THAT HE

WAS IN CANTON.

-- HIS REPORTED PRESENCE THERE SUGGESTS, DIPLOMATS BELIEVE THAT HE IS STILL PLAYING A LEADING ROLE IN CHINESE POLITICS. HIS ABSENCE FROM PUBLIC VIEW HAS HAD NO APPARENT EFFECT ON THE OPERATION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

-- SOME RECENT ARRESTS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE CLEANUP ANNOUNCED LAST DECEMBER BY PRIME MINISTER ZHAO ZIYANG IS STARTING WITH CORRUPT OFFICIALS BEFORE TRYING TO ROOT OUT AGING OR INCOMPETENT OFFICE-HOLDERS AND RADICALS LEFT OVER FROM MAO'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION. IT APPEARS THAT THE CRACK DOWN WILL BE LAUNCHED IN THE PROVINCES BEFORE MOVING TO PEKING.

9. "AROUND THE WORLD", 2/9/82, P. A9

A. HEADLINE: "PENTECOSTALS IN SOVIET GET 2ND ROOM AT EMBASSY"

BYLINE: MOSCOW, 2/8, UPI

LEAD: PENTECOSTALISTS MOVED INTO A SECOND ROOM TODAY DOUBLING THEIR LIVING SPACE.

PYOTR VASHCHENKO SHOWED GUESTS INTO A 15 BY 9 FOOT ROOM THAT WAS FORMERLY THE EMBASSY'S BARBER SHOP. VASHCHENKO,

HIS WIFE, AVGUSTINA, AND THEIR DAUGHTERS LYUBA AND LILIYA WILL MOVE INTO THE CARPETED ROOM.

MARIYA CHMYKHALOV AND HER SON TIMOFEI WILL REMAIN IN THE ROOM NEXT DOOR.

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AN EMBASSY SPOKESMAN SAID THE DECISION TO GIVE THE PENTECOSTALS MORE LIVING SPACE WAS MADE BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR A. HARTMAN.

B. "U.S. WARHEAD DEFUSED IN WEST GERMAN BARN"

BYLINE: SCHRAMBERG, WEST GERMANY, 2/8, REUTERS

UNITED STATES DEMOLITION EXPERTS DEFUSED THE DAMAGED WARHEAD OF A SIDEWINDER MISSILE TODAY THAT WAS LOST A WEEK AGO FROM AN F-15 JET FIGHTER.

THE POLICE SAID THE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE, WHICH CRASHED THROUGH THE BARN'S ROOF AND WENT 6 FEET INTO THE GROUND, WAS DEFUSED AFTER 2 DAYS WORK.

C. HEADLINE: "MOROCCO REJECTS PLEA TO TALK WITH REBELS"

BYLINE: NAIROBI, KENYA, 2/8

LEAD: "MOROCCO REJECTED A RECOMMENDATION TONIGHT BY AFRICAN LEADERS PARTICIPATING IN A SPECIAL MEETING HERE THAT IT NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH THE POLISARIO FRONT ABOUT THE FUTURE OF WESTERN SAHARA.

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THE REJECTION WAS A REITERATION OF MOROCCO'S POSITION THAT SINCE THE GUERRILLAS ARE SUPPORTED BY ALGERIA, ANY TALKS ABOUT THE 7 YEAR OLD DISPUTE OVER WESTERN SAHARA SHOULD BE BETWEEN MOROCCO AND ALGERIA. THE ALGERIANS SAY THAT ONLY THE POLISARIO FRONT AND MOROCCO SHOULD NEGOTIATE.

MOROCCO'S REJECTION OF THE RECOMMENDATION CAME ON THE OPENING DAY OF A MEETING OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, WHICH WAS CALLED TO DISCUSS THE WESTERN SAHARA AND THE SITUATION IN CHAD.

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D. HEADLINE: "5 IRISH NATIONALS ARE ARRESTED BY U.S."

BYLINE: BUFFALO, NY, 2/8, UPI

LEAD: IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS SAID TODAY THAT 5 IRISH NATIONALS WERE ARRESTED OVER THE WEEKEND FOR ATTEMPTING TO ENTER THE U.S. FROM CANADA TO PURCHASE WEAPONS.

OFFICIALS DECLINED TO IDENTIFY THE 5 BUT SAID ADDITIONAL DETAILS WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE LATER.

E. HEADLINE: "MEXICAN TO VISIT NICARAGUA"

BYLINE: MEXICO CITY, 2/8, REUTERS

LEAD: PRESIDENT JOSE LOPEZ PORTILLO OF MEXICO WILL PAY A ONE-DAY VISIT TO NICARAGUA FEB. 21, THE MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SAID TODAY. A MINISTRY STATEMENT SAID HE WOULD BE GIVEN NICARAGUA'S HIGHEST DECORATION, THE ORDER OF GENERAL AUGUSTO SANDINO.

COPTERING SALVADOR

SUMMARY

CAYETANO CARPIO IS THE SENIOR LEADER OF THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS. HE HEADS THE POPULAR FORCES OF LIBERATION, ONE OF THE LARGEST ORGANIZATIONS OF THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT. THIS STATEMENT IS EXCERPTED FROM A TALK IN EL SALVADOR WITH ROGER BOYER - THIS IS A PSEUDONYM, REQUESTED BY T'L INTERVIEWER, WHO FEARS BEING DENIED READMISSION TO EL SALVADOR - FOR THE INTERLINK PRESS SERVICE, WHICH DISTRIBUTES THIRD-WORLD NEWS

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ALREADY HAS A COMBAT ROLE IN EL SALVADOR.

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ONE OF THE BIGGEST DANGERS OF THE ELECTIONS PROPOSED
BY PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE AND SUPPORTED BY THE
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REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS THAT THEY WILL SERVE AS A
SMOKESCREEN FOR A STEPPED-UP OFFENSIVE AND FOR ASKING FOR
INCREASED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FROM THE PENTAGON.

THE HELICOPTERS SUPPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES PROVIDE
ESSENTIAL SUPPORT FOR ALL OF THE JUNTA'S MILITARY
OPERATIONS. THIS EXPLAINS WHY REAGAN IS CONSTANTLY
INSISTING THAT THE UNITED STATES PROVIDE MORE HELICOPTERS.
PEOPLE NEED TO UNDERSTAND THE CRIMINAL NATURE OF THIS
WEAPON.

BUT WEAPONS ARE NOT THE ONLY FACTOR IN THIS CONFLICT.
IF IT WERE ONLY A TECHNICAL QUESTION OF ONE MILITARY UNIT
AGAINST ANOTHER, WE COULD MAKE A PREDICTION IN MILITARY
TERMS. BUT YOU CAN'T MAKE SUCH CALCULATIONS IN A
POPULAR WAR THAT HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR OVER 10 YEARS,
PUTTING THE ARMY AGAINST THE PEOPLE, AND ENGULFING THE
WHOLE COUNTRY.

THE POPULAR WAR IN ELSALVADOR IS BY NATURE SPREADING
THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

OUR PROGRAM IS FOR A DEMOCRATIC, REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT, NOT FOR A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT. THE PROGRAM
FOR THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IS VERY BROAD-BROADER
THAN THAT OF MANY OF THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS IN
EUROPE.

THE POPULAR MOVEMENT IS MADE UP OF A WIDE RANGE OF FORCES
WITH DIFFERENT WAYS OF THINKING, WHO HAVE JOINED TO-
GETHER IN THIS BROAD PROGRAM. THIS COALITION WILL HELP
THE COUNTRY FIND SOLUTIONS TO ITS PROBLEMS AND WILL GIVE
THE PEOPLE THE POLITICAL FREEDOM NECESSARY TO ORGANIZE
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AND CARRY FORWARD THE STRUGGLE FOR A PROGRAM THAT
INCLUDES DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND INDEPENDENCE.
THE MARXISTS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE AGREED TO SUPPORT THIS
PROGRAM BECAUSE EVERYBODY MUST BE REALISTIC, AND BEING A
MARXIST IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH BEING UNREALISTIC.

THERE IS NO TRUTH TO THE CLAIM THAT ALL THE DIFFERENT

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FORCES THAT SUPPORT THIS PROGRAM WILL HAVE TO GIVE UP THEIR PARTICULAR VIEWPOINTS.

THIS IS WHY THE CAMPAIGN BY REAGAN'S PROPAGANDA OFFICE AND BY THE PENTAGON AND THE C.I.A. ABOUT THE IMMEDIATE FORMATION OF A MARXIST GOVERNMENT IN EL SALVADOR IS SO FALLACIOUS. THEY ARE PERFECTLY WELL AWARE OF OUR DEMOCRATIC PROGRAM FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT.

BESIDES, HOW CAN THEY SAY THAT CUBA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REVOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR WHEN WE WERE FIGHTING TO CHANGE THE SITUATION LONG BEFORE CUBA ITSELF WAS LIBERATED? OUR REVOLUTION IS ROOTED IN THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN OUR COUNTRY. THE REAL SOURCE OF THE CRISIS IS EXTREME SOCIAL INJUSTICE - THE ENORMOUS GAP BETWEEN THE FEW WHO DOMINATE AND OWN EVERYTHING AND THE SALVADORAN PEOPLE.

THE NORTH AMERICAN PEOPLE, WHO HAVE SUCH DEEP HUMANISTIC VALUES, DO NOT DESERVE TO BE LED ALONG A MILITARISTIC AND AGGRESSIVE PATH.

THE REAGAN GOVERNMENT IS ACTUALLY DISCREDITING ITS PEOPLE. I HAVE SEEN CHILDREN OF 4, 6, 8 YEARS OLD SHOT DOWN BY BULLETS FROM HELICOPTERS WITH NORTH AMERICAN ADVISERS IN THEM. THE NORTH AMERICAN PEOPLE DO NOT DESERVE THIS IMAGE. THIS IS PERHAPS ONE OF THE GREATEST CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE REAGAN GOVERNMENT IN SUPPORTING THIS KIND OF WAR.

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ONSLAUGHT AND PARANOIA

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY OF CLOSER RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA MAY BE NUDGING THAT COUNTRY NEARER TO PERMITTING INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA. BUT COZYING UP THE AFRIKANERS WITH "QUIET DIPLOMACY" HAS DONE NOTHING

TO IMPROVE THEIR RACIST, REPRESSIVE REGIME.

IT'S NOT EVEN CLEAR THAT REAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM. SOUTH AFRICA HAS RESISTED INDEPENDENCE SO LONG AND SO ADAMANTLY THAT NO ONE SHOULD BE SURPRISED IF PRETORIA'S LATEST MOVE TURNS OUT TO BE ANOTHER EXERCISE IN MENDACITY.

FOR THE MOMENT, SOUTH AFRICA HAS TERMED "POSITIVE" -WITHOUT FINALLY ACCEPTING-THE REVISED WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR POST-INDEPENDENCE NAMIBIA.

BUT MANY STUDENTS OF PRETORIA'S PARANOID WORLD VIEW DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER P.W. BOTHA, WHICH REGARDS SWAPO AS A PUPPET OF MOSCOW, INTENDS EVER TO PERMIT A SWAPO GOVERNMENT ON ITS BORDER. IN THIS VIEW, SOUTH AFRICA'S RELUCTANT NEGOTIATION OF INDEPENDENCE PROCEDURES IS NOT DESIGNED MERELY TO LIMIT SOME FUTURE SWAPO GOVERNMENT SO MUCH AS TO CONTINUE DELAYING INDEPENDENCE ITSELF, PERHAPS INDEFINITELY - HENCE PREVENTING THE ELECTION OF ANY SWAPO GOVERNMENT AT ALL.

SO THE POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED THAT AFTER HAVING WRUNG ALL THE CONCESSIONS IT CAN FROM THE WEST, AND

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POSSIBLY HAVING DELAYED A RESOLUTION FOR YEARS, SOUTH AFRICA AGAIN WILL FIND SOME PRETEXT FOR REJECTING WHAT IT HAS APPEARED TO ACCEPT. PRETORIA HAS DONE IT BEFORE, AND NO ONE-NOT EVEN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WITH ITS PENCHANT FOR EMBRACING "AUTHORITARIAN" BUT ANTI-COMMUNIST REGIMES-SHOULD UNDERESTIMATE THE WILL AND CAPACITY OF THE AFRIKANERS TO GO THEIR OWN WAY.

NOTHING SUGGESTS, MOREOVER, THAT MR. REAGAN'S PROFFERED HAND HAS MADE SO MUCH AS A DENT IN APARTHEID OR REPRESENTATION.

NOW A JUDICIAL COMMISSION HAS REPORTED TO PARLIAMENT THAT SOUTH AFRICA FACES A "TOTAL ONSLAUGHT" FROM EAST AND WEST, DIRECTED PRIMARILY BY THE SOVIET UNION AND TAKING THE FORM OF A WHITE-BLACK POWER STRUGGLE. MOSCOW'S "PROXY" INSTRUMENTS IN FOMENTING IT WOULD BE THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, "BLACK THEOLOGY" (MEANING BISHOP DESMOND TUTU, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES), THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.

THE PRESS SAID THE COMMISSION MUST BE RESTRICTED AND

THE PROPOSED LIMITS WOULD EFFECTIVELY SILENCE CRITICISM IN BLACK AND ENGLISH-LANGUAGE WHITE NEWSPAPERS. THE NATION'S TOUGH BANNING AND DETENTION LAWS, NOT TO MENTION APARTHEID ITSELF, WOULD HAVE TO BE CONTINUED-WITH A FEW COSMETIC ADJUSTMENTS SUGGESTED.

SINCE THE END OF NOVEMBER, THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN INSTITUTE REPORTS, 17 SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNION, STUDENT AND CLERICAL LEADERS HAVE BEEN DETAINED; A FOURTH "INDEPENDENT" BLACK HOMELAND, CISCHEI, HAS BEEN CREATED, WITH A POPULATION OF 660,000 OF WHOM 150,000 HAVE BEEN DEPORTED FROM SOUTH AFRICA PROPER AND STRIPPED OF SOUTH

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AFRICAN CITIZENSHIP.

AND IN A SPECTACULAR DEMONSTRATION OF CONTEMPT AND ABSURDITY, THE GOVERNMENT HAS JUST INTRODUCED TELEVISION APARTHEID-A SEPARATE CHANNEL FOR THE NATION'S 24 MILLION BLACKS, BROADCAST IN FIVE AFRICAN LANGUAGES. UNLIKE THE CHANNEL FOR THE FIVE MILLION WHITES, APARTHEID TV WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO CLOSE ITS BROADCAST DAY WITH THE NATIONAL ANTHEM.

I. WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLES

"HAIG HOLDS TALKS WITH EUROPEANS ON POLISH CRISIS," P. 35

"U.S. TO DEMAND SUSPENSION OF MADRID CONFERENCE TO PROTEST REPRESSION"

"U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG MET WITH OTHER WESTERN FOREIGN MINISTERS IN AN EFFORT TO KEEP WORLD ATTENTION FOCUSED ON U.S. CHARGES OF SOVIET-SPONSORED REPRESSION IN POLAND."

--HAIG WAS SCHEDULED TO SPEAK TODAY AT THE RESUMING CSCE.

--U.S. OFFICIALS SAID MR. HAIG "WOULDN'T STAND FOR IT" IF THE EAST BLOC TRIED TO PREVENT HIS SPEECH ACCUSING POLAND AND SOVIETS OF VIOLATING THE HELSINKI ACCORDS. IF THE SPEECH WAS BLOCKED, THE OFFICIALS SAID, HAIG PROBABLY WOULD WALK OUT.

--AFTER HAIG SPOKE YESTERDAY WITH WEST GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER, AMERICAN SOURCES SAID BONN SHARES WASHINGTON'S GENERAL POSITION ON POLAND

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BUT DOESN'T WANT "TO GO ALL THE WAY" IN CALLING FOR A PROMPT END TO THE CONFERENCE.

--SWITZERLAND AND SOME OTHER NEUTRAL STATES FAVOR AN EARLY SUSPENSION OF THE MADRID TALKS, BUT FOR DIFFERENT REASONS FROM THOSE VOICED BY WASHINGTON.

--THE NEUTRALS ARGUE THAT CONTINUATION OF THE CONFERENCE AT THIS JUNCTURE COULD LEAD TO A DETERIORATION AND POSSIBLE TOTAL DISINTEGRATION OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS.

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THEY SAY THERE SHOULD BE A BREAK TO ALLOW THE POLISH SITUATION TO IMPROVE, AT WHICH TIME THERE WOULD BE A CONSENSUS ON FIXING THE DATE FOR ANOTHER REVIEW CONFERENCE.

--U.S. POSITION MAY SOFTEN SOMEWHAT ONCE PROCEEDINGS GET UNDERWAY, WITH WASHINGTON AGREEING TO TWO OR THREE WEEKS OF DISCUSSION BEFORE INSISTING ON SUSPENSION.

--TASS YESTERDAY SAID THE U.S. WOULD STAND IN "GROSS VIOLATION" OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS IF IT TRIED TO TURN THE CONFERENCE INTO A DEBATE ON POLAND.

--KORNILOV, SAID T HE U.S. WAS USING POLAND "AS A PRE-TEXT TO UPSET THE NORMAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORUM, TO

MAKE IT INTO A VEHICLE FOR INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES AND TO REVIVE THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE COLD WAR. "

II. WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLES

"U.S. WEIGHS TRADE ACTIONS AGAINST JAPAN, "

"DISSATISFACTION IS EXPRESSED; POSSIBLE MOVES INCLUDE SANCTIONS, GATT PROBE"

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"THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, DISSATISFIED WITH JAPAN'S LATEST EFFORTS TO LOWER ITS TRADE BARRIERS, IS CONSIDERING TOUGH MEASURES TO INTENSIFY PRESSURE ON THE JAPANESE." BROCK IS EXPECTED MAKE PUBLIC THE ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE LATER THIS WEEK.

--AT THE SAME TIME, TRADE OFFICIALS DISCLOSED THEY ARE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING A BROAD RANGE OF POSSIBLE U.S. ACTIONS TO PROD JAPAN FURTHER. THE MEASURES BEING DISCUSSED RANGE FROM IMPOSING SOME TRADE SANCTIONS TO BRINGING JAPAN BEFORE THE GENEVA-BASED GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE.

--OFFICIALS EMPHASIZED THAT THE QUESTION OF WHAT FURTHER STEPS TO TAKE STILL IS IN PRELIMINARY STAGES OF DISCUSSION AREN'T EXPECTED FOR SEVERAL MORE WEEKS. HOWEVER, THEY SAID THE U.S. DEFINITELY WON'T ACCEPT THE JAPANESE EFFORT AS FINAL.

--THE COMMON MARKET, IS CONSIDERING NEW MEASURES OF ITS OWN. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IS SCHEDULED TO DISCUSS

A SERIES OF NEW STEPS NEXT WEEK AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS LATE THIS MONTH.

--U.S. STRATEGISTS CONTEND RESENTMENT OF JAPAN'S WORLD-WIDE EXPORT DRIVE IS SO STRONG THAT TOKYO WOULD BE ALMOST CERTAIN TO LOSE ANY VOTE IN GATT COUNCILS. "THEY WOULDN'T HAVE A SINGLE FRIEND IN THE WHOLE GATT," ONE OFFICIAL HERE SAID. A DECISION AGAINST JAPAN IN GENEVA COULD PAVE THE WAY FOR OTHER NATIONS TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON JAPANESE IMPORTS LEGALLY, WITHOUT VIOLATING INTERNATIONAL TRADE RULES.

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III. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

(1) HEADLINE: "MADRID MEETING ON HUMAN RIGHTS ICY OVER POLAND" (PAGE NO. 4)

BYLINE: ANA WESTLEY

SUMMARY: MADRID, MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND VIRTUALLY GUARANTEES THAT CSCE WILL REOPEN IN COLD-WAR ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL ACCUSATIONS.

--WESTERN NATIONS HAVE STARTED MOVING CLOSER TOGETHER TO ALIGN THEIR POLISH STRATEGY.

--"EUROPEAN THESIS," OR AT LEAST PART OF THE EUROPEAN DELEGATION, HAD OPTED FOR SAVING THE CONFERENCE.

--SOME OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, SUCH AS BELGIUM, WEST GERMANY, AND FRANCE, FEEL THAT THE CONFERENCE NEED NOT BE SUSPENDED OVER THE POLAND ISSUE AS AN EAST-WEST FORUM AVAILABLE FOR DIALOGUE.

--WITH THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE SOURED BY POLAND, NO PROGRESS ON OTHER HUMAN-RIGHTS ISSUES OR ON DISARMAMENT IS EXPECTED. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY, AS A RESULT, THAT AFTER THE SPEECHES OF THE 15 WESTERN-BLOC FOREIGN MINISTERS, THE CONFERENCE MIGHT BE SUSPENDED AT THE INSTIGATION OF ONE OR MORE NONALIGNED OR NEUTRAL COUNTRIES.

(2) HEADLINE: "MODERATE ARABS WARM TO MUBARAK", "STRESS ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS PUTS EGYPT'S FOOT IN ARAB DOOR"

BYLINE: JOHN YEMMA (PAGE NO. 1)

LEAD: "AMMAN, JORDAN, EGYPT MAY BE ON THE VERGE OF A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE ARAB WORLD THAT SPURNED IT THREE

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YEARS AGO FOR SIGNING THE CAMP DAVID PEACE ACCORDS."

MAJOR POINTS: THE DRIFT BACK HAS NOW BEEN ACCELERATED BY THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT'S RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

--MAINSTREAM ARAB STATES, GRATIFIED BY MR. MUBARAK'S STRESS ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS DURING HIS WASHINGTON STAY, NOW APPEAR RECEPTIVE TO THE IDEA OF RECONCILIATION.

--THE EFFECT OF AN EGYPT-ARAB WORLD RAPPROCHEMENT, EVEN IF IT DOES NOT IMMEDIATELY MEAN A RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, WOULD BE TO:

-- STRENGTHEN THE ARAB BARGAINING POSITION VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL BY CREATING A STRONG, MODERATE BLOC.

-- INDUCE FRINGE MODERATES SUCH AS IRAQ TO BE LESS BELLICOSE TOWARD ISRAEL, AND THEREBY IMPROVE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ARAB WORLD.

-- OPEN THE DOOR TO FINANCIAL AID FOR EGYPT FROM THE OIL-RICH CONSERVATIVES IN EXCHANGE FOR MORE EGYPTIAN AID IN THE MILITARY AREA.

--ARAB INTELLECTUALS AND WESTERN DIPLOMATS VOICE CONCERN, HOWEVER, THAT THE RAPPROCHEMENT COULD BE SEVERELY TESTED IF ISRAEL MAKES A PROVOCATIVE MILITARY MOVE--SUCH AS ONE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON--BEFORE COMPLETING ITS APRIL 25 WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI.

--ISRAEL IS ALREADY UPSET WITH MR. MUBARAK'S DIPLOMATIC POSTURE.

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--WHAT HE APPEARS TO BE DOING, ESSENTIALLY, IS BRINGING EGYPT'S GOVERNMENTAL POLICY INTO LINE WITH THE EXTENSIVE DE-FACTO CONTACT THAT EGYPT AND THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD HAVE TODAY. AND THE RESPONSE HAS BEEN POSITIVE.

(3) HEADLINE: "EXPANDING ARMS SHIPMENTS: A DANGEROUS POLICY" (OP-ED PAGE)

BYLINE: WILLIAM HARTUNG

--IN ITS FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS MOVED RAPIDLY TO DISTINGUISH ITS POLICY ON THE TRANS-

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FER OF UNITED STATES ARMS TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES FROM THE
PREVIOUS CARTER ADMINISTRATION POLICY.

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--UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE REAGAN
POLICY TEAM HAS A HEALTHY RESPECT FOR THE DANGERS
INHERENT IN A COMMITMENT TO EXPANDED ARMS SHIPMENTS BY
A NATION WHICH IS ALREADY THE WORLD'S DOMINANT SUPPLIER.

--THE ADMINISTRATION'S CATALOG OF "ACHIEVEMENTS" IN
ARMS TRANSFER POLICY IS SUBSTANTIAL:

-- IT HAS EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATED LEGISLATIVE BANS ON
MILITARY AID TO CHILE AND ARGENTIAN, DESPITE THEIR CONTIN-
UING SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THEIR
OWN CITIZENS.

-- IT HAS ARRANGED THE EXEMPTION OF PAKISTAN FROM
LEGISLATION MANDATING THAT COUNTRIES SUSPECTED OF
DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS BE DENIED US MILITARY AID.
THE EXEMPTION CLEARS THE WAY FOR A PROPOSED MULTIYEAR,
DOLS. 3.2 BILLION MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID PLAN AND THE
SALE OF 40 F-16S.

-- IT HAS WON A HARD-FOUGHT VICTORY OVER CONGRESSIONAL
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OPPONENTS OF THE DOLS. 8.5 BILLION SAUDI AWACS DEAL, A
RECORD OFFER TO A COUNTRY WHICH ALREADY HAD OVER DOLS. 20
BILLION IN BACK ORDERS UNDER THE US GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN
MILITARY SALES PROGRAM.

-- IT HAS PUSHED THROUGH OVER DOLS. 50 MILLION IN
MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR, TWICE THE VALUE OF ALL US
MILITARY SHIPMENTS TO THAT NATION SINCE 1950. THE
RECENTLY INITIATED TRAINING OF 1,500 SALVADORAN MILITARY
PERSONNEL IN THE US WILL RESULT IN ADDITIONAL AID REQUESTS
BEFORE NEXT YEAR'S BUDGET GOES THROUGH.

--IN ADDITION, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS MOVED TO ENSURE A
MORE ACTIVE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN THE MARKETING OF US ARMS
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS REPEALED
THE SO-CALLED "LEPROSY LETTER," WHICH HAD PROHIBITED US
GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL FROM ACTIVELY PROMOTING THE SALE OF
US ARMS OVERSEAS. THE NEW REAGAN ARMS TRANSFER GUIDELINES
ACTIVELY ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW US WEAPONS
SOLELY FOR EXPORT.

--CONGRESS HAS AUTHORIZED THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED
SPECIAL DEFENSE ACQUISITION FUND, WHICH WILL STOCKPILE
COMMONLY ORDERED WEAPONS IN ORDER TO ASSURE FASTER
DELIVERY TIMES TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. AT A TIME WHEN

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MOST CIVILIAN PROGRAMS ARE BEING CUT BACK, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS PUSHED THROUGH SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN US MILITARY LOANS AND GRANTS SO THAT FINANCIALLY STRAPPED DEVELOPING NATIONS CAN AFFORD TO BUY US AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, TANKS, AND HELICOPTERS.

ALL THESE ACTIONS SUGGEST A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON MILITARY SOLUTIONS TO COMPLEX SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.
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FAR FROM AIMING TO MAINTAIN AN ABSTRACT "BALANCE OF POWER" IN REGIONS OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT, MANY OF THE ACCELERATED U.S. ARMS SHIPMENTS ARE BEING USED IN COMBAT. THE USE OF U.S. HELICOPTERS AGAINST REFUGEES IN EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS AND U.S. AIRCRAFT IN MOROCCO'S MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE WESTERN SAHARA ARE ONLY THE MOST BLATANT EXAMPLES OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDED ARMS TRANSFERS.

MORE GENERALLY, THE FREE FLOW OF WEAPONRY TO UNREPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENTS LIKE THE SAUDI MONARCHY AND THE ZIA UL-HAQ DICTATORSHIP IN PAKISTAN RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT FURTHER COMMITMENTS MIGHT BE MADE TO SUCH REGIMES IN THE NAME OF "STABILITY." PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS SAID THAT HE WILL NOT ALLOW SAUDI ARABIA TO BECOME ANOTHER IRAN, BUT THE SHAH'S FALL PROVED THAT NO AMOUNT OF ADVANCED U.S. WEAPONRY CAN KEEP AN UNPOPULAR REGIME IN POWER INDEFINITELY.

DOMESTICALLY, REAGAN POLICYMAKERS HAVE OVERLOOKED THE DANGERS TO THE U.S. ECONOMY OF GROWING DEPENDENCE ON ARMS SALES. THE MOST RECENT FIGURES FROM THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY SHOW THAT CLOSE TO 5 OF THE TOTAL U.S. EXPORTS CONSISTS OF WEAPONS. PARTICULAR COMPANIES ARE ESPECIALLY EXPORT-DEPENDENT: NORTHROP RECEIVED OVER HALF OF ITS BUSINESS IN FISCAL YEAR 1980 FROM FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CONTRACTS AND CHRYSLERS'S PRODUCTION LINE FOR THE M-60 TANK IS SOLELY DEPENDENT ON SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA FOR ITS CONTINUED OPERATION. THE AMERICAN LEAGUE FOR EXPORTS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE, AN ARMS INDUSTRY LOBBYING GROUP WHICH SUPPORTS THE EASING OF ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS "TO ASSIST U.S. EXPORTERS AND PROVIDE AMERICAN JOBS," HAS SEEN MANY OF ITS RECOMMENDATIONS TRANSLATED INTO POLICY DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF THE REAGAN TERM.

WHAT IS GOOD FOR A SMALL GROUP OF ARMS EXPORTING FIRMS
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IS NOT NECESSARILY GOOD FOR THE ECONOMY AS A WHOLE. ARMS EXPORTS CREATE FEWER JOBS PER DOLLAR SPENT THAN MOST CIVILIAN ENTERPRISES. AT THE SAME TIME, AGGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR EXPANDED ARMS SALES IS PRACTICALLY AN ADMISION OF DEFEAT IN THE AREAS OF CIVILIAN PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT WHICH COULD BE BENEFITING FROM THE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING TALENT CURRENTLY DEVOTED TO PRODUCING WEAPONS FOR EXPORT.

MOST IMPORTANT, A GROWING MARKET FOR ARMS EXPORTS DEPENDS ON CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, LEAVING WORKERS IN

THE ARMS EXPORT SECTOR IN THE UNEVIABLE POSITION OF DEPENDING ON INCREASING WORLD TENSIONS FOR THEIR LIVELIHOODS.

AFTER A YEAR IN PRACTICE, THE NEW REAGAN ARMS TRANSFER POLICY HARDLY LOOKS LIKE A LONG-TERM PRESCRIPTION FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY.

WILLIAM HARTUNG IS MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ANALYST FOR THE NEW YORK BASED COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, AND AUTHOR OF THE COUNCIL'S REPORT "WEAPONS FOR THE WORLD -- 1982."

IV. THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES ARE FROM THE BALTIMORE SUN:

1. HEADLINE: "BONN WAN'S MADRID TALKS MAINTAINED"
NO BYLINE; P. 4, MADRID

LEAD: "WEST GERMANY LAST NIGHT URGED THE U.S. TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET BLOC AT THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE DESPITE THE POLISH CRISIS."

MAJOR POINTS:

-- GENSCHER TOLD HAIG THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO BREAK
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OFF TALKS ON DETENTE, A WEST GERMAN SPOKESMAN SAID.

-- WHILE THE U.S. IS KEEPING ITS OPTIONS OPEN ON CONTINUING THE MARATHON CONFERENCE, SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS ARE KNOWN TO FAVOR A COOLING-OFF PERIOD UNTIL THE FALL AS A RESULT OF THE MILITARY CRACKDOWN IN POLAND.

-- GENSCHER TOLD HAIG SUCH A MOVE WOULD "NOT BE SENSIBLE" DESPITE TENSIONS CREATED BY THE POLISH CRISIS, THE BONN SPOKESMAN SAID.

-- A U.S. OFFICIAL SAID HAIG AND GENSCHER HAD A BROAD DISCUSSION ON THE POLISH SITUATION AND ON CONFERENCE TACTICS "DESIGNED TO COORDINATE THEIR RESPECTIVE STRATEGIES."

-- THE COORDINATION "WAS EFFECTIVE," THE AMERICAN OFFICIAL SAID.

-- THE GERMAN SPOKESMAN SAID THE 2 AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO DECIDE ON FUTURE TACTICS AT THE 15 MONTH CONFERENCE UNTIL AFTER TODAY'S SESSION AND THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL FRIDAY'S SESSION.

-- BOTH THE WEST AND THE NEUTRAL NATIONS AGREE THAT PROGRESS ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES SUCH AS DISARMAMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE IN THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE.

2. HEADLINE: "U.S. READY TO PRODUCE NERVE GAS, REAGAN SAYS"
NO BYLINE, P. 8, WASHINGTON

LEAD: "PRESIDENT REAGAN NOTIFIED CONGRESS YESTERDAY THAT HE PLANS TO RESUME PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN AMERICA FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1979 TO DETER RUSSIA'S USE OF ITS STOCKPILE AND TO BE ABLE TO RETALIATE IF DETERRENCE FAILS."

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PRODUCTION WILL REQUIRE A FURTHER APPROPRIATION OF \$123 MILLION SOUGHT IN THE FISCAL 1983 BUDGET.

-- REAGAN'S NOTIFICATION WAS REQUIRED BY LAW TO SET THE STAGE FOR PRODUCTION. HE CERTIFIED THAT THE STEP "IS ESSENTIAL TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST."

THE DEFENSE DEPT. SAID PRODUCTION OF TWO TYPES OF THE LETHAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS IS PLANNED -- A "BUGEYE BOMB" CARRYING THE NERVE AGENC VX AND A 155 MILLIMETER ARTILLERY SHELL THAT DELIVERS A NERVE AGENT CALLED GB.

-- THE PENTAGON REAFFIRMED AMERICAN COMMITMENT NOT TO USE SUCH WEAPONS FIRST AND ALSO REITERATED STANDING POLICY AGAINST EVEN THE POSSESSION OF BIOLOGICAL OR TOXIN WEAPONS.

-- THE PENTAGON, SUPPORTING THE PRODUCTION DECISION, SAID DEFENSIVE MEASURE ALONE MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH TO PREVENT SOVIET USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

ARTICLE NO. 3- BALTIMORE SUN

"2 SENATORS URGE SALVADOR TALKS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT, REBELS"

"TWO DEMOCRATIC SENATORS YESTERDAY URGED NEGOTIATIONS"

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND INSURGENTS IN EL SALVADOR, A STEP THE ADMINISTRATION CLAIMED WOULD LEAD, IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, TOWARD COMMUNIST RULE."

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THE TWO ARGUMENTS WERE DIRECTED AT THE SAME GOAL: FREEDOM AND AN END TO BLOODLETTING IN EL SALVADOR.

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"WE FEEL THAT IS THE WAY OUT, " MR. TSONGAS TOLD ADMINISTRATION WITNESSES. THEIR RESPONSE WAS THE ONE THEY HAVE GIVEN BEFORE: THE WAY OUT IS THROUGH THE FREE ELECTIONS PROMISED BY THE JUNTA, WHICH THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS.

THOMAS O. ENDERS; THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, CAREFULLY DEFINED THE ADMINISTRATION VIEW TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS.

--"OUR GOAL IS EFFECTIVENESS IN A VIOLENT AND BITTERLY DIVIDED AREA OF THE WORLD. I WOULD NEVER ARGUE THAT ALL THOSE OPPOSED TO THE REGIME ARE COMMUNISTS. I DO ARGUE, HOWEVER, THAT THE EXTREMISTS WOULD EMERGE WHICH WOULD IMPOSE A COMMUNIST DITATORSHIP."

--UNDER QUESTIONING BY TSONGAS, ENDERS SAID NO ONE HAS TRIED TO DEFINE WHAT THE ULTIMATE FINANCIAL COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES MAY BE.

--THEN THE ANSWER WAS A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, TSONGAS SAID, AND IT HAD TO COME THIS YEAR. MR. ENDERS ANSWERED WITH A QUESTION, "YOU MEAN JUST HAND IT OVER?"

--WOULD THAT MEAN JUST HANDING IT OVER? TSONGAS ASKED. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, ENDERS REPLIED, YES.

--BUT THE ALTERNATIV, TSONGAS SAID, WAS AN ENDLESS DRAIN ON THE TREASURY AND ULTIMATELY A DECISION WHETHER TO COMMIT U.S. TROOPS.

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-- SECURITY ASSISTANCE (AIASA),
-- PART I - FMF AND ESF

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SECTION I. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS:

A. (U) THE FUNDAMENTAL U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS TO ACHIEVE STABILITY BY PROMOTING LASTING PEACE AMONG THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION. IN ADDITION, THE U.S. SEEKS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRATIZATION, TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS OVER NATURAL RESOURCES SUCH AS WATER, AND TO END REGIONAL ARMS COMPETITION, PARTICULARLY IN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. IT ALSO UNDERTAKES TO PROMOTE THE ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF THE FREE MARKET, TO MAINTAIN ACCESS TO OIL RESOURCES, TO STRENGTHEN U.S. EXPORTS, AND TO MONITOR AND DEFEND HUMAN RIGHTS. THE ONGOING PEACE PROCESS OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BEGUN IN MADRID LAST OCTOBER, AND SPONSORED BY THE U.S., AIMS AT EFFECTIVELY MEDIATING THE FULL RANGE OF ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTES, AND PROVIDES A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING THE ABOVE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES.

B. (U) CENTRAL TO U.S. POLICY IS OUR ENDURING COMMITMENT TO THE SURVIVAL AND SECURITY OF THE STATE OF

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ISRAEL. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS KEY TO MAINTAINING ISRAEL'S DEFENSE, AND ITS CONFIDENCE IN THE CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT FOLLOWING THE GULF WAR, INCLUDING ITS ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. OUR ESF AND FMF GRANTS PROVIDE THE RESOURCES NECESSARY TO ALLOW ISRAEL TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE AND A QUALITATIVE EDGE OVER ITS REGIONAL ADVERSARIES. DURING THE GULF WAR, ISRAEL EXERCISED A POLICY OF RESTRAINT THAT CONTRIBUTED TO U.S. STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL OBJECTIVES, BUT IN THE PAST YEAR THE WISDOM OF THIS RESTRAINT HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DEBATE IN ISRAEL, REFLECTING THE ISRAELI DESIRE FOR MAXIMUM AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION IN DEFENSE MATTERS. ISRAEL HAS TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE REDUCED SHORT-TERM MILITARY THREAT POSTWAR BY REFORMULATING ITS DEFENSE THINKING, STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE, AND IMPLEMENTING A NUMBER OF LONG-TERM MILITARY REFORMS, ONE OF WHICH IS ITS POLICY OF ACTIVE MISSILE DEFENSE, AS IN THE "ARROW" ATBM PROGRAM.

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SECTION II. THREAT PERCEPTION:

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A. (S/NF)

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B. (S/NF) THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS: 


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C. (S/NF) COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION:

[REDACTED]

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D.. (S/NF) MISSILE AND NON-CONVENTIONAL WARFARE
PROLIFERATION:

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E. (S/NF) SYRIA:

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G. (S/NF) LEBANON: [REDACTED]

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H. (S/NF) [REDACTED]

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I. (S/NF) JORDAN: [REDACTED]

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K. (S/NF) IRAN: [REDACTED]

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L. (S/NF) SAUDI ARABIA: [REDACTED]

M. (S/NF) EGYPT: [REDACTED]

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NSCE-00 OMB-01 SP-01 SS-01 T-01 DTC-01 /039W
-----40DE66 192237Z /38

R 191203Z JUN 92
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2299
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN
TREASURY WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB
HQDA WASHDC
HQUSAF WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
CDRUSAJFKSWC FT BRAGG
DIA WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 13 TEL AVIV 08618

STATE FOR PM/DSRA, PM/DTP, PM/P, NEA/IAI
STATE PLEASE PASS TO OMB, ACDA, AID
SECDEF PLEASE PASS TO OSD/ISA ROMANOWSKI AND DSAA

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 08618 05 OF 13 191238Z
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SUBJECT: FY 1994 ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF

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PAGE 03

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SECTION III. HOST COUNTRY ACTIVITIES

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PAGE 04
A. GENERAL

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 08618 06 OF 13 191239Z
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INFO LOG-00 ACDA-15 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 EB-01 HA-09
H-01 INRE-00 INR-01 L-03 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 OMB-01 SP-01 SS-01 T-01 DTC-01 /039W
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R 191203Z JUN 92
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2300
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
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TREASURY WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB
HQDA WASHDC
HQUSAF WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
CDRUSAFKSWC FT BRAGG
DIA WASHDC

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STATE FOR PM/DSRA, PM/DTP, PM/P, NEA/IAI
STATE PLEASE PASS TO OMB, ACDA, AID
SECDEF PLEASE PASS TO OSD/ISA ROMANOWSKI AND DSAA

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
PAGE 02 TEL AV 08618 06 OF 13 191239Z
TAGS: MASS, EAID, IS
SUBJECT: FY 1994 ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF

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B. ARMY.

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PAGE 03 TEL AV 08618 06 OF 13 191239Z
(U) A NEW REAR AREA DEFENSE CORP/COMMAND TO PROTECT
POPULATED AREAS WAS ALSO RECENTLY ESTABLISHED. THIS NEW
COMMAND IS IN ADDITION TO THE NORTHERN, CENTRAL AND
SOUTHERN COMMANDS AND REFLECTS INCREASED DEFENSE CONCERN
FOR REAR AREA VULNERABILITY TO MISSILE ATTACK.

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 08618 07 OF 13 191241Z
ACTION PM-01

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NSCE-00 OMB-01 SP-01 SS-01 T-01 DTC-01 /039W
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R 191203Z JUN 92
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2301
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN
TREASURY WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB
HQDA WASHDC
HQUSAF WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
CDRUSAJFKSWC FT BRAGG
DIA WASHDC

~~SECTION 07 OF 13 TEL AVIV 08618~~

STATE FOR PM/DSRA, PM/DTP, PM/P, NEA/IAI
STATE PLEASE PASS TO OMB, ACDA, AID
SECDEF PLEASE PASS TO OSD/ISA ROMANOWSKI AND DSAA

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SUBJECT: FY. 1994 ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF

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D. NAVY

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(C) [REDACTED]

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R 191203Z JUN 92
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2302
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
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TREASURY WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB
HQDA WASHDC
HQUSAF WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
CDRUSAFJFKSWC FT BRAGG
DIA WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 08 OF 13 TEL AVIV 08618

STATE FOR PM/DSRA, PM/DTP, PM/P, NEA/IAI
STATE PLEASE PASS TO OMB, ACDA, AID
SECDEF PLEASE PASS TO OSD/ISA ROMANOWSKI AND DSAA

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SUBJECT: FY 1994 ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF


E. MARINES

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F. PARAMILITARY

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G. NATIONAL POLICE

(C/NF)



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SECTION IV. ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE SPENDING

A. ACTUAL EXPENDITURES FOR PREVIOUS TWO YEARS (1990 AND 1991)

(U) STATE 114962 REQUESTS A BREAKDOWN OF ACTUAL EXPENDITURES FOR 1990 AND 1991 ACCORDING TO BRANCH OF MILITARY SERVICE. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT AVAILABLE IN

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THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT BUDGET DOCUMENTS, NOR FROM
VARIOUS GOI BUDGET SOURCES. DATA ON DEFENSE
EXPENDITURES ARE PUBLISHED ACCORDING TO WAGES, TRANSFER
PAYMENTS, CONSTRUCTION, AND DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN
PURCHASES, AS FOLLOWS BELOW.

(IN MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

EXPENDITURE	1990 (ACT.)	1991 (EST.) (9 MONTH FY)
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PAGE 04 TEL AV 08618 08 OF 13 191242Z

WAGES/PENSIONS	2,134	1,646
TRANSFER PAYMENTS	425	318
CONSTRUCTION	176	135
PURCHASES IN-COUNTRY	2,012	1,658
PURCHASES ABROAD	1,983	1,373

TOTAL EXPENDITURES	6,730	5,130
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EXPLANATORY NOTES:

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NSCE-00 OMB-01 SP-01 SS-01 T-01 DTC-01 /039W
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R 191203Z JUN 92
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2303
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN
TREASURY WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB
HQDA WASHDC
HQUSAF WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
CDRUSAFKSWC FT BRAGG
DIR WASHDC

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STATE FOR PM/DSRA, PM/DTR, PM/P, NEA/IAI
STATE PLEASE PASS TO OMB, ACDA, AID
SECDEF PLEASE PASS TO OSD/ISA ROMANOWSKI AND DSAA

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SUBJECT: FY 1994 ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF

-- THE ORIGINAL DATA IN THE "BUDGET IN BRIEF" ARE IN
MILLIONS OF CURRENT SHEKELS.

-- ISRAELI FISCAL YEAR 1991 COVERED ONLY 9-MONTHS

-- THE FOLLOWING AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATES WERE USED TO

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CONVERT SHEKELS TO DOLLARS:

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1990	2.02
1991	2.28

-- BECAUSE CHANGES IN INFLATION AND IN DOLLAR/SHEKEL EXCHANGE RATES DO NOT PARALLEL EACH OTHER EXACTLY OVER TIME, BUDGET FIGURES, PARTICULARLY WHEN CONVERTED INTO DOLLARS TO DRAW COMPARISON BETWEEN YEARS, SHOULD BE REGARDED AS SOMEWHAT DISTORTED.

-- THERE ARE ADDITIONAL DISCREPENCIES DUE TO ROUNDING.

B. (U) DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP FOR PREVIOUS TWO YEARS (1990 AND 1991)

THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT PUBLISHES ITS NATIONAL ACCOUNTS ON A GDP RATHER THAN A GNP BASIS. THE SHARE OF DEFENSE SPENDING GIVEN BELOW IS PRESENTED ACCORDINGLY.

NOMINAL VALUE IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS FOR:

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ISRAELI FISCAL YEAR	1990	1991
---------------------	------	------

GDP	49.8	58.4
DEFENSE BUDGET	6.3	4.9 (9 MOS.)
-		6.2
-		(ANNUALIZED)

DEFENSE AS A PERCENT OF GDP:	12.6	10.6
-		(ANNUALIZED)

EXPLANATORY NOTE: GOI BUDGET OFFICIALS CAUTION AGAINST ANNUALIZATION OF BUDGET FIGURES AS THE LAST QUARTER OF A GIVEN FISCAL YEAR NORMALLY CONTAINS HIGHER EXPENDITURE LEVELS THAN THE PRECEDING QUARTERS.

THE FIGURES GIVEN ABOVE PRESENT A SOMEWHAT DISTORTED VIEW OF THE ACTUAL "DEFENSE BURDEN" ON THE ISRAELI

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ECONOMY. THE FIGURES FOR DEFENSE SPENDING INCLUDE U.S. FMF GRANT ASSISTANCE, WHICH CONTINUES TO REPRESENT 30 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL ISRAELI DEFENSE BURDEN. WHEN U.S. FMF GRANT ASSISTANCE IS SUBTRACTED AND ONLY DOMESTIC ISRAELI DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ARE CONSIDERED, THE "DEFENSE BURDEN" ON THE ISRAELI ECONOMY IS REDUCED TO LESS EXCESSIVE, ALTHOUGH STILL SIGNIFICANT, LEVELS.

C. THIRD COUNTRY SECURITY ASSISTANCE

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(U) DURING THE GULF WAR, ISRAEL RECEIVED SIGNIFICANT SECURITY ASSISTANCE FROM GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS. SOME OF THIS AID ARRIVED IN 1991 AND THE GOI EXPECTS THE REMAINDER TO ARRIVE IN 1992.

SECTION V. ARMS CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS:

A. (U) FOLLOWING LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE GULF WAR, MIDDLE EAST ARSENALS CONTINUE TO GROW IN SIZE AND SOPHISTICATION. OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE U.S. AND

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 08618 10 OF 13 191244Z
ACTION PM-01

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H-01 INRE-00 INR-01 L-03 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 OMB-01 SP-01 SS-01 T-01 DTC-01 /039W
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R 191203Z JUN 92
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2304
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
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TREASURY WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB
HQDA WASHDC
HQUSAF WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
CDRUSAJFKSWC FT BRAGG
DIA WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 10 OF 13 TEL AVIV 08618

STATE FOR PM/DSRA, PM/DTP, PM/P, NEA/IAI
STATE PLEASE PASS TO OMB, ACDA, AID
SECDEF PLEASE PASS TO OSD/ISA ROMANOWSKI AND DSAA

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 08618 1 OF 13 191244Z
TAGS: MASS, EAID, IS
SUBJECT: FY 1994 ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF

TO ISRAEL IS THE INCREASING NUMBER OF SURFACE-TO-SURFACE
MISSILES IN REGIONAL INVENTORIES, AND THE DRIVE BY
CERTAIN STATES TO ACQUIRE OR INCREASE THEIR STOCKS OF
UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, AND TO DEVELOP INDIGENOUS
PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES: U.S. SALES TO ISRAEL PROJECTED
FOR FY1994 WILL NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE REGIONAL

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ARMS RACE, IN VIEW OF CONTINUING ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL'S ADVERSARIES, INCLUDING SYRIA, LIBYA AND IRAN.

B. (U) TWO NEW DEVELOPMENTS MERIT ATTENTION: FIRST, THE PRESIDENT'S MAY 1991 ARMS CONTROL FOR THE MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE (ACME), TO CONTROL DESTABILIZING ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST, MAY BEGIN TO ENCOURAGE SUPPLIER RESTRAINT. SECOND IS THE ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL SECURITY WORKING GROUP OF THE MULTILATERAL TALKS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PEACE PROCESS, WHERE ISRAEL IS CONCERNED FIRST OF ALL BY CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ASSYMETRIES, BUT INCREASINGLY ALSO BY ITS ADVERSARIES' ACQUISITION OF UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

SECTION VI. HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT:

A. (U) AS A DEMOCRATIC STATE, ISRAEL MAINTAINS A NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS TO ENSURE DUE PROCESS AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS. HOWEVER, ISRAEL'S ARAB MINORITY, COMPRISING SIXTEEN PERCENT OF THE POPULATION,

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ASSERTS THAT IT IS SUBJECT TO VARYING FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION. THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, IN HER RECENT REPORT, ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ARAB CITIZENS OF ISRAEL ARE SUBJECT TO DISCRIMINATION IN A NUMBER OF AREAS.

B. (U) IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ISRAEL'S POLICIES HAVE REGULARLY RAISED HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE PALESTINIAN INTIFADA IN DECEMBER 1987. IN PAST YEARS, THE USG HAS CRITICIZED SUCH ACTS AS THE DEPORTATION OF PALESTINIANS FOR SECURITY OFFENSES, THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL, THE DEMOLITION OR SEALING OF HOMES OF SECURITY OFFENDERS, AND OCCASIONS WHERE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE HAS CAUSED AVOIDABLE CASUALTIES. IN 1992, THE USG CONTINUED TO EXPRESS ITS CONCERNS ABOUT VIOLATIONS IN THESE AREAS. ISRAEL HAS DEFENDED ITS ACTIONS ON THE GROUNDS THAT INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIES DIFFERENTLY TO TERRITORIES UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION AND THAT SECURITY THREATS TO ISRAEL DEMAND SUFFICIENTLY STRONG PUNITIVE AND DETERRENT MEASURES.

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C. (U) IN THE PAST YEAR, VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, AS WELL AS HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS IN ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, HAVE PUBLISHED REPORTS ALLEGING THAT ISRAELI SECURITY SERVICES HAVE USED PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE ON PRISONERS UNDERGOING INTERROGATION. LACK OF SUFFICIENT ISRAELI MEASURES TO REMEDY THE SITUATION LED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS TO PUBLICLY CALL FOR CHANGES IN ISRAELI PROCEDURES, A HIGHLY UNUSUAL STEP FOR THE ICRC.

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D. (U) FOLLOWING THE KILLING OF A NUMBER OF ISRAELI SETTLERS AND OTHER SHOOTING INCIDENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN LATE 1991-1992, ISRAELI AUTHORITIES IMPOSED A NUMBER OF CURFEWS ON VARIOUS AREAS OF THE WEST BANK. AFTER THE KILLINGS BY GAZANS OF ISRAELIS IN JAFFA AND BAT YAM, THE GOI ALSO SEALED OFF THE GAZA STRIP TWICE, THE LATTER FOR A PERIOD OF OVER FIFTEEN DAYS, AFTER WHICH A LIMITED RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS OCCURED. ISRAELI AUTHORITIES ASSERTED THESE WERE NECESSARY SECURITY MEASURES TO PROTECT ARAB WORKERS --

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 08618 11 OF 13 191245Z
ACTION PM-01

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TREASURY WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB
HQDA WASHDC
HQUSAF WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
CDRUSAFKSWC FT BRAGG
DIA WASHDC

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STATE FOR PM/DSRA, PM/DTP, PM/P, NEA/IAI
STATE PLEASE PASS TO OMB, ACDA, AID
SECDEF PLEASE PASS TO OSD/ISA ROMANOWSKI AND DSAA

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TAGS: MASS, EAID, IS
SUBJECT: FY 1994 ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF

FOLLOWING ANTI-ARAB RIOTING IN THE WAKE OF THE BAT YAM
MURDER -- BUT HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS TERMED THE ACTIONS
COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT.

E. (U) AN ISSUE THAT HAS SPARKED WIDE DEBATE IN ISRAEL
AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IS THE GOI'S USE OF

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UNDERCOVER UNITS. PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS ASSERT THAT THESE UNITS EMPLOY SHOOT-TO-KILL TACTICS AGAINST PALESTINIAN SUSPECTS. ONE HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP ASSERTS THAT UNDERCOVER UNITS HAD SHOT DEAD 19 INDIVIDUALS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1992, 9 OF WHOM WERE UNARMED. GOI OFFICIALS CLAIM THAT THE UNITS ARE BOUND BY STRICT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, ARE NECESSARY TO RESPOND TO THE PROLIFERATION OF FIREARMS IN THE TERRITORIES, AND THAT SOLDIERS WHO VIOLATE PROCEDURES WILL BE PUNISHED ACCORDING TO THE LAW.

F. (U) WHILE THE GOI HAS ANNOUNCED MEASURES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, PALESTINIANS CLAIM THAT LITTLE HAS BEEN DONE TO IMPLEMENT THE DECISIONS.

G. (U) ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, MONTHLY VISITS BY FAMILIES TO PALESTINIANS IN KETZIOT PRISON ARE CONTINUING UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE ICRC. ALSO, THE NUMBER OF DEMOLITIONS AND SEALINGS OF HOMES FOR SECURITY REASONS HAS DECLINED IN 1992. WHILE THE OVERALL PRISON POPULATION HAS NOT CHANGED, THE NUMBER OF PALESTINIANS

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IN ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION CONTINUED TO DECLINE
BEGINNING IN LATE 1991.

SECTION VII. STATUS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE:

B. (C)

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SPECIFIC, MUTUALLY-BENEFICIAL RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

[REDACTED]

D. (U) SINCE 1986 THE U.S. HAS PROVIDED 1.2 BILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY IN ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS (ESF) TO ISRAEL. THIS ASSISTANCE IS ENTIRELY IN GRANT FORM. ESF

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LEVELS APPROXIMATE ANNUAL DEBT PAYMENTS TO THE USG FOR
PAST IMF LOANS.

F. (U) ALTHOUGH THE GOI CONTINUES TO CALL ECONOMIC REFORM A PRIORITY, IT HAS HAD ONLY MODEST SUCCESS IN CARRYING OUT OVERALL STRUCTURAL REFORM. WHILE IMPORTANT STRIDES HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN CAPITAL MARKET AND FOREIGN CURRENCY REFORMS, MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE. PRIVATIZATION MOVES VERY SLOWLY AND LITTLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN REDUCING THE SHARE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE ECONOMY. WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURAL REFORM,

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 08618 12 OF 13 191246Z
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TREASURY WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB
HQDA WASHDC
HQUSAF WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
CDRUSAJFKSWC FT BRAGG
DIA WASHDC

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STATE FOR PM/DSRA, PM/DTP, PM/P, NEA/IAI
STATE PLEASE PASS TO OMB, ACDA, AID
SECDEF PLEASE PASS TO OSD/ISA ROMANOWSKI AND DSAA

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TAGS: MASS, EAID, IS
SUBJECT: FY 1994 ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF

LONG TERM SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH WILL BE DIFFICULT.

SECTION VIII. PROJECTED FY 1994 SECURITY ASSISTANCE

A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION

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B. FMF FINANCING RECOMMENDATIONS

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(U) ISRAELI MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS WILL PRESENT DETAILED AND CURRENT INFORMATION ON IDF SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS AND PROJECTED CASH FLOW TO THE NEXT BILATERAL MEETING IN WASHINGTON OF THE JOINT SECURITY ASSISTANCE PLANNING GROUP (JSAP).

C. NON-FUNDED FMS CASH AND COMMERCIAL MILITARY SALES/ACTIVITIES

(U) THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED DIRECTLY BY ISRAELI MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS AS A PART OF THE ANNUAL JSAP GROUP MEETING.

D. EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES

(U) THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED DIRECTLY BY ISRAELI MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS AS A PART OF THE ANNUAL

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JSAP GROUP'S MEETING.

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E. OVERALL ECONOMIC IMPACT ON HOST COUNTRY OF PROJECTED
MILITARY PURCHASES (FUNDED AND NON-FUNDED)

(U) ISRAEL HAS RECEIVED FMF ENTIRELY IN GRANT FORM SINCE
U.S. FY 1984. THE PROPOSED FMF PROGRAM THUS HAS LITTLE
DIRECT IMPACT ON THE SIZE OR STRUCTURE OF FUTURE ISRAELI
DEBT SERVICE TO THE UNITED STATES. THE ONLY ECONOMIC
PROBLEM GENERATED BY U.S. ASSISTANCE IS THAT THE GOI

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MAKES LITTLE, IF ANY EFFORT, TO STERILIZE THE AMOUNT OF
FMF CONVERTED INTO SHEKELS FOR LOCAL PURCHASES. THESE
MONIES THEREFORE IMPACT ON THE GENERAL PRICE LEVEL OF AN
ECONOMY PRONE TO INFLATION.

(C) EXPENDITURE OF ESF ASSISTANCE IS NOT SUBJECT TO USG
SUPERVISION. INSTEAD, IT IS CREDITED TO THE MINISTRY OF
FINANCE WHICH TREATS IT AS ANOTHER SOURCE OF GOVERNMENT
REVENUE. IDF EXPENDITURE OF THE DOMESTIC PURCHASES
PORTION OF FMF ALSO IS NOT SUBJECT TO USG SUPERVISION.
EMBASSY CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE DEFENSE BUDGET

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 08618 13 OF 13 191246Z
ACTION PM-01

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 08618 13 OF 13 191246Z
TAGS: MASS, EAID, IS
SUBJECT: FY 1994 ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF

LIKELY CONTAINS FUNDS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF ROADS AND
INFRASTRUCTURE TO MAINTAIN AND ESTABLISH ISRAELI
SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. GIVEN THE
FUNGIBILITY OF BOTH ESF ASSISTANCE AND THE DOMESTIC
PURCHASE PORTION OF FMF, IT COULD ALSO BE ARGUED THAT
U.S. ASSISTANCE FREES UP OTHER ISRAELI SOURCES TO FUND

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SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY.

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SECTION IX. FUTURE SECURITY ASSISTANCE NEEDS
(FY 1995)

(U) AS NOTED IN SECTION VIII-B ABOVE, DETAILED AND CURRENT DATA ON OUT YEAR PROGRAMS WILL BE PRESENTED BY THE GOI TO U.S. INTERAGENCY TEAM AT THE NEXT JSAP IN WASHINGTON.

SECTION X. ARMAMENTS-INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION

A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION (ARMAMENTS-INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION).

(U) IN JANUARY 1992, A FORMAL MEETING WAS CONDUCTED IN ISRAEL TO DISCUSS THE ACTIVITY UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING GOVERNING MUTUAL COOPERATION IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, SCIENTIST AND ENGINEER

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PAGE 03 TEL AV 08618 13 OF 13 191246Z
EXCHANGE, AND PROCUREMENT AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF DEFENSE EQUIPMENT. PROGRESS ON BOTH SIDES HAS BEEN MADE IN TRYING TO ADHERE TO THE SPIRIT AND TERMS OF THE MOU.

B. CURRENT ARMAMENTS/INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION ACTIVITIES.

(U) THERE IS A LARGE VOLUME OF ONGOING ARMAMENT COOPERATION ACTIVITIES. WHILE THEY HAVE LITTLE DIRECT IMPACT ON ISRAELI SHORT TERM SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS, THESE ACTIVITIES STRENGTHEN ISRAELI DEFENSE INDUSTRIES AND OVER THE LONGER TERM PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL SOURCE FOR ARMS PROCUREMENT. HARROP

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

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TO : The Secretary of State
FROM : EUR - Lawrence S. Eagleburger
SUBJECT : Your Meetings With FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt January 4-6, in Washington

SUMMARY

Schmidt's political standing at home, following the President's November 18 speech and Brezhnev's visit to Bonn, has improved somewhat, but the basic weaknesses, resulting from splits in his Party, economic ills, and the strength of the peace movement, remain. We have drawn much closer together on INF issues, and Schmidt remains committed to the implementation of the NATO double decision. However, Schmidt's visit coincides with serious problems within the Alliance over Poland, and the Polish crisis will dominate his talks in Washington.

Opinion on Poland in Germany, including within the SPD, seems to be going our way, and you can use your talks with Schmidt to nudge him in our direction. We should support Schmidt in his resolve to stand by the INF decision and preempt those who wish to undermine his position, both from within his own party and from the "peace movement." At the same time, we can use this visit to impress on him the continued need for FRG support to implement German national and NATO conventional defense programs in spite of strong adverse domestic political pressure and economic difficulties. You may wish to note current congressional and public pressures for greater allied contributions to the conventional defense burden.

Our most recent public opinion poll in the FRG, conducted in December, showed that three of four West Germans who saw, heard or read about the President's November 18 speech approved of the President's zero-option proposal. However, unconditional opposition to INF deployment in the FRG is still increasing: from 26% in July to 40% today.

I. OBJECTIVES

1. To seek a consensus on policy approaches to the problems in Poland.

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2. To assure Schmidt's continued support for the NATO double decision.
3. To exchange views on development and maintenance of a firm, coherent and consistent policy toward the East and discuss your prospective meeting with Gromyko.
4. To assess NATO conventional defense efforts and seek greater FRG contributions, including infrastructure and rapid reinforcement programs.
5. To capitalize on German public interest in Afghanistan and seek Schmidt's support for efforts to focus world attention on that issue.
6. To discuss strengthening U.S.-FRG cooperation on economic issues, both on domestic policies and those dealing with East-West economic issues.
7. To discuss evolving policies on Central America.
8. To assure that European efforts in the Middle East are complimentary to, and do not undercut, our own.
9. To exchange views on Greece and Turkey.

II. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary of State
Under Secretary Stoessel
Assistant Secretary Eagleburger
Ambassador Arthur F. Burns
EUR/DAS Thomas M. T. Niles
(Notetaker)

FRG

The Chancellor
State Secretary von
Staden
Ambassador Peter Hermes
Dr. Wilhelm Hoeynck,
German Chancellery

III. SETTING

You will be meeting privately with Schmidt at Blair House immediately upon his arrival January 4 and from 8 to 9:15 a.m. on Wednesday, January 6, for breakfast. You will also attend a dinner hosted by Chancellor Schmidt January 4 as well as attending the Chancellor's meeting with the President January 5 at 11:00 a.m. followed by lunch. You have also agreed to accompany the Chancellor to the Reflecting Pool for departure following your breakfast on January 6.

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IV. DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES

Key objectives and talking points are attached.

AH: This will have to be updated just before the meeting to take account of Poland!
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12/30/81 Ext. 20414

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EB: RHormats
EUR/RPM: ABohlen
ARA/CEN: AGiese
NEA/IAI: TMiller
EUR/EE: DGrabenstetter
EUR/EE: JRDavis

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1. To seek a consensus on policy approaches to the problems in Poland.

You have been in close contact with Hans-Dietrich Genscher concerning the measures which the President announced December 29 against the Soviet Union for their role in the imposition of martial law in Poland. Although we have not moved together on this issue and von Staden's initial reaction was negative, our positions are moving in the right direction. Genscher has promised you a full read-out on the December 30 visit of Deputy Prime Minister Rakowski to Bonn.

TALKING POINTS

-- WE URGE YOU AND OUR OTHER EUROPEAN FRIENDS TO TAKE STEPS OF YOUR OWN TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT THEIR ACTIONS IN POLAND ARE UNACCEPTABLE. WE OBVIOUSLY ARE NOT ASKING THAT YOUR MOVES BE IDENTICAL TO OUR MOVES BUT WE WOULD EXPECT SOME PARALLEL ACTIONS.

-- IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE IF THERE WERE CRITICAL PUBLIC REACTIONS FROM WESTERN GOVERNMENTS OR, EVEN WORSE, ACTIONS WHICH WORKED AGAINST THE STEPS WE ARE TAKING.

-- WE HOPE YOU WILL SUPPORT OUR CALL FOR A SPECIAL CSCE SESSION ON POLAND DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF JANUARY.

-- WE ARE CONTINUING TO SEND HUMANITARIAN FOOD AID TO POLAND, (SOME \$60 MILLION IS IN THE PIPELINE); ONLY GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT AID HAS BEEN SUSPENDED.

-- THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS SOUGHT TO MAKE CLEAR TO JARUZELSKI, AND TO MOSCOW, THAT WHILE WE WANT TO HELP POLAND RECOVER FROM ITS ECONOMIC CATASTROPHE, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO WHILE THOUSANDS OF POLES ARE IN CONCENTRATION CAMPS,

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SOLIDARITY'S LEADERSHIP IS UNDER ARREST, AND MARTIAL LAW CONTINUES. WE MUST SIGNAL CLEARLY TO WARSAW AND MOSCOW THAT THE WEST WILL NOT PROCEED WITH "BUSINESS AS USUAL" AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE.

-- WE SHOULD NOT BE SO NAIVE TO THINK THAT SOVIET INTERFERENCE IN POLAND IS NOT A MAJOR FACTOR IN FOMENTING THESE TRAGIC EVENTS. THE WEST MUST TAKE STEPS TO MAKE CLEAR AND CREDIBLE TO THE SOVIETS OUR DETERMINATION TO HOLD THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT HAS OCCURRED.

-- GIVEN A CHOICE BETWEEN FURTHER ECONOMIC DECLINE AND POSSIBLE WESTERN AID THERE IS AT LEAST A CHANCE THAT JARUZELSKI WILL CHANGE COURSE. THE WEST'S GREATEST LEVERAGE IS ECONOMIC.

-- WE NEED TO ACT NOW TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE WEST WILL NOT STAND BY IDLY IN THE FACE OF EVEN GREATER REPRESSION BY EITHER THE POLES OR MOSCOW. WE HOPE YOU WILL WORK TOGETHER WITH US TO DEVELOP A COORDINATED POSITION ON OUR STRATEGY TOWARD POLAND.

-- HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE VISIT OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER RAKOWSKI TO BONN?

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2. To assure Schmidt's continued support for the NATO dual track decision.

Schmidt has repeatedly stressed his commitment to the NATO dual track decision, but he continues to have trouble keeping his party behind him. As Schmidt prepares for the Munich SPD party convention in April, he will need to demonstrate the importance of his own role in NATO and U.S.-FRG consultations on intermediate nuclear force talks. While we should continue to bolster Schmidt, we should also impress on him and through him the German public the realities of the situation regarding the achievement of success at Geneva. We should emphasize that there must be no FRG-Soviet "private channel" on the INF negotiations.

TALKING POINTS

-- THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT ABOUT THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO BOTH TRACKS OF THE 1979 NATO DECISION. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF RAPID PROGRESS IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- DURING THIS TIME, IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE NO QUESTION OF ALLIED SUPPORT FOR U.S. POSITIONS IN GENEVA.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON THE TALKS, AND TRUST THAT WE CAN THEREBY AVOID DIFFERENCES WHICH COULD UNDERMINE OUR ABILITY TO EXACT CONCESSIONS WE ALL DESIRE FROM THE SOVIETS.

-- WHAT ARE YOUR SUGGESTIONS FOR WAYS TO BUILD ON THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUCCESS OF THE PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER 18 SPEECH?

-- I AM SURE YOU UNDERSTAND WHY THERE SHOULD BE NO PRIVATE CHANNEL BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE USSR ON INF, ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNIZE THAT YOU WILL DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH THE USSR.

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3. To exchange views on development and maintenance of a firm, coherent and consistent policy toward the East and discuss your prospective meeting with Gromyko.

We have been in very close touch with the FRG during the past few days as we decided on our measures in response to the Soviet action in Poland. Although we have taken these measures, we recognize the need to maintain efforts to relieve the suffering of the Polish people. Consequently, we are prepared to continue humanitarian assistance provided it goes to the needy. We have taken no decision that would affect the INF negotiations. Although Schmidt will be concerned about the President's action, he will welcome the decision to continue INF and the President's recognition of the special character of those negotiations. Schmidt should be reassured that the President is keeping his channels open by announcing his willingness to participate in a summit meeting with President Brezhnev in 1982. These moves, along with the hope that the U.S. will begin START negotiations as early as possible in 1982, should indicate to Schmidt that, while we are firm in our actions toward the Soviet Union, our measures are moderate and reasoned and that the dialogue has not been broken.

TALKING POINTS

-- WE HAVE TAKEN NO DECISIONS THAT WOULD AFFECT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRESIDENT RECOGNIZES THE SPECIAL CHARACTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND WE DO NOT INTEND TO ALTER OUR STANCE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. WE CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT START NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE INITIATED AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE IN 1982.

-- ALTHOUGH WE SEE NO SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, THE PRESIDENT HAS INDICATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN A PROPERLY-PREPARED SUMMIT MEETING WHICH HAD PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS WITH PRESIDENT BREZHNEV IN 1982.

-- WE THINK IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE HIGH LEVEL COCOM MEETING IN JANUARY AGREE TO SPECIFIC WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN TIGHTEN CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET UNION.

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4. To assess NATO conventional defense efforts and seek greater FRG contributions, including infrastructure and rapid reinforcement programs.

We recognize that the Germans face, as we do, stringent budgetary constraints on defense outlays. While we are sympathetic to these difficulties, especially in the face of the bleak economic outlook for the FRG, we must emphasize the negative effects of the FRG's reluctance to undertake major additional defense efforts on other NATO members.

While noting the successful completion of negotiations on wartime host nation support, we must press him to increase the FRG defense budget to meet NATO agreed goals and augment FRG contributions to NATO infrastructure. Although we recognize, as Ambassador Burns has pointed out, that increases in 1982 FRG defense spending are unlikely, it is important to keep the pressure on in order to achieve this objective in the longer run. As an immediate objective we want Schmidt to agree to facilitate the ongoing dialogue with us for German assistance on the master restationing plan. We should also stress the need for greater FRG non-military support of Western objectives outside the NATO area.

We should insure that Schmidt fully appreciates the seriousness of the critical attitudes in the Congress and elsewhere toward the level of the German defense effort.

TALKING POINTS

-- IF WE ARE TO REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND THEREBY REDUCE THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR, WE MUST RESTORE THE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT.

-- WHILE WE HAVE COMPLETED NEGOTIATIONS ON WARTIME HOST NATION SUPPORT, WE MUST DO MORE TO RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES ON NATO INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING.

-- CONTINUED SHORTFALLS IN NATO INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING COULD HAVE A SERIOUS IMPACT ON OUR ABILITY TO REINFORCE NATO AND ON NECESSARY CONVENTIONAL MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS.

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-- LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL FRG SUPPORT PLACES AN UNFAIR BURDEN ON OTHER ALLIANCE GOVERNMENTS WHICH ARE MAKING EXTRA EFFORTS FOR ALLIANCE DEFENSE AND SETS AN UNFORTUNATE STANDARD FOR NATO MEMBERS WHO WISH TO REDUCE DEFENSE SPENDING.

-- THIS COULD ALSO INSPIRE "MANSFIELD-TYPE" RESOLUTIONS IN OUR CONGRESS.

-- WE FEEL THAT WE ARE NOT MAKING SUFFICIENT PROGRESS IN GAINING THE SUPPORT AND INVOLVEMENT OF KEY ALLIES IN THE DEFENSE OF VITAL WESTERN INTERESTS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA. WE WOULD LIKE YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

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5. To capitalize on German public interest in Afghanistan and seek Schmidt's support for efforts to focus world attention on that issue.

In an effort to highlight the continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the idea of an "Afghanistan Day" was suggested by German Bundestag representatives to a U.S. briefing team on Afghanistan in September. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan provides the single best rallying point for counter-action to the media monopoly held by opponents of the U.S. position on East-West relations. Consequently, we are working hard to support Afghanistan Day, now scheduled for March 21, 1982. The Schmidt visit provides the opportunity for both the President and Schmidt to endorse the European Parliament's and the U.S. Congress' initiatives on Afghanistan Day. We are including language in the departure statement for the visit on Afghanistan Day.

TALKING POINTS

-- THE RESOLUTIONS SUPPORTING AFGHANISTAN DAY IN BOTH THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE U.S. CONGRESS ARE A VERY IMPORTANT EFFORT TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN.

-- WE SUPPORT EFFORTS TO COMMEMORATE AFGHANISTAN DAY ON MARCH 21, 1982, INCLUDING HIGH LEVEL SPEECHES, PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTIONS, CONCERTS, SYMPOSIA, AND ACADEMIC CONFERENCES.

-- IN THIS CONNECTION I HOPE THAT YOU WILL JOIN PRESIDENT REAGAN IN INCLUDING AFGHANISTAN AS A SUBJECT IN THE PUBLIC STATEMENT MADE AT THE END OF YOUR MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

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6. To discuss strengthening U.S.-FRG cooperation on economic issues, both on domestic policies and those dealing with East-West economic issues.

German economic forecasters give a very bleak picture for 1982 in the Federal Republic of Germany. Expected unemployment may exceed 1.6 million, the highest in several decades. In a recent letter to the President the Chancellor expressed his deep concern over possible strategic consequences of a continued economic decline in the West. The President replied that he was optimistic that the U.S. and its friends would be able to reverse the current economic trends and find a key to greater growth with lower inflation. Schmidt on the other hand has compared the current world economic scene with the 1930's and is profoundly worried about the bleak economic outlook. He considers economic issues a new arena of strategic competition of equal importance to the more familiar military and security areas. He openly worries about the fragile social fabric in Germany and fears that it may prove impossible for the FRG, as well as other European countries, to fulfill their defense commitments given this mood. Schmidt's concern is becoming a major preoccupation as the need for closely coordinated domestic economic and monetary policies between the U.S. and the Europeans becomes more urgent.

TALKING POINTS

-- DESPITE THE 1982 FORECASTS FOR THE FRG AND THE UNITED STATES, WHICH ARE BLEAK, WE MUST WORK TOGETHER TO STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM TO WHICH OUR COUNTRIES ARE COMMITTED. WE ARE WORRIED ABOUT PRESSURES FOR PROTECTIONISM AND INCREASED SUBSIDIES IN THE EC. WE HOPE THE GERMANS CAN BE STRONG IN RESISTING THESE PRESSURES.

-- WE MUST PREPARE DILIGENTLY FOR THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN THE SPRING IN AN EFFORT TO COORDINATE OUR POLICIES. WE SHOULD ALSO ENCOURAGE INCREASED CONSULTATIONS AND EXCHANGES BETWEEN ECONOMIC DECISION MAKERS IN BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS AND CENTRAL BANKS ON A BILATERAL BASIS AS WELL AS MULTILATERALLY.

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7. To discuss evolving policies on Central America.

TALKING POINTS

-- WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONTINUED ARMS BUILD-UP IN NICARAGUA AND NICARAGUA'S CLOSE LINKS WITH CUBA AS WELL AS THEIR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS.

-- IT IS ESSENTIAL TO IMPRESS ON THE SANDINISTAS THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING PLURALISM AT HOME AND ENDING THEIR PROVOCATIVE ARMS BUILD-UP AND SUBVERSION OF OTHER COUNTRIES IF GRAVE CONSEQUENCES ARE TO BE AVOIDED.

-- WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANYTHING YOU CAN DO THROUGH YOUR GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY CONTACTS WITH THE NICARAGUANS.

-- WE URGE YOU TO RETURN YOUR AMBASSADOR TO EL SALVADOR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

-- PREPARATIONS FOR THE EL SALVADORAN ELECTIONS ARE WELL UNDER WAY. THE EL SALVADOR GOVERNMENT AND THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES ARE COMMITTED TO PROVIDE GUARANTEES FOR THE SECURITY OF THE ELECTION AND TO MINIMIZE THE RISKS OF VIOLENCE.

-- THE POLITICAL LEFT IN EL SALVADOR HAS EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION. WE PLAN TO SEND AN OBSERVER MISSION IN LATE JANUARY. WE URGE YOU TO DO THE SAME.

-- WE ARE VERY DISAPPOINTED AND PUZZLED BY YOUR U.N. VOTE ON EL SALVADOR AND HOPE THIS DOES NOT INDICATE ANY SHIFT IN FRG POLICY.

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8. To assure that European efforts in the Middle East are complimentary to, and do not undercut, our own.

On January 5 the U.N. Security Council will vote on sanctions against Israel for the annexation of the Golan Heights. Schmidt's continued support for our Middle East policy at this sensitive time is important and, although we are deeply disappointed with this action, the Israelis remain a member of the Western family. You may wish to reiterate the reasons for our disappointment with their action, namely, that the annexation is without international legal effect and that the action violated the Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation, in which we both agreed each would take the other's interests in the region into account in making major policy decisions affecting the other. Also, implicit in this understanding was the perception by both sides that there would be no more surprises like the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor. You may also want to clarify that the MOU on strategic cooperation is not cancelled, in our view, but rather we have decided not to proceed at this time with some of the talks called for under the agreement. In essence, the core relationship between the U.S. and Israel remains solid, and we would hope that the FRG continues to support our Middle East policy.

TALKING POINTS

-- THANK YOU FOR YOUR SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AT THIS SENSITIVE TIME. ALTHOUGH WE ARE DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, THE CORE RELATIONSHIP REMAINS FIRM.

-- WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE MOU ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION CANCELLED. WE HAVE DECIDED ONLY NOT TO PROCEED AT THIS TIME IN PURSUING DISCUSSION TO IMPLEMENT CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE MOU.

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9. To exchange views on Greece and Turkey.

Turkey - Turkey must have a large OECD pledge in 1982 to sustain its economic recovery program. Substantial German aid is crucial; other European donors and the Japanese take their cue from Bonn. Evren's December 30 announcement of a timetable for return to democracy should provide Schmidt with the weapon he needs to silence Turkey's critics within his coalition. We should urge him to seize the initiative.

Greece - Papandreou will visit Bonn early in 1982 at Schmidt's invitation. Intelligence indicates Schmidt told Papandreou at the EC summit that his statements on nuclear weapons ignore the implications of unilateral denuclearization by a NATO member, weaken the West's negotiating position, and are unacceptable to the FRG. We should encourage Schmidt's efforts to moderate Papandreou's stance on the nuclear issue as well as on ratification of Spanish accession to NATO and pragmatic approaches to strengthen Western security. (Note: At request of Schmidt's staff, we provided the 1976 Kissinger-Bitsios exchange on our East Mediterranean policy and the 1981 DECA negotiating history on the "security guarantee" issue.)

TALKING POINTS

(Turkey)

-- GENERAL EVREN'S ANNOUNCEMENT LAYING OUT A TIMETABLE FOR RETURN TO DEMOCRACY WILL HELP ACHIEVE A SUCCESSFUL 1982 OECD PLEDGING SESSION.

-- WE SHOULD SEIZE THE INITIATIVE FROM TURKEY'S CRITICS AND ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF VITALLY NEEDED ASSISTANCE.

-- CONTINUED WESTERN AID IS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM FOR TURKISH ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND RETURN TO STABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT.

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(Greece)

--TELL SCHMIDT ABOUT YOUR MEETING WITH PAPANDREOU.

--EXPRESS SATISFACTION PAPANDREOU WILL VISIT FRG, GIVING
SCHMIDT OPPORTUNITY TO URGE MODERATION RE SECURITY ISSUES AND
ACCEPTANCE OF GREEK RESPONSIBILITIES AS IMPORTANT MEMBER OF
WESTERN COMMUNITY.

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
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Open Secrets

Why the so-called Clipper chip—vilified as a threat to the privacy of electronic communications—is not worth losing sleep over

THE political problem the Clinton Administration least expected was a war with America's high-tech community. Between Al Gore's patronage of the "information superhighway" and the Administration's various policies favoring the computer and semiconductor industries, Bill Clinton might have imagined that the Americans who build, buy, and use computers would be among his biggest fans.

Instead, since late last year electronic forums, which are the talk shows of the computer world, have rung with bitter denunciations of Clinton and Gore for having "betrayed" and "sold out" their high-tech constituency. The complaints have to do with two related proposals affecting privacy in the electronic age: for the use of a new encryption device called the Clipper chip, and for updating the law concerning wiretaps through the Digital Telephony bill.

The subjects of these proposals are highly technical, yet the debate about them has become as intense and polarized as those over school prayer and gun control. In one month this spring some 50,000 computer users endorsed a petition circulated on the Internet which denounced the Clipper-chip plan. "If this Clipper monster isn't stopped soon, we are going to witness the criminalization of anyone who insists on complete privacy of personal communications on computer

networks," one wholly typical Internet message said. "Beating Clip-

per is a crucial step in freeing ourselves from all the dark possibilities of an authoritarian national-security state."

When I first heard about these plans, I was ready to go on the warpath alongside my fellow on-line habitués. But the more I have learned about the proposals, the less wrought-up I have become. The Clipper initiative, which has been the bat-

terficialized of the two plans, seems to me to be foolish and misguided—but also quite easily thwarted by those who most oppose it. The Digital Telephony proposal, in comparison, seems more reasonable and balanced. Looked at closely, neither is the watershed in the history of American freedoms that the electronic community has made it out to be.

BEFORE going into the ugly to-and-fro over the Clipper proposal, let's consider the beautiful mathematical discoveries that have given rise to the whole debate.

The Clipper controversy concerns cryptography—putting messages into code. Codes have been around for about as long as people have been communicating, but until 1976 all codes shared one great flaw. Each relied on a secret "key," or coding method, with which the "plaintext" of the message could be encoded into "ciphertext" and then decoded into plaintext at the other end. The person sending the message had to agree beforehand with the person receiving it on what the key would be—references to pages in a book, a system of letter transposition, or one of countless other possibilities. The need for two or more people to agree ahead of time on a key created problems that have been the stuff of spy novels and war histories for hundreds of years: lost keys, stolen keys, counterfeit keys, keys that arrived after the message itself.

In 1976 Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, both then at Stanford, wrote a paper proposing the radically different concept of a "public key" coding system, in which sender and receiver need never discuss a secret key. In 1978 Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman, then all at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, published a paper showing for the first time (at least in unclassified literature) exactly how a public-key system might work. This paper, which formulated what has come to be known as the RSA system, and the Diffie and Hellman paper before it are routinely referred to as being the "most innovative" or "most profound" steps in modern cryptography, because they eliminated the vulnerability that had afflicted all previous codes.

by James Fallows

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combinations, which is supposed to keep the other children out, but the teachers can always look in the lockers by using the key."

That the government will have long-term possession of all secret Clipper keys is the reason the NSA and the FBI favored the proposal—and also the reason that nearly all of the high-tech community lined up against it. Privacy advocates were upset enough by the idea that the government would retain the keys. Even worse was the possibility that the bureaucrats guarding the keys could be bribed to turn them over to criminals or to foreign governments, which could then listen in on all supposedly "secure" conversations. (The arrest of Aldrich Ames, the alleged mole in the CIA, came in the middle of the Clipper debate.) Companies that make computers, modems, and telephone systems have unanimously opposed the Clipper plan. They say that as technology has evolved toward international standards, it has grown complicated and costly to make two different versions of all equipment—one with Clipper, for sales in America, and one without Clipper, for export. (Customers in, say, France or China would not be eager to buy scrambling equipment to which the U.S. government permanently held the keys.)

Nonetheless, the Clipper plan required no legislation, and early this year the Administration issued the orders putting it into effect. Clipper now exists as a standard for government contracts and purchases. Most of the secure, or encrypted, communications equipment sold in this country is sold to federal agencies (the military, the intelligence services, and law-enforcement divisions). Henceforth these agencies will not buy secure systems unless they are based on the Clipper chip.

WAS this a wise decision? No. Is this the end of American civil liberties? I think not. The very trait that makes me wish the government had not adopted the Clipper standard also means that Clipper is not worth getting upset about.

This trait is the voluntary nature of the Clipper scheme. From now on, anyone who talks on a government-owned secure phone will be talking on Clipper, but no one else is obliged to use a Clipper

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THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY

When was the last time you tried making a soufflé? Or even ate a soufflé? Although no dessert is more elegant, a soufflé can be difficult and rich. But not this one. If you own an eggbeater or a mixer, this recipe is foolproof. And chocolate cake or real chocolate truffles are far more caloric than

these divine puffs of air, gooey with melting bits of chocolate and scented with Godiva Liqueur. The chef is Allen Susser, a master of the new Miami cuisine, with its Southwest Caribbean, and Cuban touches. This can stretch to serve four, but you might want to share it with just one friend.

Create
This
Delicate
Soufflé
with
Godiva
Liqueur

Godiva Liqueur Chocolate Truffle Soufflé

For 2-4
2 large eggs, separated
2 tablespoons flour
1 1/2 tablespoons butter, softened
1 cup milk
1 teaspoon vanilla
3 tablespoons sugar
2 tablespoons cocoa
1 tablespoon Godiva Liqueur
2 tablespoons semi-sweet chocolate pieces

Using a wooden spoon, combine the flour and 1 tablespoon of butter, beating until it forms a lump and comes off the sides of the bowl.

In a medium pot heat the milk with 1/2 teaspoon vanilla for five minutes, until it comes to a simmer. Mix in the flour-butter mixture and beat with a wire whisk until it dissolves and the milk begins to thicken. Continue to cook for two minutes, folding the mixture with a rubber

spatula until it is smooth and shiny. Remove from heat and pour into the bowl of an electric mixer. Beat at low speed, adding the egg yolks one at a time and then the sugar.

Once the mixture has cooled, mix the remaining vanilla, 1 tablespoon cocoa, and the Godiva Liqueur into the soufflé base. In a separate bowl whip the egg whites only until they form soft, not stiff, peaks. Gently fold egg whites into the soufflé base in two batches.

Brush a straight-sided eight-inch baking dish that is at least four inches high with the remaining butter and dust it with sugar, knocking out the excess sugar. Ladle the soufflé base into the dish until half full. Drop in the chocolate pieces. Bake soufflé dish to the rim of the oven mix. Bake in preheated oven at 375° for 30 minutes. Dust with cocoa powder and serve immediately.



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phone. Nor is anyone forbidden to develop, sell, or use other encryption schemes. The three inventors of the RSA code, for example, have formed a company, RSA Data Security, that sells public-key coding programs for less than \$500. Americans are as free to use them as they were before the jackboot of Clipper crashed down.

Both parties to the dispute had reasons not to emphasize the voluntary nature of Clipper. For Clipper's proponents, this was the obvious, gaping flaw in the entire scheme. The stated reason for a scrambling chip that permits wiretapping is that otherwise terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals might use untappable scrambling schemes. With Clipper they still can.

The government at least acknowledged this objection, and tried to answer it in two ways. The first was to argue that most criminals would never hear about Clipper chips, or would forget about them when they were planning the big heist. "Thank God most criminals are stupid!" Jim Kallstrom, the FBI's special agent in charge for New York, told me in March. "If the smartest segment of the population ever went into crime, we would really have a problem. Will some criminals catch on to the system, and buy their encryption from, let's say, Israel? Yes. Will that be a problem? Yes. But it will be a substantially smaller problem than if we didn't do anything."

The government's other response has been to emphasize its ability to "make markets." If big companies are producing Clipper because that's all they use when doing business with the government, then in the long run Clipper encryption will crowd out rival schemes. Apart from the government itself, the biggest customers for coding systems today are banks and credit-card companies, which use encryption to safeguard the billions of financial transactions they handle each day. By establishing Clipper as a standard, the government hopes to keep encryption, especially public-key systems, from becoming so cheap and convenient that anyone can walk into a Radio Shack and buy a perfectly secure phone. This attempt to shut off the growth of a market enrages many of Clipper's foes—but its very indirectness illustrates the limits of Clipper's effects. It is guaranteed to be least effective against the most serious

criminal opponents, such as state-sponsored terrorist rings that will not be limited to what they can find at Radio Shack. Clipper's opponents have also downplayed the voluntary factor, because it makes adoption of the system seem less nightmarish. When pressed on this point, they have usually reverted to the "slippery slope" argument: today Clipper is voluntary, tomorrow it will be mandatory—and all other coding schemes will be outlawed. There is no peacetime precedent to suggest that Congress would pass, or the courts uphold, such a mandatory measure, with sweeping controls on forms of speech. The likelihood of abuse would be reduced if Clipper's "key escrow" plan were changed in one significant way. Under current Clipper guidelines, the two agencies each designated to hold half the components of the secret keys will both be part of the executive branch. One is the Treasury Department; the other is the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology. On familiar separation-of-power grounds, it would be safer for one of the "escrow agents" to be part of the judicial system, insulated from direct executive control. Those who are worried about Clipper no matter who its escrow agents are can and should start using some other encryption scheme.

CALMING down about Clipper might also keep the hyperbole of the battle from spilling over onto the Digital Telephony bill. Although this proposal's name sounds futuristic, the proposal itself is principally an attempt to maintain the wiretapping powers the police and the FBI have had for more than twenty-five years.

Under the Safe Streets Act of 1968 as amended in 1970, local telephone companies must cooperate with lawful wiretap requests from the FBI. Most states have passed laws based on this act, setting similar standards of their own for legal wiretaps. Law-enforcement officials emphasize the many hurdles they must surmount before a judge grants such a request. The police or the FBI must show probable cause to suspect a crime, and demonstrate that all other investigative possibilities have been exhausted. Because of these requirements, fewer than 1,000 wiretap requests are granted each year.

According to the FBI, the conversion of telephone systems to digitally switched networks and the adoption of call forwarding and the like make it increasingly difficult to carry out lawful wiretap orders. Older phone systems had access points that police could use to put a tap on a single line; this was often as simple as attaching two alligator clips to a telephone wire. Newer systems lack simple mechanical access points and will become increasingly difficult to tap as time goes on. Therefore the FBI contends that for purely technical reasons, rather than for legal or political cause, the police are losing the ability to tap phones. The Digital Telephony bill would require telephone systems to build in the means for tapping on whatever new equipment they introduce.

Like any other on-line habitué, I am unenthusiastic about the whole idea of wiretaps. I realize that FBI Director Louis Freeh has himself sounded hyperbolic in making the case for the bill ("Without a new statute, law enforcement at the federal, state, and local level will be crippled," and so on). Yet I also recognize that no one could make a political or legal case that the wiretap powers granted since 1968 have been so grossly abused that they must now be revoked. These powers have, after all, been in place through the worst of the Vietnam War years, Richard Nixon's rise and fall from power, much of the Cold War, and the heyday of Oliver North, without leaving any powerful evidence that they have brought us noticeably nearer a national police state. (The opponents of the Digital Telephony bill also say that it would make too easy the collection of information about individual calling patterns, paving the way for Big Brother-style surveillance. Yet the bill would not at all relax the legal controls on how such information is collected or used.)

If the current ability of the police to tap phones is wrong, then this power should be withdrawn the normal way, by changing laws—not through the back door, as an unintended consequence of a technical change. So far the evidence suggests that the police have on the whole used the power responsibly. Therefore they deserve to retain it, under similar legal controls, through the Digital Telephony bill. Send your complaints—in plaintext, please—to jmfallows@aol.com.



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and determined that it is unclassified.**

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WILLIAM MCKNIGHT



Department of State

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FROM USDEL CSCE

BUCHAREST FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 (2/12/88) KAMPELMAN, MAX N.

TAGS: CSCE

SUBJECT: CSCE DAILY SUMMARY OF FEBRUARY 12, 1982

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PLENARY SESSION TOOK PLACE WITHOUT ANY PROBLEMS. CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS, THE SOVIETS AND THE EASTERN EUROPEANS RAISED NO OBJECTIONS TO THE HOLDING OF TWO SEPARATE SESSIONS TO ALLOW ALL SPEAKERS TO DELIVER THEIR SPEECHES. FRANCE (CHEYSSON), U.K. (CARRINGTON), SWEDEN (ULLSTEEN), IRELAND (DOOGE), DENMARK, NETHERLANDS (VAN DER STOEL), LUXEMBOURG

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(FLESCH), LIECHTENSTEIN, SAN MARINO, AND PORTUGAL

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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FOCUSSED ON THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE POLISH EVENTS OVER THE CSCE PROCESS, SINGLED OUT THE USSR FOR ITS ROLE IN THE POLISH DEVELOPMENTS AND INDICATED THAT WHILE IT WAS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE CSCE PROCESS, IT WAS NECESSARY THAT THE POLISH SITUATION IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY BEFORE ANY PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON MADRID. THE GOR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND BULGARIA ACCUSED THE WEST, AND SPECIFICALLY THE UNITED STATES, OF EFFORTS TO WRECK THE CSCE BY INTRODUCING THE POLISH ISSUES.

3. POLAND MADE A FORMAL DECLARATION REJECTING ALL ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE THE INTERNAL SITUATION OF POLAND AS A SUBJECT MATTER ON THE MADRID CONFERENCE. THE POLISH REPRESENTATIVE ASSERTED THAT EFFORTS BY WESTERN COUNTRIES TO INTERVENE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF POLAND WERE LIKELY TO CREATE GREATER TENSIONS, FORCE AN EXTENSION OF THE MARTIAL LAW AND MIGHT EVEN PROVOKE CIVIL WAR IN POLAND. ROMANIA, PLAYING ITS USUAL MAVERICK ROLE, STRESSED THE NEED TO CONCENTRATE ON WORKING TOWARD AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE NAA DRAFT DOCUMENT. GREECE, IMPLICITLY DISASSOCIATING ITSELF FROM THE OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES, EMPHASIZED THE FACT THAT IN SPITE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND, WHICH GREECE CONDEMNS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE PROCESS AT MADRID CONTINUE ON THE BASIS OF THE NAA DRAFT.

4. FINLAND REFRAINED FROM ANY SIGNIFICANT MENTION OF POLAND AND STATED THAT CSCE WAS AN ESSENTIAL FORUM TO CARRY ON DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS TO ENSURE EUROPEAN SECURITY AT THIS PARTICULARLY TENSE TIME. AUSTRIA, AFTER CONDEMNING SUCH ACTS AS THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, THE EVENTS OF POLAND AND THE ANNEXATION OF GOLAN BY ISRAEL, AS WELL AS THE TURKISH MILITARY JUNTA,

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WENT ON TO URGE THE CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES TO MAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS TO WORK TOWARD A BALANCED AND SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT IN MADRID USING THE NAA DRAFT AS ITS BASIS. THE HOLY SEE REP., IN AN IMPASSIONED SPEECH, OBVIOUSLY REFLECTING JOHN PAUL II'S DEEP CONCERN OVER POLISH DEVELOPMENTS, MADE A STRONG APPEAL FOR A QUICK AND JUST SOLUTION OF THE POLISH CRISIS. HE URGED ALL SIDES TO LET POLAND FIND ITS OWN WAY TO FREEDOM AND DIGNITY. THE HOLY SEE STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE REPRESSIVE ACTS WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN POLAND. HE URGED THE

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PARTICIPATING STATES TO JOIN FORCES IN MAKING THE CSCE PROCESS THE ROAD LEADING TO A SAFER EUROPE. (FURTHER DETAILS ON ABOVE SPEECHES WILL BE SENT BY SEPTTEL.)

5. WORKING PROGRAM - SWITZERLAND PROPOSED, AND THE PLENARY APPROVED, THE WORKING PROGRAM FOR THE FIRST PART OF THE NEXT WEEK AS FOLLOWS: FEB 15 - NO MEETINGS, FEB 16 - A.M. INFORMAL MEETING OF HEADS OF DELEGATION, FEB 16 - P.M. DRAFTING GROUP, FEB 17 - A.M. PLENARY. THE PLENARY OF FEB. 17 WOULD DECIDE ON THE WORK PROGRAM FOR THE BALANCE OF THE WEEK.

6. NATO CAUCUS 5 A PM CAUCUS DISCUSSED THE AFTERNOON PLENARY SESSION AND THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE GRID. THE OUTCOME OF THE PLENARY SESSION AND THE DECISION ON THE GRID ARE DISCUSSED ABOVE.

7. POLISH VICE FOMIN WIEJACZ PRESS CONFERENCE FEB 11 - THE DEPT MAY BE INTERESTED IN A STATEMENT REPORTEDLY MADE BY POLISH VICE FOMIN TO THE EFFECT THAT MARTIAL LAW MAY BE LIFTED IN POLAND BY THE END OF THE MONTH. THIS STATEMENT WAS MADE AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE SOVIETS AND POLES WERE FLOATING THE SUGGESTION THAT THE MADRID

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MEETING SHOULD LAST FOR A MONTH. WHILE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATEMENT AND THE SUGGESTION IS NOT CLEAR, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE PREPARING THE GROUND FOR CLAIMING THAT WHEN THE MARTIAL LAW IS LIFTED, CONDITIONS WILL EXIST FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS AT MADRID OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE NAA DRAFT.

KAMPELMAN

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USINFO FOR B/BNEA/EU

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, TU, US, IZ, IR, GE

SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: JANUARY 21, 1987

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1. SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE THE MOST
IMPORTANT IN THE TURKISH PRESS OF JANUARY 21:

-- TURKISH-U.S. RELATIONS: IRAN-IRAQ WAR

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SPECULATION, U.S. ROLE FOR TURKEY IN ISLAMIC WORLD, TOURISM MINISTER IN WASHINGTON;

-- TURKISH-IRANIAN RELATIONS: OZAL EXONERATES IRAN, SHERIA REGIME IN TURKEY, VOICE OF TURKEY WARNING;

-- TURKISH-IRAQI RELATIONS: MFA UNDERSECRETARY KANDEMIR TO BAGHDAD;

-- RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM: SHP'S MOTION ON RECIDIVISM REJECTED, ERBAKAN COMMENTS ON PROTEST, COURT ACTION AGAINST MURAT BAYRAK, OZAL SAYS RECIDIVISM DANGER FROM FRG; AND

-- TERRORISM: PKK SUSPECTS ARRESTED IN PALME MURDER INQUIRY, FORMER ISRAELI MILITANT MURDERED IN ISTANBUL;

2. TURKISH-U.S. RELATIONS: NILUFER YILCUN WROTE IN "MILLIYET" THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF ARAB AND MUSLIM COUNTRIES IN ANKARA BELIEVE THE U.S. SUPPORTS IRAN, BECAUSE IT DOES NOT WANT IRAN TO LOSE THE GULF WAR. ARMS SHIPMENTS BY THE U.S., ISRAEL AND SOME ARAB COUNTRIES TO IRAN WERE CITED AS EVIDENCE. U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAN IS CONSIDERED REMOTE BY THE REPRESENTATIVES WHO BELIEVE IRAN IS THE ONLY COUNTRY IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION WHICH COULD RESIST A
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SOVIET ATTACK. IN A SURVEY PUBLISHED BY "MILLIYET" WHICH SPECULATED ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN IRAQI DEFEAT, RETIRED ADMIRAL YILMAZ USLUER COMMENTED THAT IF THE U.S. INTERVENES IN THE GULF REGION, THE USE OF TURKISH BASES BY U.S. ARMED FORCES MAY BE CONSIDERED. USLUER ALSO SAID THAT THE U.S., SOVIET UNION AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES WHICH DEPEND ON GULF OIL DO NOT WANT A WINNER IN IRAN-IRAQ WAR. IN THE SAME SURVEY, FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER HASAN ESAT ISIK SAID THAT THE WEST IS TRYING TO INVOLVE TURKEY IN THE GULF WAR. MEANWHILE, LEFTIST "CUMHURİYET" REPORTED THAT FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE DEFUNCT TURKISH LABOR PARTY (TIP) MEHMET ALI AYBAR CLAIMED THAT THE U.S. WANTS TURKEY TO PLAY A MAJOR

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ROLE IN THE UNIFICATION OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. AYBAR SAID THAT THE RECENT UPSURGE IN RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM IN TURKEY WOULD ELIMINATE TURKEY'S SECULARISM AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEALING WITH ISLAMIC COUNTRIES. "MILLIYET" REPORTED THAT CULTURE AND TOURISM MINISTER MESUT YILMAZ FLEW TO WASHINGTON TO PROMOTE THE UPCOMING SULEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXHIBITION.

3. TURKISH-IRANIAN RELATIONS: ACCORDING TO "MILLIYET", PM OZAL TOLD REPORTERS THAT WITH THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUNNI AND SHIA SECTS, RECIDIVISM COMING TO TURKEY FROM IRAN IS AS UNLIKELY AS COMMUNISM COMING DIRECTLY FROM THE

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SOVIET UNION. "MILLIYET", HOWEVER, REPORTED THAT MEETINGS ARE BEING HELD IN TEHRAN TO DISCUSS ESTABLISHMENT OF A SHERIA REGIME IN TURKEY. MANY INFLUENTIAL RELIGIOUS LEADERS FROM IRAN AND OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES HAVE REPORTEDLY ATTENDED THESE MEETINGS. TURKEY WAS REPRESENTED BY CEMALETTIN KAPLAN WHO IS A LEADER OF THE ISLAMIC ASSOCIATIONS UNION IN THE FRG. "MILLIYET" ALSO REPORTED IRAN RADIO HAS LESSENNED ITS ANTI-TURKEY PROPAGANDA. ACCORDING TO THE DAILY, IRAN WAS FRIGHTENED BY THE "DER SPIEGEL" ARTICLE WHICH CLAIMED THAT ADDITIONAL U.S. WARPLANES (SIC) HAD BEEN DISPATCHED TO TURKEY (SEE SEPTTEL). MEANWHILE, MASS APPEAL "HURRIYET" REPORTED THAT VOICE OF TURKEY BROADCASTS IN FARSI WARNED IRAN NOT TO INTERFERE IN TURKEY'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND THAT THE RECENT BROADCASTS BY VOICE OF IRAN RADIO WERE NOT IN ACCORD WITH GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS.

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4. TURKISH-IRAQI RELATIONS: ALL DAILIES REPORTED THAT FONMIN UNDERSECRETARY NUZHET KANDEMIR WHO HAD RECENTLY BEEN IN TEHRAN WAS UNEXPECTEDLY SENT TO BAGHDAD. KANDEMIR REPORTEDLY CARRIED A MESSAGE FROM PM OZAL TO THE FIRST DEPUTY PM TAHA YASIN RAMADAN. "CUMHURIYET" WROTE THAT TURKEY IS ENGAGED IN FINALIZING A FORMULA TO END THE GULF WAR. ALTHOUGH NEUTRAL, TURKEY BELIEVES THAT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE SADDAM REGIME ARE UNCLASSIFIED

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IMPORTANT. THE DAILY FURTHER OBSERVED THAT TURKISH DIPLOMATS DO NOT APPEAR OVERLY CONCERNED AT IRAN'S OCCUPATION OF IRAQI TERRITORY. ACCORDING TO THE DAILY, MFA OFFICIALS FOR THE FIRST TIME CONFIRMED AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF U.S. FIGHTER PLANES IN TURKEY. OFFICIALS INDICATED THAT THE ADDITIONAL FIGHTER PLANES ARE PART OF A TRAINING EXERCISE AND NOT RELATED TO THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF WAR.

5. RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM: ALL PAPERS REPORTED THAT THE RULING MOTHERLAND PARTY (ANAP) ON JANUARY 20 REJECTED A MOTION BY THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY (SHP) TO OPEN A PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY INTO RECIDIVISM. MEANWHILE, THE FORMER LEADER OF THE DEFUNCT NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY (MSP) ERBAKAN SAID THAT HIS FOLLOWERS WERE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR LAST WEEK'S DEMONSTRATION IN ISTANBUL AND ACCUSED THE PRESS OF BEING PREJUDICED. "MILLIYET" REPORTED THAT FORMER DEPUTY OF THE DISSOLVED JUSTICE PARTY (AP) MURAT BAYRAK, WHO LIVES IN THE FRG, WAS CHARGED IN THE STATE SECURITY COURT WITH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST TURKEY WHILE ABROAD. BAYRAK HAD SAID IN AN INTERVIEW THAT HIS PARTY HAS PLANS TO ESTABLISH A THEOCRATIC STATE ORDER IN TURKEY. ACCORDING TO "CUMHURIYET" AND "MILLIYET", PM OZAL SAID RECIDIVISM ORIGINATES IN THE FRG. PM OZAL POINTED OUT THAT RADIO COLOGNE REGULARLY BROADCASTS NEWS OF EXTREMIST FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS.

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USMISSION USNATO
HQ16THAF TORREJON AB SP//CCE//
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39TACG INCIRLIK TU//CC/PA//RM//TN//
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UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 ANKARA 00660

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USINFO FOR B/BNEA/EU

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, TU, US, IZ, IR, GE

SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: JANUARY 21, 1987

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 00660 03 OF 03 220642Z

6. TERRORISM: "HURRIYET" AND "TERCUMAN"
REPORTED THAT THREE PKK SUSPECTS WERE ARRESTED
IN STOCKHOLM IN CONNECTION WITH THE
ASSASSINATION OF SWEDISH PM OLAF PALME.
ACCORDING TO "CUMHURİYET", "MILLİYET" AND
"GÜNEŞ", THE SUSPECTS WERE RELEASED DUE TO
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. MEANWHILE, "MILLİYET"
REPORTED THAT FORMER ISRAELI MILITANT MISAN
BENYAKAR WAS KILLED AT HIS HOUSE IN ISTANBUL
BY AN UNIDENTIFIED PERSON. TRINKA

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 03305 031051Z
ACTION NEA-07

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 03305

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IS, US
SUBJECT: ISRAELI CABINET COMMUNIQUE -
- MARCH 2, 1986

1. THE ISRAELI CABINET MET ON MARCH 2. FOLLOW-
ING CONCLUSION OF THE SESSION. A CABINET
COMMUNIQUE WAS ISSUED.
BEGIN TEXT:

- THE CABINET MEETING WAS OPENED BY THE
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PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT, WHICH FOLLOWED
THE ASSASSINATION OF MR. ZAAFER AL-MASRI, THE
MAYOR OF NABLUS. THE PRIME MINISTER SENT

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CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILY AND VOICED HIS APPRECIATION OF AL-MASRI'S PERFORMANCE IN THE SHORT PERIOD HE WAS SERVING AS MAYOR. HIS MURDER IS A BLOW TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES AND TO THOSE WHO ARE SEEKING PROGRESS TOWARD TRANQUILITY AND UNDERSTANDING. HE SAID THAT THE KILLING WOULD NOT DETER THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FROM PROPOSING TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADMINISTER THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. THE PRIME MINISTER MAINTAINED THAT ARAB TERRORISM HURTS FIRST OF ALL THE ARABS THEMSELVES AND MAKES THEIR LIVES INTOLERABLE. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE ALL AVAILABLE MEASURES TO FIND THE MURDERERS AND TO BRING THEM TO JUSTICE. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT AN APPROPRIATE SUBSTITUTE FOR AL-MASRI WOULD BE FOUND.

-- THE PRIME MINISTER VOICED HIS PROFOUND CONDOLENCES REGARDING THE ASSASSINATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF SWEDEN, OLOF PALME. HE POINTED OUT HIS SUPPORT FOR THE RESCUE OF SOVIET JEWRY AND SAID THAT IN THEIR LAST TALK BETWEEN THEM, WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE TWO MONTHS AGO, PALME REVEALED A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH TOWARD THE PLO AND MUCH MORE UNDERSTANDING TOWARD ISRAEL. PALME, SAID THE PRIME MINISTER, WAS A BRILLIANT MAN, ONE OF THE MOST PROMINENT FIGHTERS

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AGAINST NAZISM AND FASCISM, AND HIS OUTRAGEOUS MURDER HAS SHOCKED EVERYONE WHO BELIEVES IN DEMOCRACY.

-- THE PRIME MINISTER BRIEFED THE GOVERNMENT ON CURRENT SECURITY EVENTS. THE BRIEFING WAS GIVEN IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A MINISTERIAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE MEETING.

-- THE GOVERNMENT BEGAN DISCUSSING THE MATTER OF ECONOMIC GROWTH. THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY AND PLANNING OPENED THE DEBATE AND THE DISCUSSION WOULD CONTINUE IN THE NEXT MEETING.

2. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED. PICKERING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

February 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Acting Secretary of State

1. SIG on Lebanon Contingencies. I chaired a Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) meeting today on the problem of Lebanon. We concluded that the possibility of an Israeli military push into South Lebanon required urgent US contingency planning. Israel has been poised to strike for some weeks and, in recent days, has made clear that a relatively small PLO violation of the ceasefire would bring Israeli retaliation. The Israeli action plan blueprints a deep penetration attack affecting population centers as far north as Beirut, resulting perhaps in the retention of 25 percent of Lebanon's surface as an occupied territory. Israel's basic objective would be the liquidation of the PLO as a military adversary and the creation of a buffer zone wider than the range of any Arab artillery. The SIG tasked three studies: US diplomatic options; Soviet motives and behavior in the event of hostilities; and US military assets with which to reinforce the area and evacuate the 3,800 US citizens in Lebanon. These studies will be prepared on a top priority basis by mid-week.

2. El Salvador. Assistant Secretaries Enders and Abrams testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this afternoon regarding your certification of the human rights situation in El Salvador. The session went relatively well, with Senator Percy emphasizing that there are no good alternatives to our policy of support for the present Duarte Government. Senators Dodd and Tsongas questioned the efficacy of elections in El Salvador and urged that the United States encourage negotiations between the government and the extreme left. Even our liberal critics, however, agreed that major US security interests are at stake in El Salvador, and this point seems to be getting across after a week of hearings.

3. Discussion of Polish Sanctions with European Community Commissioners. Mac Baldridge, Jack Block, Bill Brock and I used our lunch today with three members of the European Community (EC) Commission to have a very useful discussion of Polish-related sanctions against the USSR. The Europeans repeated the importance they attach to the gas pipeline as a way of reducing dependence on the Middle East. They are worried that attempts to push for hard sanctions will turn the focus from Poland to a dispute between the US and Europe. Still, I have the impression that our arguments on the pipeline issue--and other sanctions against the Soviets--did have some impact. We particularly stressed the need for restrictions on credits to the USSR.

RDS-1 2/8/02 (STOESSEL, Walter Jr.)

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GUATEMALA 12142

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP C.), XK

SUBJECT: AMB. HABIB'S MEETING WITH SALVADORAN
PRESIDENT DUARTE

1. ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: AMB. HABIB ASSURED PRESIDENT DUARTE THAT THE USG CONTINUED TO PURSUE A TWO-TRACK POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. DUARTE SAID THAT CONTADORA WAS USEFUL AS A GOOD-WILL EFFORT AND THAT HE STILL SUPPORTED THE SEARCH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SETTLEMENT, BUT THAT MEXICO AND OTHERS SYMPATHETIC TO NICARAGUA WERE TRYING TO USE IT TO IMPOSE AN AGREEMENT ON THE CENTRAL AMERICANS. THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES HAD SOUGHT TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE DEMOCRACIES AT THE OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, BUT THE CORE THREE WERE UNITED AND FORCED THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES TO BACK DOWN. DUARTE VIEWED THE OAS/UNITED NATIONS JOINT INITIATIVE AS A FORM OF BILATERALISM AND AN ATTEMPT TO PUT A PROTECTIVE BARRIER AROUND NICARAGUA. HE SUSPECTED THAT THE OPPONENTS OF U.S. POLICY WOULD TAKE DRAMATIC ACTION TO FRUSTRATE THAT POLICY, AND EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENT IN LATIN AMERICA WAS RISING. NICARAGUA WAS ADROITLY PLAYING ON LATIN CONCERNS ABOUT AN EXPANDED WAR, AND IT WAS PREPARED TO STRIKE INTO BORDER AREAS TO PREEMPT THE BUILD-UP OF THE DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE. IF THE U.S. WERE TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING, THAT WOULD FURTHER INTENSIFY INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE TO END THE CONFLICT. DUARTE NOTED THAT ALL PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE CRISIS CLOSELY MONITORED U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICS, AND MANY HAD DOUBTS ABOUT THE ABILITY OF THE USG TO STAY THE COURSE. AMB. HABIB GAVE STRONG ASSURANCES ABOUT U.S. RESOLVE AND DETERMINATION TO CARRY OUT OUR POLICY. END SUMMARY

3. ON NOVEMBER 20, AMBASSADOR HABIB MET FOR NEARLY TWO HOURS WITH SALVADORAN PRESIDENT DUARTE AT A LUNCH HOSTED BY CHARGE D'LOUHY. ALSO ATTENDING WERE FOREIGN MINISTER ACEVEDO, AIDE MORALES ENRICH, AS WELL AS THE OTHER MEMBERS OF HABIB'S PARTY AND SEVERAL EMBASSY.

CONTADORA

4. AMB. HABIB STATED THAT THE U.S. CONTINUED TO PURSUE A TWO TRACK POLICY OF PRESSURE ON NICARAGUA AND NEGOTIATIONS. WE WANTED TO KEEP THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS

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GOING, AND WE DID NOT WANT TO APPEAR TO BE KILLING CONTADORA. DUARTE AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO APPEAR IN OPPOSITION TO CONTADORA. HE STATED THAT THE PROPER ROLE OF CONTADORA WAS TO BE A "GOOD-WILL" EFFORT, AND THAT ITS SUCCESS DEPENDED ON THE POLITICAL WILL OF ALL FIVE CENTRAL AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS. CONTADORA SHOULD NOT BE SOMETHING TO IMPOSE AN AGREEMENT ON THE CENTRAL AMERICANS. HOWEVER, NICARAGUA AND SOME OF THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES WERE SEEKING TO TURN IT INTO SOMETHING ELSE. MEXICO TRIED TO USE CONTADORA TO IMPOSE ITS VIEWS.

5. DUARTE INSISTED THAT ANY AGREEMENT MUST BE COMPLETE, INCLUDING PROVISIONS FOR VERIFICATION AND CONTROL. DUARTE NOTED THE IMPACT OF NICARAGUA'S ICJ CASES ON THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE DESCRIBED IT AS A "POINT OF HONOR," EXPLAINING THAT COSTA RICA COULD NOT NEGOTIATE WHILE THE SUITS WERE PENDING AND HONDURAS FOLLOWED COSTA RICA'S LEAD. EL SALVADOR SUPPORTED THEIR POSITION IN THE INTEREST OF CORE THREE SOLIDARITY. HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT NICARAGUA WOULD FILE SUIT AGAINST EL SALVADOR BECAUSE OF THE HASENFUG CASE.

6. AMB. HABIB PRAISED THE SALVADORANS FOR THEIR SUCCESS AT THE OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN FORCING THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES TO AGREE TO A MILD COMPROMISE RESOLUTION. HE UNDERScoreD THAT THIS HAD DEMONSTRATED THE STRENGTH OF THE DEMOCRACIES WHEN THEY WORKED IN UNISON. ACEVEDO SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES THAT THEY SHOULD PUT PRESSURE ON NICARAGUA TO DROP ITS ICJ CASES AGAINST COSTA RICA AND HONDURAS.

7. ASKED ABOUT THE UPCOMING CONTADORA MEETING IN RIO DE JANEIRO, DUARTE SAID THAT THE EIGHT COULD DEVISE A STRONG DOCUMENT AND THEN TAKE IT TO THE CENTRAL AMERICANS AND PRESSURE THEM TO SIGN, AS THE CONTADORA GROUP HAD DONE IN THE SUMMER OF 1984.

JOINT OAS/UNITED NATIONS INITIATIVE

8. DUARTE VIEWED THE JOINT OAS/UN INITIATIVE AS A NICARAGUAN/MEXICAN FORM OF BILATERALISM AND AN ATTEMPT TO FORM A PROTECTIVE BARRIER AROUND NICARAGUA. IT WOULD PREVENT A U.S. INVASION AND STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF MEXICO AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES OPPOSED TO U.S. POLICY. IT IGNORED THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE 1983 DOCUMENT OF OBJECTIVES AND INSTEAD FOCUSED ON MILITARY EVENTS. WHILE SOME OF ITS POINTS COULD BE OF VALUE IN IMPLEMENTING AN AGREEMENT, THERE WAS AS YET NO AGREEMENT TO BE IMPLEMENTED. ACEVEDO STATED THAT THE INITIATIVE SHOULD NOT BECOME A METHOD TO "SALAMI SLICE" THE 21 OBJECTIVES IMPLEMENTING SOME POINTS WITHOUT HAVING A SIGNED AGREEMENT. THE MAIN EFFORT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE TOWARD REACHING A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT.

9. DUARTE STATED THAT THE INITIATIVE COULD NOT GO FORWARD WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE CENTRAL AMERICANS. NICARAGUA WOULD OBVIOUSLY SIGN ON, INSISTING THAT IT HAD NO INTERNAL PROBLEM, JUST A CONFLICT WITH THE U.S. GUATEMALA PROBABLY WOULD AGREE TO IT AS WELL. EL SALVADOR WOULD SAY "YES, BUT...". COSTA RICA WOULD SAY "YES, BUT FIRST NICARAGUA MUST DROP ITS SUIT AT THE ICJ." HONDURAS WOULD SAY THAT IT WAS NOT A MILITARY PROBLEM, BUT RATHER A POLITICAL ONE.

10. THUS, THE CORE THREE COULD BE PERCEIVED AS THE OBSTACLE TO AN AGREEMENT, AND THIS COULD DEVELOP INTO A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THEM AND THE REST OF LATIN AMERICA. AMB. HABIB POINTED TO THE NEED FOR CONTINUED UNITY AMONG THE CORE THREE, AND STRESSED THAT THE U.S. HAD THE RESOLVE TO STAY THE COURSE. DUARTE EXPRESSED

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HIS DISCOMFORT WITH THE THOUGHT OF BEING ISOLATED, AND HE WONDERED ABOUT THE CAPACITY OF THE CENTRAL AMERICANS TO RESIST IN THAT TYPE OF SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT, EXCEPT FOR ISRAEL, ONLY EL SALVADOR HAD VOTED WITH THE U.S. AT THE UNGA ON NICARAGUA'S ICJ RESOLUTION. BURGHARDT POINTED OUT THAT MANY AFRICAN AND ASIAN COUNTRIES HAD ABSTAINED ON THE RESOLUTION, BUT DUARTE REPLIED THAT IN LATIN AMERICA, THERE WAS NO ONE WHO REALLY WAS RESISTING THE CONTADORA'S PRESSURE.

11. DUARTE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE OAS/UN MAY SEND BORDER OBSERVERS TO NICARAGUA. AMB. HABIB ARGUED THAT AT THE UN, ONLY THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD TAKE SUCH ACTION, AND THE U.S. COULD VETO IT. BURGHARDT ADDED THAT THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES WOULD PREVENT THE OAS FROM DOING SO. DUARTE RESPONDED THAT THE OPPONENTS OF OUR POLICY MIGHT FIND SOME WAY. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY COULD INVOKE THE RIO TREATY. DUARTE ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF MEXICO, PERU, OR ARGENTINA SENT OBSERVERS TO THE NICARAGUAN BORDER. WHEN AMB. HABIB ASKED IF ARGENTINA WOULD REALLY DO THAT FOR THE SANDINISTAS, DUARTE REPLIED "YOU WOULD BE SURPRISED". BURGHARDT NOTED THAT URUGUAY WAS ALREADY PROMOTING SUCH A SCHEME. DUARTE THEN ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WHEN THOSE OBSERVERS STARTED GETTING KILLED. THE MATTER COULD DEVELOP INTO A DRAMATIC SITUATION, WITH PERHAPS TEN LATIN COUNTRIES WITHDRAWING FROM THE OAS, INSISTING THAT IT DID NOT REPRESENT THE WILL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

12. DUARTE EXPECTED THAT THE SITUATION ON THE BATTLEFIELD WOULD PROPEL DIPLOMATIC EVENTS. HE SUSPECTED THAT THE RECENT LULL IN FIGHTING IN EL SALVADOR WAS THE RESULT OF THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS RELOCATING INTO HONDURAS SO THAT THEY COULD ATTACK THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE FROM THE REAR. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SANDINISTAS WOULD NOT SIT BY AND WAIT FOR THE RESISTANCE TO GROW STRONGER; THEY WOULD ATTACK IN THE BORDER AREAS IN AN EFFORT TO PREEMPT THE RESISTANCE. AMB. HABIB AND BURGHARDT INJECTED THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT STAND BY IF HONDURAS WERE ATTACKED. DUARTE REPLIED THAT THE HONDURAN ARMY AND THE U.S. WOULD BECOME INVOLVED, AND ADDED THAT SUCH AN ESCALATION WAS PRECISELY WHAT THE SANDINISTAS WANTED. THE EXPANDED CONFLICT WOULD GENERATE ENORMOUS INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL PRESSURE TO STOP THE FIGHTING. ARGENTINA, PERU, AND OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD PRESS FOR OAS ACTION. EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD ALSO TRY TO STEP IN. THE SANDINISTAS WOULD BE ABLE TO CAPITALIZE ON WORLD-WIDE ANTI-IMPERIALIST SENTIMENT. THEY WERE PREPARED TO SACRIFICE SOME OF THEIR TROOPS TO DO SO, HE REMARKED.

NICARAGUA'S STRATEGY

13. NICARAGUA'S STRATEGY INCLUDED TWO ELEMENTS. FIRST, IT WAS PLAYING ON THE LATIN'S CONCERN ABOUT A WIDENING WAR AND U.S. INTERVENTION BY CLAIMING THAT U.S. POLICY WOULD LEAD TO ESCALATION AND ULTIMATELY AN INVASION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SANDINISTAS WERE INSISTING THAT THE DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE ITSELF COULD NOT ACHIEVE ANYTHING, AND THAT WITH DEMOCRATS NOW IN CONTROL OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS AND IN A STRONG POSITION FOR THE 1988 ELECTION, THE U.S. WOULD ULTIMATELY CHANGE ITS POLICY AND NEGOTIATE WITH NICARAGUA.

14. DUARTE REMARKED THAT THE SANDINISTAS WERE "PLAYING IT SMART" IN LATIN AMERICA. THEY WERE ARGUING THAT THE DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE WOULD BE DEFEATED AND THAT NICARAGUA WOULD EMERGE STRONGER THAN EVER. THEY WERE ATTRACTING MORE SUPPORT WHILE ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IN

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LATIN AMERICA WAS INCREASING. THIS GROWING ANTI-AMERICANISM WAS CAUSED BY THE MALVINAS SITUATION AND U.S. AID TO THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S. WORKING WITH THOSE LATIN COUNTRIES WHO WERE NOT ALREADY COMMITTED, SUCH AS COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA, AND EVEN PANAMA, ALTHOUGH THE ROLE OF THE LATTER WAS MUCH LESS.

U.S. POLITICS AND U.S. COMMITMENT

15. DUARTE SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ANALYZE THE LOGIC DRIVING THE ACTIONS OF THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES. THEY PERCEIVED THAT THE NEXT U.S. ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE A MUCH DIFFERENT POLICY. AMB. HABIB REMARKED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD TWO MORE YEARS IN OFFICE, AND MUCH COULD HAPPEN IN THAT TIME. HE ALSO ASSURED DUARTE THAT EVEN IF THE DEMOCRATS WON IN 1988, THIS WOULD NOT PRODUCE A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY BECAUSE NO ADMINISTRATION COULD ACCEPT A COMMUNIST REGIME ON THE AMERICAN MAINLAND. AMB. HABIB STRESSED THAT THE RECENT U.S. ELECTION HAD NOT YIELDED A MAJOR SHIFT IN CONGRESS. OUR POLICY HAD SUBSTANTIAL BIPARTISAN SUPPORT. AS THE PERFORMANCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE IMPROVED IN THE COMING MONTHS, EVEN MORE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WOULD SEE THE CORRECTNESS OF OUR POLICY. WHILE HE DID NOT WANT TO RAISE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS, AMB. HABIB SAID THAT IN A FEW MONTHS THE AID THAT WAS JUST BEGINNING TO GO TO THE RESISTANCE WOULD BEGIN TO HAVE A VISIBLE IMPACT. AMB. HABIB COMMENTED THAT HE GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES FELT LIKE THE USG WOULD LEAVE THEM IN THE LURCH. DUARTE RESPONDED "SOMETIMES." AMB. HABIB REITERATED U.S. RESOLVE TO STAY THE COURSE IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

MEXICO

16. ACEVEDO SAID THAT THE MEXICAN AMBASSADOR HAD TOLD HIM THAT MEXICO HAD TAKEN SUCH A HARD POSITION ON THE SALVADOR HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE AT THE UN BECAUSE "PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD HAD THE NERVE TO REFER TO PRESIDENT DE LA MADRID ABOUT MEXICO'S CONDUCT ON CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUES. THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE." MEXICO WAS DEMONSTRATING THAT IT WOULD NOT YIELD TO U.S. PRESSURE BY PUSHING FOR ITS RESOLUTION CRITICIZING SALVADOR'S HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE. AMB. HABIB ADVISED DUARTE THAT HE WOULD MAKE CLEAR IN HIS MEETING WITH DE LA MADRID ON NOVEMBER 21 THAT THE USG WAS NOT HAPPY WITH MEXICO'S ACTIONS IN NEW YORK OR AT THE OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. WE CONTINUED TO FAVOR A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT WITH ALL 21 POINTS OF THE DOCUMENT OF OBJECTIVES, BUT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT A PIECEMEAL APPROACH.

NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE

17. DUARTE REMARKED THAT THE RESISTANCE LACKED A STRONG LEADER THAT COULD MAINTAIN STABILITY OR APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE. IT HAD A STRUCTURE, ARMS, AND MONEY, BUT IT DID NOT HAVE AN IMAGE WHICH ATTRACTED FOLLOWERS.

18. COMMENT. DUARTE CLEARLY HAD BEEN OCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATED WITH RECONSTRUCTION FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 18 EARTHQUAKE. HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ACQUIRING MUCH-NEEDED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND HE ASKED AMB. HABIB TO PASS ON TO AID DIRECTOR McHERSON THAT "IF YOU WANT YOUR HORSE TO WIN THE RACE YOU HAVE TO GIVE HIM A LITTLE OATS". HE WAS EXPRESSING HIS VIEWS THAT THE OPPONENTS OF

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U.S. POLICY WERE WORKING TIRELESSLY TO FRUSTRATE THAT
POLICY, AND HE BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE HAVING SOME
SUCCESS. HIS DECISION TO VOICE HIS BELIEF THAT
ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IS RISING INDICATES HOW SERIOUS
HE PERCEIVES THE PROBLEM. CLEARLY, HE AND OTHER
OBSERVERS OF THE U.S. POLITICAL SCENE ARE CONCERNED
ABOUT POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECENT ELECTIONS FOR
OUR CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY, AND WE MUST REDOUBLE OUR
EFFORTS TO CONVINCE THEM OF OUR STAYING POWER. ALSO,
DUARTE WAS FRANK IN DESCRIBING HIS LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN
THE POLITICAL CAPABILITY OF THE RESISTANCE. END COMMENT.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CASC, PHUM, PINS, PGOV, PINR, GT
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH HARBURY - 3/7/95

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: JENNIFER HARBURY CONCLUDED A VERY BRIEF VISIT TO GUATEMALA WITH A MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR ON MARCH 7. ALSO PRESENT WERE POLCOUCS, CONGEN AND ACS OFFICER (NOTETAKER). HARBURY VISITED GUATEMALA THE WEEK OF MARCH 6 TO FULFILL REQUIREMENTS REGARDING THE REGISTRATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO EFRAIN BANACA. SHE REQUESTED THE AMBASSADOR TO APPROACH GUATEMALAN AUTHORITIES ON HER BEHALF TO URGE THEM TO RESPECT THE VALIDITY OF HER TEXAS MARRIAGE AND ENSURE HER FULL ACCESS TO THE GUATEMALAN COURT SYSTEM. WITH REGARD TO THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL'S CONTINUING INVESTIGATION INTO THE CASE, HARBURY EMPHASIZED THAT SHE WANTED TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE PRESENT AT ALL INTERVIEWS OF MILITARY MEMBERS AND AT ANY OTHER SIGNIFICANT STEPS IN THE INVESTIGATION. SHE ASKED THAT THE EMBASSY PASS THIS REQUEST TO PROSECUTOR GENERAL RAMSES CUESTAS. ALTHOUGH SHE DID NOT ASK THAT THE EMBASSY DESIST IN ITS PRESSURE ON THE GOG TO INVESTIGATE THE CASE, SHE NOTED HER FEAR THAT "INTENTIONAL" ERRORS IN THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION COULD PUT IN JEOPARDY HER FUTURE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST GOG MILITARY MEMBERS. HARBURY RAISED THE ISSUE OF A POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN CONG. BILL RICHARDSON AND MOD ENRIQUEZ TO PROVIDE THE GOG WITH AN "ESCAPE HATCH" OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE. TO HER REQUEST THAT THE EMBASSY FACILITATE SUCH A MEETING, THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT SHE HAD ALREADY PASSED THE PROPOSAL TO THE MOD WHO HAD INDICATED THAT HE WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY RICHARDSON. THE TENSION LEVEL IN THE ROOM BECAME

NOTABLY HIGHER WHEN HARBURY EXPRESSED HER DISPLEASURE THAT HER FOIA REQUEST HAD NOT YET BEEN FILLED, DESPITE THE REQUIREMENT FOR EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING. SHE ALSO REPEATEDLY ASKED IF THE USG HAD EVIDENCE OR RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT BAMACA WAS DEAD, TO WHICH THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT THE USG BELIEVED HE WAS DEAD BASED ON ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE. HARBURY'S HUNGER STRIKE IS STILL ON TRACK AND, ACCORDING TO HARBURY, MAY BE SUPPORTED IN SOME WAY BY VARIOUS

CONGRESSIONAL WIVES AND HOLLYWOOD CELEBRITIES. SHE
CLOSED BY UNDERSCORING THAT A RICHARDSON/ENRIQUEZ
NEGOTIATING SESSION MAY PREVENT AN INTERNATIONAL
"HEAD-ON-COLLISION" ON THE BAMACA CASE. END SUMMARY.

3. HARBURY OPENED BY EXPLAINING THAT SHE HAD RETURNED TO GUATEMALA TO WORK WITH HER LAWYERS ON OVERCOMING ALL OBSTACLES TO REGISTERING HER MARRIAGE IN GUATEMALA. THE ONLY BARRIER REMAINING IS A DISCREPANCY RELATED TO BAMAACA'S CORRECT MIDDLE NAME/NAMES. HARBURY SAID THAT SHE MUST OBTAIN A SWORN AFFIDAVIT FROM SOMEONE WHO KNEW BAMAACA BY THE NAME UNDER WHICH THE TEXAS MARRIAGE TOOK PLACE. SHE OBSERVED THAT BAMAACA'S FRIENDS UNDERSTANDABLY FEAR FOR THEIR SECURITY IF THEY SIGN SUCH A DOCUMENT, BUT SHE FEELS CONFIDENT THAT SHE WILL FIND SOMEONE. SHE ALSO WARNED THAT THE EMBASSY SHOULD BE ON THE LOOK-OUT FOR ANOTHER "HOAX" IN THE INVESTIGATION. SHE REVEALED THAT SHE HAD INFORMATION THAT TWO PEOPLE HAD RECENTLY COME OUT OF AN ARMY BASE CLAIMING THAT THEY HAD BEEN PRESSURED TO SAY THE BAMAACA HAD BEEN MARRIED TO TWO OTHER WOMEN (NOT HARBURY). HARBURY

WAS RELUCTANT TO PROVIDE MORE DETAILS, SAYING ONLY THAT THE TWO PEOPLE ARE NEITHER URNG NOR GUATEMALAN SOLDIERS, BUT RATHER, ARE "SOMEWHERE IN THE GREY ZONE." SHE SAID THAT THEY WERE NOT AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER INTERVIEW AS THEY HAD SINCE "BOLTED".

4. RETURNING TO THE ISSUE OF HER MARRIAGE REGISTRATION, SHE OBSERVED THAT THE GOG'S TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO THAT REGISTRATION WERE ILLEGAL AND CONSTITUTED HARRASSMENT. SHE ASKED THAT THE AMBASSADOR ADVISE APPROPRIATE GOG OFFICIALS THAT THE USG IS NOT HAPPY WITH THE WAY HARBURY'S MARRIAGE HAS BEEN TREATED AND THAT SHE EXPRESS HER SINCERE HOPE THAT THE GOG WILL RESPECT A U.S. COURT DECISION, RECOGNIZE THE MARRIAGE, AND REFRAIN FROM BLOCKING JENNIFER'S ACCESS TO THE GUATEMALAN COURTS WITH OTHER OBSTACLES.

5. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD HARBURY THAT SHE AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS HAD AGAIN URGED PROSECUTOR GENERAL RAMSES CUESTAS (AND MINUGUA'S LEONARDO FRANCO) TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THE INVESTIGATION INTO BAMACA'S FATE. IN THOSE CONVERSATIONS, CUESTAS HAD SHOWN SOME HESITANCY ABOUT RE-INTERVIEWING ALL MILITARY MEMBERS

ALREADY INTERVIEWED BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN'S INVESTIGATORS. THE EMBASSY PRESSED, HOWEVER, AND HE AGREED TO BEGIN THE PROCESS, NOTING THAT HE WOULD ALLOW MINUGUA REPRESENTATIVES TO OBSERVE, THOUGH NOT CONDUCT, THE INTERVIEWS. HE HAD ALSO ADVISED EMOFFS

THAT WHILE MINUGUA CAN ACCOMPANY PUBLIC MINISTRY INVESTIGATORS ON CERTAIN PHASES OF THE INVESTIGATION, THEY MAY NOT NECESSARILY BE PRESENT FOR EVERY INVESTIGATIVE VISIT OR INTERVIEW. THE AMBASSADOR HAD ALSO PERSONALLY DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF RE-INTERVIEWING MILITARY MEMBERS WITH MOD ENRIQUEZ. HE HAD EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE, BUT ONLY UPON A LEGAL REQUEST FROM A PUBLIC MINISTRY INVESTIGATOR.

6. HARBURY SAID THAT SHE UNDERSTOOD THE EMBASSY'S
~~DECIDE TO PRESS THE GOC TO INVESTIGATE THE CASE,~~
~~EMPHASIZING THAT SHE WANTED TO BE NOTIFIED ABOUT ALL~~
~~STEPS IN THE PUBLIC MINISTRY'S INVESTIGATION SO THAT~~
~~SHE COULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO FLY TO GUATEMALA~~

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 OF 02 GUATEM 02007 00 OF 03 102057Z
AND PERSONALLY OBSERVE EACH AND EVERY ONE. THE
AMBASSADOR PROMISED TO PASS HARBURY'S REQUEST ON TO
CUESTAS BUT WARNED THAT SHE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THE
PROSECUTOR GENERAL'S AGREEMENT TO SUCH AN
ARRANGEMENT. HARBURY INSISTED THAT HER PRESENCE AND
ABILITY TO MONITOR EACH ASPECT OF THE INVESTIGATION
WAS HER LEGAL RIGHT AND SHE WANTED TO GO ON RECORD
WITH THE REQUEST AND THE GOG'S (LIKELY) REFUSAL TO
GRANT IT. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION, SHE
REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED HER FEAR THAT THE GOG WOULD
MANIPULATE THE INVESTIGATION IN SUCH A WAY AS TO
JEOPARDIZE HER EFFORTS TO PRESS CRIMINAL CHARGES
AGAINST GOG MILITARY MEMBERS IN THE FUTURE. THE
AMBASSADOR ACCEPTED HER POINT, NOTING THAT THE
EMBASSY HAS ALWAYS URGED THE GOG TO PURSUE AN
INVESTIGATION, BUT THAT WE WERE IN NO POSITION TO

PREDICT HOW THAT INVESTIGATION MIGHT AFFECT OTHER
RELATED COURT CASES IN THE FUTURE. DESPITE THIS
CAVEAT, HARBURY SAID SHE UNDERSTOOD THAT EMBASSY
PRESSURE WAS NECESSARY AND AT NO TIME DURING THE
CONVERSATION DID SHE REQUEST THE EMBASSY TO DESIST
FROM PUSHING A GOG INVESTIGATION. THE AMBASSADOR
SUGGESTED THAT HARBURY CONSULT WITH HER GUATEMALAN
LAWYERS CONCERNING ALL LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE
ISSUE.

7. ON THE PROPOSAL BY CONGRESSMAN BILL RICHARDSON TO
MEET WITH MOD ENRIQUEZ, THE AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT
SHE HAD PASSED THE REQUEST TO MINISTER OF DEFENSE
ENRIQUEZ AND CHIEF OF STAFF GONZALEZ TARACENA.
ENRIQUEZ HAD RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO
RECEIVE HIM. HOWEVER, HE HAD ALSO INDICATED HE WOULD
HAVE NOTHING NEW TO OFFER RICHARDSON. THE AMBASSADOR
ADDED THAT THE EMBASSY WOULD FACILITATE SUCH A
MEETING WHENEVER CONG. RICHARDSON CHOOSES TO VISIT
THE COUNTRY. HARBURY THANKED THE AMBASSADOR AND
STATED THAT SHE SAW THE RICHARDSON OPTION OF
"NEGOTIATING BEHIND CLOSED DOORS" AS THE ONLY REALLY
VIABLE WAY TO SOLVE THE SITUATION. SHE ADDED, "THEY
THINK IT'S ALL OR NOTHING RIGHT NOW. THEY NEED
SOMEONE TO OPEN AN ESCAPE HATCH FOR THEM. UNLESS
THOSE OFFERS ARE ON THE TABLE, IT'LL GET NASTY.
THERE WILL BE A TOTAL HEAD-ON-COLLISION." THE
AMBASSADOR OFFERED THAT SHE BELIEVED THAT THE GOG
RECOGNIZES THAT IT WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH MANY
ATROCIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS CASES, NOT JUST BAMACA, AND
THAT THEY HAVE DECIDED TO DEAL WITH THEM ALL IN THE

CONTEXT OF A PEACE ACCORD, NOT INDIVIDUALLY. DESPITE
THAT FACT, SHE REITERATED THAT IF RICHARDSON WAS
WILLING TO TRY THIS NEW OPTION, EVEN WITHOUT ANY
ASSURANCE OF A BREAKTHROUGH, THE EMBASSY WOULD
CERTAINLY ASSIST IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE.

8. HARBURY THEN OUTLINED IN GENERAL TERMS THE
PROPOSAL SHE PLANNED TO SEND WITH RICHARDSON. IT
WOULD ESSENTIALLY OFFER A "WAY OUT" FOR THE GOG IF
BAMACA WERE ALIVE OR IF BAMACA WERE DEAD. HARBURY'S
CARROT WOULD BE HER SIGNATURE ON A LEGAL WAIVER OF
HER RIGHT TO PROSECUTE ANY GOG OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN
THE CASE. SUCH A WAIVER WOULD REMAIN VALID, EVEN IF
SHE WERE TO CHANGE HER MIND AT A LATER DATE. THE
MILITARY, IN TURN, WOULD HAVE TO ALLOW A MUTUALLY
AGREED UPON INTERMEDIARY TO GUARD BAMACA UNTIL THE
HOSTILITIES HAVE ENDED. THAT INTERMEDIARY WOULD
AGREE NOT TO TALK. TWO MONTHS AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE,
THE ARMY WOULD HAVE TO SET BAMACA FREE; IF NOT,
HARBURY'S WAIVER WOULD BE NULL AND VOID. THEY WOULD

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GUATEM 02007 00 OF 03 102057Z

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BOTH TRAVEL TOGETHER TO ANOTHER COUNTRY (PERHAPS
ISRAEL OR PARAGUAY) AND RELINQUISH THEIR PASSPORTS
FOR 2 YEARS.

9. TUESDAY'S VISIT WAS GENERALLY CORDIAL, BUT BECAME
TENSE WHEN HARBURY PRESSED THE AMBASSADOR FOR ANY USC
HARD INFORMATION THAT BAMACA IS DEAD. IN THE
INTERCHANGE, HARBURY ASKED, "DO YOU HAVE ANY EVIDENCE
THAT HE WAS KILLED? HAS ANYONE TOLD YOU HE IS

DEAD?" SHE WAS IRRITATED BY THE AMBASSADOR'S
RESPONSE OF, "WE HAVE REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT HE
IS DEAD, BASED ON AVAILABLE EVIDENCE." RESPONDING TO
THE SAME QUESTION AGAIN, THE AMBASSADOR ELABORATED,
"I AM CONVINCED HE IS DEAD, BUT I DO NOT KNOW WHAT
HAPPENED TO HIM." SHE THEN SUGGESTED THAT HARBURY
REFER ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ON THE TOPIC TO
WASHINGTON. THE TENSION IN THE AIR CONTINUED TO RISE
WHEN HARBURY POINTED OUT THAT 30 DAYS HAD EXPIRED
SINCE HER FILING OF THE FOIA REQUEST AND ASKED WHY
SHE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED HER DOCUMENTS. THE
AMBASSADOR ASSURED HER THAT ALL OFFICES INVOLVED
WERE WORKING ON THE REQUEST ON AN EXPEDITED BASIS AND
THAT THERE WAS NO DELIBERATE DELAY ON ANYONE'S PART.

9. TURNING TO SUNDAY'S KICK-OFF OF HER WASHINGTON
HUNGER STRIKE, HARBURY SAID THAT SHE HAD HOPED THE
STRIKE COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BUT THAT SHE EXPECTED
PUBLICITY TO BE HIGH AND HOPED TO BE JOINED BY A
GROUP OF CONGRESSIONAL WIVES, LED BY KATHERINE
PORTER, "HOLLYWOOD TYPES", AND VARIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS
ACTIVISTS FROM GUATEMALA AND THE U.S. MCAFFEE

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Bureau of African Affairs

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A9

PARTICIPANTS: Kenneth Brown
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs

William Recant
Executive Director, American Association for
Ethiopian Jews

Scott Cohen, Scott Cohen & Associates

John Hall, Country Officer for Ethiopia

DATE: July 12, 1989

SUBJECT: Ethiopian Jews

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Mogadishu, Tel Aviv

Messrs. Recant and Cohen (who serves the AAEJ in a consultant capacity) called on Acting Assistant Secretary Brown July 12 to discuss a number of issues related to the emigration of Ethiopian Jews.

Mr. Recant said he had been told during a recent trip to Israel that before the May 1989 coup attempt in Ethiopia, the GPDRE and Government of Israel had worked out some sort of arrangement whereby those Jews who have traveled to Addis Ababa from Gonder in hopes of emigrating would be allowed to depart directly for Israel. Mr. Recant estimated there were two thousand such people now in Addis. Some Jews had gotten out of Ethiopia but Recant denied reports that as many as 700 had succeeded in doing so in the last seven months. The GPDRE, he had been told in Israel, backed out of the agreement after the coup attempt. Reasons were unclear, although the deal probably included Israeli security assistance to Ethiopia. The Israelis also wanted GPDRE recognition of Israel.

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At any rate, the Israelis had told Mr. Recant that the Jews should return to Gonder and leave Ethiopia overland, via Sudan, in the hope of getting to Israel. Recant said he was reluctant to recommend such a course, given conditions in the Gedaref camp (where they were most likely to wind up). He was not sure they would be able to leave. That said, there are Israeli "contacts" at the camp, and people do get out. Four or five groups of 200-300 each have left for Israel over the last two to two-and-a-half years. The most recent departed in March, 1989. Recant said the number of Ethiopian Jews in Sudan had grown in recent months to about a thousand, most of whom are at Gedaref.

Mr. Recant referred to a group of about twenty who, trying to get out last summer, were arrested and imprisoned. All but four now had been released within the last few days, and release of the remaining four may be imminent, he said. Most of those who travel to Sudan cross the border east of the Sudanese city of Showak. They have reported that EPLF forces move freely about the countryside after dark as far south as the Semien national park, although government troops are seen in the daytime.

In response to Mr. Recant's question, Mr. Brown confirmed that Kassa Kebede still seems to be the GPDRE's main contact with Israel. Recant noted that Kassa was educated in Israel, and speaks Hebrew.

Mr. Brown referred to reports of murders of Ethiopian Jews in Gonder, and USG attempts to substantiate those reports. Our people had checked, but so far had no hard information about the reported killings. Representatives of the Joint Distribution Committee, who work in Gonder, had told our Embassy recently that in some cases people reported to be dead were still living; others had died years ago.

Mr. Brown asked about the proposed Senate Concurrent Resolution 41, which would express the sense of the Congress that improvement in US/Ethiopian relations should be made contingent on progress in human rights, including Jewish emigration. Mr. Recant, whose organization at first had encouraged Congressional action, said the AAJ had found the resolution too rigid. He does not expect much to come of it.

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(Note: Karl Zuckerman of the Hebrew Immigration Assistance Society told Brown on 7/14 that during January-June 1989 302 Jews had made it to Israel from Ethiopia: 100 directly from Addis Ababa and 202 through Sudan. "Recently," he said, 28 children had been allowed to leave Addis for Israel overtly in the name of family reunification. Apparently those 28 were not included in the figure of 100 mentioned earlier. In a conversation on 7/18 with Brown, Abe Bayer of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council insisted that the Israelis had indeed succeeded in getting 700 Jews out of Ethiopia to Israel since late 1988.)

Drafted: AF/E:JMHall JMH
Cleared: AF:KBrown
AF/E:SMercurio JMH for
NEA/IAI:GPratt
7/17/89 (09920) 7-8852

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Friends of Ethiopian
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97/5 Bar Kochba St.
Jerusalem, Israel

March 28, 1989

President George Bush
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We want to thank you for taking the time to meet with Rachamim Elazar and ourselves two weeks ago.

In our meeting, Mr. Elazar contrasted the joy of the Ethiopian Jewish community in Israel over their successful absorption with the great pain and sorrow caused by family separation. Parents remain separated from children; husbands from wives and brothers from sisters. Almost every Ethiopian Jewish family is afflicted.

We all appreciated discussing an approach to the Soviet Union to join the United States in urging Ethiopia to allow for family reunification for this distressed community. As you indicated, the Soviets may view this as a "low cost" opportunity to improve their human rights image in the international community.

We have enclosed a list of parents separated from children which you suggested might be helpful. Your personal concern and interest in this critical issue could increase the likelihood that the Soviet Union might contribute to a rapid solution to the problem.

During our meeting, you expressed concern over members of the community remaining in the Sudan. We have collated a reliable list of 54 individuals who remain held under surveillance by Sudanese authorities in Umm Rakubra. These people have been held since the time of your earlier effort in 1985.

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Thank you again for your great contributions in bringing about the rescue of hundreds of Ethiopian Jews. We hope and pray that, under your guidance, the remainder of the community will be brought to freedom in the near future.

Sincerely,

William Recant

Dr. William Recant
Executive Director

Jonathan Cohen

Jonathan Cohen
Special Representative

cc:

Brent Scowcroft
Robert Cabelly

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FAMILY REUNIFICATION LIST OF SEPARATED FIRST DEGREE RELATIVES

Name in Ethiopia (all in Addis Ababa)	Relatives in Israel	Israeli Contact
1. Bezuay Chole, 20 Yeshizab, 11 Agernish, 10	mother, father, 3 siblings	Chale Getahun Tiberias
2. Tilashework Addisu, 8 Abebe Tilashework Addisu, 6	mother, father, 2 uncles, aunt	Addisu Dawit Beersheva
3. Hirut Tekle, 45 Elisabeth, 14 Tirfit, 13 Esayas, 6	son, 4 daughters	Fasil Legesse Jerusalem
4. Yeshilem Workeneh, 57 Woretaw, 23 Nanowoah, 19 and her husband Aelemu, 12 Hanna, 8 Aster, 6	husband, 3 children	Zeizanu Berhan Kiryat Gan
5. Zeit Takele, 43 Zemetu, 8 Zemene, 7 Mulutesfa, 4	3 children	Shmuel Golla Tel Aviv
6. Aregaw Gobeze, 9 Tsaw Gobeze, 7	mother, father, aunts, uncles	Gobeze Achenefe Kiryat Yam
7. Bertukan Fisseha, 6	mother, father dead	Kibret Gessesse Nazareth
8. Abyat Demozie, 10 Habtam Demozie, 8	father	Moshe Baruch Bat Yam
9. Manalo Melkamo, 7	mother, father	Shimshon Reda, Ashdod
10. Awoke Atanaw, 12 Tegegne, 10 Solomon, 8 Yenish, 6	mother	Atnaw Bigelegne Ashdod
11. Turingo Abraham, 9 Wubishet Abraham, 7	mother, father	Abraham Asres Ashkelon

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Name in Ethiopia	Israeli Relative	Contact
12. Tadfie Worku, 16	parents dead, uncles, aunts, grandmother	Worku Molla Bat Yam
13. Zahavia Koku, 10 Ayele Koku, 8	mother, father	Koku Ayele Beersheva
14. Ferede Tarekagn, 15	mother, father, siblings	Tarekegn Admasu Nazareth
15. Tegeste Tawode, 8 Tirhast Tewode, 7	mother, father	Haragwen Beyene Kiryat Gat
16. Tadela Mekete, 10	mother, father	Mekete Tsaga Carmiel Nazareth
17. Ergoia Teshome, 12 Simon Teshome, 9	mother, father dead, siblings	Tamar Bitaw Neve Michael Pardes Hannah
18. Tssegaw Lakia, 32 Tegestia, 8 Aderagew, 6	mother, father, wife, brother	Shwaraya Zewdu Kiryat Gat
19. Teshay Wossenie, 33 Paulos, 16 Esayas, 14 Amaretech, 13	husband	Aineshet Gete Hertzalia
20. Abebe Berhan, 45 Abeba, 40 Moshe, 10 Mordichai, 8 Molka, 7 Yahevit, 4	3 children, 2 brothers	Elias Berhan Aklitu Berhan Zeizanu Berhan Beersheva
21. Addisu Sahalu, 35 Ester Tamayeit, 28 Jerush, 8 Yakov, 5 Mulate, 2	mother, father, 2 children	Yemanu Tamayeit Aberre Addisu Askenew Addisu Lod
22. Azenu Adane, 26 Haptam, 6 Rahel, 4	husband	Shmuel Mehari Netanya
23. Bewkete Mengiste, 16	mother, father dead, 4 siblings	Zared Mengiste Pardes Hannah
24. Habshat Mulu, 13 Asmare, 11 Teyayu, 6	mother dead, father in army and presumed dead,	Yonah Ledai (brother) Bat Yam

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List of 54 Ethiopian Jews being held under surveillance in Umm Rakubra, Sudan -- Since 1985

			AGE	SEX
Manalebesh	Abebe	Abraham	15	F
Alemitu	Abraham	Medanie	38	F
Yenesh	Adisu	Wodag	1	F
Fitfit	Asmanaw	Eshetie	8	F
Gombel	Berhie			
Nega	Berhanie			
Worku	Berlie	Dessie	15	M
Teka	Berlie	Dessie	18	M
Amarach	Biadgigne			
Melaku	Biyadgigne	Tafets	22	M
Teseru	Brak			
Tesfahun	Demelew	Eyasie	14	M
Yidege	Demelew	Eyasie	12	M
Aberash	Demelew	Eyasie	10	F
Yirga	Demelew	Eyasie	8	M
Eshetie	Demelew	Eyasie	6	M
Fentahun	Demissie			
Estate	Dessie	Esmania	20	F
Demelew	Esasie	Worku	48	M
Yezab	Eshetie	Yishak	20	F
Debrie	Eskyas	Dawit	60	F
Atala	Eyasie			
Gard	Gebeye			
Kebede	Gembre	Wubie	65	M
Kefyalew	Kassahun			
Ayenesh	Mebrat			
Bewket	Melaku			
Muchit	Mekonen			
Asnakew	Melese	Mulat	17	M
Misanesh	Melese	Mulat	4	M
Ereda	Mera	Tegegne	35	M
Sendku	Meri	Tegegne	35	M
Yesist	Mesfin			
Tadie	Mihret	Gember	22	M
Asnakech	Mulat			
Missanesh	Mulat			

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			AGE	SEX
Manlegbash Kesete Zemene	Salamon Semagne Semagne	Semu	45	F
Lewtie Asressa Adno Emuhay	Semagne Semagne Semagne Semegn	Teled	40	M
Melaku Zenev Adisse Ayele Mulat Tigab Eneye	Sendekie Sendekie Sendekie Sendekie Sendeku Sendeku Seretie	Mera Yigza	6 17	M F
Tekeba Setegne Sisay Mulu Alem Yawbnedo	Tasew Tegaw Tegaw Tegegne Teshale	Yayeh	23	F
Tazebe Workie	Zewudu Zewudu	Dessie Dessie	13 16	M F

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SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN JEWS REPORTED KILLED AND IMPRISONED

REF: ADDIS 1371 (NOTAL)

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR ETHIOPIAN JEWS (AAEJ) HAS GIVEN US COPIES OF EXCERPTS OF LETTERS RECEIVED FROM ETHIOPIAN JEWS REGARDING REPORTED MURDERS OF 23 JEWS BY CHRISTIANS IN GONDAR AREA. LETTERS DATE FROM NOVEMBER 1988. EMBASSY SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITIES TO RAISE USG CONCERN ABOUT REPORTED MURDERS WITH GPDRS OFFICIALS. LETTER EXTRACTS FOLLOW:

IN THIS LETTER WE ARE CRYING OUT TO OUR RELATIVES IN ISRAEL. I'M WRITING THIS LETTER WITH A HEAVY HEART AND A DEEP SENSE OF MOURNING. PEOPLE ARE BEING MURDERED IN BROAD DAY-LIGHT, IN COLD BLOOD AND FOR NO REASON.

IN WAGRA COUNTRY, BABRAK REGION: SHAMI BRET, BARI FARADE, MALAKU KASSE

IN BOZE REGION: BARI AVELIN, MAKILEN MEGALEN

MURDERED NOVEMBER 1988: ALMEINU GATA, SORNU ALMEINU, KASSE ABRAHAM

CHRISTIANS FROM A WHOLE VILLAGE STORMED KASSE ABRAHAM'S HOUSE AND KILLED HIM, HIS SON AND A THIRD MAN. THEY BURNED THE HOUSE AND LINED THEM. THEY CUT THEIR BODIES AND ORDERED NOT TO BURY THEM. THEY LEFT THEIR BODIES TO BE DEVoured BY BEASTS.

IN VENA-DEGA REGION: A MAN AND A WOMAN WERE MURDERED AND THE REST OF THE VILLAGE IS UNDER GUARD BY THE FARMER'S UNION. THEY THREATEN TO KILL THEM ALL LIKE MICE.

IN OUR AREA THEY KILLED THE SON OF YITZHAK. IN COLD BLOOD.

THEY ARE ALL DETERMINED TO ANNIHILATE US AND IF YOU DO NOT DO SOMETHING VERY SOON NOBODY WILL STAY ALIVE HERE. EVERYONE IS AGAINST US. NOT ONLY THE CITIZENS BUT ALSO THE POLICE AND THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES. THERE IS NO ONE TO

GO TO. WE ARE HELPLESS AND POWERLESS. IF YOU DO NOT DO SOMETHING FOR US YOU CAN SAY THAT YOU DO NOT HAVE RELATIVES HERE. WE WILL ALL BE FINISHED. THEY DECIDED TO FINISH US OFF.

NOT ONLY THE ADULTS BUT ALSO THE CHILDREN. THE NEXT GENERATION WE ARE SCARED FOR THE LIFE OF OUR CHILDREN. OUR FEAR OF A POWHOM IS INCREASING DAILY. OUR FUTURE IS DIM. WE ARE THE LOWEST OF LOW. EVEN ANIMALS HAVE PROTECTORS, BUT WE, HUMAN BEINGS, HAVE NONE.

(THE NAME OF THE WRITER IS KEPT FOR SECURITY REASONS)

DEAR ELIAS,

I RECEIVED YOUR LETTER IN WHICH YOU INQUIRE AS TO THE TRUTH OF MRS. AMBAT (ZIPPORA) YAACOV'S DEATH.

MRS. AMBAT AND HER DAUGHTER WERE MURDERED BY THE GENTILE IN COLD BLOOD. MRS. AMBAT WAS A POOR WOMAN WHO MADE LIVING BY MAKING AND SELLING POTTERY. AS WAS HER HABIT SHE WENT ON HER WEEKLY TRIP TO THE MARKET TO SELL AND BUY PROVISIONS. ON THEIR RETURN, SHE AND HER DAUGHTER WERE MET BY THE PEOPLE OF GORBA AND MR. TAKELA MASELA WHO ASSISTED THEM IN CROSSING THE RIVER SARVA. THEY WERE

ACCOMPANIED TO THE JUNCTION AND WERE LEFT THERE

BY CHANCE, MR. AVELIN CAME TO VISIT MRS. AMBAT THAT DAY AT HER HOME. THE NEXT DAY HE WENT TO LOOK FOR THEM AT THE RIVER AND CALLED THE GORBA PEOPLE TO HELP HIM IN THE SEARCH. FINALLY, THEY FOUND THEIR BODIES IN THE SCHOOL. IT WAS APPARENT THAT THEY WERE MURDERED WITH GREAT CRUELTY.

YOU KNOW THAT WE ALWAYS HAD PROBLEMS IN THE VILLAGE. WHEN THE WHOLE COMMUNITY WAS HERE, WE WERE PROTECTED. BUT NOW, WHEN THERE ARE HERE ONLY VERY FEW JEWS, THE GENTILE DO WHATEVER THEY WISH. THERE IS NO ONE TO PROTECT US. TO OUR DAILY ECONOMIC, SAFETY AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS WERE ADDED NOW THE TERRIBLE DEATH OF MRS. AMBAT AND HER DAUGHTER. (AMIAS ELAZARI)

FROM THE VILLAGE SAKALAT

CHAFRA ABRAHAM WAS MURDERED BY CHRISTIANS. CHAFRA WENT TO THE REGIONAL MARKET AT KOLA DABA. UPON HIS RETURN, THREE CHRISTIANS WHO KNEW HIM AND WERE HIS FRIENDS, ABUSED HIM AND SHOT HIM IN THE BACK IN BROAD DAY-LIGHT. ANOTHER JEWISH MAN WHO WAS WITH HIM MANAGED TO ESCAPE AND HIS LIFE WAS SAVED.

CHAFRA WAS A FATHER OF SIX. HIS CHILDREN REMAIN ORPHANED AND WITHOUT MEANS OF SUPPORT. AFTER HIS MURDER AND OUT OF FEAR OF SIMILAR INCIDENTS, ALL THE JEWISH INHABITANT OF THE VILLAGE WERE OBLIGED TO LEAVE THEIR HOMES AND FLEE TO ANOTHER VILLAGE. TODAY THEY ARE REFUGEES WITHOUT SHELTER OR JOB.

IN NORA VILLAGE

AMRA GABAEITU'S SON WAS MURDERED. THE REASON DEMAND FOR MONEY.

IN CHEBETTA VILLAGE

DANIEL BRET'S SON WAS MURDERED BY CHRISTIAN. THE REASON HE BUILT A HOUSE FOR CHRISTIANS AND ASKED FOR PAYMENT FOR HIS LABOR. THE CHRISTIANS BECAME ANGRY AT HIS LIES AND ASKED FOR MONEY AND KILLED HIM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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N BLACK MALAYA VILLAGE

SIMIN GANAMURE VILLAGE

IN THE KOLA MARBE REGION

3. AAEJ ALSO PROVIDED LIST OF 34 JEWS SAID TO HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED IN GONDAR FOR TRYING TO LEAVE FOR SUDAN. FIRST REPORTS ORIGINATED LAST SEPTEMBER BUT WERE SUPPORTED BY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUBSEQUENTLY. FAMILIES OF THE PRISONERS WERE SAID TO BE IN GONDAR AND ABLE TO BRING FOOD TO THE PRISONERS. AAEJ INDICATED THERE MIGHT BE SOME HOPE OF OBTAINING RELEASE OF PRISONERS, POSSIBLY THROUGH BRIBES, AND DID NOT WANT EMBASSY ACTION UNLESS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED. NAMES OF THOSE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED FOLLOW:

1. NEG TIGABU AYELE, 2. NAHUM SENAY AYELE, 3. ZEUDU
EZERA PLUS 1, 4. TIAW GETU PLUS 2, 5. WUBIE GETU, 6.
SCACELAL NIGUSSIE, 7. ALENE AZEM, 8. BIREDA WUBIE, 9.
AGRESCIE WORDEDE, 10. WORKIE ZEWUALU, 11. DESSIE WUBIE,
12. MELAK NAHUSENAY, 13. ZEWODIE BIRHANEN, 14. MERSHA
NAHUMSENAY PLUS HIS WIFE, 15. ERUBEL TILAH, 16. ENEYE
ADEZO, 17. SARIHU AYNESSEGN PLUS HIS WIFE, 18. GEBEYE
(7), 19. MANU AGHENEF, 20. EYDRE TILAHUN, 21. YEWUBE
GETU, 22. BIRKU DIBEKULU PLUS HIS WIFE, 23. AMEHA
DIBEKULU PLUS HIS WIFE, 24. MAMO ATINAFU PLUS HIS WIFE,
25. ATNAFU PLUS HIS WIFE. EAGLEBURGER

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/TR 18 Date: 5/8/97

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF RACHAMIM ELAZAR

Rachamim Elazar was born in 1950 in the small village of Sakelt, Ethiopia, the fifth of nine siblings. Embued by his grandfather's love of Zion, he decided at the age of nine to attend primary school in Ambober where Hebrew and Jewish Studies were taught. Although none of his older four siblings had entertained this type of schooling and it was impractical, Rachamim's father consented because he recognized that his son was different and special.

Ever since, this recognition has been universal, among his Israeli friends who helped him leave Ethiopia in 1972 (before Ethiopian Jews were recognized as full Jews) up until the present when every Prime Minister seeks his counsel. Rachamim arrived in Israel in 1972 already fluent in Hebrew. After a brief stay in a Youth Aliyah School, he attended Tel-Aviv University studying Middle-East and African History and Journalism. His simple eloquence and command of language led to his direction of Amharic language broadcasts for Kol Yisrael. His voice is known and he is loved by Ethiopian Jews in both Israel and Ethiopia. He bridges the gap between all segments of Ethiopian Jewry -- the strict religious traditionalists from the villages and the modern secularists who valued education and had to hide their Judaism in the larger cities.

In his official position as an Ethiopian spokesperson, he is the Chairman of the National Council of Ethiopian Jews in Israel which speaks for Ethiopia Jewish needs beyond the political party system of established Israel politics. He speaks English well and has traveled and spoken extensively to American Jewish audiences.

Rachamim is modest and unaffected. He personally greets Ethiopian *Olim* upon arrival to Israel and has a far-reaching knowledge of Jewish demography and living conditions in Ethiopia. Our understanding of the thoughts, secrets, anguish and ambitions of Ethiopian Jews is best understood through Ethiopian voices and Rachamim Elazar is one of the most articulate.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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February 9, 1989

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 MEMORANDUM

To: AF - Kenneth L. Brown
 Through: AF/E - John S. Davison
 From: AF/E - John L. Berntsen
 Subject: Proposed call by Rachamin Elazar, leader of National Council of Ethiopian Jews in Israel.

Anita Moss from the American Association of Ethiopian Jews asked if a Department official would be interested in meeting with Rachamin Elazar, the "outspoken leader" of the National Council of Ethiopian Jews in Israel and the director of Amharic broadcasts for the Voice of Israel. Ms. Moss says Rachamin met with a "high U.S. official" in Israel in 1988, but has not been more specific.

Rachamin will be in the Washington area from February 23 to March 4. Ms. Moss has provided a list of dates/times when Rachamin would be available. I told her I would get back to her with a response.

Draft: AF/E: JLBerntsen
 Clear: AF/E: DHKaeuper

(07530)

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 Set up w/
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Set up for
 Feb. 23 at
 3:00 P.M. - 3:30
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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ACTION REQUESTED:

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CONGRESSIONAL

HIGH PRIORITY ITEM

STATE TRANSMITTAL FORM
TO NSCS OVP

TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

PROVIDE INFO COPY OF
DIRECT REPLYWITH DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE
BY:

WITH COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION

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WITH MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT WITH REPLY FOR SIGNATURE

FOR APPROPRIATE HANDLING

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

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73

ETHIOPIAN JEWRY INFORMATION SHEET
(Exclude Underlined Material from Secular Press)

Life in Ethiopia

Ethiopia, with a population of 40 million, is one of the world's poorest and least developed countries. The life expectancy is 39 years, the mortality rate of children, under five years old, is nearly 50 percent; and there is only one doctor for every 70,000 people. The average annual income is less than \$150.

Current Status of Ethiopian Jews

Fifteen thousand Jews are still stranded in Ethiopia's Gondar Province. They are mostly women, children, the elderly and infirm. Threatened by famine, disease, and a bloody civil war in neighboring Tigre province, the Jews of Ethiopia struggle to survive. They want desperately to join their 15,000 relatives in Israel.

In Marxist Ethiopia, free emigration is forbidden. Reunification of its citizens with family members living abroad is one of the few potential avenues for legally leaving Ethiopia - if and when permission is granted. The Jews often face religious discrimination from their non-Jewish neighbors. The teaching of Hebrew and Jewish studies is discouraged. Special permission for holiday gatherings is required and often denied. Travel outside Gondar is severely restricted. Most Jewish villages are closed to outsiders, and permits are required to visit the few villages open to tourists.

Today 16,000 Ethiopian Jews live in Israel. Half that number were airlifted in 1984 and 1985 during the secret U.S.-Israeli airlifts-Operations Moses and Joshua/Sheba, from Sudanese refugee camps.

About 500 more Jews have been brought from Ethiopia to Israel since then through the coordination and funding of Jewish American rescue groups in conjunction with the Israeli government.

Need for a Family Reunification Program

A Family Reunification Program is the best means for bringing large numbers of Ethiopian Jews to Israel. To date, the governments of Ethiopia, Israel and the United States have been unsuccessful in establishing a large scale reunification process for the Ethiopian Jews.

The division of families has created serious consequences, for both the Jews in Ethiopia and in Israel. The anguish, guilt and fear which Israeli Ethiopian Jews experience on behalf of the loved ones they left behind is, for many, a major obstacle to continued progress in their absorption. Many of the Ethiopian Jewish children living in Israel have been orphaned- their parents are either no longer living or were left behind in Ethiopia. The Jews in Ethiopia are left without the youth, vitality and leadership of those who left. The infrastructure of the community is impaired.

Dangers Posed by Famine and Disease

Drought conditions are again intensifying in Ethiopia. It is expected that this drought will be of even greater severity than the one of 1984. President Mengistu has requested relief intervention from the international community.

Ongoing supplementary food shipments are essential to sustain the Jewish community during drought and non-drought periods. Loss of these shipments will result in dire conditions for our people: hunger, malnutrition, disease and death.

At best, our people abide grinding poverty, contaminated water, absence of medical care, respiratory diseases, tuberculosis and blindness due to aggravated conjunctivitis and trachoma. X

Guerrilla warfare has erupted again where Jews live. They continue to be caught in its cross-fire.

President Mengistu's "Villagization Plan" is being implemented. Jewish families have been moved from their Jewish villages into new communal areas with non-Jews. They are expected to build their living quarters anew. In most instances, the Jews do not have sufficient money for this rebuilding. Not only will Jewish religious practices be affected by the communalization, but the Jews will be more closely observed making communication and contact with them more difficult.

An Historical Overview

The Jews of Ethiopia call themselves, House of Israel--*Beta Israel*. They are called "Falasha" by non-Jewish Ethiopians, a derogatory term meaning stranger or landless. Despite centuries of anti-Semitism, land confiscation, enslavement, forced conversion, torture and death--the Ethiopian Jews have maintained their Jewish heritage and prayed for their return to Jerusalem.

Some believe the Ethiopian Jews to be the remnants of the lost tribe of Dan, while others claim they are descendants of Menelik I, the fabled son of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. Ethiopian Jews are perhaps descendants of the Jews who dispersed after the destruction of the First Temple. Other theories suggest that Judaism was spread among Ethiopians by Jews who were living in Egypt or South Arabia--perhaps traders who crossed the Red Sea.

Isolated from other Jewish communities for two millennia, the Ethiopian Jews adhere strictly to a form of pre-Rabbinic and pre-Talmudic Judaism. The Sabbath, Rosh Hashonah, Yom Kippur, Sukkot, Purim, Shavuot and Passover are observed. Jewish dietary and ritual purity laws are maintained, and circumcision of male children is performed on the eighth day.

From the tenth century C.E. through the 14th century, one million Ethiopian Jews enjoyed political and economic independence.

In 900 C.E., a great Jewish queen, Judith-Yehudite, ruled the empire.

Even as the Inquisition took place in Spain, An Ethiopian ruler in 1434 gave himself the title of "Exterminator of the Jews." During the ten year reign of his son, many Jews were forcibly baptized: many Ethiopian Jews kept Judaism alive in secret.

The decline of the Jewish Empire began as the Jews were caught in a civil war between the Muslims and Christians.

In the 1600's, a great massacre was perpetrated against those Jews refusing conversion. Many were sold into slavery. Their land was confiscated and they were forced, as were our European forebearers, to till the land only as lessees. The Jews retreated to the mountainous region of Ethiopia for safety and have remained there, largely isolated, maintaining their Judaism.

The Ethiopian Jews believed that they were the only people left on earth perpetuating Judaism. In 1867, Joseph Halevy searched out the community and the first modern contact with Western Jewry took place. During the 20th century, Ethiopian Jews in small numbers were brought to Israel to study Talmudic Judaism and returned to Ethiopia to become teachers and leaders of their Jewish people.

By 1930, when former Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie ascended the throne, the Jewish population had dwindled from one million to 50,000. Their numbers continued to decline to the current total estimate of 30,000 Jews. The Jews were still unable to own land, pressured to convert, and not allowed to emigrate.

Refer to the other side of this Information Sheet for a description of conditions under the current Marxist government.

American Radio Network for Ethiopian Jewry (213) 681-4065

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DRAFTED BY: AF/E: JMHALL (12030)

APPROVED BY: AF/E: JSDAVISON

AF/E: JLUNSTEAD

AF/E: DHKAEUPER

NEA/IAI: GPRATT

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TO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 040475

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PHUM, ET, SU

SUBJECT: REPORT THAT TPLF IS CONSCRIPTING ETHIOPIAN JEWS
FROM REFUGEE CAMP IN SUDAN

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR
ETHIOPIAN JEWS CONTACTED ETHIOPIA DESK OFFICER
FEBRUARY 5 TO SAY THAT THE AAEJ HAS HAD REPORTS FROM
GONDER THAT THE TPLF IS SEIZING ETHIOPIAN JEWS FROM A
REFUGEE CAMP IN SUDAN AND PRESSING THEM INTO
SERVICE. ACCORDING TO THE AAEJ SOURCE, ABOUT 250
PEOPLE HAVE BEEN CONSCRIPTED IN THIS FASHION. THE
SOURCE DID NOT GIVE THE NAME OF THE CAMP.3. ETHIOPIA DESK OFFICER ASKED WHETHER THE SOURCE
MIGHT BE REACTING TO A GENERAL CONSCRIPTION OF
REFUGEES OF ALL FAITHS. AAEJ REPRESENTATIVE SAID
THAT ACCORDING TO HIS SOURCE, THE TIGRAYANS SEEK OUT
JEWS SPECIFICALLY, AND TELL THEM IT IS IN
"RETALIATION" FOR ISRAEL'S RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA.4. FOR KHARTOUM: AAEJ HOPES TO BE ABLE TO ARRANGE
FOR THE SOURCE TO BE BROUGHT TO ADDIS AND INTERVIEWED
IN MORE DETAIL. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WOULD APPRECIATE
KNOWING WHETHER THE EMBASSY HAS HEARD ANY OF THESE
REPORTS.5. FOR TEL AVIV: WE SUGGEST YOU CHECK WITH
APPROPRIATE ISRAELI OFFICIALS TO SEE IF THEY HAVE ANY
INFORMATION REGARDING THIS REPORT, EMPHASIZING THAT
WE HAVE NO INFORMATION THAT CONFIRMS IT, AND TEND TO
BE SKEPTICAL OF IT. EAGLEBURGER

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DATE: 5/8/97
 BY: [signature]

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ET - Folio 409

P.1

American Association for Ethiopian Jews

Eastern Office
340 Corlies Avenue
Pelham, New York 10803
(814) 733-0958

NATIONAL OFFICE
2730 CAR ST.
HIGHLAND PARK, ILL. 60038
(312) 433-8180

Western Office
304 Robin Hood Ln.
Costa Mesa, California 92626
(714) 881-8000

Dr. Graham Berger
Founding President

Nathan Shapiro
President

Dr. Howard Lavin
Immediate Past President

Beginning of February, 1987, the following Jews were put into prison in Addis Abeba:

RELEASED

Hirut Tekle - (F-42) - became pregnant while in prison - had been active in helping Jews process to leave - has 4 children in Israel, 4 small children in Ethiopia.

6/21/88

Makonen Alemayahu - (M-34) - had been active in processing cases to leave.

6/21/88

Mitiku Bayuh - (M-38) - 3 brothers in States - mother and father in Israel - 2 children and wife in Ethiopia - had been active in helping some cases.

6/24/88

Meshom Beecha - (M-43) - active in helping people process - businessman who frequently travels to Europe/Israel - brother who just arrived in Israel.

6/21/88

Mekki Bainsaigh - (M-30) - educated in Israel in the 50's - children in Israel - active in aiding cases - first person put into prison - picked up in Dira Dawa and accused of escaping from Ethiopia via Djibouti with Mogus, Assefa and Dawit.

6/21/88

Mogus Atenaw - (M-30) and wife - was leaving country with Haim.

6/21/88

Assefa Mailu (Belay) - (M-30) - leaving country with Haim.

6/24/88

Dawit Bayuh - (M-23) - leaving country with Haim.

6/24/88

Solomon?

6/24/88

Genet Aschagne

6/24/88

Fekede (Hoptes) Woldehanna - non-Jew, facilitator for Jewish cases.

6/21/88

6 other Jews - names unavailable????

?

Midde of February, these were put into prison in Gondar:

Eshate Ferade - (M-33) and wife Tsahaynesh - 6 children - taken to Addis prison, October, 1987

6/88

RAVE (M-30) - wife and 4 children

10/87

RAVE (M-45) - wife and 5 children - had been active in distributing money.

10/87

Contributions are tax deductible

RELEASED

Tsegaw Balay - (M-29) - ~~wife~~ and 3 children

10/87

Miheret Abraham - (M-26)

10/87

March, 1987 put into prison:

Wondafaraw Awoka - (M-45) - helped with some cases.

6/21/ 88

October, 1987, put into prison in Gondar:

Genetu Tessaema - (M-50) - 2 children in Israel - 1 in Canada - wife and 4 children at home - taken to Addis Abeba Prison

1/88

January, 1988

Abebe Barhan (M-30) - "kes", head of Wallecha synagogue, married, father of 5, 2 children in Israel.

Abraham Sahalu (M-27) - married, father of 4

May, 1988

According to several sources the following Jews (23) were put into prison. in Addis. It is believed they were on their way to Assab or Djibouti via Dessie-Assab road

Pentahun Baru plus 3 family members
 Demoze Biru plus 3 family members
 Son of Yetela
 Son of Esayaa
 Mogus Wote
 Mengist Tizazu plus 2 family members
 Negussie Alebon - ORT teacher
 Teke Tamino
 Mela Kinde plus 2 family members
 Dassie ?
 Cheklit Makonnen
 Fisseha Yalew
 Worku Asmaru



United States Department of State
To authority to
POIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions
Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
MEMORANDUM

UNCLASSIFIED

September 12, 1986

TO: The Files

FROM: AF/E -- Jean Szymanski

SUBJECT: Bishop Meeting with Barbara Ribakove, North American Conference on Ethiopian Jewry, September 11, 1986

Barbara Ribakove, North American Conference on Ethiopian Jewry called on DAS James K. Bishop September 11, 1986, to introduce herself, tell about her recent trip to Gondar region, Ethiopia, and to express several concerns. Michael Strum, also of the North American Conference, and Ethiopia desk officer Jean Szymanski were present.

Ribakove said she traveled with a group to Gondar late June/early July, 1986. Although an RRC official in Addis Ababa had told her that things were very bad in Gondar at that time, it was raining when she arrived and the countryside looked green, almost lush. However, conditions were not good. Under heavier than usual security, the group visited five villages. They were denied permission to visit another village they had asked for although they had been promised unrestricted access if there was no fighting in the area.

Ribakove said the Jewish villages were populated mostly with old people, women and children. There were hardly any young men. Young men had either gone to Israel or had been drafted into the Ethiopian army. Very young boys were helping the old men in the fields but the old men could probably only farm for a few more years. Despite this, these villagers who remained behind did not appear resentful of those who had gone to Israel. On the contrary, they seemed proud of their children in Israel and showed Ribakove's group letters and pictures. Ribakove said remittances were a problem as local post offices seemed to be stealing money from the letters. However, this was probably a general problem and not directed only at Jews.

Ribakove found the villagers suffering from malnutrition and disease, especially the babies. The group was able to give

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people money to visit the clinics in nearby towns. The local clinic was poor with no doctor. Eye disease was endemic and there was no medication for this. Ribakove's group bought eye medication in Gondar City for the clinic. She said the AJJDC was accepted by local officials but had been prevented from

staffing the clinics they had built and from conducting training classes. Officials had said they could only start training after buildings were completed, giving Ribakove the impression the government wanted the buildings for future use. Medical care was available locally, but transport was difficult and lodging expensive so that this care was out of the reach of most people. Ribakove's group formed an ad hoc medical team, which included their "minders". (She said this kept the minders busy so that the group was able to converse more freely with the local population).

Ribakove was concerned about the high mortality rate of oxen which had been provided through AJJDC. She was told oxen were small, weak and sick, and so were often slaughtered for food before they died. She wondered if perhaps these oxen were not suitable for that particular area and suggested people from the village should help select. Earlier in the day, Walter North, AID had shown her a report that contradicted this information. (North is checking this out with USAID Addis).

Ribakove said the political situation seemed "unreal". The power struggle between Major Malaku and Ato Wolega continues. A Jew came down from Wegera--a two day walk--and said there was a lot of fighting up there. He said the Jews were caught in the middle although there were no casualties yet among the Jewish population. He said those returning from Sudan were having difficulties reclaiming their land and houses. Those who had stayed called them traitors and in many cases, the homes had been given away. It was not clear if this pertained only to Jews or to all those who had gone to Sudan. He also reported starvation in the Belesa area.

An AJJDC representative told Ribakove a man from Libo reported that 3000 Jews had been forcibly transported to Libo and were starving there. However, Ribakove believed this

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unlikely. There had been about that number in the Libo region for some time and she would certainly have heard of mass transport from other sources if it had been going on. Back in Addis Ababa, Ribakove was told by an Ethiopian Jew that Ambover region was to be villagized after the harvest. People had been told they should plan to move. There was a report that Ambover was to be made into a forest. Ribakove thought this unlikely as it was an established town with a good regional school, dispensary and synagogue. If true, the report is extremely ominous.

Ribakove said they had no problem getting permission for future trips. One person (Jume Mueller) was going out in mid September and had permission for six days in Gondar. She would contact the U.S. Embassy. A group was traveling to Gondar in late November.

Ribakove asked for Bishop's ideas on how to get the PMGSE to allow more Jews to emigrate and Strum asked about the effect of domestic American pressure on the PMGSE. Bishop stressed that pressure from the Administration or from American Jewish groups could have an adverse effect on those Jews remaining in Ethiopia and could conceivably cause the PMGSE to cut off the trickle of people now getting out. On the other hand, more pressure from individual Congressmen might be helpful as the PMGSE often tried to drive a wedge between Congress and the Administration and believed they had friends in Congress. Likewise, pressure coming from other donors might be more effective. Ribakove asked what other Western countries might have good enough relations with the PMGSE to raise the Ethiopian Jewish issue. Bishop replied that Canada and Italy enjoyed fairly good relations but did not know if they would be willing to raise the issue or if it would do any good.

Ribakove mentioned Bishop's upcoming talks before the American Association of Ethiopian Jews and the Rabbinic Call to Conscience. She said one of the differences between her group and these was that the others believed Israel could do much more to help family reunification of Ethiopian Jews. She believed Israel was doing what it could. Bishop pointed out that Israel was probably doing more than we knew about and,

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given the sieve-like media atmosphere in Israel, was holding this information very close. Ribakove agreed.


Bishop also briefed Ribakove on the present poor state of U.S./Ethiopia relations. He said that Mengistu did not follow-up through diplomatic channels his public protestations of desire for an improved relationship. Bishop said the only possible leverage we have over the PMGSE is the Congressional threat of economic sanctions and our influence on other donors. On villagization, Szymanski said the PMGSE may have learned something from international criticism of resettlement as villagization was not so obviously brutal and coercive. It was conducted in a more subtle manner than resettlement. Bishop said we believed the eventual goal was control of the population and collectivization but that this had not yet occurred. We were watching the program closely.

cc: AF - James K. Bishop
AF/E - David Fischer
Embassy Addis Ababa

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM

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July 29, 1986

TO: The Files

FROM: AF/E - Jean Szymanski *JS*

SUBJECT: DAS Bishop's Meeting of July 29, 1986, with Nate Shapiro, President of the American Association of Ethiopian Jews.

Nate Shapiro, President of the American Association of Ethiopian Jews, paid a courtesy call on DAS James Bishop July 29, 1986. Accompanying him were Scott Cohen (formerly staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for years with Senator Percy) and Lisa Freund, also of the AAEJ. Also present were incoming DCM Addis Ababa Lou Janowski and desk officer Jean Szymanski.

Shapiro expressed his organization's appreciation for State Department assistance and understanding during the past several years on the issue of the Ethiopian Jews. He looked forward to working with Bishop. He said his main concern now is family reunification between those in Israel and those left behind in Ethiopia, as well as Sudan. Telling of stress and even suicide among Ethiopian Jews in Israel, compounded by the difficulties of absorption into a new culture and worry over family members still in Ethiopia, Shapiro said the Ethiopian Jewish issue was surely a priority human rights concern.

Bishop agreed that this issue was an important human rights concern and that there were unfortunately many human rights issues in Ethiopia such as resettlement and villagization. We had publicized our concern about these other issues but could not publicly speak out on the Jewish issue without endangering those involved. He pointed out that public pressure on the PMGSE would dry up what little access we now have to the villages in Gondar and the small trickle of refugees now flowing out to Israel. The PMGSE must know this activity exists. Publicity would force them to react more negatively. Bishop outlined the difficulties of the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Ethiopia and our attempts to engage in dialogue.

Bishop and Shapiro discussed current procedures for getting Ethiopian Jews to Israel. Bishop said the procedure moved in a direct line from Carl Zucker to Bishop to Lou Janowski to

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the field. No one else should get involved as too many players had caused problems in the past. Shapiro agreed. He said the AAEJ worked closely with Zuckerman and the Israeli Consulate in New York. Shapiro said they would like to increase the Israeli role in the family reunification effort.

Shapiro asked what could be done to help Ethiopian Jews now in Sudan. Bishop replied that we can do very little at the moment. We believe there are about 200 there and they are being kept apart from other refugees. We have not heard that they are being persecuted other than the isolation but that it is impossible for us to check on them at this time. Bishop reminded Shapiro that we have had to evacuate everyone but key personnel from our Embassy in Khartoum because of the Calkins shooting and the still present Libyan threat. It is not possible for a U.S. official to visit the refugee sites at this time. Also, it would be harmful both to U.S. interests and to the Ethiopian Jews themselves for us to show official American interest in this group.

Shapiro invited Bishop to speak at the AAEJ conference September 14 and Bishop accepted. He thanked Shapiro for taking the initiative in coming in to introduce themselves and looked forward to working together in the future.

cc: AF - James Bishop
AF/E - David Fischer

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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September 30, 1986

AI

TO: The Files

FROM: AF - Jean Szymanski

SUBJECT: DAS Bishop Meeting with Richard Krieger September 29, 1986

DAS Bishop met with Richard Krieger September 29, at Krieger's request, to discuss Ethiopian Jewry. Krieger told Bishop AAEJ President Nate Shapiro called him and asked about the possibility of running a rescue program for Ethiopian Jews out of Djibouti along the lines of that in Addis Ababa. Shapiro said that in 3 or 4 days he would have an Ethiopian Jew in Djibouti and wondered if we could get him out. Earlier (March or April), Krieger had raised this with Consular Affairs DAS Michael Newland who said the program might be possible. Bishop replied that Krieger should call Shapiro and that he, Bishop, would also call Shapiro, and both would make it clear that Shapiro should deal directly with the State Department rather than through Krieger. Krieger agreed that this was "no problem".

Bishop then raised the misunderstanding between him and Krieger on what Krieger can and cannot do as a private citizen regarding Ethiopian Jewry. Krieger said he had understood Bishop to say that it was all right to discuss the issue with anybody as long as people understood the discussion was unofficial and that Krieger was there as a private citizen and on private business. Bishop said that Krieger's understanding was not correct. Krieger was not authorized to discuss the issue with foreign officials. In order for the USG to have coherence on this issue, foreign governments must deal only with the State Department. Krieger, as an American Jew, can discuss the issue privately with French Jews or other private citizens. Bishop said he regretted the misunderstanding, but foreign governments cannot be expected to make the distinction between Krieger as a private citizen and official USG communications. He reiterated that Krieger had no authority to raise the Ethiopian Jewry issue with foreign governments.

Krieger said he had been very upset at the message from our Embassy in Paris that he was not to discuss this issue with the French Government. However, he did not raise the issue with any French officials. Krieger then told Bishop about the meetings he had had in France, Israel, and elsewhere on Ethiopian Jewry.

In France, he saw only private citizens and added that these citizens were well-connected with the Foreign Ministry.

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Krieger said the major concern among the Israelis regarding Ethiopian Jews was the situation in Sudan. Krieger spoke to Moshe Gilboa and one other whom he referred to but did not name. This person asked him about the status of Ethiopian Jews in Sudan and asked what could be done to help these people. He said he was worried about Sudanese plans for a Sudanese refugee review board to thoroughly check refugee credentials. Krieger said he did not know if the board was yet formed, but last he had heard, the USG opposed its formation. The Israeli asked Krieger if he had any ideas on what to do about those Ethiopian Jews caught in Sudan. Krieger replied that he did but that the U.S. could not be involved in any rescue efforts out of Sudan. Krieger thought it possible to work through a third country which had an embassy there but had not been identified with the prior movement. The Israeli said he would consider this. Krieger suggested France or Italy as possibilities and said he would be happy to discuss this further. He also raised the idea with Gilboa who said the GOI would discuss.

Krieger said he and Gilboa discussed difficulties with absorption and movements of Ethiopians within Israel, including settlement of Ethiopians on the West Bank. Bishop said that his brief covered only rescue and West Bank settlement, not problems of absorption and education. That was handled by RP. Krieger said he understood that. He said Gilboa assured him the Ethiopians had been moved off the West Bank and that no more had arrived. Krieger said that Gilboa expressed satisfaction with the operations to bring Ethiopian Jews out of Israel and with the GOI relationship with the State Department on this issue. Krieger mentioned asked Gilboa about Swedish efforts to persuade the PMGSE to allow family reunification. Gilboa said the Swedes had presented the list of names to the PMGSE for the second time and felt the PMGSE was treating the Swedish proposal in the same cavalier way they treated similar proposals for family reunification by American Congressmen. Krieger told Bishop there was a significant increase in Swedish visas issued in Addis during July and August. When the Israelis raised the possibility of a visit to Israel by Bishop, Krieger advised them to raise it with Ambassador Pickering who then could issue the invitation through the Embassy.

Krieger said that while in Sweden he spoke with the Swedish Under Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was assured of the Swedish commitment to reissuing the list for family reunification to the PMGSE. Krieger did not talk to the Danes. He had planned to talk to French officials but did not raise the issue after being told he could not.

Bishop and Krieger also talked about the possible Reader's Digest article on Ethiopian Jews. Both agreed they had understood Princeton Lyman and Gene Douglas had come to an understanding earlier with the Reader's Digest that the RD would check with State before using their material. However, there appeared to be two different articles and the issue apparently was not yet resolved. The earlier author, Ruth

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Gruber, appeared to be contained. The author of the latest article was an unknown quantity. Bishop and Krieger agreed to check with Princeton Lyman as he was probably the last person in State to talk to the RD about this article. Krieger said he feared the RD would use names of U.S. officials and others that should not be used. In earlier conversations with the RD, Lyman had asked them to remove these names and Krieger had pointed out inaccuracies.

Krieger told Bishop he is taking a group of 9 Black American leaders to Israel in December and they would include Ethiopian settlements in their itinerary.

cc: AF - Jim Bishop

AF - Dave FISHER

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FOR US MISSION NATO: PLEASE DELIVER WILSON BY 8:30 AM TUESDAY,
AUGUST 6 FOR USE IN POLADS.

SUBJECT: CZECHOSLOVAKIA

FOLLOWING IS DEPARTMENT'S ASSESSMENT IN LIGHT OF CIERNA AND
BRATISLAVA MEETINGS. DEPARTMENT WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP POSTS
APPRISED OF ITS VIEWS AS EVENTS WARRANT.

1. AUGUST 3 BRATISLAVA MEETING APPEARS TO MARK END OF CURRENT
PHASE OF DIRECT SOVIET THREAT TO INVAD. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE
ACCUSATIONS AND THREATS VOICED IN THE JULY 15 LETTER OF PART-
ICIPANTS IN THE WARSAW CONVERENCE APPEAR TO HAVE BECOME A DEAD
LETTER. DUBCEK REGIME HAS WON RESPITE AND RIGHT ESSENTIALLY
TO CONTINUE ITS DOMESTIC REFORM PROGRAMS, THOUGH IT NOT YET
CLEAR EXACTLY WHAT PRICE IT MAY HAVE HAD TO PAY. PRIOR DIFF-
ERENCES BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND OTHER CRITICAL REGIMES
APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN PAPERED OVER RATHER THAN RESOLVED, AND IT
UNCLEAR HOW MODUS VIVENDI SANCTIONED AT CIERNA AND LATER BRAT-
ISLAVA WILL STAND TEST OF TIME.

2. MEETING ITSELF WAS TOO BRIEF TO HAVE DONE MUCH MORE THAN
RUBBER STAMP RESULTS OF CIERNA DISCUSSIONS. COMMUNIQUE IT-
SELF AN UNREVEALING DOCUMENT, WITH CONTENTS FOR MOST PART ITEMS
PREVIOUSLY AGREED (E.G., ECONOMIC SUMMIT HAD BEEN AGREED IN
PRINCIPLE AT MARCH MEETING IN DRESDEN: IDEA OF PEOPLE'S
CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY DATED BACK TO KARLOVY VARY
COMMUNIST MEETING LAST YEAR). INDEED, PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT
WAS EVIDENTLY TO DREDGE UP OLD POINTS TO STRESS CONTINUITY
OF AGREEMENT AMONG PARTICIPANTS, AND GIVE SOME VENEER OF NOR-
MAILITY TO BRATISLAVA MEETING.

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3. COMMUNIQUE SAID NOTHING EXPLICIT ABOUT CZECHOSLOVAK INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ENDORSE CZECHOSLOVAK DEMOCRATIZATION NOR DID IT EXPLICITLY RENOUNCE CLAIMS OF FIVE-PARTY LETTER OF JULY 15 TO HAVING RIGHT TO BE CONCERNED OVER CZECHOSLOVAK DEVELOPMENTS. SILENCE ON THESE TOPICS EVIDENTLY REFLECTED READINESS TO GIVE DUBCEK LEADERSHIP TIME TO WORK OUT ITS OWN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, AND REINFORCES TRUCE IN OPEN POLEMICS. SOVIET MEDIA CEASED ATTACKS ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN DAYS PRECEDING BRATISLAVA SUMMIT; EAST GERMANS WERE LAST AMONG EAST EUROPEANS TO FOLLOW SUIT. IMPLICIT IN CESSATION OF POLEMICS IS SOME CZECHOSLOVAK COMMITMENT TO RESTRAIN MEDIA. WHILE FORMAL RE-INSTITUTION OF CENSORSHIP HARDLY POSSIBLE POLITICALLY FOR DUBCEK REGIME, SOME FORM OF REGULATION WILL PRESUMABLY BE NECESSARY TO MEET THIS COMMITMENT. MORE GENERALLY, LANGUAGE OF COMMUNIQUE BINDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO PRINCIPLE OF PRESERVING "LEADING ROLE" OF COMMUNIST PARTY -- AN ORTHODOX BUT VAGUE PROPOSITION WHOSE IMPLEMENTATION MAY ONCE AGAIN BECOME SUBJECT OF DEBATE BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND ITS ALLIES.

4. LANGUAGE OF COMMUNIQUE ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES -- VIETNAM, MIDDLE EAST, AND GERMANY -- WAS FAMILIAR STEREOTYPE. DOCUMENT WAS LESS VEHEMENTLY ANTI-US THAN IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, BUT ENDORSEMENT OF BUCHAREST AND KARLOVY VARY DECLARATIONS ON EUROPEAN POLICY AVOIDED REITERATION OF SOME OF OLD "DETENTE" THEMES (SUCH OLD IDEAS AS MUTUAL DISSOLUTION OF MILITARY ALLIANCES, NON-USE OF FORCE ARRANGEMENTS APPEAR TO HAVE BECOME SENSITIVE ISSUES). AND SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO NEED FOR "CONCERTED POLICY" ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS MAY REPRESENT RESTRICTION ON FUTURE CZECHOSLOVAK DEALINGS WITH WESTERN EUROPE AND PARTICULARLY FRG.

5. ONE OF QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE IS DEGREE TO WHICH ULBRICHT, WHO OBVIOUSLY MOST DISTURBED ABOUT CZECHOSLOVAK EVOLUTION, WAS PLACATED. ONE OF HIS OBJECTIVES CLEARLY WAS TO PUT BRAKE ON PRAGUE'S DEALINGS WITH FRG AND, AS NOTED ABOVE, HE MAY HAVE SUCCEEDED AT LEAST FOR TIME BEING. CURIOUS PASSAGE IN BRATISLAVA COMMUNIQUE CONCERNING PERMANENT SUPPORT FOR GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY MAY BE DESIGNED TO PUT GENERAL CRIMP IN DEALINGS WITH SPD. TIME WILL TELL WHETHER ULBRICHT WILL ALSO ATTEMPT FURTHER PRESSURE ON FRG-BERLIN RELATIONS IN THE NAME OF ASSERTING THE SOVEREIGNTY WHICH BRATISLAVA TEXT ONCE AGAIN AFFIRMS FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL ITS SIGNATORIES.

6. MUTUAL ENDORSEMENT OF NOVEMBER INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONFERENCE

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CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW APPARENTLY INTENDED BY SOVIETS TO REIN IN CZECHOSLOVAKS AND TO REDUCE CHANCES THAT RECENT DISPUTE WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA MAY BECOME AN ISSUE AMONG POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN THAT MEETING.

7. ON MILITARY ASPECTS:

--SOVIET FORCES RINGING CZECHOSLOVAKIA SO FAR APPARENTLY IN PLACE.
--CZECHOSLOVAK DEFENSE MINISTRY ANNOUNCED ON AUGUST 1 THAT SOVIET TROOPS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR JUNE WARSAW PACT EXERCISE HAD COMPLETED WITHDRAWAL FROM CZECHOSLOVAK SOIL; MOSCOW HAD NOT MADE ANY ANNOUNCEMENT TO THIS EFFECT. WHILE IT COULD BE TRUE, WE CANNOT AT THIS TIME CONFIRM THAT ALL SOVIET TROOPS HAVE LEFT CZECHOSLOVAKIA. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ANNOUNCEMENT'S REFERENCE TO SOVIET TROOPS TAKING PART IN EXERCISE HAD BEEN INTENDED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THEM AND OTHERS WHO DID NOT.
--BE THAT AS IT MAY, SOME CZECHOSLOVAK SOURCES HAVE SUGGESTED THAT SOME NEW AGREEMENT ALLOWING WARSAW PACT MILITARY PERSONNEL TO BE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA MAY BE IN THE OFFING. WORDING OF COMMUNIQUE ON STRENGTHENING OF WARSAW PACT COULD BE UMBRELLA FOR SOME NEW AGREEMENT OF THAT SORT.
--CZECHOSLOVAK PREMIER CERNIK REPORTED TO HAVE SAID ON AUGUST 3 THAT THERE IS NEED TO DEVELOP AND REINFORCE WARSAW PACT SO LONG AS NATO EXISTS, THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS NO INTENTION OF REDUCING THE NUMBER OF ITS TROOPS -- ON THE CONTRARY, IT WILL STRENGTHEN ITS CAPACITY TO PROTECT ITS WESTERN FRONTIER (I.E., THAT BORDERING ON FRG).
--IT NOT CLEAR WHETHER ANNOUNCEMENT THAT SOVIET MARSHAL SHTEMENKO TO REPLACE KAZAKOV AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF WARSAW PACT JOINT FORCES CONNECTED WITH CZECHOSLOVAK EVENTS. NOT KNOWN WHETHER THIS REPLACEMENT CLEARED, AS IN PAST, WITH ROMANIA -- WHICH WAS NOT REPRESENTED AT BRATISLAVA. HOWEVER, THIS POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE RULED OUT.

8. SPEECHES BY DUBCEK AND OTHER CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS OVER WEEK-END SEEM INTENDED TO REASSURE POPULATION THAT SOVEREIGNTY WAS NOT BEEN COMPROMISED AND THAT NATION WILL CONTINUE ITS DEMOCRATIZATION. THE LEADERSHIP OBVIOUSLY FEELS ITSELF UNDER PRESSURE TO DISPEL SUSPICIONS THAT IT HAS GIVEN IN TO SOVIETS AND OTHER EAST EUROPEANS ON ISSUES OR MADE ANY SECRET AGREEMENTS. THE LATTER WAS DENIED IN DUBCEK'S AUGUST 4 ADDRESS. HOWEVER, WHILE STRESSING THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT OWN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, DUBCEK STATED THAT HIS REGIME WILL STRENGTHEN

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STRENGTHEN ITS TIES WITH CEMA AND WARSAW PACT -- SOMETHING THAT MAY WELL DISQUIET MANY LIBERALS AND ECONOMIC REFORMERS WHO FEEL THAT TIES WITH WEST MUST BE EXPANDED AT EXPENSE OF CEMA AND OTHER COMMUNIST INSTITUTIONS. COMMUNIQUE'S SUPPORT FOR EAST GERMANY, WHOSE PROVOCATIVE ROLE IN PRESENT CRISIS UNDENIABLE, AND IMPLIED RENUNCIATION OR POSTPONEMENT OF SUCH FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES AS RECOGNITION OF FRG AND ISRAEL SEEM LIKELY TO INDUCE POLITICAL GROUPS REGARD THIS AS INFRINGEMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY.

9. DUBCEK MAY WELL BE FACED WITH NEW CHALLENGES FROM DISSATISFIED YOUTH AND LIBERALS. FOR TIME BEING, CONSERVATIVES APPEAR ON VERGE OF BEING REMOVED FROM INFLUENCE, BUT STRUGGLE COULD DEVELOP AT SEPTEMBER PARTY CONGRESS BETWEEN LIBERALS AND MODERATES OVER VACUUM RESULTING FROM REMOVAL OF THESE CONSERVATIVES FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, ETC. ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES REMAIN A PRIMARY CONCERN OF DUBCEK REGIME. ANY FAILURE TO IMPROVE ECONOMY WILL CERTAINLY RESULT IN RENEWED DEMANDS AMONG LIBERALS AND REFORMERS THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA SHOULD SEEK WESTERN (AND FRG) ASSISTANCE AS A SOLUTION TO INEFFECTUAL SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE. DUBCEK WOULD THUS RISK ALIENATING LIBERALS AND REFORMERS IF HE FAILED TO HEED THEIR DEMANDS, AS WELL AS AROUSING SOVIET AND OTHER EE SUSPICIONS IF HE DID HEED THEM.

10. THUS, UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED AT CIERNA AND BRATISLAVA LIKELY TO BE SUBJECT OF NEW AND DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS AND PERHAPS STARTING POINT FOR RENEWED STRAINS IN SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK RELATIONS. IT SEEMS DIFFICULT, FOR EXAMPLE, TO CONCEIVE OF SOVIETS REFRAINING FROM ANY ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS AS CRUCIAL CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY CONGRESS APPROACHES. PERHAPS SOME UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN DUBCEK AND BREZHNEV OVER COMPOSITION OF NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE -- ONE WHICH WOULD NOT EXCLUDE COMPLETELY ALL CONSERVATIVE INFLUENCE. YET ANY SUCH UNDERSTANDING WOULD IN TURN RENDER DUBCEK LIABLE TO CHARGE THAT HE MADE CONCESSIONS TO SOVIETS ON COMPLETELY DOMESTIC MATTER.

11. EFFECT IN USSR OF EVENTS WILL REMAIN OBSCURE AND IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT POSITION OF ANY OF TOP LEADERS WILL BE AFFECTED IMMEDIATELY SINCE LEADERSHIP GROUP WILL WISH PRESERVE IMAGE OF UNITY. OVER TIME, PROBLEMS GENERATED BY CZECHOSLOVAK EVOLUTION MAY PRODUCE DIFFERENCES AND CONSEQUENT RESHUFFLES.

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RESHUFFLES. REACTION OF SOVIET PUBLIC TO RECENT EVENTS ALSO NOT IMMEDIATELY APPARENT ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN GIVEN A SOMEWHAT RARE EXPOSURE TO A SCENARIO WHICH MANY SOVIETS MAY VIEW AS SETBACK FOR REGIME AND A REBUFF FROM A SUPPOSED SATELLITE. OUTCOME VERY LIKELY TO ENCOURAGE PRESSURES IN USSR FOR FURTHER EVOLUTION IN LIBERAL DIRECTION, ALTHOUGH REGIME MAY FEEL EVEN MORE CONSTRAINED TO RESIST SUCH CHANGE. SOVIET PRESS TREATMENT THUS FAR PICTURING CIERNA AND BRATISLAVA MEETINGS AND DOCUMENTS EMERGING THEREFROM AS TRIUMPH OF SOCIALIST SOLIDARITY AND ORTHODOXY OVER MACHINATIONS OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES AND IMPERIALISTS. WE NOTE PRESENCE IN MOSCOW OF SOME PROVINCIAL LEADERS SUGGESTING POSSIBLE CENTRAL COMMITTEE REVIEW OF SITUATION AND PROMULGATION OF AUTHORITATIVE SOVIET VERDICT ON EVENTS.

12. STILL NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR WHETHER AND WHEN CZECHOSLOVAK MEETINGS WITH YUGOSLAV AND ROMANIAN LEADERS WILL OCCUR. IN ANY EVENT, HOWEVER, SOME SORT OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE THREE COUNTRIES DIFFERENT FROM RELATIONS BETWEEN PRAGUE AND OTHER FIVE COMMUNIST STATES LIKELY TO EMERGE. AS SUCH IT WILL REMAIN AT LEAST POTENTIAL IRRITANT TO SOVIETS.

13. IN SUMMARY, WHILE DIRECT AND OPEN CLASH HAS BEEN AVERTED, INTERPRETATION OF CIERNA AND BRATISLAVA MODUS VIVENDI BY VARIOUS PARTIES LIKELY TO POST CONTINUING PROBLEMS. IMPACT OF UNFOLDING EVENTS ON NATURE OF INDIVIDUAL COMMUNIST REGIMES AND ON RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THEM BOUND TO BE COMPLEX PROCESS. NO QUESTION, HOWEVER, THAT ANOTHER MILSTONE HAS BEEN PASSED IN TORTUOUS TRANSFORMATION OF STALINIST EMPIRE INTO MORE DIVERSE SYSTEM.

FOR USNATO:

YOU MAY DRAW UPON THE FOREGOING FOR NAC AND POLADS DISCUSSIONS AND, AT YOUR DISCRETION SUBMIT THIS INFORMATION IN WRITTEN FORM TO SITCEN. GP-3. RUSK

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Classification

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Control: 2859

Date: 20 FEB 68
1530Z

ACTION: SecState WASHDC

SUBJ: Brezhnev and Kosygin Speeches

REF: 2858

Feb 20

1. While foreign policy sections speeches by Brezhnev and Kosygin (in Leningrad Feb 16 and Minsk Feb 15 respectively) for most part cover familiar ground, they are in fact most comprehensive review Soviet foreign policy since Brezhnev's report at Jubilee last November. (Remarks on Vietnam and Korea reported separately).
2. Both Brezhnev and Kosygin reiterated Soviet position on ^{international} communist conference and need for unity. Brezhnev deals in some detail with relations between socialist states and reveals extent to which Soviets seem willing compromise in effort obtain semblance of unity at Budapest. He flatly states there can be no longer any question of direction communist movement from some single center. Furthermore, in speaking of fraternal socialist countries, he admits each country accumulates its own experience in socialist construction in such areas as economy, ideology, party life and state activity. His reference to ideology is particularly striking since at least on surface it seems to recognize such developments as those in Yugoslavia. Also, apparently not to scare off those who only reluctantly going to Budapest, Brezhnev

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Date:

and Kosygin somewhat mute their criticism of Peking. At same time, Brezhnev seems to indicate limit Soviet concessions to polycentrism by criticizing in context his remarks on China, manifestations of policies nationalistic tendencies, read/~~policy~~ inimical to Soviet national interests.

3. Brezhnev discloses that during recent visits by ^{Triumvirate} ~~Triumvirate~~ to Poland and GDR, discussions focused on bilateral matters, especially on economic cooperation, as well as ~~some~~ "some international problems". As to Dubcek's recent visit to Moscow, Brezhnev expresses confidence it will contribute to further development Soviet-Czech ties and successful construction of socialism and communism in CSR and USSR—a formulation suggesting some concern re further Czech stance. This impression strengthened by fact that while noting unity of views in connection visits Poland and East Germany, Brezhnev made no such assertion in discussing Dubcek's visit.

4. Neither Brezhnev nor Kosygin add new ingredients to Soviet position re Middle East, except perhaps Kosygin's acknowledgement of "major" steps taken by Soviets to restore UAR and Syrian military capabilities. Kosygin also stresses that Soviets do not advocate liquidation of Israel, but support Israel's existence as a state.

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Date:

5. Kosygin repeats Soviet accusations re revanchism, militarism, and neo-Nazism in FRG, and especially re Bonn's alleged designs against GDR. He calls Bonn's policy, supported by US, serious danger which must be combatted. This remark evidently intended for benefit of EE's, since Kosygin also stresses need for constant vigilance and strengthening military cooperation Warsaw Pact members. Yet he is also careful to note that all this does not mean there is military conflict in making Germany in Europe. Brezhnev, for his part, in dealing with Germany not only puts full Soviet support behind GDR; he also ~~it~~ insists it represents "future for all Germany".

6. Kosygin reserves special bouquet for India. This all ~~more~~ ^{more} striking in view absence any comment about Pakistan. Presumably, this not only reflects state of affairs involving recent exchange of visits between Moscow and Delhi; it probably also points to Soviet pique with recent press campaign ^{generated by} ~~generating~~ Rawalpindi criticizing Soviet arms policy on subcontinent.

7. With reference NPT, Kosygin says draft treaty eliminates question of MLF and bars FRG access to nuclear weapons. While stating negotiations entering concluding phase, he points out all obstacles not yet overcome since some continue to resist. In this connection, he mentions only FRG.

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Perhaps alluding to round of demarches Soviets initiated last week (Moscow 2843 ~~WOL~~), Kosygin says Soviets making every effort expedite solution this problem. Brezhnev also notes importance Soviets attach to NPT as factor in strengthening international security.

8. Both Brezhnev and Kosygin depict US as leader "aggressive" forces in world, with Brezhnev using particularly harsh language in describing US policy ("international brigandage"). However, Kosygin also suggests Soviet interest in development of bilateral relations with US, particularly in economic area, by noting successful development such relations with other capitalistic countries, such as France, Italy, UK and Japan, and US isolation in this respect resulting from continued US prohibitions and restrictions.

9. Department repeat as desired.

GP-4

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- WILL NOT RESUME THIS YEAR

/

THE FRENCH SCIENCE ATTACHE TOLD US THAT SINO-FRENCH SCIENCE EXCHANGES WILL NOT RESUME THIS YEAR, PARTLY FOR BUDGETARY AND PARTLY FOR POLITICAL REASONS. THE BUDGETARY PROBLEM IS THAT THE PROGRAM OVERSPENT IN 1988 AND 1989, AND THIS YEAR'S FUNDS ARE BEING USED TO COVER THE DEFICIT. THE RESULT IS THAT NO NEW PROJECTS WILL BEGIN IN 1990, SINCE FRANCE IS POLITICALLY RELUCTANT TO RESUME EXCHANGES THIS YEAR IN ANY CASE.

/

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FRENCH ARE FILLING THE SCIENCE COUNSELOR POSITION VACANT SINCE JUNE, 1989 WHEN THE PREVIOUS COUNSELOR WAS WITHDRAWN. THE FRENCH NOW HAVE A SCIENCE COUNSELOR, A NUCLEAR COUNSELOR, AND A SCIENCE ATTACHE IN BEIJING.

4. ADVANCES IN VOICE RECOGNITION

/

THE MAY 7 EDITION OF THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DAILY ANNOUNCED THAT THE GALAXY COMPUTER COMPANY HAS

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DEVELOPED A VOICE RECOGNITION SYSTEM FOR CHINESE INPUT WITH A 98 PERCENT SUCCESS RATE- THE DIRECTOR OF THE CHINESE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES' INSTITUTE OF ACOUSTICS SEPARATELY TOLD SCIOFFS THAT HIS INSTITUTE IS SELLING A REAL-TIME SPEECH RECOGNITION SYSTEM THAT IS COMPATIBLE WITH APPLE, IBM AND OTHER GENERAL-PURPOSE MICRO-COMPUTERS. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO FUND LARGE-SCALE RESEARCH INTO VOICE RECOGNITION SYSTEMS.

5. FEASIBILITY STUDIES FOR THREE GORGES DAM

/

CHINESE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE CONGRESS VICE-CHAIRMAN QIAN ZHENGYING (FORMERLY MINISTER OF WATER CONSERVANCY) TOLD DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR OFFICIAL THAT THE PRC GOVERNMENT WAS HOLDING MEETINGS TO REVIEW PLANNING FOR FLOOD CONTROL AND DAM CONSTRUCTION ON THE YANGTZE RIVER, INCLUDING THE THREE GORGES PROJECT. SHE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS LOOKING AT TWO FEASIBILITY STUDIES, ONE PREPARED BY THE CHANGJIANG WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE, AND ANOTHER PREPARED BY A CANADIAN GROUP. THE CANADIAN STUDY WAS WRITTEN TO CONFORM TO WORLD BANK STANDARDS.

QIAN SAID THAT ENGINEERS IN THE MINISTRY OF WATER

SHE
SAID THAT IF THE STATE COUNCIL APPROVED THE FEASIBILITY
STUDIES, THE REVIEW OF PRELIMINARY DESIGN STUDIES WILL
BEGIN IN JULY.

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te Printed: 11/13/1996

DOC NUMBER: 90BEIJIN18334

CHANNEL: n/a

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KSCA, KTIA, CH, TPHY
SUBJECT: SCIENCE IN CHINA: JUNE SUMMARY

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6. MOLECULAR BEAM EPITAXY WORK CONTINUES IN THE PRC

RECENT REPORTS IN THE CHINESE PRESS INDICATE THAT THE PRC GOVERNMENT IS FUNDING CONTINUED RESEARCH INTO MOLECULAR BEAM EPITAXY THROUGH A HIGH TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (CALLED THE 863 PROGRAM) RUN BY THE STATE COUNCIL. THE ARTICLE SAID THAT RESEARCHERS USED "MULTIPLE QUANTUM PITS" MANUFACTURED WITH CHINESE MADE EPITAXY MACHINES TO MAKE HIGH EFFICIENCY LASERS. THE SAME ARTICLE MENTIONED THAT CHINESE RESEARCHERS ARE NOW PERFECTING THE MANUFACTURE OF CRYSTALLINE LASERS USING LITHIUM TRIBORATE.

DURING A RECENT CALL RESEARCHERS AT THE INSTITUTE OF PHYSICS TOLD SCIOFF THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY DEVELOPED A FOURTH GENERATION OF CHINESE MOLECULAR BEAM EPITAXY SYSTEM, WHICH THEY HAVE ALREADY SHOWN ABROAD AT AN EXHIBITION IN THE SOVIET UNION. MOLECULAR BEAM EPITAXY LABORATORY CHIEF DR. ZHOU JUNMING SAID HE HOPED THAT THE USG WOULD ALLOW CHINA TO IMPORT RELATED EQUIPMENT SINCE DOMESTICALLY MANUFACTURED MBE DEVICES ARE NOW AVAILABLE IN THE PRC. DR. ZHOU SAID HE WELCOMES INQUIRIES TO THE LABORATORY AT #8, SOUTH 3RD STREET, ZHONGGUANCUN, BEIJING 100080, P.O. BOX 603, FAX # (011-86-1)-282271.

7. BEIJING: SOVIET DIPLOMATS STUDY
CONVERSION OF MILITARY S&T~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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SOVIET SCIOFF VICTOR SOLOMIN RECENTLY TOLD US THAT BESIDES HANDLING A PLETHORA OF DELEGATIONS IN THE WAKE OF LI PENG'S VISIT TO THE USSR, HE HAS BEEN GIVEN AN ASSIGNMENT TO REPORT ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE BUREAUCRACY IN CHARGE OF CONVERSION OF MILITARY PRODUCTION TO CIVILIAN USES. SOLOMIN SAID THE S&T SECTION IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BEIJING WERE RELYING EXTENSIVELY ON JAPANESE STUDIES TO PRODUCE THEIR REPORT. HE ADMITTED HE DID NOT COMPREHEND THE REASONING BEHIND TASKING THE S&T SECTION WITH THIS REPORT, AS HE FELT IT WOULD HAVE MADE MORE SENSE FOR EITHER THE ECONOMIC OR THE TRADE SECTION TO HANDLE IT. HOWEVER, SOLOMIN SAID, HE HAD NO CHOICE IN THE MATTER AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN LEARNING OF THE CHINESE HANDLING OF CONVERSION POLICIES AND COMPARISONS WITH SOVIET PRACTICES. SOLOMIN ADDED THAT HE FOUND IT A DIFFICULT REPORT TO WRITE, SINCE HE ACTUALLY KNOWS VERY LITTLE ABOUT THE USSR'S OWN CONVERSION POLICIES.

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8. LASER FESTIVAL

THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DAILY, THE CHINESE OPTICAL SOCIETY AND OTHER PRC ORGANIZATIONS SPONSORED A JOINT LASER KNOWLEDGE CONTEST AND LASER CONFERENCE IN BEIJING ON MAY 11. SCICOUNS SPOKE (THANKS TO CLAIRE HUBBARD'S HELP) ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LASER IN THE U.S. FAMED PRC SCIENTIST WANG DAHANG GAVE THE KEYNOTE ADDRESS, IN WHICH HE DISCUSSED CURRENT PROBLEMS IN LASER WORK IN THE PRC ALONG WITH THE HISTORY OF CHINESE LASER DEVELOPMENT. WANG GAVE MUCH CREDIT TO CHARLES TOWNES AND OTHER U.S. MENTORS OF CHINESE SCIENTISTS WHO STUDIED

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Date Printed: 11/13/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 90BEIJIN18334

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DEPT FOR OES/SCT AND EAP/CM

WHITEHOUSE FOR OSTP

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: KSCA, KTIA, CH, TPHY

SUBJECT: SCIENCE IN CHINA: JUNE SUMMARY

IN THE U.S., AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED
 FUNDING FOR BASIC RESEARCH IN THIS AREA. REPRESENTATIVES
 OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT, ELECTRONICS
 AND PHYSICS ESTABLISHMENT, ALONG WITH GOVERNMENT AND
 MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES ATTENDED THE MEETING. THE
U.S. EMBASSY WAS THE ONLY FOREIGN PRESENCE AT THE MEETING.
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SREF, PBTS, PREL, JO, IS
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN JEWS TO THE WEST BANK

REFS: 1) TEL AVIV 3746 (NOTAL) B) TEL AVIV 3729 (NOTAL)

1. (C) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FRONT-PAGE MARCH 12 JERUSALEM POST ARTICLE TITLED "ISRAEL TELLS U.S. ETHIOPIANS WON'T BE SETTLED IN TERRITORIES", BY MICHAEL EILAN. PRIME MINISTER'S ADVISOR NIMROD NOVIK PHONED AMBASSADOR MARCH 12 TO SAY THAT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED TO PROVIDE THIS STORY TO JERUSALEM POST DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT DAVID LANDAU (EILAN'S SUPERVISOR) ON BACKGROUND IN RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST THAT THE GOI MAKE A CLEAR PUBLIC DECLARATION OF THE FACTS SURROUNDING SETTLEMENT OF ETHIOPIAN JEWS AND THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. NOVIK EXPLAINED THAT THE MESSAGE WAS DONE ON BACKGROUND SINCE THEY WERE ONLY CONFIRMING THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT

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HE THOUGHT THE BACKGROUNDER WOULD HELP AND HOPED

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THE FOREIGN MEDIA WOULD PICK UP THE STORY.

2. (U) BEGIN TEXT.

ISRAEL HAS PROMISED THE U.S. THAT IT WILL NOT SETTLE NEWCOMERS FROM ETHIOPIA IN THE ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES.

THE U.S. RECENTLY ASKED THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT FOR CLARIFICATIONS OF REPORTS THAT NEWLY ARRIVED JEWS FROM ETHIOPIA WERE BEING SETTLED IN THE WEST BANK.

AMERICAN OFFICIALS CONFIRMED LAST NIGHT THAT SUCH A REQUEST HAD BEEN MADE RECENTLY BUT WOULD NOT ADD ANY DETAILS.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT GIVES ISRAEL 15 MILLION DOLLARS A YEAR THROUGH THE AID PROGRAM FOR RESETTLEMENT OF JEWISH REFUGEES, AND WILL NOT PERMIT THIS MONEY TO BE USED IN WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS, TO WHICH IT IS OPPOSED.

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN JERUSALEM SAID LAST NIGHT, IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, THAT ISRAEL HAS ASSURED THE U.S. THAT THE ETHIOPIAN OLIM ARE NOT BEING SENT TO WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS. THE ETHIOPIAN JEWS WHO DO LIVE IN KIRYAT ARBA ARE NOT NEWCOMERS, THE OFFICIALS SAID.

HAIM AHARON, HEAD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY ALIYA DEPARTMENT, HAD DECLARED IN A RECENT INTERVIEW THAT ISRAEL WILL SETTLE THE ETHIOPIAN OLIM WHEREVER IT SEES FIT, INCLUDING JUDEA AND SAMARIA. THIS, AND OTHER STATEMENTS BY ISRAELI OFFICIALS, APPARENTLY EVOKED THE AMERICAN REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATIONS.

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 01665

E.O. 12356: DECL: 02/02/89
TAGS: PBTS, PREL, PGOV, EIND, IS
SUBJECT: SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:
PART II--CONSTRUCTION AND POPULATION

REFS: (A) STATE 15785, (B) TEL AVIV 1591

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE OVERALL GOI BUDGET FOR SETTLEMENT IN FY 83 IS SMALLER THAN THE SETTLEMENT BUDGET FOR FY 82 (REFTEL B). NONETHELESS, THE HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION MINISTRY'S BUDGET REPORT FOR FY 83 REFLECTS THE HIGH PRIORITY WHICH THE GOI CONTINUE REPOPULATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, PARTICULARLY ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. PLANS PROVIDE FOR HOUSING FOR ABOUT 29,000 SETTLERS IN THE WEST BANK, 13,000 ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, AND 1,200

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IN GAZA BY APRIL 1984. MOSTLY IN PERMANENT STRUCTURES.

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HOWEVER, ALMOST A THIRD OF ALL WEST BANK HOUSING UNITS FOR SETTLERS WILL BE LOCATED IN HALF A DOZEN WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS WITHIN COMMUTING DISTANCE OF PRE-1967 ISRAEL, WHILE ABOUT A THIRD OF THE UNITS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS WILL BE AT THE LARGE SETTLEMENT OF KATZRIN. IN FY 83, AS IN FY 82, THE EMPHASIS WILL BE ON THE "CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION" OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS RATHER THAN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS. THE GOI ALSO PLANS TO MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF ITS RESOURCES BY ENCOURAGING INDIVIDUAL OWNERS AND CONTRACTORS TO DO AS MUCH OF THE BUILDING OF HOUSING UNITS AS POSSIBLE AND AVOIDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF TEMPORARY UNITS. END SUMMARY.

3. SOURCES AND METHODS

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF HOUSING CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY AND ESTIMATED POPULATION CAPACITY FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IS BASED ON DATA IN FOUR DOCUMENTS:

B1

ESTIMATES OF HOUSING CAPACITY ARE

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BASED ON THE AVERAGE ISRAELI FAMILY SIZE OF 3.4.

4. GENERAL TRENDS

THE HOUSING MINISTRY BUDGET REPORT FOR FY 83 INDICATES THAT THE CONSTRUCTION SURGE BEGUN IN FY 80 AND FY 81, AS A RESULT OF DECISIONS TAKEN IN THE LATE 1970'S, CONTINUED IN FY 82. IN FY 82, THE GOI EMPHASIZED CONSTRUCTION BY INDIVIDUAL SETTLERS AND PRIVATE FIRMS AND THE "CONSOLIDATION" OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS

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RATHER THAN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS. THESE TRENDS AND THE STRONG FOCUS ON A HANDFUL OF LARGE URBAN-TYPE SETTLEMENTS NEAR ISRAEL'S PRE-1967 BORDERS WILL PERSIST THROUGH FY 83.

5. WEST BANK

ON THE WEST BANK, IN FY 82 THE LION'S SHARE OF RESOURCES WENT TO A HANDFUL OF SETTLEMENTS WITHIN COMMUTING DISTANCE OF PRE-1967 ISRAEL. FOR EXAMPLE, ACCORDING TO THE HOUSING MINISTRY REPORT, 1900 NEW HOUSING UNITS WERE BUILT AT ALFAE MENASHE, ARIEL, EFRAT, EMMANUEL, AND KARNEI SHOMERON. ALSO, ACCORDING TO THE BUDGET REPORT, CONSTRUCTION OF ONLY FIVE NEW SETTLEMENTS WAS STARTED ON THE WEST BANK IN FY 82. THE BUDGET REPORT DOES NOT INDICATE WHETHER CONSTRUCTION ON ANY NEW SETTLEMENTS WILL BE STARTED ON THE WEST BANK IN FY 83. HOWEVER, BY THE END OF FY 83, 2,500 DWELLING UNITS WILL HAVE BEEN COMPLETED IN ALFAE MENASHE, ARIEL, EMMANUEL, GIVAT ZEEV, KARNEI SHOMERON AND MAALE ADUMIM.

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 AID-07 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00
EB-08 DODE-00 IO-15 NSC-01 NSAE-00 COME-00 TRSE-00
PM-09 SSN-02 SP-02 /076 W
-----323062 031344Z /53

P 031329Z FEB 83

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1314

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 01665

--ON THE BASIS OF HOUSING MINISTRY DATA ON THE
NUMBER OF HOUSING UNITS COMPLETED AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION
AND USG ESTIMATES (AS DISCUSSED IN PARA 3) OF
POPULATION AT SETTLEMENTS NOT DISCUSSED IN THE
MINISTRY'S BUDGET REPORT, WE ESTIMATE THAT BY THE
END OF FY 1983 THERE WILL BE SUFFICIENT HOUSING
CAPACITY FOR ABOUT 29,100 SETTLERS AT SOME 91
WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS. HOWEVER, ABOUT 30 PERCENT OF
THIS NUMBER WILL LIVE IN THE SIX SETTLEMENTS
IDENTIFIED ABOVE.

6. GOLAN HEIGHTS

--A SIMILAR PHENOMENON APPEARS TO BE OCCURRING ON
THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. IN FY 83 TWO NEW SETTLEMENTS
WILL BE SET UP--KIBBUTZ MEITZAR IN THE SOUTH AND
KIDMAT ZVI IN THE NORTH. HOWEVER, THE GOI WILL
CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE "STRENGTHENING" KATZRIN WHERE
CONTRACTORS WILL BUILD 150 DWELLING UNITS AND

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SETTLERS ANOTHER 150.

--BY THE END OF FY 83 THE HOUSING CAPACITY IN THE 31

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OR 32 GOLAN HEIGHTS SETTLEMENTS SHOULD BE ABOUT 12,900, ABOUT A THIRD OF WHICH WILL BE AT THE LARGE SETTLEMENT KNOWN AS KATZRIN.

--
7. GAZA

--GAZA WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE SUBSTANTIALLY LESS ATTENTION THAN THE WEST BANK AND GOLAN. HOUSING MINISTRY PLANS PROVIDE FOR CONTINUED EFFORTS TO "CONSOLIDATE" THE KATIF BLOC. TWO NEW SETTLEMENTS ARE TO BE ESTABLISHED.

--BY THE END OF FY 83 HOUSING CAPACITY IN THE TEN OR SO GAZA SETTLEMENTS WILL BE AROUND 1200.

--
8. COMMENT

DESPITE THE SMALLER BUDGET FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES COMPARED TO FY 82, THE MINISTRY'S BUDGET REPORT FOR FY 83 REFLECTS THE HIGH PRIORITY THE GOI ATTACHES TO INCREASING THE SETTLER POPULATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, PARTICULARLY ON THE WEST BANK. THE REPORT ALSO INDICATES THAT MOST WEST BANK SETTLERS WILL BE LOCATED IN THE AREAS CLOSEST TO ISRAEL'S PRE-1967 BORDER, DESPITE THE INCREASED BENEFITS THE GOI HAS PROVIDED SINCE DECEMBER 1981 TO ISRAELIS WHO SETTLE IN THE MORE REMOTE REGIONS. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO LIMIT ITS ROLE TO PROVIDING

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BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOANS AND GRANTS WHILE CONTINUING TO SHIFT THE BURDEN OF CONSTRUCTION TO THE NON-GOVERNMENT SECTOR. SUBSTANTIAL SUCCESS HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED IN THIS RESPECT, PARTICULARLY ON THE WEST BANK, WHERE 416 OF THE 476 HOUSES REPORTED UNDER CONSTRUCTION ARE BEING "SELF-BUILT," WITH GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES, BY INDIVIDUALS WHO WILL EITHER LIVE IN THEM OR RENT THEM OUT. STILL, AT THIS POINT, IT REMAINS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE MOMENTUM OF THE SELF-BUILD PROGRAM CAN BE SUSTAINED AND WHAT THE DIMENSIONS OF THE ROLE OF PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS

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IN THE GOI'S OVERALL EFFORT TO ATTRACT SETTLERS TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WILL BE, NONETHELESS, IT IS LIKELY THAT MOST OF THIS PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT WILL TAKE PLACE WHERE THERE IS A PROFITABLE MARKET, I.E. BEDROOM COMMUNITIES LOCATED WITHIN EASY COMMUTING DISTANCE TO ISRAEL'S MAIN EMPLOYMENT CENTERS. THIS GIVES FUTURE SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN THE TERRITORIES AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT CAST THAN WHAT WE HAVE KNOWN TO DATE.
END COMMENT.

9. COORDINATED WITH CONGEN JERUSALEM.
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PAGE 01 TEL AV 03746 111751Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SSO-00
-----034424 111758Z /51

1026 W

0 111747Z MAR 85
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7858
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SREF, PBTS, PREL, IS, JO
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN JEWS TO THE WEST BANK

REF: TEL AVIV 3675

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.)~~

2. SUMMARY: THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ASSURED US MARCH 11 THAT NO ETHIOPIAN JEWS HAVE BEEN MOVED TO THE WEST BANK SINCE OCTOBER, NONE WILL BE, AND THIS POLICY DECISION WAS RECONFIRMED IN THE CABINET MARCH 10. END SUMMARY.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER'S POLITICAL ADVISOR, NIMROD NOVIK, CALLED THIS MORNING, MARCH 11, TO RESPOND TO OUR REPEATED DEMARCHES ON THE SUBJECT OF SETTLEMENT OF ETHIOPIAN JEWS ON THE WEST BANK. (WE SPOKE WITH NOVIK ONCE ON SATURDAY, MARCH 9, AND TWICE ON SUNDAY, MARCH 10. MFA DIRECTOR-GENERAL DAVID KINCHE LEFT THIS COUNTRY SUDDENLY OVER THE

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WEEKEND SO WE HAVE NOT HEARD BACK FROM HIM.))

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4. NOVIK SAID HE HAD TWO PARTS OF A RESPONSE FOR US. THE FIRST IS THAT SINCE THIS GOVERNMENT CAME INTO OFFICE IN SEPTEMBER NO ETHIOPIAN JEWS HAVE BEEN MOVED TO THE WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS. THE 80 FAMILIES THAT ARE KNOWN TO BE IN KIRYAT ARBA WERE SETTLED THERE PRIOR TO THE FORMATION OF THE PERES GOVERNMENT.

5. COMMENT: THIS MEANS OF COURSE THAT NONE OF THE IMMIGRANTS RESULTING FROM OPERATION MOSES HAVE BEEN MOVED TO WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS. END COMMENT.

6. NOVIK SAID THAT HIS INFORMAL COMMENT WOULD ADD THE FOLLOWING: IT WAS TRUE THAT THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING HAD A PLAN TO BUILD HOUSING FOR ETHIOPIANS IN THE WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS. THIS HOUSING WAS TO BE FOR PERSONS WHO HAD BEEN IN THE COUNTRY OVER A YEAR, THAT IS, AFTER THE ORIGINAL ABSORPTION PROCESS HAD BEEN COMPLETED. ALTHOUGH THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING ANNOUNCED SUCH A PROGRAM, IT HAS NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED ALTHOUGH SOME FUNDS MAY HAVE BEEN SPENT. NOVIK SAID THAT THE ISSUE CAME UP DURING THE CABINET MEETING YESTERDAY, MARCH 10. DURING THE CABINET SESSION THE EARLIER DECISIONS TO SEND NO ETHIOPIAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO THE WEST BANK FOR SETTLEMENT WAS REAFFIRMED. NOVIK DID NOT SAY SO, BUT IT APPEARS THAT THE ISSUE CAME UP BECAUSE OF THE INSISTENCE OF THE U.S. ON THIS ISSUE. NOVIK DID SAY THAT MINISTER OF ABSORPTION YAACOV TSUR HAD BOTH DURING AND PRIOR TO THE CABINET SESSION OPPOSED THE HOUSING MINISTRY'S PLAN TO MOVE ETHIOPIANS TO
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WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS.

7. NOVIK CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION BY SAYING "NOTHING HAS HAPPENED AND NOTHING WILL HAPPEN."

8. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD NOVIK THAT SINCE THIS WAS THE CASE, HE ASSUMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WOULD FIND A WAY TO MAKE A CLEAR PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT ETHIOPIAN JEWS WERE NOT BEING SETTLED IN THE WEST BANK. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY

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THE IMPRESSION HAS BEEN CREATED ABROAD THAT SUCH RESETTLEMENT HAS TAKEN PLACE, AND IT IS THE PERCEPTION WHICH COULD BE HARMFUL TO OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE TO BE HELPFUL IN GETTING THE REST OF THE ETHIOPIAN JEWS OUT OF SUDAN. NOVIK SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY SEEK A MEANS OF MAKING THE CABINET'S DECISION PUBLIC. LEWIS

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-14 ADS-00 SSN-03 SSN-02 CIAE-00
PM-07 H-01 INR-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SPRS-02
SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 HA-06 /103 W
-----126977 140547Z /14/64

R 131431Z JAN 81
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4520
INFO DIA WASHINGTON DC//
473*-./AMEMBASSY AMMAN 6191
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 00637

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARA 2)

E.O. 12065: GDS 1/12/87 (HILL, CHARLES) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, PDEV, IS, JO
SUBJECT: DOTAN: SNAPSHOT OF A WEST BANK SETTLEMENT

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. A RECENT CHANCE ENCOUNTER WITH SETTLERS
OF THE SANUR/DOTAN SETTLEMENT, MIDWAY BETWEEN NABLUS
AND JENIN, LED TO A DISCUSSION OF THE "NUTS AND BOLTS"
ASPECTS OF SETTLEMENT LIFE AND REVEALED SOME
SURPRISINGLY PRAGMATIC ATTITUDES ABOUT THE SETTLEMENT
ENTERPRISE ON THE PART OF THESE SETTLERS, WHO ARE
LOOSELY AFFILIATED WITH GUSH EMUNIM. THE SETTLERS

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WERE NOT STRONGLY IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED. ALTHOUGH

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REASON: E.O. 12065, OR-M
EXEMPTIONS: 1.5 OR 1.8 OR 1.9 OR 2.4 OR 2.5 OR 2.6 OR 2.7 OR 2.8 OR 2.9 OR 3.0 OR 3.1 OR 3.2 OR 3.3 OR 3.4 OR 3.5 OR 3.6 OR 3.7 OR 3.8 OR 3.9 OR 4.0 OR 4.1 OR 4.2 OR 4.3 OR 4.4 OR 4.5 OR 4.6 OR 4.7 OR 4.8 OR 4.9 OR 5.0 OR 5.1 OR 5.2 OR 5.3 OR 5.4 OR 5.5 OR 5.6 OR 5.7 OR 5.8 OR 5.9 OR 6.0 OR 6.1 OR 6.2 OR 6.3 OR 6.4 OR 6.5 OR 6.6 OR 6.7 OR 6.8 OR 6.9 OR 7.0 OR 7.1 OR 7.2 OR 7.3 OR 7.4 OR 7.5 OR 7.6 OR 7.7 OR 7.8 OR 7.9 OR 8.0 OR 8.1 OR 8.2 OR 8.3 OR 8.4 OR 8.5 OR 8.6 OR 8.7 OR 8.8 OR 8.9 OR 9.0 OR 9.1 OR 9.2 OR 9.3 OR 9.4 OR 9.5 OR 9.6 OR 9.7 OR 9.8 OR 9.9 OR 10.0 OR 10.1 OR 10.2 OR 10.3 OR 10.4 OR 10.5 OR 10.6 OR 10.7 OR 10.8 OR 10.9 OR 11.0 OR 11.1 OR 11.2 OR 11.3 OR 11.4 OR 11.5 OR 11.6 OR 11.7 OR 11.8 OR 11.9 OR 12.0 OR 12.1 OR 12.2 OR 12.3 OR 12.4 OR 12.5 OR 12.6 OR 12.7 OR 12.8 OR 12.9 OR 13.0 OR 13.1 OR 13.2 OR 13.3 OR 13.4 OR 13.5 OR 13.6 OR 13.7 OR 13.8 OR 13.9 OR 14.0 OR 14.1 OR 14.2 OR 14.3 OR 14.4 OR 14.5 OR 14.6 OR 14.7 OR 14.8 OR 14.9 OR 15.0 OR 15.1 OR 15.2 OR 15.3 OR 15.4 OR 15.5 OR 15.6 OR 15.7 OR 15.8 OR 15.9 OR 16.0 OR 16.1 OR 16.2 OR 16.3 OR 16.4 OR 16.5 OR 16.6 OR 16.7 OR 16.8 OR 16.9 OR 17.0 OR 17.1 OR 17.2 OR 17.3 OR 17.4 OR 17.5 OR 17.6 OR 17.7 OR 17.8 OR 17.9 OR 18.0 OR 18.1 OR 18.2 OR 18.3 OR 18.4 OR 18.5 OR 18.6 OR 18.7 OR 18.8 OR 18.9 OR 19.0 OR 19.1 OR 19.2 OR 19.3 OR 19.4 OR 19.5 OR 19.6 OR 19.7 OR 19.8 OR 19.9 OR 20.0 OR 20.1 OR 20.2 OR 20.3 OR 20.4 OR 20.5 OR 20.6 OR 20.7 OR 20.8 OR 20.9 OR 21.0 OR 21.1 OR 21.2 OR 21.3 OR 21.4 OR 21.5 OR 21.6 OR 21.7 OR 21.8 OR 21.9 OR 22.0 OR 22.1 OR 22.2 OR 22.3 OR 22.4 OR 22.5 OR 22.6 OR 22.7 OR 22.8 OR 22.9 OR 23.0 OR 23.1 OR 23.2 OR 23.3 OR 23.4 OR 23.5 OR 23.6 OR 23.7 OR 23.8 OR 23.9 OR 24.0 OR 24.1 OR 24.2 OR 24.3 OR 24.4 OR 24.5 OR 24.6 OR 24.7 OR 24.8 OR 24.9 OR 25.0 OR 25.1 OR 25.2 OR 25.3 OR 25.4 OR 25.5 OR 25.6 OR 25.7 OR 25.8 OR 25.9 OR 26.0 OR 26.1 OR 26.2 OR 26.3 OR 26.4 OR 26.5 OR 26.6 OR 26.7 OR 26.8 OR 26.9 OR 27.0 OR 27.1 OR 27.2 OR 27.3 OR 27.4 OR 27.5 OR 27.6 OR 27.7 OR 27.8 OR 27.9 OR 28.0 OR 28.1 OR 28.2 OR 28.3 OR 28.4 OR 28.5 OR 28.6 OR 28.7 OR 28.8 OR 28.9 OR 29.0 OR 29.1 OR 29.2 OR 29.3 OR 29.4 OR 29.5 OR 29.6 OR 29.7 OR 29.8 OR 29.9 OR 30.0 OR 30.1 OR 30.2 OR 30.3 OR 30.4 OR 30.5 OR 30.6 OR 30.7 OR 30.8 OR 30.9 OR 31.0 OR 31.1 OR 31.2 OR 31.3 OR 31.4 OR 31.5 OR 31.6 OR 31.7 OR 31.8 OR 31.9 OR 32.0 OR 32.1 OR 32.2 OR 32.3 OR 32.4 OR 32.5 OR 32.6 OR 32.7 OR 32.8 OR 32.9 OR 33.0 OR 33.1 OR 33.2 OR 33.3 OR 33.4 OR 33.5 OR 33.6 OR 33.7 OR 33.8 OR 33.9 OR 34.0 OR 34.1 OR 34.2 OR 34.3 OR 34.4 OR 34.5 OR 34.6 OR 34.7 OR 34.8 OR 34.9 OR 35.0 OR 35.1 OR 35.2 OR 35.3 OR 35.4 OR 35.5 OR 35.6 OR 35.7 OR 35.8 OR 35.9 OR 36.0 OR 36.1 OR 36.2 OR 36.3 OR 36.4 OR 36.5 OR 36.6 OR 36.7 OR 36.8 OR 36.9 OR 37.0 OR 37.1 OR 37.2 OR 37.3 OR 37.4 OR 37.5 OR 37.6 OR 37.7 OR 37.8 OR 37.9 OR 38.0 OR 38.1 OR 38.2 OR 38.3 OR 38.4 OR 38.5 OR 38.6 OR 38.7 OR 38.8 OR 38.9 OR 39.0 OR 39.1 OR 39.2 OR 39.3 OR 39.4 OR 39.5 OR 39.6 OR 39.7 OR 39.8 OR 39.9 OR 40.0 OR 40.1 OR 40.2 OR 40.3 OR 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65.4 OR 65.5 OR 65.6 OR 65.7 OR 65.8 OR 65.9 OR 66.0 OR 66.1 OR 66.2 OR 66.3 OR 66.4 OR 66.5 OR 66.6 OR 66.7 OR 66.8 OR 66.9 OR 67.0 OR 67.1 OR 67.2 OR 67.3 OR 67.4 OR 67.5 OR 67.6 OR 67.7 OR 67.8 OR 67.9 OR 68.0 OR 68.1 OR 68.2 OR 68.3 OR 68.4 OR 68.5 OR 68.6 OR 68.7 OR 68.8 OR 68.9 OR 69.0 OR 69.1 OR 69.2 OR 69.3 OR 69.4 OR 69.5 OR 69.6 OR 69.7 OR 69.8 OR 69.9 OR 70.0 OR 70.1 OR 70.2 OR 70.3 OR 70.4 OR 70.5 OR 70.6 OR 70.7 OR 70.8 OR 70.9 OR 71.0 OR 71.1 OR 71.2 OR 71.3 OR 71.4 OR 71.5 OR 71.6 OR 71.7 OR 71.8 OR 71.9 OR 72.0 OR 72.1 OR 72.2 OR 72.3 OR 72.4 OR 72.5 OR 72.6 OR 72.7 OR 72.8 OR 72.9 OR 73.0 OR 73.1 OR 73.2 OR 73.3 OR 73.4 OR 73.5 OR 73.6 OR 73.7 OR 73.8 OR 73.9 OR 74.0 OR 74.1 OR 74.2 OR 74.3 OR 74.4 OR 74.5 OR 74.6 OR 74.7 OR 74.8 OR 74.9 OR 75.0 OR 75.1 OR 75.2 OR 75.3 OR 75.4 OR 75.5 OR 75.6 OR 75.7 OR 75.8 OR 75.9 OR 76.0 OR 76.1 OR 76.2 OR 76.3 OR 76.4 OR 76.5 OR 76.6 OR 76.7 OR 76.8 OR 76.9 OR 77.0 OR 77.1 OR 77.2 OR 77.3 OR 77.4 OR 77.5 OR 77.6 OR 77.7 OR 77.8 OR 77.9 OR 78.0 OR 78.1 OR 78.2 OR 78.3 OR 78.4 OR 78.5 OR 78.6 OR 78.7 OR 78.8 OR 78.9 OR 79.0 OR 79.1 OR 79.2 OR 79.3 OR 79.4 OR 79.5 OR 79.6 OR 79.7 OR 79.8 OR 79.9 OR 80.0 OR 80.1 OR 80.2 OR 80.3 OR 80.4 OR 80.5 OR 80.6 OR 80.7 OR 80.8 OR 80.9 OR 81.0 OR 81.1 OR 81.2 OR 81.3 OR 81.4 OR 81.5 OR 81.6 OR 81.7 OR 81.8 OR 81.9 OR 82.0 OR 82.1 OR 82.2 OR 82.3 OR 82.4 OR 82.5 OR 82.6 OR 82.7 OR 82.8 OR 82.9 OR 83.0 OR 83.1 OR 83.2 OR 83.3 OR 83.4 OR 83.5 OR 83.6 OR 83.7 OR 83.8 OR 83.9 OR 84.0 OR 84.1 OR 84.2 OR 84.3 OR 84.4 OR 84.5 OR 84.6 OR 84.7 OR 84.8 OR 84.9 OR 85.0 OR 85.1 OR 85.2 OR 85.3 OR 85.4 OR 85.5 OR 85.6 OR 85.7 OR 85.8 OR 85.9 OR 86.0 OR 86.1 OR 86.2 OR 86.3 OR 86.4 OR 86.5 OR 86.6 OR 86.7 OR 86.8 OR 86.9 OR 87.0 OR 87.1 OR 87.2 OR 87.3 OR 87.4 OR 87.5 OR 87.6 OR 87.7 OR 87.8 OR 87.9 OR 88.0 OR 88.1 OR 88.2 OR 88.3 OR 88.4 OR 88.5 OR 88.6 OR 88.7 OR 88.8 OR 88.9 OR 89.0 OR 89.1 OR 89.2 OR 89.3 OR 89.4 OR 89.5 OR 89.6 OR 89.7 OR 89.8 OR 89.9 OR 90.0 OR 90.1 OR 90.2 OR 90.3 OR 90.4 OR 90.5 OR 90.6 OR 90.7 OR 90.8 OR 90.9 OR 91.0 OR 91.1 OR 91.2 OR 91.3 OR 91.4 OR 91.5 OR 91.6 OR 91.7 OR 91.8 OR 91.9 OR 92.0 OR 92.1 OR 92.2 OR 92.3 OR 92.4 OR 92.5 OR 92.6 OR 92.7 OR 92.8 OR 92.9 OR 93.0 OR 93.1 OR 93.2 OR 93.3 OR 93.4 OR 93.5 OR 93.6 OR 93.7 OR 93.8 OR 93.9 OR 94.0 OR 94.1 OR 94.2 OR 94.3 OR 94.4 OR 94.5 OR 94.6 OR 94.7 OR 94.8 OR 94.9 OR 95.0 OR 95.1 OR 95.2 OR 95.3 OR 95.4 OR 95.5 OR 95.6 OR 95.7 OR 95.8 OR 95.9 OR 96.0 OR 96.1 OR 96.2 OR 96.3 OR 96.4 OR 96.5 OR 96.6 OR 96.7 OR 96.8 OR 96.9 OR 97.0 OR 97.1 OR 97.2 OR 97.3 OR 97.4 OR 97.5 OR 97.6 OR 97.7 OR 97.8 OR 97.9 OR 98.0 OR 98.1 OR 98.2 OR 98.3 OR 98.4 OR 98.5 OR 98.6 OR 98.7 OR 98.8 OR 98.9 OR 99.0 OR 99.1 OR 99.2 OR 99.3 OR 99.4 OR 99.5 OR 99.6 OR 99.7 OR 99.8 OR 99.9

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THEY INHABIT AT PRESENT A BULLET-POCKETED, ABANDONED BRITISH POLICE FORT, THEY REGARD LIFE IN THE SETTLEMENT AS A "GOOD LIFE;" DESPITE THE NOTICEABLY SUB-STANDARD LIVING CONDITIONS AND WORKING FACILITIES, THEY SCOFFED AT THE IDEA THAT THEY WERE MAKING ANY SPECIAL SACRIFICE IN LIVING THERE. UNLIKE MANY SETTLEMENTS, MOST OF THE DOTAN SETTLERS EARN THEIR LIVELIHOOD ON-SITE, RATHER THAN COMMUTING TO ISRAEL. THE SANUR/DOTAN SETTLERS WILL MOVE TO A NEW SITE CLOSER TO THE GREEN LINE WHICH, UNLIKE THE PRESENT SITE, THEY BELIEVE WILL REMAIN IN ISRAELI HANDS UNDER A TERRITORIAL-COMPROMISE PEACE AGREEMENT. THEY OPPOSE THE IDEA OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE ARISING IN THE WEST BANK, BUT THEIR OBJECTIONS WERE LOW-KEY. THEY CLAIM TO ENJOY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THEIR ARAB NEIGHBORS.
END SUMMARY.

3. ON A RECENT DRIVE AROUND THE WEST BANK TO OBSERVE, INTER ALIA, THE LAST YEAR'S PROGRESS IN SETTLEMENT-BUILDING, POLOFFS CROOM AND KULICK STOPPED AT A ROADSIDE SNACK BAR OPERATED BY THE SETTLEMENT OF DOTAN (HITHERTO IDENTIFIED IN EMBASSY/CONGEN REPORTING AS "SANUR"). IN A CHANCE ENCOUNTER, THEY STRUCK UP A CONVERSATION WITH TWO OF THE LOCAL SETTLERS, WHO INVITED THEM TO TOUR THE SETTLEMENT. THE FOLLOWING IS A REPORT ON BOTH THE ORGANIZATION AND PHYSICAL PLANT OF THE SETTLEMENT, AND THE ATTITUDES OF AT LEAST TWO OF THE SETTLERS.

4. FIRST, SOME NOTE SHOULD BE TAKEN OF THE SETTLEMENT NAME GAME. THE PRESENT SETTLEMENT OF DOTAN, SITUATED ON THE MAIN NORTH-SOUTH HIGHWAY OF THE WEST BANK,

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APPROXIMATELY HALF WAY BETWEEN NABLUS AND JENIN, APPEARS ON OUR MAPS AS "SANUR", THE NAME OF THE NEAREST ARAB VILLAGE. HOWEVER, THE 17 FAMILIES NOW OCCUPYING THE OLD BRITISH POLICE FORT ARE THERE ONLY TEMPORARILY (SINCE 1977) WHILE A PERMANENT SITE IN THE DOTAN VALLEY, 8 KM FROM THE GREEN LINE EAST OF THE ISRAELI ARAB VILLAGE OF BAQA AL-GHARBIYA, IS BEING PREPARED FOR THEM AND AN EQUAL NUMBER OF NEW SETTLERS. ONCE THE DOTAN "GAR'IN"(NUCLEUS) MOVES OUT, THE SANUR FORT COULD BE USED AS TRANSITIONAL QUARTERS FOR ANOTHER GAR'IN. (NOTE:

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THIS IS A COMMON PATTERN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS AND OFTEN COMPLICATES OUR EFFORTS TO KEEP TRACK OF EXACTLY HOW MANY SETTLEMENTS EXIST AND WHERE THEY ARE LOCATED.)

5. THE EIGHTY-ODD PEOPLE CURRENTLY LIVING AT SANUR/DOTAN, INCLUDING FIFTY CHILDREN, LIVE IN "CARAVANS" OF THE OLDER AND SMALLER TYPE PREVIOUSLY EMPLOYED IN OLDER SETTLEMENTS. THE SANUR/DOTAN SETTLERS ARE COMMITTED TO THE IDEA OF PROVIDING EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL THEIR MEMBERS WITHIN THE SETTLEMENT ITSELF, AND SEEM TO BE MUCH CLOSER TO THAT GOAL THAN MANY OTHERS. TO THIS END THEY HAVE ESTABLISHED A NUMBER OF SMALL INDUSTRIES, MOSTLY ONE-FAMILY OPERATIONS, PRODUCING CERAMICS, FIBERGLASS LAMPSHADES, LEATHER-GOODS, WOOD PRODUCTS AND COTTON FLOOR-CLEANING CLOTHS. THESE INDUSTRIES ARE LOCATED IN DIFFERENT ROOMS OF THE OLD FORT, WHICH WAS USED AS A MILITARY PRISON UNDER JORDANIAN RULE, AND FOR SEVERAL YEARS AS A PARATROOP COMBAT TRAINING SITE FOR THE IDF. THE BUILDING VERY MUCH SHOWS THE WEAR AND TEAR WHICH MIGHT BE EXPECTED FROM SUCH USE, INCLUDING NUMEROUS BULLET HOLES IN THE WALLS, AND LITTLE HAS BEEN DONE TO FIX IT UP.

6. THE SETTLERS THEMSELVES, WHILE THEY CLAIM TO BE LOOSELY AFFILIATED WITH GUSH EMUNIM, APPEAR, FROM OUR

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SMALL SAMPLE, TO BE CONSIDERABLY LESS DEDICATED TO

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 00637 02 OF 02 140121Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-14 ADS-00 CIAE-00 PH-07 H-01
INR-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SPRS-02 SP-02 SS-15
ICA-11 SSH-03 SSN-02 HA-06 /103 W
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R 131431Z JAN 81
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4521
INFO DIA WASHINGTON DC//
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 00637

THE "CAUSE" OF SETTLEMENT, LESS IDEOLOGICALLY
MOTIVATED, AND LESS RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT THAN IS
USUAL AMONG GUSH EMUNIM SETTLERS. FOR EXAMPLE, OUR
PRINCIPAL HOST, YA'ACOV, REVEALED THAT BEFORE JOINING
THE SETTLEMENT, HE HAD OWNED AND OPERATED A SMALL AUTO-
PARTS BUSINESS IN TEL AVIV. HE FELT DISSATISFIED WITH
HIS LIFE AND WORK, DID NOT REALLY LIKE THE HASSLE
OF BIG-CITY LIVING, AND WAS IN FACT CONSIDERING
EMIGRATING FROM ISRAEL ALTOGETHER. INSTEAD, HE
DECIDED TO TRY LIFE AS A SETTLER IN THE WEST BANK. FOR
HIM, IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A SUCCESSFUL EXPERIMENT.
HE REPEATEDLY INSISTED THAT HE FELT HE HAD A GOOD
LIFE, AND WAS MAKING NO PARTICULARLY GREAT SACRIFICE
IN STAYING IN THE SETTLEMENT. HE REPEATED THE REFRAIN
THAT WE HAVE HEARD FROM OTHER SETTLERS THAT A MAJOR

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CONSIDERATION IN THEIR MOVING TO AND STAYING WITH THE
SETTLEMENT WAS THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE SETTLEMENT WAS

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AN IDEAL ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH TO RAISE THEIR CHILDREN. HIS - WAS ONE OF THE FIRST FAMILIES IN DOTAN; HE HAS BEEN WITH THE SETTLEMENT FOR THREE YEARS AND INTENDS TO MOVE WITH THE NUCLEUS TO ITS NEW LOCATION IN EIGHT OR TEN MONTHS.

7. INTERESTINGLY, THE SETTLERS WITH WHOM WE SPOKE TOLD US THAT IT HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION FORTHEN THAT THE NEW SETTLEMENT SITE WAS NEAR THE GREEN LINE. THIS FACT GAVETHEN A GREATER FEELING OF SECURITY, FOR, AS THEY SAID, "WHO KNOWS WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN HERE?" IN THE HEART OF THE WEST BANK. THEIR ASSUMPTION WAS THAT ANY LIKELY PEACE AGREEMENT WOULD LEAVE THE NEW SITE IN ISRAELI HANDS, WHILE THE SAME COULD NOT BE ASSUMED ABOUT THE PRESENT SITE. THEY SAID THAT THEY WOULD NOT HAVE AGREED TO MOVE TO THE NEW SITE HAD THEY NOT BEEN ASSURED THAT NO PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND HAD BEEN CONFISCATED FOR THE SETTLEMENT. AT THE NEW SITE, THEY CLAIMED, THE DOTAN SETTLERS WOULD RECEIVE CLEAR TITLE, REGISTERED IN THE TABU, FOR THEIR INDIVIDUAL HOUSE PLOTS. (NOTE: WE SERIOUSLY DOUBT THE ACCURACY OF THIS, SINCE EVEN ON SETTLEMENTS WITHIN ISRAEL PROPER INDIVIDUAL SETTLERS DO NOT HOLD TABU REGISTRATION FOR INDIVIDUAL PLOTS. HOWEVER, THIS IS A POINT WHICH WE INTEND TO PURSUE WITH LAND REGISTRATION EXPERTS WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE.) ALTHOUGH THEY NATURALLY OPPOSED THE IDEA OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE ARISING IN THE WEST BANK, THE PROSPECT DID NOT AROUSE THE PASSIONATE OUTPOURING ONE MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED FROM GUSH EMUNIM SETTLERS. THEY THOUGHT LIVING

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PAGE 03

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STANDARDS OF PALESTINIANS WOULD INEVITABLY GO DOWN, AND THAT THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES WOULD SUFFER IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY, BUT THE FLAVOR OF THEIR OBSERVATIONS WAS PHILOSOPHICAL, RATHER THAN INFLAMMATORY. THESE SETTLERS CLAIMED TO BE ON EXCELLENT FRIENDLY TERMS WITH THEIR ARAB NEIGHBORS AND TO HAVE FREQUENT SOCIAL CONTACT WITH A FEW OF THEM.

8. COMMENT. THE ATTITUDES EXPRESSED DURING THIS SHORT VISIT WERE CERTAINLY NOT THOSE USUALLY HEARD FROM THE SPOKESMEN OF WEST BANK SETTLERS, PARTICULARLY THOSE

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AFFILIATED, HOWEVER LOOSELY WITH GUSH ENUNIM, BUT THEY
COULD BE MORE WIDE-SPREAD THAN WE HAVE HITHERTO IMAGINED.
ALTHOUGH WE DOUBT THEY ARE TYPICAL, THERE MAY BE MORE
PRAGMATISM AMONG WEST BANK SETTLERS THAN IS GENERALLY
BELIEVED. END COMMENT.
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PAGE 01 TEL AV 14032 01 OF 02 311644Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 IO-14 SSN-02 SSM-03 CIAE-00 DODE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0605

INFO DIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
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AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 14032

USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/31/86 (BROWN, WILLIAM A.) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, PEPR, SHUM, IS, SY
SUBJECT: KNESSET SESSION ENDS WITH FLURRY OF LEGISLATION
ON JERUSALEM, CITIZENSHIP AND "TERRORISM"

REFS: A) TEL AVIV 13904, B) TEL AVIV 13949 (NOTAL),
C) TEL AVIV 13361

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 14032 01 OF 02 311644Z

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

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2. THE KNESSET ENDED ITS 1979-80 SESSION JULY 30 WITH A LAST-MINUTE FLURRY OF HARD-LINE LEGISLATION WHICH KEPT MEMBERS WORKING LATE INTO THE NIGHT. IN ITS LAST TWO DAYS, THE KNESSET ADOPTED LAWS MAKING JERUSALEM THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL, BANNING MANIFESTATIONS OF SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND AUTHORIZING THE EXTENSION OF ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP TO DRUSE RESIDENTS OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, AND FINISHED WITH AN (UNINTENTIONALLY) SYMBOLIC VOTE TO -- LITERALLY -- TURN BACK THE CLOCK.

3. JERUSALEM BILL. GEULA COHEN'S JERUSALEM PROPOSAL, ABOUT WHICH WE HAVE REPORTED EXHAUSTIVELY IN RECENT WEEKS (REF A AND PREVIOUS) WAS ADOPTED LAST NIGHT BY A VOTE OF 69-15 WITH 3 ABSTENTIONS. AS PREDICTED, THE ENTIRE COALITION PLUS A SIZABLE PORTION OF THE OPPOSITION LABOR PARTY SUPPORTED THE BILL, ALBEIT WITH EXPRESSIONS OF MISGIVINGS FROM MEMBERS OF BOTH GROUPS. THE NAYS WERE CAST BY MKS FROM MAPAM, SHAI, THE COMMUNISTS AND SHELLI, PLUS SHULAMIT ALONI (CRM) AND YOSSEI SARID (LABOR). TWO MKS FROM LABOR AND ONE FROM SHAI ABSTAINED. THE TEXT OF THE BILL IS CONVEYED IN REF A.

4. TERRORISM ORDINANCE AMENDMENTS. ON MONDAY THE KNESSET PASSED ON FIRST READING (REF B) AN AMENDMENT TO THE "PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ORDINANCE" WHICH PRESCRIBED CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR ANYONE CONVICTED OF COMMITTING ANY OF A SPECIFIED SERIES OF ACTS "CONSTITUTING A DISPLAY OF IDENTIFICATION WITH OR SYMPATHY FOR A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION...." SINCE THIS LANGUAGE REPRESENTED A COMPROMISE WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE LABOR PARTY AND JUSTICE MINISTER TAMIR, IT RECEIVED ONLY PERFUNCTORY TREATMENT IN COMMITTEE

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AND RETURNED TO THE FLOOR FOR ITS FINAL READING YESTERDAY. THE ACT WAS ADOPTED BY A VOTE OF 45-12 AND WAS OPPOSED BY BASICALLY THE SAME CAST OF CHARACTERS AS VOTED AGAINST THE COHEN BILL.

5. CITIZENSHIP LAW AMENDMENTS. TUESDAY NIGHT THE KNESSET ADOPTED AMENDMENTS TO THE CITIZENSHIP LAW WHICH INTER ALIA EMPOWERED THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR TO EXTEND ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP, UPON REQUEST AND UNDER CERTAIN SPECIFIED CONDITIONS, TO "A RESIDENT OF A REGION THAT IS BEING HELD BY

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THE IDF." THE DRUSE RESIDENTS OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ARE THE CLEARLY INTENDED BENEFICIARIES OF THIS LEGISLATION. INTERIOR MINISTERBURG DID NOT FOLLOW THROUGH SERIOUSLY ON HIS PROMISE (REF C) TO CONTINUE TO OPPOSE THE BILL. AFTER LOSING HIS FIGHT AGAINST THE BILL IN COMMITTEE, BURG'S OPPOSITION BECAME PRO FORMA. ONE OF HIS AIDES TOLD POLOFF KULICK THAT BURG HAD OPPOSED THE BILL INITIALLY IN HIS ROLE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE AUTONOMY TEAM, OUT OF CONCERN TO AVOID FUTURE ACCUSATIONS THAT HE HAD NOT TRIED TO HEAD OFF A PIECE OF LEGISLATION POTENTIALLY DAMAGING TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH BURG VOTED AGAINST THE BILL, HE DID LITTLE TO MARSHAL THE COALITION BEHIND HIM.

6. THE LABOR ALIGNMENT DECLARED A FREE VOTE FOR ITS MKS ON THIS ISSUE AND MANY LABOR DOVES VOTED AGAINST IT, DESPITE ITS HAVING BEEN INTRODUCED BY LABOR MK SHLOMO HILLEL. LABOR MK DANNY ROSOLIO, WHOSE CONSTITUENCY INCLUDES BOTH THE KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT AND THE GALILEE/GOLAN SETTLEMENTS, TOLD US THAT SETTLEMENT CIRCLES IN LABOR WOULD CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR MORE MEASURES TO TIGHTEN THE LINKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. HE WAS RELUCTANT TO SPECIFY THOSE MEASURES BUT DID NOT DENY THE REPORT THAT THE KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT WAS PRESSING THE LABOR PARTY TO TAKE AN OUTRIGHT ANNEXATIONIST STANCE.

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ACTION, NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-14 ADS-00 SSN-02 SSM-03 CIAE-00
CODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00
HA-05 ACDA-12 OMB-01 TRSE-00 PM-07 H-01 INR-10
L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 DCT-02 SY-05 SYE-00 /107 W
-----002839 311655Z /40

O 311629Z JUL 80 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0606

INFO DIA WASHDC

AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 14032

USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/31/86 (BROWN, WILLIAM A.) OR-M

TAGS: PBOR, PEPR, SHUM, IS, SY

SUBJECT: KNESSET SESSION ENDS WITH FLURRY OF LEGISLATION
ON JERUSALEM, CITIZENSHIP AND "TERRORISM"

7. DURING THE NEAR-MIDNIGHT DEBATE ON THE BILL, HERUT MK
DOV SHILANSKY SLIPPED PAST THE GROGGY MKS ANOTHER
AMENDMENT TO THE LAW THAT LISTED CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH

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THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR CAN REVOKE CITIZENSHIP, ONE OF
WHICH WAS A "VIOLATION OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE STATE OF

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ISRAEL." THE NEXT DAY, A NUMBER OF LIKUD MKS DISCOVERED TO THEIR CHAGRIN THAT WHAT THEY HAD VOTED FOR HAD THE BLESSING OF NEITHER THE LIKUD FACTION OR THE INTERIOR MINISTER. SHAI IMMEDIATELY DENOUNCED THE AMENDMENT, SAYING THAT "A VIOLATION OF ALLEGIANCE" WAS TOO VAGUE A CONCEPT TO BE INCORPORATED IN A LAW, AND ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO SEEK REPEAL.

8. FINALLY, IN AN ACT THAT COULD BE A METAPHOR FOR THE ENTIRE SESSION, MK RABBI KALMAN KAHANA (POALEI AGUDAT ISRAEL) INTRODUCED LATE LAST NIGHT A PRIVATE-MEMBER BILL THAT WOULD TURN BACK THE CLOCK BY OVERRIDING, IN EFFECT, A RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION THAT ORDERED THE INSTITUTION OF DAYLIGHT SAVINGS TIME. PASSED ON A "PRELIMINARY READING" BY A SMALL MAJORITY, KAHANA'S BILL WOULD LEAVE THE INTRODUCTION OF DAYLIGHT SAVINGS TIME TO THE DISCRETION OF THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR. THAT POST HAS FOR THE LAST TWENTY YEARS BEEN HELD BY A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY, WHOSE MEMBERS GENERALLY OPPOSE DAYLIGHT SAVINGS TIME ON GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD ENCOURAGE SABBATH VIOLATIONS. THE BILL WILL NOT RETURN TO THE PLENARY, IF AT ALL, UNTIL AFTER THE RECESS AND THEREFORE DOES NOT NOW AFFECT APPLICATION OF THE COURT ORDER, WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO GO INTO EFFECT THIS WEEKEND.

9. COMMENT: IN ITS RUSH TO ENACT AS MUCH HARD-LINE LEGISLATION AS POSSIBLE BEFORE THE RECESS, THE COALITION MAJORITY DISPLAYED THE "APRES MOI LE DELUGE" ATTITUDE PERSONIFIED BY BEGIN'S DECISION TO MOVE HIS OFFICE TO EAST JERUSALEM. WHAT IS EVEN MORE TROUBLING IS THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE LABOR PARTY OPPOSITION HAS BEEN COOPERATING IN THIS RIGHTWARD SURGE. ON NONE OF THE ABOVE ISSUES

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PAGE 03

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(EXCEPT FOR THE ODD-BALL KAHANA BILL) WAS THE VOTE EVEN CLOSE. IN TWO CASES, LABOR WAS RELUCTANTLY DRAGGED IN AGAINST ITS BETTER JUDGMENT, AND IN THE THIRD INSTANCE, THE CITIZENSHIP BILL, IT ACTUALLY TOOK THE LEAD. THE FAR RIGHT (GEULA COHEN) AND THE LIKUD ARE THUS EXPLOITING THE SIEGE MENTALITY BESETTING ISRAEL TO PUSH HARD-LINE "PATRIOTIC" LEGISLATION WHICH LABOR IS AFRAID TO OPPOSE IN A PRE-ELECTION YEAR. THIS TENDENCY IS COMPOUNDED BY THE LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE WITHIN THE LABOR PARTY, WHICH FURTHER REDUCES PERES' WILLINGNESS TO STICK HIS NECK OUT. IRONICALLY, BY BLURRING THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF ITS POLICIES ON

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE ISSUES, LABOR COULD BE CONTRIBUTING TO BEGIN'S ABILITY TO DEPICT HIMSELF AS OPERATING WITHIN THE "NATIONAL CONSENSUS." IN ANY CASE, THE LAST FEW DAYS DO NOT AUGUR WELL FOR THE NEXT YEAR, WHEN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN WILL BE IN FULL SWING.
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PAGE 01 TEL AV 13700 01 OF 02 281047Z
ACTION SSN-02

INFO OCT-01 NEA-06 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 SS0-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 PM-10 H-01 INR-10
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0479

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 13700

FOR S/SN: AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ; CAIRO FOR USMEDEL

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/28/86 (BROWN, WILLIAM A.) OR-M

TAGS: PBOB, PEPR, IS, XF

SUBJECT: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF JERUSALEM LAW

REF: STATE 197268 (NOTAL)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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1. (C) FOLLOWING ARTICLE, BY DR. BARUCH BRACHA, ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXPERT AND COMMENTATOR, WHICH APPEARED IN THE JULY 23 HA'ARETZ, ADDRESSES THE QUESTIONS POSED IN REFTEL AND CONCLUDES THAT "IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THE PROPOSED BASIC LAW INTRODUCES NO REAL CHANGE IN JERUSALEM'S PRESENT STATUS IN ISRAELI LAW."

2. (U) START TEXT:

THE "BASIC LAW: JERUSALEM, THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL," WHICH WILL BE BROUGHT FOR DEBATE IN A FIRST READING AT THE KNESSET TODAY, ENJOYS NO PROTECTION WHATSOEVER -- AND THEREFORE THERE IS NOTHING TO PREVENT (LEGALLY) A CHANGE (OR NULLIFICATION OF) IN THE LAW'S PROVISIONS BY MEANS OF A REGULAR KNESSET LAW. TO BE SURE, THE "JERUSALEM LAW"

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IS CALLED A "BASIC LAW", BUT ACCORDING TO THE LEGAL SIT-

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SITUATION PREVAILING TODAY, BASIC LAWS HAVE NO LEGAL PREFERENCE OVER REGULAR LAWS -- AS LONG AS THEY DO NOT INCLUDE A "PROTECTION CLAUSE" LIMITING THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE KNESSET REGARDING THE AMENDMENT OR NULLIFICATION OF THE BASIC LAW. SINCE THE PRESENT BASIC LAW INCLUDES NO PROTECTIVE INSTRUCTIONS AT ALL, THERE IS NO LEGAL MACHINERY PREVENTING A DEVIATION FROM ITS SPECIFICATIONS BY PASSING A "REGULAR" (I.E. NOT A BASIC) LAW -- OR BY A SIMPLE MAJORITY VOTE OF THOSE ACTUALLY PARTICIPATING IN THE DEBATE (I.E. NOT NECESSARILY A MAJORITY OF 61 MK'S, OR ANY OTHER -RELATIVE MAJORITY).

THUS, IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THE PROPOSED BASIC LAW INTRODUCES NO REAL CHANGE IN JERUSALEM'S PRESENT STATUS IN ISRAELI LAW. SECTION 1 OF THE LAW DOES INDEED DECLARE THAT "JERUSALEM IS THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL" BUT THIS DOES NOT REPRESENT A CHANGE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. NEITHER DOES SECTION 2 OF THE LAW, WHICH STATES THAT "THE INTEGRITY AND UNITY OF JERUSALEM AS DELINEATED AFTER THE SIX DAY WAR SHALL NOT BE IMPAIRED, CHANGE THE PRESENT LAW REGARDING JERUSALEM. AFTER THE SIX DAY WAR, THE KNESSET LEGISLATED AMENDMENT NO. 11 TO THE LAW AND ADMINISTRATION

A ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE SHALL APPLY IN ANY AREA OF ERETZ YISRAEL DESIGNATED BY THE GOVERNMENT BY ORDER." IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE LEGISLATION OF THIS AMENDMENT, THE GOVERNMENT PUBLISHED (ON 28 JUNE 1967) THE LAW AND ADMINISTRATION ORDER (NO. 1) APPLYING ISRAELI LAW, JURISDICTION, AND ADMINISTRATION ON THE AREA OF EAST JERUSALEM (THE AREA OF EAST JERUSALEM WAS DEFINED BY ITS GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES, AND NOT BY NAME (#) AMENDMENT NO. 11 TO THE LAW AND ADMINISTRATION ED. NOTE). ON THEY VERY

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SAME DAY, THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR PROCLAIMED (BY VIRTUE OF HIS AUTHORITY UNDER THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ORDINANCE) EAST JERUSALEM PART OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF JERUSALEM.

THE SUPREME COURT HAS REITERATED (IN SEVERAL DECISIONS) THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED GOVERNMENT ORDER DID INDEED EXTEND ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER EAST JERUSALEM, AND HAS DETERMINED THAT EAST JERUSALEM WAS MADE PART OF THE STATE OF

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ISRAEL. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN A 1968 DECISION, JUDGE BINYAMIN HALEVY RULED THAT "UNITED JERUSALEM IS AN INSEPARABLE PART OF ISRAEL." THE ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COURT AT THE TIME, JUDGE SILBERG, CONCURRED -- ADDING THAT "AS OF 28 JUNE 1968, EAST AND WEST JERUSALEM ARE ONE AND THE SAME, WHETHER FOR ZONING PURPOSES, OR IN THE MATTER OF THE LAW'S JURISDICTION." THIS OPINION HAS BEEN UPHELD IN SUBSEQUENT COURT DECISIONS. THEREFORE, THE "JERUSALEM LAW" ADDS NOTHING WITH RESPECT TO THE UNIFICATION OF THE CITY, AND ITS BEING AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

IT SHOULD BE FURTHER NOTED THAT EVEN IF THE "ANNEXATION" OF EAST JERUSALEM WAS PROMULGATED BY GOVERNMENT ORDER, THIS DOES NOT ALLOW FOR (ACCORDING TO PREVAILING OPINION AMONG LEGAL AUTHORITIES WHO HAVE EXPRESSED VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT) THE SEVERANCE OF THE EASTERN SECTION FROM THE STATE'S SOVEREIGNTY BY MEANS OF CANCELLING THE ORDER. THE PREVAILING OPINION IS THAT ONLY THE KNESSET, BY LAW, CAN DO SO. AS WE HAVE ALREADY SAID, THE NEW LAW WILL ALSO NOT AFFECT THE KNESSET'S AUTHORITY TO "CONCEDE" EAST JERUSALEM BY LAW, AND THEREFORE, IN THIS RESPECT AS WELL, THE NEW LAW CONTAINS NO PROVISIONS THAT WILL FURTHER "PROTECT" THE STATUS OF UNIFIED JERUSALEM. FINALLY, SECTION 3 OF THE LAW STATES THAT "THE PRESIDENT OF THE STATE, THE KNESSET, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE HIGH COURT

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NOTE BY OC/T: TEL AVIA 13700/01 (*) OMISSION CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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ACTION SSN-02

INFO OCT-01 NEA-06 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 PM-10 H-01 INR-10
L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 SSM-03 IO-14 /068 W
-----106738 281105Z /10 S

O 281034Z JUL 80 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0480
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

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FOR S/SN: AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ; CAIRO FOR JSMEDL

SHALL ALL HAVE THEIR PERMANENT SEAT IN JERUSALEM." THIS
SECTION (MERELY) REPEATS ALREADY EXISTING LEGAL STIPULATIONS
RELEVANT TO THIS MATTER, AND CONTAINS NO INNOVATIONS WHAT-
SOEVER.

END-TEXT. LEWIS

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
IO-15 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-06 L-03 PM-09
PA-01 SSM-03 INRE-00 SAL-01 ACDA-12 SSN-02 ICAE-00
SP-02 SPRS-02 /089 W
-----004267 101719Z /50

O 101658Z NOV 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0774
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 17292

E.O. 12065: GDS 11/10/87 (BROWN, WILLIAM A.) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, PDEV, IS, EG
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND ON NEW ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN GAZA

REF: (A) CAIRO 26212, (B) TEL AVIV 1979 19127

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE NEGATIVE EDITORIAL REACTION IN THE EGYPTIAN DAILY AL-AHRAM (REF A) WAS, AS FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE HERE, SPARKED BY ISRAELI PRESS AND RADIO REPORTS OF NOVEMBER 1. ACCORDING TO THESE REPORTS, THE MINISTERIAL SETTLEMENTS COMMITTEE, IN ITS FIRST MEETING IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT, DECIDED TO ESTABLISH TWO NEW SETTLEMENTS AND A REGIONAL CENTER NEAR BAYT LAHIYAH, IN NORTHERN GAZA.

[REDACTED]

MAINTAINS THAT THE MINISTERIAL SETTLEMENTS COMMITTEE DISCUSSED THE GAZA SETTLEMENTS, BUT DID
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NOT AUTHORIZE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY NEW ONES.

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HE INDICATED THAT THE SETTLEMENTS REFERRED TO HAVE BEEN UNDER CONSTRUCTION FOR SOME TIME. FURTHER CONFUSING THE ISSUE, THE CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS IDENTIFIED IN THE PRESS REPORTS ARE NOT LOCATED IN THE NORTH AS REPORTED, BUT IN THE CENTER OF THE GAZA STRIP. THE NORTHERN BAYT LAHIYAH SITE, HOWEVER, IS EARMARKED FOR A MILITARY NAHAL, WHICH DOES NOT COME UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF WZO SETTLEMENTS DIVISION.

3. THE FOLLOWING GENERAL BACKGROUND ON ISRAEL'S GAZA SETTLEMENTS MAY BE HELPFUL. AT THE PRESENT TIME, THERE ARE EIGHT ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN GAZA, MAINLY CLUSTERED IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE GAZA STRIP, ENCIRCLING KHAN YUNIS. THESE SETTLEMENTS, WHICH WERE ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO SERVE AS A BUFFER BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE GAZA STRIP FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF THE NORTHERN SINAI TO EGYPT, HAVE A COMBINED, TOTAL POPULATION OF LESS THAN 500 ISRAELI SETTLERS.

4. IN GENERAL, SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN GAZA HAS NOT KEPT PACE WITH SIMILAR EFFORTS IN THE WEST BANK AND THE GOLAN. EVEN AMONG THE PROFESSIONALLY ZEALOUS FUNCTIONARIES OF THE WZO SETTLEMENTS DIVISION, THERE HAS NEVER BEEN THE SAME IMPETUS TO ESTABLISH SETTLEMENTS IN GAZA AS IN THE WEST BANK, WITH ITS MORE THAN 80 SETTLEMENTS, OR IN GOLAN WITH 32 SETTLEMENTS. IN PART, THIS IS BECAUSE THE HIGHLY EMOTIONAL RELIGIOUS/NATIONALIST JUSTIFICATION WHICH MOTIVATES MUCH OF THE WEST BANK SETTLEMENT EFFORT IS ABSENT IN GAZA, WHICH HAS NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED TO BE PART OF THE HISTORIC ERETZ YISRAEL.
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FURTHERMORE, THE SECURITY JUSTIFICATION IS NOT AS STRONG AS IN THE OTHER OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, PARTLY BECAUSE THE SECURITY THREAT IN THE GAZA REGION WAS NOT PERCEIVED TO BE AS GREAT. LASTLY, ECONOMICS HAS DICTATED A MORE MODEST EFFORT IN GAZA. GIVEN LIMITED FINANCIAL RESOURCES, THE DECISION WAS MADE EARLY-ON TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THE WEST BANK. IN ADDITION, UNTIL RECENTLY, IT WAS QUITE DIFFICULT TO FIND ADEQUATE NUMBERS OF SETTLERS TO FILL THE SETTLEMENTS. IN RECENT YEARS, HOWEVER, THIS HAS

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CHANGED MARKEDLY, WITH PUBLIC OPINION SHIFTING STEADILY IN FAVOR OF A CONTINUED SETTLEMENT EFFORT. SETTLEMENTS HAVE BECOME "RESPECTABLE" AND MORE ATTRACTIVE TO PROSPECTIVE SETTLERS, WHO INCREASINGLY TEND TO BE YOUNG COUPLES UNABLE TO FIND ADEQUATE HOUSING IN ISRAEL PROPER. SETTLEMENTS OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO STRESS, MORE SO NOW THAN AT ANY OTHER TIME, THAT THE BULK OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENT RESOURCES AND EFFORTS FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE BEGIN ADMINISTRATION WILL BE DIRECTED AT INCREASING THE NUMBER OF SETTLERS IN EXISTING WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS, RATHER THAN IN ESTABLISHING NEW ONES.

5. [REDACTED] WITH THE COMPLETION OF THE TWO SETTLEMENTS REFERRED TO IN THE PRESS REPORTS, THE OVERALL SETTLEMENTS PLAN FOR GAZA IS ESSENTIALLY COMPLETE. COMMENT: WHILE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS OFFICIALS HAVE PLAYED "NEW SETTLEMENT/OLD DECISION/END OF PLANNED SETTLEMENTS" WITH US BEFORE, WE ARE INCLINED TO GIVE SOME CREDENCE TO [REDACTED] EXPLANATION IN THIS CASE, PARTICULARLY AS HIS EXPLANATION COINCIDES WITH PAST ISRAELI PRACTICE

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
IO-15 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-06 L-03 PM-09
PA-01 SSM-03 INRE-00 SAL-01 ACDA-12 SSN-02 ICAE-00
SP-02 SPRS-02 /089 W

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O 101658Z NOV 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0775
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

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IN ALLOCATING SETTLEMENTS RESOURCES. AT THE SAME
TIME, WHILE THE PRESS REPORTS ANNOUNCING THESE
NEW SETTLEMENTS MAY HAVE BEEN IN ERROR, WHICH IS
FREQUENTLY THE CASE IN ISRAELI REPORTING ON
SETTLEMENTS MATTERS, WE BELIEVE THAT SETTLEMENTS
OFFICIALS ARE NOT PARTICULARLY DISTURBED IF THE MESSAGE
HAS BEEN CONVEYED, EVEN BY ACCIDENT, THAT THE
ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ENTERPRISE WILL BE NEITHER
WITHDRAWN NOR DIMINISHED AS A PART OF THE CAMP DAVID
PEACE PROCESS. END COMMENT. LEWIS

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HIS NEW PLAN IS PART OF A WIDER DRIVE TO INCREASE THE JEWISH POPULATION OF JUDEA AND SAMARIA FROM THE PRESENT 20,000 TO 1,000,000 WITHIN 30 YEARS. ACCORDING TO NEWS REPORTS, HE ADDED THAT THE NEEDS OF ARAB RESIDENTS OF THE AREA HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT: "THE PLAN IS A PLAN FOR JEWS", DROBLES SAID, "I DON'T CARE IF THE ARABS ACCEPT IT OR NOT". DROBLES ADMITTED IN HIS PRESS INTERVIEWS THAT THE PLAN REPRESENTS HIS OWN VIEWS AND DOES NOT HAVE THE GOVERNMENT'S BLESSING, THOUGH HE NOTED IT WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE GOVERNMENT FOR ITS APPROVAL.

3.

[REDACTED] PUBLICITY SURROUNDING THE ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD COMPLICATE THE CURRENT ROUND OF AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DROBLE'S PROPOSALS AND PRESS HIGHLIGHTING OF THEM FLATLY CONTRADICTED ASSURANCES SHARON HAD GIVEN THE EGYPTIANS AND US DURING THE SEPTEMBER 23-24 AUTONOMY MINISTERIAL IN CAIRO.

4.

[REDACTED] THE PLAN STILL IN THE PROPOSAL STAGE, IT WAS NOT EVEN COMPLETE AS A PROPOSAL. WZO SETTLEMENTS DIVISION OFFICIALS ARE STILL WORKING OUT DETAILS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE PLAN, WHILE IT IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS PAST PRONOUNCEMENTS, DOES CONTAIN ONE NEW POTENTIALLY CONTROVERSIAL ELEMENT -- THE PROPOSED ADDITION OF 10 NEW SATELLITE TOWNS TO BE SET UP
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ON THE WESTERN SLOPES OF SAMARIA AND AROUND JERUSALEM.

[REDACTED] THE GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY APPROVE THOSE PORTIONS OF THE PLAN CALLING FOR AN ADDITIONAL 100,000 ISRAELI SETTLERS IN THE WEST BANK WITHIN THE NEXT FOUR YEARS, BUT THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD APPROVE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TEN ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENTS. AMONG OTHER THINGS, [REDACTED] ADDING ADDITIONAL SETTLERS TO EXISTING SETTLEMENTS WAS AN ECONOMICALLY MORE

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EFFICIENT WAY TO INCREASE THE JEWISH PRESENCE
IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA.

5. COMMENT. DROBLES USUALLY ANNOUNCES A NEW VERSION
OF THE SETTLEMENTS PLAN ROUGHLY EVERY SIX MONTHS.
WHILE THE PLAN IS ESSENTIALLY NOT NEW AND HAS NOT
RECEIVED GOVERNMENT APPROVAL, THE EXTENSIVE
PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THE PLAN WILL UNDOUBTEDLY
FUEL ARAB CONCERNS ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS ON THE
WEST BANK AND WILL CREATE ADDITIONAL COMPLICATIONS FOR
THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE REALIZING THESE
CONSEQUENCES, WE DO NOT EXPECT THAT THE GOVERNMENT
WILL PUBLICLY THROW COLD WATER ON THE PLAN FOR
REASONS OF HISTORY AND ITS OWN POLITICAL STANDING
INSIDE ISRAEL. END COMMENT.


6. FOR DEPARTMENT. IF QUERIED PUBLICLY ABOUT THE
WZO PLAN, WE SUGGEST TAKING LINE THAT WE HAVE SEEN
REPORTS ON THE PROPOSALS BY THE WZO BUT NOTE THEY
HAVE NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT. LEWIS

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EVENTUAL LIMITED SELF-RULE THROUGH THE SELECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF WHAT HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED AS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES; REASSERTED THE INDISPENSABILITY OF PLO LEADERSHIP FOR THE INHABITANTS OF THE TERRITORIES; AND SUMMARILY DISMISSED AUTONOMY WITHOUT GUARANTEED -- ULTIMATE SELF-DETERMINATION AS A DOOMED AND FUNDAMENTALLY IRRELEVANT EFFORT. END SUMMARY.

3. ON OCTOBER 6 -- BEFORE THE GRAVITY OF THE ATTACK ON PRESIDENT SADAT BECAME KNOWN --

[REDACTED]

POLOFF'S PURPOSE WAS TO ELICIT ADDITIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEFMIN SHARON'S CURRENT AND IMPENDING EFFORTS TO STIMULATE LOCAL INTEREST IN AUTONOMY THROUGH COORDINATED STEPS DESIGNED TO EASE THE STRAIN OF OCCUPATION AND TO BLOCK PLO INFLUENCE. HIS LINE OF INQUIRY, HOWEVER, WAS LESS DIRECT -- WITH EMPHASIS ON WHAT SHARON HAS DONE OR SAYS HE WILL DO, RATHER THAN ON THE IMPLICITLY UNDERSTOOD AUTONOMY LINK. AS COULD BE EXPECTED,

[REDACTED] WAS SCATHINGLY CRITICAL OF THE SHARON APPROACH. BUT THE OTHERS, [REDACTED] WERE SCARCELY MORE

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RECEPTIVE OR FORTHCOMING, AND, [REDACTED] TOOK CARE TO STRESS THE PRIMACY OF THE PLO AND THE FUTILITY OF PURSUING ANY NEGOTIATIONS THAT DO NOT GRAPPLE IN A MEANINGFUL WAY WITH THE ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION. HIGHLIGHTS OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL COMMENTS FOLLOW.

4. [REDACTED]
HARPED CONSTANTLY ON THE NECESSITY OF TAKING.

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PALESTINIAN DIGNITY INTO ACCOUNT. UNLIKE SOME OF THEIR ARAB COUSINS, HE SAID, THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE INHABITANTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAVE NEVER BEEN BOUGHT OFF BY THE ISRAELIS -- AND WILL NOT BE CO-OPTED BY SHARON. AUTONOMY UNDER ISRAELI TUTELAGE IS THEREFORE MEANINGLESS AND FOREDOOMED. WHAT IS NEEDED INSTEAD IS AN ARRANGEMENT FACILITATED BY U.S. PRESSURE WHEREIN THE MILGOV WOULD WITHDRAW TOTALLY, ALLOWING THE INHABITANTS TO REALIZE THEIR LEGITIMACY. PALESTINIAN PRIDE THUS RESTORED, A FULL, COMPREHENSIVE PEACE COULD BE NEGOTIATED. [REDACTED]

COMMENTING THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COVENANT SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED LITERALLY AND THAT "ALL" NOW ACCEPT TACITLY THAT THE ZIONIST STATE IS ON THE MAP TO STAY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DIVIDE THE CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TERRITORIES AS TANTAMOUNT TO NOTHING MORE THAN A "CHANGE OF UNIFORMS." AS FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES GENERALLY, HE SAID HE WOULD BE HARD TO CONVINCE. WITH CONSIDERABLE EMOTION [REDACTED]

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-15 CIAE-00 ICA-11
DODE-00 H-01 IO-15 NSC-05 NSAE-00 SY-05 HA-06
L-03 PM-09 PA-01 SSM-03 SSM-02 SP-02 SPRS-02
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-----221556 100626Z /16

R 091648Z OCT 81

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0177

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USLO RIYADH

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

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[REDACTED] IN THE HEADY DAYS OF
RAPPROCHEMENT THAT FOLLOWED SADAT'S VISIT TO JERUSALEM,

[REDACTED] THE
ISRAELIS CONTINUALLY DANGLE THE PROSPECT OF EARLY
RELEASE, BUT ALWAYS PULL BACK AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR.
WHAT [REDACTED] CANNOT TOLERATE IS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] HOW THEY PLAY WITH
OUR FEELINGS.

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5. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] OVER LUNCH IN THE STRIP'S MOST POPULAR SEASIDE RESTAURANT, HE ASSERTED THAT AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS, I.E., PALESTINIAN "SELF-DETERMINATION," ARE NOT NEGOTIABLE, AND THEREFORE THE "FINAL STATUS" PROVISION OF THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK IS A MOCKERY. HE THOUGHT THE BEST CHANCE FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM LAY THROUGH THE MECHANISM OF MUTUAL PLO-ISRAELI RECOGNITION. [REDACTED] HE SOUGHT TO MINIMIZE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ANTI-ZIONIST PROVISIONS OF THE PALESTINE COVENANT -- AND OF THE RADICALIZING INFLUENCE OF SOME OF THE FRINGE PLO ENTITIES. IN THIS LATTER REGARD, HE SAID, "I CAN TELL YOU THAT WHEN IT BECOMES NECESSARY, THOSE MOUTHS WILL BE SHUT, JUST AS THEY WERE AFTER THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT IN LEBANON." ON THE SHARON INITIATIVE,

[REDACTED] ANY EASING OF THE OCCUPATION WAS ALL TO THE GOOD, BUT IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER A SEPARATION OF THE CIVIL AND MILITARY FUNCTIONS WOULD FACILITATE MATTERS OR SIMPLY ADD ANOTHER LAYER TO AN ALREADY TOP-HEAVY BUREAUCRACY. ONE WAY THE ISRAELIS COULD BUILD CONFIDENCE, HE SUGGESTED, WOULD BE TO APPROVE SUCH PROJECTS AS THE RED CRESCENT HOSPITAL. ASKED WHETHER STEPS OF THIS NATURE WOULD INDUCE THE INHABITANTS TO RECONSIDER AUTONOMY, NABAHI REPLIED, NO, BUT IT MIGHT ALLAY THEIR FEAR THAT WHAT ISRAEL REALLY WANTS IS TO MAKE LIFE SO INTOLERABLE THEY WILL EVENTUALLY BE FORCED TO LEAVE. APROPOS AUTONOMY, [REDACTED] ONE INTRIGUING OBSERVATION.

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MANY PEOPLE, HE SAID, ARE WAITING TO SEE HOW MUCH FREEDOM OF ACTION THE REFUGEES OF NON-GAZA RAFAH (WHO RESIDE IN A ZONE DUE TO COME UNDER THE MFO-EGYPTIAN UMBRELLA) WILL ENJOY AFTER APRIL 26.

6.

[REDACTED] REARTICULATED HIS LONG-HELD CONVICTION THAT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS IS BANKRUPT, AND IT IS TIME FOR NEW DEPARTURES.

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DISPOSING OF THE SHARON APPROACH WITH A WAVE OF HIS HAND, HE COMMENTED THAT NO ONE IN THE TERRITORIES HAD THE "CAPABILITY" TO NEGOTIATE IN LIEU OF THE PLO AND IMPLIED THAT NO SERIOUS PERSON WOULD TRY. HE ADDED THE THOUGHT THAT THE PALESTINIANS ONLY HOPE OF EVENTUALLY ACHIEVING STATEHOOD LOGICALLY LAY IN RESISTING AUTONOMY AS ENVISIONED IN THE COA. HIS POINT WAS THAT IF PALESTINIANS WERE TO TAKE PART IN THE PROCESS, THEIR NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE WOULD DISAPPEAR: INTERNAL DIVISION WOULD DEEPEN AND WORLD PRESSURE ON ISRAEL WOULD TAPER OFF. [REDACTED] ONLY AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE -- INCLUDING THE PLO AND THE EUROPEANS BUT, IF THE U.S. OBJECTS, WITHOUT THE SOVIETS -- CAN SET THINGS RIGHT.

7. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DECLARED THAT THE AUTONOMY PROCESS HAD RUN ITS COURSE, AND SOMETHING ELSE SHOULD BE TRIED: BUT UNLIKE THEM, HE WAS KEENLY INTERESTED IN LAST MONTH'S CAIRO MINISTERIAL, AND ABOUT WHAT

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ACTION MEA-11

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-15 CIAE-00 ICA-11
DODE-00 H-01 IO-15 NSC-05 NSAE-00 SY-05 HA-06
L-03 PM-09 PA-01 SSM-03 SSM-02 SP-02 SPRS-02
/114 W

-----221572 100627Z /16

R 091648Z OCT 81
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0178
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USLO RIYADH
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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SHAPE THE TALKS WOULD TAKE IN THE COMING FEW WEEKS.
WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ISRAELI INITIATIVES,
HE SAW SOME MERIT IN MOSHE DAYAN'S UNILATERAL
WITHDRAWAL SCHEME, BUT CHARACTERIZED SHARON'S
PLAN TO SEPARATE THE CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES
AS A CYNICAL STEP BACKWARD. IN THE FORMER
INSTANCE, HE COMMENTED, PALESTINIANS WOULD AT
LEAST BE ABLE TO ORGANIZE AND ASSUME
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOME ASPECTS OF THEIR AFFAIRS,
BUT UNDER THE LATTER THEY WOULD MERELY BECOME
"STOOGES" FOR SENIOR-LEVEL ISRAELI CIVILIANS.
PRAGMATIC IN MATTERS OF FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT.

TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF OFF-SHORE FUNDS
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(INCLUDING 10,000 DOLLARS FROM ANERA) FOR THE
EXPANSION OF THE SCHOOL FOR MENTALLY HANDICAPPED

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WHICH HE RUNS. AT THAT TIME, HE ADDED, HE WILL TELL THE DEFENSE MINISTER THAT IT IS FOOLISH TO TRY TO ISOLATE THE POPULATION FROM THE PLO. "WE MUST BE ABLE TO TELL ARAFAT WHEN HE IS DOING SOMETHING RIGHT, AND WHEN HE IS WRONG," HE SAID.

8. [REDACTED]

LAST MONTH SHARON GRANTED PERMISSION FOR THE COLLEGE TO EXPAND TO A THIRD YEAR. WHILE MANIFESTLY PLEASED BY THIS DEVELOPMENT, [REDACTED] COMMENTED TO POLOFF THAT IN ANY EVENT SOME STUDENTS HAD ALREADY REACHED FOUR-YEAR EQUIVALENCY AND WOULD RECEIVE DEGREES IN ISLAMIC LAW IN THE SPRING. KEEPING HIS PRIORITIES SEPARATE, HE IMPLIED THAT SCHOLASTICS WERE ONE ENDEAVOR AND POLITICS ANOTHER. SHARON HAD CLEARED THE WAY FOR THE SCHOOL TO DEVELOP, HE SAID, AND THAT WAS A POSITIVE CHANGE -- BUT HE WAS QUICK TO ADD THAT THE PROBLEM WITH THE PEACE PROCESS WAS THAT NEITHER ISRAEL NOR THE U.S. SEEMED TO REALIZE ONLY THE PLO COULD REPRESENT PALESTINIAN INTERESTS. BROWN

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ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-05 SS-14 CIAE-00 IO-06 NSCE-00
NSAE-00 SSO-00 L-01 PM-03 PA-01 SSM-01 INRE-00
SSN-01 ICAE-00 SP-02 SPRS-01 /043 W
-----061253 231722Z /46

O 231648Z SEP 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9836

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

INFO DIA WASHINGTON DC// IMMEDIATE

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CAIRO PLEASE PASS AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3,4 9/23/01 (BROWN, WILLIAM A.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, IS, EG

SUBJECT: MEDIA COVERAGE OF POSSIBLE INITIATIVES ON
THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

REF: A.TEL AVIV 14805 (NOTALL)

- B. JERUSALEM 2883

1. (C) SUMMARY. THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE PRESS
COVERAGE OF THE REPORTED NEW ISRAELI INITIATIVE TO
SEPARATE MILITARY/CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS ON THE WEST BANK
AND GAZA AS THE RESULT OF A SHORT SEPTEMBER 22 MINISTRY
OF DEFENSE PRESS BULLETIN. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS
HAVE APPARENTLY PROVIDED SOME ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF THE
PLAN TO JOURNALISTS, AND THE CABINET WILL CONSIDER
SHARON'S PROPOSAL AT THE SEPTEMBER 27 CABINET SESSION.
FOR THE MOMENT, WE CAUTION AGAINST READING TOO MUCH INTO
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THE CHANGES UNTIL THE FULL OUTLINE AND DETAILS

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OF THE PLAN ARE CLEARER AND FORMALLY ADOPTED. END SUMMARY.

2. (LOU) OBVIOUSLY TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THE OPENING OF AUTONOMY DISCUSSIONS IN CAIRO AND TO PUT ISRAEL IN A MORE FAVORABLE PUBLIC RELATIONS POSITION REGARDING THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS HAVE CIRCULATED THE STORY THAT THE CABINET WILL CONSIDER NEXT SUNDAY A PLAN SEPARATING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POWERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON IS SCHEDULED TO INTRODUCE THE PLAN TO THE CABINET, WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONCURRENCE, ACCORDING TO A SEPTEMBER 22 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (PRESS) BULLETIN. (TEXT SENT REF B.) THE BULLETIN AND APPARENT PRESS BACKGROUNDER BY MOD OFFICIALS HAVE STIMULATED A FLURRY OF MEDIA REPORTS ON THE NEW PLAN.

3. (C) SEPTEMBER 23 MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE REPORTED PLAN CLOSELY FOLLOWED WHAT WE HAD LEARNED EARLIER

[REDACTED] THE SEPTEMBER 23 PRESS COVERAGE ADDED THE FOLLOWING POINTS (WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE ACCURATE):

- THE PLAN WILL BE INITIATED IMMEDIATELY, BUT
 - IMPLEMENTED GRADUALLY (DAYAR);
 - DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON INTENDS TO APPLY SOME
 - OF THE POINTS FIRST TO GAZA AND THEN TO THE
 - WEST BANK (DAYAR);
 - PRIOR TO THE 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR, THE CIVILIAN
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- FUNCTIONS WERE SEPARATED FROM MILITARY ACTIVITIES
- IN THE TERRITORIES (DAYAR);
- A PERMANENT FORUM FOR TACKLING ISSUES PERTAINING
- TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAS BEEN SET UP RECENTLY
- BY THE DEFENSE MINISTER. THIS FORUM IS SCHEDULED
- TO BE IN CHARGE OF DETERMINING POLICY IN THE
- TERRITORIES. THE MEMBERS OF THE FORUM ARE: THE
- OCCUPIED TERRITORIES CENTRAL COMMAND, THE OCCUPIED
- TERRITORIES NORTHERN COMMAND, REPRESENTATIVES OF

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- THE SECURITY SERVICES AND THE POLICE, THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, THE COORDINATOR OF OPERATIONS IN THE TERRITORIES, AND MAJOR GENERAL AVRAHAM TAMIR (HAARETZ);
- THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITY (OR GOVERNOR) WOULD BE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO THE DEFENSE MINISTER (JERUSALEM POST);
- THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITY WILL COORDINATE ACTIVITIES WITH VARIOUS GOVERNMENT MINISTERS THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR OF ACTIVITIES IN THE TERRITORIES, AS IN THE PAST (JERUSALEM POST);
- CIVIL ADMINISTRATION TASKS WILL BE GRADUALLY SHIFTED TO GAZA AND WEST BANK RESIDENTS (JERUSALEM POST).

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9837

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

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4. (C) AL HAMISHMAR COMMENTATOR RAHEL BARKAN
SPECULATED IN A SEPTEMBER 22 PIECE THAT THE PROPOSED
CHANGES AND THE APPOINTMENT OF PROFESSOR MENAHEM MILSON
AS CHIEF CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATOR IN THE TERRITORIES
CONTRADICT INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING TERRITORIES UNDER
MILITARY OCCUPATION.

5. (C) COMMENT. WHILE THE REPORTING ON THE PROPOSED
PLAN HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE

WE CAUTION AGAINST
READING TOO MUCH INTO ONE OR MORE OF THE ABOVE DETAILS
UNTIL THE NEW POLICY IS OFFICIALLY ADOPTED BY THE
CABINET. THE PLAN WILL BE SUBJECT TO DETAILED DISCUSSION
AND CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AT NEXT SUNDAY'S CABINET SESSION.
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AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE GOI IS COMMITTED
TO CHANGE ITS STRUCTURAL MODE OF OPERATION ON THE WEST

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BANK IN ORDER TO CREATE A MORE FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE IN
THE AUTONOMY DISCUSSIONS. END COMMENT. BROWN


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E.O. 12065: GDS 2/25/87 (HILL, CHARLES) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PBOR, PEPR, IS, EG
SUBJECT: GOI CONTEMPLATES TIGHTER SECURITY MEASURES FOR
GAZA

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT).
 2. AT A FEBRUARY 24 MEETING OF THE KNESSET FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE COMMITTEE (WHERE THE PRINCIPAL TOPICS OF DISCUSSION WERE LEBANON AND THE WEST BANK), DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER MORDECHI ZIPORI REPORTEDLY DREW ATTENTION TO THE RECENT UPSURGE IN TERRORISM, SMUGGLING, DRUG TRAF- FICKING AND COMMON CRIME IN THE GAZA STRIP. ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, ZIPORI CLAIMED THAT IN SOME INSTANCES THE ACTIVITIES OF TERRORIST AND ISRAELI UNDERWORLD ELEMENTS WERE LINKED: PALESTINIAN-SUPPLIED HASHISH, FOR EXAMPLE, IS OFTEN BARTERED FOR GUNS STOLEN FROM ISRAELI SOLDIERS. TO TURN THE TIDE, HE APPARENTLY RECOMMENDED THAT SECURITY FORCES IN THE STRIP BE INCREASED. (IN WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN A PURELY GRATUITOUS POLITICAL DIG, HE IS SAID TO HAVE
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COMMENTED, IN THIS CONTEXT, THAT THE CURRENT

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DETERIORATION IN GAZA DEMONSTRATED THAT MOSHE DAYAN'S PROPOSAL THAT ISRAEL REDUCE ITS SECURITY PROFILE WHILE IMPOSING "UNILATERAL" AUTONOMY WAS ILL-FOUNDED.) ZIPORI REPORTEDLY ALSO SAID THAT ISRAEL AND EGYPT HAD BEEN DISCUSSING WAYS OF INTERDICTING THE SMUGGLING ROUTES ACROSS THE SINAI, BUT THAT, BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVE BILATERAL NATURE OF THE ISSUE, THERE WERE LIMITS TO WHAT MEASURES ISRAEL COULD TAKE ALONE.

3. ALTHOUGH IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER ZIPORI FLESHED OUT A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM, HA'ARETZ MILITARY AFFAIRS CORRESPONDENT ZEEV SCHIFF REPORTED THE SAME DAY THAT THE DEFENSE MINISTRY WAS CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFERRING A BORDER-POLICE UNIT TO GAZA TO REPLACE SOME IDF ELEMENTS AND TO SUPPLEMENT THE EFFORTS OF THE LOCAL ARAB POLICE. THE ONLY HANG-UP, ACCORDING TO SCHIFF, WAS WHETHER THE COST OF SUCH A TRANSFER WOULD BE DEFRAIDED BY THE POLICE OR THE IDF -- A MATTER THAT APPARENTLY WILL BE TAKEN UP WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, ACTING IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEFENSE MINISTER, LATER IN THE WEEK. SCHIFF ALSO WROTE THAT THE GAZA MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO ENFORCE STRICTLY A LONGSTANDING REGULATION THAT PROHIBITS ARABS FROM THE TERRITORIES BETWEEN THE AGES OF 16 AND 25 FROM RETURNING HOME FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS AFTER TRAVELING TO A HOSTILE ARAB COUNTRY. THE LOGIC BEHIND THIS ORDER, AS RELATED BY SCHIFF, IS THAT IT DISCOURAGES PALESTINIAN YOUTHS FROM BEING RECRUITED FOR QUICKIE COURSES IN TERRORISM AND SENT BACK IMMEDIATELY FOR "ACTION IN THE FIELD."

4. COMMENT. ALTHOUGH MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE COMMITTEE NORMALLY ARE SHROUDED IN SECRECY, ZIPORI'S REPORTED REMARKS ON THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION IN GAZA HAVE A RING OF AUTHENTICITY WHICH SUG-
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GESTS THAT A "LAW-AND-ORDER" (AS OPPOSED TO A STRICTLY "POLITICAL") CRACKDOWN MAY WELL BE IN THE OFFING. SUCH A MOVE UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD BE TACITLY WELCOMED BY A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER, IF NOT AN OUTRIGHT MAJORITY, OF THE STRIP'S ARAB RESIDENTS.

"I AM NOT CONCERNED WHETHER THEY CATCH THE PEOPLE WHO ARE DOING THE SHOOTING -- BUT ONLY THAT THEY TAKE STEPS TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE WHOSE HOMES ARE BEING BURGLARIZED." LEWIS

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INFO DIA WASHINGTON DC//

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E.O. 12065: GDS 2/4/88 (BROWN, WILLIAM A.) OR-M

TAGS: PBOR, PDEV, PEPR, IS, JO, EG

SUBJECT SETTLEMENTS--NO END IN SIGHT

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT:

2. SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S WIDELY
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PUBLICIZED PLEDGE OF MAY 1980 THAT HIS GOVERNMENT

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WOULD ESTABLISH NO MORE THAN TEN ADDITIONAL NEW WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS HAS BEEN SO CAVEATED WITH CLARIFICATIONS AND EXCLUDED AREAS AS TO BE VIRTUALLY MEANINGLESS AS A BRAKE ON SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY GOES ON AT AN ACCELERATED PACE, ALTHOUGH IN NEW AND POTENTIALLY MORE SERIOUS DIRECTIONS. CURRENT EFFORTS OF THE WZO SETTLEMENTS DIVISION ARE FOCUSED ON EXPANDING BOTH THE LAND BASE AND ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS, INCREASING THE SETTLER POPULATIONS AND OBTAINING LARGE TRACTS OF WEST BANK LAND. LAND ACQUISITIONS ARE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH VARIOUS DEVICES, INCLUDING THE DECLARATION OF LAND PARCELS AS "STATE LAND," OR JEWISH-OWNED LAND, AND INCREASINGLY, BY OUTRIGHT PURCHASE BY PRIVATE ISRAELI CITIZENS. SOME OBSERVERS ESTIMATE THAT SUCH LAND ACQUISITIONS MAY TOTAL AS MUCH AS 40,000 ACRES, OR NEARLY A THIRD OF THE WEST BANK. IN ADDITION, DURING THE YEARS OF LIKUD GOVERNMENT, A STEADY SHIFT IN PUBLIC OPINION HAS OCCURRED IN FAVOR OF CONTINUING SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY AND CONTINUING ISRAELI CONTROL OVER THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, TO THE DEGREE THAT THE WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS HAVE BECOME FOR THE MAJORITY OF ISRAELIS AN ACCEPTED FACT OF LIFE. FURTHER, THE EXPANDING NETWORK OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK IS SEEN, NOT ONLY AS NOT AN OBSTACLE TO PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY, BUT AN INDISPENSABLE MARGIN OF SECURITY FOR ISRAEL, FORESTALLING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PLO DOMINATED STATE FROM THE SEEDS OF PALESTINIAN SELF GOVERNING AUTHORITY, IF IT IS EVER ACHIEVED. WE ANTICIPATE THAT SUCH SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY WILL

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CONTINUE STEADILY, TO THE LIMIT OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES.
END SUMMARY.

3. SINCE PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S WIDELY PUBLICIZED PLEDGE OF MAY 1980 THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD ESTABLISH ONLY TEN ADDITIONAL NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK, WE HAVE MONITORED SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES CLOSELY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT WOULD HONOR THAT PLEDGE, OR WHETHER IN ITS DRIVE TO "CREATE FACTS" ON THE GROUND, IT WOULD DEVISE RATIONALIZATIONS FOR

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EXCEEDING THE "LAST TEN" LIMITATION. SUBSEQUENT "CLARIFICATIONS" OF BEGIN'S STATEMENT HAVE VIRTUALLY STRIPPED IT OF ANY REAL MEANING. FIRST, THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE CLARIFIED THAT THE PLEDGE APPLIED ONLY TO THE JUDEA/SAMARIA HIGHLANDS AND NOT TO THE JORDAN VALLEY. LATER, WZO SETTLEMENTS PROFESSIONALS ESTABLISHED THAT THE PLEDGE REFERRED ONLY TO "NEW APPROVALS", I.E., SETTLEMENTS PROPOSALS WHICH RECEIVED FINAL CABINET APPROVAL AFTER MAY 1980. STILL LATER WZO SETTLEMENTS DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN, ZEEV BEN JOSEF, TOLD EMBOFF THAT THE SO-CALLED "URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS" OF JERUSALEM (ESTABLISHED BY THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING RATHER THAN THE WZO) WERE SIMILARLY EXCLUDED FROM THE "LAST TEN" LIMITATION, AND THEN DELINEATED A VERY LARGE AREA ENTIRELY SURROUNDING JERUSALEM AND, ON THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF THE CITY, EXTENDING TO GUSH ETZION, AS THE PROPOSED PLANNING BOUNDARIES FOR URBAN JERUSALEM. MOST RECENTLY, THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HAS ANNOUNCED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 16 PRE-SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK. THE ANNOUNCEMENT EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRE-SETTLEMENTS ARE TO BE CONSTRUCTED ENTIRELY UNDER MOD AUSPICES, WILL HAVE NO RESERVES OF LAND OR WATER RESOURCES ALLOCATED

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TO THEM, AND ARE DISTINCT FROM EITHER NAHALS OR CIVILIAN
SETTLEMENTS. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE MOD
PRE-SETTLEMENTS PROJECT MANAGER CONCEDED THAT LAND AND
WATER RESERVES COULD BE ALLOCATED TO THE PRE-SETTLEMENTS
IN THE FUTURE, THUS MAKING POSSIBLE THEIR DEVELOPMENT
INTO PERMANENT CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS. PRESS REPORTS
OF NEW SETTLEMENTS APPARENTLY IN EXCESS OF THE 'LAST TEN'
LIMITATION WHICH SURFACE PERIODICALLY ARE ROUTINELY
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DISCOUNTED BY WZO SPOKESMEN UNDER ONE OR ANOTHER OF THESE
'CLARIFICATIONS'. GIVEN THE LARGE NUMBER OF SETTLEMENTS

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PLANS REPORTEDLY APPROVED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO MAY 1980 - 'MORE THAN 40', ACCORDING TO SIMON RAVID, FORMER HEAD OF THE WZO SETTLEMENTS DIVISION - AND THE EXTENT OF THE EXCLUDED AREAS--IT IS CLEAR THAT THE FAMOUS "LAST TEN" PLEDGE IS VIRTUALLY MEANINGLESS AS A BRAKE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS.

4. BECAUSE OF THIS, MOST LOCAL SETTLEMENTS OBSERVERS NOW IGNORE THE NUMBERS GAME AND FOCUS INSTEAD ON THE MEASURES BEING TAKEN TO EXPAND EXISTING SETTLEMENTS, INCREASE THE SETTLER POPULATION, AND ACQUIRE LARGE TRACTS OF WEST BANK LAND. IN OVER FOUR YEARS OF LIKUD RULE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ESTABLISHED NEARLY 50 SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK, BRINGING THE TOTAL TO ROUGHLY 85 SETTLEMENTS (EXCLUSIVE OF THE JERUSALEM URBAN SETTLEMENTS), AND MORE THAN QUADRUPLLED THE NUMBER OF SETTLERS FROM 5,000 TO APPROXIMATELY 23,000. EVEN IN GAZA, NEVER A PRIORITY AREA, THE NUMBER OF SETTLEMENTS WAS DOUBLED, BRINGING THE TOTAL TO 8. PRESENTLY, THE WZO SETTLEMENTS DEPARTMENT IS FOCUSING ON EXPANDING THE SETTLER POPULATION STILL FURTHER. THE LATEST VERSION OF THE DROBLES MASTER PLAN FOR SETTLEMENTS CALLS FOR AN INCREASE IN THE ISRAELI SETTLER POPULATION OF THE WEST BANK TO 150,000 WITHIN FIVE YEARS, A GOAL MORE EASILY AND ECONOMICALLY ACHIEVED BY EXPANDING EXISTING SETTLEMENTS. WHEREAS A TOTALLY NEW SETTLEMENT REQUIRES CONSIDERABLE EXPENDITURES FOR BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE SUCH AS ROADS, SCHOOLS, WATER AND ELECTRICITY, RESULTING IN A RELATIVELY SMALL
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INCREASE IN THE SETTLER POPULATION, EXPANDING THE EXISTING 80 OR SO WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS FROM THE PRESENT POPULATION LEVELS OF BETWEEN 40 AND 100 FAMILIES EACH, TO ROUGHLY 300 FAMILIES EACH IS A FAR MORE COST EFFECTIVE APPROACH--PARTICULARLY AS ALL PERMANENT SETTLER HOUSING IS NOW BEING PLANNED ON A "BUILD YOUR OWN" BASIS, ALBEIT GENEROUSLY ASSISTED WITH GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZED LOANS AND MORTGAGES. WHILE WE ESTIMATE GOI EXPENDITURES ON SETTLEMENTS HAVE GENERALLY REMAINED RELATIVELY CONSTANT AT APPROXIMATELY

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1 1/2 TO 2 PERCENT OF THE ANNUAL BUDGET UNDER BOTH LABOR AND LIKUD GOVERNMENTS, THE PRESENT EMPHASIS ON EXPANSION OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS, A SHIFT TO SO-CALLED "URBAN SETTLEMENTS" IN WHICH SETTLERS COMMUTE TO ISRAEL FOR EMPLOYMENT THUS ELIMINATING THE NEED FOR AN EXTENSIVE ECONOMIC BASE, AND THE ADOPTION OF THE "BUILD YOUR OWN HOME" SCHEME HAS ENABLED THE LIKUD GOVERNMENT TO GREATLY INCREASE ISRAELI "PRESENCE" IN THE WEST BANK WITHIN A RELATIVELY MODEST BUDGET. IN ADDITION, THERE IS NO LONGER ANY LACK OF PROSPECTIVE SETTLERS, INCLUDING LARGE NUMBERS WHO APPEAR TO BE MOVING TO THE SETTLEMENTS, NOT FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS, BUT RATHER BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THEIR QUALITY OF LIFE WILL BE BETTER THERE. WZO SETTLEMENTS DEPARTMENT SOURCES REPORTED THAT DURING THE SUMMER MONTHS OF 1981, ROUGHLY 7,000 NEW SETTLERS MOVED TO SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK ALONE. IT IS COMMONLY ESTIMATED THAT ROUGHLY ONE-HALF OF THE SETTLERS ON THE WEST BANK COMMUTE TO WORK WITHIN THE PRE-1967 BORDERS.

5. BUT EVEN MORE DRAMATIC HAS BEEN THE ACQUISITION OF LARGE TRACTS OF WEST BANK LAND BY DECLARING THEM TO BE EITHER STATE-OWNED OR JEWISH-OWNED PRIVATE LAND. THE OFFICIAL FIGURE FOR THE AMOUNT

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OF LAND THUS ACQUIRED FOR ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE LAST TWO YEARS IS ONLY 9,000 ACRES. BUT ISRAELI JOURNALISTS INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH WHAT IS HAPPENING ON THE WEST BANK, AND WHO TEND TO BE

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY. ESTIMATE THAT
AS MUCH AS 40,000 ACRES HAVE BEEN TAKEN OVER DEFACTO
FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES, MOSTLY FOR FUTURE
EXPANSION OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS. MOREOVER,
SPURRED ON BY THE EXHORBITANT COMPENSATION DEMANDS
OF THE YAMIT SETTLERS, AND THE GOVERNMENT'S
WILLINGNESS TO MEET THEM SUBSTANTIALLY, WEST BANK
SETTLERS AND OTHER ISRAELI ENTREPRENEURS ARE
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CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN A VIRTUAL "LAND RUSH" EFFORT
TO PURCHASE PARCELS OF WEST BANK LAND, ALLEGEDLY

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OFTEN RESORTING TO QUESTIONABLE METHODS. THE REALITY IS THAT, OUTSIDE OF A SMALL INNER CIRCLE OF ISRAELIS CHARGED WITH THE MISSION OF LAND ACQUISITION, NO ONE REALLY KNOWS HOW MUCH WEST BANK/ GAZA LAND IS NOW IN ISRAELI HANDS OR IS POTENTIALLY UNDER ISRAEL'S CONTROL IN THE FORM OF SETTLEMENTS, LAND SET ASIDE FOR SETTLEMENT EXPANSION, PUBLIC AND MILITARY PURPOSE LAND, STATE LAND, OR PRIVATELY PURCHASED LAND. IT IS PROBABLY ABOUT ONE THIRD OF THE TOTAL AREA OF THE WEST BANK. IN ADDITION, THE GOI HAS ESTABLISHED A MASSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE OF ROADS, POWER LINES, WATER SYSTEMS AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, ALL THOROUGHLY LOCKED INTO THE ISRAELI GRIDS, AND DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE WEST BANK ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON ISRAEL PROPER. THE GOAL HAS BEEN TO CREATE A MATRIX OF ISRAELI CONTROL IN THE WEST BANK SO DEEPLY ROOTED THAT NO SUBSEQUENT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ABLE TO RELINQUISH SUBSTANTIAL CHUNKS OF THAT TERRITORY, EVEN IN EXCHANGE FOR PEACE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE LIKUD GOVERNMENT HAS MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING THIS GOAL.

6. CONCOMITANT WITH THIS PROCESS HAS BEEN A MARKED SHIFT IN PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS AND THE FUTURE OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. OVER THE PAST YEAR, VARIOUS PUBLIC OPINION POLLS HAVE SHOWN A STEADILY INCREASING SUPPORT FOR THE CONTINUED ESTABLISHMENT OF SETTLEMENTS IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA. THERE APPEARS TO BE NO SIGNIFICANT, ORGANIZED OPPOSITION TO THE CONTINUING

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PAGE 03

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SETTLEMENTS ENTERPRISE. PEACE NOW IS VIRTUALLY DEFUNCT. THE LABOR PARTY IS SILENT AND DIVIDED ON THE ISSUE. NOR, OF COURSE, IS THERE ANY OPPOSITION FROM WITHIN THE COALITION, NOW THAT YIGAL YADIN AND THE DMC NO LONGER EXIST AS POLITICAL FACTORS. WHILE ONLY A YEAR OR TWO AGO, NEWS OF A NEW UNAUTHORIZED GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENT IN THE WEST BANK BROUGHT HOWLS OF INTERNATIONAL PROTEST, AND SENT THOUSANDS OF PEACE NOW ACTIVISTS TO THE STREETS IN PROTEST, TODAY THE STEADY STREAM OF ANNOUNCEMENTS OF NEW SETTLEMENT EXPENDITURES, NEW ACQUISITIONS UNDER

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THE 'STATE LAND' DEVICE ARE MET WITH VIRTUAL SILENCE. IN SHORT, THE MAJORITY OF ISRAELIS HAVE COME TO ACCEPT THE SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AS A FACT OF LIFE.

7. NOR IS THE CONTINUED STRENGTHENING OF THE SETTLEMENT NETWORK AND THE INFLUX OF ADDITIONAL HUNDREDS OR EVEN THOUSANDS OF ISRAELI SETTLERS TO THE WEST BANK VIEWED AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO AUTONOMY. ASIDE FROM THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENT THAT SETTLEMENTS SERVE A USEFUL SECURITY ROLE IN THE DEFENSE OF ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY FROM TERRORIST INCURSIONS, THE PRESENCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF ISRAELI SETTLERS AND ISRAELI CONTROL OVER MAJOR TRACTS OF WEST BANK LAND IN STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT AREAS ARE SEEN AS VITALLY NECESSARY TO FORESTALL THE POSSIBILITY OF AUTONOMOUS SELF GOVERNING AUTHORITY DEVELOPING INTO AN EMBRYO GOVERNMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PLO STATE-IN-THE-MAKING. AS THE APRIL DEADLINE FOR WITHDRAWAL APPROACHES, AND WITH IT THE ANTICIPATION OF AN INCREASINGLY TOUGH EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATING POSITION ON AUTONOMY AFTER THAT DATE, WE BELIEVE THAT ADDITIONAL EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION OF SETTLEMENTS WILL CONTINUE WITH THE AIM OF ENSURING THAT AUTONOMY, IF AGREEMENT IS EVER ACHIEVED, DOES NOT EXCEED THE BOUNDS ENVISIONED BY THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT. AS WE SEE IT,
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THE MAJOR LIMITING FACTOR IS RESOURCES, AND NOT THE AVAILABILITY OF LAND, PEOPLE OR POLICY CONSTRAINTS.

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 TEL AVIV 01871

B. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH CONGEN.
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INFO OCT-01 10-14 ADS-00 SSN-03 SSN-02 HA-05 HUD-01
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 09528

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/23/86 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, PDEV, IS, JO
SUBJECT: ISRAELI PLANS TO ESTABLISH A SETTLEMENTS
BUFFER ZONE IN THE GAZA STRIP

1. (U) HA'ARETZ' YEHUDA LITANI REPORTED TODAY ON A
DETAILED PLAN BY AGRICULTURE MINISTER SHARON TO ESTABLISH
A BLOC OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE SOUTHERN GAZA STRIP THAT
WOULD FORM A BUFFER ZONE BETWEEN EGYPT (SINAI) AND THE
HEAVILY ARAB POPULATED PARTS OF THE STRIP. THE BLOC
WOULD ULTIMATELY CONTAIN SOME DOZEN SETTLEMENTS OF WHICH
FIVE (NETZER HAZANI, KATIF, GANEI TAL, NAHAL GEDID,
NAHAL MORAG) ALREADY EXIST. GROUND WAS BROKEN EARLY
THIS WEEK FOR A SIXTH (KATIF D) AND THE MINISTERIAL
SETTLEMENTS COMMITTEE HAS APPROVED TWO MORE (KATIF G
AND ONE NAHAL.) AT LEAST TWO MORE SETTLEMENTS AND A
REGIONAL CENTER ARE ULTIMATELY ENVISAGED IN THIS BLOC.
IN ADDITION, SHARON'S PLANS CALL FOR TWO NEW SETTLEMENTS
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ON THE NORTHERN EDGE OF THE GAZA STRIP

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2. (C) IN CONVERSATION WITH POLOFF KULICK, LITANI SAID THAT SHARON IS INTENT ON MOVING AHEAD AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE WITH HIS PLANS. LITANI'S SOURCES IN THE SETTLEMENTS DEPARTMENT OF THE WZO, HOWEVER, TELL HIM THERE IS NO MONEY FOR ANYTHING LIKE THIS AMBITIOUS A PROGRAM. LITANI'S PERSONAL ESTIMATE WAS THAT IF SHARON RETAINS HIS CURRENT HIGH STANDING IN THE GOVERNMENT AND IF EZER WEIZMAN SHOULD LEAVE THE SCENE, SHARON WOULD PROBABLY GET HIS WAY, FINANCIAL STRICTURES OR NO.

3. (U) FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF LITANI STORY.

COMMENCE TEXT: A PLAN FOR SETTING UP A "BUFFER ZONE" OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP WILL BE IMPLEMENTED OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS ON THE INITIATIVE OF MINISTERIAL SETTLEMENTS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN ARIEL SHARON. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FIRST NEW SETTLEMENT (KATIF D) SCHEDULED TO FORM PART OF THIS PLAN WAS ALREADY STARTED THIS WEEK, IN A DUNE AREA SOUTHWEST OF KHAN YUNIS, WHERE ANOTHER THREE SETTLEMENTS WILL ALSO BE ESTABLISHED. THE PROJECTED BUFFER ZONE WILL BE IN THE SHAPE OF THE LETTER L, WITH THREE ALREADY EXISTING SETTLEMENTS LOCATED ON ITS NORTHERN EDGE (NETZER HAZANI, KATIF AND GANEI TAL). THERE WILL BE A REGIONAL CENTER AND ANOTHER THREE OR FOUR NEW SETTLEMENTS: GEDID, GAN-OR AND KATIF F. A NAHAL OUTPOST WILL FORM THE SOUTHERNMOST SPOT ON THE BUFFER ZONE. THE NAHAL OUTPOST OF MORAG IS SITUATED TO THE WEST(SIC) OF THE ZONE. THE LAND DESIGNED TO BE SEIZED AMOUNTS TO SOME 11,500 DUNAMS: SOME OF THE SETTLEMENTS WILL BE ESTABLISHED ON STATE-OWNED LAND (THE DUNE AREA), AND
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SOME ON THE LAND PROJECTED FOR SEIZURE. A DECISION TO ESTABLISH THE SETTLEMENT OF KATIF G WAS REPORTEDLY ADOPTED SOME TIME AGO. THE SETTLEMENT IS TO BE LOCATED BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER AND THE RAFAH ROAD, OPPOSITE THE NAHAL OUTPOST OF GEDID. THE NEW SETTLEMENT, THE CONSTRUCTION OF WHICH WAS ALREADY STARTED EARLIER IN THE WEEK, IS DESIGNED TO BE A NAHAL OUTPOST AT THE FIRST STAGE. THE POSSIBILITY OF TURNING THE NAHAL OUTPOST OF MORAG INTO A CIVILIAN SETTLEMENT IS REPORTEDLY ALSO BEING EXAMINED. THIS PLAN, WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY

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SCHEDULED TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN 1974-1975, WAS RECENTLY DISCUSSED BY GOVERNMENT AND SETTLEMENT ELEMENTS, WHO DECIDED TO WORK FOR ITS FASTER IMPLEMENTATION.

THE BUFFER ZONE IS DESIGNED TO BE LINKED TO ISRAELI TERRITORY WITHIN THE GREEN LINE AT Kfar Daron and Kisufim. THE POSSIBILITY OF BUILDING ANOTHER ROAD IN THE AREA IS ALSO BEING PROBED.

THE AIM IN ESTABLISHING THE BUFFER ZONE IS TO CREATE A STRIP OF LAND SEPARATING EGYPT FROM THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION RESIDING IN GAZA, IN LIGHT OF THE RETURN OF THE RAFAH SALIENT TO EGYPT.

MINISTER SHARON IS ALSO PLANNING TO ESTABLISH TWO NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE NORTH OF THE GAZA STRIP, NEAR THE EREZ BLOC (EREZ A AND EREZ B). THESE SETTLEMENTS ARE TO BE ESTABLISHED ON STATE-OWNED LAND.

THE DECISION TO SPEED UP THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN OF CREATING THE BUFFER ZONE WAS TAKEN IN LIGHT OF THE ONGOING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL, EGYPT AND THE US CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AUTONOMY PLAN IN GAZA

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INFO OCT-01 10-14 ADS-00 SSM-03 SSN-02 HA-05 HUD-01
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 09528

FIRST.

SETTLEMENT SOURCES TOLD HA'ARETZ YESTERDAY THAT THE FUTURE
OF THIS PLAN IS NOT YET CLEAR - OWING TO LACK OF FUNDS.
END TEXT. LEWIS

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USCINCEUR FOR POLAD, DEPT FOR S/SN AMB FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12065: RDS 1, 4 5/4/02 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, PGOV, PINT, IS, JO, XF

SUBJECT: BEGIN SPEAKS ON AUTONOMY AND SETTLEMENTS

REF: TEL AVIV 6521

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IS/FPC/CDR 26 Date: NOV 7 1996

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2. SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER BEGIN TOLD THE OPENING OF THE KNESSET SUMMER SESSION THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT WITHDRAW FROM SETTLEMENTS IN ANY FUTURE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO REITERATED ISRAEL'S FIRM OPPOSITION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE AND ASSERTED THAT ISRAEL'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WOULD BE RAISED AND APPROPRIATE ACTION TAKEN AT THE END OF THE INTERIM PERIOD STIPULATED IN THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPLAINED THAT ISRAEL WOULD MAINTAIN AND OBSERVE FULL AUTONOMY FOR THE ARAB INHABITANTS "ONCE OUR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IS APPLIED TO JUDEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA DISTRICT." THE PRIME MINISTER LEFT THE IMPRESSION WITH SOME ISRAELI OBSERVERS THAT HE MIGHT BE FLEXIBLE REGARDING VENUE FOR THE AUTONOMY TALKS, BUT REAFFIRMED THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT TOLERATE "A BOYCOTT OF OUR CAPITAL, JERUSALEM." THE PRIME MINISTER'S REFERENCES TO JERUSALEM AND ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA HAS NOT MADE A COMPROMISE OVER THE VENUE ISSUE ANY EASIER. END SUMMARY.

3. SPEAKING AT THE OPENING OF THE KNESSET SUMMER SESSION (FULL ACCOUNT SEPTEL), MAY 3, PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ZEROED IN ON ISRAEL'S POSITIONS REGARDING AUTONOMY AND THE DISMANTLING OF SETTLEMENTS AS A PRICE FOR ANY FUTURE PEACE AGREEMENT. THE PRIME MINISTER, HAVING

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RECEIVED THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE CABINET DURING ITS MAY 2 SESSION, STATED THAT THERE WOULD BE "NO NEED TO EXPLAIN, IN ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE SIGNING OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS, ISRAEL'S REJECTION OF ANY SUGGESTION THAT ONE OF THE SETTLEMENTS IN WHICH ISRAELI CITIZENS AND JEWISH PEOPLE HAVE SETTLED AND LIVE BE REMOVED OR WITHDRAWN." BEGIN NOTED THAT THIS WAS THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL OF EDUCATION MINISTER HAMMER AND TOLD THE KNESSET THAT "THE ENTIRE CABINET ENDORSED IT."

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(EMBASSY COMMENT: ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, BOTH HAMMER AND DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON, HOWEVER, WERE STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF PRESENTING THIS FORMULATION ON SETTLEMENTS AS A SEPARATE RESOLUTION INSTEAD OF BEING INCLUDED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S POLITICAL ADDRESS. END COMMENT.)

4. BEGIN'S REFERENCE TO THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE DID NOT CREATE THE BARRAGE OF HECKLING AND COMMENTS FROM THE KNESSET FLOOR WHICH IS CUSTOMARY DURING KNESSET SPEECHES AND DEBATES. AT THE SAME TIME, OPPOSITION LEADER SHIMON PERES DEVOTED ALMOST ALL OF HIS REBUTTAL SPEECH TO THE ISSUE STRESSING THAT THE LABOR PARTY IS AGAINST ESTABLISHING SETTLEMENTS IN DENSELY POPULATED ARAB AREAS.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO LEFT THE IMPRESSION WITH MANY ISRAELI POLITICAL OBSERVERS THAT HE WAS ANXIOUS FOR A SPEEDY RESUMPTION OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. HE NOTED THAT IN HIS REPLY TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE ON

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ISRAEL'S INDEPENDENCE DAY, HE HAD SUGGESTED TO
THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT THAT HE "SET AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE" THE DATE FOR RESUMING AUTONOMY
NEGOTIATIONS. ON THE VENUE ISSUE, THE PRIME
MINISTER SAID: "AN ISRAELI DELEGATION WOULD
GLADLY GO EITHER TO CAIRO OR TO WASHINGTON PROVIDED
THAT THE EGYPTIAN AND THE UNITED STATES DELEGATIONS
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COME TO JERUSALEM FOR TALKS. IT IS UNTHINKABLE
FOR US TO ACCEPT THE BOYCOTTING OF JERUSALEM.

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OUR CAPITAL, AS ONE OF THE THREE VENUES FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS." ISRAELI JOURNALISTS COVERING THE SPEECH FELT THAT BEGIN'S FORMULATION LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT ISRAEL MIGHT AGREE TO A MEETING FIRST IN WASHINGTON OR CAIRO PROVIDED THAT EGYPT AGREED TO AN IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN JERUSALEM. KOL ISRAEL'S ALAN BEN AMI BUTTONHOLED A NUMBER OF CLOSE BEGIN ADVISERS INCLUDING HIS MEDIA ADVISER, URI PORAT. NONE OF THEM WAS WILLING TO CONFIRM OR DENY THAT THE LANGUAGE FROM BEGIN'S PREPARED TEXT INDICATED FLEXIBILITY.

6. BEGIN ALSO REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT ISRAEL WOULD NEVER AGREE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE "WHETHER OVERTLY OR UNDER VERBAL DISGUISE." HE RECALLED THAT THIS WAS WRITTEN IN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT'S BASIC POLICY GUIDELINES (APPROVED BY THE KNESSET IN AUGUST 1981) AND NOTED THAT AT THE END OF THE INTERIM PERIOD STIPULATED IN THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS "ISRAEL WILL RAISE ITS DEMAND AND TAKE ACTION TOWARD REALIZING ITS RIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY" OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. HE SAID IT WAS FURTHER STATED IN THE NINTH ARTICLE OF THE BASIC GUIDELINES THAT "SETTLEMENT IN ERETZ ISRAEL IS A RIGHT AND AN INALIENABLE PART OF THE NATION'S SAFETY." BEGIN THEN STRESSED: "THE GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE ACTION TO STRENGTHEN THE SETTLEMENTS, EXPAND THIS DRIVE AND DEVELOP IT. THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THE RULE THAT JEWISH SETTLEMENTS WILL NOT DEPRIVE ANYONE OF HIS LAND, VILLAGE OR TOWN."

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7. REFERRING TO THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, THE PRIME MINISTER STRESSED: "I COME HERE TO PROCLAIM--WITH THE CONSENT OF THE ENTIRE CABINET--THAT AS SOON AS, ONE DAY, OUR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IS APPLIED TO JUDEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA DISTRICT, WE WILL MAINTAIN AND OBSERVE THE FULL AUTONOMY FOR THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF THESE PARTS OF OF ERETZ YISRAEL IN THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ONE COULD ASSUME WILL RESUME SOON."

8. COMMENT: THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS ON THE

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SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE BASICALLY STAYED WITHIN
GOVERNMENT POLICY GUIDELINES, BUT THIS IS THE
FIRST TIME THAT BEGIN HAS UNEQUIVOCALLY STATED
IN PUBLIC THAT AUTONOMY WOULD STAY IN PLACE
EVEN IF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY IS EXTENDED
AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. HIS ARTICULATION
OF THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE WILL NOT HELP THE
NEGOTIATIONS DESPITE HIS EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR
EARLY RESUMPTION OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS. BY
PUBLICLY REITERATING ISRAEL'S POSITION THAT
IT WILL NOT TOLERATE AN EGYPTIAN BOYCOTT OF
JERUSALEM AND BY ASSERTING ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO
CONTINUE ESTABLISHING SETTLEMENTS, THE PRIME
MINISTER HAS NOT MADE A COMPROMISE ON THE VENUE
ISSUE ANY EASIER. END COMMENT.
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ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 H-01
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E.O. 12356: DECL: 12/10/88
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, IS, US
SUBJECT: PRESS REPORT CONCERNING DOUBLING OF WEST
BANK SETTLER POPULATION IN THREE MONTHS

REF: TEL AVIV 18247

1. (U) DECEMBER 9 JERUSALEM POST HAD PAGE ONE STORY BY DAVID RICHARDSON WHICH SAID THAT ACCORDING TO ESTIMATES OF UNNAMED SETTLEMENT OFFICIALS, THE JEWISH POPULATION IN THE WEST BANK IS EXPECTED TO DOUBLE TO NEARLY 50,000 IN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS. ACCORDING TO THESE ESTIMATES, 6,000 HOUSING UNITS WILL BE COMPLETED DURING THIS PERIOD. THE REPORT SAYS THE APARTMENTS, MOSTLY IN THE URBAN "DORMITORY" SETTLEMENTS AROUND JERUSALEM AND EAST OF TEL AVIV, HAVE BEEN SOLD AND OCCUPANCY WILL BE IMMEDIATE.

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2. (C) A WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION SETTLEMENTS DIVISION CONTACT TOLD EMBASSY OFFICER DECEMBER 10 THAT THE ESTIMATES CITED IN RICHARDSON'S STORY MADE NO SENSE AT ALL. RICHARDSON (PROTECT) HIMSELF TOLD EMBOFF THAT HE ALSO DID NOT THINK THE ESTIMATES WERE FEASIBLE. HE NOTED THAT MANY HOUSING UNITS IN THE WEST BANK WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN COMPLETED REMAIN VACANT. HE ADDED THAT, EVEN IF 6,000 NEW UNITS DO BECOME AVAILABLE, WHICH HE DOUBTED, AND ALL OF THEM ARE SOLD, THE GOVERNMENT IS UNLIKELY TO GET MANY ISRAELIS TO AGREE TO GIVE UP THEIR APARTMENTS IN PRE-1967 ISRAEL AND LIVE IN THE SETTLEMENTS ON A PERMANENT BASIS. HOWEVER, HE SAID HE WANTED TO REPORT WHAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD WITHOUT INTERPRETATION AS HE HAD NOT BEEN CLOSELY FOLLOWING THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE RECENTLY. LEWIS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 18543

E.O. 12356: DECL: 12/15/88

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, S, US

SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON, SETTLEMENT
OFFICIALS AND THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION ADDRESS
THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON AND GOVERNMENT-
AFFILIATED SETTLEMENT OFFICIALS HAVE RECENTLY REAFFIRMED
INTENTIONS TO PROCEED WITH SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. WHILE THEY HAVE DENIED ANY GOI
INTENTIONS TO ANNEX THE WEST BANK, THEY HAVE STRESSED
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTINUED SETTLEMENT IN THE
TERRITORIES AND ISRAEL'S SECURITY, GIVING WHAT APPEAR
TO BE INFLATED MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS OF
EXPECTED JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN THOSE AREAS. AT THE SAME
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TIME, LABOR PARTY SUPPORTERS HAVE QUESTIONED THE RELA-

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TIONSHIP BETWEEN SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES AND ISRAELI SECURITY. THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE HAS ALSO BEEN A CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE AT THE WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS MEETING IN JERUSALEM, ILLUSTRATING THE DIVISIONS BETWEEN LIKUD AND LABOR SUPPORTERS ON THIS POINT. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING DECEMBER 14 TOUR OF WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS, DEFENSE MINISTER ARIEL SHARON DECLARED THAT ISRAEL HAD NO INTENTION OF ANNEXING THE WEST BANK BUT WOULD CONTINUE ITS SETTLEMENT EFFORTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE SAID THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WAS PART OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND THAT "AS ISRAEL'S SECURITY IS CONCERNED," ISRAEL WOULD NOT PERMIT ANYONE TO DICTATE TO IT HOW TO SECURE THE AREA. SHARON SAID ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO SETTLE IN PRE-1967 ISRAEL AS WELL AS IN THE TERRITORIES WAS ONE OF ISRAEL'S AND THE JEWISH PEOPLE'S MOST BASIC RIGHTS. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT'S ELECTION PLATFORM. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, WOULD PREVENT ANY EFFORT TO TRY TO ESTABLISH A "SECOND PALESTINIAN STATE, IN ADDITION TO JORDAN." ACCORDING TO JERUSALEM POST REPORTER JOSHUA BRILLIANT, SHARON ALSO TOLD SETTLERS THAT HE WANTED TO SEE SETTLEMENT OF MORE AREAS OF THE WEST BANK, INCLUDING THE HEAVILY ARAB-POPULATED MOUNTAIN REGION. (BRILLIANT SAID THIS APPARENTLY REFLECTED A BREAK WITH THE PAST STRATEGY OF MOVING INTO THINLY POPULATED AREAS ONLY.) SHARON HOPED THAT IN SEVERAL YEARS TENS OR EVEN HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF JEWS WOULD LIVE IN THE WEST BANK. ISRAEL, HE SAID, IS READY TO NEGOTIATE ITS AUTONOMY PLAN IMMEDIATELY. HOWEVER, HE PROMISED, IN 50 YEARS ISRAEL
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WOULD STILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY OF THE WEST BANK.

4. THE 30TH ZIONIST CONGRESS CURRENTLY UNDER WAY IN JERUSALEM IS ALSO DRAWING RENEWED ATTENTION TO THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE:

--THE SETTLEMENT DIVISION OF THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES) AND THE SETTLEMENT DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH

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AGENCY (RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTLEMENT IN PRE-1967 ISRAEL) HAVE PREPARED AN INTERNAL MEMORANDUM WHICH REPORTEDLY CALLS FOR 28 NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES, A JEWISH POPULATION OF 80,000 IN THE WEST BANK, AND STATE EXPENDITURES OF \$610 MILLION IN THE PERIOD 1983-1987.

--THE SETTLEMENTS QUESTION WAS DISCUSSED AT THE CONGRESS ON DECEMBER 12. THIS DISCUSSION BROUGHT OUT SOME DIFFERENCES. WZO SETTLEMENT DIVISION HEAD MITITIYAHU DROBLES, A LIKUD APPOINTEE, TOLD THE GATHERING THAT THE NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK WERE IMPORTANT FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY. HE SAID THE JEWISH POPULATION IN THE WEST BANK WOULD REACH 120,000 BY 1985, "THUS PREVENTING THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE." HOWEVER DROBLES' COUNTERPART, PROFESSOR RAANAN WEITZ, WHO HEADS THE JEWISH AGENCY SETTLEMENTS DEPARTMENT AND BELONGS TO THE LABOR PARTY, DISAGREED WITH DROBLES' ASSERTION AND ARGUED THAT SIMPLY SETTLING ALONG THE JORDAN RIVER, "WITHOUT TAKING LAND FROM ANYONE," WOULD GRANT ISRAEL FULL SECURITY.

--ON DECEMBER 14 THE CONGRESS ADOPTED A RESOLUTION

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AGAINST DIVERTING FUNDS EAR-MARKED FOR SUBURBAN RENEWAL
PROJECTS TO WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS.

--ALSO, ON DECEMBER 14, THE MEDIA REPORTED THAT THE
DEFENSE AND INTERIOR MINISTRIES COULD NOT AGREE ON
THE NUMBER OF JEWS WHO WOULD INHABIT THE WEST BANK
IN THE YEAR 2010. THE DEFENSE MINISTRY FORECAST
PREDICTED THAT HALF A MILLION JEWS WOULD BE IN THE
WEST BANK IN 30 YEARS, WHILE THE INTERIOR MINISTRY PUT
THE FIGURE AT HALF THAT NUMBER.

--FINALLY, AT THE WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS MEETING IN
JERUSALEM ON DECEMBER 15, THE LIKUD WAS SAVED, AT
LEAST TEMPORARILY, FROM AN EMBARRASSING DEFEAT WHEN
A MAJORITY OF THE DELEGATES APPROVED A LABOR-INSPIRED
RESOLUTION WHICH CALLED FOR NO ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENTS
IN HEAVILY POPULATED ARAB AREAS, AS WELL AS
SOLVING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM BY TERRITORIAL

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COMPROMISE. EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN DULZIN ROSE AT
THIS POINT TO SUGGEST THAT A REPEAT VOTE BE MADE

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SINCE THE CONFEDERATION OF UNITED ZIONISTS COMPOSED MAINLY OF HADASSAH WOMEN "APPARENTLY DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE RESOLUTION." THE CONGRESS HAS NOW SET UP A COMMITTEE TO TRY TO DRAFT COMPROMISE LANGUAGE.

5. COMMENT: SHARON'S REMARK ON NON-ANNEXATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, WHICH WAS ALSO MIRRORED IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION BETWEEN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER YEHUDA BEN MEIR AND NEA/IAI DIRECTOR PENDLETON ON DECEMBER 14 (SEPTTEL), IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH PAST POLICY. HOWEVER, THE EMPHASIS ON THE POINT NOW CAN BE INTERPRETED PARTLY AS AN EFFORT TO DEFLECT CRITICISM FROM ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. (IN AN INTERESTING TWIST ON THE THEME, DAVAR CORRESPONDENT RUBENSTEIN, WHO IS A LONG TIME ANGUISHED CRITIC OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY IN THE WEST BANK, ARGUED IN A DECEMBER 13 ARTICLE THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD BE BETTER TO EXTEND ISRAELI LAW TO THE TERRITORIES IN ORDER TO GIVE THE INHABITANTS PROPER CIVIL RIGHTS, RATHER THAN ALLOWING THE CURRENT POLICY OF OPPRESSION AND DENIAL OF RIGHTS TO CONTINUE.) FINALLY, THE VARIOUS CONFLICTING PLANS AND PROJECTIONS REFLECT THE INTENSIVE DEBATE IN ISRAEL ON THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE, STIMULATED PARTLY BY THE USG POSITION THAT A FREEZE WOULD FACILITATE MOVEMENT ON THE PEACE PROCESS.

6. COORDINATED WITH CONGEN JERUSALEM. LEWIS

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CIA FOR OGI

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, KPAL, ECON, IS
SUBJECT: SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:
PART II--CONSTRUCTION AND POPULATION

REFS: A) TEL AVIV 2698, B) TEL AVIV

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY

ACCORDING TO THE ISRAELI BUDGET REPORT FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR WHICH BEGAN APRIL 1 (FY 85), THIS YEAR'S BUDGET
WILL BE DEVOTED PRIMARILY TO "MAINTAINING AND
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STRENGTHENING" EXISTING SETTLEMENTS. IF TRUE, THIS

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WOULD MEAN THAT THE SLOW DOWN IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSING UNITS WHICH HAS BEEN EVIDENT IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND GAZA MAY ALSO OBTAIN IN THE WEST BANK IN THE FUTURE. AT THIS POINT WEST BANK CONSTRUCTION CONTINUES. HOWEVER, THERE REMAINS A SUBSTANTIAL RESERVOIR OF EXCESS HOUSING CAPACITY IN THE SETTLEMENTS THERE AS WELL AS IN THE GOLAN AND GAZA. THE 150 SOME WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS HAVE A POPULATION OF AT LEAST 35,000 AND SUFFICIENT HOUSING TO ABSORB AS MANY AS 22,000 ADDITIONAL PERSONS. THE GOLAN HEIGHTS SETTLEMENTS HAVE A POPULATION OF ABOUT 7,500 AND MAY BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE AS MANY AS ANOTHER 7,500 SETTLERS. IN THE GAZA SETTLEMENTS (TOTAL POPULATION AROUND 1,400), THERE IS HOUSING FOR 600 MORE SETTLERS. IN ADDITION, ALTHOUGH NOT INCLUDED IN THE BUDGET REPORT, THE 11 JEWISH NEIGHBORHOODS OF EXPANDED EAST JERUSALEM HAVE A CAPACITY OF ABOUT 112,000. END SUMMARY.

3. SOURCES AND METHODS

THIS REPORT IS BASED ON DATA IN THE BUDGET REPORTS FOR ISRAEL FY 1985 (APRIL 1, 1985 TO MARCH 31, 1986) OF THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION AND THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, SUPPLEMENTED BY USG ESTIMATES OF HOUSING CAPACITY IN SETTLEMENTS NOT COVERED IN THE REPORTS AND BY SITE SURVEYS. WE HAVE ASSUMED AN AVERAGE FAMILY SIZE OF 4.2 PERSONS.

4. THE HOUSING MINISTRY REPORT CONTAINS DATA FOR 29 OF THE 32 GOLAN HEIGHTS SETTLEMENTS. THE DATA
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ACCOUNT FOR OVER 95 PERCENT OF THE HOUSING UNITS IN GOLAN SETTLEMENTS. THE REPORT ALSO CONTAINS DATA FOR SEVEN OF THE GAZA SETTLEMENTS, WHICH ACCOUNT FOR ABOUT 90 PERCENT OF ALL GAZA SETTLEMENT HOUSING. HOWEVER, THE REPORT CONTAINS DATA FOR ONLY 84 OF THE 150 WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS, ACCOUNTING FOR ABOUT 50 PERCENT OF ALL SETTLEMENT HOUSING ON THE WEST BANK. DATA IS GIVEN FOR QARNE SHOMERON (293 HOUSING UNITS), QEDUMIN (287), EFRAT (282), AND ALLON SHEVUT (234), BUT NOT FOR OTHER LARGE SETTLEMENTS SUCH AS MAALE

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ADUMIM, QIRYAT ARBA, AND IMMANUEL.

5. WEST BANK

ON THE BASIS OF HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION MINISTRY BUDGET DATA AND USG ESTIMATES OF HOUSING CAPACITY AT SITES NOT INCLUDED IN THE MINISTRY'S REPORT, WE ESTIMATE THAT AT THE END OF 1984, THERE WAS HOUSING FOR BETWEEN 52,000 AND 57,000 SETTLERS AT SOME 150 WEST BANK SETTLEMENT SITES. MORE HOUSING IS BEING BUILT. ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF THIS CAPACITY IS LOCATED IN THE 11 LARGEST SETTLEMENTS--ALFE MENASHE, ALLON SHEVUT, ARIEL, EFRAT, GIVAT ZEEV, IMMANUEL, MAALE ADUMIM, MAALE EFRAYIM, QARNE SHOMERON, QEDUMIM, AND QIRYAT ARBA. (NOTE: PRIVATE RESEARCHERS ESTIMATE THAT ABOUT 73 PERCENT OF THE CURRENT SETTLER POPULATION LIVES IN THE 15 LARGEST SETTLEMENTS AND THAT OVER 70 PERCENT LIVES IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO TEL AVIV AND JERUSALEM.) ACCORDING TO THE HOUSING MINISTRY BUDGET, OF THE 657 WEST BANK UNITS BUILT AT

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CIA FOR OGI

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, KPAL, ECON, IS
SUBJECT: SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:

44 SETTLEMENTS IN 1984, 94 WERE BUILT BY THE
GOVERNMENT AND 552 BY "DIRECT CONSTRUCTION"--I.E., ON
THE INITIATIVE OF THE SETTLERS, EITHER WITH PRIVATE
CONTRACTORS OR UNDER THE BUILD-YOUR-OWN-HOME PROGRAM.

6. ACCORDING TO THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE BUDGET
REPORT, EIGHT NEW SETTLEMENTS WERE ESTABLISHED IN THE
MOUNTAIN RIDGES AND ETZION BLOC REGIONS OF THE WEST
BANK IN FY 1984--ELI, MAALE LEVONA, YITZHAR, NAVA,
MEZAD, RAMEI, ZUR, ADAM, AND PEDUEL. THE REPORT ALSO
IDENTIFIES THIRTEEN OTHER SETTLEMENTS AS HAVING BEEN
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EXPANDED--GANIM, KADIM, HERMESH, DOLAV, EGOZ, NEVE
DANIEL, TELEM, ALMON, NETAFIM, UAZAR, MAON, SUSIA,

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AND OMARIM. (NOTE: WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY RAMEI, EGOZ, AND UAZAR. ZUR WOULD APPEAR TO BE KARNE ZUR WHICH, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, WAS ESTABLISHED JUNE 7. THIS SETTLEMENT IS REPORTEDLY LOCATED IN THE GUSH ETZION AREA, NEAR THE JERUSALEM/HEBRON ROAD.) "MANY OTHERS ALREADY APPROVED SETTLEMENTS, THE REPORT CONTINUES, WILL BE DELAYED. IN 1985, OPERATIONS IN THE JUDEN AND SAMARIA REGION OF THE WEST BANK ACTIVITY WILL CENTER ON STRENGTHENING OF NEWER SETTLEMENTS. THIS WILL INCLUDE ASSISTING SETTLEMENTS WHICH ARE STILL NOT SELF-SUFFICIENT, POPULATING SETTLEMENTS WITH VACANT HOUSING UNITS, COMPLETION OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND DWELLINGS IN SETTLEMENTS WITH FEWER THAN 50 FAMILIES, COMPLETION OF SMALL INDUSTRY AND CRAFT PROJECTS BEGUN IN 1984, AND DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL ENTERPRISES.

7. ACCORDING TO THE BUDGET REPORT, THE TARGET FOR THE JORDAN RIFT REGION OF THE WEST BANK WAS CHANGED IN LIGHT OF THE "SPECIAL ECONOMIC SITUATION" OF THE SETTLEMENTS THERE. SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT "SLOWED AND ALMOST STOPPED". ABSORPTION OF NEW FAMILIES "CLOSED" ALMOST COMPLETELY, AND THE BULK OF THE BUDGET WAS DEVOTED TO DEALING WITH THE ECONOMIC STRAITS OF THESE SETTLEMENTS. THE REPORT PROPOSED THAT THE FY 85 BUDGET WILL BE DEVOTED TO MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING ASSETS, COMPLETING ACTIVITIES BEGUN IN 1984, ABSORPTION OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF FAMILIES AND SMALL SETTLEMENTS WHICH HAVE LOST POPULATION, DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND IRRIGATION FACILITIES, AND
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SUPPORT FOR AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY IN THE SETTLEMENTS.

8. GOLAN HEIGHTS

ACCORDING TO THE HOUSING MINISTRY REPORT, AT THE END OF 1984 THERE WERE 3,551 HOUSING UNITS IN 29 SETTLEMENTS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, OF WHICH 980 OR 28 PERCENT ARE IN THE LARGE URBAN SETTLEMENT QAZRIN. THE CAPACITY OF THESE UNITS, IS AT LEAST 10,000 AND COULD BE AS MUCH AS 15,000 PERSONS. OF THE 124 UNITS

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BUILT DURING 1984, 28 WERE BUILT BY THE GOVERNMENT AND 96 UNDER THE BUILD-YOUR-OWN-HOME SCHEME.

9. ACCORDING TO THE AGRICULTURAL MINISTRY REPORT, TWO SETTLEMENTS ARE "BEING ESTABLISHED", AND APPROVAL HAS BEEN GIVEN FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FIVE ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENTS--EIN KANAF, DALIYAT, KFAR HAYAGIM, ZION, AND MERKAZ BRUHIM. TEMPORARY "NUCLEI" HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR EIN KANAF AND FOR ZION, AND PLANNING FOR THE FIVE OTHER SETTLEMENTS WILL CONTINUE IN FY 85. HOWEVER, ACTUAL "ESTABLISHMENT" OF ALL THESE SETTLEMENTS WILL BE DELAYED. IN FY 85, EFFORTS WILL CENTER ON UPGRADING EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE, ABSORPTION OF POPULATION IN SMALL SETTLEMENTS, "REINVIGORATION" OF REGIONAL ENTERPRISES IN QAZRIN, ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL STRENGTHENING OF SETTLEMENTS HAVING SPECIAL PROBLEMS, DEVELOPMENT OF A WINE GRAPE ENTERPRISE, AND COMPLETION OF 1984 PROJECTS.

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CIA FOR OGI

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, KPAL, ECON, IS
SUBJECT: SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:

10. GAZA

THE HOUSING MINISTRY REPORT INDICATES THAT THERE ARE 427 HOUSING UNITS AT SEVEN SETTLEMENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP. OF THIS NUMBER, 158 UNITS (37 PERCENT) ARE AT NEVE DEQALIM. ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, 48 UNITS WERE BUILT DURING 1984, ALL AT THE NEVE DEQALIM SETTLEMENT. WE ESTIMATE THE HOUSING CAPACITY AT THESE SEVEN SETTLEMENTS TO BE ABOUT 1,800.

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11. ACCORDING TO THE AGRICULTURAL MINISTRY REPORT, THREE NEW SETTLEMENTS WERE ESTABLISHED IN GAZA IN

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1984--RAFIAH YAM, ELI SINAI, AND NISANIT--AND CONSOLIDATION OF PERMANENT HOUSING BEGAN IN TWO OTHERS--BEDOLAH AND ATZMONA. EFFORTS IN GAZA IN FY 1985 WILL BE FOCUSED ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF FACILITIES AT THESE FIVE SETTLEMENTS, "AT THE EXPENSE OF ALMOST A COMPLETE FREEZE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REMAINING SETTLEMENTS."

12. EAST JERUSALEM

THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING DOES NOT INCLUDE IN ITS BUDGET THE 11 JEWISH NEIGHBORHOODS LOCATED WITHIN THE 65-SQUARE KILOMETERS OF WEST BANK TERRITORY UNILATERALLY ANNEXED TO THE MUNICIPALITY OF JERUSALEM IN 1967. HOWEVER, THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO PLACE EMPHASIS ON CONSTRUCTION AND SETTLEMENT OF THESE NEIGHBORHOODS WHICH STRATEGICALLY RING THE CITY. ABOUT 92,000 PEOPLE RESIDE IN THESE NEIGHBORHOODS. WE ESTIMATE THAT OVERALL CAPACITY IN THESE NEIGHBORHOODS IS AROUND 112,000.

13. COMMENT

THE BUDGET REPORT IS A POLITICAL DOCUMENT, WHICH PROBABLY DOES NOT REFLECT COMPLETELY THE ACTUAL SCALE OF SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY ON THE WEST BANK. NEVERTHELESS, THIS YEAR'S REPORT SUGGESTS THAT THE SLOWDOWN IN CONSTRUCTION OF NEW SETTLEMENTS EVIDENT WITH RESPECT TO GAZA AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS FOR SOME
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TIME MAY BEGIN TO BE REFLECTED IN THE WEST BANK ALSO. THIS CONFIRMS WHAT WE WERE TOLD BY THE LABOR PARTY CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION SETTLEMENT DIVISION (REF A). THE EMPHASIS ON ATTRACTING NEW SETTLERS REFLECTS THE SUBSTANTIAL EXCESS HOUSING CAPACITY IN THE SETTLEMENTS PARTICULARLY IN THE WEST BANK AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THE WEST BANK SETTLER POPULATION IS AT LEAST 35,000 AND EXISTING UNITS COULD ABSORB AN ADDITIONAL 17,000 TO 22,000 INDIVIDUALS. WE ESTIMATE THE SETTLER POPULATION OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS SETTLEMENTS AT ABOUT

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7,500 WITH SUFFICIENT HOUSING FOR AS MANY AS 7,500
ADDITIONAL SETTLERS. IN GAZA, WHERE WE ESTIMATE THE
SETTLER POPULATION AT ABOUT 1,400, EXISTING HOUSING
UNITS COULD ABSORB 600 MORE SETTLERS. END COMMENT.

14. CONGEN JERUSALEM SAW AND COMMENTED ON A DRAFT OF
THIS REPORT.

15. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLATEN

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, KPLA, IS, XF
SUBJECT: JEWISH AGENCY OFFICIAL DISCUSSES
SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY
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JEWISH AGENCY SETTLEMENT DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR NISSIM ZVILI, A LABOR PARTY APPOINTEE, TOLD POLITICAL OFFICER FEBRUARY '13 THAT THE SETTLER POPULATION OF THE WEST BANK IS NOW ABOUT 46,000 AND THAT OF GAZA ABOUT 1,500. HE SAID MOST OF THE SETTLERS ARE RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT, OVER HALF THE SETTLER POPULATION OF THE WEST BANK CONSISTS OF CHILDREN, AND MOST OF THE INCREASE IN SETTLER POPULATION IN RECENT YEARS IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO NATURAL INCREASE. ZVILI SAID THAT THIS YEAR'S EXPECTED WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION BUDGET FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES, WHICH WILL BE ABOUT 26 MILLION DOLLARS OR 25 PERCENT LESS THAN LAST YEAR'S BUDGET, WILL NOT PERMIT MORE THAN MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS. SETTLEMENTS IN PRE-1967 ISRAEL WILL RECEIVE MORE ATTENTION AND LESS EMPHASIS WILL BE PLACED ON THE JUDEA AND SAMARIA PORTION OF THE WEST BANK THAN ON THE JORDAN VALLEY REGION AND THE GOLAN. ZVILI SAID THAT MOST OF THE SETTLERS ON THE WEST BANK LIVE IN THE FEW URBAN SETTLEMENTS NEAR THE PRE-1967 GREEN LINE, AND ONLY 20 PERCENT LIVE IN AREAS OF LARGE ARAB POPULATION. HE SAID THAT HE EXPECTED MOST SETTLERS WOULD AGREE TO LEAVE THEIR WEST BANK HOMES IF THEY ARE COMPENSATED. HOWEVER, THE EXTREMIST MINORITY WOULD POSE PROBLEMS BECAUSE THESE PEOPLE WOULD INSIST ON STAYING UNDER NON-ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION. ZVILI ALSO SAID THE SETTLEMENTS AND THE TERRITORY OF THE WEST BANK DO NOT ENHANCE ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND THAT THE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS IN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WOULD BE DRAWING A BORDER BY WHICH ISRAEL WOULD ABSORB AS FEW ARABS AS POSSIBLE AND ALSO BE PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN AN

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IDF FORCE ALONG THE JORDAN FOR 10-20 YEARS. ZVILI SAID THE INTERMINISTERIAL SETTLEMENTS COMMITTEE HAS CEASED FUNCTIONING UNDER THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT AND THAT HE BELIEVES THE LIKUD IS NO LONGER AS EXTREME ON THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE AS IT WAS A COUPLE YEARS AGO BUT IS CONCERNED ABOUT LOSING SETTLER SUPPORT TO THE RIGHT WING TEHIYA PARTY. END SUMMARY.

3. ON FEBRUARY 13 POLOFF DISCUSSED SETTLEMENTS IN

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THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND PRE-1967 ISRAEL WITH JEWISH AGENCY SETTLEMENT DEPARTMENT HEAD NISSIM ZVILI. ZVILI'S OFFICE HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY WITHIN PRE-1967 ISRAEL WHILE THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION SETTLEMENT DIVISION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR JEWISH SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES. HOWEVER, ZVILI IS INVOLVED IN DECISION-MAKING CONCERNING SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES AND IS WELL INFORMED ON DEVELOPMENTS THERE. AGE 42, ZVILI CAME TO ISRAEL FROM TUNISIA WHEN HE WAS 14. HE WAS APPOINTED TO HIS POSITION LAST SUMMER. A MEMBER OF THE LABOR PARTY, ZVILI IS A STRONG ADMIRER OF PRIME MINISTER PERES.

4. WEST BANK AND GAZA SETTLER POPULATION

ZVILI SAID THAT THE SETTLER POPULATION IN THE WEST BANK IS NOW ABOUT 45,000 OF WHICH ABOUT 3,600 ARE IN THE JORDAN VALLEY AND THE REMAINDER IN THE JUDEA AND SAMARIA DISTRICTS. HE ALSO SAID THAT THERE ARE ABOUT 1,500 SETTLERS IN GAZA. ZVILI SAID THAT THERE ARE JUST OVER 10,000 SETTLER FAMILIES IN THE WEST BANK. MOST OF THESE FAMILIES ARE RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT AND THEY HAVE A HIGH RATE OF NATURAL INCREASE, HE SAID. FIFTY THREE PERCENT OF THE POPULATION CONSISTS OF CHILDREN AND THE INCREASE IN THE SETTLER POPULATION

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ON THE WEST BANK IN THE PAST COUPLE YEARS HAS

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, KPLA, IS, XF
SUBJECT: JEWISH AGENCY OFFICIAL DISCUSSES

*RESULTED MAINLY FROM NEW BIRTHS RATHER THAN FROM NEW
FAMILIES SETTLING THERE.*

5. BUDGET FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES
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ZYILI SAID THAT ALL SETTLEMENTS IN ISRAEL AND THE

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TERRITORIES ARE GOING THROUGH A DIFFICULT PERIOD. HOWEVER, TOTAL WOULD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION SETTLEMENT BUDGET FOR THE ISRAELI FISCAL YEAR WHICH WILL BEGIN APRIL 1 (FY 85) WILL BE ABOUT 26 MILLION DOLLARS, WHICH HE SAID IS 25 PERCENT LESS THAN LAST YEAR'S BUDGET. SUCH A BUDGET FOR THE 152 SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES IS A JOKE, ZVILI SAID. THIS BUDGET WILL NOT PERMIT ANY DEVELOPEMNT OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK, GAZA, AND THE GOLAN DURING FISCAL YEAR 1985. IT WILL ONLY PERMIT BASIC SUPPORT FOR THE SETTLEMENTS WHICH ALREADY EXIST.

6. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, ZVILU SAID THAT THE SETTLEMENT DIVISION OF THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION IS RESPONSIBLE ONLY FOR BUILDING THE INITIAL 20-25 HOUSES IN NEW SETTLEMENTS WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY CONTAIN UP TO A MAXIMUM OF 250 FAMILIES. ADDITIONAL HOUSES ARE BUILT ON THE BASIS OF LOANS FROM THE HOUSING MINISTRY, WHICH IS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LARGE URGAN SETTLEMENTS. MANY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND MINISTRIES PARTICIPATE IN BUILDING SETTLEMENTS, HE SAID. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL ROAD WORK, SUPPLY OF ELECTRICITY AND OTHER BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE, AND OTHER MINISTRIES HAVE OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES. THE AGRICULTURAL MINISTRY, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS A SETTLEMENT BUDGET OF BETWEEN 1.5 AND 2 MILLION DOLLARS, WHICH IS DESIGNATED FOR THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND THE JORDAY VALLEY. SIMILARLY, THE HOUSING MINISTRY HAS ITS OWN BUDGET. ZVILI SAID HE DID NOT KNOW HOW LARGE THIS BUDGET IS BUT INDICATED HE DID NOT EXPECT IT TO BE LARGE. HE SAID THAT
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BECAUSE SO MANY GOVERNMENT OFFICES ARE INVOLVED IN THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS IT IS DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE THE EXACT AMOUNT OF THE TOTAL SETTLEMENT BUDGET. HOWEVER, HE SAID, A GOOD RULE OF THUMB IS THAT IT TAKES ABOUT 100,000 DOLLARS TO SETTLE ONE FAMILY IN ONE HOUSING UNIT.

7. BUDGET FOR GREEN LINE SETTLEMENTS

ZVILI SAID THAT THE SETTLEMENT BUDGET FOR PRE-1967 ISRAEL DURING FY 85 WOULD BE 67 MILLION DOLLARS.

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TWENTY PERCENT OF THIS WILL GO TO HELP REHABILITATE HOSHAVIM AND SOME KIBBUTZIM WHICH ARE IN DEEP ECONOMIC DISTRESS. THE REST WILL GO FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FOUR NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE ARAVA REGION OF SOUTHERN ISRAEL AND IN GUSH REHAN IN THE GALILEE AS WELL AS FOR ASSISTANCE TO OTHER SETTLEMENTS IN ISRAEL PROPER.

8. REORDERED PRIORITIES

ZVILI SAID THAT EVEN UNDER THE LIKUD THE BUDGET FOR SETTLEMENTS OUTSIDE THE TERRITORIES WAS NEVER MORE THAN ABOUT 50 PERCENT OF THE BUDGET FOR ALL SETTLEMENTS. HE SAID THAT IN FY 82, "THE PEAK YEAR OF INVESTMENTS IN SETTLEMENTS OUTSIDE THE GREEN LINE," THE BUDGET FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES WAS 63 MILLION DOLLARS WHILE THE BUDGET FOR PRE-1967

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, POTS, KPLA, IS, XF
SUBJECT: JEWISH AGENCY OFFICIAL DISCUSSES
SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES

SETTLEMENTS WAS BETWEEN 60 MILLION AND 63 MILLION
DOLLARS. THIS YEAR THE WZO SETTLEMENT BUDGET FOR THE
TERRITORIES WILL BE ABOUT 29 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
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WZO-JEWISH AGENCY BUDGET. IN ADDITION, THE
PRIORITIES IN THE TERRITORIES HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY

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REORDERED. IN FY 82, 53 PERCENT OF THE SETTLEMENT BUDGET FOR THE TERRITORIES WENT TO JUDEA AND SAMARIA, 21 PERCENT TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, 20 PERCENT TO THE JORDAN VALLEY, AND 8-9 PERCENT TO GAZA. THIS YEAR, JUDEA AND SAMARIA WILL GET ONLY 23-24 PERCENT AND THE SHARES GOING TO THE GOLAN AND THE JORDAN VALLEY WILL INCREASE TO AT LEAST 20 PERCENT EACH. AS FOR THE SIX SETTLEMENTS WHICH THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT RECENTLY APPROVED, ZVILI SAID THAT THEY CANNOT POSSIBLY BE BUILT WITH THE 26 MILLION DOLLAR BUDGET FOR THE TERRITORIES. HE SAID HE TOLD THE GOVERNMENT THAT SINCE THE DECISION TO ESTABLISH THESE SETTLEMENT WAS A POLITICAL ONE, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD FINANCE THEM WITH "POLITICAL MONEY".

9. DISTRIBUTION

ZVILI SAID THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT FIGURE FOR THE WEST BANK SETTLER POPULATION IS THE LARGE NUMBER OF SETTLERS CONCENTRATED IN A FEW LARGE URBAN CENTERS NEAR THE GREEN LINE. THE INCREASE IN POPULATION IN THE PAST COUPLE YEARS HAS OCCURRED MAINLY IN HANLE ADUMIM AND ENMANUEL. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED, HE SAID, THAT ONLY 20 PERCENT OF THE SETTLERS LIVE IN THE AREAS OF THE WEST BANK WITH A LARGE ARAB POPULATION.

10. EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENTS?

ZVILI SAID THAT MOST OF THE SETTLEMENTS COULD NOT REMAIN UNDER A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD PUT
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THE WEST BANK UNDER JORDANIAN ADMINISTRATION, TO INSIST THAT ISRAELIS REMAIN WOULD LAY THE SEEDS FOR ANOTHER WAR. THE SOLUTION DEPENDS ON WHERE THE BORDER WILL BE DRAWN. THERE ARE TWO ENTIRELY DIFFERENT GROUPS OF SETTLERS IN THE WEST BANK, ZVILI SAID. MOST SETTLERS ARE IN THE WEST BANK FOR ECONOMIC REASONS--THEY WENT THERE TO GET BETTER HOUSING AT LESS COST, AND THEY WILL LEAVE WITHOUT ANY PROBLEMS IF THE GOVERNMENT PAYS THEM OFF. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED SETTLERS WILL POSE PROBLEMS EVEN THOUGH THEIR NUMBER IS NOT GREAT.

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BECAUSE THEY WILL INSIST ON STAYING.

11. SETTLEMENTS, TERRITORY, AND SECURITY

ZVILI SAID THERE IS NO BASIS TO THE ARGUMENT THAT THE SETTLEMENTS ENHANCE ISRAEL'S SECURITY. HE SAID THE VIEW THAT ISRAEL MUST RETAIN THE WEST BANK UP TO THE JORDAN RIVER IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A GREATER MEASURE OF SECURITY BECAUSE OF THE CULNERABILITY OF ISRAEL'S "NARROW NECK" IS PLAIN BULL. HE SAID THE ALLEN PLAN, WHICH HE FAVORS, IS BASED ON TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES--THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF A JEWISH STATE AND BORDER SECURITY. THESE CRITERIA CAN BE ACHIEVED BY VIRTUALLY ANY BORDER. HE SAID THAT UNDER A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, ISRAEL WOULD RETAIN MAALE ADUMIN AND THE RIGHT TO STATION THE IDF ALONG A NARROW STRIP ALONG THE JORDAN RIVER FOR AT LEAST

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGDY, PBTS, KPLA, IS, XF
SUBJECT: JEWISH AGENCY OFFICIAL DISCUSSES
SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES

10-20 YEARS. HOWEVER, ISRAEL WOULD PROBABLY GIVE UP
THE AREA WHERE EMMANUEL IS LOCATED. MOST SETTLERS,
HE SAID, WOULD ACCEPT THIS AS LONG AS THEY RECEIVE
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HOUSING ELSEWHERE. THE IMPORTANT QUESTION IN DRAWING
A NEW BORDER WILL BE HOW MANY ARABS ISRAEL HAS TO

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ABSORB. A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT LINES COULD BE DRAWN TO MAXIMIZE THE AMOUNT OF LAND ISRAEL RETAINS AND MINIMIZE THE ARAB POPULATION IT HAS TO ABSORB. BECAUSE ISRAEL DOESN'T FULLY TRUST THE ARABS, AN IDF FORCE OF SOME KIND, PROBABLY ALONG THE JORDAN, WILL BE NECESSARY. HOWEVER, IN THE EVENT OF A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN THEN ENTIRE SITUATION COULD CHANGE, AND THE IDF PRESENCE MIGHT NO LONGER BE NECESSARY AFTER 10-20 YEARS. HE SAID THAT IF THE IDF COULD REMAIN ALONG THE JORDAN, ISRAEL'S SECURITY WOULD NOT BE DIMINISHED. HE SAID THE TERRITORY WOULD NOT BE LESS SECURE THAN IT IS NOW WITHOUT JORDANIAN ADMINISTRATION AND THAT HE WOULD PREFER THE IDF ALONG THE JORDAN WITHOUT ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK. THERE IS TERRORISM IN THE WEST BANK NOW EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL IS OCCUPYING THE WEST BANK, HE SAID.

12. INTERMINISTERIAL SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE

ZVILI SAID THAT THE INTERMINISTERIAL SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE, WHICH PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN DECISIONS ON SETTLEMENTS UNDER THE LIKUD GOVERNMENT, HAD CEASED FUNCTIONING. DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN IS THE LIKUD PARTY'S CANDIDATE TO HEAD THE COMMITTEE. HOWEVER, THE LIKUD IS BLOCKING RABIN'S APPOINTMENT, AND THE PRIME MINISTER IS NOT PUSHING THE ISSUE BECAUSE HE IS CONTENT TO HAVE THE COMMITTEE NOT FUNCTION. ACCORDING TO ZVILI, PERES WOULD LIKE TO DO AWAY WITH THE COMMITTEE ENTIRELY.

13. LIKUD APPROACH

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ZVILI SAID THAT THE LIKUD IS NO LONGER AS EXTREME ON THE SETTLEMENT QUESTION AS IT WAS A YEAR OR TWO AGO BECAUSE IT REALIZES THAT THE OLD APPROACH HAS BEEN PUSHED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, THE LIKUD FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO RESIST THE PRESSURE OF THE GUSH EMINIM EXTREMISTS. IT HAS TO SHOW IT IS CONTINUING TO FIGHT FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK BECAUSE IT IS AFRAID IT OTHERWISE WILL LOSE THE SUPPORT OF THESE PEOPLE TO THE RIGHT WING TEHIYA PARTY, ZVILI SAID.

14. COORDINATED WITH CONGEN JERUSALEM. LEWIS

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, KLPA, IS, XF
SUBJECT: GAZA SETTLEMENTS AT A STANDSTILL

REFS: A) 84 TEL AVIV 6863, B) 83 TEL AVIV 3130

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1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

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2. SUMMARY

JANUARY 21 SURVEY OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN GAZA REVEALED THAT HOUSING CONSTRUCTION IS AT A STANDSTILL AND THAT SETTLER MORALE IS LOW. THERE IS SUFFICIENT HOUSING FOR ABOUT 2,000 SETTLERS. HOWEVER, THE NUMBER OF SETTLERS HAS DECLINED FROM ABOUT 1,600 TO ABOUT 1,400 OVER THE PAST NINE MONTHS. THIS DECLINE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE SHARP CURTAILMENT IN GOVERNMENT FUNDS FOR THESE SETTLEMENTS, COMBINED WITH THE HARSH CONDITIONS IN THE REGION AND THE LACK OF LOCAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES. END OF SUMMARY.

3. THE FOLLOWING DESCRIPTIONS OF THE SETTLEMENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP ARE BASED ON JANUARY 21 VISIT TO THE FIFTEEN SETTLEMENT SITES IN THE REGION.

4. ELE SINAI (NORTHERN END OF GAZA STRIP)

THERE ARE NOW NINE FAMILIES AT ELE SINAI COMPARED TO FIVE IN APRIL 1984. THE NEW FAMILIES ARE HOUSED IN MOBILE HOMES SET BEHIND THE FIVE PREBIDS. THIS AND THE ADDITION OF CONCERTINA WIRE IN FRONT OF THE SETTLEMENT AND BARBED WIRE AROUND THE PERIMETER ("TO KEEP THE CHILDREN FROM WANDERING AWAY") ARE THE ONLY CHANGES SINCE APRIL IN THIS RATHER WEATHER-BEATEN, PRIMITIVE LOOKING SETTLEMENT.

A RUSSIAN FAMILY WHICH EMBASSY OFFICER MET LAST YEAR
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HAS SINCE MOVED TO JERUSALEM BECAUSE THE HUSBAND, AN ECONOMIST, COULD NOT FIND WORK IN THE AREA. THEIR HOUSE IS NOW OCCUPIED BY FORMER RESIDENTS OF THE YAMIT SETTLEMENT IN THE SINAI. THE HUSBAND WAS BORN IN LIBYA, AND HIS WIFE IMMIGRATED TO ISRAEL FROM THE USSR IN 1967. THEY HAVE FOUR CHILDREN.

THE WIFE TOLD EMBASSY OFFICER THAT THERE ARE PLANS TO BUILD 20 PERMANENT HOUSES AT THIS SITE. HOWEVER, NO WORK HAS BEEN STARTED AND EMBASSY OFFICER WAS TOLD

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THAT THERE ARE NO FUNDS FOR CONSTRUCTION. STAKES WHICH WERE IN PLACE LAST YEAR ON THE SITE WHERE THE HOUSES ARE TO BE BUILT ARE NO LONGER VISIBLE. THE WIFE SAID THAT NEITHER THE GOI NOR THE JEWISH AGENCY ARE PROVIDING ANY HELP AND THAT THE SETTLERS ARE "STICKING IT OUT" FROM A SENSE OF PRIDE. THE SETTLERS HAVE A VEGETABLE GARDEN AND "DO SOME FISHING". A SOLDIER WAS POSTED BY THE FRONT OF THE SETTLEMENT.

5. NISANIT (NORTHERN END OF GAZA STRIP)

LIKE ELE SINAI, THIS IS A RATHER PRIMITIVE LOOKING SETTLEMENT WITH MILITARY STYLE PREFABS. EMBASSY OFFICER WAS TOLD BY ONE OF THE SETTLERS, WHO WORKS IN ASHKELON IN PRE-1967 ISRAEL, THAT THERE ARE EIGHT FAMILIES AT THIS SITE AND THAT THREE NEW FAMILIES WILL BE ARRIVING IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE INHABITANTS SEEM TO BE PRIMARILY FRENCH-SPEAKING OBSERVANT JEWS.

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 01515 02 OF 05 291027Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 SVC-00 /026 14
-----107761 291256Z /17
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6857
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
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AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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AMCONSUL JEDDAH
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SANAA
CIA WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 TEL AVIV 01515

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, KLPA, IS, XF
SUBJECT: GAZA SETTLEMENTS AT A STANDSTILL

NISANIT WAS ONE OF THE SITES WHICH WAS TO BE
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PAGE 02 TEL AV 01515 02 OF 05 291027Z

INAUGURATED AS A CIVILIAN SETTLEMENT JUST BEFORE THE
JULY NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL LAST YEAR.

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HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY OF THE SETTLEMENT TOLD EMBASSY OFFICER THAT IT REMAINS A NAHAL (MILITARY PRE-SETTLEMENT).

THE ROAD LEADING TO THIS SETTLEMENT REMAINS UNPAVED. THE SITE APPEARS BASICALLY UNCHANGED SINCE MARCH 1983.

6. NEZARIM (SOUTH OF GAZA CITY)

A SETTLER, WHO APPEARED TO BE (*)EMBASSY(*) OFFICER THAT THIS SITE, (*) FORMERLY A NAHAL, AND BEFORE THAT A MOSHAV WHICH HAD FAILED, WAS CONVERTED TO A CIVILIAN SETTLEMENT A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE JULY NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL. SHE SAID THAT THE SETTLEMENT IS POPULATED BY OBSERVANT JEWS AND RECEIVES ASSISTANCE FROM THE RELIGIOUS KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT. SHE SAID THAT SHE HAD MOVED TO THE KIBBUTZ SEVERAL MONTHS AGO FROM A KIBBUTZ IN PRE-1967 ISRAEL, WHERE SHE HAD LIVED SINCE IMMIGRATING FROM DENMARK FOUR AND A HALF YEARS AGO. SHE SAID 20 PERSONS LIVE AT THE SITE.

--
SHE SAID THE SETTLERS GROW VEGETABLES AND FLOWERS. SHE COMPLAINED THAT THE JEWISH AGENCY PROVIDES INSUFFICIENT SUPPORT AND THAT PEOPLE ARE LEAVING. THIS SETTLER SAID SHE WAS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER SHE WOULD STAY HERSELF. SHE SAID MORALE IS LOW AND THAT MANY OF THE SETTLERS OFTEN SPEND THEIR EVENINGS IN THEIR ROOMS WATCHING TV. AS THIS REDUCES SOCIAL
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INTERACTION AMONG THE MEMBERS, THE SETTLEMENT IS HAVING A MEETING TO DECIDE WHETHER TO LIMIT TV VIEWING IN THE EVENINGS. ACCORDING TO THIS SETTLER, THE BEDOUINS IN THE AREA HAD EARLIER TAKEN SOME OF THE MOSHAV'S WATER SUPPLY, BUT HAD STOPPED DOING THIS AFTER THE SETTLERS ESTABLISHED A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LOCAL BEDOUIN CHIEFS. NO NEW CONSTRUCTION. THREE RESERVE SOLDIERS SERVE AS GUARDS.

7. KFAR DAROM (CENTRAL GAZA)

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FORMERLY A SETTLEMENT, THIS SITE HAS BECOME A NATURE STUDY FIELD SCHOOL FOR STUDENTS FROM ISRAEL PROPER.

8. NEZER HAZANI (SOUTHERN GAZA)

A SETTLER SAID THAT 45 OF THE 75 HOUSES ARE OCCUPIED. MOST OF THE SETTLERS ARE OBSERVANT YEMENITES AND MOROCCANS. HOWEVER, SEVERAL AMERICAN FAMILIES ALSO LIVE AT THIS SITE. EMBASSY OFFICER WAS TOLD THAT AN AMERICAN SETTLER FROM ARIZONA WHO LIVED AT THE SETTLEMENT LAST YEAR MAY HAVE RETURNED TO THE U.S. THE SETTLERS GROW FLOWERS AND TOMATOES, MOST OF THE TOMATO CROP BEING EXPORTED TO THE U.S. MANY OF THE HOUSES HAVE A DISHEVELED OUTWARD APPEARANCE. THE LAWNS ARE PARTLY COVERED BY SAND AND MANY OF THEM ARE LITTERED WITH BROKEN MACHINERY AND OTHER JUNK. ONE LARGE HOUSE IS BEING BUILT--APPARENTLY BY AN ARAB

NOTE BY OC/T: (*): OMISSION ON LINE. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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ACTION SS-25

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P 291007Z JAN 85

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 685B
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

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AMCONSUL JEDDAH
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SANAA
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 TEL AVIV 01515

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, KLPA, IS, XF
SUBJECT: GAZA SETTLEMENTS AT A STANDSTILL

CONTRACTOR--ON THE BASIS OF THE SELF-BUILD PROGRAM.
ARAB WORKERS AND A GAZA LICENSE PLATE CAR WERE
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OBSERVED AT THE SETTLEMENT. A GUARD WAS POSTED AT
THE ENTRANCE.

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9. QATIF (SOUTHERN GAZA)

TWELVE FAMILIES LIVE HERE NOW COMPARED TO MORE THAN TWENTY IN EARLY 1983, SOME SETTLERS HAVING LEFT IN THE PAST YEAR. EMBASSY OFFICER WAS TOLD THAT THIS MOSHAV, DESIGNATED FOR ENGLISH-SPEAKING OBSERVANT JEWS, HAS HAD A LOT OF PROBLEMS DUE TO INFIGHTING AMONG THE SETTLERS. MOST OF THE SETTLERS ARE AMERICANS. THE TWO SETTLERS EMBASSY OFFICER SPOKE WITH AT THIS SETTLEMENT HAVE BEEN THERE APPROXIMATELY THREE YEARS. NO NEW CONSTRUCTION.

10. GANNE TAL (SOUTHERN GAZA)

FORTY FIVE OF THE SIXTY PLUS HOUSES AT THIS SETTLEMENT ARE OCCUPIED. THE SETTLERS ARE OBSERVANT JEWS. ONE SETTLER, WHO CAME TO ISRAEL AS A CHILD FROM ROMANIA, SAID HE HAD LIVED AT THE SETTLEMENT FOUR YEARS. CARS OF GAZA ARABS WERE OBSERVED AT THE SETTLEMENT. NO NEW CONSTRUCTION.

11. GAZA BEACHES (SOUTHERN GAZA)

NO CHANGE FROM LAST YEAR. HOWEVER, ON THE UNPAVED ROAD LEADING TO THE BEACH, A RESTAURANT WAS OPENED THREE MONTHS AGO. THERE IS ALSO A SMALL HORSE RIDING FACILITY NEAR THE RESTAURANT.
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12. NEWE DEQALIM (SOUTHERN GAZA)

NEWE DEQALIM, WHICH SERVES AS A REGIONAL CENTER, IS THE LARGEST AND BEST ESTABLISHED SETTLEMENT IN GAZA. IT HAS 100 HOUSES. ACCORDING TO AN ADMINISTRATOR AT THE SETTLEMENT, ALL OF THE HOUSES ARE OCCUPIED AND THERE IS A WAITING LIST OF NEW APPLICANTS WHO WANT TO SETTLE HERE. HOWEVER, THE SETTLEMENT FREEZE IS PREVENTING NEW CONSTRUCTION. THE SETTLERS COME FROM

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A VARIETY OF BACKGROUNDS--SEPHARDIM, INDIAN JEWS, AMERICANS, ETC. THEY ARE OCCUPIED AS SCHOOL TEACHERS, ENGINEERS, YESHIVA STUDENTS, ETC. A LARGE, WELL-CONSTRUCTED AND ATTRACTIVE YESHIVA IS ALMOST FINISHED. SEVERAL OTHER COMMUNITY BUILDINGS ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION. NO NEW HOUSING CONSTRUCTION IS UNDER WAY.

EMBASSY OFFICER SAW GAZA LICENSE PLATE VEHICLES AT THE SETTLEMENT. THE ADMINISTRATOR EMPHASIZED THAT RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS WERE RELATIVELY GOOD AND IMPROVING. HE SAID THAT HE HAD LIVED IN GAZA FOR THE PAST EIGHT YEARS AND THAT GRADUALLY THE ARABS AND THE JEWS HAVE DEVELOPED GOOD RELATIONS AS THEY HAVE GOTTEN TO KNOW EACH OTHER.

13. GANOR (SOUTHERN GAZA)

TWENTY FIVE OF THE APPROXIMATELY 50 HOUSES AT THIS

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ACTION SS-25

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P 291007Z JAN 85
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6859
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SANAA
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 TEL AVIV 01515

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, KLPA, IS, XF
SUBJECT: GAZA SETTLEMENTS AT A STANDSTILL

SETTLEMENT ARE OCCUPIED. EMBASSY OFFICER SAW AN ARAB
FROM GAZA AT THE SETTLEMENT. THE ARAB WAS APPARENTLY
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THE OWNER OF A CHILDREN'S BICYCLE SHOP AND WAS EITHER
RENTING OR SELLING THE BICYCLES TO THE CHILDREN OF

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THE SETTLERS. HE SPOKE FLUENT HEBREW.

14. GADID (SOUTHERN GAZA)

THERE ARE 36 HOUSES AND 28 FAMILIES AT THIS SETTLEMENT. THE SECRETARY OF THE SETTLEMENT SAID HE HAD MOVED TO THE SETTLEMENT FIVE MONTHS AGO FROM RISHON LE ZION, SOUTH OF TEL AVIV.

15. BEDOLAH (SOUTHERN END OF GAZA)

TWENTY HOUSES ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT THIS SITE. THE SITE IS NEAR GADID. (ORIGINALLY 60-70 UNITS WERE PLANNED AND THE FIRST FAMILIES WERE TO HAVE MOVED IN DURING 1984.)

16. MITZPHE ATZMONA

TWENTY-ONE RELIGIOUS FAMILIES LIVE IN PREFABS AT THIS SITE. AN AMERICAN-ORIGIN SETTLER SAID HE HAD BEEN AT THE SETTLEMENT TWO YEARS. HE SAID THE SETTLERS ARE WAITING FOR PERMANENT HOUSING. "HOWEVER, EVERYTHING IS FROZEN". THE SETTLERS GROW FLOWERS AND PLANTS. SEVERAL IDF GUARDS WERE AT THIS SITE.

17. MORAG (SOUTHERN GAZA)

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TWENTY SEPHARDI RELIGIOUS FAMILIES LIVE HERE. THE UNOFFICIAL SETTLEMENT FREEZE, EMBASSY OFFICER WAS TOLD, IS PREVENTING NEW CONSTRUCTION.

18. RAFAH YAM (NEAR RAFAH, BY THE SEA)

A PRE-ELECTION SETTLEMENT. 11 FAMILIES LIVE HERE. THEY ARE TRYING TO PRODUCE SHRIMP AND LOBSTERS IN PONDS FOR EXPORT. (THE SETTLEMENT IS FOR SECULAR JEWS.) THE ROAD TO THE SETTLEMENT IS NOT PAVED. ONE

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SETTLER SAID HE HAD RECENTLY REJOINED THE ARMY BECAUSE HE COULD NOT FIND A CIVILIAN JOB. HE COMPLAINED THAT 500-600 ARABS HAVE FOUND WORK IN CONNECTION WITH THE SETTLEMENTS, AND THAT THIS HAS REDUCED EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR SETTLERS.

19. COMMENT

THIS SURVEY OF THE SETTLEMENTS IN GAZA REVEALS THAT CONSTRUCTION OF NEW HOUSING UNITS HAS BASICALLY CEASED AND THAT THE SETTLER POPULATION HAS NOT INCREASED IN THE PAST NINE MONTHS. IN FACT, THE NUMBER OF SETTLERS APPEARS TO HAVE DECREASED FROM ABOUT 1,600 IN APRIL 1984 TO ABOUT 1,400 AT PRESENT. WE NOW ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 465 FINISHED HOUSING UNITS PLUS AN ADDITIONAL 20 TO 25 UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT THE VARIOUS GAZA SETTLEMENTS. ASSUMING AN AVERAGE FAMILY SIZE OF 4.2, THESE UNITS

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6860
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DOHA
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
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AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SANAA
CIA WASHDC
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 TEL AVIV 01515

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, KLPA, IS, XF
SUBJECT: GAZA SETTLEMENTS AT A STANDSTILL

WOULD PROVIDE HOUSING FOR APPROXIMATELY 2,000
SETTLERS.
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21. THE SETTLEMENTS APPROVED JUST BEFORE THE JULY

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NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL HAVE HAD NO APPRECIABLE EFFECT ON THE SIZE OF THE SETTLER POPULATION. THE UNDECLARED SETTLEMENT FREEZE, COMBINED WITH A GENERAL LACK OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS, RECREATIONAL FACILITIES, AND EMPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES, AND THE HARSH CONDITIONS PREVAILING IN THE AREA, HAVE TAKEN THEIR TOLL ON SETTLER MORALE. SOME HAVE LEFT AND OTHERS ARE CONSIDERING DOING SO. FEW SETTLERS SEEM TO HAVE LIVED IN THE REGION MORE THAN SEVERAL YEARS AND, WHILE NEW SETTLERS WILL CONTINUE TO ARRIVE, SOME "OLD TIMERS" WILL LEAVE.

22. WHILE SETTLERS COME FROM A VARIETY OF BACKGROUNDS--SEPHARDI/ASHKENAZI, RELIGIOUS/SECULAR, SABRA/FOREIGN BORN, ETC.--THE PERCENTAGE OF SEPHARDI SETTLERS SEEMS HIGH. AND MOST OF THE SETTLERS ARE OBSERVANT JEWS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RELIGIOUS KIBBUTZ/MOSHAV MOVEMENT.

23. A PARTICULARLY INTERESTING FEATURE OF THE SETTLEMENTS IN GAZA IS THE ROLE WHICH GAZA ARABS ARE PLAYING AS CONTRACTORS, SUBCONTRACTORS, AND PROVIDERS OF VARIOUS SERVICES TO THE SETTLERS. THE SETTLER PRESENCE IS PROVIDING EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR HUNDREDS OF GAZANS, A NUMBER OF WHOM ARE FLUENT IN HEBREW; AND RELATIONS WITH THESE LOCAL RESIDENTS AND THE SETTLERS APPEAR TO BE GOOD. SETTLERS EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING POSSIBLE INFILTRATION OF THEIR SETTLEMENTS FROM PERSONS LIVING OUTSIDE ISRAEL (I.E., EGYPT) RATHER THAN FROM AMONG THE LOCAL POPULATION. END COMMENT.

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24. REQUEST DEPARTMENT PASS TO THE FOLLOWING MILITARY ADDRESSEES:

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN
USCENTCOM MACOILL AFB
DIA WASHDC

USCINCEUR/USCENTCOM FOR POLAD. LEWIS

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ACTION NEA-11

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2847
INFO DIA WASHINGTON DC//
USIA WASHDC 5567

AMEMBASSY AHMAN
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USELO RIYADH
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB

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USIA FOR P/RNA

USCENTCOM FOR USIS ADVISOR BELL

USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI PUBLIC TOUGHENS STANCE ON WEST BANK

REF: ✓ TEL AVIV 08838

1. (LOU) SUMMARY AND COMMENT

ACCORDING TO A MODI'IN EZRAHI POLL, THE ISRAELI PUBLIC IS TAKING AN INCREASINGLY HARD LINE REGARDING CONCESSIONS IN EXCHANGE FOR A PEACE TREATY WITH JORDAN, A TREND THAT BEGAN EARLIER THIS SPRING (REFTEL). THE POLL, CONDUCTED IN EARLY JULY AND PUBLISHED IN HAARIV JULY 17 SHOWS THAT THE NUMBER OF THOSE UNWILLING TO RETURN ANY OF THE WEST BANK IN EXCHANGE FOR PEACE WITH JORDAN (49.2 PERCENT) NOW ROUGHLY EQUALS THE COMBINED TOTAL OF THOSE WILLING TO RETURN ALL AND THOSE WILLING TO RETURN SOME OF THE TERRITORIES (48.6 PERCENT). LAST FEBRUARY, THOSE WILLING TO MAKE CONCESSIONS STOOD AT 59.1 PERCENT WHEREAS 36.9 PERCENT WERE NOT PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. THE POLL ALSO INDICATES THAT THE PUBLIC IS TAKING A TOUGHER STANCE VIS-A-VIS WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS. IN EXCHANGE FOR A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN, 36 PERCENT OF ISRAELIS WOULD BE UNWILLING TO FREEZE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS, UP 8 PERCENT SINCE FEBRUARY. ONLY 6.5 PERCENT WOULD BE WILLING TO EVACUATE ALL JEWISH SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK, A DECLINE OF 5
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PERCENT SINCE FEBRUARY. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT

--
2. (U) HEREIN FOLLOWS FBIS TRANSLATION OF THE HAARIV REPORT.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE PUBLIC HAS TOUGHENED ITS ATTITUDE REGARDING CONCESSIONS IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA, ACCORDING TO A

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PUBLIC OPINION POLL CONDUCTED BY THE MODI'IN
EZRAHI RESEARCH INSTITUTE AND COMMISSIONED BY
MAARIV.

THE QUESTION POLLED WAS: "DO YOU FAVOR A PEACE
AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN IN THE CONTEXT OF WHICH
ISRAEL WOULD UNDERTAKE TO EVACUATE AREAS IN
JUDEA AND SAMARIA?" (THE ANSWERS ARE QUOTED IN
PERCENTAGES):

--
--
--

JUL	MAY	MAR	FEB
84	84	84	84

IN FAVOR: PREPARED TO
GIVE UP ALL OF JUDEA
AND SAMARIA, INCLUDING
EAST JERUSALEM:

2.4	2.2	3.0	4.3
-----	-----	-----	-----

IN FAVOR: PREPARED TO
GIVE UP ALL OF JUDEA
AND SAMARIA, EXCLUDING
EAST JERUSALEM:

8.5	11.1	13.5	18.5
-----	------	------	------

IN FAVOR: PREPARED TO

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ACTION NEA-11

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SSA-02 /070 W

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2848

INFO DIA WASHINGTON DC//

USIA WASHDC 5568

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

USINT BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USELO RIYADH

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN

USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB

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USCENTCOM FOR USIS ADVISOR BELL

USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, IS

SUBJECT: ISRAELI PUBLIC TIGHTENS STANCE ON WEST BANK

GIVE UP CERTAIN PARTS OF

JUDEA AND SAMARIA: 37.7 42.7 39.7 36.3

THE REPLIES TO THIS QUESTION SHOW THAT THE PUBLIC IS SPLIT INTO THREE MAIN GROUPS:

--	JUL	MAY	MAR	FEB
--	84	84	84	84

1. HAWKS (NOT PREPARED TO MAKE ANY CONCESSION) 49.2 40.6 40.7 36.9

2. MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROADERS (PREPARED TO GIVE UP CERTAIN PARTS) 37.7 42.7 39.7 36.3

3. DOVES (PREPARED TO GIVE UP ALL OF JUDEA AND SAMARIA) 10.9 13.3 16.5 22.8

THESE FINDINGS SHOW THAT AT THE BEGINNING OF JULY 1984 THE STRENGTH OF THE "HAWKS" AMOUNTS TO THAT OF THE "MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROADERS" AND THE "DOVES" PUT TOGETHER.

THE "DOVES" REPRESENT ABOUT 11 PERCENT OF THE PUBLIC. A LONG-TERM COMPARISON INDICATES THAT
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THE "DOVES" AND THE "MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROADERS" HAVE LOST STRENGTH (BY 2 AND 5 PERCENT RESPECTIVELY) WHILE THE "HAWKS" HAVE STRENGTHENED (BY APPROXIMATELY 8.5 PERCENT). IN OTHER WORDS, COMPARED TO MAY 1984 THE "HAWKS" HAVE STRENGTHENED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE "MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROADERS" AND THE "DOVES."

A SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS CAMPS SHOWS THAT THE "HAWKS" INCLUDE MORE YOUTHS (AGED 18 TO 22), THOSE WITH PRIMARY AND PARTIAL HIGH SCHOOL

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EDUCATION, THOSE BORN IN ASIA AND AFRICA AND ISRAELIS OF SEPHARDIC EXTRACTION, AND ORTHODOX AND OBSERVANT JEWS WITH A LOW LEVEL OF INCOME WHO VOTE FOR THE LIKUD, THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES AND TEHIYA...

THE "MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROADERS" INCLUDE MORE MEN AGED 30 TO 39 WITH HIGH SCHOOL AND HIGHER EDUCATION, BORN IN EUROPE AND AMERICA AND ISRAELIS OF WESTERN EXTRACTION, WITH INDEPENDENT AND ACADEMIC PROFESSIONS, SECULAR JEWS WITH A MEDIUM TO HIGH LEVEL OF INCOME AND ALIGNMENT VOTERS.

THE "DOVES" INCLUDE MORE WOMEN, PEOPLE OVER 60 YEARS OLD, THOSE BORN IN EUROPE AND AMERICA, SECULAR JEWS WITH A PARTIAL HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION, PEOPLE WITH INDEPENDENT AND ACADEMIC PROFESSIONS, AND VOTERS OF THE ALIGNMENT AND THE SMALL PARTIES RELATED TO IT (CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT, SHINUI, AND LOVA ELI'AV).

ANOTHER QUESTION POLLED WAS: "IN EXCHANGE FOR A

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R 191410Z JUL 89
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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INFO DIA WASHINGTON DC//
USIA WASHDC 5243
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AMEMBASSY ATHENS
USINT BAGHDAD
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AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, IS

SUBJECT: ISRAELI PUBLIC TIGHTENS STANCE ON WEST BANK

PEACE AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN WOULD YOU. . ."

	JUL 84	MAY 84	MAR 84	FEB 84
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BE PREPARED TO EVACUATE ALL THE SETTLEMENTS IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA:	6.5	7.6	10.1	11.5
---	-----	-----	------	------

BE PREPARED TO EVACUATE SOME OF THE SETTLEMENTS IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA:	21.7	24.8	25.7	21.8
---	------	------	------	------

BE PREPARED TO FREEZE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS ONLY:	29.7	29.6	28.0	29.6
--	------	------	------	------

NOT EVEN BE PREPARED TO FREEZE THE ESTAB- LISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS:	35.9	30.6	30.2	27.9
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OTHER CONCESSIONS:	3.9	4.1	2.6	1.3
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DID NOT REPLY:	2.4	3.6	3.4	8.2
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THESE FINDINGS SHOW THAT ABOUT 66 PERCENT OF THE PUBLIC IS NOT PREPARED TO EVACUATE EXISTING SETTLEMENTS, SOME 38 PERCENT ARE NOT EVEN PREPARED TO FREEZE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS, AND APPROXIMATELY 30 PERCENT ARE PREPARED TO FREEZE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS ONLY.

IN CONTRAST, OVER 28 PERCENT ARE PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO EVACUATE SETTLEMENTS IN EXCHANGE FOR PEACE, INCLUDING 22 PERCENT OF WHOM ARE

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PREPARED TO EVACUATE ONLY SOME OF THE SETTLEMENTS AND SOME 7 PERCENT WHO ARE PREPARED TO EVACUATE ALL THE SETTLEMENTS IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA.

A LONG-TERM COMPARISON SHOWS THAT THE PUBLIC TENDENCY IS A TOUGHENING OF ITS POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF THE SETTLEMENTS. THE NUMBER OF THOSE PREPARED TO EVACUATE SETTLEMENTS HAS DECREASED WHEREAS THE NUMBER WHO ARE EVEN OPPOSED TO FREEZING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SETTLEMENTS HAS INCREASED.

THE POLL WAS CONDUCTED BETWEEN 2 AND 4 JULY. IT COMPRISED 1,292 PEOPLE WHO REPRESENT THE ADULT JEWISH POPULATION IN ISRAEL EXCLUDING INHABITANTS OF KIBBUTZIM, JUDEA AND SAMARIA, AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. END TEXT.
LEWIS

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O 161405Z JUL 84
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2755
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY DOHA
USELO RIYADH
AMEMBASSY SANAA
CIA WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 10262

CIA FOR OGI

USCINCEUR FOR POLAT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, IS
SUBJECT: SETTLEMENTS SUPPORTERS KICK OFF PRE-ELECTION
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SETTLEMENTS PUSH WITH APPROVAL OF FIVE NEW

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REF: ✓ TEL AVIV 9986 (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WITH SUBSTANTIAL FANFARE AND AMID SOME CONTROVERSY, THE INTER-MINISTERIAL SETTLEMENTS COMMITTEE, ON JULY 15, APPROVED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FIVE ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. AT LEAST FOUR, (NAYA, AYNE HEFEZ, SELA'IM, AND NEVE 'ANER) ARE TO BE IN THE WEST BANK. A FIFTH, DESCRIBED AS "A FISHERMAN'S VILLAGE EAST OF LAKE TIBERIAS", APPEARS TO BE IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THE COMMITTEE ALSO APPROVED A SETTLEMENT IN PRE-1967 ISRAEL.

3. ACCORDING TO ISRAELI PRESS REPORTS, THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING, CHAIRED BY ACTING CHAIRMAN SCIENCE MINISTER YUVAL NEEMAN, WAS PHOTOGRAPHED BY THE TELEVISION NETWORKS REPRESENTED IN ISRAEL AND THE NEW CHAIRMAN OF THE JEWISH AGENCY'S SETTLEMENT DEPARTMENT PROTESTED THE "RASH APPROVAL" ON THE EVE OF THE ELECTIONS. AT THE MEETING, NEEMAN EXPRESSED ANGER AT THE CITING OF WHAT HE CALLED EXAGGERATED SUMS WITH RESPECT TO THE SETTLEMENTS BUDGET. HE SAID THAT IN THE PAST FOUR YEARS ONLY \$20 MILLION DOLLARS HAD BEEN SPENT ON SETTLEMENTS. HE ALSO ARGUED THAT IT COSTS THE GOVERNMENT FIVE TIMES AS MUCH TO SETTLE A FAMILY IN THE JORDAN RIFT VALLEY AS IN THE SAMARIA REGION OF
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THE WEST BANK.

4. THE COMMITTEE'S ACTION FOLLOWED RECENT PRESS REPORTS THAT A DOZEN OR SO SETTLEMENT SITES IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE TO BE INAUGURATED IN THE COMING DAYS:

ADAM

THREE KILOMETERS NORTH OF ANATOT, NORTHEAST OF JERUSALEM,

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NEAR GIVON.

ASFAR

SOUTHEAST OF BETHLEHEM AND NORTH OF HEBRON. THIS
IS A MILITARY NAHAL, WHICH IS TO BE CIVILIANIZED.

YITZHAR

SOUTH OF NABLUS AND MOUNT BRAHA.

GIVAT LEVONA

NEAR SHILO, SOUTH OF HEBRON.

HAGAI

A NAHAL OUTPOST, SOUTH OF HEBRON.

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O 161405Z JUL 84
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2756
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY DOHA
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AMEMBASSY SANAA
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CIA FOR OGI

USCINCEUR FOR POLAT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, IS
SUBJECT: SETTLEMENTS SUPPORTERS KICK OFF PRE-ELECTION
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RAFAH - YAM

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IN GAZA.

NETZARIM

A NAHAL IN GAZA. ESTABLISHED IN 1972 AND CIVILIANIZED
AS A MOSHAV IN 1980.

--
NISANIT

A NAHAL IN GAZA. ESTABLISHED IN 1982.

5. COMMENT

THIS MOST RECENT SETTLEMENTS INITIATIVE IS COMMONLY
VIEWED AS A PRE-ELECTIONS PLOY BY ADVOCATES OF
CONTINUED VIGOROUS SETTLEMENT IN THE TERRITORIES,
PARTICULARLY BY RIGHT WING TEHIYA PARTY LEADER
YUVAL NEEMAN. THE FUTURE OF THESE NEW SITES IS,
HOWEVER, IN DOUBT GIVEN THE GOI'S CURRENT BUDGETARY
CONSTRAINTS AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT LABOR WILL BE
ABLE TO FORM THE NEXT GOVERNMENT. IN ADDITION,
AFTER A LABOR PARTY OFFICIAL LODGED A COMPLAINT,
ELECTIONS COMMISSION CHAIRMAN SACH RULED THAT THE
INAUGURATIONS OF THE SETTLEMENTS WERE PART OF THE
ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN. HE FORBODE ENTERTAINERS FOR THE
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PAGE 03

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POLITICAL PARTIES FROM ATTENDING THE VARIOUS
INAUGURATIONS AND SAID GOVERNMENT FUNDS COULD NOT
BE USED FOR THESE EVENTS. END COMMENT.

--
6. COORDINATED WITH CONGEN JERUSALEM.

7. BEIRUT AND KUWAIT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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P 121545Z JUN 84
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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CIA FOR OGI
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, EFIN, IS
SUBJECT: MEDIA REPORT MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE APPROVES
NEW SETTLEMENTS IN GOLAN AND WEST BANK

1. (C) SUMMARY

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THE JOINT MINISTERIAL WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

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IS/FPC/CDR 26 Date: NOV 7 1996

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SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE APPROVED, JUNE 10, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THREE NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GOLAN HEIGHTS. THE COMMITTEE ALSO DISCUSSED JUSTICE MINISTER NISSIM'S RESERVATIONS OVER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO ADDITIONAL WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS AND WILL REACH A DECISION ON THESE WHEN A QUESTION OVER OWNERSHIP OF PROPOSED LAND HAS BEEN RESOLVED. COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SCIENCE MINISTER YUVAL NE'EMAN REPORTEDLY DENIED THAT APPROVAL OF THE NEW SETTLEMENTS WAS LINKED TO THE CURRENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN. HOWEVER, A JUNE 7 TOUR OF HEBRON AREA AND GAZA SETTLEMENTS BY FINANCE MINISTER COHEN-ORGAD, AND PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR'S SCHEDULED JUNE 12 VISIT TO TWO WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS INDICATE LIKUD WILL CONTINUE TO REMIND ITS CONSTITUENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTINUING HARD-LINE STANCE ON SETTLEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

--
2. (U) CABINET SECRETARY ANNOUNCED JUNE 10 THAT THE JOINT MINISTERIAL-WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE APPROVED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THREE NEW SETTLEMENTS--DALIAT (NORTH OF RAMAT HAGSHIMIN IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS), EIN KANAF (SOUTH OF GAZLA IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS), AND ELISHAMA ON THE WEST BANK. ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE BULLETIN ANNOUNCEMENT, THE COMMITTEE ALSO DISCUSSED JUSTICE MINISTER MOSHE NISSIM'S RESERVATIONS ABOUT A DECISION TO ESTABLISH TWO ADDITIONAL WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS, NERIYAH AND YA'ARIT. (NOTE: EMBASSY IS LOOKING INTO WHETHER THESE ARE IN CONFIDENTIAL
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FACT NEW SETTLEMENTS OR RENAMED PRE-SETTLEMENTS.
END NOTE.)

--
3. (U) THE JUNE 11 JERUSALEM POST REPORTED THAT NISSIM'S RESERVATIONS OVER NERIYAH AND YA'ARIT AROSE FROM DISPUTES OVER OWNERSHIP CLAIMS TO THE LAND FOR THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENTS. ACCORDING TO THE POST, THE SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE HAD DECIDED TO ESTABLISH NERIYAH MAY 15, BUT NISSIM HAD APPEALED TO THE CABINET AND COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SCIENCE MINISTER YUVAL NE'EMAN OVER A QUESTION OF WHO

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ACTUALLY OWNED LAND ALLEGEDLY SOLD TO THE SETTLEMENT'S PROMOTERS. THERE WERE SIMILAR QUESTIONS OVER OWNERSHIP OF PROPOSED LAND FOR YA'ARIT. THE POST REPORTED COMPROMISE WAS REACHED AFTER LENGTHY AND HEATED DEBATE, AND THE COMMITTEE DECIDED TO ESTABLISH THE TWO SETTLEMENTS WHEN THE OWNERSHIP QUESTION HAS BEEN DETERMINED BY THE STATE ATTORNEY'S OFFICE.

4. (U) IDF RADIO JUNE 10 QUOTED NE'EMAN AS SAYING APPROVAL OF THE NEW SETTLEMENTS HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS. NE'EMAN ADDED THAT A NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENTS ARE ALSO BEING CONSIDERED AND SAID, "IF YOU WANT, YOU MIGHT SAY THAT FOR TWO YEARS I HAVE BEEN WORKING TOWARDS THE ELECTIONS ALL THE TIME BECAUSE WE ARE ESTABLISHING SETTLEMENTS ALL THE TIME".

5. (U) HEBREW LANGUAGE NEWSPAPER DAVAR ALSO REPORTED JUNE 8 THAT ACCORDING TO JEWISH AGENCY SETTLEMENTS DEPARTMENT HEAD MATI DROBLES, 1.5 BILLION SHEKELS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, EFIN, IS
SUBJECT: MEDIA REPORT MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE APPROVES

(APPROXIMATELY 7.5 MILLION DOLLARS) WILL BE INVESTED IN
DEVELOPING SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK NEAR HEBRON
AND IN GAZA DURING THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR. DROBLES
REPORTEDLY EXPLAINED THIS TO FINANCE MINISTER COHEN-
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ORGAD DURING A TOUR OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE HEBRON AREA.
DAVAR QUOTED COHEN-ORGAD AS STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE

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OF SETTLEMENT TO ESTABLISH A BUFFER BETWEEN THE SINAI AND GAZA, BUT ADDED THAT HE DID NOT PROMISE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES OTHER THAN THOSE ALLOTTED IN THE CURRENT BUDGET. HEBREW LANGUAGE NEWS SERVICE ITIM ALSO REPORTED COHEN-ORGAD'S TOUR OF THE HEBRON AREA SETTLEMENTS, QUOTING THE FINANCE MINISTER AS SAYING, "I HOPE THE ISRAELI NATION WILL ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IT ELECTS WILL EXPAND SETTLEMENTS THROUGHOUT ISRAEL".

6. (C) COMMENT

CLEARLY, THESE MOVES ARE DESIGNED TO HAVE MAXIMUM ELECTORAL IMPACT AMONG THE LIKUD'S HARD-LINE CONSTITUENCY. THE PRESS REPORTED THAT A CAMPAIGN FILM CREW COVERED COHEN-ORGAD'S TOUR, AND PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT THE SETTLEMENTS OF KARNEI SHOMRON AND RAMAT MODI'IN ON THE WEST BANK JUNE 12.
END COMMENT.

7. (U) COORDINATED WITH AMCONGEN JERUSALEM. FLATEN

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP

REFS: A) TEL AVIV 4853, B) 83 TEL AVIV 3130 (NOTAL)

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1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.

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2. SUMMARY

ON APRIL 26, POLOFF SURVEYED ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN GAZA. EXCEPT FOR A FEW HOUSES IN GANNE TALE, AND CONTINUING CONSTRUCTION AT NEVE DEQALIM BUILDING ACTIVITY IN GAZA SETTLEMENTS HAS SLOWED SUBSTANTIALLY. HOWEVER, SINCE SEPTEMBER 1983, ALMOST 400 NEW RESIDENTS HAVE ARRIVED, MAKING A TOTAL OF 1600 GAZA SETTLERS. OF THE FIVE SETTLERS POLOFF SPOKE WITH AT LENGTH, THREE FELT THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS NEGLECTED SETTLEMENT IN GAZA AND SAID THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY VOTE FOR LABOR IN THE COMING ELECTIONS. ONE SAID SHE WOULD VOTE FOR THE LIKUD, AND THE FIFTH EXPRESSED NO PREFERENCE. THROUGHOUT THE SETTLEMENTS, A HEIGHTENED SENSE OF ATTENTION TO SECURITY WAS APPARENT. AT ALL BUT TWO SETTLEMENTS, POLOFF WAS STOPPED AT THE GATE BY AN ARMED GUARD AND QUESTIONED BEFORE BEING ALLOWED TO PROCEED. END SUMMARY.

--
3. FOLLOWING IS A SITE BY SITE SURVEY OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP. FINDINGS APPEAR IN ORDER OF VISITATION, ROUGHLY FROM NORTHEAST TO SOUTHWEST.

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4. ELE SINAI (31 DEGREES 35' 00N, 034 DEGREES 30' 20" E)

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A GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENT, LOCATED JUST WITHIN THE NORTHERN GAZA/ISRAEL BORDER. FIVE SOMEWHAT RAMSHACKLE PREFAB HOUSES ARE IN PLACE, OCCUPIED SINCE AUGUST 1983 BY FIVE FAMILIES WITH A TOTAL OF 17 CHILDREN. OF THE FIVE FAMILIES, TWO LIVED IN THE FORMER SINAI SETTLEMENT OF YAHIT, THE OTHER THREE CAME FROM ASHQELON IN ISRAEL. THE CHILDREN ATTEND SCHOOL IN ASHQELON.

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NO NEW CONSTRUCTION IS PRESENTLY TAKING PLACE, BUT BRUSH FOREST FORMERLY SOUTHWEST OF THE SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN CLEARED. HOWEVER, LOTS FOR 50 HOUSES HAVE BEEN STAKED OUT IN THE SAND. SETTLEMENT WAS GUARDED BY AN ARGENTINIAN JEW ON GUARD DUTY FOR ONE MONTH. POLOFF TALKED IN RUSSIAN WITH ONE COUPLE WHICH EMIGRATED FROM THE SOVIET UNION IN 1972. THEY HAD LIVED IN THE FORMER YAMIT SETTLEMENT IN THE SINAI FROM ITS INCEPTION, WHERE THE HUSBAND, AN ECONOMIST, RAN THE SUPERMARKET. THE SETTLERS POINTED OUT THEIR STORE AND FORMER HOME ON AN AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH OF YAMIT WHICH HANGS ON THEIR LIVING ROOM WALL. THEY SAID THEY WERE SORRY TO LEAVE YAMIT AND HAD HOPED THAT THE JEWISH SETTLEMENTS IN THE SINAI WOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS WITHIN EGYPTIAN TERRITORY.

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ACTION SS-25

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
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AMEMBASSY SANAA
CIA WASHDC
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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 TEL AVIV 06863

EXDIS
CIA FOR OGI
USCINCEUR FOR POLAT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP

THE COUPLE SAID THEY HAD VOTED FOR LIKUD IN THE
LAST ELECTION. HOWEVER, THEY INDICATED THAT
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EVEN THOUGH THEY DISLIKE THE SETTLEMENTS PROGRAM
AND SOCIALISTIC IDEAS OF THE LABOR PARTY, THEY

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WILL PROBABLY VOTE FOR LABOR IN THE COMING ELECTIONS BECAUSE THEY FEEL LABOR CAN MANAGE THE ECONOMY BETTER.

5. NISANIT (31D 33' 25" N, 034D 31' 40" E)

LOCATED JUST WEST OF THE EREZ INDUSTRIAL ZONE. THIS REMAINS A NAHAL SETTLEMENT. POLOFF WAS NOT ADMITTED TO THIS MILITARY SITE. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS NO NEW CONSTRUCTION IS OCCURRING.

6. NEZARIM (31D 28' 40" N, 034D 25' 00" E)

A MOSHAV ASSOCIATED WITH THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY. NOT VISITED.

7. KEFAR DAROM (31D 24' 20" N, 034D 21' 30" E)

NO NEW CONSTRUCTION IS TAKING PLACE. ALL HOUSING UNITS APPEAR OCCUPIED. SETTLERS CLAIM THAT THIS FORMER MOSHAV IS NOW A SORT OF NON-MILITARY FIELD SCHOOL OPERATED BY GUSH QATIF.

8. NEZER HAZANI (31D 22' 55" N, 034D 19' 30" E)

A MOSHAV ASSOCIATED WITH NRP. NO NEW CONSTRUCTION IS TAKING PLACE. AGRICULTURAL CROPS INCLUDE TOMATOES, CUCUMBERS, SWEET AND HOT PEPPERS, AND
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BABY'S BREATH, ALL FOR EXPORT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

OF THE 70 HOUSES, ONLY THOSE NEAR THE CENTER OF THE COMMUNITY APPEAR OCCUPIED. ACCORDING TO ONE SETTLER, THE UNOCCUPIED SITES DO NOT REFLECT LACK OF DEMAND, BUT TRADITIONAL OVERBUILDING BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. (ALL HOUSES IN THE SETTLEMENT WERE BUILT BEFORE 1977.)

POLOFF TALKED WITH AMERICAN-BACKGROUND RESIDENT

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WHO IS MARRIED TO A YEMENI AND HAS ONE CHILD. HE SAID THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS NEGLECTING THE GAZA STRIP AND CONCENTRATING ON SETTLEMENTS IN THE JERUSALEM AREA AND THE WEST BANK. HE SAID HE THOUGHT DEEMIN ARENS' RECENT TRIP TO GAZA WAS A MEDIA EVENT AND THAT ARENS, WHO VISITED GAZA TO MEET ARAB DIGNITARIES, STOPPED TO MEET WITH SETTLERS ONLY AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT. THIS SETTLER SAID HE HAD NEVER HEARD OF YUVAL NEEMAN, THE ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE INTERMINISTERIAL SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE. THE SETTLER, ORIGINALLY FROM ARIZONA, IS AN ENGLISH TEACHER AND PART TIME FARMER. HE WAS AT FIRST RELUCTANT TO SPEAK WITH POLOFF, CLAIMING THAT WARINESS WAS DUE TO "FARMER'S" SUSPICION OF STRANGERS, "AS IN THE AMERICAN MIDWEST". HE SAID THAT IN THE SETTLEMENTS ONE MAY ENCOUNTER WARINESS BUT NEVER HOSTILITY. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY VOTE FOR LABOR IN THE COMING ELECTION, FOR

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ACTION SS-25

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 TEL AVIV 06863

EXDIS
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E.O. 12356-1 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP

ECONOMIC REASONS.

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9. QATIF (31D 22' 30" N, 034D 18' 45" E)

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A MOSHAV. NO NEW CONSTRUCTION TAKING PLACE.
HOUSES NEAR EDGE OF SETTLEMENT APPEAR
UNOCCUPIED.

10. GANNE TAL (32D 22' 30" N, 034D 18' 15" E)

A MOSHAV ASSOCIATED WITH NRP. OBSERVED ONE NEW
HOUSE AND AN ADDITION TO ANOTHER UNDER CONSTRUCTION.
HOUSES HERE, COMPARED TO NEIGHBORING NEZER HAZANI
AND QATIF ARE, IN MANY CASES, LARGER AND MORE
ATTRACTIVE. THERE ARE MANY NICELY KEPT LAWNS
AND FLOWER GARDENS. ACCORDING TO RESIDENTS
OF OTHER SETTLEMENTS, THIS IS WHERE "THE RICH
FOLKS" LIVE.

11. GAZA BEACHES (31D 21'S 0"N, 034D 16' 05" E)

THESE ARE TWO BEACHES FOR SETTLERS AND TOURISTS
NEAR A SMALL NAVAL STATION. ONE, COMPLETE WITH
SEVERAL PALM-THATCHED SHELTERS, IS FOR SECULAR
SWIMMERS. FURTHER SOUTH IS ANOTHER BEACH FOR
SEGREGATED MALE AND FEMALE SWIMMING BY RELIGIOUS
SETTLERS. A BUILDING WITH SEPARATE CHANGING ROOMS
HAS BEEN RECENTLY CONSTRUCTED AND AN ADJOINING
FENCE RUNNING FROM THE CHANGING ROOMS TO THE
SEA ALLOWS MEN AND WOMEN TO SWIM WITHOUT SEEING
EACH OTHER. ANOTHER FENCE PARALLELING THE ROAD
ENSURES PRIVACY THERE. POLOFF OBSERVED NO ONE
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USING THE SEGREGATED BEACH ALTHOUGH A FEW
ISRAELIS WERE ON THE SECULAR ONE. ONE SETTLER
STATED THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO ATTRACT ISRAELI
VACATIONERS FROM THE NORTH, BUT FEW COME "DUE
TO THE ARAB POPULATION".

12. NEWE DEQALIM (31D 21' 20" N, 034D 16' 40" E)

A REGIONAL CENTER ASSOCIATED WITH NRP. ACCORDING
TO ONE SETTLER, FAMILIES OCCUPY 65 OF THE 70 EXISTING

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HOUSES AND SINGLES LIVE IN THE OTHER FIVE. VISUAL INSPECTION CONFIRMED THIS CLAIM. THIS SETTLER ALSO STATED THAT 300 FAMILIES ARE WAITING TO MOVE IN. PREFABRICATED WALLS ARE IN PLACE FOR THE START OF CONSTRUCTION ON 30 NEW UNITS. FIFTY NEW UNITS WERE PLANNED. HOWEVER, THE NUMBER WAS REDUCED FOR BUDGETARY REASONS. CONSTRUCTION IS ALSO TAKING PLACE ON A LARGE COMMUNITY BUILDING AND SEVERAL OTHER BUILDINGS: A TWO STORY REGIONAL SCHOOL IS ALREADY IN USE.

POLOFF VISITED THE HOUSE OF AN ISRAELI-BORN RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT WOMAN WITH THREE CHILDREN. ORIGINALLY FROM JERUSALEM, THE FAMILY HAD SPENT A YEAR IN NEZER HAZANI WHILE NEWE DEQALIM WAS BEING BUILT. THEIR THREE-BEDROOM HOUSE, THE LARGEST OF THE THREE HOUSE TYPES AT THIS SITE, IS MODESTLY FURNISHED. THE WOMAN SAID SHE WILL DEFINITELY SUPPORT LIKUD IN THE COMING ELECTION BECAUSE OF ITS SETTLEMENT POLICY. HOWEVER,

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ACTION SS-25

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EXDIS
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP

SHE BELIEVES THAT EVEN IF A LABOR GOVERNMENT IS
ELECTED, LIKUD'S POWER WILL PREVENT LABOR FROM
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RETARDING THE SETTLEMENT PROGRAM.

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13. GADID (31D 20' 45" N, 034D 16' 30" E)

A MOSHAV ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRP. NO NEW CONSTRUCTION TAKING PLACE. HOUSES IN THE NORTHERN SECTION OF THE SETTLEMENT, AND OTHER OUTLYING HOUSING OF THE SOUTHERN SECTIONS APPEAR UNOCCUPIED. ESTIMATE 50 PERCENT OCCUPANCY. OBSERVED TOMATOES AND BABY'S BREATH BEING GROWN IN GREENHOUSES.

14. GAN OR (31D 20' 20" N, 034D 15' 40" E)

A MOSHAV ASSOCIATED WITH NRP. OBSERVED NO NEW CONSTRUCTION TAKING PLACE. SINCE SEPTEMBER 1983, 20 FAMILIES HAVE MOVED INTO THE SETTLEMENT WHICH IS NOW ABOUT 50 PERCENT OCCUPIED.

AT 3:00 PM, PALESTINIAN WORKERS LEAVING THIS AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENT WERE OBSERVED UNDERGOING STRICT SECURITY PROCEDURES, INCLUDING VEHICULAR SEARCHES. BETWEEN GAN OR AND MIZPE AZMONA, POLOFF OBSERVED NEW 10-12" DIAMETER PLASTIC PIPE BEING LAID ON SAND BAGS PARALLEL TO THE ROAD, AND ALONG A NEW, UNCOMPLETED ROAD WHICH RUNS PERPENDICULAR TO EXISTING ROAD TOWARD THE ARAB AGRICULTURAL LANDS THAT BORDER THE COAST. IN ADDITION, SAND DUNES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE MAIN ROAD ARE NOW COVERED WITH ROWS OF RECENTLY PLANTED TREE SAPLINGS.

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EQUIPMENT TRUCKS SEEN IN THE BEND OF THE MAIN ROAD IN SEPTEMBER 1983 AND IDENTIFIED THEN AS POSSIBLE SITE PREPARATION FOR BEDOLAH SETTLEMENT MUST HAVE BEEN PREPARATION FOR PLANTING OF THESE TREES.

15. MIZPE AZMONA (31D 19' 30" N, 034D 14' 20" E)

A MOSHAV. NO NEW CONSTRUCTION TAKING PLACE. SETTLEMENT APPEARS TO BE APPROXIMATELY 75 PERCENT

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OCCUPIED. UNLIKE PREVIOUS SETTLEMENTS ENCOUNTERED, THIS SETTLEMENT HAD NO GUARD PRESENT.

16. MORAG (310 18' 30" N, 0340 17' 15" E)

A MOSHAV ASSOCIATED WITH THE AGRICULTURAL UNION. NO NEW CONSTRUCTION TAKING PLACE. ACCORDING TO ONE SETTLER, 18 FAMILIES LIVE HERE. SITE OBSERVATION TENDS TO VERIFY THIS. SETTLERS HERE ARE NEARLY ALL SEPHARDIM FROM SPAIN, TUNISIA, AND MOROCCO. AGAIN, NO GUARD WAS PRESENT AT THE GATE. FLOWER GROWING, ESPECIALLY LAVENDER, IS MORAG'S MAIN INDUSTRY.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SETTLERS AND THE ARAB WORKERS ARE EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD HERE COMPARED WITH THE ASHKENAZI MOSHAVIM. SETTLER AND ARAB MEN WERE OBSERVED WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER, APPARENTLY

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ACTION SS-25

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E.O. 12356: DECLASS
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PPTS, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP

ENJOYING GOOD FELLOWSHIP. ONE CAR MET AT THE
GATE WAS SHARED BY SETTLERS AND ARABS; AN ARAB
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HAD THE SETTLER'S BABY ON HIS LAP. POLOFF TALKED
IN SPANISH WITH WOMAN SETTLER WHO SAID SHE EMIGRATED

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FROM SPAIN 30 YEARS AGO. SHE CLAIMED THAT SHE DOESN'T BOTHER WITH POLITICS; "BOTH PARTIES ARE THE SAME" TO HER. SHE STATED THAT MORAG ALREADY HAD EVERYTHING IT NEEDED. SOME RESISTANCE WAS ENCOUNTERED BY A SECOND SETTLER, WHO INITIALLY OBJECTED TO HER TALKING WITH A FOREIGNER.

17. COMMENT

SINCE SEPTEMBER 1983 NEW SETTLERS HAVE MOVED INTO PREVIOUSLY CONSTRUCTED HOUSING AT MIZPE AZMONA, ELE SINAI, GAN OR, AND NEVE DEQALIM, INCREASING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF GAZAN SETTLERS TO APPROXIMATELY 1600. FOLLOWING IS A SETTLEMENT BY SETTLEMENT POPULATION BREAKDOWN BASED ON TRIP FINDINGS AND PREVIOUS STUDIES:

ELE SINAI	25
GADID	130
GANNE TAL	225
GAN OR	100
KEFAR DAROM	50
MORAG	90
MIZPE AZMONA	140
NEVE DEQALIM	350
NEZARIM	50
NEZER HAZANI	285
NISANIT	20
QATIF	135

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TOTAL 1600

18. BEIRUT AND KUWAIT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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TELEGRAM

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INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 DODE-00 H-01
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JODDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
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CIA FOR OGI
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, EFIN, IS
SUBJECT: SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:
PART I -- THE BUDGET

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REFS: (A) 83 TEL AVIV 1591, (B) TEL AVIV 3146

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR 36 Date: NOV 7 1996

EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

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- (C)^M TEL AVIV 3198, (D)^{NR} TEL AVIV 4022
 - (E)^{NR} TEL AVIV 4648

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
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2. SUMMARY:

ON THE BASIS OF GOI BUDGET REPORTS, WE ESTIMATE THE OFFICIAL GOI SETTLEMENT BUDGET FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN THE FISCAL YEAR WHICH BEGINS APRIL 1 (1984) WILL BE AROUND 70 MILLION DOLLARS. HOWEVER, THE EVENTUAL BUDGET MAY BE LESS IN VIEW OF INFLATION UNLESS THERE ARE SUFFICIENTLY LARGE BUDGET SUPPLEMENTALS. THE \$70 MILLION STARTING FIGURE IS ABOUT 89 PERCENT OF ESTIMATED GOI EXPENDITURES FOR THIS PURPOSE IN FY83 AND ONLY SLIGHTLY MORE THAN HALF THE FY82 SETTLEMENT BUDGET. AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS, TOTAL INVESTMENT ON SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES WILL BE LARGER THAN THE BUDGET FIGURES INDICATE DUE TO INPUTS BY OTHER GOI MINISTRIES SUCH AS DEFENSE, INTERIOR, INDUSTRY AND TRADE, AND TRANSPORTATION. HOWEVER, AS THESE ADDITIONAL INPUTS ARE NOT IDENTIFIED IN THE BUDGET AS DESIGNATED FOR THE TERRITORIES, WE ARE UNABLE TO ESTIMATE HOW MUCH OF AN ADD-ON TO THE DECLARED BUDGET THEY REPRESENT. THE PRIVATE SECTOR, OPERATING IN COOPERATION WITH THE GOI, HAS IN THE PAST ALSO MADE SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. HOWEVER, PRIVATE SECTOR ACTIVITY ALSO SEEMS TO BE DECLINING. THE EXPECTED DECLINE IN OFFICIALLY DECLARED EXPENDITURE FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES COMPARED TO FY83 IS THE RESULT OF OVERALL GOI

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BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS. THE FACT THAT THE NUMBER OF COMPLETED UNITS AND UNITS UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN THE SETTLEMENTS CONTINUES TO EXCEED THE NUMBER OF ISRAELI FAMILIES PREPARED TO OCCUPY THEM WOULD APPEAR TO BE ANOTHER FACTOR. END SUMMARY.
 --

3. BUDGET FOR SETTLEMENTS IN ISRAEL AND THE TERRITORIES

THE OFFICIAL GOI SETTLEMENT BUDGET IS CONTAINED IN THE

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BUDGETS OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING. THE BUDGETS FOR THESE MINISTRIES FOR THE ISRAELI FISCAL YEAR WHICH BEGINS APRIL 1 (FY84) WERE PRESENTED TO THE KNESSET ON FEBRUARY 22. THE KNESSET IS EXPECTED TO APPROVE THE ENTIRE BUDGET BY MARCH 31. THE RELEVANT FIGURES FOR EXPENDITURES FOR SETTLEMENTS IN FY84 AND THE TWO PRECEDING YEARS--EXTRACTED FROM THE BUDGET PRESENTATIONS OF THE TWO MINISTRIES--ARE CONTAINED IN THE TABLES IN PARAS 8-9 BELOW.

THE TWO BUDGET REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE BASIC GOI FY84 BUDGET FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF PRE-1967 ISRAEL WILL BE 16,685 MILLION SHEKELS. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE SETTLEMENT PROGRAMS WILL RECEIVE 6485 MILLION SHEKELS, WHILE THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION SETTLEMENT BUDGET WILL BE 10,230 MILLION SHEKELS. USING THE GOI'S AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATE ASSUMPTION FOR FY84 (192 SHEKELS EQUALS \$1.00), THIS TRANSLATES INTO \$87 MILLION FOR SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN ISRAEL PROPER AND IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM
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CIA FOR OGI
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E.O. 12356: DECLASS: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, EFIN, IS
SUBJECT: SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:

4. BASIC SETTLEMENT BUDGET FOR THE TERRITORIES
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THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE FY84 BUDGET FOR SETTLEMENTS

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IN THE TERRITORIES IS IDENTIFIED AS 6.455 MILLION SHEKELS (NO FIGURE IS GIVEN FOR SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY WITHIN ISRAEL PROPER) OR \$34 MILLION.

AS IN THE PAST, THE DATA IN THE HOUSING MINISTRY BUDGET (PARA 9) DO NOT PERMIT US TO DETERMINE THE EXACT HOUSING MINISTRY APPROPRIATION FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES. THE MINISTRY'S BUDGET REPORT GIVES A FIGURE FOR THE WEST BANK (JUDEA, SAMARIA, AND JORDAN VALLEY)--3,520 MILLION SHEKELS. AS WAS THE CASE LAST YEAR, THE REPORT TREATS THE GALILEE AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AS ONE REGION. THE BUDGET REPORT PROVIDES ONLY ONE FIGURE (3,740 MILLION SHEKELS) FOR THIS "REGION" WITHOUT EXPLICITLY INDICATING HOW MUCH WILL GO FOR THE GALILEE OR THE GOLAN. SIMILARLY, ONLY ONE FIGURE (2,970 MILLION SHEKELS) IS GIVEN FOR GAZA AND THE NEGEV/ARAVA REGION. HOWEVER, WE ESTIMATE THAT ABOUT FIFTY PERCENT (3,355 MILLION SHEKELS) OF THE SUM (6,710 MILLION SHEKELS) OF THE TWO FIGURES WILL BE SPENT IN THE GOLAN AND GAZA. THUS, WE EXPECT THE HOUSING MINISTRY BUDGET FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES WILL BE ABOUT 6,875 SHEKELS (3,520 PLUS 3,355) OR \$36 MILLION.

THE INITIAL SETTLEMENT BUDGET FOR THE TERRITORIES SHOULD THEREFORE BE APPROXIMATELY \$70 MILLION.

5. FY84 BUDGET IS SMALLER THAN FY83 BUDGET

LAST YEAR, USING THE GOI'S AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATE
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ASSUMPTION OF 52 SHEKELS EQUALS \$1.00, WE ESTIMATED THAT THE FY83 SETTLEMENT BUDGET FOR THE TERRITORIES WOULD BE ABOUT \$116 MILLION (REFTEL A). HOWEVER, THE AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATE ACTUALLY WAS ABOUT 85.9 SHEKELS TO THE DOLLAR, WHICH REDUCED THE BUDGET TO THE EQUIVALENT OF \$79 MILLION. THE STARTING BUDGET FOR THE TERRITORIES FOR FY84 (\$70 MILLION) IS THEREFORE LESS THAN LAST YEAR'S ACTUAL BUDGET FOR THE SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES. SINCE THE RATE OF INFLATION DURING FY84 WILL RESULT IN AN AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATE SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN 192 SHEKELS TO THE DOLLAR, THE BASIC SETTLEMENT BUDGET WILL BE MUCH LESS THAN THE EQUIVALENT OF \$70

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MILLION, UNLESS COMPENSATORY MEASURES ARE TAKEN.

6. SUPPLEMENTARY APPROPRIATIONS

IN VIEW OF OVERALL GOI BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS, WE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT SUFFICIENTLY LARGE SUPPLEMENTARY APPROPRIATIONS WILL BE MADE TO THE FY84 SETTLEMENTS BUDGET FOR THE TERRITORIES TO FULLY OFFSET THE EROSION IN THE BUDGET WHICH WILL BE CAUSED BY THE DECLINE IN THE VALUE OF THE SHEKEL DURING THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS.

7. INPUTS FROM OTHER MINISTRIES

AS IN THE PAST, FUNDS CONTROLLED BY OTHER MINISTRIES-- SUCH AS THE DEFENSE MINISTRY, AND THE TRANSPORTATION, INDUSTRY AND TRADE AND INTERIOR MINISTRIES-- WILL BE USED TO SUPPORT SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE TERRITORIES. WE ARE UNABLE TO ESTIMATE THE AMOUNT OF THESE ADDITIONAL INPUTS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THEY ARE SIGNIFICANT IN

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
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AMEMBASSY SANAA
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, EFIN, IS
SUBJECT: SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:

TERMS OF PROVIDING INFRASTRUCTURE TO THE SETTLEMENTS,
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EVEN WHEN ONE FACTORS IN THAT SOME OF THESE ADDITIONAL
EXPENDITURES WILL BE ON THE BASIS OF TRANSFERS OF FUNDS

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FROM THE HOUSING AND AGRICULTURE MINISTRIES TO OTHER
ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.

8. SUMMARY OF AGRICULTURE MINISTRY'S SETTLEMENTS
BUDGET:

(FIGURES ARE IN MILLIONS OF SHEKELS)

	FY84 (FORECAST)	FY83 (ESTIMATED)	FY82 (ACTUAL)
TOTAL MINAG DEVELOPMENT BUDGET FOR PRE-67 ISRAEL AND OCCUPIED TERRITORIES	15,100	7,900	3,800
TOTAL FOR NEW SETTLE- MENTS IN THE TERRITORIES	6,455	3,220	1,440
JUDEA AND SAMARIA (INCLUDING ETZION BLOC)	2,250	1,230	580
JORDAN VALLEY	1,670	790	360
KATIF BLOC (GAZA) AND HEBRON SLOPES	1,100	500	250
GOLAN HEIGHTS	1,425	700	250

NOTE 1: MINISTRIES MAY OBLIGATE AMOUNTS BEYOND THE BASIC
APPROPRIATION, ON THE CONDITION THAT THESE ADDITIONAL
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AMOUNTS WILL NOT BE DISBURSED UNTIL THE SUCCEEDING FISCAL
YEAR, EXCEPT AS SUPPLEMENTARY AUTHORIZATIONS MAY PROVIDE.

NOTE 2: NO FIGURES ARE GIVEN FOR PRE-1967 ISRAEL.

9. MINISTRY OF HOUSING ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO
SETTLEMENTS BY REGION

FY 1984

FY 1983

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MILLIONS SHEKELS	MILLIONS SHEKELS	PERCENT	MILLIONS SHEKELS	PERCENT	
84 PRICES	83 PRICES				
JUDEA, SAMARIA					
JORDAN VALLEY	3,520	1,600	34	1,800	34
GALILLEE AND GOLAN	3,740	1,700	37	2,010	37
KATIF BLOC (GAZA), NEGEV AND ARAVA (SOUTHERN NEGEV)	2,970	1,350	29	1,540	29
TOTALS	10,230	4,650	100	5,350	100

10. COMMENT

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, EFIN, 'IS
SUBJECT: SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:

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-- THE OFFICIAL GOI BUDGET FOR FY84 (\$70 MILLION) FOR
SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES REPRESENTS A RATHER SHARP

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DROP FROM THE FY83 BUDGET, EVEN IF ONE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE ACTUAL DOLLAR VALUE OF THE FY83 BUDGET (ABOUT \$79 MILLION) RATHER THAN THE \$116 MILLION BASED ON THE UNREALISTICALLY LOW AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATE ASSUMPTION FOR FY83. THE FY84 TERRITORIES SETTLEMENTS BUDGET IS ABOUT 89 PERCENT OF THE FINAL FY83 BUDGET AND ONLY SLIGHTLY MORE THAN HALF THE FY82 BUDGET.

-- THE DECLINE IN ACTUAL INVESTMENT IN THE SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES IN THE PAST COUPLE YEARS IS BASICALLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE HIGH LEVEL OF INFLATION IN ISRAEL AND THE BUDGET STRINGENCIES THE GOI IS FACING. IT ALSO REFLECTS MORE MARGINALLY THE INCREASED EMPHASIS, RELATIVELY SPEAKING, BEING PUT ON SETTLEMENT IN AREAS OUTSIDE THE WEST BANK, PARTICULARLY IN THE GALILEE AND THE NEGEV/ARAVA REGION. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEREAS 41 PERCENT OF THE HOUSING MINISTRY FY83 SETTLEMENT BUDGET WAS ORIGINALLY EARMARKED FOR THE WEST BANK (JUDEN, SAMARIA AND THE JORDAN VALLEY), IN FACT ONLY 34 PERCENT WENT TO THE WEST BANK. ON THE OTHER HAND, HOUSING MINISTRY RESOURCES GOING TO GAZA AND THE NEGEV/ARAVA REGION AND THE GALILEE AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS INCREASED. THE DECLINE MAY ALSO BE RELATED TO THE EXCESS CAPACITY IN COMPLETED UNITS AND UNITS UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN THE SETTLEMENTS COMPARED TO THE NUMBER OF ISRAELIS PREPARED TO MOVE TO THE SETTLEMENTS.

-- IN THE PAST, THE PRIVATE SECTOR HAS MADE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN THE TERRITORIES, ON THE BASIS OF COOPERATION WITH THE GOI AND GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND GUARANTEES. HOWEVER, PRIVATE SECTOR
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INTEREST IN HOUSING CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY IN THE TERRITORIES ALSO APPEARS TO BE DECLINING. THUS, THE PRIVATE SECTOR IS UNLIKELY TO COMPENSATE FOR THE DECLINE IN GOI EXPENDITURES.

-- IN SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES WE WILL EXAMINE PAST, PRESENT AND PLANNED HOUSING CONSTRUCTION AND OCCUPANCY RATES IN THE SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES. END COMMENT.

11. COORDINATED WITH CONGEN JERUSALEM.

12. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED BEIRUT AND KUWAIT. LEWIS

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PBTS, IS, JO
SUBJECT: JERUSALEM POST EDITORIAL ON PLANNED HEBRON
SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A JANUARY 17 JERUSALEM POST
EDITORIAL ENTITLED "SEARCH FOR SCAPEGOATS," WHICH
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DEALS WITH THE GOI'S INTENTION TO SETTLE IN DOWNTOWN

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HEBRON. BEGIN TEXT:

AVERTING ECONOMIC RUIN AND EXTRICATING THE IDF FROM THE MORASS OF LEBANON WOULD SEE TO BE AWESOME ENOUGH TASKS FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO FOCUS ON AT ONE TIME. YESTERDAY, HOWEVER, A HIGH-LEVEL PANEL OF MINISTERS WAS DUE TO MEET ON AN ISSUE THAT WOULD SEEM, ON THE FACE OF IT, TO BE RATHER FAR FROM URGENT--THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AN EXPANDED JEWISH QUARTER INSIDE HEBRON. IT WAS ONLY BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE DEFENSE MINISTER, BOTH OF WHO WERE AWAY ATTENDING MAJOR SA'AD HADDAD'S FUNERAL AT MARJAYOUN, THAT THE MEETING WAS PUT OFF FOR A FEW DAYS.

SPECIFICALLY, WHAT THE PANEL IS DUE TO APPROVE IS THE REMOVAL OF THE ARAB MARKET IN HEBRON TO MAKE WAY FOR JEWISH HOUSING. PREPARATIONS FOR SUCH A MOVE HAVE BEEN UNDERWAY FOR SOME TIME NOW. IN THE MEANTIME THE LEGAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN CLEARING RIGHTS TO THE FORMERLY JEWISH-OWNED LAND HAVE PRESUMABLY BEEN SOLVED. ALL THAT IS NEEDED IS TO RELOCATE THE ARAB WHOLESALERS AND VENDORS, AND MOST OF THESE, IT IS BELIEVED, WILL GO ALONG PEACEFULLY WITH THE PLAN. BUT THE RELOCATION PROCESS WILL TAKE A LONG WHILE, AND EVEN A START ON THE WORK OF RECONSTRUCTION, WITH FUNDS MOSTLY OBTAINED IN THE U.S., IS AT BEST A FEW YEARS OFF. THIS, INDEED, IS THE ANSWER TO THOSE--

SOME EVEN WITH HERUT--WHO CLAIM THAT THE TIMING OF THE DECISION, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF HECTIC MOVES FOR BUDGET CUTS, IS ALL WRONG.

BUT IF THE PROJECT IS NOT READY FOR IMPLEMENTATION,

WHY THE HASTE IN CALLING A MEETING TO APPROVE IT?

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THE ANSWER SEEMS TO BE THAT IT WAS THOUGHT POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT. WHETHER INTENTIONALLY OR NOT, YESTERDAY'S SCHEDULED MINISTERIAL CONCLAVE WAS IN THE NATURE OF AN OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO KING HUSSEIN'S ADDRESS TO THE RECONVENED JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT, IN WHICH HE CALLED FOR A "PRACTICAL FORMULA" TO REUNITE HIS KINGDOM. ISRAEL'S RESPONSE WAS NOT, AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, THAT ANY RESTORATION OF JORDANIAN SOVEREIGNTY ON THE WEST BANK WOULD HAVE TO BE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF FULLY FLEDGED PEACE

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WITH ISRAEL.

ISRAEL'S RESPONSE, IN EFFECT, WAS THAT THE HASEMITE KINGDOM WOULD NEVER, EVEN IF IT FORMALLY JOINED THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, BE ALLOWED TO REGAIN ANY FOOTHOLD IN WHAT ISRAEL WILL ALWAYS CALL JUDEA AND SAMARIA.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE JEWISH QUARTER IN HEBRON IS NOT, DESPITE OFFICIAL RHETORIC TO THE CONTRARY, AN EXERCISE IN PEACEFUL JEWISH-ARAB COEXISTENCE. IT DOES NOT SIMPLY PROCLAIM THE RIGHT OF JEWS TO THEIR LOST PROPERTIES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE--AND IT WILL CERTAINLY NOT LEAD TO ANY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PALESTINIANS UNDER ISRAELI RULE TO REPOSSESS THEIR PROPERTIES ON THIS SIDE OF THE LINE. IT DOES NOT EVEN ANNOUNCE THE RIGHT THE JEWS TO LIVE, AMONG ARABS, IN ALL PARTS OF ERETZ YISRAEL.

WHAT IT DOES IS TO DECLARE THAT THIS LAND, FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN TO THE JORDAN RIVER, IS THE LAND OF THE JEWS, TO WHICH FOREIGNERS, SUCH AS THE JORDANIANS, WILL BE GRANTED NO ACCESS, EVEN IF SUCH ACCESS IS SECURED IN THE UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION 242, TO WHICH ISRAEL IS SUPPOSEDLY COMMITTED. IT MAY BE IMPORTANT FOR THE GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY AT A TIME WHEN A SLOW-DOWN IS BEING PLANNED ON SETTLEMENT IN THE TERRITORIES, TO MAKE THIS DEMONSTRATION OF ITS FEALTY TO A CARDINAL ARTICLE OF LIKUD FAITH. BUT

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ITS MAIN IMPACT MAY WELL BE TO REVIVE WHAT THE LIKUD DOES NOT WANT, NAMELY U.S. EFFORTS TOWARD JORDAN AND THE PLO REGARDING THE REAGAN PLAN. END TEXT.
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 03130E.O. 12356: DECL: 03/04/89
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: STATUS OF SETTLEMENTS IN GAZA
REFS: A) 82 TEL AVIV 13465, B) TEL AVIV 16651. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.2. SUMMARY: ABOUT 900 PERSONS--OVER 150 OF THEM
SOLDIERS--ARE LIVING IN EXISTING SETTLEMENT SITES
IN THE GAZA STRIP. THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 350
UNITS--20-25 PERCENT OF THEM TEMPORARY STRUCTURES.
ANOTHER HUNDRED OR SO PERMANENT HOUSING UNITS ARE
EITHER UNDER CONSTRUCTION OR SOON WILL BE, AND
HOUSING IS CLEARLY IMPROVING AND TAKING ON A
MORE SOLID, "PERMANENT" CHARACTER. HOWEVER, THE
OCCUPANTS OF THESE NEW UNITS WILL BE MOSTLY
SETTLERS WHO HAVE BEEN LIVING IN SMALL AND RATHER
PRIMITIVE-LOOKING PREFABS, RATHER THAN NEW ARRIVALS
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TO GAZA, ALTHOUGH THE SETTLERS AND THE GOI HOPE

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THAT SOME NEWCOMERS WILL MOVE INTO THE PREFABS AND OTHER EXISTING STRUCTURES. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, MOST OF THE SETTLERS IN GAZA WILL PROBABLY REMAIN NATIONALISTICALLY-MOTIVATED ORTHODOX JEWS CONCERNED ABOUT MAINTAINING A JEWISH PRESENCE IN THE REGION FOR SECURITY AND IDEOLOGICAL REASONS.
END SUMMARY.

3. THE FOLLOWING DESCRIPTIONS OF THE 13 EXISTING SETTLEMENT SITES IN GAZA ARE BASED ON MARCH 1 VISIT BY EMBASSY OFFICER WHO ALSO TALKED WITH A NUMBER OF THE SETTLERS INCLUDING THE "MAYOR" OF THE KATIF BLOC OF SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTHERN GAZA:

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ELE SINAI

LOCATED AT THE NORTHERN END OF GAZA, ABOUT A KILOMETER FROM THE SEA ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE ROAD FROM EREZ. ELE SINAI IS ONE OF THE SETTLEMENTS WHOSE CREATION THE JOINT MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON SETTLEMENTS APPROVED ON SEPTEMBER 5, 1982 (REFTEL A). IT CONSISTS OF 4 SMALL PREFAB "DUPLEXES"--I.E., 8 HOUSING UNITS--PLUS A BUS WHICH MAY BE USED FOR STORAGE. EMBASSY OFFICER OBSERVED ONLY 2 PERSONS--SOLDIERS--AT THE SITE.

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NISANIT

ESTABLISHED IN 1982 IN NORTHERN GAZA NEAR ROUTE 4, NISANIT REMAINS A NAHAL POPULATED BY ABOUT 60 SOLDIERS HOUSED IN PREFABS. A RESIDENT TOLD
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EMBASSY OFFICER THAT NISANIT MAY BECOME A SETTLEMENT IN ABOUT A YEAR. THE SOLDIERS ENGAGE IN CARPENTRY AND AGRICULTURE AND HAVE SOME LIVESTOCK. THE SITE HAS NO PAVED STREETS.

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NEZARIM

LOCATED SOUTH OF GAZA CITY, NEZARIM WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1980. IT CONSISTS OF ABOUT HALF A DOZEN PREFABS.

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PLUS WHAT APPEARS TO BE A NEW TWO-STORY BUILDING WITH TWELVE SMALL UNITS, EVIDENTLY FOR SINGLE OR DOUBLE OCCUPANCY. SOME OF THE MEN AT THE SITE WERE IN MILITARY UNIFORM. A RESIDENT TOLD EMBASSY OFFICER THAT 12 FAMILIES LIVE AT THE SITE. HE SAID THAT FLOWER GROWING IN HOTHOUSES IS THE MAIN ACTIVITY AT THE SITE AND THAT THERE ARE NO PLANS TO ADD MORE SETTLERS. ACCORDING TO RESIDENTS OF THE KATIF BLOC SETTLEMENTS (SEE BELOW), RESIDENTS OF NEZARIM WILL MOVE TO PERMANENT HOUSING IN THE KATIF BLOC AS UNITS BECOME AVAILABLE THERE.

--
KAFAR DAROM

ESTABLISHED IN 1970, THIS SITE IN CENTRAL GAZA WAS NOT OBSERVED ON MARCH 1. IT IS NOT IDENTIFIED IN THE FY83 BUDGET REPORT OF THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION (REF 8) AS A SETTL WHERE NEW HOUSING IS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, AND, FOR THE PURPOSES OF OUR ANALYSIS (BELOW), WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT ITS POPULATION REMAINS ABOUT WHAT IT WAS IN JULY 1982--I.E., 35 PERSONS. ACCORDING

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TO RESIDENTS OF A KATIF BLOC SETTLEMENT, FAMILIES
FROM KEFAR DAROM WILL MOVE TO PERMANENT HOUSING
IN THE KATIF BLOC.

--
NEVE DEQALIM

ESTABLISHED IN 1982, THIS SITE IN SOUTHERN GAZA IS
PLANNED AS THE REGIONAL CENTER FOR THE KATIF
BLOC OF SETTLEMENTS, WHICH INCLUDES THE EIGHT
SITES DISCUSSED BELOW.

ABOUT 70 HOUSES ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION. ACCORDING
TO THE "MAYOR" OF THE CENTER, THE HOUSES WILL BE
READY FOR OCCUPANCY THIS SUMMER AND FALL. MANY
OF THE UNITS WERE BROUGHT TO THE SITE
FROM YAMIT AFTER IT WAS EVACUATED. AN ATTRACTIVE
SCHOOL AND SEVERAL OTHER BUILDINGS WHICH WILL HOUSE
A TOWN HALL, AND MEDICAL AND OTHER SERVICE
FACILITIES FOR SETTLERS IN THE KATIF BLOC HAVE

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BEEN COMPLETED. THERE ARE NO PAVED STREETS IN
THE SETTLEMENT. AT PRESENT TWO FAMILIES AND 100

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RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT "HESDER YESHIVA" SOLDIERS LIVE ON THE SITE. ABOUT 40 FAMILIES TEMPORARILY HOUSED IN OTHER SETTLEMENTS IN THE BLOC AS WELL AS, IN OTHER SETTLEMENT SITES IN GAZA WILL BEGIN TO MOVE INTO THIS SETTLEMENT AS THE HOUSES UNDER CONSTRUCTION ARE COMPLETED.

MEZER HAZZANI

ESTABLISHED IN 1973, THIS APPEARS TO BE A PROSPEROUS MOSHAV (A NON-COMMUNAL FARMING SETTLEMENT). IT HAS ABOUT 60 PERMANENT UNITS. NONE APPEAR TO BE OF RECENT CONSTRUCTION.

KATIF

ESTABLISHED IN 1978, KATIF IS A SEMI-COMMUNAL MOSHAV (MOSHAV SHITUF). IT HAS 32 HOUSING UNITS, 20 OF WHICH ARE OCCUPIED BY PERMANENT RESIDENTS AND SEVERAL MORE BY FAMILIES WHICH PLAN TO MOVE INTO NEVE DEQALIM THIS SUMMER. NO UNITS ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION. RESIDENTS TOLD EMBASSY OFFICER THAT 4 MORE UNITS MAY BE BUILT AT SOME INDEFINITE TIME IF VACANT UNITS ARE OCCUPIED. THE RESIDENTS ARE MOSTLY IMMIGRANTS FROM THE U.S. AND OTHER ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES.

GANEI TEL

A PROSPEROUS-LOOKING MOSHAV ESTABLISHED IN 1978-79.
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THERE ARE 60 UNITS, 42 ARE OCCUPIED BY MEMBERS OF THE MOSHAV AND 11 OTHERS BY FAMILIES WHICH WILL MOVE TO NEVE DEQALIM. NO UNITS ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION, BUT A RESIDENT SAID THERE ARE PLANS TO BUILD 20 MORE.

GADID

ESTABLISHED IN 1982, THIS SITE HAS 36 HOUSES, 27 OF WHICH ARE OCCUPIED. THREE OF THE FAMILIES WILL MOVE TO ANOTHER SETTLEMENT IN THE KATIF

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BLOC.

GANOR

ESTABLISHED IN 1982, GANOR HAS 50 PERMANENT
UNITS. THERE ARE NO PAVED STREETS AND SETTLERS
HAVE NOT MOVED IN YET. THE RESIDENTS WILL
COME FROM NEZER HAZZANI, KEFAR DAROM, AND MOR G
(BELOW), WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN LIVING IN
TEMPORARY HOUSING.
--

BEDOLAH

NOT OBSERVED. A RESIDENT OF MORAG TOLD EMBASSY
OFFICER MARCH 1 THAT THERE ARE NO STRUCTURES
AT BEDOLAH. CONSTRUCTION OF UNITS WILL BEGIN
THIS YEAR. AND THE FIRST FAMILIES WILL MOVE
IN AROUND THE END OF 1984. THE MORAG RESIDENT
SAID 60-70 UNITS ARE PLANNED.
--

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PRESENTLY ACCESSIBLE ONLY BY AN UNSURFACED ROAD, THIS PRIMITIVE-LOOKING SITE CONSISTS OF ABOUT 30 PREFAB UNITS, 20 OF WHICH ARE OCCUPIED. A RESIDENT SAID THAT 5 TO 10 NEW FAMILIES WILL MOVE IN OVER THE NEXT 2 YEARS AND THAT WORK WILL BEGIN ON PERMANENT HOMES IN THIS SAME PERIOD.

MORAG

ESTABLISHED IN 1982, THIS SITE HAS ABOUT 25 UNITS. TWELVE FAMILIES WITH A TOTAL OF 26 CHILDREN LIVE AT THE SITE. THE RESIDENTS WILL MOVE TO BEDOLAH AS PERMANENT HOMES ARE COMPLETED THERE.

4. COMMENT: AT THIS POINT, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE GOI PLANS TO ESTABLISH ANY NEW SETTLEMENTS

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IN GAZA BEYOND THE ONES DISCUSSED ABOVE. THE THIRTEEN EXISTING SITES HAVE ABOUT 400 UNITS

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EITHER COMPLETED OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION WITH AN ESTIMATED CAPACITY OF ABOUT 1,350. AT LEAST SIXTY OF THESE UNITS ARE PREFABS, WHICH ARE OBVIOUSLY NOT INTENDED AS PERMANENT DWELLINGS OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS UP TO A HUNDRED ADDITIONAL UNITS MAY BE BUILT. THESE WOULD BE PERMANENT DWELLINGS, SUITABLE FOR FAMILIES. THE TOTAL POPULATION AT THE EXISTING SITES IS ABOUT 900 OF WHICH AT LEAST 160 ARE SOLDIERS. TWO TRENDS ARE DISCERNIBLE: (1) THE RESIDENTS OF THE UNITS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND PLANNED WILL HOUSE PRIMARILY SETTLERS ALREADY LIVING IN GAZA RATHER THAN NEW ARRIVALS, AND (2) THE KATIF BLOC IS THE MAJOR FOCUS OF PRESENT AND PLANNED SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN GAZA. WHILE HOUSING FOR SETTLERS IS CLEARLY IMPROVING AND THE KATIF BLOC SETTLEMENT ARE TAKING ON A MORE "PERMANENT" CHARACTER, THE SETTLER POPULATION DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE RAPIDLY EXPANDING, ALTHOUGH IT WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO GROW INCREMENTALLY. THIS IS NOT SURPRISING GIVEN THE DISTANCE OF THE SITES FROM ISRAEL'S MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS, THE GENERALLY UNATTRACTIVE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT, AND THE POTENTIALLY HOSTILE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT. THE SUPERIOR "QUALITY OF LIFE" ARGUMENT WHICH IS USED WITH RESPECT TO THE WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS NEAR JERUSALEM AND TEL AVIV DOES NOT APPLY TO GAZA, WHILE EQUIVALENT HOUSING IN THE NEGEV/ARAVA REGION OF ISRAEL PROPER WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE MUCH MORE EXPENSIVE. IN THE EYES OF MANY OF THE PRESENT RESIDENTS--AND UNDOUBTEDLY OF THE GOI--
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THE SETTLEMENTS SERVE A SECURITY FUNCTION. ALSO, THE KATIF BLOC SETTLERS ARE MOSTLY RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT JEWS, A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF THEM PERSONS EVACUATED FROM YAMIT IN THE SINAI, WHO FEEL THEY ARE FULFILLING A NATIONAL DUTY BY SETTLING IN AN AREA WHICH THEY CONSIDER SHOULD BE PART OF ISRAEL. END COMMENT. LEWIS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: 02/01/89

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EFIN, IS, EAID

SUBJECT: SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:

PART I--THE BUDGET

REFS: A) STATE 15785, B) 82 TEL AVIV 3322, C) STATE 28873

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY:

--WE ESTIMATE THE OFFICIAL GOI SETTLEMENT BUDGET FOR
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN FY83 WILL BE BETWEEN
\$116 AND \$121 MILLION. THIS IS \$12 TO \$17
MILLION LOWER THAN ESTIMATED GOI EXPENDITURES
FOR THIS PURPOSE IN FY82. AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS,
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TOTAL INVESTMENT ON SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES

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WILL BE LARGER THAN THE BUDGET FIGURES INDICATE. DUE TO INPUTS BY OTHER GOI MINISTRIES SUCH AS DEFENSE, INTERIOR, INDUSTRY AND TRADE, AND TRANSPORTATION. HOWEVER, AS THESE ADDITIONAL INPUTS ARE NOT IDENTIFIED IN THE BUDGET AS DESIGNATED FOR THE TERRITORIES, WE ARE UNABLE TO ESTIMATE HOW MUCH OF AN ADD-ON TO THE DECLARED BUDGET THEY REPRESENT.

THE EXPECTED DECLINE IN EXPENDITURE FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES COMPARED TO FY82 APPEARS TO BE THE RESULT--AT LEAST IN PART--OF OVERALL GOI BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS. OTHER LIKELY FACTORS ARE (1) THE INCREASED GOI EMPHASIS ON SELF-BUILDING BY OWNERS AND BY PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS; (2) THE GOVERNMENT'S EMPHASIS ON "CONSOLIDATING AND EXPANDING" EXISTING SETTLEMENTS RATHER THAN ON THE MORE EXPENSIVE TASK OF ESTABLISHING NEW SETTLEMENTS; AND (3) A GREATER ALLOCATION OF GOI RESOURCES TO SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN PRE-1967 ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

3. INTRODUCTION: BUDGET FOR SETTLEMENTS IN ISRAEL
AND THE TERRITORIES

THE OFFICIAL GOI SETTLEMENT BUDGET IS CONTAINED IN THE BUDGETS OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING. THE BUDGETS FOR THESE MINISTRIES FOR THE ISRAELI FISCAL YEAR WHICH BEGINS APRIL 1 (FY83) WERE PRESENTED TO THE
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KNESSET ON JANUARY 10. THE FIRST OF THE THREE REQUIRED "READINGS" OF THE BUDGET IN THE KNESSET OCCURED ON JANUARY 25. THE RELEVANT FIGURES FOR EXPENDITURES FOR SETTLEMENTS IN FY83 AND THE TWO PRECEDING YEARS--EXTRACTED FROM THE BUDGET PRESENTATIONS OF THE TWO MINISTRIES--ARE CONTAINED IN THE TABLES IN PARAS 8-10 BELOW.

THE TWO BUDGET REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE BASIC GOI FY83 BUDGET FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED

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TERRITORIES AND WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF PRE-1967 ISRAEL WILL BE 7,422 MILLION SHEKELS, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE SETTLEMENT PROGRAMS WILL RECEIVE 2,692 MILLION SHEKELS, WHILE THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION IS TO GET 4,730 MILLION SHEKELS. USING THE GOI'S PROJECTED AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATE FOR FY83 (52 SHEKELS EQUALS \$1.00), THIS TRANSLATES INTO \$143 MILLION FOR SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN ISRAEL PROPER AND IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

4. BASIC SETTLEMENT BUDGET FOR THE TERRITORIES

THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE FY83 BUDGET FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES IS IDENTIFIED AS 2,692 MILLION SHEKELS (NO FIGURE IS GIVEN FOR SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY WITHIN ISRAEL PROPER) OR \$52 MILLION.

THE DATA IN HOUSING MINISTRY BUDGET (PARA 10) DO NOT PERMIT US TO DETERMINE THE EXACT HOUSING MINISTRY APPROPRIATION FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES. THE MINISTRY'S BUDGET REPORT GIVES A FIGURE FOR THE WEST BANK (JUDEA, SAMARIA,

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AND JORDAN VALLEY)--1,920 MILLION SHEKELS.
HOWEVER, THE REPORT TREATS THE GALILEE AND THE
GOLAN HEIGHTS AS ONE REGION. THE BUDGET REPORT
PROVIDES ONLY ONE FIGURE (1,610 MILLION SHEKELS)
FOR THE "REGION" WITHOUT EXPLICITLY INDICATING
HOW MUCH WILL GO FOR THE GALILEE OR GOLAN.
SIMILARLY, ONLY ONE FIGURE (1,200 MILLION SHEKELS)
IS GIVEN FOR GAZA AND THE NEGEV/ARAVA REGION.
HOWEVER, ON THE BASIS OF THE BUDGET'S DESCRIPTION
OF SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES PLANNED FOR THESE
VARIOUS AREAS DURING FY83, WE ESTIMATE THAT
ABOUT FIFTY PERCENT (1,405 MILLION SHEKELS) OF
THE SUM OF THE TWO FIGURES (2,810 MILLION SHEKELS)
WILL BE SPENT IN THE GOLAN AND GAZA. THUS, WE
EXPECT THE HOUSING MINISTRY BUDGET FOR SETTLEMENTS
IN THE TERRITORIES WILL BE ABOUT 3,325 MILLION
SHEKELS (1,920 PLUS 1,405) OR \$64 MILLION.
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THE INITIAL SETTLEMENT BUDGET FOR THE TERRITORIES

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WILL THUS BE ABOUT \$116 MILLION.

5. FY83 BUDGET IS SMALLER THAN FY82 BUDGET

COMPARED TO THE ESTIMATED GOI FY82 SETTLEMENT BUDGET FIGURE FOR ISRAEL AND THE TERRITORIES OF 3,863 MILLION SHEKELS (WHICH TRANSLATES INTO \$155 MILLION USING THE GOI'S PROJECTED AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATE FOR FY82 OF 25 SHEKELS EQUALS \$1.00), THIS YEAR'S ESTIMATED INITIAL SETTLEMENT BUDGET FOR ISRAEL AND THE TERRITORIES DECLINED BY ABOUT \$12 MILLION. AS FOR FY83, HOUSING MINISTRY DATA DO NOT PERMIT US TO DETERMINE EXACTLY WHAT THE FY82 SETTLEMENT BUDGET FOR THE TERRITORIES WAS, BUT WE ESTIMATE IT AT ABOUT 3313 MILLION SHEKELS (\$133 MILLION). THUS, THIS YEAR'S SETTLEMENT BUDGET FOR THE TERRITORIES COULD BE ABOUT \$17 MILLION LESS THAN LAST YEAR. HOWEVER, AS DISCUSSED BELOW, (PARA 6) THE DIFFERENCE COULD BE SOMEWHAT SMALLER ONCE SUPPLEMENTARY APPROPRIATIONS DURING FY83 ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

6. SUPPLEMENTARY APPROPRIATIONS

AS IN PAST YEARS, THERE WILL PROBABLY BE SUPPLEMENTARY APPROPRIATIONS DURING FY83, WHICH COULD RESULT IN A SOMEWHAT LARGER SETTLEMENTS BUDGET. HOWEVER, AS IN PAST YEARS, THESE SUPPLEMENTARY APPRO-
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PROPRIATIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE RELATIVELY SMALL, WITH THE MAJOR ADJUSTMENTS TO KEEP INFLATION FROM ERODING THE REAL VALUE OF THE EXPENDITURES. SETTLEMENT EXPENDITURES IN FY82 EXCEEDED LAST YEAR'S INITIAL BUDGET BY ONLY \$4 MILLION. WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE SUPPLEMENTARY APPROPRIATIONS IN FY83 WILL BE ABOUT \$5 MILLION. WHEN ADDED TO OUR ESTIMATE OF THE BASIC BUDGET FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES FOR FY83, THIS YIELDS A TOTAL PROBABLE BUDGET FOR THE YEAR OF \$121 MILLION.

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7. INPUTS FROM OTHER MINISTRIES

AS IN PAST YEARS, FUNDS CONTROLLED BY OTHER MINISTRIES--SUCH AS THE DEFENSE MINISTRY, AND THE TRANSPORTATION, INDUSTRY AND TRADE AND INTERIOR MINISTRIES--WILL BE USED TO SUPPORT SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE TERRITORIES. WE ARE UNABLE TO ESTIMATE THE AMOUNT OF THESE ADDITIONAL INPUTS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THEY ARE SIGNIFICANT IN TERMS OF PROVIDING INFRA-STRUCTURE TO THE SETTLEMENTS, EVEN CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT SOME OF THESE ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURES WILL BE ON THE BASIS OF TRANSFERS OF FUNDS FROM THE HOUSING AND AGRICULTURE MINISTRIES TO OTHER ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.
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8. SUMMARY OF AGRICULTURE MINISTRY'S FY83
- SETTLEMENT BUDGET

FY83

(FIGURES ARE IN) (FORECAST)

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MILLIONS OF SHEKELS)

TOTAL MINAG DEVELOPMENT
BUDGET FOR PRE-67 ISRAEL
AND THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES-----6521

TOTAL FOR NEW SETTLEMENTS
IN THE TERRITORIES-----2692

JUDEA AND SAMARIA
(INCLUDING ETZION BLOC)-----1067.5

JORDAN VALLEY-----656.3

KATIF BLOC (GAZA) AND
HEBRON SLOPES-----449
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GOLAN HEIGHTS-----519.3

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NOTE 1: MINISTRIES MAY OBLIGATE AMOUNTS BEYOND THE BASIC APPROPRIATION, ON THE CONDITION THAT THESE ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS WILL NOT BE DISBURSED UNTIL THE SUCCEEDING FISCAL YEAR, EXCEPT AS SUPPLEMENTARY AUTHORIZATIONS MAY PROVIDE.

NOTE 2: NO FIGURES ARE GIVEN FOR PRE-1967 ISRAEL.

9. SUMMARY OF AGRICULTURE MINISTRY'S FY81 AND
FY82 SETTLEMENT BUDGETS:

	FY1982	FY1981
(FIGURES ARE IN (ESTIMATED) (ACTUAL)		
MILLIONS OF SHEKELS)		

TOTAL MINAG
DEVELOPMENT BUDGET FOR
PRE-67 ISRAEL AND THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES-----3485-----1754

TOTAL FOR NEW SETTLE-
MENTS IN THE TERRITORIES-----1363-----805

JUDEA AND SAMARIA
(INCLUDING ETZION
BLOC)-----543.6-----403.85

JORDAN VALLEY-----378-----171.25
KATIF BLOC (GAZA) AND
HEBRON SLOPES-----210.6-----102.1
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(INCLUDING RAFA STRAIT
AND SINAI)
GOLAN HEIGHTS-----230.4-----127.9

10. MINISTRY OF HOUSING: ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
TO SETTLEMENTS BY REGION
1982

	MILLIONS OF SHEKELS	PERCENT
JUDEA, SAMARIA		

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AND JORDAN VALLEY-----1400-----56
GALILEE AND GOLAN-----660-----26

KATIF BLOC (GAZA),
NEGEV AND ARAVA
(SOUTHERN NEGEV)-----440-----18
TOTALS-----2500-----100

1983

MILLIONS OF SHEKELS AT 83 PRICES	MILLIONS OF SHEKELS AT 82 PRICES	PERCENT

JUDEA, SAMARIA
 AND JORDAN VALLEY-----1920-----920-----41
 GALILEE AND GOLAN-----1610-----770-----34

KATIF BLOC (GAZA),
NEGEV AND ARAVA
(SOUTHERN NEGEV)-----1200-----570-----25

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TOTALS-----4730-----2260-----100

11. COMMENT: THE SMALLER SETTLEMENT BUDGET
FORECAST FOR FY83 TRACKS WITH INDICATIONS THAT
OVERALL GOI BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS AFFECT
EXPENDITURES FOR SETTLEMENTS AS WELL. FOR EXAMPLE,
A WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION SETTLEMENTS DEPARTMENT
OFFICIAL RECENTLY PREDICTED THAT BOTH THE CURRENT
AND COMING YEARS WOULD BE LEAN ONES FOR SETTLEMENT
AND THAT A SLOWDOWN IN THE RATE OF SETTLEMENT
MIGHT THEREFORE BE EXPECTED. THE INCREASED GOI
EMPHASIS ON THE SELF-CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSES BY
INDIVIDUAL SETTLERS AND ON CONSTRUCTION BY
PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS APPEARS TO REFLECT AN
EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THIS REALITY. OTHER FACTORS
ARE THE GOI'S EMPHASIS ON CONSOLIDATING EXISTING
SETTLEMENTS (WHICH IS CHEAPER THAN ESTABLISHING
NEW SETTLEMENTS); AND SOME DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON
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THE GOI TO DEVOTE GREATER ATTENTION TO SETTLEMENT
ACTIVITY IN THE GALILEE (WHICH IS LOSING JEWISH

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POPULATION), AND TO REBUILD SOME OF ISRAEL'S
POORER NEIGHBORHOODS. END COMMENT.

12. COORDINATED WITH CONGEN JERUSALEM, LEWIS

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USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY ROME
USLO RIYADH
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
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USCINCEUR FOR POLAD, BRUSSELS FOR USEC
E.O. 12356: DECL: 09/07/88
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, IS, US
SUBJ: GOI SIGNALS INTENTION TO AVOID SETTLEMENT FREEZE
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1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

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2. SUMMARY: ON SEPTEMBER 5 THE JOINT MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON SETTLEMENTS DECIDED THAT EIGHT NEW SETTLEMENTS WOULD BE CREATED ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. SENIOR ISRAELI OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED REJECTION OF A SETTLEMENTS FREEZE, BUT HAVE ALSO DENIED THAT SUNDAY'S DECISIONS WERE A RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE GOI INTENDED TO SIGNAL THAT THE PRESIDENT'S CALL FOR A SETTLEMENTS FREEZE WOULD NOT "DETER" ISRAEL FROM PROCEEDING WITH THE SETTLEMENTS PROGRAM.
END SUMMARY.

--
3. THE SEPTEMBER 5 DECISION BY THE JOINT MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON SETTLEMENTS INDICATES THAT PLANS WILL NOW GO FORWARD FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF THREE PRESETTLEMENTS (NAHALS) INTO NEW SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK (SUSIA, KOCHVA, AND GINNAT). TWENTY MILLION ISRAELI SHEKELS (ABOUT U.S. DOLLARS 741,000) HAVE BEEN ALLOTTED FOR EACH OF THE THREE SETTLEMENTS ON WHICH 50-60 FAMILIES REPORTEDLY WILL SETTLE IN THE "FIRST STAGE." THE COMMITTEE ALSO APPROVED "IN PRINCIPLE" THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FOUR NEW SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK (AT NEGOHOT, ADORA, OMARIN AND YAKIN) AND ONE IN NORTHERN GAZA (AT ELE SINAY FOR YAMIT EVACUEES). HOWEVER, NO GOI FUNDS HAVE YET BEEN ALLOCATED FOR THESE SETTLEMENTS.

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4. SENIOR GOI OFFICIALS, SUCH AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE
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FOR SETTLEMENT AFFAIRS SIMHA EHRLICH, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER DAVID LEVI AND MINISTER-WITHOUT-PORTFOLIO YITZAK MODAI, HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PLANS FOR THE NEW SETTLEMENTS HAD BEEN IN THE WORKS FOR SOME TIME. THEY MAINTAINED THE SEPTEMBER 5 ANNOUNCEMENT WAS NOT IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE, AND THAT IT WAS SIMPLY A COINCIDENCE THAT IT CAME ONLY A FEW DAYS AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH. MODAI SPECIFICALLY SAID ON SEPTEMBER 6 THAT THE NEW SETTLEMENTS WERE NOT IN RETALIATION BUT A CONTINUATION OF LIKUD POLICY. HE CLAIMED THEY

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WERE IN LINE WITH THE U.S. UNDERSTANDING OF CAMP DAVID (SIC) AND THAT THEY DO NOT IMPAIR THE PEACE PROCESS.

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5. DIRECTLY ADDRESSING THE NEGATIVE U.S. REACTION TO THE SETTLEMENTS DECISION, MODAI ADDED THAT THERE HAD NEVER BEEN SUCH A REACTION PREVIOUSLY AND SUGGESTED THAT THE REACTION IN THIS INSTANCE MIGHT REFLECT SECRETARY SHULTZ' PERSONAL OPINION. AT THE SAME TIME, THESE SAME OFFICIALS EMPHASIZED THAT JEWS HAVE A "NATURAL RIGHT TO SETTLE ANYWHERE IN ERETZ ISRAEL," THAT THE U.S. POSITION ON THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE WAS "UNACCEPTABLE," AND THAT THE GOI COULD NOT BE SEEN AS ACCEDING TO THE U.S. POSITION. EHRLICH, FOR EXAMPLE, CHARACTERIZED THE ATTEMPT TO "FOIL OR INFLUENCE" THE GOI TO STOP JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN ERETZ ISRAEL AS "AN UNJUSTIFIED AND EVEN IMMORAL IMPOSITION." HE ADDED THAT ANY POSTPONEMENT OF SUNDAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED AS HAVING BEEN DETERRED (BY THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH) AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD NO INTENTION OF BEING DETERRED.

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6. QUITE COINCIDENTALLY, WHEN DEFENSE MINISTER
SHARON MET WITH DAS DRAPER AND THE AMBASSADOR
SEPTEMBER 5, THE PARTY ARRIVED TO FIND SETTLEMENT
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MAPS SPREAD ACROSS THE CONFERENCE TABLE AND A
GOI OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTLEMENTS PRESENT.

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IN A SCARCELY DISGUISED MANNER, SHARON SAID THAT WHILE THE SETTLEMENTS HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED AT THE WEEKLY CABINET MEETING EARLIER IN THE DAY, HE WAS "TAKING INVENTORY" AND MENTIONED THAT A SETTLEMENTS GROUP WAS MEETING "UPSTAIRS" AT THAT VERY MOMENT. IN ADDITION, SEPTEMBER 7, INDEPENDENT DAILY HAARETZ REPORTED THAT ON THE SAME DAY (SEPTEMBER 1) AS THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS, SHARON ORDERED A SPEED UP OF THE LAYING OF HIGHWAYS IN THE WEST BANK TO SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW STRONGHOLDS IN MOUNTAINOUS AREAS (DETAILS BY SEPTTEL).

7. COMMENT: DESPITE THE OFFICIAL DENIALS, THE GOI MUST HAVE BEEN AWARE THAT A SETTLEMENT DECISION AT THIS TIME, EVEN WHILE NOT CONVEYED IN THE OFFICIAL CABINET COMMUNIQUE, WOULD BE WIDELY INTERPRETED AS A DELIBERATE REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. THE GOI IS CLEARLY SIGNALING ITS INTENTION TO PROCEED WITH AND EVEN INTENSIFY ITS PLANS FOR NEW SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS A TANGIBLE MANIFESTATION OF ITS DISCONTENT WITH THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE PLAN AND CALL FOR A SETTLEMENTS FREEZE. END COMMENT.

8. MINIMIZE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS CONSIDERED.
LEWIS

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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NEA FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PBOR, PDEV, IS, JO
SUBJECT: SETTLEMENTS IN THE MEDIA

1. A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF WHAT CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS PRO-SETTLEMENTS "HYPE" HAS SURFACED IN THE ISRAELI MEDIA IN THE PAST WEEK. PROMINENT AMONG THESE WERE THE REMARKS OF CHIEF OF STAFF EITAN THAT "SINCE THE SIX-DAY WAR ALL OF ISRAEL IS OURS. THERE IS NO LONGER ANY GREEN LINE; IT HAS ALL BEEN ERASED. IT IS ALL ERETZ ISRAEL." HE ADDED THAT MANY MORE JEWISH SETTLEMENTS SHOULD BE BUILT IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA.

2. SUBSEQUENTLY, ISRAEL RADIO REPORTED SEPTEMBER 8 AN APPARENTLY NEW GOVERNMENT PLAN TO SETTLE AN ADDITIONAL 150,000 JEWISH SETTLERS IN THE WEST BANK WITHIN THE NEXT FOUR YEARS. WZO SPOKESMAN ZEEV BEN-JOSEF, HOWEVER, ASSURED POLOFF THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS IN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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FACT ONLY THE RESTATEMENT BY NEW DEPUTY MINISTER

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OF AGRICULTURE MIKHAIL DEKEL OF THE PREVIOUSLY
PUBLISHED DROBLES PLAN.

3. STILL A THIRD ITEM, A JERUSALEM POST PUBLIC OPINION
POLL REVEALED 52.8 PERCENT OF ALL RESPONDENTS FAVORING
UNLIMITED FUTURE SETTLEMENT IN THE WEST BANK.
LESS THAN 20 PERCENT WERE OPPOSED TO FUTURE SETTLEMENTS,
AND A FURTHER 20 PERCENT WOULD FAVOR ADDITIONAL
SETTLEMENT SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS.

4. COMMENT. THESE CONSTANT REITERATIONS OF GRANDIOSE
SETTLEMENTS PLANS ARE INTENDED TO CONFER A KIND OF
LEGITIMACY TO THE ENTIRE WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS
ENTERPRISE. THIS HAS BEEN REFLECTED IN PUBLIC OPINION
POLLS OVER THE LAST YEAR SHOWING A STEADILY INCREASING
PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION SUPPORTING AN AGGRESSIVE
WEST BANK SETTLEMENT EFFORT. END COMMENT
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E.O. 12065: GDS 8/3/87 (HILL, CHARLES) OR-M

TAGS: PBOR, PGOV, PINT, PEPR, IS, EG, JO, PLO

SUBJECT: NEW COALITION AGREEMENT LIKELY TO ENDORSE

- ISRAELI CLAIM TO WEST BANK AND GAZA

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FORMAL COALITION AGREEMENT
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WIND UP TODAY (AUGUST 3), IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT A

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FORMAL STATEMENT ASSERTING ISRAELI CLAIMS OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WILL BE INCLUDED, AN ACT WHICH IS VIEWED BY MANY AS A HARDENING OF THE GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATING POSITION. THE AMENDMENT, REPORTEDLY MADE AT THE SUGGESTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER, WILL PLEDGE THE GOVERNMENT TO REASSERT ISRAELI CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AT THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR AUTONOMY PLAN.

3. THE PROPOSED CHANGE DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE LAST COALITION AGREEMENT IN 1977. ACCORDING TO THE EARLIER FORMULATION, ASSERTION OF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY WOULD NOT BE MADE "AS LONG AS NEGOTIATIONS ON A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS ARE BEING HELD."

4. HOWEVER, AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT IN MAY 1977, MR. BEGIN SUBMITTED TO THE CABINET FOR RATIFICATION A NEW AUTONOMY PLAN WHICH ASSERTED THAT:

-- "ISRAEL WILL NOT TOLERATE NOR PERMIT A PALESTINIAN STATE IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA;

-- "ISRAEL WILL CLAIM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS INALTERABLE RIGHT TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE TERRITORIES OF JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA, AT THE END OF THE FIVE YEARS OF AUTONOMY."

THEN, MINISTERS DAYAN, WEIZMAN, YADIN AND KATZ OPPOSED THIS STRONGER LANGUAGE WHICH WAS NOT FORMALLY SUBMITTED TO EGYPT AND THE UNITED STATES. INSTEAD, IT WAS HANDLED AS AN INTERNAL GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT TO
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GUIDE THE ISRAELI AUTONOMY NEGOTIATING TEAM.

5. THE COALITION AGREEMENT WILL PROBABLY NOT INCLUDE AN ASSERTION OF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, BUT SOME LIKUD SOURCES HAVE NOT RULED THIS OUT ENTIRELY.

6. COMMENT: WITH WEIZMAN AND DAYAN NOW GONE, BEGIN APPARENTLY FEELS HE CAN ELEVATE THE STRONGER LANGUAGE TO "OFFICIAL STATUS" AS PART OF THE FORMAL COALITION

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AGREEMENT, THUS GIVING THE ISRAELI AUTONOMY TEAM
VERY LITTLE NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY. AT THE SAME TIME,
AS CORRESPONDENT DAVID LANDAU POINTED OUT IN THE
AUGUST 3 JERUSALEM POST, THIS HARDER POSITION CAN BE
SEEN AS AN EXPRESSION OF DESIRE RATHER THAN INTENT
SINCE THE GOVERNMENT'S TENURE IS SHORTER THAN THE
FIVE-YEAR PERIOD UNDER THE AUTONOMY PLAN. BROWN

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UNCLAS TEL AVIV 12284

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, IS, EG, SY, JO

SUBJECT: NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT POLICY GUIDELINES ON THE
WEST BANK, GAZA, AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

REFS: (A) TEL AVIV 12215, (B) TEL AVIV 12100

1. THE FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION
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OF THE RELEVANT SECTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S BASIC

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POLICY GUIDELINES DEALING WITH THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE GUIDELINES, ALONG WITH BEGIN'S NEW CABINET, WERE PRESENTED TO THE KNESSET AUGUST 5 AND A VOTE WILL BE TAKEN AT APPROXIMATELY 2300 HOURS AUGUST 5 LOCAL TIME. (FYI: STATEMENTS ON THESE SENSITIVE SUBJECTS WERE NOT INCLUDED AFTER ALL IN THE COALITION AGREEMENT - REF B. END FYI.)

2. COMMENCE QUOTE: THE GOVERNMENT SHALL ACT TOWARDS THE RENEWAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT REGARDING FULL AUTONOMY FOR THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF JUDEA, SAMARIA, AND THE GAZA STRIP.

3. AT THE END OF THE INTERIM PERIOD, STIPULATED IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, ISRAEL SHALL CLAIM AND ACT TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER JUDEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA STRIP.

4. THE AUTONOMY ACCORDS, REACHED AT CAMP DAVID, ARE THE GUARANTY THAT, UNDER NO CONDITIONS WHATSOEVER, WILL A PALESTINIAN STATE BE ESTABLISHED IN TERRITORIES OF THE LAND OF ISRAEL. THE AUTONOMY AGREED UPON AT CAMP DAVID IS NOT A STATE, IS NOT SOVEREIGNTY AND IS NOT SELF-DETERMINATION.

5. SETTLEMENT IN THE LAND OF ISRAEL IS A RIGHT AND AN INSEPARABLE PART OF THE NATION'S SECURITY. THE GOVERNMENT SHALL CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE RULE THAT JEWISH SETTLEMENT NOT CAUSE THE EVICTION OF ANY PERSON FROM HIS LAND, VILLAGE OR TOWN.

6. THE GOVERNMENT WILL ACT TOWARDS THE REINFORCEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE JEWISH SETTLEMENTS

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ESTABLISHED AND TOWARDS STRENGTHENING THE HOLD ON THEM. THE GOVERNMENT WILL ACT TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS AND TOWARDS THE EXPANSION OF JEWISH SETTLEMENTS IN ALL THE TERRITORIES OF THE HOMELAND. THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO AVOID WAR.

7. ISRAEL SHALL NOT DESCEND FROM THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND SHALL NOT REMOVE ANY SETTLEMENT ESTABLISHED ON GOLAN. IT WILL BE UP TO THE GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE

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ON THE APPROPRIATE TIMING FOR THE APPLICATION OF
THE STATE'S LAW, JURISDICTION AND ADMINISTRATION
TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. END QUOTE. BROWN

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 05504

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PBOR, PDEV, IS, JO
SUBJECT: GOI STATEMENT ON WEST BANK LAND
1. FOLLOWING IS THE COMPLETE TEXT OF A JERUSALEM POST
ARTICLE BY DAVID RICHARDSON, APRIL 6, ENUMERATING RECENT
WEST BANK LAND ALLOCATIONS FOR ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS. THESE
NEW FIGURES ARE OFFERED BY THE ISRAEL INFORMATION CENTER
IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE IN A EFFORT TO RECTIFY
"ERRONEOUS AND MISLEADING DATA" RECENTLY PUBLISHED IN
THE WORLD MEDIA.

- COMMENCE TEXT. A TOTAL OF 200,000 DUNAMS (50,000
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ACRES) HAS BEEN ALLOCATED TO JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN THE

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WEST BANK, INCLUDING 36,004 DUNAMS SINCE LAST JULY, ACCORDING TO FIGURES RELEASED YESTERDAY BY THE ISRAEL INFORMATION CENTRE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE.

- A LARGE PART OF THE LAND ALLOCATED FOR JEWISH SETTLEMENT SINCE LAST JULY -- 30,000 DUNAMS -- WAS CLASSIFIED BY THE INFORMATION CENTRE AS "STATE LAND." BUT THIS FIGURE IS CONTRADICTED BOTH BY LAWYERS HANDLING COURT CASES AGAINST THE TAKE-OVER OF "STATE LAND," AND A SENIOR JUSTICE MINISTRY SOURCE WHO CONFIRMED THAT THE FIGURE IS MUCH LARGER.

- THE TWO ISRAELI LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT MOST OF THE PETITIONERS IN THE 17 CASES CURRENTLY BEFORE THE COURTS, ELIAS KHOURY AND FELICIA LANGER, MAINTAIN THAT BETWEEN THEMSELVES THEY ARE HANDLING A TOTAL OF NEARLY 40,000 DUNAMS WHICH THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS DECLARED "STATE LAND."

- THE SENIOR JUSTICE MINISTRY SOURCE TOLD THE JERUSALEM POST LAST WEEK THAT SOME 20,000 DUNAMS HAVE BEEN ALLOCATED TO SETTLEMENTS IN THE ARIEL AND SHOMRON AREA AND ANOTHER 20,000 IN SOUTHERN JUDEA IN THE AREA OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF MITZPE GUVRIN. IN ADDITION, SOME 17,000 DUNAMS EAST OF ABU DIS HAVE ALSO BEEN DECLARED STATE LAND, THE SOURCE SAID.

- THE INFORMATION CENTRE SAID IT PUBLISHED ITS FIGURES TO RECTIFY "ERRONEOUS AND MISLEADING DATA" RECENTLY PUBLISHED IN THE WORLD MEDIA. THIS DATA, THE CENTRE MAINTAINS, WAS INCORRECT IN REGARD TO "THE EXTENT OF THE ALLOCATIONS AND THE NATURE OF THE ALLOCATED LANDS."

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- THE GOVERNMENT'S LATEST SETTLEMENT DRIVE AIMS TO RESETTLE SOME 30,000 PEOPLE IN UP TO 80 SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK BY ELECTION DAY. THE CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY AN ACCELERATED SEARCH FOR LANDS WHICH ARE EITHER FREE OF ARAB LANDOWNERS OR APPARENTLY UNCONTESTED.

- THE SEARCH FOR UNCONTESTED LAND FOLLOWED THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE RULING 18 MONTHS AGO ORDERING THE DISMANTLING OF THE GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENT OF EILON MOREH OVERLOOKING NABLUS. THE COURT RULED THAT JEWISH SETTLE-

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MENTS COULD ONLY BE ESTABLISHED ON PRIVATE LAND FOR CLEAR-CUT REASONS OF SECURITY.

- FOLLOWING THE COURT'S DECISION, THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AIDED BY JUSTICE MINISTRY LAND EXPERTS UNDERTOOK AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF LAND IN THE WEST BANK TO DETERMINE WHERE AND HOW MUCH LAND WAS AVAILABLE FOR SETTLEMENT. THIS SURVEY IS CONSIDERED ONLY PRELIMINARY AND IS DUE TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.

- THE REVIEW CONFIRMED THAT AT MOST ONLY 50 PER CENT OF THE LAND IN THE WEST BANK HAD UNDERGONE THE LEGAL PROCESS OF RESOLVING OWNERSHIP AND FINALLY REGISTERING TITLE. THIS LEGAL PROCESS STARTED UNDER THE BRITISH MANDATE AND WAS CONTINUED BY THE JORDANIANS BUT STOPPED AFTER THE 1967 SIX DAY WAR.

- YESTERDAY'S STATEMENT BY THE INFORMATION CENTRE SAYS THAT MUCH OF THE LAND ALLOCATED FOR JEWISH SETTLEMENT IS CONSIDERED "STATE LAND." BUT A SENIOR JUSTICE MINISTRY OFFICIAL ADMITS THIS TERM HAS NO REAL FORMAL BASIS IN THE APPLICABLE LAND LAW.

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- LAND LAW IN THE WEST BANK IS COMPLEX AND OBSCURE, HAVING ITS ORIGINS IN THE OTTOMAN MEJALLAH AND CIVIL CODE. THE BRITISH MANDATE, AND LATER THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT, INTRODUCED A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT CHANGES, AND THE ISRAEL MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS PUBLISHED ORDERS WHICH HAVE ALSO AFFECTED QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURE IN LAND CASES BUT NOT THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF LAND.

- ACCORDING TO VARIOUS LAND EXPERTS - INCLUDING GOVERNMENT LAWYERS - "STATE LAND" IN FACT REFERS TO TWO SEPARATE CATEGORIES KNOWN BY THE OTTOMAN TERMS OF MIRI AND MEWAT.

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- MIRI -- A TERM DERIVED FROM THE WORD "EMIR" -- REFERS TO A POOL OF LAND RESERVED FOR BUILDING AND AGRI-

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CULTURE 2.5 KILOMETRES AROUND EACH VILLAGE. UP TO THE SIX DAY WAR VILLAGERS COULD EARN TITLE TO MIRI LAND EITHER BY AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVEREIGN POWER OR BY WORKING THE LAND FOR 10 CONSECUTIVE YEARS. AFTER THE SIX DAY WAR THE ONLY WAY TO EARN SUCH TITLE WAS THROUGH 10 CONSECUTIVE YEARS OF WORKING THE LAND. OWNERSHIP OF MIRI LAND ACQUIRED THROUGH WORK LAPSES IF THE LAND IS NOT WORKED FOR 10 CONSECUTIVE YEARS.

- THE TERM "STATE LAND" AS USED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN AREAS WHERE MIRI APPLIES MEANS THOSE PARTS OF THE MIRI PLOT OF WHICH NO OWNERSHIP WAS RECORDED IN THE LANDS REGISTRY, OR TABU AS IT IS POPULARLY KNOWN.

- HEWAT OR "DEAD LANDS" ARE THOSE BEYOND THE MIRI AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP IS VERY RARE IN THIS CATEGORY.

- ATTORNEY KHOURY WROTE A LONG LETTER TO ATTORNEY-GENERAL YITZHAK ZAMIR IN FEBRUARY COMPLAINING THAT THE PROCEDURE OF DECLARING "STATE LANDS" PLACED AN UNFAIR BURDEN OF PROVING OWNERSHIP ON THE PEASANTS WHO CLAIMED TITLE TO IT.

- JUSTICE MINISTRY SOURCES FEEL THAT KHOURY'S LETTER WAS BEHIND MANY OF THE REPORTS PUBLISHED ABROAD ABOUT THE LATEST RUSH IN SETTLEMENT.

- YESTERDAY'S INFORMATION SHEET PROVIDES A BREAKDOWN OF WHERE LANDS WERE ALLOCATED, THE LARGEST BEING 5,900 DUNAMS FOR ARIEL IN JANUARY THIS YEAR.

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- THE FIGURES PROVIDED DO NOT REFER TO LANDS DECLARED CLOSED OR SEIZED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES OR AREAS AROUND SETTLEMENTS WHERE BUILDING HAS BEEN FORBIDDEN. UNOFFICIAL HQAT SINCE 1967 UP TO A THIRD OF THE WEST BANK HAS BEEN CLOSED, SEIZED OR PURCHASED FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PURPOSES. THE LARGEST TRACTS ARE THE EASTERN PART OF THE JUDEAN DESERT AND THE JORDAN VALLEY. END TEXT.

2. WE WILL OFFER COMMENTS AFTER OBTAINING COPY OF THE INFORMATION SHEET. LEWIS

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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E.O. 12065: RDS-1,4.7/9/01 (HILL, CHARLES) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, PEPR, IS
SUBJECT: GAZANS CONCERNED OVER TIGHTENING MILGOV GRIP
1. (U) ISRAEL MEDIA OVER PAST TWO DAYS CARRIED THE
FOLLOWING REPORTS ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO GAZA:

-- UNRWA COMMISSIONER-GENERAL RYDBECK LAST WEEK MADE A
FORMAL COMPLAINT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OVER THE
DEMOLITION BY SECURITY ELEMENTS RECENTLY OF SEVERAL
HOMES BELONGING TO THE FAMILIES OF PERSONS APPREHENDED
FOR TERRORIST ACTS. CITING THE DESTRUCTION OF A
TOTAL OF SEVEN DWELLINGS ON MAY 17 AND JUNE 22 -- AND
THE RESULTANT DESTITUTION OF APPROXIMATELY 76
INDIVIDUALS -- RYDBECK SCORED THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT
FOR IMPLEMENTING "COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT" AND DEMANDED
THAT FULL COMPENSATION BE PAID. RESPONDING TO A
QUERY ABOUT THE UNRWA PROTEST, AN ISRAELI OFFICIAL
TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE DEMOLITIONS WERE NECESSARY
BECAUSE THE BUILDINGS HAD HOUSED "TERRORISTS OR
WEAPONS" AND THAT THE INNOCENT WOULD BE COMPENSATED IN
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ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PRACTICE

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-- THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS ISSUED A WRITTEN ORDER RESTRICTING RED CRESCENT CHAIRMAN HAYDAR ABDEL-SHAFI TO THE GAZA AREA FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS, THEREBY CONFIRMING A VERBAL BAN THAT HAS BEEN IN EFFECT FOR ABOUT A YEAR. AN EARLIER APPEAL BY ABDEL-SHAFI TO THE HIGH COURT TO LIFT THE RESTRICTION, MEANWHILE, HAS BEEN REFERRED TO A MILITARY REVIEW COMMITTEE, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO RENDER A DECISION IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS.

2. (C) THOUGH NOT IN AND OF THEMSELVES EXTRAORDINARY, SUCH MILGOV ACTIONS ARE IN LINE WITH OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN RECENT WEEKS WHICH GAZANS REGARD AS INDICATIVE OF A CONSCIOUS HARDENING OF ISRAELI POLICY. THESE INCLUDE, INTER ALIA,

-- THE ARROGATION TO AN ENTITY DIRECTLY UNDER MILGOV CONTROL OF THE GAZA MUNICIPALITY'S AUTHORITY TO LICENSE NEW CONSTRUCTION;

-- RIGID ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATIONS (OVERLOOKED IN THE PAST) THAT REQUIRE LOCAL MERCHANTS TO CHARGE 12 PERCENT VALUE-ADDED TAX, AS IN ISRAEL PROPER;

-- ISSUANCE OF NEW I.D. CARDS THROUGHOUT THE STRIP;

-- AN INCREASE IN IDF SECURITY PATROLS, LEADING TO AN UPSWING IN "HARASSING" SPOTCHECKS.

3(C)COMMENT: COL KRAIM ZADOK, ARAB AFFAIRS ADVISER TO THE COORDINATOR FOR THE ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES, TOLD POLOFF LAST MONTH THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO POLICY DECISION TO CRACK DOWN HARDER ON GAZA -- AN

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ASSERTION THAT IS GENERALLY BACKED BY SUCH CLOSE OBSERVERS OF THE TERRITORIES AS SHILOAH ANALYSTS ZVI ELPELEG AND ELIE REKHESS. ACCORDING TO REKHESS, THE TIGHTENING OF CONTROLS IS RELATED TO SECURITY, ECONOMIC OR ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS, AND HAS OCCURRED NOT BECAUSE OF A POLICY SHIFT, BUT RATHER IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY POLICY AT ALL. SINCE THERE IS NO FULL-TIME DEFENSE MINISTER, HE CONTENDS, MILGOV INITIATIVES AIMED AT EFFECTING OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE RARELY EXAMINED CAREFULLY FOR POLITICAL

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IMPACT, BUT INSTEAD ARE ALMOST ROUTINELY APPROVED.
WE SUSPECT THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF TRUTH IN THIS
PERCEPTION. END COMMENT. LEWIS

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January 5, 1983

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Date: 3/5/16

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Alternative Scenarios for Departure
of the MNF from Lebanon

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Now that the negotiations for withdrawal of foreign forces are underway, we need to address again the role which an expanded MNF would play during and after withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and the timing of the MNF's departure. Decisions about the appropriate mission for the MNF should flow from our objectives in Lebanon. These include supporting efforts by the central government to extend its authority throughout the country and fostering conditions which will prevent attacks on Israel from Lebanese territory.

In an important sense, however, our objectives in Lebanon are derivative: One measure of the success of our Lebanon policy would be the extent to which it facilitates the mideast peace process. Conversely, a policy which resulted in the US becoming politically and militarily tied down in Lebanon could be judged a failure.

One key consideration in defining the role of an expanded MNF will be the duration of its deployment in Lebanon. That issue, in turn, poses a serious dilemma for US policy. On the one hand, there are good reasons to withdraw US forces from Lebanon as soon as possible. On the other hand, there are strong arguments in favor of remaining longer in Lebanon to enhance the possibility of the LAF being able to provide security and stability in a larger portion of the country.

This paper describes the competing incentives we face and suggests three alternative responses in the form of scenarios for departure of the MNF:

° Prompt MNF departure (e.g., 30-60 days) following withdrawal of all foreign forces.

° Short-term MNF presence (e.g., 6 months) following withdrawal of all foreign forces.

° Longer-term MNF presence (e.g., 1-2+ years) to give the LAF a longer preparation period before it attempts to provide adequate security nation-wide.

Prospects for Lebanon

It is assumed that once foreign forces withdraw Lebanon will not face any substantial external threats to its security. Syrian and Israeli forces are unlikely to re-enter Lebanon; the threat of

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Israeli retaliation provides an added incentive for Syrian forces to stay out. Although more problematical, we also can assume that there will be no serious effort by the PLO to re-infiltrate. Nevertheless, as recent events in Tripoli and the Chouf illustrate, persistent violence is likely to remain a fact of life in Lebanon until the various Lebanese factions can reach a mutually acceptable political accommodation. The withdrawal of Syrian, Israeli, and PLO forces may create a security vacuum in which the situation actually worsens for a time.

No military force--neither an expanded MNF nor a rebuilt LAF--can ensure internal stability and security in the absence of an accommodation among the confessional parties. Nevertheless, the internal security situation should improve gradually if the program to rebuild Lebanese military capabilities proceeds as planned. Even on the basis of that optimistic timetable, however, LAF capabilities will be little more than marginal for at least another year and are unlikely to achieve the goal of a seven battalion force for another two years. It is not clear that tying down US forces in Lebanon for the additional 12-30 months or more probably needed, with a real prospect of casualties, would be worth the political, military, and economic costs it would require.

During that interval, moreover, US responsibility for events in Lebanon which it cannot control will steadily increase. Since the prospects for a secure, stable Lebanon ultimately depend upon agreement among the factions, we cannot be optimistic that the situation will be markedly better 12 or 30 months after withdrawal of foreign forces than it is now.

We assume that, in the context of agreement on the withdrawal of foreign forces, the MNF will be expanded to perhaps twice its present size. Such a force could play a useful role in deterring PLO reinfiltration, discouraging Phalange activities, and building GOL confidence.

No one, however, expects an expanded MNF to be able to assume all of the LAF's responsibilities nor to be able to prevent outbreaks of fighting. A six to seven battalion force may be little more than politically culpable observers: large enough to be blamed for events in Lebanon, but too small in size (and probably limited in mandate) to have much influence over them. Finally a specific, near-term departure date for the MNF may be a necessary incentive for the GOL both to take the difficult steps needed to launch and sustain LAF improvements and the perhaps hazardous initiatives required to forge the indispensable internal political consensus.

Such a prognosis argues for departure of the MNF a short interval following the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. The US could take credit for a successful withdrawal agreement and concentrate its political and military energies elsewhere. There also is a good case, however, for rejecting such a course of action.

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Prompt departure of the MNF could result in a short-term victory evolving into a long-term debacle for which the US is held accountable. The preeminent US role over the past six months ensures that we will be blamed (even as we try to reap the credit) for what ensues, whatever the status of the MNF. The President's personal involvement, the legacy of the refugee camp massacres, and the long shadow which events in Lebanon continue to cast over the mideast peace process are further obstacles to any efforts to distance ourselves.

Perhaps equally important, the content of the MNF mandate--including its duration--may make an important contribution to securing the agreement of the Israelis, Syrians, and PLO to withdraw. For the Israelis, the MNF may be a valuable complement to security arrangements provided in the withdrawal agreement. For the PLO, the MNF may be the necessary assurance that the Palestinians who remain in Lebanon will be safe. For the Syrians, the MNF may seem the best available deterrent to another Israeli invasion. Each of these players, for his own reasons, therefore may prefer a longer rather than shorter MNF deployment.

The same political considerations probably will discourage a phase out of US forces prior to the departure of the bulk of the MNF. The other MNF contributors also may insist that US forces remain prominently involved while their forces are deployed in Lebanon. Finally, practical factors such as the dependence of the LAF and other MNF contributors on US logistical or combat service support may preclude an early US withdrawal.

The constructive role which the MNF could play following the withdrawal of foreign forces also should not be ignored. As noted above, its presence could help deter PLO reinfiltration and Israeli over-reaction as well as help build LAF confidence. Depending on its mandate, the assets at its disposal also could help quell outbursts of violence within the country.

In brief, there are strong arguments--based more on necessity than choice--for a longer term MNF deployment. They do not, however, clearly outweigh the case for a rapid MNF departure. In light of these competing considerations, there appear to be three alternatives for determining the duration of the MNF's deployment in Lebanon.

Alternative Departure Scenarios

The following options are based on differences in the duration of the MNF's deployment and in the mandate of the force.

1. Prompt MNF Departure. The mandate of the MNF would be to oversee the withdrawal of foreign forces and to ensure their continued separation during the disengagement phase of the withdrawal process. The MNF would depart within 30-60 days after withdrawal had been completed. Internal security would be

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the responsibility of the LAF. UNIFIL would assist in providing security. UNIFIL protection of the refugee camps, if that were politically feasible, would result in an international presence throughout the country without the appearance of a force which was directed either at the Israelis or Syrians.

This option most closely resembles the mandate and responsibilities of the first MNF during the departure of the PLO from West Beirut. It has the advantages of an early departure described above. By tying the MNF's rationale to the disengagement/withdrawal process and assigning a continuing security mission to UNIFIL, it attempts to mitigate some of the disadvantages of an early departure described above.

The LAF will be unable to perform an internal security mission countrywide for a year or more, even in the problematical event that significant progress is made in reaching a domestic political accommodation. The attractiveness of this option, therefore, may depend heavily upon the willingness and ability of the UNIFIL force to help provide security throughout Lebanon. The UNIFIL mandate probably would have to be modified and the force might have to be strengthened (e.g., by the addition of a Belgian battalion currently under consideration for the MNF). The future of UNIFIL, however, is uncertain as some contributors have indicated a desire to withdraw their contingents and others have expressed reluctance to become involved in internal security missions (including protection of the refugee camps), particularly given the prospect of continuing inter-communal violence. The need to return to the Security Council for a revised mandate also would expand Soviet opportunities for mischief.

2. Short-term MNF Presence. The mandate of the MNF under Option 2 would be to strengthen GOL confidence and authority during the initial phase following withdrawal and to impart momentum to the LAF rebuilding process. During this period, the MNF would be deployed at key locations (e.g., main access routes). It would depart on a specified date (e.g., June 30 when the training/and deployment of the first four brigades should be well underway).

The presence of the MNF during this period should help deter reinfiltration and discourage some internal strife. The expanded MNF (like the current MNF in Beirut), however, would have no direct security responsibilities beyond observing and reporting incidents to the LAF. UNIFIL would assist the LAF in providing security, especially for the refugee camps.

This option attempts to strike a middle ground between a prompt MNF departure and a longer term presence. By setting a specific date for departure, it is intended to avoid making the MNF's withdrawal hostage to the creation of a secure situation in Lebanon and to the success of the LAF rebuilding effort--which has been very slow in getting underway--as well as to provide incentives to the LAF to implement a difficult program on time. It runs the risk of the MNF being held responsible if security

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conditions deteriorate during its deployment. The same circumstances also could generate strong pressures to extend the MNF's deployment until security conditions had improved.

Like Option 1, this alternative assumes that UNIFIL will be available and willing to perform the camp security mission. Although the continued presence of the MNF will be a deterrent to external and some internal security threats, this alternative also assigns security responsibilities to the LAF which it will be unable to perform countrywide for a year or more.

3. Longer-term MNF Presence. The mandate of the MNF under Option 3 would be to assist the LAF in maintaining internal security and deterring reinfiltration until the LAF were able to perform these functions adequately on its own. The Bartlett Report estimates that the seven brigade LAF needed to accomplish these missions could be available as soon as mid-1985 (i.e., about 30 months). An interim five brigade force could be available as soon as early 1984 (i.e., about 12 months). The UNIFIL force could provide additional assistance and might perform specific missions (e.g., security of the refugee camps).

This option has the advantages and disadvantages of a continuing MNF presence described above. It risks making the departure of the MNF hostage to the LAF's success in implementing an ambitious rebuilding program at the same time as it weakens the GOL's incentives to meet the demanding schedule required. It also increases the MNF's exposure to hostilities and increases the probability of casualties. Finally, it could generate pressures to increase the size of the MNF so that it could better perform its mission of direct support for the LAF.

This option assumes that the US and other MNF troop and financial contributors will be able and willing to sustain deployments for an additional 12 to 30 months. It also assumes that the internal situation will have improved sufficiently by that time both to permit its departure and justify the duration of its deployment. Finally it assumes that MNF contributors are prepared to support a mandate which would be likely to involve their respective forces in hostilities.

On the other hand, this alternative makes the weakest assumptions about LAF capabilities and about the availability and flexibility of a UNIFIL force. It provides the most compelling rationale for the MNF and may give the Lebanese the best chance of buying time to create the political conditions which will lead to a more enduring stability.

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
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E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 2/12/01 (HILL, CHARLES) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, IS
SUBJECT: MILGOV COMMANDER BEN-ELIEZER'S PERSPECTIVE
ON THE WEST BANK

REFS: (A) JERUSALEM 0330; (B) JERUSALEM 0333
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. INTRODUCTION AND COMMENT. PURSUANT TO LONGSTANDING
EMBASSY REQUEST, JUDEA AND SAMARIA MILITARY DISTRICT COM-
MANDER BRIG. GEN. BINYAMIN BEN-ELIEZER MET FEBRUARY 9 WITH
POLCOUNS, ECONCOUNS, TWO POLOFFS AND ARMA AT HIS HEAD-
QUARTERS IN BEIT EL TO PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT
OF THE CURRENT SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK. IN HIS PRE-
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SENTATION AND RESPONSES TO EMBASSY OFFICERS' QUESTIONS,

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BEN-ELIEZER WAS OFTEN DISCURSIVE, BUT HE ADHERED CLOSELY TO GOI POSITIONS OF RECORD, AND, FOR THE MOST PART, TOOK CARE NOT TO VENTURE ONTO WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS "POLITICAL" GROUND. DURING THE SESSION, WHICH LASTED ABOUT TWO HOURS, HE TOUCHED ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES, INCLUDING, INTER ALIA, THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, THE MILGOV'S HANDLING OF DISTURBANCES IN PUBLIC ORDER, ISRAELI POLICY GOVERNING THE TRANSFER OF JOINT (PLO-JORDANIAN) FUNDS, THE EXPLOITATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF WATER AND ELECTRICITY RESOURCES AND THE VIABILITY OF THE "JORDANIAN OPTION." HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS REMARKS FOLLOW. HIS OBSERVATIONS AND MILGOV STATISTICS ON SETTLEMENTS WILL BE SENT SEPTEL. END INTRODUCTION AND COMMENT.

3. BEN-ELIEZER OPENED WITH A DESCRIPTION OF HIS COMMAND, WHICH IS DIVIDED INTO FOUR PARTS: THE GOVERNMENT ("EVERYTHING FROM EDUCATION THROUGH EMPLOYMENT"), THE MILITARY (IDF AND SECURITY ELEMENTS), THE LEGAL BRANCH AND THE OFFICE OF THE ADVISER ON ARAB AFFAIRS. THE JUDEA AND SAMARIA AREA IS SPLIT INTO SEVEN MILITARY DISTRICTS (JERICHO, HEBRON, NABLUS, JANIN, TULKARM, RAMALLAH AND BETHLEHEM), AND CONTAINS A POPULATION OF BETWEEN 800,000 AND 850,000 PERSONS, 23 PERCENT OF WHOM LIVE IN THE "MAJOR" CITIES (HEBRON, BETHLEHEM, RAMALLAH AND NABLUS) AND APPROXIMATELY ONE-THIRD OF WHOM ARE STUDENTS. BEN-ELIEZER SAID HIS BUDGET, ALL UP, WAS MORE THAN "TEN BILLION LIRA" PER ANNUM -- ABOUT \$122 MILLION AT TODAY'S EXCHANGE.

4. BEN-ELIEZER CHARACTERIZED THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE POPULATION UNDER HIS CONTROL AS "EXCELLENT," REMARKING THAT EVEN SOME "EXTREMIST" MAYORS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED TO HIM THAT WEST BANKERS HAD ACHIEVED GREATER PROSPERITY IN 13 YEARS OF ISRAELI RULE THAN THEY COULD HAVE OBTAINED

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IN "100 YEARS" IN AN ARAB STATE. BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO CONCOMITANT PROGRESS ON THE POLITICAL SIDE. ACCORDING TO BEN-ELIEZER, THE AREA ABOUNDS IN "MODERATES," BUT, CONSISTENT WITH A 60-YEAR TRADITION, RESIDENT PALESTINIANS NEVER THINK IN TERMS OF "WHAT THEY WANT," BUT INSTEAD IN CONSONANCE WITH THE DICTATES OF AN "OUTSIDE" GROUP -- TODAY, THE PLO. THIS BEING THE CASE, SAID BEN-ELIEZER, DURING HIS APPROXIMATELY TWO-AND-ONE-HALF YEAR TENURE AS MILITARY GOVERNOR NO "MODERATE" HAS BEEN ABLE TO SIT DOWN WITH AN ISRAELI AND FREELY DISCUSS THE MAJOR POLITICAL

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PROBLEMS OF THE WEST BANK. HE IDENTIFIED EAST JERUSALEM ELECTRIC COMPANY CHAIRMAN ANWAR NUSEIBEH AS ONE SUCH LOCAL LEADER WHO MUST CONSTANTLY DEFER TO PLO GUIDANCE. 5. ELABORATING ON THIS GENERAL THEME, BEN-ELIEZER MAINTAINED THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION UNDER HIS CONTROL FAVORED MILGOV MEASURES AIMED AT KEEPING "EXTREMISTS" UNDER CHECK. HE COMMENTED THAT RECENTLY HE HAD MET WITH A GROUP OF 15 PALESTINIAN PROFESSORS ("I WILL NOT SAY EXACTLY WHOM OR WHY") WHO CASTIGATED HIM SHARPLY FOR PERMITTING "NON-MODERATE" ELEMENTS TO DOMINATE THE LOCAL UNIVERSITIES. BEN-ELIEZER SINGLED OUT NABLUS MAYOR BASSAM SHAKA AS BEING ONE OF THE MOST ACTIVE EXTREMISTS. SINCE RETURNING FROM MEDICAL TREATMENT ABROAD, HE SAID, SHAKA HAS TRIED TO "REVIVE" THE NATIONAL GUIDANCE COMMITTEE IN ORDER TO "BEGIN THE WHOLE THING AGAIN." ACCORDING TO BEN-ELIEZER, SHAKA HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING IN A MUCH MORE "CAREFUL, SOPHISTICATED AND CALCULATING" MANNER THAN BEFORE TO EXTEND HIS INFLUENCE, NOTABLY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS AND THE UNIVERSITIES. HIS EFFORTS, HOWEVER, HAVE MET WITH ONLY LIMITED SUCCESS -- LARGELY BECAUSE OF LOCAL ARAB RESISTANCE. BEN-ELIEZER MAINTAINED THAT THE MILGOV IMPOSED NO RESTRICTIONS WHATEVER ON EITHER SHAKA'S OR RAHALLAH MAYOR KARIM KHALLAF'S MOVEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK.

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA
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HE READILY ACKNOWLEDGED, ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT TRAVEL BANS REMAINED IN EFFECT ON "NINE" NATIONAL GUIDANCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS.

6. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION, BEN-ELIEZER DISCOUNTED THE NOTION THAT THE DRAMATIC FLARE-UPS OF THE PAST YEAR REFLECTED A GENERAL DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK, OR THAT THEY FORESHADOWED INCREASED TENSION. "FOR EVERY INCIDENT," HE SAID, "THERE IS AN EXPLANATION." ON MILGOV CROWD-CONTROL POLICY, HE STATED THAT SOLDIERS WERE UNDER STANDING ORDERS NOT TO EMPLOY LIVE FIRE UNLESS THEY BECAME ISOLATED AND THEIR LIVES WERE ENDANGERED. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY MUST SHOUT A WARNING AND (IF THAT FAILS) SHOOT IN THE AIR BEFORE AIMING AT THEIR ASSAILANTS' LEGS. EXCEPT IN SUCH INSTANCES OF EXTREME PERIL, SOLDIERS

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ARE ENJOINED FROM FIRING WITHOUT BEN-ELIEZER'S EXPRESS PERMISSION. IN A EFFORT TO PREVENT A REPETITION OF WHAT

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OCCURRED AT BIR ZEIT LATE LAST YEAR (WHEN A NUMBER OF YOUNG STUDENTS WERE SHOT IN THE LEGS). BEN-ELIEZER REMARKED THAT GREATER USE WOULD BE MADE OF WATER CANNONS, GAS AND RUBBER BULLETS.

7. DURING THE COURSE OF THE SESSION -- IN MOST CASES IN REPLY TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS -- BEN-ELIEZER ALSO MADE THESE OBSERVATIONS:

- -- THE MILGOV IS PREPARED TO TURN OVER "90 PERCENT" OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE LOCAL POPULATION, BUT THE ARAB LEADERS DON'T WANT TO COOPERATE -- OR BE SEEN TO BE COOPERATING -- IN SUCH A TRANSFER. THE "10 PERCENT" THAT MUST REMAIN DIRECTLY UNDER MILGOV CONTROL RELATES SOLELY TO SECURITY. (BEN-ELIEZER DID NOT REFER TO MOSHE DAYAN'S "UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL PLAN," AND MAY NOT HAVE HAD IT IN MIND. AT ONE POINT HE SPOKE OF THE UTILITY OF HAVING A LOCAL HOSPITAL DIRECTOR "COME WORK WITH ME" AS DIRECTOR OF HEALTH -- AN INDICATION, PERHAPS, THAT THE PROFFERED "90 PERCENT" TURNOVER WOULD BE COSMETIC RATHER THAN SUBSTANTIVE.)

- -- JORDANIAN INFLUENCE IN THE TERRITORIES AT THIS STAGE IS NOT "VALUABLE," BECAUSE HUSSEIN'S POLICY IS NOT "CLEAR." LOCAL LEADERS, IN ANY CASE, CONTINUE TO TAKE THEIR CUES ONLY FROM THE PLO.

- -- MILGOV REGULATION 854 WAS PROMULGATED ESSENTIALLY TO PUT THE UNIVERSITIES IN THE TERRITORIES "ON A LEGAL BASIS." STUDENTS FROM EAST JERUSALEM AND GAZA MUST GET THEIR "GREEN CARD" BEFORE STUDYING ON THE WEST BANK -- BUT THIS WAS OBTAINABLE WITHIN "36 HOURS." LECTURERS
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TEL AV 02465 02 OF 03 131135Z

FROM OUTSIDE THE WEST BANK SOMETIMES HAD TO WAIT LONGER, BUT GENERALLY RECEIVED MILGOV CLEARANCE "SOONER OR LATER." BEN-ELIEZER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE MILGOV HAS HAD DIFFICULTY IN IMPLEMENTING SOME PROVISIONS OF THE NEW REGULATION, AND DID NOT WANT TO PRESS THE ISSUE TOO HARD AT THIS POINT. THE PROBLEM, HE MAINTAINED, WAS NOT SO MUCH WITH THE NEW LAW AS WITH LOCAL LEADERS WHO, FOR POLITICAL REASONS, HAVE SEIZED ON THE IDEA OF AN "INDEPENDENT" SCHOLASTIC REGIME. (BEN-ELIEZER MENTIONED THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE NEW REGULATION -- WHICH, LIKE CONGEN JERUSALEM, WE BELIEVE TO BE ITS RAISON D'ETRE -- BUT DID

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NOT DWELL ON THEM.)

- -- THE MILGOV IS OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO PERMITTING THE PLO TO EXTEND ITS INFLUENCE THROUGH THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS FOR PROJECTS ON THE WEST BANK. AT THE SAME TIME, IT RECOGNIZES THAT LOCAL COMMUNITIES MAY SUFFER NEEDLESSLY IF OUTSIDE FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE FOR WORTHY UNDERTAKINGS BUT NOT USED. THEREFORE, IT ALLOWS SOME "BLACK MONEY" FROM SOURCES SUCH AS THE JOINT COMMITTEE TO BE TRANSFERRED FOR SPECIFIC, PRE-APPROVED PROJECTS.

- -- THE ISRAELIS HAVE SPENT "MUCH MONEY" SEEKING OUT AND EXPLOITING NEW WATER SOURCES ON THE WEST BANK -- AN IMPORTANT ENDEAVOR IN AN AREA WHERE "75 PERCENT" OF THE ECONOMY IS BASED ON AGRICULTURE. BUT SOME OF THE ARAB LEADERS, WHO WANT TO "DOMINATE," HAVE REFUSED TO ACCEPT ISRAELI ASSISTANCE. THUS, NABLUS' WATER SUPPLY COULD BE INCREASED BY A FACTOR OF "FOUR OR FIVE" IF MAYOR SHAKA WOULD STOP INSISTING THAT THE ARABS "MUST SUFFER."

- -- ELECTRICITY IS READILY AVAILABLE TO VILLAGES AND CITIES NEAR ISRAEL ELECTRIC COMPANY POWER LINES, AND "TENS"

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 AOS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-15 CIAE-00 EB-08
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 02465

OF COMMUNITIES HAVE BEEN HOOKED INTO THEM. WHERE ISRAELI
LINES ARE NOT AVAILABLE, GENERATORS ARE ALLOWED, AND IN
SOME CASES PROVIDED WITHOUT CHARGE. THE EAST JERUSALEM
ELECTRIC COMPANY, WHICH SERVES PRIMARILY RAMALLAH AND
BETHLEHEM, HAS EXPERIENCED (IN BEN-ELIEZER'S PHRASE)
"GREAT DIFFICULTIES" -- AND WILL "PROBABLY" END UP BEING
ABSORBED BY ITS ISRAELI COUNTERPART. (BEN-ELIEZER DID
NOT ADDRESS THIS CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE -- NOW PENDING IN
COURT -- EXCEPT IN THE MOST GENERAL TERMS.)
8. TO A QUERY RELATING TO THE VIABILITY OF THE JORDANIAN
OPTION, BEN-ELIEZER AT FIRST RESPONDED OBLIQUELY, RE-
MARKING THAT THE PROBLEM FACING ISRAEL WAS NOT ESSENTIALLY
"POLITICAL" IN NATURE, BUT ONE OF ITS "EXISTENCE OR
NON-EXISTENCE." HE ADDED "PRIVATELY," HOWEVER, THAT
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ISRAEL'S ONLY ALTERNATIVE AT THIS JUNCTURE WAS THE
"EGYPTIAN OPTION" -- I.E., THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS.

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"WHEN THE OTHER ARAB STATES DECIDE TO SIT DOWN AND TALK WITH ISRAEL," HE SAID, "THEY WILL FIND THAT THE MAJORITY OF US ARE QUITE WILLING TO COMPROMISE." LEWIS

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ACTION MEA-11

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E.O. 12065: GDS 1/21/87 (HILL, CHARLES) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, PDEV, IS, JO
SUBJECT: TWO MORE OF THE "LAST TEN" SETTLEMENTS
APPROVED

REFS: (A) TEL AVIV 00797, (B) TEL AVIV 00594
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN WHAT WAS DESCRIBED BY ISRAEL TV AS AN "EMERGENCY EXTRAORDINARY SESSION," THE JOINT GOI-WZO SETTLEMENTS COMMITTEE ON JANUARY 18 APPROVED TWO NEW SETTLEMENTS FOR CONSTRUCTION. THEY ARE REPORTED TO BE NILI, JUST BEYOND THE GREEN LINE NEAR THE ARAB VILLAGE NI'ILIN (ABOUT TEN KILOMETERS SOUTHEAST OF BEN-GURION AIRPORT), AND YAKIR B, HALF WAY BETWEEN ELKANA AND ARIEL. MEDIA REPORTS RECKON THESE TWO SETTLEMENTS AS THE FIFTH AND SIXTH OF THE "LAST TEN" PROMISED BY PRIME MINISTER BEGIN. BY OUR COUNT, HOWEVER, BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH WZO SETTLEMENTS DIVISION SPOKESMAN, ZEEV BEN-YOSEF THEY SHOULD BE NUMBERS THREE AND FOUR TO RECEIVE FINAL APPROVAL, ALTHOUGH NEITHER WERE AMONG THE FIVE SETTLEMENTS LISTED BY BEN-YOSEF AS BEING "IN THE PIPELINE" TOWARD FINAL APPROVAL (REF B).

3. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER YIGAL YADIN HAS ONCE AGAIN EXERCISED THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT'S RIGHT TO APPEAL
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SETTLEMENTS DECISIONS TO THE KNESSET FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND

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DEFENSE COMMITTEE AND HAS CONTESTED THE COMMITTEE'S DECISION TO ESTABLISH THREE ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENTS AT MITZPE GUYRIN, TEQOA B, AND HINANIT B (WHICH ARE AMONG THE FIVE MENTIONED IN REF B). (COMMENT: GIVEN YADIN'S PERFECT RECORD OF NEVER HAVING WON SUCH AN APPEAL, THIS SHOULD NOT SLOW DOWN THEIR FINAL APPROVAL FOR LONG. END COMMENT.)

4. OTHER PRESS REPORTS JANUARY 20 ELABORATED ON THE RECENT REQUEST OF WZO SETTLEMENTS DIVISION CHIEF MATITYAHU DROBLES FOR AN ADDITIONAL BUDGET OF 237.5 MILLION SHEKELS FOR SETTLEMENTS PURPOSES IN FY 81/82 (REF A). 150 MILLION SHEKELS OF THE REQUESTED ADDITIONAL AMOUNT WILL BE EARMARKED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE "LAST TEN" SETTLEMENTS, AT THE RATE OF 15 MILLION SHEKELS PER SETTLEMENT. 45 MILLION SHEKELS WILL FINANCE AN ADDITIONAL 430 HOUSING UNITS IN EXISTING WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS, BRINGING EACH SETTLEMENT UP TO A MINIMUM LEVEL OF 60 HOUSING UNITS. THE REMAINING 42.5 MILLION SHEKELS IS TO BE USED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF "MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD" WITHIN THE EXISTING SETTLEMENTS, WITH THE GOAL OF PROVIDING ON-SITE EMPLOYMENT FOR A MINIMUM OF 50 PERCENT OF THE WAGE EARNERS IN EACH SETTLEMENT. AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY, HOWEVER, WE SEE NO LIKELIHOOD OF AN ADDITIONAL BUDGET BEING APPROVED FOR SETTLEMENTS AT THIS TIME, DESPITE THE OBVIOUS SENSE OF URGENCY ON THE PART OF SHARON AND OTHER SETTLEMENTS ZEALOTS. LEWIS

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AM: DB10061-0201

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ACTION MEA-11INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-15 CIAE-00 EB-08
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TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, IS, JO, XF
SUBJECT: MAYOR SHAWA: SITTING TIGHT IN GAZA
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.2. ON FEBRUARY 3, EGYPT COUNTRY DIRECTOR ED PECK AND
POLOFF GREENLEE PAID A CALL ON MAYOR SHAWA IN HIS GAZA
CITY HOME. HOLDING FORTH FOR ABOUT AN HOUR, SHAWA,
ACCOMPANIED BY HIS SON MANSOUR, WAS CHARACTERISTICALLY
EXPANSIVE, ALTHOUGH HIS MOOD WAS SOMBER AND HIS OUTLOOK
QUITE BLEAK. AFTER REVIEWING ITS HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND, SHAWA REMARKED THAT THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE
WAS IN THE PROCESS OF "SNOWBALLING," A DEVELOPMENT
THAT BODES ILL FOR THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATIONS.
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AS WELL AS FOR THE ISRAELIS AND THE PALESTINIANS. AS

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THE SUPREME WORLD POWER, SHAWA SAID, THE UNITED STATES MUST MOVE SWIFTLY TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. IN HIS VIEW, PEACE WILL BE POSSIBLE ONLY WHEN ISRAEL CAN DEMONSTRATE TO THE NEIGHBORING ARAB STATES THAT IT HAS NO INTENTION OF EXPANDING INTO THEIR LAND OR OF DOMINATING THEM -- OR THE PALESTINIANS -- ECONOMICALLY OR POLITICALLY.

3. WHILE RESPECTFUL OF SADAT'S INTENTIONS (AND, BY IMPLICATION, THOSE OF THE U.S.), SHAWA COMMENTED THAT THE PROBLEM WITH THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS WAS THAT THEY ADDRESSED ONLY "SIDE ISSUES" INSTEAD OF COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE NEED FOR PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION. (WHEN PECK SUGGESTED THAT U.S. SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN ASPIRATIONS MIGHT BE EASIER TO OBTAIN IF THE PLO FIRST FORMALLY ACKNOWLEDGED ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, SHAWA INITIALLY BALKED, BUT LATER APPEARED TO RECONSIDER, COMMENTING, "I WILL TRY TO CONVINCE THEM.") SHAWA MAINTAINED THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE WOULD BE THROUGH AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE "CONSTITUTED" BY THE U.S. AND THE USSR. THE SUPERPOWERS, HE SAID, SHOULD HEAR THE SUGGESTIONS OF ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN "MODERATES," AND THEN MOVE IN CONCERT TO "IMPOSE" A JUST SOLUTION ON THE CONFLICTING PARTIES.

4. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION FROM PECK, SHAWA, SUPPORTED BY MANSOUR, REMARKED THAT PALESTINIANS SAW LITTLE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE POLICIES OF THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT TOWARD THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THOSE THAT WOULD BE PURSUED IF LABOR WERE RESTORED TO POWER. REFERRING TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH SHIMON PERES SOME WEEKS AGO, SHAWA SAID LABOR WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON THE ISSUE OF SETTLEMENTS AND SELF-

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GOVERNMENT IN GAZA, BUT WOULD TRY TO HOLD FAST TO KEY AREAS OF THE WEST BANK INDEFINITELY. SHAWA SAID HE TOLD PERES FLATLY HIS IDEA WOULD NOT WORK BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLOW FOR THE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE AND BECAUSE IT WAS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF INDEFINITE (ALBEIT PARTIAL) ISRAELI DOMINATION. IF THE ISRAELIS WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER REAL PEACE, SAID SHAWA, THE QUESTION OF SECURITY WOULD NOT BE SO PROBLEMATIC: IT WOULD COME IN "THE TENTH PLACE, NOT THE FIRST."

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5. COMMENT: SHAWA'S REMARKS WERE FULLY IN LINE WITH THE TOUGH, UNCOMPROMISING PUBLIC STANCE HE HAS ADOPTED IN RECENT MONTHS. ALTHOUGH CONCEIVABLY HE COULD BE RESPONSIVE TO NEW DEVELOPMENTS, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT HE EXPECTS NO PROGRESS ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IN THE NEAR-TERM FUTURE, AND IS RESIGNED TO WAIT. END COMMENT. LEWIS

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 10509 061651Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO /OCT-01 10-14 ADS-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00
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E.O. 12065: GDS 6/6/86 (BROWN, WILLIAM A.) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, PDEV, PINT, IS, JO
SUBJECT: SETTLEMENTS UPDATE

1. (U) MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE ARIK SHARON, WHOSE
POLITICAL STOCK IN ANY CASE IS NOT HIGH THESE DAYS,
SUFFERED YET ANOTHER SETBACK THIS WEEK WHEN THE
MINISTERIAL SETTLEMENTS COMMITTEE WHICH HE HEADS RE-
JECTED HIS PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISH TEN NEW SETTLEMENTS
IN THE WEST BANK. IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE PROPOSAL, IT
BECAME APPARENT THAT THE MINISTERS OPPOSED THE APPROVAL
OF NEW SETTLEMENTS UNTIL IT WAS CLEAR THAT STATE-OWNED
LAND RESERVES AND NECESSARY MONEY WOULD BE AVAILABLE.
FINANCE MINISTER HURWITZ STRUCK THE FINAL BLOW, SAYING
THAT TEN MORE SETTLEMENTS COULD NOT BE FUNDED.

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2. (C) PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S RECENT STATEMENTS TO,

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WASHINGTON POST PUBLISHER KATHERINE GRAHAM THAT ISRAEL INTENDED TO ESTABLISH "ONLY TEN MORE SETTLEMENTS NECESSARY TO OUR SECURITY" HAS LED TO SOME SPECULATION THAT THE TEN SETTLEMENTS PROPOSED BY MINISTER SHARON WOULD REPRESENT THE COMPLETION OF ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENTS BUILDING PROGRAM. ISRAEL RADIO CORRESPONDENT SHIMON SCHIFFER TOLD POLOFF KULICK THAT THE "LAST TEN SETTLEMENTS" BEING REFERRED TO IN FACT REPRESENT THE LAST TEN SETTLEMENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENTS PLAN ORIGINALLY PRESENTED BY AGHIN SHARON EARLY IN THE LIKUD ADMINISTRATION. SHARON ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD ANOTHER 15 IN HIS BACK POCKET TO PROPOSE UPON COMPLETION OF HIS ORIGINAL PLAN. AND OF COURSE OTHER MINISTERS MAY HAVE OTHER PLANS OF THEIR OWN.

3. (C) COMMENT: SHARON MIGHT WELL TRY TO PUSH A NUMBER OF SETTLEMENTS-RELATED ISSUES AT THE COMING CABINET MEETING. AMONG THEM:

- -- THE DEMANDS OF GOLAN HEIGHTS SETTLERS THAT THE NUMBER OF JEWISH SETTLERS IN THE GOLAN BE DOUBLED AND THAT ISRAELI LAW BE EXTENDED TO THAT REGION.

- -- THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON SETTLEMENTS LAND PROBLEMS REGARDING KIRYAT ARBA AND EFRAT.

HOWEVER, THE LIKELIHOOD OF SHARON'S BEING ABLE TO PUSH THROUGH EITHER OF THESE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IS RATHER SLIM. BEGIN HAS CONSISTENTLY RESISTED PRESSURE FROM GOLAN SETTLERS, INCLUDING A 700,000-SIGNATURE PETITION CALLING FOR VIRTUAL ANNEXATION, AND WE HAVE SEEN NO
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INDICATIONS THAT HE HAS CHANGED HIS MIND. AS FAR AS NEW SETTLEMENTS PROPOSALS ARE CONCERNED, MINISTER HURWITZ'S STAUNCHLY REPEATED ASSERTIONS THAT THERE IS "NO MONEY" SEEM FINALLY TO BE HAVING SOME EFFECT. AND, MOST TELLING OF ALL, FOR THE FIRST TIME, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CABINET STRUGGLE, THERE APPEARS TO BE A SERIOUS FALLING-OUT BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND SHARON. SHARON'S BEHAVIOR THROUGHOUT THE CABINET SHUFFLE CRISIS HAS ALIENATED NEARLY EVERYONE TO THE DEGREE THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HE CAN MUSTER SUPPORT

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FOR THESE ISSUES, ALTHOUGH, BEING SHARON, HE WILL
PROBABLY TRY. LEWIS

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ACTION EUR-00

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: ETTC, ETRD, MASS, SW
SUBJECT: WEAPONS EXPORTS AND SWEDISH HYPOCRISY

43. PICTURE OF A BOFORS HOWITZER.
PICTURE CAPTION: THE ORDER FOR A FIELD ARTILLERY SYSTEM
BY INDIA NOT ONLY SAVED BOFORS FROM DRASTIC CHANGES BUT
ALSO PUSHED SWEDISH ARMS EXPORTS TO RECORD LEVELS.
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ORGANIZATION'S DECISION TO REPLACE RATHER THAN AMEND ITS 1968 CHARTER. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS MADE IT A CONDITION FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS THAT THE CLAUSE ON JIHAD AGAINST ISRAEL BE FORMALLY DELETED FROM THE CHARTER....

"THE ISRAELIS FEEL NOTHING LESS THAN AN EXPLICIT ABROGATION OF THE PLO'S OLD AIM TO INSTALL A PALESTINIAN STATE IN THE WHOLE TERRITORY INCLUDING AREAS CONSTITUTING THE STATE OF ISRAEL WOULD SECURE THE PEACE. THE PLO SEEMS UNPREPARED, HOWEVER, TO PROVIDE THIS SECURITY GUARANTEE IN THE FORM ISRAEL IS DEMANDING WITHOUT GETTING SOMETHING IN RETURN....

"THE IDEA OF A NEW CHARTER IS LIKELY TO BE INTERPRETED NOT AS THE PLO TAKING WHAT IS ITS WELL-KNOWN MAXIMALIST NEGOTIATING POSITION BUT AS EVIDENCE THAT...ARAFAT, STRENGTHENED BY A POPULAR MANDATE, INTENDS TO BE MORE INTRACTABLE. RESOLVING THE MATTER OF THE PLO'S OLD COVENANT IN A WAY WHICH REMOVES ISRAELI APPREHENSIONS IS VITAL FOR PRIME MINISTER SHIMON PERES, WHO IS COUNTING ON THE PEACE PROCESS TO SHORE UP HIS LABOR PARTY'S PROSPECTS IN THE COMING GENERAL

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ELECTION."
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